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## Commander's Conference (Luncheon) 10 Feb 07

### Change of MNF-I Mission/Evolution of the Situation:

- Modification of priorities
- Level of violence invalidates strategy, in particular sectarian violence after al Askari Mosque bombing
- Security is a prerequisite for the way ahead
- Transition still important, but must protect the population, particularly in Baghdad
- Maliki is our guy; time is right to move forward -- both U.S. and Iraqi governments understand this is the last chance

### Increase in MNF-I Forces:

- 5 BCTs, plus 4K Marines (must hold CENTCOM to this)
- Not about plus-up, but about how we are using the forces

### TTP for Population Security:

- Must position forces in the neighborhoods
- JSSs, combat outposts, patrol bases

### Embrace Iraqi Units:

- Execute linked arms with Iraqi forces

### Unity of Effort with ISF:

- Co-locate HQs, exchange liaison officers, shovels SA, etc.

### Information Operations:

- React to insurgent/terrorist propaganda
- Got Iraqis doing the right things in front of the camera

### Escalation of Force:

- Don't let subordinate commanders modify the ROE
- Shape the situation so as not to put our soldiers in questionable situations
- MNC-I modifying investigation policy

### Importance of Continuity:

- Key leaders must remain for extended periods to maintain relationships with Iraqis
- Do not allow SA to drop off in transitions
- Intel analysis in particular have a hard time in transition; must keep experienced team in Iraq

### Discussion:

- Must be able to manage relationships with Iraqis; Iraqis must lead when possible, but if we don't get a grip on the violence, then it doesn't matter who is in charge. Maliki understands this now

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- Must control both Baghdad and the Baghdad belts; accelerants to violence in the capital originating outside the city
- Must continue to enhance/support TTs and coordinate their activities
- Maintain offensive mindset, use of systems to help target enemy (aviation/UAV link)
- Support outreach to tribes in al Anbar
- BCTs must embrace PRTs
- Look at embedding at the senior levels of the Iraqi government
- Creation of Rule of Law green zone in Rusafa
- GRD must get involved in oil, electricity
- Figure out right structure with AMB Tim Carney
- Must get refinery at Beiji working, protect pipelines from Kirkuk and to Baghdad
- Do not overly trumpet our successes; must temp down expectations with slow, incremental progress; levels of violence is key metric; will take months
- Must expand Iraqi prison capacity; current plan nowhere near adequate
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| 1.4b, 1.4d |
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- Need to build up Iraqi capacity in non-security lines of operation
- Campaign plan is very good, but if you can't secure the population, you can't execute it
- Enemy senses a turning point and is ramping up the violence to counter our strategy; they are looking for another al Askari mosque to reignite the civil war
- Concern that metrics will crowd out deeper thinking and longer range goals
- Having said that, we cannot get away from looking at the level of violence as the key indicator of success
- Gated communities, battalion CPs in neighborhoods, use of ID cards/biometrics
- Continuity should include Iraqi army as well; cannot know neighborhoods if units rotate every 90 days
- Time may be ripe to drive a wedge between PM Maliki and JAM
- The jobs/employment with improved security; allow Iraqis in al Anbar to enlist to serve locally
- Must restrict damage from VBIEDs
- Reconciliation is key in the long run
- Need to ramp-up ministerial support teams
- Work with Embassy to craft UNSCR, then get Iraqi buy-in
- BCTs must own the TTs
- Anticipate increased Iraqi needs with expansion of ISF
- Expansion of Iraqi logistical capability proceeding very slowly; maintenance especially a weakness
- Continuity includes keeping units with their organic parent headquarters where it makes sense to do so
- Need to pull together an intel architecture for Iraq; big project, but must be done
- Four big transportation projects: Turkish LOC, Jordanian LOCs, port of Um Qasr, and rail capacity
- Too much capability in GRD not to bring it to bear, especially in oil, electricity sectors
- Encourage short-term embeds and facilitate their movement away from the IZ
- We will stand behind our soldiers and their decisions on the battlefield

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