INTERVIEW OF

OF

EFFECTS DEPUTY
MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

9 JUNE 2007
HEADQUARTERS, MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.)
PROCEDINGS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian. Today is Saturday, the 9th of June 2007 at approximately 1500.

I am here at the Multinational Corps Headquarters at Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, and also with me is --

(b)(6): This is (b)(6), U.S. Army Center of Military History.

(b)(3), (b)(6): And we are interviewing (b)(3), (b)(6), who is the Deputy of the Effects Section.

(b)(3), (b)(6), could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial, last name, and correct me if I didn't get your title absolutely book straight.

(b)(3), (b)(6) That's okay. My name is (b)(3), (b)(6) Regular Army. I am the Deputy Effects

*SECRET*

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Coordinator. I actually wear two hats. The other hat that I wear is the Fire Support Coordinator for the Corps.

Great. Can you give me a little bit of your professional background?
That's pretty good. Actually, that answered somewhat one of my questions, because I was going to ask you relative to being the commander for Artillery relative to this billet.

Were you stationed at Fort Sill or at Fort Hood?

At Fort Hood. The III Corps Artillery Headquarters was at Fort Sill.

So when the Corps Artillery furled its colors, did you physically transfer down to Fort Hood?

Well, I decided
that it would be easier on soldiers and families for all those soldiers that were going to deploy with us to keep them at Fort Sill and then just join the Corps for the deployment.

(b)(3), (b)(6): With the rest to be sorted out upon return?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. When we redeploy, the soldiers will either stay at Fort Sill in one of the two fire brigades that are there, could go to The Artillery School. That's obviously at Fort Sill, or just PCS to another Army requirement.

(b)(3), (b)(6): I'm going to get into the overall structure of the Effects Section, but before I do, can you give me a sense for how many people came with you, if you will, from III Corps Artillery that formed part of the Effects Cell?

Yes. 1.4a

1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6): That are here

* S E C R E T *
with you?

Yes, came from Fort Sill, and there's about 1.4a that came from the Fire Support cell that was at Fort Hood, organic to the Corps Headquarters. So we are right at 1.4a total.

Let me segue then into: Can you kind of give me the basic laydown of the Effects Cell? How many people are there, and I know there are many diverse elements to it, but if you can do your best to kind of describe what those elements and what your strength is.

Sure. Well, the strength -- Here in the Palace, in the Headquarters, is of the JFEC, the Joint Fires and Effects Cell is about 1.4a Actually, I'm sorry, closer to 1.4a And you mentioned it. it is quite a -- what word did you use?

Complex.

Yes, complex.

Diverse.
Diverse. That was the word, I think, you used. It is made up of several sections that comprise the JFEC. The first one is the Force Field Artillery Section, which really is a residual from the Corps Artillery Headquarters.

The Corps Artillery Headquarters, like any artillery organization, battalion or above, in the Army is the Force Field Artillery Headquarters, and in III Corps it was Corps Artillery.

As a result, the transformation and modularity and corps becoming unencumbered Corps Artilleries inactivated, but it is my view, always has been and always will, that as long as there is a fire support function in whatever we are doing, the commander is going to look to the senior fire supporter to address the commander's concerns.

So although the Corps Artillery Headquarters inactivated, I felt it important
to have those functions still resident in the Corps Headquarters, so when the boss says, hey, what about air power or what about field artillery surface to surface fires, or what about non-lethal fires, he's got the fire support coordinator to look to.

Let me ask something here. Doesn't modularity, though, account for that, or not?

Well, it does, but barely. The authorized strength of a fire support element in a modular corps, unencumbered corps, is roughly. Now we could not do what we are doing today in this corps with people. It's just physically impossible.

So that's the Force Field Artillery Headquarters function that I wanted to keep for the Corps, and essentially that's surface to surface fires, central management radars, sourcing of those two assets or capability, I should say. That's what the
Force Field Artillery function does.

The next section is the Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell. Our Army doctrine says that electronic warfare falls under Information Operations. We don't believe that. We believe that electronic warfare is a non-lethal fire and, therefore, should be planned, coordinated, synchronized, and managed by a fire supporter. That's why in this Headquarters today EWCC is subordinate to the JFEC.

There's two components to that, ground and air, and in this theater it is unique because of the IED threat and the actions we take to counter that threat with electronic warfare. So our EWCC Section has both air and ground representation in it.

Although not directly assigned to the JFEC, we have a very close relationship with the United States Air Force; and if you look on our diagram I sent you, it's got a dotted line. That's because in this theater...
CENTCOM has -- Actually, it's the Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General North, has got command and control of Air Force assets, but we learned in OIF-I that the interdependence of air and ground power is essential, and it's one thing that I am personally very proud of, is the relationship between -- in freak-war between air and ground.

We've always had a very good relationship with the ALO (Phonetic). You'll notice the General Officer in Charge. His office is there. Next to him is the ALO, and next to him is the FIS Corps (Phonetic). That's just representative.

There's a reason for that, because we talk, and we have a very good relationship.

We have an Assessment Cell. We decided preparing for this rotation that, as part of assessing how we are doing, you need to have a capability to do that that is
divorced from those that planned the operation.

We thought that, if you grade your own paper, you'll give yourself an A, but if you have someone external to the planners that can look at the results of what is going on, that will more of value to the Commander as the Commander does his own assessments.

So our Assessment Cell is about five guys, very heavy in the ORSA (Phonetic) background, operations, research, systems analysis, and they -- That's all they do day in and day out, is manage the polling data, collect data, analyze it, and then we take that once a month down to -- off of what the subject matter expert on the staff believes is going on, and then present that to the Commander. Then he will make a decision whether, you know, are we doing things right, are we doing the right things.

Information Operations: In the non-deployed Corps Headquarters, you have an
IO Chief, Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel, and one or two IO guys, and that's it. But now we are a deployed JPF. The IO Section is much more robust.

The given IO is also a non-lethal fire. It's underneath the JFEC. Actually, the IO Section in and of itself is, if you count all the combat camera crewmen and all of the people that he's got, he's over 1.4a people. So quite a robust information operations capability.
Let me see the chart. Can't remember all these guys off the top of my head.

You know, you have a complicated (Inaudible).

We have a small section down on the JOC which essentially goes day to day, 99 percent of the time, lethal fires, and is both surface to surface and air to surface fires, representative to the CHOPS (Phonetic) for day to day OSP.

We have a traditional Targeting Section that you would find in any Headquarters, small, but different than -- in scope. In old days when we were fighting the Russians, it was pretty easy. You targeted tanks and artillery systems.

The difference in this fight is we
Is that lethal and non-lethal targeting?

That's correct.

The last section that falls under the JFEC is just getting stood up, and it is focused on engagements and reconciliation. As more and more of the Iraqi populous get tired of AQI, Al Qaeda in Iraq, we are recognizing that there needs to be a way to understand, synchronize, and provide guidance to subordinates on reconciliation between those that don't want to fight and those that do.

That section (Several words inaudible) that go out and --

And action officers mostly. Our actually engagers, the
people that do the engagements, are really a kind of leadership.

Now this is just getting started in the past couple of weeks. So we are in uncharted territory, but --

(b)(6) : Does the Force take the lead in that and you support, or what?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : The Force is standing up a similar capability, but will be focused at the strategic level of engagements. We are more focused at really understanding what's going on in the divisions and their relationships between reconcilable groups, their tribal relationships. And that's our role.

We really just got to understand it, and then help them when it gets to the point of getting help from Force and the Government of Iraq.

(b)(6) : And that's strictly a COIN kind of effort. Right?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Absolutely.
Well, that's my only experience. So absolutely. But, yeah, it's very much COIN.

The way in which the Effects Cell was built, at what point and what kind of initial guidance did the Commanding General give as far as how he wanted the Effects Cell structured for this fight? Was there a lot of thought in it? Did you pretty much follow what the V Corps was doing for you? How would you describe that evolution?

We took a look at what V Corps had, and the overarching philosophy coming in was, you know, we needed to do a (inaudible) doctrinally, and that's following what they had.

We made a few tweaks before we came here, because we knew we were going to be -- There were some things that just better suited the personality of our leadership than V Corps. Not critical against V Corps at all, just different commanders have different
personalities.

So we tweaked it a little bit, but not a whole lot. So we essentially fell in on what V Corps was doing.

The Commander's guidance was really focused on one thing, and that was the output: What are we as the Corps staff doing to provide output to help subordinate commanders?

So he wasn't overly concerned with precisely how many sections we had or who was in that section. His overarching guidance to us was we got to be organized such that what we do is not necessarily process focused, but output focused.

At what point -- and the Cell has a Brigadier General who is in charge of it. Correct? General Mcdonald?

That's correct.

At what point was General McDonald brought into this? Of course, that's not the normal structure...
either. Was that something that also paralleled the V Corps, and can you kind of speak to his role and when he was brought in?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. It goes back to the Corps Artillery Headquarters. The Corps Artillery Headquarters Commander was a Brigadier General.

General McDonald joined the Corps about a year ago in June or '06, and reported to the Corps at Fort Hood as the Effects Coordinator. This is also related to JIFCOM's effects based approach or effects based operations doc. where there was an Effects Coordinator.

We could probably talk for the next week on effects based operations, the pros and cons. But I would tell you that the fact that there is a General Officer here is good. It's required, because of the relationships that he develops at Force and, in many cases, with members of the GOI. My opinion is that a Colonel would have a
difficult time maintaining those relationships and working some of the issues at those levels.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Can you speak to me a little bit about what is the relationship with higher headquarters? What is the relationship between the FECS and MNF-I? Is there a comparative Cell, or is really covering both?

(b)(3), (b)(6) There is a comparative cell called Strat Effects. It is not -- I wouldn't call it a mirror image, because they do some things that we don't.

For example, Strat Effects is very much focused on communications. Take, for example, Major General Caldwell and now General (Inaudible). They are the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strat Effects at MNF. They spend a great amount of their time on communications, strategic communications.

Whereas, here in MNC-I we have a linkage to Public Affairs and communications,
but not -- Since we have Information Operations, we have to keep a separation between IO and Public Affairs, or the law. So that's why we don't have a -- The Public Affairs Section is not in the JFEC, because we keep those two separate, although we talk between IO and PA, and have a weekly meeting just to ensure that our communications, messages and things are consistent between IO and PA.

Part of the effects that we are working, obviously, are economics, governance, and we have a linkage to our Corps C-9, Corps C-7, the reconstruction also on a C-7; whereas, Strat Effects has those sections within Strat Effects, Strat Effects Economics, Strat Effects Governance.

So I wouldn't call them a mirror image. I would call them related.

What is the relationship there? Is there a lot of -- what I'm looking for is the nature of the
relationship one that is more directive or collaborative?

Collaborative.

Are they focused mostly at what I have heard called the strategic level, and you do more at the operational level, more at the mission level?

Yes. That's the way it is designed, and we do our absolute best to try and keep it that way. What we don't want is the Force Headquarters worrying about what, you know, Company A of 166 Armor is doing on whatever they are doing. So it's collaborative.

What is the relationship down the chain? Are they like elements in (Inaudible)? What is your typical contact at the brigade level on how they are executing?

Each of our divisions has a Fire Support Coordinator who also usually -- Yes, in all of our divisions
also dual-acts the Effects Coordinator for the Division, and work similar items.

I would call it closer to a mirror image from this Headquarters down to Divisions than our Headquarters to MNF.

(b)(6): Are they at the Division level or is that Fire Support Coordinator -- is he an 06?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.

(b)(6) So he would be like the old Div Arty --

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. He would be, but we no longer have any Div Arties, unfortunately, for the record.

(b)(3), (b)(6) I want to take you back a little bit, because we had talked about the structure of the section, and you initially told me about how many folks came from III Corps Artillery, and you talked about the strength being about 14a people in the Cell.

I just want to make sure I'm
tracking right, because you also said just in one area there's probably mixed some apples and oranges.

You said the Combat Camera had about Well, no, Combat Camera is part of IO, but they are not here. They are out and about, but they are underneath IO.

So are you asking the strength just in the Headquarters or the -- I'm looking for -- Yes, the strength in the Headquarters, and if you can give me a sense for -- For instance, I'm guessing the Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell, if we are talking about aviation and ground -- I'm interested to know do they directly report to you or are they assets you have access to, I guess, and how that affects your overall numbers in terms of if you were to sort of roll it up and say --

*SECRET*
Okay. Well, there is a collage here of individual augmentees, of people that are assigned to III Corps, of people that are assigned to JCCS-I, the Navy outfit that is working electronic warfare.

So all those kind of mesh together. So what I can tell you is we brought about from Fort Sill, and we have about for the -- The rest of the structure is -- like EWCC is all individual augmentees.

Okay.

This Engagement Cell: Well, we took the Engagement Cell out of hide. We built that out of hide.

How about IO?

For instance, today. Were they all augments?

Well, the MNC-I IO Chief is an individual augmentee, full Colonel. The Corps IO Officer that came with us from III Corps is a Lieutenant Colonel.
He's the Deputy IO.

It's just that there is a difference there between the Corps MTO&E, Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, and a JTF.

Joint Task Force. Right, the Joint Task Force. Right. The Joint Manning Document takes individual augmentees and the Corps' MTO&E, comes together to make the manning document for the MNC-I Headquarters.

As you come into this environment -- and I'm looking at this point from your arrival here to where we are now in the fight -- what's been the biggest challenge of managing this peace call Effects and --

For me personally?

Yes, for your personally and just structurally, and how is it working, I guess, is the question?
I would say, keeping my fingers on all of those diverse organizations and what they do is the most challenging thing for me personally.

Is it working? I would say --

Well, to answer that question, I got to look at the results. And if you look at the results that the Corps has achieved since TOA, we are seeing a number of good, positive indicators, pulling data, statistics, analysis of those statistics, atmospherics, and there are, like I said, a number of good trends.

So is it working? I look at the results and say, yes, we think it's working, cautiously, optimistically.

Are there some internal things internally within the Corps Headquarters and the staff that we are doing differently than what we thought? Yes. But again, you know, we came in with how we thought we would fight. Then we adapted, and I think we are
making slow progress.

Can you talk to me about that piece of how those effects integrate with the rest of the staff?

Roger. We spent several months dialoguing and designing how we would plug into the Corps staff; and if you look in our organization chart and see the C-37 Plans and the C-35 FUOPS, when we designed it, we wanted to have representatives from each functional area of the staff resident in those two planning horizons, and we are doing that to a large degree, but not completely.

In what way, not completely?

Just through some challenges with people, personnel Manning, that we don't have a --

Can't dedicate somebody full time?

Right.
Is that something that was talked about before deploying, that this was how you were going to do it, and was that the same as what V Corps had done or something new?

No, it was different than what V Corps did. It would really take a lengthy discussion to explain to you how we built this and came up with it.

I'm trying to think how I can make it down a bit.

You know, it seems logical that you have those cells to embed in those other -- especially the three staff sections, to help plan, especially in the plans, meaning FUOPS. Is that one of them?

Yes, FUOPS, right.

And help write the orders. So I mean, it seems -- From an outsider, it seems kind of logical that you would want something like that.
Right. And if I had to give myself a grade on how the Corps is executing what we designed to come into, I would give it a B. There's just -- Actually, my assessment is that there is more going on, the Op tempo is higher than we designed FUOPS for.

The JOC, which is really current ops, they are just so inundated with day to day, hour by hour, things happening out on the battlefield that they cannot be a planning horizon. We thought that they might be able to handle one to three, maybe five days planning and coordination. The fact is they just can't. It's just -- There's too much going on.

So as a result, FUOPS is picking up many of the three to five-day requirements that we thought the JOC could handle, and what that has caused is some of our operations and missions are going into FUOPS, and there's just not enough C-7 planners, C-9
planners, you know, effects planners or fires planners to get at all those at the same time.

So I think the design is fundamentally very sound. It's just a matter of some personnel shortages and working it.

Let me take you in a different direction. As you look at where you are now in your tenure, and because you are in some really interesting pieces of this, what in your mind comes up as the couple of either systems or systems events, functions that have been real success stories?

I would go back to what our boss told us initially, and that's output and helping the divisions. The feedback that I get in here is that our divisions are appreciative of the work that the Corps Headquarters is doing.

You are always going to have that friction between a unit and its higher
headquarters, and that's probably pretty healthy. To me, it's healthy. But we have received a lot of feedback that we are providing service to, helping, and are of value to the divisions, and that makes me feel very good.

I want to take you a little deeper into some of those and ask about some of the unique systems, if I could, Excaliber being one that just kind of comes to mind as a system that's new on the horizon.

Do you have visibility on the success of this at this level or is that something you push down to someone in your section for later?

We have visibility of it. I have the Force Field Artillery Section. They manage that. It's a new weapons system. It resulted from an operational needs statement from Iraq -- not one that we did -- a couple of years ago.
Well, I don't know exactly when they did it, but that's how the weapon got designed.

Can I interrupt you here briefly to explain what Excaliber is?

Certainly.

For those that are familiar with artillery, it is similar to, but very

It's a great weapon. We are just
getting it now where we fielded three
divisions so far and have one more to go. We
have fired it already as part of the fielding
process, and with incredible effect. It's
very accurate.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you know when
the first use of the system was, by any
chance?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : I do. I'll see
if I can remember. 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field
Artillery in Taji.

(b)(3), (b)(6) : And when would
that have been? Do you know?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : About two weeks
ago, maybe three weeks ago. How about May
'07? Is that close enough?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : Sure. No big
problem.

Any unique requirements on the
(Inaudible) artillery piece?

(b)(3), (b)(6) No, it fires from
a standard Palladin howitzer. There's a
couple of hardware, radio interface, cables, things that has to be done. But no, there is nothing really significant. 

(b)(3), (b)(6): I don't want to take you too much deeper into that, because I know (several words inaudible). But a totally different direction: You are constantly dealing with a lot of unique areas and big systems, are some of the staff that work under Effects -- are they civilian contractors who are helping your field systems or provide the technical consultation that may unique compared to other areas within the Multinational Corps?

(b)(3), (b)(6) We came over with one civilian assigned who joined a team of civilians that had the same skill set, and that's to be FSR Field Service representatives to JADOCS, Joint Air Deep Operations Coordination System, which is just an automated system to help us manage joint fires.
That's the JCCI, you say?

No. No. Sorry, I lost you. I'll go back and check it on the tape.

Okay. So one civilian assigned to the Corps Headquarters that came with us from Hood, and they joined, like I said, I think, two others that are already in theater, and they are just FSRs for JADOCS, to help us troubleshoot and keep the JADOC system up and operating.

We solicited JWACS, Joint Warfare and Analysis Center, for some help in conducting analysis and assessments, and they graciously agreed to help, and have a team over here to help us work our assessments and analysis.

In fact, I just got a briefing before our meeting on an analysis of the Baghdad sewer system and where potentially we could focus effort and resources to get it up
and running.

I'm interested in the assessment piece, and what struck me coming into the command initially is just sitting in on whether the Force BUIS (Phonetic) or the Corps BUIS is very much the focus on metrics and the measurement of everything from the obvious, from the casualties we have had to how much power is pouring into Baghdad.

Can you give me a sense for what percentage of that originates from your office?

Actually, very little. The metrics that are discussed at the BUIS predominantly, at least at the MNC-I BUIS, are predominantly really just a collection of significant activities, IEDs, explosions, casualties, as you mentioned, and that's tracked in the JOC through a -- It's called the CIDNE Database, and I'm sorry. I don't know what CIDNE stands for.
Our Assessment Section in the JFEC is focused on the effects that we have developed and designed that meet with the Commander's objectives. So maybe if I take a step left and walk it to the right, maybe that will be a little clearer.

The Commander has got his mission and his intent and his objectives. We have taken his objectives and his intent, and we have created effects that we want to achieve consistent with those objectives.

Then we measure our progress against those effects. That's what the Assessment Cell here does, and they do that by roughly 150 indicators are out there that we can collect on, can then analysis those and come up with an assessment of are we making progress or not.

Can you give me some sense of that 150? What kind of things
went in the sampling of that?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sure. I'm going to pull out my effects assessment board, and I'm happy to give you a copy of this.

(b)(3), (b)(6): If you could e-mail it later, that would be great.

(b)(6): Is that on the -- Is that posted on the --

(b)(3), (b)(6): It should be on our portal.

(b)(6): On your portal?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. But for example, our effect number 1: Population secured, and violence reduced. That's the effect that we want to achieve.

Supporting that effect, there are five measures of effectiveness, and then for each measure of effectiveness there are indicators that feed that measure of effectiveness, and our assessment cell takes those indicators and, for example, I just described population secured and violence
reduced has five measures of effectiveness, MOEs.

One of them is "decrease in the number of execution and murders" would be a measure of effectiveness against the effect. There are two indicators that feed that measure of effectiveness, and those are the number of murders and the number of executions. And we collect on those two data points or indicators, which then tell us if we have had an increase or a decrease, which then tells us if we are achieving the effect that we want to.

(b6): Let me follow up on that. When you achieve an effect of reduced murders or executions, how can you tell whether the Corps, the Multinational -- the Coalition is having that effect or it's just a cycle drawdown or a cycle increase? How do you connect the effect of, say, a lower murder rate to MNC operations?

(b3), (b6): Well, it gets
back to linkage. I think what you're asking is --

(b)(6): Right.

(b)(3), (b)(6): The linkage is to the effect, which is population secured and violence reduced. That's the overarching effect.

(b)(6): It seems to me you can assume, or one can assume, that decreased presence in Baghdad is having an effect on decreased murders, but you don't really know there is a solid linkage there.

(b)(3), (b)(6): In other words, how do you screen for other variables, in a sense? In other words, were murders down last week because it was a religious holiday or were murders down because we had more boots on the ground?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Well, that's the beauty of having a human involved in this, because, you know, the commander and the staff have got to look at that. And what I
just described was one indicator --

-- of one effect
-- of one measure of effect in this -- of one effect.

-- We have -- Right now we have nine effects-
nine effects with about 40 measures of effectiveness and 150 indicators, and all those feed in, and it is somewhat scientific, but then the art of it becomes when you sit down and look at the data over time and apply some judgments.

So there's still an interpretive (Inaudible) or an analysis based on that?

Absolutely.

Given that one of the things that's pressing on MNF-I and MNC-I, of course, is this political aspect that's this deadline of
Congress that General Petraeus is going to speak to -- Is this ultimately in the source document by which, presumably, either General Odierno or General Petraeus kind of lays this on the desk, so to speak? How close --

(b)(3), (b)(6): I don't think it will be the source document. I think it will be a very significant piece of the assessment that General Petraeus has to report on in September.

Another piece, obviously, will be the benchmarks that Congress has laid out, the 18 benchmarks in the supplemental. Right now, I believe that MNF will largely be responsible for preparing that assessment of those 18 benchmarks, but whatever we have to do to feed MNF-I our assessments and our thoughts on it, we are, obviously, going to do.

(b)(3), (b)(6): How regularly is this briefed to General Odierno?

(b)(3), (b)(6): By design, once a
month.

(b)(3), (b)(6) And that's briefed by General McDonald?

(b)(3), (b)(6) It is briefed by, actually, the Chief of Assessments.

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) briefs that. General McDonald is there. I'm there, and --

(b)(3), (b)(6) And the briefer.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Right. But he is the guy -- He's the briefer, but in the briefing as well is the Corps staff that is responsible for the line of operation. For security, there is a C-3 rep who is there to look at the external assessment, separate assessment coming in.

The C-3 rep knows what is going on day to day and has a -- is familiar with what's going on. So now we have a meeting between the two, and do they agree, because the empirical data and the assessment and analysis of that empirical data may differ.
from what the C-3 believes on security, and
some cases they don't agree. And that's
okay. That's very -- Again, I think that's
very healthy, because then it provides the
Commander, okay, well, the numbers tell me
this; the guy on the ground tells me this.
Where do I go to make my decisions? And
that's the iterative -- the iterative part of
it and the art part of it.

I want to ask you
about another piece that just caught my
attention, too, the polling. Can you
describe for me, in the context of what you
are describing here, what kind of polling are
we talking about? Who does it? Who is
polled?

We have a number
of polling contracts. They are conducted
mostly by Iraqis. They do not know that they
are polling for us. They believe that they
are polling for academia and universities and
maybe for the government of Iraq.
And is that just a contract structure, some kind of conduit between MNC-I and --

Yes, and Joint Contracting Command does all the contracting piece of it. We don't contract it ourselves out of the JFEC. We have provided a Statement of Work, and then the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq, JCCI -- they do all the leg work to actually let the contract and all.

Are there a particular set of issues that are the ones we are looking for out of the polling data?

Absolutely. We ask -- We want to poll to answer those indicators that are in our assessments architecture. So all those indicators, for those that you can actually ask a person about, we ask those questions.

I'm curious to know -- a totally different avenue. But
there is a team -- I believe, mostly they are on contract -- of Iraqi Americans who serve as kind of an advisory cell. Do some of those belong to the FECs?

They do. Well, they are associated with the JFEC. They are not really assigned. That's the IQATF, Iraqi Advisors Task Force that is the organization, and I do not know exactly how many they are. We have four that work with us in our linkage to cultural issues, atmospherics coming out of the Iraqis that are passed up the IQATF lines perchance.

So in a sense, they are a resource in our work.

Right.

But you've got four of them who are able to work with you.

Right. And they are actually the senior -- In the IQATF hierarchy, they are the senior IQATF advisors in the Corps, and we have a Sunni, a Shia, a
Christian and a Kurd. So we are very fortunate to have the cross-section of the religious framework.

I have a couple of specific questions.

Walk me through a typical day with you, if any day is typical. What do you do? Give me a typical day.

Typical day? By hour?

Well, you know, blocks of hours.

The first part of the day is reserved for a little bit e-mail to see what has happened overnight, the series of (Inaudible) was in the morning, a couple of follow-on meetings from the (Inaudible), just to stay synchronized with the staff, and then within the JFEC a meeting following that to stay synchronized with their operations.

Depending on what day of the week
it is, there will be -- may or may not be a Corps meeting of some sort, Corps staff meeting or a briefing to attend. Bouncing off General McDonald to see what areas he's covering. He tends to focus more outwardly toward MNF. I tend to focus more inward in the Corps across the Corps staff and down.

(b)(6): We are pausing?

(Off the record briefly.)

Okay, back from a brief pause. You were describing how your day was. You meet with General McDonald, and --

(b)(3), (b)(6) Right. And if you think through the organization of the JFEC, I'll be working and touching base with all those sections, just working actions and issues that are occurring within those sections throughout the day.

An occasional trip to the International Zone to meet with economics issues, information operations issues, to
attend some meetings there. I can't think of a typical day.

I was just trying to get an idea of your own battle rhythm. But what do you think you spend most of your time on as a Deputy?

Most of my time? Keeping situational awareness of what's going on in all those areas within the JFEC so we can stay in front of it, not get behind, keep the Commander informed, keep the ECORD (Phonetic) informed, help subordinate units.

What keeps you up at night? What do you worry about? Do you think -- You already indicated or sort of indicated if that effects briefing assessment team is headed in the right direction and we've got the right strategy, good Corps strategy. Just published 0701 lays it out pretty well, but what do you worry about? What do you think is out there that we don't

*SECRET*
know we don't know yet?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Mostly, very recently within the past month or so, the thing that's keeping me up at night is the ability of the government of Iraq and the Coalition, to some degree, able to handle what I believe is going to be a groundswell of Iraqis that have just had it with AQI, want to fight AQI.

(b)(6): That sounds like a good problem to have.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. Oh, it's a great problem to have, but what keeps me up is can we, the GOI -- when I say, I mean everyone -- Can we accommodate the desires and will of those people, because if we can't, we have failed them, and where else are they going to go now?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Missed opportunity.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. Missed opportunity. I mean, AQI at one point and the
militias at one point were providing for the people. Well, they are tired of it. They are tired of violence. If the GOI can't provide for them, they've left one -- You know, they've left the AQI and the militias to come to GOI, and if GOI can't provide for them, where do they go now?

That's what keeps me up at night recently, in the past 30 days, because we see more and more people are saying we are fed up with AQI.

What keeps me up long term? The death of our soldiers, the families of those soldiers that have died.

I want to take you back a little bit. You were discussing how you fit into III Corps before you deployed here. Were you able to go to any of those pre-deployment exercises?

Oh, absolutely. Yes. Went to academics. Went to the MRX -- MRE/MRX ramp-up. Yes, we did, absolutely,
participate in that.

And did you go on the pre-deployment site visit?

I did.

So you got to see how V Corps was operating?

Yes. I was fortunate. In January of '06, I was the Corps Artillery Commander at the time, and I had 3,000 soldiers from Corps Artillery deployed over here driving trucks, doing non-standard artillery missions.

So I was able to come over and visit them, and while I was over here, I came up and visited V Corps, which was very early on in their deployment. So I had that opportunity to kind of look and see how V Corps was doing, and then as you said, I did come on the PDSS when we came over in August.

When you came over in August and came back, you probably spent about, what, a week here?
Yes, I think seven or eight days.

What was your impression of how the Effects Cell here at V Corps was running, if you remember?

I do remember. I felt -- and this is not a criticism. So please, I don't want it to be on record as a criticism. But it appeared to me that a good portion of the staff, the Effects piece and the overall staff, were in a grind.

They were just grinding on a weekly meeting to produce a product. That was my observation, that the staff was just grinding.

What that prevented, in my opinion, key staff officers from doing was to step back and think, instead of being focused on process and following a route battle rhythm, every meeting -- you know, every Tuesday we are going to have this meeting and so forth -- and just, I didn't think, allowed...
people to think and read and understand and
keep situational awareness of what was going
on and what was required to help the
Divisions. That was my observation, and it's
-- That's not a criticism.

I think I just have
one more.

You said the results in the number
of positive -- you said earlier you were
seeing a number of positive indicators in
atmospherics. I wonder, could you provide
just one or two examples of those positive
indicators?

I think, since
(Phonetic) began, sectarian
violence is down. I think, if you look at
the casualties, they are down over the past
60 days. I think, if you look at the work
that MNC-I, MMF-I, Embassy officials have
done in reconstruction, basic services, that
there is progress, albeit not as fast as we
would like.
For example, when we arrived, the sewer system in Baghdad was in shambles. It still is in bad shape, but a lot of the effort was going into fix small pieces of the sewer system based on separate, independent analyses of the problem rather than a systemic, holistic view of the sewer system.

Over the past six months or so, the collective we, MNC-I Headquarters, not the JFEC, not any one person but just the staff, worked very hard with MNF and GRD, Gulf Regional Division, to complete a holistic analysis, and now have identified the critical nodes that have to be repaired.

What's really good about that story is the government -- I'm sorry, the Iraqis are now in those meetings and those analyses. You know, to put it pretty simply, the sewer guy from Rashid is now at the meeting saying here's my problem and, no, that's not the problem. So I think we've brought in the Iraqis to solve some of the...
problems.

I think, if you read some of the atmospherics from the IQATF, which we talked about earlier, the cultural advisors, and read some of their reports, there are indications that there's positive momentum, but there are also indications of not so positive momentum. So is it balanced? No, it's not balanced perfectly, but I sense some forward movement.

(b)(6): I said I had -- that was my last, but I do have one --

(b)(3), (b)(6): That's quite all right.

(b)(6) When you got here, you were under MNF run by General Casey. On the 10th of February, of course, General Petraeus and his new staff came in.

I wondered if you could comment on any perceived differences between the two, even if they are just style.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. Well,
style is an obvious. Different style. I think the biggest difference between the two commanders is General Petraeus' engagement of his staff to keep focused at the strategic level and the GOI.

I think he's got -- If you look at the BUIS (Phonetic) that occurred before General Petraeus came, and look at the ones that are now, you will see a much different focus or orientation of the Multinational Forces staff. They are focused on things that -- where we need them to be focused on: Governance, political things, significant reconstruction, those things that need interface with the government of Iraq.

I think that's the biggest difference between the two commanders.

That's all I have.

I have one last one, if you will oblige me.

Oh, sure.

I just wanted to
know, relative to the fact that III Corps kind of came in under an operational plan which was essentially one of, hey, continue to sort of draw back and very quickly moved instead into a now we are going to surge with five additional brigades, does that pose any unique challenges to the Effects Section?

I wouldn't say unique challenges, and I don't think challenges anymore so than any other of the staff sections other than just an increase in workload and Op tempo.

My last question will just be: Is there anything we haven't asked you that you are still thinking, hey, they didn't ask me this; this is kind of important. I want to make sure this gets said.

Anything that's still on your mind that we haven't touched on?

No, I can't think of anything. I'm really excited that you all
are doing this, and I hope it will be able to get out maybe in an unclassified version somehow. Otherwise, our history will be on the shelves in the library at Fort Leavenworth or at Carlisle or wherever it ends up.

I think there's a great story to tell, and I hope we can just get it out.

(Several words inaudible) The Center is committed to do it, but it will be based on -- Well, go ahead.

Okay. We'll go ahead and conclude this interview.