Intelligence Fusion Brief

20 May 2007

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION IS SECRET/NOFORN/MR

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- Diyala

- Bayji Oil Refinery
Key Take Aways

- Historically the fight in Diyala has been tribal; transitioning in the fall to one between JAM elements and AQI.
- Operation Fardin al Qanoon, coupled with successful tribal and CF operations in the west, has caused an insurgent migration into the Diyala province.
- The greater Baqubah/Diyala River Valley is assessed to be a center point of AQI activity in MND-North.
- Sunni insurgents using breadbasket region (North of Muqdadiyah) as a base of operations and hiding point for HVIs.
- Anti-AQI sentiment rising within tribal, nationalist and Former Regime elements; increase in intra-Sunni violence forcing some AQI elements North into the DRV.
- Sunni’s distrust of the Shi’a dominated provincial government continues to grow, causing tension levels to rise between the Sunni populaces and the GoI.
- Increased JAM presence in Western Diyala as a result of migration North to escape Coalition operations and respond to AQI activity.
- JAM reportedly increasing activity after adopting defensive posture, wherein they conducted most operations under guise of security operations.
- Diyala is a focal point for smuggling as insurgents bring weapons across the border.

Sir,

Your key take aways...

Diyala’s landscape makes a permissive environment for insurgent freedom of movement

Comprised mostly of Farms and Orchards

Lack of CF/ISF presence in many parts of Diyala, allows freedom of movement making it easier to transport weapons and FF

Reporting indicates Sunni and Shia elements moving into Diyala to avoid current operations in Baghdad

Local Sunni distrust the Shia dominated govt. Sunnis want to be involved more in the provincial government and feel that the Sh’ia are making decisions for their own gain.

*Local tribes and citizens are resisting AQI influence in Diyala and are fighting back to defend their neighborhoods. AQI strict enforcement of Islamic law along with murders and kidnappings drove a wedge between Sunni villages and other Sunni insurgent groups.

*JAM elements that migrated North to escape Coalition operations are reportedly responding more aggressively to AQI activity – what was once a defensive posture has become more active.

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Breadbasket region N of Muqdadiyah, remains a significant AQI stronghold, a known planning and staging area for AQI to conduct attacks in Diyala.
*Baqubah and its rural villages remains controlled by a Sunni majority and continues to be a support zone for AQI in Diyala

The Breadbasket region remains a key area for AQI to plan and stage attacks throughout the province.

*CF presence and Sunni LN resistance within Baqubah has forced some of AQI to escape and move north into the DRV.

*Currently AQI is experiencing a pushback from CF/ISF operations and the local populace.

Reporting indicates that AQI continues to lose support from the local population as well as other Sunni threat groups because of strict Islamic law being enforced, intimidation and indiscriminate killings.

*Reflections indicating that AQI has also fled south of the city to northern Khan Bani Sad and the surrounding villages.

*The majority of AQI is believed to be pushed out of two of Baqubah’s neighborhoods. In Tahrir and Buhriz, most of AQI has been cleared out, but there are still small numbers of insurgents in the more densely populated areas.

Though largely pushed out of these areas, recent reporting indicates AQI has possibly gathered in Abu Khamis, just south of Buhriz, preparing to push back into the neighborhood.

AQL is the main instigator of the violence in the Diyala province, with some FRE involvement at the lower levels.

**WHILE** Some FRE elements are working with the tribes to combat AQI in the SAA/TAAN model. Sheik Sattar has visited the province.
Diyala Threat Assessment

Diyala Province Overview

JAM Areas of Operations

AQI Areas of Operations

LEGEND
- AQI or Route
- Power Line
- Oil Pipe
- FOB
- IF Station
- Hospital
- Water Treatment Plant

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Conclusion

- Sunni and Shi'a elements continue to struggle for dominance throughout Diyala
  - AQI aggression countered with localized JAM counterattacks
- Insurgents migrating into Diyala as a result of Operation Fardh al Qanoon
  - Transitions nature of fight from tribal to sectarian
  - Continued push of insurgents into surrounding areas
- Perceived permissive environment for insurgent freedom of movement and extremist ideologies

C2 Assessment: AQI will continue to meet local resistance as they use violence and intimidation against the local populace in efforts to regain their footing and retake control of their previous areas of operation. However, with JAM reportedly engaging in increased sectarian based activity in Diyala, AQI may exploit Sunni vulnerabilities and reconcile differences with currently opposed local nationals, mitigating the damage done to their organization by the ongoing anti-AQI sentiment; while local national push-back continues, AQI remains significant freedom of movement and operation within the province. Both JAM and AQI maintain the objective of keeping essential smuggling routes and staging points into Baghdad and surrounding provinces open.
Diyala Demographic Overview
As of December 2006

QARA TAPA: 10,000
20% Shi’a, 80% Sunni
50% Arab, 50% Kurd

MUQDADIYAH: 84,000
45% Shi’a, 55% Sunni
90% Arab, 10% Kurd

KHALIS: 112,000
70% Shi’a, 30% Sunni
90% Arab, 10% Kurd

BAQUBAH: 300,000
25% Shi’a, 75% Sunni
80% Arab, 20% Kurd

KHAN BANI SA’AD: 75,000
65% Shi’a, 35% Sunni
100% Arab

KIFRI: 25,000
1% Shi’a, 99% Sunni
80% Arab, 20% Kurd

KHANIKAN: 62,000
60% Shi’a, 40% Sunni
30% Arab, 70% Kurd

JALULA: 52,000
10% Shi’a, 90% Sunni
50% Arab, 50% Kurd

AS SADIYAH: 37,000
90% Shi’a, 10% Sunni
100% Arab

BALAD RUZ: 100,000
50% Shi’a, 50% Sunni
100% Arab

MANDALI: 30,000
50% Shi’a, 50% Sunni
85% Arab 15% Kurd

Total Diyala Population: 1,490,000 (Approx)
**Key Take Aways**

- Deterioration of threat in AO Spartan
  - AQI/ISI
  - MCT

- Attack planning and execution demonstrates experience and expertise

- Bayji JSS is area high-payoff target
  - Reconnaissance and planning through April
  - Attack on JSS will be coordinated with secondary and tertiary attacks on QRF and first responders

- Effects of intimidation and corruption
  - Reduces AQI/ISI influence
  - Small number of corrupt IPs leading insurgency to insurgents
  - IP operational increasing

- IED attacks will dominate this month
  - Weapons theft indicates capability to sustain operations
  - TTPs exploit understanding of CF countermeasures

- Bayji Oil Refinery is insurgent focus
  - Attacks, smuggling, theft and corruption
  - Upcoming AFR Security Plan

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**Enemy Threat in AO Spartan (1-505 PIR)** has increased drastically:

- AQI/ISI has emerged as the most likely element in control of insurgents operations
- They currently possess the largest insurgent presence within Bayji
- AQI has at least nine cells operating within the area
- Numbers continue to grow with the reported movement of AQI from Al Anbar to Salah ad Din and Al Tamin Provinces
- The MSC may have taken a secondary role in overall leadership but still exert some level influence within ISI
- Most likely, the MSC is the conduit between planning and execution.

- The level of attacks, frequency and TTPs demonstrates a level of expert planning and execution of a higher caliber.
- On a strategic level, AQI in AO Spartan want to deals a severe blow to CF operations.
- They would likely attempt to enact their intent in the form of spectacular attacks in order to drive the point home.

- Bayji JSS will be the highest pay-off target:
  - Reconnaissance and planning has been carried out throughout the month of April
  - This has given insurgents crucial intelligence on CF movements, routes, force disposition and QRF response times.
    - An attack on the JSS and/or other fixed positions would be followed by ambushes against our QRF.
    - First responders would be targeted with second and third IEDs
  - TTPs will become more prevalent as the month goes on

- In Siniyah, intimidation of IPs is an indicator of ISI influence within the city.
  - Pay problems whether actual or fabricated will be a precursor to ISI operations in Siniyah.
  - IPs will walk out prior to any large scale attacks on CF in Siniyah.
  - It is very likely that a small number of IPs in Siniyah are corrupt and most likely providing information on CF activity to insurgents.

- Enemy IO operations have also increased:
  - Increase in assassinations
  - The fact that attacks are being conducted closer to populated areas indicates that the intimidation being exerted on the local populace is extensive enough in order to allow this to happen
  - Enemy IO focus has been on officials, government employees, ISF and specially IPs.
  - TTP will evolve to target civilians if/when ISI perceives local populace cooperation with ISF and CF.
  - We continue to see an IED cell operating out of Mezbah and into Al Buoma, most likely remnants of the Wazass Battalion.
  - We have detained a number of Wazass Battalion IED Cell members; still, their TTPs and support nodes will readily sustain operations.
  - CIED operations in this area have proven the most effective deterrent to against IEDs.
  - Longer command wires with offset trigger devices which render CF countermeasures ineffective demonstrate the insurgents’ understanding of CF capabilities.
  - This TTP will become dominant during the month of May.
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