INTERVIEW
OF
MAJ. GENERAL PETER DEVLIN (UK)
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL COALITION
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

This transcript was produced from tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.
This is the Multinational Corps Iraq Historian. Today is Monday, the 31st of December 2007, at the al Faw Palace, Headquarters, Multinational Corps Iraq, outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and it is approximately 1005.

I am here interviewing Major General Devlin, who is the Deputy Commanding General for Coalition and Infrastructure.

General Devlin, could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Sure. My name is Major General Peter Devlin, Deputy Commanding General for Coalition and Infrastructure, the last day of 2007.

Then we have -- For the listener's benefit, this is the second interview with General Devlin. He was previously interviewed on the 18th of June 2007, but also to bring the listener up to speed, General Devlin is a Canadian officer who is on exchange to 3 Corps, as is mentioned in the first
interview, but the finer details on that would all be found in the first interview.

Sir, we also did a formal release document during the first interview. If it is acceptable to you, we will consider that to still be in effect.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Please do.

All right, sir.

Sir, my first question is kind of a general one, which is: Since we sat down in June, have there been any dramatic changes in your tasks or the Commander's guidance from General Odierno to you?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No, there has not been any change. I still focus on the Coalition. I focus on Iraqi infrastructure, with a priority to electricity and oil.

I guess, [b](3),[b](6) the one thing that has changed, the other area that I was focusing on was international organizations, mainly the U.N. So while I don't think there has been a change in tasking, I would say that there has been a change from a U.N. point of view as to what they see happening in Iraq and what potential they see themselves playing inside
Iraq.

I think that has been triggered by two main events. Event isn't the right word -- two main areas. Firstly, the lessened violence and, therefore, greater stability and, I would argue, much greater opportunities, much greater potential for the U.N. to become involved; as well as a change in leadership, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

There is a new SRSG, (b)(6). So he is a special representative of the Secretary General. He comes in with two new deputies, (b)(6) (Phonetic) who looks after the agencies, the nongovernmental coordination, humanitarian assistance and that realm, and (b)(6), who looks after more of the political side of the house, a new Chief of Staff and a team that surrounds those people.

They bring a whole new level of energy to the U.N. portion of the effort here in Iraq. I mean that in a very, very positive way. So that, coupled with greater opportunity that comes from more stability in Iraq, has signaled more excitement within
the U.N. community and the agencies for their potential involvement here in Iraq.

What that means on the ground is that UNAMI (Phonetic) in Baghdad will see more staff. Their regional office in Urbil (Phonetic) will grow almost 50 percent. The office in Basra, which was open, then closed because of the unacceptable threat to the U.N. -- that office will reopen and they are planning a visit to Anbar and one to Tallil in early 2008.

This is all great stuff, because it signals the fact that the international community beyond the Coalition sees what is happening here as positive and that it is time for them to make a contribution to helping Iraqis grow.

More on the U.N. is their involvement in major efforts, some of their agencies. An example would be the United Nations Development Program has been involved in Biaf as well as the port at Um Qasr, two gateways, two very important gateways to Iraq for the international community for economic growth, for development, and more.
So to have connected the U.N., the U.N. agencies, in this particular case UNDP, with MNFI and our efforts in Baghdad with the airport in Basra and Un Qasr, the port, I think, is also just a small signal of greater cooperation, greater understanding and, again, more potential for Iraqi people.

Sir, can you talk to me a little bit about what has been the nature of your engagement, in particular with these U.N. developments? Are you having regular meetings with them or periodic meetings, and how are those structured? How have you become involved with these changed?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I saw it as an opportunity that we were not availing ourselves of, both MNCI and MNFI, and having had a couple of tours wearing a blue beret and touching some of these agencies, it just struck me that we needed to engage in a more deliberate and more powerful way, particularly as violence levels trended downward.

So I have -- Since we last spoke, I have now been attending the bi-weekly U.N.'s strategic
meeting, a bi-weekly U.N. strategic planning group, and I have been to Amman to brief the agencies and UNAMI, as you know, is split between Baghdad and Amman with most of their effort in Amman, because there was too much risk here. It is a very risk averse organization.

So what I see is my role is connecting people. So I have connected the agencies in a more deliberate way with the MNFI staff and the MNCI staff, specifically the C-9 staff and the Civil Affairs Brigade.

An example of that would be having gone to visit the NIAC, the National Iraqi Assistance Center, yesterday, and the fallout from that is, again, more intros of Civil Affairs Brigade, who has the responsibility for running the NIAC, with U.N. agencies that are doing or attempting to do very similar things.

So my message always is we just need to coordinate our efforts so that we realize the greatest gains for the Iraqi people.

Let me also touch on security for a
moment, if I could. I expected that in early of 2008 we will receive a visit from (b)(6) (Phonetic). (b)(6) is a security and safety honcho for the U.N.

We expect that, when he visits and when he understands the truth of what is happening here in Iraq, that there will be a greater willingness from the U.N. Headquarters in New York to lessen some of the restrictions that are placed on the U.N. in terms of their movement, in terms of how many people they are permitted in theater, in terms of the things you need to have in place to be able to house U.N. people, whether that be overhead protection or accommodations or dining facilities, how you move, what size force you have to have with you, which is an MNFI force.

So that is a good thing. So when (b)(6) comes and he understands what is happening better on the ground here throughout Iraq and his destinations -- There was a visit planned for December that incredibly was cancelled, but Baghdad, Urbil and Basra -- when he understands that area better, we are hopeful that there will be a lessening of the
restrictions that will allow more freedom for our U.N.
friends to move about, to assess, to coordinate and
more potential for the Iraqi people.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Has there been any actual
discussion on where they would headquarter a larger
contingent? I say that, kind of looking back to their
departure from theater fairly early on after their
headquarters was bombed.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, they have
headquarters in the International Zone, and they have
beefed that up so that there are more bed spaces there
to be able to accommodate a larger group, as they have
in Urbil, and in Basra they have made an arrangement
with the Brits that are there to be able to house - I
think it is around a dozen people, at the airbase
there inside the Britain compound.

The visit to Ramadi has been coordinated
with the Marines, and so they will go visit the
Marines and look at the potential to be on-FOB corner
with a view -- if they could realize their real dream,
with a separate access, whether it exists or whether
they have to build it. There is a need for a certain
level of independence with the U.N. So things like a separate entrance is important for them, and MNP-West understands this very well.

So there is stuff that already exists, and there is stuff that we are looking at -- that the U.N. is looking at building, and there's caution. You know all the stuff that goes on with all that involved.

In general, just as a reference point, do you have a sense for what their presence is, how many people? Again, you indicated they were just in the IZ at a headquarters there.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Sixty-ish, going up to 100 in Baghdad; 30 going up to 50 in Urbil; zero going up to about a dozen in Basra; and the rest of the stuff is still to be determined, Anbar and Tallil,

Great. That is an interesting mission, sir. I wasn't aware of that. So that is actually a pretty neat thing to be involved with.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It is. The real question, is who coordinates the efforts of the greater international community in Iraq.
Do you have an MNFI counterpart who is working this issue?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Correct. Yes.

Embassy?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It's Major General Skip Scott in Strat Effects who is my counterpart. I have a little bit more freedom than Skip Scott does, which is why I have been -- at least I would like to think that I have been the guy who has been instigating some of this, because Skip is the guy involved in the Government of Iraq Ministry Liaison in a huge way. So he is the guy that does a tremendous amount of stuff with the government of Iraq and ministries.

I don't do that stuff, and so I channel my energy toward the U.N. and coordinating with them, and other organizations that have been connected have been OPA (Phonetic) with the U.N. So the Office of Provincial Affairs and the PRTs and EPRTs with the U.N., particularly those that are in PIC provinces.

Those that have gone to British or Iraqi control?

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. And Tallil is a great example where there are three Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are housed in one camp, which is why, I think, that there is great potential for the U.N. to be linked in there, and from a single point have access to three provinces.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Anything else along that U.N. engagement piece, sir?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No. I think that is pretty much it. You know, I will tell you that one of the great strengths of multinationality, if I can kind of steer off, along with the U.N. is the Canadian Embassy, also part of a group, the Iraq contact group, are a bunch of countries that are accredited to Iraq but don't have an embassy in Iraq.

Canada is a great example. So our embassy in Amman, Jordan, and the Ambassador there -- she is also the Ambassador to Iraq and has presented her credentials to the President, and so is the accredited -- and I'm not sure whether that is the right term or not, but anyway she is Canada's Ambassador to Iraq.

There are other countries that are based...
in Amman that have ambassadors to Iraq, but they are housed in -- because they have the responsibility for more than one country, they are housed in Jordan.

The heart of that potential is also a great thing, and because of the flag that I wear, she has been very helpful to the efforts in Iraq in simple things like hosting dinners where Iraq is the theme of the dinner or the Iraq Contact Group meetings where I've become involved in providing the info for that presentation or that theme for that particular period of time, a monthly type thing.

So it's just another way that the international community and multinationality here in Iraq makes a contribution, perhaps small, but it touches different countries. It touches their interest in Iraq and in the Iraqi people. It perhaps leads to more resources or a greater commitment to the country, and so it's things like that that are important. That's just a country.

I could go on with the EU as well, which has a representative in Baghdad and provides 60 percent of the U.N. funding, comes from the EU. So
another area where we, the international community, or we, MNFI, where we, CENTCOM, where we -- if I can be so bold to say we, the U.S. can lead on for greater involvement in Iraq.

I could also tell you, from an EU point of view, that over 60 percent of the EU vote -- as you know, the EU is a voting organization. Over 60 percent of their votes by country have served in Iraq, and the current vote is about 33 percent.

(b)(3), (b)(6) So 60 percent of the constituent countries have served in Iraq?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Thirty-plus are current serving in Iraq, of the vote.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Of the vote.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Wanted to make sure I was following you correctly.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: So if I use an example like Poland, Poland based on their population, the strength of their economy and blah-blah-blah, have X percent of the EU vote. So if I add up that and the nations that have participated in OIF, over 60 percent
of that vote has served in Iraq, and currently we are just over 30 percent of the EU vote is participating here.

I could pick other examples like the Brits and others, but just as a point of reference.

Certainly. Sir, on this line, just kind of segueing to the current status of the broader Coalition Force responsibilities for you, can you give me a little bit of a snapshot, where we are now in terms of what the Coalition element's strength and number of nations are?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: There are 26 nations, about 11,500 non-Americans. That goes up and down as forces RIP in and out, but that's where we are at today, and I think things will change a bit in 2008. I think that you will see that the numbers will go down in 2008, but I tell my media buddies that it is wrong to measure the strength of the Coalition by the number of flags and how many soldiers are on the ground, because nations make a difference in Iraq through a whole host of ways.
That kind of stuff is -- you don't see it in counting flags and counting soldiers, but has a tremendous impact on what is happening inside Iraq. So don't just count flags. Please just don't count soldiers. Look at how much enthusiasm there is, how much energy there is for what is happening in Iraq and for the Iraqi people.

So you talked about looking ahead to 2008 and, certainly, we know some things now we didn't know a few months ago in terms of what has been announced for production of the
1.4b

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: And others, I'm sure, will follow.

Have you been involved in the planning process with regard to, from a tactical standpoint, how we fill those gaps or what the reconfiguration of the areas of responsibility will be?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes. There are going to be some adjustments on the ground. There are going to be some boundary changes. There are going to be some things that -- Take MND-Center South as a great example.

leave after having made a huge contribution here -- huge -- their battle space will be subsumed into MND-Center. We are hopeful that some of the units that participate in MND-Center will continue to participate in OIF, whether it be out of Camp Echo or whether out of a different camp.
Up north in MND-Northeast, we are pleased in 2008, albeit at a smaller number. So still a two-star HQ with 550-ish soldiers, but what they do up there is a very special thing in terms of their civic work, in terms of vo-tech programs, in terms of their hospital and more.

Likewise, in the south with MND-Southeast,

So this is, I think, expected that, as we achieve a greater level of stability in Iraq, as we strengthen the ISF and the ISF becomes more capable, more capable based on their numbers, their training, their equipment and their experience, that they have the capability to care for their battle space.

a good thing for Iraq that they are still participating here and still training their Iraqi
brothers.

Sir, we have had some new partners join us since we talked last to you. Some of the component -- any big challenges with getting them in place, getting them into the fight, so to speak? Any thoughts on how that all came together?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I think that the soldiers here doing -- more than 2000. As you know, they are up in Wasit Province, part of MND-Center out at Camp Delta.

They also are responsible for the middle ring security in the International Zone for the U.N. with a force of about 250-ish soldiers that are there.

here doing tremendous work.

They have undergone some great training, some training at home, some training in Europe and some great training down in --
Talking about the training that they had.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes. I had the opportunity to visit their training down in Kuwait sponsored by Task Force 14a. So some wonderful they fell in on 6b at Camp Delta, 80-300-plus (Inaudible) and Humvees with communications gear, with the Coalition version of Blue Force Tracker and a counter-IED suite, in a tough area, predominantly manning checkpoints, six checkpoints, all that have been carefully identified based on an IPB analysis of the flow of accelerants toward Baghdad and toward the rest of Iraq.

They are very strong soldiers, very motivated soldiers. I have had the opportunity to visit them at Camp Delta a couple of times, as well as at their checkpoints -- hard, fit soldiers. So these are guys and gals that are living out at checkpoints and at a combat outpost next to that checkpoint, living in a tent, living on a cot, eating a few MREs a day and one TRAD a day.
If they are lucky, they might have internet access that is shared amongst 145 people --

is the one that I most recently visited. You know, they shower in lukewarm water, if they are lucky. They shit in a hole. So they are living in austere conditions, and they are doing marvelous work.

The limiting factor -- The limiting factor, to my -- I guess I shouldn't have been surprised at this, but this is the limiting thing with prized asset and tough to find, very, very tough to find. That is a real challenge, and that is what limits our ability to fully exploit the talents of the

One of the questions that has come up, I know just in the assessments, is the capacity and go outside of their originally assigned area. Do you have any thoughts on where that discussion is right now and if that is another opportunity to utilize them?
MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, I think it's a great opportunity. right now. Their (Inaudible) was briefed and has

We are hopeful that they will say yes, because I don't -- You know, again as stability continues to improve, we can harness their potential much better in other areas, and it is not that far away, up the street in [14a] area, which is part of MND-Center, where they could really use and exploit caveat-free nature of their deployment here to good effect, good effect for the people of Iraq.

Let me be very specific here, because what their presence will do is will allow clearing of areas and of presence -- of presence in areas where [14a] and MND-Center does not have a presence right now. There are not ISF soldiers in number to go into some of these areas, which are tough areas.

These are areas where we also have Iraqi infrastructure challenges, where there are downed 400
So where there are 20-plus hours of power per day in the south to where there are 12 to 14 hours of power per day in Baghdad, we can bring more of that north, especially with deals that are being cut with the Iranians to import 200 megawatts of power per day. We need the lines to bring them north, and we don't have the lines to bring them north right now.

So that is an example, a very real current battle space.

You talked about the Concerned Local Citizens for a moment there, sir, and I wanted to ask a broader question.

When we look back over the last eight to 12 months now, one of the things that emerged as a key in that was the reconciliation initiative and then the
Concerned Local Citizens movement.

Do you have any unique perspectives as you have gone out and worked with our Coalition partners, how that has manifested itself in the areas where we have had primarily Coalition forces?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: You know, I think it has been a very powerful thing, but if I can, can I draw you a little sketch here; because this is time, and this is violence, and this is June, and this is the surge, and surge defined as (b)(6) (Phonetic), June defined as Phantom Hammer, followed a couple of months later by Phantom Strike.

Here is what I would tell you, and it struck me just recently in my travels around. So I asked a young American battalion commander what was the thing that allowed violence to start to trend downward, and I said, so was it these Concerned Local Citizens. And he goes, well, hold it for a moment; you have to understand that the Concerned Local Citizen movement started because we crushed the insurgency.

So a battalion that arrived in Baghdad in

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the middle of March, 800 guys working a neighborhood
of 300,000 Iraqis, a lot of violence, a lot of IEDs,
a lot of direct fire attacks, a lot of indirect fire
and more. March arrival, heavy fighting in April, May
and June, and then the insurgents said, okay, you win,
we've had enough, can we talk.

The costs, 18 American lives from the
battalion of 800, and 80 wounded. So that, I would
submit to you, was a vitally important trigger
in instigating the movement of the CLCs forward.

So I would hate for people to think that
it was the awakening of the CLCs that it happened. It
happened, because the insurgency was being crushed by
the surge, by the combat operations that were being
conducted across the country, but certainly with a
priority to Baghdad and the belts.

Since that time, the Concerned Local
Citizen movement is a very important initiative. It is
an initiative, though, that needs to be managed very
carefully, because of the expectations.

So while we have targets moving 20 percent
into the ISF, police and army, the 80 percent others
we need to find -- the government of Iraq needs to
find permanent employment for these guys. And whether
that is -- Whether that is in the service industry,
the public service industry to support communities or
whether that be in the manufacturing sector or the
service industries, it just needs to be coordinated
well so that the window that has been opened by the
CLCs doesn't come crashing closed and, as it comes
crashing closed, it crashes the expectations and the
belief in the future of the Iraqis.

I think all that stuff is happening. I
hope the government of Iraq steps forward in a more
powerful way than they have demonstrated for the past
couple of months, and that would be -- if you were to
say what is your biggest fear, my biggest fear is that
the government of Iraq is not stepping forward
strongly enough, vigorously enough, enthusiastically
even to realize an absolutely extraordinary
opportunity that they have, that they have not had
over several years, and it is there.

It is right at their doorstep, and they
need -- all they need to do is pick it up. There is
some risk in picking it up but, man, you got to pick it up and do something with it or the window will come crashing closed.

Given the very nuanced aspect of that, again looking at our Coalition

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right.

-- how much of a degree of difficulty does that add to developing CLCs, say,

are? In other words, has the CLC movement been as critical in those areas, number one? And has it -- Do our Coalition partners get that, so to speak?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, there are no CLCs in the southern part of the country, but by MNFI and Government of Iraq guidance. There are CLCs in MND-Center South, and they are CLCs that provide security along MSRs and ASRs, as an example, and there
has been talk about a CLC type organization to help support the growth of the agriculture industry in that province.

As you know, Katasiyah (Phonetic) is very much an agriculture based province that would benefit from more attention there. By that, I mean water to the fields, fertilizer, feeds, and perhaps some of the new technology that is out there, but is appropriate to their farming and their culture and all that stuff. But in the rest of the country, southern provinces, there are not CLCs.

Sir, changing the subject just a little bit, I just want to make sure we don't miss this. In your responsibility in the areas of infrastructure, as you look back again since we spoke in mid June, of course, there continues to be a lot of interest emphasis at the highest command levels on how much energy is being generated and how much oil is being exported.

Of course, I know you interface with a lot of different pieces of that, whether it is the C3, infrastructure protection element or C9. Where are
you seeing your energies in that area? What has been
your primary focus since we spoke last?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It's been mainly
tied to the (Inaudible) and events that I have
participated in, as well as opportunities that are
highlighted from those meetings and things that need
a bit of attention.

I would tell you that it's the darnedest
thing, actually, the mystery of oil. The
Minister of Oil is an idiot. But the Ministry of Oil
has achieved some amazing things, despite the guy at
the top.

So there are exports, probably around $35
billion worth of exports, about 4 billion -- 3.5
billion higher than what they are budgeting was. The
exports north had a 46 inch line. How they are able
to fix brakes, the things that have happened -- I
would just say, I say the things that have happened
because -- and this is mainly in the north. The
things -- The arrangements is probably a better word
than things, but it's as loose as that.

The arrangements that appear to have been
made so that there are less booms along strategic pipelines, is all phenomenal stuff, which has allowed the flow of crude and product to reach levels that it hasn't seen in years, and it is being managed reasonably well.

The disappointment is the relationship between oil and electricity, whereas the Minister of Electricity is much more engaged, certainly much more engaged with MNFI, tries to exploit the skill and talent and the resources within the greater MNFI to realize more electricity for the people of Iraq.

Some of that is tied to the quantity and the type of fuel he can access, whether it be from the Minister of Oil or whether it be from neighboring countries. But whenever there is fuel involved, the Minister of Oil is involved, and it has been frustratingly slow.

Things like contracts, like diesel contracts from Kuwait, which took months -- months -- to coordinate -- unbelievable. Months, many long months where there could have been more hours of power per day to Joe Iraqi, because from where I sit, there
didn't seem to be a strong enough desire from the
Minister of Oil to sort out the bureaucratic crap that
made the months -- the days turn to weeks turn to
months.

So some amazing things happened in oil.
I think that they will continue to happen, but the
real key is a private investment legislation that will
allow the international community to invest in Iraq
with some guaranty that their investment won't be
taken away from them by the government. That -- When
that happens, there will be a flood of dough into
Iraq.

On the electricity side, as you probably
know, in September we reached the greatest amount of
electricity that has been generated in a long, long
time. It wasn't the 6,000 target that had been set,
but it was pretty close to it, and with the movement
of additional generators -- we just moved two
(Inaudible) from Syria to (Inaudible), trying to get
those (Inaudible) which have been on the Syrian border
for years up to the Samarra plant, and these are 20
generators, huge generators, HFO burning generators.
I'm sorry. HFO, sir, is?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Heavy fuel oil.

So I just say that so that you see the connection with oil here. So that it is a by-product from the refineries that are needed to fuel these 20 generators.

So there has been some good things that have happened. But what Iraq needs and what we are working toward -- what MNFI, to be honest with you, is working toward is an energy strategy. There is a draft put together with the U.S. mission, Iraq, and just working to get Government of Iraq buy-in and understanding so that the future of Iraqi infrastructure, oil and electricity is managed in accordance with a plan that is more central and balances sometimes the competing needs of oil and electricity.

Sir, probably not long after we talked last, MNFI brought in and created a new position, brought in Brigadier Cripwell (Phonetic) to be the MNFI -- Right. Did that change anything about the way your interface with MNFI and --
MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Oh, that was awesome. That was a wonderful thing. So the energy fusion cell has done great things and has strengthened -- strengthened the relationship between the Coalition and the Government of Iraq, mainly our two ministries. But since then, we have branched out into the Ministry of Transportation and rail lines to be able to move product and crude. And of course, other things come from that.

The movement of Coalition goods north from the port of Um Qasr is a great example of that, but other -- I mean, it spurs economic growth to move other goods across Iraq.

So the energy fusion cell has been a good thing, a real good thing. Cripwell did great work. He has since left, and Brigadier Carou Wilks (Phonetic) has arrived and is just carrying doing the same thing.

His focus now, though, rightly so, has moved toward this strategic view of energy. So what the real benefit of the EFC has been, has been the relationship with the Ministries, a greater
understanding. They have been able to work their priorities with the opportunities that we have highlighted, and to be able to realize more production, more export and more electricity. They have done it. We would like to think that we have assisted in that.

Sir, one of the things that -- an initiative that has brought some results has been the Key Leader Engagement Initiative on the public affairs front, being able to put our senior officers out there and really make an effort to more directly get the word out on what we are doing, getting that message out.

Can you speak to me about what role you may have had in that, and realizing there may be some nuances to you being a Canadian General Officer relative to that, and I don't know what country restrictions you may have about speaking for the Coalition, have you seen effects from that? Have you been involved with that, and what are you thoughts on it?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, there are no
limits put on me. I have not been asked to be overly involved in that other than from the Coalition's point of view. So not overly active in it, but have I seen results? I have seen huge results from the other key leaders that have spoken and continue to speak on a regular basis.

They speak with a very special level of understanding. They speak with facts, and that makes a great difference in all the countries that participate here and the whole international community.

So the regular engagements by the leaders, the fact that they are supported by hard facts and statistics, just gives greater credibility to their words. So I think it has been a very positive thing.

Sir, we are coming to the end of the time I had on your schedule. If you have a few more minutes, I might ask you another question, but certainly, if you have to move in your schedule, I will wrap things up.

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: We can take a couple of minutes. I'm hoping that I can have you here one
other time before I split.

(b)(3), (b)(6) All right, sir.

I wanted to ask about MND-CS, because when
we talked last, at that time during their eighth
rotation, things were looking somewhat -- grim might
be an overstatement, but they seemed to be pretty much
pending at Forward Operating Base Echo. What has
happened since then is the 9th rotation coming in and
General Fouk (Phonetic).

It certainly seems as if it is a totally
different picture down there now. Any thoughts on
what was unique about the dynamic that they were able
to change it so dramatically?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: That's a great
question. I would -- From where I sit at a
distance from Camp Echo, but visiting and having
visited there probably once a month at least over the
past many months, 15 months actually -- So Fouk is my
third Division Commander.

I think what has happened in MND-Center
South is a very powerful example of the effect that
leadership has in combat. General Fouk has taken a
more aggressive, deliberate, realistic approach to the challenges of Diwaniyah and Katasiyah (Phonetic). He has employed the Special Forces much differently and way more aggressively.

He has a very strong relationship with the ODA that works and lives out at Camp Echo and have been involved in some great ops and some great targeting. So this is the ODA along with the --

Right. ODA is the Operations Detachment Alpha?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. So U.S. Special Forces, together with ISOF.

Iraqi Special Operations Forces?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. Together operations, mainly in Diwaniyah but into the greater Diwaniyah area, that have targeted bad guys, and they have been extremely effective at that.

They have, I think, had a more deliberate engagement plan with the provincial leadership and the sheikhs and the ISF leadership. I think that General
Fouk has -- and his staff have a good relationship with Commander at 8IA, General Uthman (Phonetic), and that has been beneficial.

I think the Corps has also done a reasonable job of supporting MND-Center South, supporting them with the resources they needed to be able to build two JSSs and some combat outposts, engineering assets, military police that have been involved in hiding and (Inaudible) the CLCs as well as the ISF. But above all, O[3,000] I would say it is a great example of the difference a leadership approach can make, and that is nothing against the other guys.

[100] arrived at a time where the threat was peaking, and he dealt with it very appropriately and aggressively, given how many soldiers he had and the limits that he has on his soldiers. So while there's 1200 that are living there, very few actually are (Inaudible) forces.

Sorry, the other thing I should probably mention is he readjusted how many combat troops he had, which he was able to do, because -- and

concentrated in Camp Echo, from Camp Delta as Camp
Delta in Wasit Province went to MND-Center.

So having the infrastructure to run two camps, he was able to take the Camp Delta infrastructure and turn them into combat soldiers that could patrol and go outside the wire, and that was also an important element.

Sir, last question of this session: With the 18th Airborne Corps handover that will be coming up, is there a counterpart 18th Airborne Corps that you will be specifically be handing off your duties to?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. There will be another (Inaudible) who will come in behind me, Brigadier Nick Matern (Phonetic), awesome guy. Awesome guy, and he is one of two DCGs just like me. He is assigned to 18 Airborne Corps and lives in Fort Bragg. He arrived in Bragg this summer.

He has been over here on a PSS, and we probably talk every week or every other week, and all my meeting summaries, other reports that I get are all forwarded to him. So I am quite confident that he will come in here with a great level of understanding.
of what is happening in Iraq and with some great experience.

Sir, anything I haven't asked you at this session that you wanted to comment on?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No, I don't think so. I would like the opportunity to kind of close out with you in a few weeks here. That would be wonderful.

I look forward to it, sir. Thanks.

That concludes this interview.