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UNITED STATES ARMY  
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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12 JUNE 2007

MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes  
provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.)

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 [redacted] -- Today is Tuesday, the 12th of  
3 June 2007, and I am here at Camp Victory outside of Baghdad,  
4 Iraq. I am interviewing the [redacted]

5 [redacted] [redacted]

6 [redacted] could you go ahead and introduce  
7 yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle  
8 initial, and last name?

9 [redacted] Yes, [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 [redacted] Okay. Let me pause for a second  
12 here. I neglected to allow another historian in the room who  
13 will also be helping with the interview, [redacted]

14 [redacted] Yes. This is [redacted] U.S.  
15 Army Center of Military History.

16 [redacted] Great. [redacted] what  
17 component are you? Are you Regular Active Duty Army,  
18 Reserve, National Guard?

19 [redacted] Regular Army.

20 [redacted] Okay. Can you take a few  
21 minutes to give me your background in your career so far?

22 [redacted]

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(b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

I'm sorry. HVT is?

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

High value targets. So we

worked with them for about six months to get their program started.

Then from there I commanded the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Korea, which we did the aviation transformation and became the only aviation brigade on the peninsula.

Of course, from there I came directly over here to be the [redacted] (b)(6)

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) When did you arrive here?

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Arrived on the 28th of July.

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And how long will your tour be?

4 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) It will be one year. Actually,  
5 a little short of one year, because my next assignment is  
6 going to take (Inaudible).

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) How was it that you were picked  
8 for this assignment or were there others from the same -- Did  
9 you bring over other people from your same unit, all the men,  
10 to this assignment?

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) No. Initially, Branch notified  
12 me of an opportunity over here. At that point I was  
13 contacted by General Pittard and, of course, at that time  
14 General (Inaudible) was the DSC Commander in Korea who has  
15 known General Pittard for sometime from previous assignment,  
16 and (Several words inaudible) the mission over here as well  
17 as the goodness of working for General Pittard and how he was  
18 definitely going to take this organization in the right  
19 direction.

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) What's the history of the Iraqi  
21 Assistance Group? How long had it been in existence before  
22 you arrived, and --

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe it was credentialed in  
2 '05, toward the end of '05-beginning of '06. (Several words  
3 inaudible). It's a subcommand of MNCI.

4 Initially its primary purpose was to conduct the  
5 reception staging, onward movement and the integration of all  
6 transition teams in theater, primarily in the areas of the  
7 military transition teams at the -- from the IGST (Phonetic)  
8 level all the way down to battalion level, the border  
9 transition teams from, again, the regional level all the way  
10 down to the battalion level to include the POE, the port of  
11 entry, as well as the national police, from the national  
12 police headquarters all the way down through the battalions  
13 of the two divisions.

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, am I right to understand  
15 that you have control of not just the military condition  
16 teams but the border transition teams and the police  
17 transition teams?

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The National Police transition  
19 teams.

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The National :Police transition  
21 teams.

22 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) And again, that's how we

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1 initially started. You know, there's a big role in that  
2 piece that some people now see in (Inaudible) assumed the  
3 responsibility of the train-up that normally occurs in CONUS.  
4 We have weekly BCTs with them, or we did have weekly BCTs  
5 with them. They are bi-weekly.

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) At Fort Riley.

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Fort Riley, where we would  
8 discuss teams in training. We discussed personnel shortages  
9 on certain teams. We discussed replacement bench status of  
10 that. We would talk about issues that are occurring in  
11 theater or trends that are emerging in theater that would tie  
12 back into the training base.

13 We have also had one, and in two weeks we will  
14 have our second program of instruction review to ensure that  
15 our training is progressing and sequential through the  
16 different phases of training, one at Fort Riley with the 6th  
17 Brigade (Inaudible) at Riley, the actual six-day program at  
18 Camp Geary (Phonetic), and then the eight-day program of  
19 instructional training that occurs at the Police Academy in  
20 Haji.

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Could you talk to me a little  
22 bit about the component that is the border training teams or

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1 the National Police training teams? Are those -- Is there  
2 civilian involvement in those teams or is that still a  
3 military role?

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) For the most part, it's  
5 military. Let me define that.

6 On the National Police side, it's still military,  
7 very heavily military. There are some advisors, the Iraqi  
8 Liaison Officers that are contracted, but for the most part  
9 it's the team, and it's (Several words inaudible) it's army.

10 It consists of not only combat officers as the  
11 primary team chiefs. You have a staff (Inaudible) trainer,  
12 and then sequential to that is the typical (Inaudible)  
13 operating system represented, fires, fires and effects. You  
14 have the (Inaudible), signal, medical and those type of key  
15 members.

16 Now the border: The border has been  
17 traditionally military. However, with our coordination and  
18 our ties with the Department of Homeland Security, we are  
19 starting to link our efforts through that agency, and timing  
20 the efforts with the rotation team at DHS, a 12-man team that  
21 subdivides into two, sometimes three-man sub-teams that tour  
22 different facilities or the different border (Inaudible) in

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1 Iraq.

2           Too, the most recent initiative is through -- and  
3 I'm not sure what NPRI stands for, but that's one piece of  
4 the contract that has gone to mostly the regional  
5 headquarters in the Department of Border Enforcement schools  
6 to help and assist with the training of the recruits in the  
7 Department of Border Enforcement. But the other side of the  
8 contract is through Dynacorp, which is now providing ex-  
9 border agents, law enforcement individuals and employing them  
10 over here.

11           Right now we have currently 48. We have some  
12 more inbound. I believe our total numbers will eventually  
13 reach 98. These individuals contracted from Dynacorp, and  
14 they will be broken down in two-man teams and augment the  
15 existing transition teams out on the border (Inaudible).

16           The best value there is from the military  
17 perspective we've probably had very limited experience  
18 dealing with customs, dealing with border type operations.  
19 But we do have good insight on training as well as  
20 understanding patrolling and those type of things.

21           These representatives will come in and provide  
22 the technical aspects or (Inaudible) necessary to continue

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1 the progression of (Inaudible) enforcement.

2 [redacted] (b)(6) These transition teams -- these are  
3 the military transition teams, the MTT by acronym?

4 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That's correct.

5 [redacted] (b)(6) Okay. So MTT stands for Military  
6 Transition Teams. Okay. And the civilian contractors  
7 augment these MTTs?

8 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) They augment the BTTs, the  
9 border transition teams.

10 [redacted] (b)(6) Border transition teams.

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Now it's funny that you asked  
12 that. We are in the early stages of actually, with that same  
13 concept of adding some expertise, doing the same thing with  
14 the Military Transition Teams.

15 [redacted] (b)(6) has a -- We just got approved for a  
16 contract with [redacted] (b)(6) It's an \$8.9 million contract,  
17 but what it enables us to do, it adds consistency and  
18 continuity for our division level transition teams throughout  
19 the Iraqi (Inaudible).

20 It consists of ex-Special Forces officers and  
21 NCOs that are forward internal defense experts, as well as  
22 our Iraqi cultural experts. Some of them are U.S. citizens.

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1 Some live in the United States on visas and so forth.

2 Normally, these cultural advisors are ex-Iraqi  
3 officers, general officers in some cases. The concept is it  
4 will be two (Inaudible) are foreign internal defense experts  
5 and two cultural advisors. You have a total of four that  
6 will augment the existing Division MTT teams. Again, the MTT  
7 teams normally rotate on an annual basis. This just provides  
8 one extra piece in our internal defense, two in the cultural  
9 aspects of the mission, but also continuity (Inaudible).

10 They will always be assigned to a Division and to  
11 that command.

12 (b)(6) Are these the so called embedded MTT?

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) For the most part, we try and  
14 have (Inaudible) throughout all of -- I mean, that's the  
15 objective. In some cases, we do very well (Several words  
16 inaudible). In other cases, we have some challenges as you  
17 start going to the outlying regions, but the overall goal is  
18 to have embedded MTTs, meaning that they live on the same  
19 (Inaudible), the same (Inaudible) as their counterpart unit,  
20 be it from the borders, police or from the Iraqi Army side.

21 Right now, we are about 69 percent overall as far  
22 as having teams co-located with their Iraqi security force

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1 counterpart.

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Are the structure of the teams  
3 the same for a MTT vice a border transition team vice a  
4 National Police transition team?

5 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6): Similar but different, and it  
6 will go (Inaudible). As an example, your Division level  
7 structure has a 15-man team, and normally it is led by an O6  
8 and, of course, you have a little bit more dynamic there for  
9 the (Inaudible) operating systems, because you add on an MP  
10 advisor, military police advisor, signal advisor, so forth,  
11 that allows you the higher structure.

12 As you go down one level to a brigade transition  
13 team, your numbers drop to 10. Normally, that's led by a  
14 lieutenant colonel.

15 Then, when you hit the battalion level, your  
16 numbers are 11, and that team is led by a Major.

17 For the National Police, their divisional  
18 structure starts at 11, but once again led by an O6;  
19 brigades, O5, lieutenant colonel, 10 man team; and then your  
20 battalions are your 11-man team led by a major.

21 There's a little bit of difference from the  
22 National Police to your military transition teams, and that

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1 is more police, military police centered type organization,  
2 but you still have the logisticians, your staff member  
3 trainer, and the medical type (Inaudible).

4 From the Department of Border Enforcement, your  
5 regional teams are 11-man organizations. Brigade are 10, and  
6 battalions are 11 as well. The major difference there is  
7 that for those teams you pick up a wheeled vehicle mechanic  
8 because of the distance that they operate from normally their  
9 base of operations.

10 [redacted] (b)(6) Are they Regular Army officers? Are  
11 they Reservists, National Guardsmen, a mix, recalled?

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I believe the number is around  
13 58 percent multi-compo, meaning multi-composition of Active  
14 Duty and the other part, percentage of the team is Reserve or  
15 National Guard. So really, over half of our teams are multi-  
16 compo in that you have a balanced team that has balance of  
17 experience.

18 Now there are some teams that are pure. As an  
19 example, we have Army Reserve units in some cases that rotate  
20 in here as a unit, and to help with their (Inaudible), if you  
21 will, as an example, the 108 will have X amount of battalion  
22 teams that they will source or man as well as brigade and

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1 division teams. You will see that -- You see that throughout  
2 the sourcing solution (Several words inaudible).

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Is there something in the  
4 screening process for the commanders of the teams, not the  
5 team itself? What are you looking for when you are trying to  
6 find those kind of people or is there actually a screening  
7 process (Inaudible) of who is available?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) There's supposed to be a  
9 screening process. What we say is that heavy on operational  
10 experience, if possible combat experience. We'd like to see  
11 the team chiefs who has commanded at the different levels,  
12 respective to their current grade, heavy on the operational  
13 side, meaning that they've spent time with the line units as  
14 an operations officer, as an executive officer, and those  
15 type of assignments that (Several words inaudible).

16 We'd like to see that their records when they  
17 were in those positions have performed very well. Ideally,  
18 we'd like to have -- I mean, in a perfect world we would like  
19 to have a brigade team chiefs that were successful battalion  
20 commanders, and the same with the Division level type team  
21 chiefs. We would like to see that they have been successful  
22 brigade commanders.

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1           Now realistically, that's probably not very  
2 feasible. However -- and that's one of the things that  
3 General Pittard had started. He personally reviews and  
4 selects every Division and national level team we have, and  
5 the national level teams, as an example, the IGFC, the Iraqi  
6 Ground Force Command military transition team. [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
7 (Phonetic) (Inaudible). He was hand picked, promoted to the  
8 job.

9           [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) from the National Police  
10 Headquarters and replacement for Colonel (Inaudible) -- All  
11 of these team chiefs were hand selected by General Pittard.  
12 So for the 06 level type team chief positions, we are  
13 actively involved with the senior leader development at HRC,  
14 (Inaudible) [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic), and we pull  
15 their officer record briefs. General Pittard screens them  
16 for the right types of job, that they've had the right type  
17 of experience. Then he will make a selection based upon his  
18 review of their records.

19           So it works very well for the 06 level. The 05  
20 starts complicating things with the number of teams we have  
21 out there, as well as the (Several words inaudible) system,  
22 the personnel system, and it kind of gets to the area of not

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1 being very practical to execute.

2 To be honest with you, we've had some problems.  
3 We do have some issues with some team chiefs. I don't want  
4 to say a flawed screening process, but essentially you have  
5 what you have (Several words inaudible).

6 We have experienced some teams out here that have  
7 not performed well, and there's been a lot of friction  
8 internal to the team. That's to be expected, given the  
9 environment, given the small team dynamics and so forth, and  
10 given the experience and demographics of the team make-up and  
11 the tough mission.

12 That's not to take away from them. It's just  
13 they are in way over their head, and the environment has a  
14 tendency to really wear on the team, and that's where your  
15 friction falls.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) I want to take you back to when  
17 you first came to the assignment, and you had just discussed  
18 the detail and talking about General Pittard coming.

19 Did General Pittard arrive at about the same  
20 time? Had he already been to command?

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) He arrived about, I want to say,  
22 two weeks prior to my arrival.

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) What were his original marching  
2 orders to you in terms of what he wanted to do with the  
3 command and possibly your own synopsis on where did you see  
4 things coming into this mission? Where were you things as  
5 you started this job?

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, his guidance was very  
7 clear and very simple. It was: We need to make the Iraq  
8 Assistance Group relevant to the Corps and become a player in  
9 the Corps.

10 Prior to him arriving here, no one really knew  
11 who the Iraq Assistance Group was, and let me quantify that.  
12 When I came here for my PDSS in April of '06, I remember  
13 sitting at (Inaudible) tent waiting for my flight to come up  
14 here. And there was a lieutenant colonel kind of staring  
15 into the distance, and he looks up at me and says, who are  
16 you, mate? Told him who I am, told him I'm here for a PDSS  
17 (Inaudible) survey for the Iraq Assistance Group, and I  
18 asked him what he did. He said, sir, I'm a transition team.  
19 I'm the brigade team chief up here. And I said, well, great.

20 So we started talking about his mission and some  
21 of his frustration and so forth that he had with his IA  
22 counterpart. Then at the conclusion of the conversation he

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1 goes, Sir, can I ask you a question. I said, sure. He said,  
2 what does the Iraq Assistance Group do? He had been in  
3 country for eight months.

4 So, you know, I did my PDSS, and it appeared that  
5 we were very good managers, but no one -- but we really  
6 didn't do anything for the teams once they actually embedded  
7 or left the (Inaudible) academy and went forward to link up  
8 with their Iraqi counterpart.

9 General Pittard has changed that. He spends on  
10 an average of between five and six days on the road visiting  
11 teams, talking to teams about what their issues are, talking  
12 to the IA leadership, the ISF leadership.

13 Of course, in order for him to do that, that's  
14 where my role comes in running the day to day operations back  
15 here. And as he comes back from his trips, be it a resource  
16 issue or be it a coordination issue, whatever he brings back  
17 from the teams comes back over to us for us to resolve and  
18 for us to resource, whatever type of issue it might have been  
19 that he observed on his (Inaudible) circulation.

20 So to answer that question, to make the Iraq  
21 Assistance Group relative and responsive to the teams. And  
22 of course, you know that that has changed as of March in

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1 regard to the authority -- when I say authority, the command  
2 (Inaudible) of the transition teams in respect to the MND,  
3 the Multinational Divisions, and of course, out west the  
4 Marines we have out there.

5 Now that's changed with (Several words  
6 inaudible). So the administrative control relationship that  
7 we have had in the past is gone. However, with that, though,  
8 as General Pittard learned throughout the year, we became  
9 more and more involved with Iraqi Security Force type issues  
10 in the logistician's area, command and control area, to just  
11 working operational type issues where we, I would say,  
12 eventually merged with the Corps' effort to resolve those  
13 issues.

14 It's really maximized the efficiencies and the  
15 staff processes. That is where we have evolved to for the  
16 future, and I think that we have started that process, and we  
17 are getting better and better as we learn how to leverage  
18 each other's ability s well as personnel, functional areas  
19 that align with the ISF, with what the Corps is doing  
20 (Several words inaudible), not just the (Inaudible) Corps but  
21 also with the Multinational Security Transition Corps,  
22 MNSTCI, with the CPAT, the Civilian Police Assistance

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1 Transition Team led by General Hunsecker (Phonetic), and  
2 CMAT, the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team led  
3 by right now General Wolfe (Phonetic), because I think  
4 there's been a big communication gap between MNCI and MNSTCI  
5 at points, because teams tell us that sometimes we have two  
6 different efforts working toward different objectives. So we  
7 are trying to bridge that gap and be that bridging mechanism  
8 between the Corps and MNSTCI as well as working (Inaudible)  
9 with the Corps and with the Transition Teams.

10 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That was actually one of the  
11 questions I wanted to ask you. How would you describe, as I  
12 look at things like MNSTCI's role vice IAG, where the  
13 overlaps are in that?

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That's been a problem. Now if  
15 you look at it, by virtue of the design of the organization,  
16 you have the warfighting headquarters, which is the Corps,  
17 responsible for the day to day warfight as well as the future  
18 plans and how we want to shape the environment here.

19 Then you have the Multinational Security  
20 Transition Corps, who is supposed to what we call the United  
21 States Training and Doctrine Command for the trade-off, where  
22 if a man trained and equipped (Several words inaudible)

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1 organization, and that's how you have two sub-entities with  
2 CMAT and CPAT.

3 The CMAT organization deals primarily with units  
4 for defense type forces, the Iraqi Army organizations. CPAT  
5 is your civilian side or your Minister of Interior side which  
6 deals with your Iraqi Police.

7 At times we have not done a very good job of  
8 linking these two efforts together, the training side and the  
9 equipping side. I just say that, because we get too involved  
10 in the (Inaudible) day to day, and sometimes there is a lack  
11 of cross-coordination and communication.

12 We have -- We went back and looked at our  
13 systems. We have replaced a more robust (Inaudible) with  
14 MNSTCI. We've gotten involved with their (Inaudible), and we  
15 are starting to share reports and information to help ensure  
16 (Several words inaudible).

17  How would you describe your mission  
18 today?

19 : Today? We have, I think, three  
20 essential tasks. The first essential task: It goes back to  
21 the RSOI, the Reception Station on Integration of Transition  
22 Teams up to the point of the (Inaudible) Academy. So there's

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1 a big training piece and resources for that training that  
2 goes into that.

3 Then, of course, once they complete their Police  
4 Academy and go into their REP TOA, their mission place or  
5 transfer of authority with the on-station team, that  
6 relationship ends, and they become attached in these. We do  
7 not see those teams again until the redeployment or when they  
8 hit the end of their 365 day tour here and they complete  
9 their outbound (Inaudible) with the incoming team.  
10 Then we pick them back up for redeployment. So that's the  
11 first task that we have.

12 The second task is: We still retain AdCon,  
13 administrative control, as well as well as coordinating  
14 authority for your national level teams. That's the Iraqi  
15 ground force missions training.

16 (Several sentences missing.)

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) -- transition team that -- for  
18 those national level teams.

19 So we will continue to provide that type of  
20 oversight, cross-coupled for those national level teams.

21 Then the third and remaining essential task is,  
22 again, to make us -- to make the Iraqi Security Forces more

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1 capable (Inaudible) the capability to build capacity. And we  
2 do that through being the central point of contact for the  
3 Corps Commander on all ISF issues.

4 (Several words inaudible) in direct support of  
5 us. But whenever there is an ISF issue, be it a leadership,  
6 (Inaudible) or what have you -- it might be a fuel problem.  
7 It might be an equipping problem. It might be discussing  
8 which rotation (Inaudible) to Baghdad, we take the lead in  
9 the coordinating through the IGFC and the Joint Headquarters,  
10 which again (Inaudible) has a play in that, because they  
11 provide advisors for that to ensure that we are providing the  
12 answers or working (Inaudible) what the Corps Commander  
13 wants.

14 So, really, those are our three key tasks that we  
15 see now, and the last task is really just developing. We are  
16 continuing to refine the process.

17 I will tell you that through the operational  
18 ratings assessment, the ORA, awards that we get and the Corps  
19 C-3 ISF cell gets, we think that in the past where we have  
20 been just reacting, we have essentially been an information  
21 conduit, just receiving information and not too much analysis  
22 has been done.

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1           We are trying to do the analysis now, so that  
2 when we go to do that problem solving process and identifying  
3 -- not just treating symptoms out there but actually  
4 identifying the problem and coming up with recommendations  
5 how to fix the problems.

6           **(b)(6)** Since you've been here since July,  
7 you have served under two regimes here, both at Force and the  
8 Corps level, and you know that General Casey and General  
9 Cherelli were all for transitioning almost everything to the  
10 Iraqi Security groups.

11           Odierno comes in, and --  
12           (Several sentences missing.)

13           **(b)(3), (b)(6)** We are here to (Inaudible)  
14 transition teams, where you build upon that core base we  
15 talked about, the 11, and give them more capability in  
16 providing the security piece, and Baghdad did it on the  
17 National Police.

18           In fact, the first unit that graduated from the  
19 Phase 2 training in (Inaudible), and that core base we talked  
20 about was actually enhanced with essentially an extra company  
21 at the brigade level where he was able to do -- The company  
22 was able to put down the (Inaudible), and it increased -- I

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1 want to say it increased by 28 additional personnel or  
2 soldiers per unit. That gave them 24/7 capability. It gave  
3 them the ability to provide advisors all the way down to the  
4 company level (Inaudible).

5 [redacted] (b)(6) When was this?

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) This was in November time frame.  
7 So there was about 28 additional personnel. They are taking  
8 security forces or combat forces and remissioning them to be  
9 an advisor versus going out there and being in the combat  
10 (Inaudible).

11 So looking at the offensive of Baghdad that was  
12 kicked off in January, we realized that we didn't have  
13 enough forces to do that.

14 [redacted] (b)(6) : This is Together Forward [redacted] (b)(6)

15 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, exactly. So we stopped,  
16 and we began remissioning them (Inaudible) transitioning.  
17 You only have so many resources. So we had to stop the  
18 (Inaudible). We didn't have enough forces to do that, and we  
19 tried putting more emphasis on the partnership, the  
20 partnership between a BCT and a Division, an IA Division, or  
21 a IA level force with a brigade IA unit and (Inaudible)  
22 battalion.

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1           So we try to increase the partnership and  
2 continue (Several words inaudible) to continue their  
3 development, in conjunction with the transition team members.

4           [REDACTED] (b)(6) Well, I'm trying to get at the change  
5 that's taken place with Petraeus and Odierno and their  
6 emphasis on both operations security and the -- I'm trying to  
7 get a feel for the transition piece, though.

8           I don't have a -- I can't -- I know they are all  
9 for security right now. I mean, that's the big push, and  
10 that's the reason for the surge, and I know the transition is  
11 still on, but I'm trying to get a feel for, you know, where  
12 it's at.

13           [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) I think we don't really know  
14 yet. The reason why we don't know yet is because we are  
15 getting ready to kick off the surge, and we are getting ready  
16 to actually play the full measures at full capability in the  
17 surge.

18           You know, from General Corelli and General  
19 Casey's perspective at that time, I think we were searching  
20 for a way to show change as well as searching for a mechanism  
21 to show progress. Inherent with that, there was a lot of  
22 risk with that. It was dependent upon how well the ISF has

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1 embraced Iraqi national values.

2           You know, in the transition strategy it actually  
3 had U.S. forces going to the periphery or the outskirts of  
4 urban areas and allowing the ISF type units, the IA, the  
5 Iraqi Army, police as well as the National Police, to work  
6 the internal security of that area, which now caused -- well,  
7 there are some risks just in the risk mitigation and with the  
8 enhanced transition team providing oversight to make sure we  
9 keep them in the right direction.

10           The risk was, of course, corruption, judicial  
11 killings and those types of things.

12           [REDACTED] (b)(6) Sectarian --

13           [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) That's right. Sectarian  
14 violence, and there is risk with that. The new (Inaudible)  
15 views it differently. They said, hey, got to get security.  
16 We can't afford to take these risks, because we have to show  
17 progress. In order to lower the risk levels, we have to do  
18 certain things that will guaranty certain security  
19 conditions, and I think that we are not -- We've started it,  
20 but now I think we have the right force structure,  
21 (Inaudible) to really surge forward and establish some  
22 security conditions so that we can start pushing more money

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1 and more construction to cause us to be successful so that we  
2 can start improving the economy and security.

3 (Several words inaudible) -- because of what they  
4 have seen and the progress they have seen. So I think --

5 (Several sentences unintelligible.)

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask about the  
7 relationship with the Coalition provided MTTs. Can you speak  
8 a little bit about -- Do U.K. forces have an MTT element?

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes.

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) How about the inter-service  
11 aspect, because Marines have their own MTTs. Are there any  
12 other MTTs out there that are formed by any other Coalition  
13 or other service partners?

14 (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, I'm sure that, you know  
15 (Inaudible). There's a tremendous amount of restraints  
16 placed on our Coalition, what they can do and they can't do.  
17 MND-North were trained, for example, they never  
18 leave the gate. They don't do too much as far as the  
19 development of 1st Brigade, 2nd Division that's up here in  
20 the battle space. So when they came into Baghdad, we had to  
21 provide a U.S. trained team to (Inaudible).

22 As an example, those units get committed in the

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1 Mosul area. We had to provide a transition team for them  
2 because of the constraints placed on them. [REDACTED] 1.4b

3 [REDACTED] 1.4b

4 In fact, we provided a battalion MTT team to the  
5 8th Division, because they just were not getting the  
6 necessary support that General (Inaudible) thought was  
7 needed.

8 So, again, we re-tasked a team, U.S. team, to  
9 provide him the necessary support that he needed.

10 Southeast, MND-Southeast: They do have some  
11 transition teams, but they are more -- They do not see it as  
12 we do. They are more of a rolling type concept where they  
13 have some brigade teams out there that they will visit  
14 routinely to support the battalions (Inaudible.)

15 [REDACTED] (b)(6) But they are not really embedded?

16 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) But they are not really  
17 embedded. I wouldn't say that they are not engaged, but they  
18 do not have a type of relationship that is so critical to  
19 this brigade or to this culture that we might have with our  
20 counterparts.

21 Normally, it's at a much higher level, and it's a  
22 spot check, if you will, versus a coach/teaching/mentor type

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1 focus.

2 Now finally, I'm not saying the Marines out west  
3 are -- I don't think too many people are doing it better than  
4 the Marines out west. (Inaudible) teams are enhanced.  
5 Normally, their teams average from 1.4a Marines per  
6 battalion team. They are embedded. They know their  
7 counterparts. They are doing a heck of a job out in the  
8 west.

9 So I would say for an ideal model, they are the  
10 one to pick. My personal one would be the Marines. I think  
11 they are doing a wonderful job. And (Inaudible) that they  
12 are very, very critical in their selection process of who  
13 their team chiefs are. They are taking executive officers,  
14 S-3s and saying you are this battalion level team chief. So  
15 they are truly picking their best out of their ranks to serve  
16 in those functions.

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) Especially coming into the end  
18 of your tour, (Inaudible) or your tour, when you talk to  
19 teams after they have been out and they either wrapping up  
20 their assignment or they are coming back periodically, what  
21 are the most pressing issues that they are dealing with in  
22 terms of this job and this unique position that they hold?

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1                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            It depends on where they are  
2 coming from. There's a lot of frustration right now with the  
3 teams because of the (Inaudible) up in Haji. You know, maybe  
4 it will change; maybe it won't, and as we go through change  
5 with the new command relations, some BCTs just don't have it  
6 yet. They don't understand the value of transition teams.

7                    So they don't do a very good job at embracing the  
8 transition teams, bringing them into their network, into  
9 their battle rhythm, into their flow of information or  
10 dissemination of information.

11                    So sometimes these transition teams are left out.  
12 But there are some other BCTs -- and I'm talking Baghdad --  
13 that have done very well as transition teams. They say you  
14 are our main effort. They are part of the decision making  
15 cycle for operations.

16                    They serve as a conduit or a link back into the  
17 IA, what the IA should be doing as part of the overall  
18 operation, and so it works very well. But there is a lot of  
19 frustration out there, being that transition teams are kind  
20 of being isolated or excluded from certain things within the  
21 BCT and support. Sometimes it's questionable, and especially  
22 when it deals with administrative and logistic type

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1 challenges, be it the parts, fuel.

2 (Several sentences missing.)

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Are there common themes that you  
4 are hearing as far as their work with the Iraqi defense  
5 forces? What are their kind of success stories that they  
6 send you? Is there a common theme to their success stories  
7 and also to their challenges, incidentally, with their  
8 mission to the Iraqis?

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) I think a common theme is that  
10 they are starting to see -- You know, in the Iraqi culture in  
11 general it is seniority, you know, and the lack of ability to  
12 have a mission.

13 That's no longer the culture, because no one ever  
14 requires, let's say, the Division or the Brigade Commander to  
15 do certain things, and they can allow certain things to  
16 happen and make decisions.

17 I think that these younger generation officers,  
18 the Majors, the Captains, are seeing and living with the U.S.  
19 forces, they are seeing that thing called initiative. They  
20 are seeing a thing called getting out and talking to soldiers  
21 and taking care of soldiers, being accountable for the health  
22 and welfare of their men.

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1           So they are starting to see this, and they are  
2 starting to see a lot of young officers and a very immature  
3 but developing NCO corps -- they are starting to see change  
4 take place, and it's good change, and they are starting some  
5 lieutenant colonels adapt to their environment and, you know,  
6 understanding the importance of taking risks and not being  
7 afraid of taking risks and challenges and so forth.

8           So those are the success stories that they are  
9 seeing. They are seeing that, with engaged leadership, there  
10 is a reflection on the rest of the unit and the success of  
11 the units as we go out there and fight. And where you don't  
12 have that, that's where you see failure and other things.

13           Probably the biggest frustration is the logistics  
14 system. Not being able to have timely support for fuel,  
15 ammo, or spare parts, you know, are your typical things that  
16 they have to struggle with. It's very frustrating.

17           In some cases, you don't even have enough fuel to  
18 do all the patrols that you need to do.

19           [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)   Everybody? Iraqi logistics?

20           [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)   The Iraqi logistics system. And  
21 I think General Odierno talked about this once. He goes, you  
22 cannot have a nation at war and only spends six percent of --

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1 use six percent of its allocation (Inaudible) to its  
2 military and the rest going to the other demands of the  
3 population.

4 So think about that. Six percent of your  
5 nation's (Inaudible) is going on to your military for that  
6 war, and when we say a war, you got the IA, you got the IPs,  
7 you got the National Police, you have the borders, and  
8 everybody is fighting for this precious resource that there's  
9 just not enough of.

10 So that does impact operations, and it does cause  
11 some hardship out there. And that doesn't even include the  
12 fuel required to run the generators. The generators run your  
13 sustaining systems for your air conditioning or for your  
14 refrigerators that keep your food cold. Having to shut the  
15 stuff down where you got food that is getting thawed out or  
16 rotting and the refrigerator doesn't refreeze it or re-cool  
17 it down. Soldiers get sick. The food is just terrible.

18 So you know, there's second and third order  
19 effects to deal with, not just combat patrol (Several words  
20 inaudible) the soldiers' outlook on things as we expect them  
21 to go out there and that combat operation and everything.

22 The other one, although it's not -- it's isolated

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1 sort of units -- is corruption/affiliation with militias.

2 (b)(6) The sectarian side?

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. This is classified.

4 Right?

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) The other frustration is  
7 probably the most disheartening, is where you have lieutenant  
8 colonels, sometimes colonels, sometimes General Officers,  
9 that have truly embraced with the national objectives of  
10 what's good for this country and what we are saying, and if  
11 then for some reason they get interrogated, they can  
12 (Inaudible) for them, all coming from the OCINC's Office.

13 We've had a couple of (Inaudible), for example,  
14 in 5th Brigade, 6th Division. They went out there and got  
15 all those weapons caches, and it was a tremendous success. A  
16 few days later they had arrest warrants out for them directly  
17 from the OCINC's office.

18 (b)(6) What office?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) The Office of the Commander in  
20 Chief.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) Within the Iraqi Army?

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. Well, within the Iraqi

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1 government? The OCINC is a combination of special advisors  
2 to Prime Minister Maliki. That's (Inaudible), but that  
3 causes some tremendous amount of frustration. The Third  
4 Border Region is another example. You got a lieutenant  
5 colonel at Regional Headquarters who was very (Several words  
6 inaudible) that led to the arrest in those weapons seizures  
7 in the Al Kut area, and very quickly within a day or so,  
8 again there was an arrest warrant for him.

9 Another example is you had General Hussein, Major  
10 General Hussein from the National Police, who was at one  
11 point fired or was going to be replaced, and the replacement  
12 was a Major General Medhi (Phonetic) who used to be the First  
13 National Police Division Commander who was removed because of  
14 his corruption and because of his ties to militia and because  
15 of his ties to EKJ (Phonetic). And (b)(6) (Phonetic)  
16 had picked him to replace General Hussein.

17 So that has an impact not just to the advisors  
18 but also to the IA, those IA leaders that are trying to do  
19 the right thing, but it's too successful.

20 So there is some frustration there, and that's  
21 probably the most damaging frustration, because it not only  
22 affects just the transition team members, but it affects the

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1 leadership of the ISF and, of course, goes back to, you know,  
2 is this government really committed towards national  
3 objectives that have been publicized?

4 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) But you are not -- Are you able  
5 to push back on some of these?

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) For every single one. Yes, sir.  
7 Every single one, the Coalition is involved, from MNSTCI -- I  
8 want to say MNSTCI, CMAT, CPAT, General Hunsecker (Phonetic),  
9 General Wolfe (Phonetic), JHQ transition teams, General Lest  
10 (Phonetic). They all have a piece of this as far  
11 as coming back and saying why are we doing this; you know,  
12 what are your charters and so on, and challenging the arrest  
13 warrants for these leaders. But again, this takes time. It  
14 takes energy, and you know, it goes back to the very  
15 beginning: Why does this even occur?

16 There's some targeting -- I mean, why do these  
17 people look at the S-2 and G-2 shops as a targeting mechanism  
18 for JAM (Several words inaudible).

19 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Meaning that Iraqi element --

20 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Oh, yeah.

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) -- is channeling that  
22 information directly back?

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely, and when they  
2 receive the information, go out and (Inaudible). And there's  
3 a lot of it. You just got to be very careful in your target  
4 selection or going into certain (Inaudible), from somebody  
5 from the MOD are on watch focusing (Inaudible).

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I just kind of want to throw it  
7 back to you. (Several words inaudible). Are there things we  
8 haven't talked about that you're thinking about in your  
9 assignment here that we haven't touched on that's been kind  
10 of significant?

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I think we are -- From the  
12 Corps' perspective, I think we are headed in the right  
13 direction. I would tell you, the concern would be the  
14 future, being held to a timetable versus held to a condition.

15 You know, when we start talking about theater  
16 posture and (Inaudible) the lines, I believe the Corps  
17 planners had it right when they identified certain conditions  
18 before dropping 20 to 15, 15 to 13, and so forth.

19 It really needs to be tied to certain conditions  
20 within an area, and part of that condition is not just the  
21 threat, but it's also the capacity and capability of the ISF  
22 forces, Iraqi Police and to the National Police and the

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1 (Inaudible), and we even have this thing called ERU,  
2 Emergency Response Units. We have a Provincial Security Unit  
3 now (Several words inaudible). But each has a key role in  
4 the security posture for that given area, and we need to  
5 measure those withdrawal of forces based upon those type of  
6 security forces and their capability to maintain the security  
7 in that area.

8 In concert with that, as we move forward with  
9 these advisory brigades and we get out of the traditional  
10 role of transition teams, the advisor brigades need to be  
11 self-sustained in some cases, but also we need to make sure  
12 that these advisor brigades are enhanced in a sense where  
13 their requirements are identified, and their brigade battle  
14 station will have X amount of Division requirements, X  
15 amount of Brigade requirements, X amount of (Inaudible)  
16 requirements, and that we need to really look at what those  
17 requirements are and then source the brigade above their PO&E  
18 to be able to adequately meet all the advisory requirements  
19 for that given area.

20 I think the Corps is moving forward in that  
21 direction.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) Are you getting the manning

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1 levels that you need right now, and are your teams managed to  
2 the point where you need them?

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Our challenge is that a lot of  
4 our team is going to Riley. Maybe we are not getting the  
5 right type. Maybe they are (Several words inaudible) in  
6 order for the replacement cycle to hit us correctly. We have  
7 a lot of teams that deploy into theater missing one or two  
8 people.

9 (Several words missing.) For every guy that we  
10 get trained, we want to put on the bench to be able to serve  
11 as a replacement for in theater here (Several words  
12 inaudible). It goes to training and dedicated to a team.

13 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) That concludes this interview.

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