UNITED STATES ARMY
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

INTERVIEW
OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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PROCEEDINGS

-- Today is Tuesday, the 12th of June 2007, and I am here at Camp Victory outside of Baghdad, Iraq. I am interviewing the (b)(6)

could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial, and last name?

Yes, (b)(6)

Okay. Let me pause for a second here. I neglected to allow another historian in the room who will also be helping with the interview, (b)(6)

Yes. This is (b)(6) U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Great. (b)(6) what component are you? Are you Regular Active Duty Army, Reserve, National Guard?

Regular Army.

Okay. Can you take a few minutes to give me your background in your career so far?
I'm sorry. HVT is? High value targets. So we worked with them for about six months to get their program started. Then from there I commanded the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Korea, which we did the aviation transformation and became the only aviation brigade on the peninsula. Of course, from there I came directly over here to be the
When did you arrive here?

Arrived on the 28th of July.

And how long will your tour be?

It will be one year. Actually, a little short of one year, because my next assignment is going to take (Inaudible).

How was it that you were picked for this assignment or were there others from the same -- Did you bring over other people from your same unit, all the men, to this assignment?

No. Initially, Branch notified me of an opportunity over here. At that point I was contacted by General Pittard and, of course, at that time General (Inaudible) was the DSC Commander in Korea who has known General Pittard for sometime from previous assignment, and (Several words inaudible) the mission over here as well as the goodness of working for General Pittard and how he was definitely going to take this organization in the right direction.

What's the history of the Iraqi Assistance Group? How long had it been in existence before you arrived, and --
I believe it was credentialed in '05, toward the end of '05-beginning of '06. (Several words inaudible). It's a subcommand of MNCI.

Initially its primary purpose was to conduct the reception staging, onward movement and the integration of all transition teams in theater, primarily in the areas of the military transition teams at the -- from the IGST (Phonetic) level all the way down to battalion level, the border transition teams from, again, the regional level all the way down to the battalion level to include the POE, the port of entry, as well as the national police, from the national police headquarters all the way down through the battalions of the two divisions.

Sir, am I right to understand that you have control of not just the military condition teams but the border transition teams and the police transition teams?

The National Police transition teams.

The National Police transition teams.

And again, that's how we
initially started. You know, there's a big role in that piece that some people now see in (Inaudible) assumed the responsibility of the train-up that normally occurs in CONUS. We have weekly BCTs with them, or we did have weekly BCTs with them. They are bi-weekly.

At Fort Riley.

Fort Riley, where we would discuss teams in training. We discussed personnel shortages on certain teams. We discussed replacement bench status of that. We would talk about issues that are occurring in theater or trends that are emerging in theater that would tie back into the training base.

We have also had one, and in two weeks we will have our second program of instruction review to ensure that our training is progressing and sequential through the different phrases of training, one at Fort Riley with the 6th Brigade (Inaudible) at Riley, the actual six-day program at Camp Geary (Phonetic), and then the eight-day program of instructional training that occurs at the Police Academy in Haji.

Could you talk to me a little bit about the component that is the border training teams or...
the National Police training teams? Are those -- Is there civilian involvement in those teams or is that still a military role?

For the most part, it's military. Let me define that.

On the National Police side, it's still military, very heavily military. There are some advisors, the Iraqi Liaison Officers that are contracted, but for the most part it's the team, and it's (Several words inaudible) it's army.

It consists of not only combat officers as the primary team chiefs. You have a staff (Inaudible) trainer, and then sequential to that is the typical (Inaudible) operating system represented, fires, fires and effects. You have the (Inaudible), signal, medical and those type of key members.

Now the border: The border has been traditionally military. However, with our coordination and our ties with the Department of Homeland Security, we are starting to link our efforts through that agency, and timing the efforts with the rotation team at DHS, a 12-man team that subdivides into two, sometimes three-man sub-teams that tour different facilities or the different border (Inaudible) in
Iraq.

Too, the most recent initiative is through -- and I'm not sure what NPRI stands for, but that's one piece of the contract that has gone to mostly the regional headquarters in the Department of Border Enforcement schools to help and assist with the training of the recruits in the Department of Border Enforcement. But the other side of the contract is through Dynacorp, which is now providing ex-border agents, law enforcement individuals and employing them over here.

Right now we have currently 48. We have some more inbound. I believe our total numbers will eventually reach 98. These individuals contracted from Dynacorp, and they will be broken down in two-man teams and augment the existing transition teams out on the border (Inaudible).

The best value there is from the military perspective we've probably had very limited experience dealing with customs, dealing with border type operations. But we do have good insight on training as well as understanding patrolling and those type of things.

These representatives will come in and provide the technical aspects or (Inaudible) necessary to continue...
the progression of (Inaudible) enforcement.

These transition teams -- these are the military transition teams, the MTT by acronym?

That's correct.

Okay. So MTT stands for Military Transition Teams. Okay. And the civilian contractors augment these MTTs?

They augment the BTTs, the border transition teams.

Border transition teams.

Now it's funny that you asked that. We are in the early stages of actually, with that same concept of adding some expertise, doing the same thing with the Military Transition Teams.

has a -- We just got approved for a contract with It's an $8.9 million contract, but what it enables us to do, it adds consistency and continuity for our division level transition teams throughout the Iraqi (Inaudible).

It consists of ex-Special Forces officers and NCOs that are forward internal defense experts, as well as our Iraqi cultural experts. Some of them are U.S. citizens.
Some live in the United States on visas and so forth.

Normally, these cultural advisors are ex-Iraqi officers, general officers in some cases. The concept is it will be two (Inaudible) are foreign internal defense experts and two cultural advisors. You have a total of four that will augment the existing Division MTT teams. Again, the MTT teams normally rotate on an annual basis. This just provides one extra piece in our internal defense, two in the cultural aspects of the mission, but also continuity (Inaudible).

They will always be assigned to a Division and to that command.

Are these the so called embedded MTT?

For the most part, we try and have (Inaudible) throughout all of -- I mean, that's the objective. In some cases, we do very well (Several words inaudible). In other cases, we have some challenges as you start going to the outlying regions, but the overall goal is to have embedded MTTs, meaning that they live on the same (Inaudible), the same (Inaudible) as their counterpart unit, be it from the borders, police or from the Iraqi Army side.

Right now, we are about 69 percent overall as far as having teams co-located with their Iraqi security force.
counterpart.

Are the structure of the teams the same for a MTT vice a border transition team vice a National Police transition team?

Similar but different, and it will go (Inaudible). As an example, your Division level structure has a 15-man team, and normally it is led by an O6 and, of course, you have a little bit more dynamic there for the (Inaudible) operating systems, because you add on an MP advisor, military police advisor, signal advisor, so forth, that allows you the higher structure.

As you go down one level to a brigade transition team, your numbers drop to 10. Normally, that's led by a lieutenant colonel.

Then, when you hit the battalion level, your numbers are 11, and that team is led by a Major.

For the National Police, their divisional structure starts at 11, but once again led by an O6; brigades, O5, lieutenant colonel, 10 man team; and then your battalions are your 11-man team led by a major.

There's a little bit of difference from the National Police to your military transition teams, and that
is more police, military police centered type organization, but you still have the logisticians, your staff member trainer, and the medical type (Inaudible).

From the Department of Border Enforcement, your regional teams are 11-man organizations. Brigade are 10, and battalions are 11 as well. The major difference there is that for those teams you pick up a wheeled vehicle mechanic because of the distance that they operate from normally their base of operations.

Are they Regular Army officers? Are they Reservists, National Guardsmen, a mix, recalled?

I believe the number is around 58 percent multi-compo, meaning multi-composition of Active Duty and the other part, percentage of the team is Reserve or National Guard. So really, over half of our teams are multi-compo in that you have a balanced team that has balance of experience.

Now there are some teams that are pure. As an example, we have Army Reserve units in some cases that rotate in here as a unit, and to help with their (Inaudible), if you will, as an example, the 108 will have X amount of battalion teams that they will source or man as well as brigade and
division teams. You will see that -- You see that throughout
the sourcing solution (Several words inaudible).

Is there something in the
screening process for the commanders of the teams, not the
team itself? What are you looking for when you are trying to
find those kind of people or is there actually a screening
process (Inaudible) of who is available?

There's supposed to be a
screening process. What we say is that heavy on operational
experience, if possible combat experience. We'd like to see
the team chiefs who has commanded at the different levels,
respective to their current grade, heavy on the operational
side, meaning that they've spent time with the line units as
an operations officer, as an executive officer, and those
type of assignments that (Several words inaudible).

We'd like to see that their records when they
were in those positions have performed very well. Ideally,
we'd like to have -- I mean, in a perfect world we would like
to have a brigade team chiefs that were successful battalion
commanders, and the same with the Division level type team
chiefs. We would like to see that they have been successful
brigade commanders.
Now realistically, that's probably not very feasible. However -- and that's one of the things that General Pittard had started. He personally reviews and selects every Division and national level team we have, and the national level teams, as an example, the IGFC, the Iraqi Ground Force Command military transition team. (Phonetic) (Inaudible). He was hand picked, promoted to the job.

from the National Police Headquarters and replacement for Colonel (Inaudible) -- All of these team chiefs were hand selected by General Pittard. So for the 06 level type team chief positions, we are actively involved with the senior leader development at HRC, (Inaudible) (Phonetic), and we pull their officer record briefs. General Pittard screens them for the right types of job, that they've had the right type of experience. Then he will make a selection based upon his review of their records.

So it works very well for the 06 level. The 05 starts complicating things with the number of teams we have out there, as well as the (Several words inaudible) system, the personnel system, and it kind of gets to the area of not
being very practical to execute.

To be honest with you, we've had some problems. We do have some issues with some team chiefs. I don't want to say a flawed screening process, but essentially you have what you have (Several words inaudible).

We have experienced some teams out here that have not performed well, and there's been a lot of friction internal to the team. That's to be expected, given the environment, given the small team dynamics and so forth, and given the experience and demographics of the team make-up and the tough mission.

That's not to take away from them. It's just they are in way over their head, and the environment has a tendency to really wear on the team, and that's where your friction falls.

I want to take you back to when you first came to the assignment, and you had just discussed the detail and talking about General Pittard coming.

Did General Pittard arrive at about the same time? Had he already been to command?

He arrived about, I want to say, two weeks prior to my arrival.
What were his original marching orders to you in terms of what he wanted to do with the command and possibly your own synopsis on where did you see things coming into this mission? Where were you things as you started this job?

Well, his guidance was very clear and very simple. It was: We need to make the Iraq Assistance Group relevant to the Corps and become a player in the Corps.

Prior to him arriving here, no one really knew who the Iraq Assistance Group was, and let me quantify that. When I came here for my PDSS in April of '06, I remember sitting at (Inaudible) tent waiting for my flight to come up here. And there was a lieutenant colonel kind of staring into the distance, and he looks up at me and says, who are you, mate? Told him who I am, told him I'm here for a PDSS (Inaudible) survey for the Iraq Assistance Group, and I asked him what he did. He said, sir, I'm a transition team. I'm the brigade team chief up here. And I said, well, great.

So we started talking about his mission and some of his frustration and so forth that he had with his IA counterpart. Then at the conclusion of the conversation he
goes, Sir, can I ask you a question. I said, sure. He said, what does the Iraq Assistance Group do? He had been in country for eight months.

So, you know, I did my PDSS, and it appeared that we were very good managers, but no one -- but we really didn't do anything for the teams once they actually embedded or left the (Inaudible) academy and went forward to link up with their Iraqi counterpart.

General Pittard has changed that. He spends on an average of between five and six days on the road visiting teams, talking to teams about what their issues are, talking to the IA leadership, the ISF leadership.

Of course, in order for him to do that, that's where my role comes in running the day to day operations back here. And as he comes back from his trips, be it a resource issue or be it a coordination issue, whatever he brings back from the teams comes back over to us for us to resolve and for us to resource, whatever type of issue it might have been that he observed on his (Inaudible) circulation.

So to answer that question, to make the Iraq Assistance Group relative and responsive to the teams. And of course, you know that that has changed as of March in
regard to the authority -- when I say authority, the command (Inaudible) of the transition teams in respect to the MND, the Multinational Divisions, and of course, out west the Marines we have out there.

Now that's changed with (Several words inaudible). So the administrative control relationship that we have had in the past is gone. However, with that, though, as General Pittard learned throughout the year, we became more and more involved with Iraqi Security Force type issues in the logistician's area, command and control area, to just working operational type issues where we, I would say, eventually merged with the Corps' effort to resolve those issues.

It's really maximized the efficiencies and the staff processes. That is where we have evolved to for the future, and I think that we have started that process, and we are getting better and better as we learn how to leverage each other's abilities well as personnel, functional areas that align with the ISF, with what the Corps is doing (Several words inaudible), not just the (Inaudible) Corps but also with the Multinational Security Transition Corps, MNSTCI, with the CPAT, the Civilian Police Assistance...
Transition Team led by General Hunsecker (Phonetic), and CMAT, the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team led by right now General Wolfe (Phonetic), because I think there's been a big communication gap between MNCI and MNSTCI at points, because teams tell us that sometimes we have two different efforts working toward different objectives. So we are trying to bridge that gap and be that bridging mechanism between the Corps and MNSTCI as well as working (Inaudible) with the Corps and with the Transition Teams.

That was actually one of the questions I wanted to ask you. How would you describe, as I look at things like MNSTCI's role vice IAG, where the overlaps are in that?

That's been a problem. Now if you look at it, by virtue of the design of the organization, you have the warfighting headquarters, which is the Corps, responsible for the day to day warfight as well as the future plans and how we want to shape the environment here.

Then you have the Multinational Security Transition Corps, who is supposed to what we call the United States Training and Doctrine Command for the trade-off, where if a man trained and equipped (Several words inaudible)
organization, and that's how you have two sub-entities with CMAT and CPAT.

The CMAT organization deals primarily with units for defense type forces, the Iraqi Army organizations. CPAT is your civilian side or your Minister of Interior side which deals with your Iraqi Police.

At times we have not done a very good job of linking these two efforts together, the training side and the equipping side. I just say that, because we get too involved in the (Inaudible) day to day, and sometimes there is a lack of cross-coordination and communication.

We have -- We went back and looked at our systems. We have replaced a more robust (Inaudible) with MNSTCI. We've gotten involved with their (Inaudible), and we are starting to share reports and information to help ensure (Several words inaudible).

How would you describe your mission today?

Today? We have, I think, three essential tasks. The first essential task: It goes back to the RSOI, the Reception Station on Integration of Transition Teams up to the point of the (Inaudible) Academy. So there's
a big training piece and resources for that training that goes into that.

Then, of course, once they complete their Police Academy and go into their REP TOA, their mission place or transfer of authority with the on-station team, that relationship ends, and they become attached in these. We do not see those teams again until the redeployment or when they hit the end of their 365 day tour here and they complete their outbound (Inaudible) with the incoming team.

Then we pick them back up for redeployment. So that's the first task that we have.

The second task is: We still retain AdCon, administrative control, as well as well as coordinating authority for your national level teams. That's the Iraqi ground force missions training.

(Several sentences missing.)

-- transition team that -- for those national level teams.

So we will continue to provide that type of oversight, cross-coupled for those national level teams.

Then the third and remaining essential task is, again, to make us -- to make the Iraqi Security Forces more
capable (inaudible) the capability to build capacity. And we do that through being the central point of contact for the Corps Commander on all ISF issues.

(Several words inaudible) in direct support of us. But whenever there is an ISF issue, be it a leadership, (inaudible) or what have you -- it might be a fuel problem. It might be an equipping problem. It might be discussing which rotation (inaudible) to Baghdad, we take the lead in the coordinating through the IGFC and the Joint Headquarters, which again (inaudible) has a play in that, because they provide advisors for that to ensure that we are providing the answers or working (inaudible) what the Corps Commander wants.

So, really, those are our three key tasks that we see now, and the last task is really just developing. We are continuing to refine the process.

I will tell you that through the operational ratings assessment, the ORA, awards that we get and the Corps C-3 ISF cell gets, we think that in the past where we have been just reacting, we have essentially been an information conduit, just receiving information and not too much analysis has been done.
We are trying to do the analysis now, so that when we go to do that problem solving process and identifying -- not just treating symptoms out there but actually identifying the problem and coming up with recommendations how to fix the problems.

Since you've been here since July, you have served under two regimes here, both at Force and the Corps level, and you know that General Casey and General Cherelli were all for transitioning almost everything to the Iraqi Security groups.

Odierno comes in, and --

(Several sentences missing.)

We are here to (Inaudible) transition teams, where you build upon that core base we talked about, the 11, and give them more capability in providing the security piece, and Baghdad did it on the National Police.

In fact, the first unit that graduated from the Phase 2 training in (Inaudible), and that core base we talked about was actually enhanced with essentially an extra company at the brigade level where he was able to do -- The company was able to put down the (Inaudible), and it increased -- I
want to say it increased by 28 additional personnel or soldiers per unit. That gave them 24/7 capability. It gave them the ability to provide advisors all the way down to the company level (Inaudible).

When was this?

This was in November timeframe. So there was about 28 additional personnel. They are taking security forces or combat forces and remissioning them to be an advisor versus going out there and being in the combat (Inaudible).

So looking at the offensive of Baghdad that was kicked off in January, we realized that we didn't have enough forces to do that.

: This is Together Forward

Yes, exactly. So we stopped, and we began remissioning them (Inaudible) transitioning. You only have so many resources. So we had to stop the (Inaudible). We didn't have enough forces to do that, and we tried putting more emphasis on the partnership, the partnership between a BCT and a Division, an IA Division, or a IA level force with a brigade IA unit and (Inaudible) battalion.
So we try to increase the partnership and continue (Several words inaudible) to continue their development, in conjunction with the transition team members.

Well, I'm trying to get at the change that's taken place with Petraeus and Odierno and their emphasis on both operations security and the -- I'm trying to get a feel for the transition piece, though.

I don't have a -- I can't -- I know they are all for security right now. I mean, that's the big push, and that's the reason for the surge, and I know the transition is still on, but I'm trying to get a feel for, you know, where it's at.

I think we don't really know yet. The reason why we don't know yet is because we are getting ready to kick off the surge, and we are getting ready to actually play the full measures at full capability in the surge.

You know, from General Corelli and General Casey's perspective at that time, I think we were searching for a way to show change as well as searching for a mechanism to show progress. Inherent with that, there was a lot of risk with that. It was dependent upon how well the ISF has
embraced Iraqi national values.

You know, in the transition strategy it actually had U.S. forces going to the periphery or the outskirts of urban areas and allowing the ISF type units, the IA, the Iraqi Army, police as well as the National Police, to work the internal security of that area, which now caused -- well, there are some risks just in the risk mitigation and with the enhanced transition team providing oversight to make sure we keep them in the right direction.

The risk was, of course, corruption, judicial killings and those types of things.

\[(b)(6)\] Sectarian --

\[(b)(3), (b)(6)\] That's right. Sectarian violence, and there is risk with that. The new (Inaudible) views it differently. They said, hey, got to get security. We can't afford to take these risks, because we have to show progress. In order to lower the risk levels, we have to do certain things that will guaranty certain security conditions, and I think that we are not -- We've started it, but now I think we have the right force structure, (Inaudible) to really surge forward and establish some security conditions so that we can start pushing more money
and more construction to cause us to be successful so that we can start improving the economy and security.

(Several words inaudible) -- because of what they have seen and the progress they have seen. So I think --

(Several sentences unintelligible.)

(b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask about the relationship with the Coalition provided MTTs. Can you speak a little bit about -- Do U.K. forces have an MTT element?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6) How about the inter-service aspect, because Marines have their own MTTs. Are there any other MTTs out there that are formed by any other Coalition or other service partners?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Well, I'm sure that, you know (Inaudible). There's a tremendous amount of restraints placed on our Coalition, what they can do and they can't do. MND-North were trained, for example, they never leave the gate. They don't do too much as far as the development of 1st Brigade, 2nd Division that's up here in the battle space. So when they came into Baghdad, we had to provide a U.S. trained team to (Inaudible).

As an example, those units get committed in the
Mosul area. We had to provide a transition team for them because of the constraints placed on them.

In fact, we provided a battalion MTT team to the 8th Division, because they just were not getting the necessary support that General (Inaudible) thought was needed.

So, again, we re-tasked a team, U.S. team, to provide him the necessary support that he needed.

Southeast, MND-Southeast: They do have some transition teams, but they are more -- They do not see it as we do. They are more of a rolling type concept where they have some brigade teams out there that they will visit routinely to support the battalions (Inaudible.)

But they are not really embedded? But they are not really embedded. I wouldn't say that they are not engaged, but they do not have a type of relationship that is so critical to this brigade or to this culture that we might have with our counterparts.

Normally, it's at a much higher level, and it's a spot check, if you will, versus a coach/teaching/mentor type
focus.

Now finally, I'm not saying the Marines out west are -- I don't think too many people are doing it better than the Marines out west. (Inaudible) teams are enhanced. Normally, their teams average from Marines per battalion team. They are embedded. They know their counterparts. They are doing a heck of a job out in the west.

So I would say for an ideal model, they are the one to pick. My personal one would be the Marines. I think they are doing a wonderful job. And (Inaudible) that they are very, very critical in their selection process of who their team chiefs are. They are taking executive officers, S-3s and saying you are this battalion level team chief. So they are truly picking their best out of their ranks to serve in those functions.

Especially coming into the end of your tour, (Inaudible) or your tour, when you talk to teams after they have been out and they either wrapping up their assignment or they are coming back periodically, what are the most pressing issues that they are dealing with in terms of this job and this unique position that they hold?
It depends on where they are coming from. There's a lot of frustration right now with the teams because of the (Inaudible) up in Haji. You know, maybe it will change; maybe it won't, and as we go through change with the new command relations, some BCTs just don't have it yet. They don't understand the value of transition teams.

So they don't do a very good job at embracing the transition teams, bringing them into their network, into their battle rhythm, into their flow of information or dissemination of information.

So sometimes these transition teams are left out. But there are some other BCTs — and I'm talking Baghdad — that have done very well as transition teams. They say you are our main effort. They are part of the decision making cycle for operations.

They serve as a conduit or a link back into the IA, what the IA should be doing as part of the overall operation, and so it works very well. But there is a lot of frustration out there, being that transition teams are kind of being isolated or excluded from certain things within the BCT and support. Sometimes it's questionable, and especially when it deals with administrative and logistic type...
challenges, be it the parts, fuel.

(Several sentences missing.)

Are there common themes that you are hearing as far as their work with the Iraqi defense forces? What are their kind of success stories that they send you? Is there a common theme to their success stories and also to their challenges, incidentally, with their mission to the Iraqis?

I think a common theme is that they are starting to see -- You know, in the Iraqi culture in general it is seniority, you know, and the lack of ability to have a mission.

That's no longer the culture, because no one ever requires, let's say, the Division or the Brigade Commander to do certain things, and they can allow certain things to happen and make decisions.

I think that these younger generation officers, the Majors, the Captains, are seeing and living with the U.S. forces, they are seeing that thing called initiative. They are seeing a thing called getting out and talking to soldiers and taking care of soldiers, being accountable for the health and welfare of their men.
So they are starting to see this, and they are starting to see a lot of young officers and a very immature but developing NCO corps — they are starting to see change take place, and it's good change, and they are starting some lieutenant colonels adapt to their environment and, you know, understanding the importance of taking risks and not being afraid of taking risks and challenges and so forth.

So those are the success stories that they are seeing. They are seeing that, with engaged leadership, there is a reflection on the rest of the unit and the success of the units as we go out there and fight. And where you don't have that, that's where you see failure and other things.

Probably the biggest frustration is the logistics system. Not being able to have timely support for fuel, ammo, or spare parts, you know, are your typical things that they have to struggle with. It's very frustrating.

In some cases, you don't even have enough fuel to do all the patrols that you need to do.

Everybody? Iraqi logistics?

The Iraqi logistics system. And I think General Odierno talked about this once. He goes, you cannot have a nation at war and only spends six percent of —
use six percent of its allocation (Inaudible) to its military and the rest going to the other demands of the population.

So think about that. Six percent of your nation's (Inaudible) is going on to your military for that war, and when we say a war, you got the IA, you got the IPs, you got the National Police, you have the borders, and everybody is fighting for this precious resource that there's just not enough of.

So that does impact operations, and it does cause some hardship out there. And that doesn't even include the fuel required to run the generators. The generators run your sustaining systems for your air conditioning or for your refrigerators that keep your food cold. Having to shut the stuff down where you got food that is getting thawed out or rotting and the refrigerator doesn't refreeze it or re-cool it down. Soldiers get sick. The food is just terrible.

So you know, there's second and third order effects to deal with, not just combat patrol (Several words inaudible) the soldiers' outlook on things as we expect them to go out there and that combat operation and everything.

The other one, although it's not -- it's isolated
sort of units -- is corruption/affiliation with militias.

The sectarian side?

Yes. This is classified.

Right?

Yes.

The other frustration is probably the most disheartening, is where you have lieutenant colonels, sometimes colonels, sometimes General Officers, that have truly embraced with the national objectives of what's good for this country and what we are saying, and if then for some reason they get interrogated, they can (Inaudible) for them, all coming from the OCINC's Office.

We've had a couple of (Inaudible), for example, in 5th Brigade, 6th Division. They went out there and got all those weapons caches, and it was a tremendous success. A few days later they had arrest warrants out for them directly from the OCINC's office.

What office?

The Office of the Commander in Chief.

Within the Iraqi Army?

Yes. Well, within the Iraqi
government? The OCINC is a combination of special advisors to Prime Minister Maliki. That's (Inaudible), but that causes some tremendous amount of frustration. The Third Border Region is another example. You got a lieutenant colonel at Regional Headquarters who was very (Several words inaudible) that led to the arrest in those weapons seizures in the Al Kut area, and very quickly within a day or so, again there was an arrest warrant for him.

Another example is you had General Hussein, Major General Hussein from the National Police, who was at one point fired or was going to be replaced, and the replacement was a Major General Medhi (Phonetic) who used to be the First National Police Division Commander who was removed because of his corruption and because of his ties to militia and because of his ties to EKJ (Phonetic). And (b)(6) (Phonetic) had picked him to replace General Hussein.

So that has an impact not just to the advisors but also to the IA, those IA leaders that are trying to do the right thing, but it's too successful.

So there is some frustration there, and that's probably the most damaging frustration, because it not only affects just the transition team members, but it affects the
leadership of the ISF and, of course, goes back to, you know, is this government really committed towards national objectives that have been publicized?

But you are not -- Are you able to push back on some of these?

For every single one. Yes, sir.

Every single one, the Coalition is involved, from MNSTCI -- I want to say MNSTCI, CMAT, CPAT, General Hunsecker (Phonetic), General Wolfe (Phonetic), JHQ transition teams, General Lest (Phonetic). They all have a piece of this as far as coming back and saying why are we doing this; you know, what are your charters and so on, and challenging the arrest warrants for these leaders. But again, this takes time. It takes energy, and you know, it goes back to the very beginning: Why does this even occur?

There's some targeting -- I mean, why do these people look at the S-2 and G-2 shops as a targeting mechanism for JAM (Several words inaudible).

Meaning that Iraqi element -- Oh, yeah.

-- is channeling that information directly back?
(b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely, and when they receive the information, go out and (Inaudible). And there's a lot of it. You just got to be very careful in your target selection or going into certain (Inaudible), from somebody from the MOD are on watch focusing (Inaudible).

I just kind of want to throw it back to you. (Several words inaudible). Are there things we haven't talked about that you're thinking about in your assignment here that we haven't touched on that's been kind of significant?

I think we are -- From the Corps' perspective, I think we are headed in the right direction. I would tell you, the concern would be the future, being held to a timetable versus held to a condition.

You know, when we start talking about theater posture and (Inaudible) the lines, I believe the Corps planners had it right when they identified certain conditions before dropping 20 to 15, 15 to 13, and so forth.

It really needs to be tied to certain conditions within an area, and part of that condition is not just the threat, but it's also the capacity and capability of the ISF forces, Iraqi Police and to the National Police and the
(Inaudible), and we even have this thing called ERU, Emergency Response Units. We have a Provincial Security Unit now (Several words inaudible). But each has a key role in the security posture for that given area, and we need to measure those withdrawal of forces based upon those type of security forces and their capability to maintain the security in that area.

In concert with that, as we move forward with these advisory brigades and we get out of the traditional role of transition teams, the advisor brigades need to be self-sustained in some cases, but also we need to make sure that these advisor brigades are enhanced in a sense where their requirements are identified, and their brigade battle station will have X amount of Division requirements, X amount of Brigade requirements, X amount of (Inaudible) requirements, and that we need to really look at what those requirements are and then source the brigade above their PO&E to be able to adequately meet all the advisory requirements for that given area.

I think the Corps is moving forward in that direction.

Are you getting the manning
levels that you need right now, and are your teams managed to the point where you need them?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Our challenge is that a lot of our team is going to Riley. Maybe we are not getting the right type. Maybe they are (Several words inaudible) in order for the replacement cycle to hit us correctly. We have a lot of teams that deploy into theater missing one or two people.

(Several words missing.) For every guy that we get trained, we want to put on the bench to be able to serve as a replacement for in theater here (Several words inaudible). It goes to training and dedicated to a team.

(b)(3), (b)(6) That concludes this interview.