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**Meeting Notes GEN Saygun, DCHOD Turkish Armed Forces  
Turkish General Staff Headquarters  
Ankara, Turkey  
20 November 2007**

**Meeting Participants:** General Cartwright (VCJCS), AMB Wilson (Turkey), GEN Saygun, CG, Maj Gen Rosborg (ODC Turkey), MG Keen (EUCOM J-3), MG Sherlock (Joint Staff J-3 rep.), Turkish General Staff Primaries

**Background:** Meeting was preceded by one-on-one meeting between CG and AMB Wilson at the airport and by a US-only meeting of the VCJCS, AMB, CG, and the three MGs.

**Synopsis:** Though not fully explicit in briefing their CONOPS, Gen Saygun, back by the Turkish General Staff, seemed set on conducting an aerial CBO to strike selected KGK targets. They did not articulate a set of comprehensive objectives as to what they want to achieve in the short term and over time. VCJCS and CG expressed understanding of domestic pressure on Turkish leaders and stressed that ample notification must be given to US and Iraqi leaders and that such a CBO should be a limited affair as it would not resolve the underlying political problem with the KGK.

**Key Points:**

**Real Time Information Requirements**

GEN Saygun began the meeting by stating that the Turks had signed the MOU on intelligence sharing yesterday but that there were some shortcomings in the technical infrastructure to support real time information sharing. i.e. FMV. GEN Saygun also noted that Turkish leadership has discussed the larger KGK issue with President Bush, and it was clear to the TGS that the US will provide ISR support but not attack aircraft for any kinetic strikes against the KGK. He iterated that the Turks had no intention of occupying any part of Iraq – their only aim is the KGK. He wanted to cooperate with the US for the good of northern Iraq. He also stressed they are trying to collect information on the KGK in other ways (Implication was 1.4c)

**Area of Potential Turkish Flights**

Gen Saygun asked for more details on the routes, times, and number of Coalition Flights ivo of Iraq's northern border. At this point, the TGS presented a map with a possible area of flight operations that they wanted cleared for Turkish flights. The area marked as such extended deep into Iraq, to include to the south of Dahuk.

CG noted this expansive area would be problematic because MNF-I is responsible for Iraqi airspace, and he would have to clear this map with the Iraqi PM, who, along with other Iraqi leaders, is very sensitive to sovereignty infringements. CG noted that we do not routinely fly in the north other than between Mosul and Habur Gate (and later noted economic importance of Habur Gate flow and current backlog). VCJCS added that our ISR assets would need to fly in that area to provide intelligence to the Turks and those procedures would need to be worked.

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Gen Saygun was sensitive to these concerns and to collateral damage, and noted the difficulty of differentiating Peshmerga from the KGK. CG stated the need for any Turkish strike to be transparently public and limited, and that MNF-I and the ODC would work with the TGS to neck down the map to areas that could be agreed to by the Iraqi PM (who is also negotiating a sovereignty sensitive SPD with the US at same time).

GEN Saygun said Turkish forces already in northern Iraq would stay put during any operation. VCJCS said we had covered all the key points (Notification, ISR support, limited scope) the US reps had talked about to facilitate a CBO while minimizing collateral damage, but that work remained to be done on notification procedures (to the US and Iraqis) and on the airspace map. He said we are working to set up a long term solution to deconflict ISR and get it close enough to the target to be useful (FMV) and also that it would be useful to bring additional

1.4c

1.4c

1.4a

#### **Informing the people**

VCJCS noted need to inform the people (Turks and Iraqis) about the operations and offered US help in doing so.

*VCJCS departed meeting at this point*

#### **Fusion Cell**

CG continued meeting with more discussion of fusion cell and how to link ISR platforms to units. Maj Gen Rosborg added that the TGS had developed a very good briefing on the nature of the PKK that he would forward to the CG.

#### **KRG Role**

Discussion moved to the role of the KRG. CG stressed need to engage Nechervan Barzani, who is a constructive player, and offered to fly him to meet with Turkish officials himself. GEN Saygun said a previous attempt negotiating hot pursuit rules had fizzled; the CG suggested he try again, and over time work to repatriate the refugees at Mahkoor. CG also noted economic impetus for the KRG to help Turks deal with the problem. CG added that many of Turkey's Kurdish problems in the east had been ameliorated by political solutions (e.g. allowing a Kurdish TV channels, recognition of Kurdish heritage and language). Such transparency on both sides (Turks and KRG) will set conditions for long term solution.

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### **Countering Foreign Fighter Flow**

CG thanked Turks for their help with reducing the FF flow to Syria, and briefly covered OBJ Massey with the TGS (CG briefed GEN Saygun one-on-one after this session with slides developed by ORA and left those packets with the TGS, which were SECRET REL to TUR).

### **Gratitude for Return of Turkish Soldiers**

Gen Saygun personally thanked the CG for the work of MNF-I in getting the eight Turkish soldiers released, noting he should have said that at the beginning of the meeting. On a tangential point, GEN Saygun said he had intelligence that ISF wanted to participate in the CBO in some manner. CG said this was a case of Iraqi rhetoric outpacing their capabilities.

### **Wrap Up**

CG invited GEN Saygun to come to Baghdad to see how we run our fusion cells to assist the TGS with the long term architecture needed to deal effectively with the KGK problem. GEN Saygun did not indicate if he would take up the offer.

Approved for Release

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