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UNITED STATES ARMY
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW OF

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

EFFECTS DEPUTY

MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

+ + + + +

9 JUNE 2007

HEADQUARTERS, MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from
tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of
Military History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian. Today is Saturday, the 9th of June 2007 at approximately 1500.

I am here at the Multinational Corps Headquarters at Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, and also with me is --

(b)(6): This is (b)(6)

(b)(6), U.S. Army Center of Military History.

(b)(3), (b)(6): And we are

interviewing (b)(3), (b)(6), who is the Deputy of the Effects Section.

(b)(3), (b)(6), could you go ahead

and introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial, last name, and correct me if I didn't get your title absolutely book straight.

(b)(3), (b)(6) That's okay. My

name is (b)(3), (b)(6)

Regular Army. I am the Deputy Effects

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1 Coordinator. I actually wear two hats. The
2 other hat that I wear is the Fire Support
3 Coordinator for the Corps.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Can you
5 give me a little bit of your professional
6 background?

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Approved for Release

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(b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

That's pretty

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good. Actually, that answered somewhat one

11

of my questions, because I was going to ask

12

you relative to being the commander for

13

Artillery relative to this billet.

14

Were you stationed at Fort Sill or

15

at Fort Hood?

16

(b)(3), (b)(6)

At Fort Hood.

17

The III Corps Artillery Headquarters was at

18

Fort Sill.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

: So when the Corps

20

Artillery furlled its colors, did you

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physically transfer down to Fort Hood?

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

: Well, I decided

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1 that it would be easier on soldiers and
2 families for all those soldiers that were
3 going to deploy with us to keep them at Fort
4 Sill and then just join the Corps for the
5 deployment.

6 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : With the rest to
7 be sorted out upon return?

8 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Right. When we
9 redeploy, the soldiers will either stay at
10 Fort Sill in one of the two fire brigades
11 that are there, could go to The Artillery
12 School. That's obviously at Fort Sill, or
13 just PCS to another Army requirement.

14 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : I'm going to get
15 into the overall structure of the Effects
16 Section, but before I do, can you give me a
17 sense for how many people came with you, if
18 you will, from III Corps Artillery that
19 formed part of the Effects Cell?

20 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Yes. [1.4a]

21 [1.4a]

22 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : That are here

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1 with you?

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, came from
3 Fort Sill, and there's about [redacted] 1.4a that came
4 from the Fire Support cell that was at Fort
5 Hood, organic to the Corps Headquarters. So
6 we are right at [redacted] 1.4a total.

7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Let me segue then
8 into: Can you kind of give me the basic
9 laydown of the Effects Cell? How many people
10 are there, and I know there are many diverse
11 elements to it, but if you can do your best
12 to kind of describe what those elements and
13 what your strength is.

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Sure. Well, the
15 strength -- Here in the Palace, in the
16 Headquarters, is of the JFEC, the Joint Fires
17 and Effects Cell is about [redacted] 1.4a Actually, I'm
18 sorry, closer to [redacted] 1.4a And you mentioned it.

19 it is quite a -- what word did you use?

20 [redacted] Complex.
21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, complex.
22 [redacted] Diverse.

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1 [REDACTED] Diverse. That
2 was the word, I think, you used. It is made
3 up of several sections that comprise the
4 JFEC. The first one is the Force Field
5 Artillery Section, which really is a residual
6 from the Corps Artillery Headquarters.

7 The Corps Artillery Headquarters,
8 like any artillery organization, battalion or
9 above, in the Army is the Force Field
10 Artillery Headquarters, and in III Corps it
11 was Corps Artillery.

12 As a result, the transformation
13 and modularity and corps becoming
14 unencumbered Corps Artilleries inactivated,
15 but it is my view, always has been and always
16 will, that as long as there is a fire support
17 function in whatever we are doing, the
18 commander is going to look to the senior fire
19 supporter to address the commander's
20 concerns.

21 So although the Corps Artillery
22 Headquarters inactivated, I felt it important

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1 to have those functions still resident in the
2 Corps Headquarters, so when the boss says,
3 hey, what about air power or what about field
4 artillery surface to surface fires, or what
5 about non-lethal fires, he's got the fire
6 support coordinator to look to .

7 [(b)(6)] : Let me ask something
8 here. Doesn't modularity, though, account
9 for that, or not?

10 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Well, it does,
11 but barely. The authorized strength of a
12 fire support element in a modular corps,
13 unencumbered corps, is roughly [1.4a] Now we
14 could not do what we are doing today in this
15 corps with [1.4a] people. It's just physically
16 impossible.

17 So that's the Force Field
18 Artillery Headquarters function that I wanted
19 to keep for the Corps, and essentially that's
20 surface to surface fires, central management
21 radars, sourcing of those two assets or
22 capability, I should say. That's what the

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1 Force Field Artillery function does.

2 The next section is the Electronic
3 Warfare Coordination Cell. Our Army doctrine
4 says that electronic warfare falls under
5 Information Operations. We don't believe
6 that. We believe that electronic warfare is
7 a non-lethal fire and, therefore, should be
8 planned, coordinated, synchronized, and
9 managed by a fire supporter. That's why in
10 this Headquarters today EWCC is subordinate
11 to the JFEC.

12 There's two components to that,
13 ground and air, and in this theater it is
14 unique because of the IED threat and the
15 actions we take to counter that threat with
16 electronic warfare. So our EWCC Section has
17 both air and ground representation in it.

18 Although not directly assigned to
19 the JFEC, we have a very close relationship
20 with the United States Air Force; and if you
21 look on our diagram I sent you, it's got a
22 dotted line. That's because in this theater

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1 CENTCOM has -- Actually, it's the Air
2 Component Commander, Lieutenant General
3 North, has got command and control of Air
4 Force assets, but we learned in OIF-I that
5 the interdependence of air and ground power
6 is essential, and it's one thing that I am
7 personally very proud of, is the relationship
8 between -- in freak-war between air and
9 ground.

10 We've always had a very good
11 relationship with the ALO (Phonetic). You'll
12 notice the General Officer in Charge. His
13 office is there. Next to him is the ALO, and
14 next to him is the FIS Corps (Phonetic).
15 That's just representative.

16 There's a reason for that, because
17 we talk, and we have a very good
18 relationship.

19 We have an Assessment Cell. We
20 decided preparing for this rotation that, as
21 part of assessing how we are doing, you need
22 to have a capability to do that that is

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1 divorced from those that planned the
2 operation.

3 We thought that, if you grade your
4 own paper, you'll give yourself an A, but if
5 you have someone external to the planners
6 that can look at the results of what is going
7 on, that will more of value to the Commander
8 as the Commander does his own assessments.

9 So our Assessment Cell is about
10 five guys, very heavy in the ORSA (Phonetic)
11 background, operations, research, systems
12 analysis, and they -- That's all they do day
13 in and day out, is manage the polling data,
14 collect data, analyze it, and then we take
15 that once a month down to -- off of what the
16 subject matter expert on the staff believes
17 is going on, and then present that to the
18 Commander. Then he will make a decision
19 whether, you know, are we doing things right,
20 are we doing the right things.

21 Information Operations: In the
22 non-deployed Corps Headquarters, you have an

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1 IO Chief, Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel,
2 and one or two IO guys, and that's it. But
3 now we are a deployed JPF. The IO Section is
4 much more robust.

5 The given IO is also a non-lethal
6 fire. It's underneath the JFEC. Actually,
7 the IO Section in and of itself is, if you
8 count all the combat camera crewmen and all
9 of the people that he's got, he's over 1.4a
10 people. So quite a robust information
11 operations capability.


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1.4a, 1.4g

Let me see the chart. Can't remember all these guys off the top of my head.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

You know, you have a complicated (Inaudible).

(b)(3), (b)(6)

We have a small section down on the JOC which essentially goes day to day, 99 percent of the time, lethal fires, and is both surface to surface and air to surface fires, representative to the CHOPS (Phonetic) for day to day OSP.

We have a traditional Targeting Section that you would find in any Headquarters, small, but different than -- in scope. In old days when we were fighting the Russians, it was pretty easy. You targeted tanks and artillery systems.

The difference in this fight is we

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1.4a, 1.4g

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

; Is that lethal

7

and non-lethal targeting?

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

: That's correct.

9

The last section that falls under the JFEC is just getting stood up, and it is focused on engagements and reconciliation. As more and more of the Iraqi populous get tired of AQI, Al Qaeda in Iraq, we are recognizing that there needs to be a way to understand, synchronize, and provide guidance to subordinates on reconciliation between those that don't want to fight and those that do.

19

(b)(6)

That section (Several words inaudible) that go out and --

21

(b)(3), (b)(6)

: And action

22

officers mostly. Our actually engagers, the

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1 people that do the engagements, are really a
2 kind of leadership.

3 Now this is just getting started
4 in the past couple of weeks. So we are in
5 uncharted territory, but --

6 [REDACTED] (b)(6): Does the Force take
7 the lead in that and you support, or what?

8 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): The Force is
9 standing up a similar capability, but will be
10 focused at the strategic level of
11 engagements. We are more focused at really
12 understanding what's going on in the
13 divisions and their relationships between
14 reconcilable groups, their tribal
15 relationships. And that's our role.

16 We really just got to understand
17 it, and then help them when it gets to the
18 point of getting help from Force and the
19 Government of Iraq.

20 [REDACTED] (b)(6): And that's strictly a
21 COIN kind of effort. Right?

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): Absolutely.

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1 Well, that's my only experience. So
2 absolutely. But, yeah, it's very much COIN.

3 [REDACTED]: And the way in
4 which the Effects Cell was built, at what
5 point and what kind of initial guidance did
6 the Commanding General give as far as how he
7 wanted the Effects Cell structured for this
8 fight? Was there a lot of thought in it?
9 Did you pretty much follow what the V Corps
10 was doing for you? How would you describe
11 that evolution?

12 [REDACTED]: We took a look at
13 what V Corps had, and the overarching
14 philosophy coming in was, you know, we needed
15 to do a (Inaudible) doctrinally, and that's
16 following what they had.

17 We made a few tweaks before we
18 came here, because we knew we were going to
19 be -- There were some things that just better
20 suited the personality of our leadership than
21 V Corps. Not critical against V Corps at
22 all, just different commanders have different

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1 personalities.

2 So we tweaked it a little bit, but
3 not a whole lot. So we essentially fell in
4 on what V Corps was doing.

5 The Commander's guidance was
6 really focused on one thing, and that was the
7 output: What are we as the Corps staff doing
8 to provide output to help subordinate
9 commanders?

10 So he wasn't overly concerned with
11 precisely how many sections we had or who was
12 in that section. His overarching guidance to
13 us was we got to be organized such that what
14 we do is not necessarily process focused, but
15 output focused.

16 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : At what point --
17 and the Cell has a Brigadier General who is
18 in charge of it. Correct? General McDonald?

19 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : That's correct.

20 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : At what point was
21 General McDonald brought into this? Of
22 course, that's not the normal structure

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1 either. Was that something that also
2 paralleled the V Corps, and can you kind of
3 speak to his role and when he was brought in?

4 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. It goes
5 back to the Corps Artillery Headquarters.
6 The Corps Artillery Headquarters Commander
7 was a Brigadier General.

8 General McDonald joined the Corps
9 about a year ago in June or '06, and reported
10 to the Corps at Fort Hood as the Effects
11 Coordinator. This is also related to
12 JIFCOM's effects based approach or effects
13 based operations doc. where there was an
14 Effects Coordinator.

15 We could probably talk for the
16 next week on effects based operations, the
17 pros and cons. But I would tell you that the
18 fact that there is a General Officer here is
19 good. It's required, because of the
20 relationships that he develops at Force and,
21 in many cases, with members of the GOI. My
22 opinion is that a Colonel would have a

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1 difficult time maintaining those
2 relationships and working some of the issues
3 at those levels.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Can you speak to
5 me a little bit about what is the
6 relationship with higher headquarters? What
7 is the relationship between the FECS and MNF-
8 I? Is there a comparative Cell, or is really
9 covering both?

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) : There is a
11 comparative cell called Strat Effects. It is
12 not -- I wouldn't call it a mirror image,
13 because they do some things that we don't.

14 For example, Strat Effects is very
15 much focused on communications. Take, for
16 example, Major General Caldwell and now
17 General (Inaudible). They are the Deputy
18 Chief of Staff for Strat Effects at MNF.
19 They spend a great amount of their time on
20 communications, strategic communications.

21 Whereas, here in MNC-I we have a
22 linkage to Public Affairs and communications,

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1 but not -- Since we have Information
2 Operations, we have to keep a separation
3 between IO and Public Affairs, or the law.
4 So that's why we don't have a -- The Public
5 Affairs Section is not in the JFEC, because
6 we keep those two separate, although we talk
7 between IO and PA, and have a weekly meeting
8 just to ensure that our communications,
9 messages and things are consistent between IO
10 and PA.

11 Part of the effects that we are
12 working, obviously, are economics,
13 governance, and we have a linkage to our
14 Corps C-9, Corps C-7, the reconstruction also
15 on a C-7; whereas, Strat Effects has those
16 sections within Strat Effects, Strat Effects
17 Economics, Strat Effects Governance.

18 So I wouldn't call them a mirror
19 image. I would call them related.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6): What is the
21 relationship there? Is there a lot of --
22 what I'm looking for is the nature of the

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1 relationship one that is more directive or
2 collaborative?

3 [redacted] Collaborative.

4 [redacted] Are they focused
5 mostly at what I have heard called the
6 strategic level, and you do more at the
7 operational level, more at the mission level?

8 [redacted] Yes. That's the
9 way it is designed, and we do our absolute
10 best to try and keep it that way. What we
11 don't want is the Force Headquarters worrying
12 about what, you know, Company A of 166 Armor
13 is doing on whatever they are doing. So it's
14 collaborative.

15 [redacted]: What is the
16 relationship down the chain? Are they like
17 elements in (Inaudible)? What is your
18 typical contact at the brigade level on how
19 they are executing?

20 [redacted]: Each of our
21 divisions has a Fire Support Coordinator who
22 also usually -- Yes, in all of our divisions

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1 also dual-acts the Effects Coordinator for
2 the Division, and work similar items.

3 I would call it closer to a mirror
4 image from this Headquarters down to
5 Divisions than our Headquarters to MNF.

6 [redacted] (b)(6) : Are they at the
7 Division level or is that Fire Support
8 Coordinator -- is he an 06?

9 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes.

10 [redacted] (b)(6) So he would be like
11 the old Div Arty --

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right. He would
13 be, but we no longer have any Div Arties,
14 unfortunately, for the record.

15 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) I want to take
16 you back a little bit, because we had talked
17 about the structure of the section, and you
18 initially told me about how many folks came
19 from III Corps Artillery, and you talked
20 about the strength being about [redacted] 1.4a people in
21 the Cell.

22 I just want to make sure I'm

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1 tracking right, because you also said just in
2 one area there's [1.4a] people.

3 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Right. I
4 probably mixed some apples and oranges.

5 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : You said the
6 Combat Camera had about [1.4a]

7 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Well, no, Combat
8 Camera is part of IO, but they are not here.
9 They are out and about, but they are
10 underneath IO.

11 So are you asking the strength
12 just in the Headquarters or the --

13 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] I'm looking for -
14 - Yes, the strength in the Headquarters, and
15 if you can give me a sense for -- For
16 instance, I'm guessing the Electronic Warfare
17 Coordination Cell, if we are talking about
18 aviation and ground -- I'm interested to know
19 do they directly report to you or are they
20 assets you have access to, I guess, and how
21 that affects your overall numbers in terms of
22 if you were to sort of roll it up and say --

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. Well,
2 there is a collage here of individual
3 augmentees, of people that are assigned to
4 III Corps, of people that are assigned to
5 JCCS-I, the Navy outfit that is working
6 electronic warfare.

7 So all those kind of mesh
8 together. So what I can tell you is we
9 brought about [redacted] 1.4a from Fort Sill, and we have
10 about [redacted] 1.4a for the -- The rest of the
11 structure is -- like EWCC is all individual
12 augmentees.

13 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : This Engagement
15 Cell: Well, we took the Engagement Cell out
16 of hide. We built that out of hide.

17 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : How about IO?
18 For instance, today. Were they all augments?

19 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Well, the MNC-I
20 IO Chief is an individual augmentee, full
21 Colonel. The Corps IO Officer that came with
22 us from III Corps is a Lieutenant Colonel.

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1 He's the Deputy IO.

2 It's just that there is a
3 difference there between the Corps MTO&E,
4 Modified Table of Organization and Equipment,
5 and a JTF.

6 [REDACTED] Joint Task Force.
7 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right, the Joint
8 Task Force. Right. The Joint Manning
9 Document takes individual augmentees and the
10 Corps' MTO&E, comes together to make the
11 manning document for the MNC-I Headquarters.

12 [REDACTED] : As you come into
13 this environment -- and I'm looking at this
14 point from your arrival here to where we are
15 now in the fight -- what's been the biggest
16 challenge of managing this peace call Effects
17 and --

18 [REDACTED] : For me
19 personally?

20 [REDACTED] Yes, for your
21 personally and just structurally, and how is
22 it working, I guess, is the question?

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1 [REDACTED] I would say,
2 keeping my fingers on all of those diverse
3 organizations and what they do is the most
4 challenging thing for me personally.

5 Is it working? I would say --
6 Well, to answer that question, I got to look
7 at the results. And if you look at the
8 results that the Corps has achieved since
9 TOA, we are seeing a number of good, positive
10 indicators, pulling data, statistics,
11 analysis of those statistics, atmospheric,
12 and there are, like I said, a number of good
13 trends.

14 So is it working? I look at the
15 results and say, yes, we think it's working,
16 cautiously, optimistically.

17 Are there some internal things
18 internally within the Corps Headquarters and
19 the staff that we are doing differently than
20 what we thought? Yes. But again, you know,
21 we came in with how we thought we would
22 fight. Then we adapted, and I think we are

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1 making slow progress.

2 [REDACTED]: Can you talk to me
3 about that piece of how those effects
4 integrate with the rest of the staff?

5 [REDACTED] Roger. We spent
6 several months dialoguing and designing how
7 we would plug into the Corps staff; and if
8 you look in our organization chart and see
9 the C-37 Plans and the C-35 FUOPS, when we
10 designed it, we wanted to have
11 representatives from each functional area of
12 the staff resident in those two planning
13 horizons, and we are doing that to a large
14 degree, but not completely.

15 [REDACTED]: In what way, not
16 completely?

17 [REDACTED]: Just through some
18 challenges with people, personnel manning,
19 that we don't have a --

20 [REDACTED]: Can't dedicate
21 somebody full time?

22 [REDACTED] Right.

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1 [REDACTED] Is that something
2 that was talked about before deploying, that
3 this was how you were going to do it, and was
4 that the same as what V Corps had done or
5 something new?

6 [REDACTED]: No, it was
7 different than what V Corps did. It would
8 really take a lengthy discussion to explain
9 to you how we built this and came up with it.

10 I'm trying to think how I can make it down a
11 bit.

12 [REDACTED]: You know, it seems
13 logical that you have those cells to embed in
14 those other -- especially the three staff
15 sections, to help plan, especially in the
16 plans, meaning FUOPS. Is that one of them?

17 [REDACTED] Yes, FUOPS,
18 right.

19 [REDACTED]: And help write the
20 orders. So I mean, it seems -- From an
21 outsider, it seems kind of logical that you
22 would want something like that.

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1 [REDACTED]: Right. And if I
2 had to give myself a grade on how the Corps
3 is executing what we designed to come into, I
4 would give it a B. There's just -- Actually,
5 my assessment is that there is more going on,
6 the Op tempo is higher than we designed FUOPS
7 for.

8 The JOC, which is really current
9 ops, they are just so inundated with day to
10 day, hour by hour, things happening out on
11 the battlefield that they cannot be a
12 planning horizon. We thought that they might
13 be able to handle one to three, maybe five
14 days planning and coordination. The fact is
15 they just can't. It's just -- There's too
16 much going on.

17 So as a result, FUOPS is picking
18 up many of the three to five-day requirements
19 that we thought the JOC could handle, and
20 what that has caused is some of our
21 operations and missions are going into FUOPS,
22 and there's just not enough C-7 planners, C-9

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31

1 planners, you know, effects planners or fires
2 planners to get at all those at the same
3 time.

4 So I think the design is
5 fundamentally very sound. It's just a matter
6 of some personnel shortages and working it.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6): Let me take you
8 in a different direction. As you look at
9 where you are now in your tenure, and because
10 you are in some really interesting pieces of
11 this, what in your mind comes up as the
12 couple of either systems or systems events,
13 functions that have been real success
14 stories?

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) I would go back
16 to what our boss told us initially, and
17 that's output and helping the divisions. The
18 feedback that I get in here is that our
19 divisions are appreciative of the work that
20 the Corps Headquarters is doing.

21 You are always going to have that
22 friction between a unit and its higher

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32

1 headquarters, and that's probably pretty
2 healthy. To me, it's healthy. But we have
3 received a lot of feedback that we are
4 providing service to, helping, and are of
5 value to the divisions, and that makes me
6 feel very good.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) I want to take
8 you a little deeper into some of those and
9 ask about some of the unique systems, if I
10 could, Excaliber being one that just kind of
11 comes to mind as a system that's new on the
12 horizon.

13 Do you have visibility on the
14 success of this at this level or is that
15 something you push down to someone in your
16 section for later?

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) We have
18 visibility of it. I have the Force Field
19 Artillery Section. They manage that. It's a
20 new weapons system. It resulted from an
21 operational needs statement from Iraq -- not
22 one that we did -- a couple of years ago.

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33

1 Well, I don't know exactly when they did it,
2 but that's how the weapon got designed.

3 (b)(6) Can I interrupt you
4 here briefly to explain what Excaliber is?

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Certainly.

6
7
8 1.4a, 1.4g
9

10 For those that are familiar with
11 artillery, it is similar to, but very

12
13
14
15
16
17 1.4a, 1.4g
18
19
20
21

22 It's a great weapon. We are just

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34

1 getting it now where we fielded three
2 divisions so far and have one more to go. We
3 have fired it already as part of the fielding
4 process, and with incredible effect. It's
5 very accurate.

6 [REDACTED]: Do you know when
7 the first use of the system was, by any
8 chance?

9 [REDACTED]: I do. I'll see
10 if I can remember. 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field
11 Artillery in Taji.

12 [REDACTED]: And when would
13 that have been? Do you know?

14 [REDACTED]: About two weeks
15 ago, maybe three weeks ago. How about May
16 '07? Is that close enough?

17 [REDACTED]: Sure. No big
18 problem.

19 Any unique requirements on the
20 (Inaudible) artillery piece?

21 [REDACTED] No, it fires from
22 a standard Palladin howitzer. There's a

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35

1 couple of hardware, radio interface, cables,
2 things that has to be done. But no, there is
3 nothing really significant.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6): I don't want to
5 take you too much deeper into that, because I
6 know (several words inaudible). But a
7 totally different direction: You are
8 constantly dealing with a lot of unique areas
9 and big systems, are some of the staff that
10 work under Effects -- are they civilian
11 contractors who are helping your field
12 systems or provide the technical consultation
13 that may unique compared to other areas
14 within the Multinational Corps?

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) We came over with
16 one civilian assigned who joined a team of
17 civilians that had the same skill set, and
18 that's to be FSR Field Service
19 representatives to JADOCS, Joint Air Deep
20 Operations Coordination System, which is just
21 an automated system to help us manage joint
22 fires.

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36

1 [REDACTED] That's the JCCI,
2 you say?

3 [REDACTED]: No. No.

4 [REDACTED] Sorry, I lost
5 you. I'll go back and check it on the tape.

6 [REDACTED]: Okay. So one
7 civilian assigned to the Corps Headquarters
8 that came with us from Hood, and they joined,
9 like I said, I think, two others that are
10 already in theater, and they are just FSRs
11 for JADOCs, to help us troubleshoot and keep
12 the JADOC system up and operating.

13 We solicited JWACS, Joint Warfare
14 and Analysis Center, for some help in
15 conducting analysis and assessments, and they
16 graciously agreed to help, and have a team
17 over here to help us work our assessments and
18 analysis.

19 In fact, I just got a briefing
20 before our meeting on an analysis of the
21 Baghdad sewer system and where potentially we
22 could focus effort and resources to get it up

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37

1 and running.

2 [REDACTED] I'm interested in
3 the assessment piece, and what struck me
4 coming into the command initially is just
5 sitting in on whether the Force BUIS
6 (Phonetic) or the Corps BUIS is very much the
7 focus on metrics and the measurement of
8 everything from the obvious, from the
9 casualties we have had to how much power is
10 pouring into Baghdad.

11 Can you give me a sense for what
12 percentage of that originates from your
13 office?

14 [REDACTED]: Actually, very
15 little. The metrics that are discussed at
16 the BUIS predominantly, at least at the MNC-I
17 BUIS, are predominantly really just a
18 collection of significant activities, IEDs,
19 explosions, casualties, as you mentioned, and
20 that's tracked in the JOC through a -- It's
21 called the CIDNE Database, and I'm sorry. I
22 don't know what CIDNE stands for.

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1 [redacted] CID.

2 [redacted]: CIDNE, right.

3 Our Assessment Section in the JFEC is focused
4 on the effects that we have developed and
5 designed that meet with the Commander's
6 objectives. So maybe if I take a step left
7 and walk it to the right, maybe that will be
8 a little clearer.

9 The Commander has got his mission
10 and his intent and his objectives. We have
11 taken his objectives and his intent, and we
12 have created effects that we want to achieve
13 consistent with those objectives.

14 Then we measure our progress
15 against those effects. That's what the
16 Assessment Cell here does, and they do that
17 by roughly 150 indicators are out there that
18 we can collect on, can then analysis those
19 and come up with an assessment of are we
20 making progress or not.

21 [redacted]: Can you give me
22 some sense of that 150? What kind of things

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39

1 went in the sampling of that?

2 [REDACTED]: Sure. I'm going
3 to pull out my effects assessment board, and
4 I'm happy to give you a copy of this.

5 [REDACTED]: If you could e-
6 mail it later, that would be great.

7 [REDACTED]: Is that on the -- Is
8 that posted on the --

9 [REDACTED] It should be on
10 our portal.

11 [REDACTED]: On your portal?

12 [REDACTED]: Yes. But for
13 example, our effect number 1: Population
14 secured, and violence reduced. That's the
15 effect that we want to achieve.

16 Supporting that effect, there are
17 five measures of effectiveness, and then for
18 each measure of effectiveness there are
19 indicators that feed that measure of
20 effectiveness, and our assessment cell takes
21 those indicators and, for example, I just
22 described population secured and violence

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40

1 reduced has five measures of effectiveness,
2 MOEs.

3 One of them is "decrease in the
4 number of execution and murders" would be a
5 measure of effectiveness against the effect.

6 There are two indicators that feed that
7 measure of effectiveness, and those are the
8 number of murders and the number of
9 executions. And we collect on those two data
10 points or indicators, which then tell us if
11 we have had an increase or a decrease, which
12 then tells us if we are achieving the effect
13 that we want to.

14 (b)(6): Let me follow up on
15 that. When you achieve an effect of reduced
16 murders or executions, how can you tell
17 whether the Corps, the Multinational -- the
18 Coalition is having that effect or it's just
19 a cycle drawdown or a cycle increase? How do
20 you connect the effect of, say, a lower
21 murder rate to MNC operations?

22 (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, it gets

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1 back to linkage. I think what you're asking
2 is --

3 [(b)(6)]: Right.

4 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: The linkage is to
5 the effect, which is population secured and
6 violence reduced. That's the overarching
7 effect.

8 [(b)(6)]: It seems to me you can
9 assume, or one can assume, that decreased
10 presence in Baghdad is having an effect on
11 decreased murders, but you don't really know
12 there is a solid linkage there.

13 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: In other words,
14 how do you screen for other variables, in a
15 sense? In other words, were murders down
16 last week because it was a religious holiday
17 or were murders down because we had more
18 boots on the ground?

19 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Well, that's the
20 beauty of having a human involved in this,
21 because, you know, the commander and the
22 staff have got to look at that. And what I

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1 just described was one indicator --

2 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Right.

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : -- of one effect
4 -- of one measure of effect in this -- of one
5 effect.

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.
7 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : So when you take
8 -- We have -- Right now we have nine effects-
9 - nine effects with about 40 measures of
10 effectiveness and 150 indicators, and all
11 those feed in, and it is somewhat scientific,
12 but then the art of it becomes when you sit
13 down and look at the data over time and apply
14 some judgments.

15 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : So there's still
16 an interpretive (Inaudible) or an analysis
17 based on that?

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Absolutely.
19 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : How closely --
20 Given that one of the things that's pressing
21 on MNF-I and MNC-I, of course, is this
22 political aspect that's this deadline of

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1 Congress that General Petraeus is going to
2 speak to -- Is this ultimately in the source
3 document by which, presumably, either General
4 Odierno or General Petraeus kind of lays this
5 on the desk, so to speak? How close --

6 [REDACTED]: I don't think it
7 will be the source document. I think it will
8 be a very significant piece of the assessment
9 that General Petraeus has to report on in
10 September.

11 Another piece, obviously, will be
12 the benchmarks that Congress has laid out,
13 the 18 benchmarks in the supplemental. Right
14 now, I believe that MNF will largely be
15 responsible for preparing that assessment of
16 those 18 benchmarks, but whatever we have to
17 do to feed MNF-I our assessments and our
18 thoughts on it, we are, obviously, going to
19 do.

20 [REDACTED]: How regularly is
21 this briefed to General Odierno?

22 [REDACTED]: By design, once a

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1 month.

2 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : And that's
3 briefed by General McDonald?

4 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : It is briefed by,
5 actually, the Chief of Assessments.

6 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic)
7 briefs that. General McDonald is there. I'm
8 there, and --

9 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : And the briefer.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right. But he is
11 the guy -- He's the briefer, but in the
12 briefing as well is the Corps staff that is
13 responsible for the line of operation. For
14 security, there is a C-3 rep who is there to
15 look at the external assessment, separate
16 assessment coming in.

17 The C-3 rep knows what is going on
18 day to day and has a -- is familiar with
19 what's going on. So now we have a meeting
20 between the two, and do they agree, because
21 the empirical data and the assessment and
22 analysis of that empirical data may differ

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1 from what the C-3 believes on security, and
2 some cases they don't agree. And that's
3 okay. That's very -- Again, I think that's
4 very healthy, because then it provides the
5 Commander, okay, well, the numbers tell me
6 this; the guy on the ground tells me this.
7 Where do I go to make my decisions? And
8 that's the iterative -- the iterative part of
9 it and the art part of it.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : I want to ask you
11 about another piece that just caught my
12 attention, too, the polling. Can you
13 describe for me, in the context of what you
14 are describing here, what kind of polling are
15 we talking about? Who does it? Who is
16 polled?

17 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : We have a number
18 of polling contracts. They are conducted
19 mostly by Iraqis. They do not know that they
20 are polling for us. They believe that they
21 are polling for academia and universities and
22 maybe for the government of Iraq.

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1 [REDACTED]: And is that just
2 a contract structure, some kind of conduit
3 between MNC-I and --

4 [REDACTED]: Yes, and Joint
5 Contracting Command does all the contracting
6 piece of it. We don't contract it ourselves
7 out of the JFEC. We have provided a
8 Statement of Work, and then the Joint
9 Contracting Command-Iraq, JCCI -- they do all
10 the leg work to actually let the contract and
11 all.

12 [REDACTED]: Are there a
13 particular set of issues that are the ones we
14 are looking for out of the polling data?

15 [REDACTED]: Absolutely. We
16 ask -- We want to poll to answer those
17 indicators that are in our assessments
18 architecture. So all those indicators, for
19 those that you can actually ask a person
20 about, we ask those questions.

21 [REDACTED]: I'm curious to
22 know -- a totally different avenue. But

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1 there is a team -- I believe, mostly they are
2 on contract -- of Iraqi Americans who serve
3 as kind of an advisory cell. Do some of
4 those belong to the FECs?

5 [REDACTED] They do. Well,
6 they are associated with the JFEC. They are
7 not really assigned. That's the IQATF, Iraqi
8 Advisors Task Force that is the organization,
9 and I do not know exactly how many they are.
10 We have four that work with us in our
11 linkage to cultural issues, atmospheric
12 coming out of the Iraqis that are passed up
13 the IQATF lines per chance.

14 [REDACTED] So in a sense,
15 they are a resource in our work.

16 [REDACTED] Right.
17 [REDACTED] But you've got
18 four of them who are able to work with you.

19 [REDACTED] Right. And they
20 are actually the senior -- In the IQATF
21 hierarchy, they are the senior IQATF advisors
22 in the Corps, and we have a Sunni, a Shia, a

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1 Christian and a Kurd. So we are very
2 fortunate to have the cross-section of the
3 religious framework.

4 [REDACTED] (b)(6) I have a couple of
5 specific questions.

6 Walk me through a typical day with
7 you, if any day is typical. What do you do?
8 Give me a typical day.

9 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Typical day? By
10 hour?

11 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : Well, you know, blocks
12 of hours.

13 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : The first part of
14 the day is reserved for a little bit e-mail
15 to see what has happened overnight, the
16 series of (Inaudible) was in the morning, a
17 couple of follow-on meetings from the
18 (Inaudible), just to stay synchronized with
19 the staff, and then within the JFEC a meeting
20 following that to stay synchronized with
21 their operations.

22 Depending on what day of the week

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1 it is, there will be -- may or may not be a
2 Corps meeting of some sort, Corps staff
3 meeting or a briefing to attend. Bouncing
4 off General McDonald to see what areas he's
5 covering. He tends to focus more outwardly
6 toward MNF. I tend to focus more inward in
7 the Corps across the Corps staff and down.

8 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : We are pausing?

9 (Off the record briefly.)

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay, back from a
11 brief pause. You were describing how your
12 day was. You meet with General McDonald, and
13 --

14 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right. And if
15 you think through the organization of the
16 JFEC, I'll be working and touching base with
17 all those sections, just working actions and
18 issues that are occurring within those
19 sections throughout the day.

20 An occasional trip to the
21 International Zone to meet with economics
22 issues, information operations issues, to

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1 attend some meetings there. I can't think of
2 a typical day.

3 [(b)(6)] I was just trying to
4 get an idea of your own battle rhythm. But
5 what do you think you spend most of your time
6 on as a Deputy?

7 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Most of my time?
8 Keeping situational awareness of what's
9 going on in all those areas within the JFEC
10 so we can stay in front of it, not get
11 behind, keep the Commander informed, keep the
12 ECORD (Phonetic) informed, help subordinate
13 units.

14 [(b)(6)]: What keeps you up at
15 night? What do you worry about? Do you
16 think -- You already indicated or sort of
17 indicated if that effects briefing assessment
18 team is headed in the right direction and
19 we've got the right strategy, good Corps
20 strategy. Just published 0701 lays it out
21 pretty well, but what do you worry about?
22 What do you think is out there that we don't

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1 know we don't know yet?

2 [REDACTED]: Mostly, very
3 recently within the past month or so, the
4 thing that's keeping me up at night is the
5 ability of the government of Iraq and the
6 Coalition, to some degree, able to handle
7 what I believe is going to be a groundswell
8 of Iraqis that have just had it with AQI,
9 want to fight AQI.

10 [REDACTED]: That sounds like a
11 good problem to have.

12 [REDACTED]: Right. Oh, it's
13 a great problem to have, but what keeps me up
14 is can we, the GOI -- when I say, I mean
15 everyone -- Can we accommodate the desires
16 and will of those people, because if we
17 can't, we have failed them, and where else
18 are they going to go now?

19 [REDACTED]: Missed
20 opportunity.

21 [REDACTED]: Right. Missed
22 opportunity. I mean, AQI at one point and the

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1 militias at one point were providing for the
2 people. Well, they are tired of it. They
3 are tired of violence. If the GOI can't
4 provide for them, they've left one -- You
5 know, they've left the AQI and the militias
6 to come to GOI, and if GOI can't provide for
7 them, where do they go now?

8 That's what keeps me up at night
9 recently, in the past 30 days, because we see
10 more and more people are saying we are fed up
11 with AQI.

12 What keeps me up long term? The
13 death of our soldiers, the families of those
14 soldiers that have died.

15 (b)(6): I want to take you
16 back a little bit. You were discussing how
17 you fit into III Corps before you deployed
18 here. Were you able to go to any of those
19 pre-deployment exercises?

20 (b)(3), (b)(6): Oh, absolutely.
21 Yes. Went to academics. Went to the MRX --
22 MRE/MRX ramp-up. Yes, we did, absolutely,

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1 participate in that.

2 [REDACTED] (b)(6): And did you go on the
3 pre-deployment site visit?

4 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): I did.

5 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): So you got to see how
6 V Corps was operating?

7 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. I was
8 fortunate. In January of '06, I was the
9 Corps Artillery Commander at the time, and I
10 had 3,000 soldiers from Corps Artillery
11 deployed over here driving trucks, doing non-
12 standard artillery missions.

13 So I was able to come over and
14 visit them, and while I was over here, I came
15 up and visited V Corps, which was very early
16 on in their deployment. So I had that
17 opportunity to kind of look and see how V
18 Corps was doing, and then as you said, I did
19 come on the PDSS when we came over in August.

20 [REDACTED] (b)(6): When you came over in
21 August and came back, you probably spent
22 about, what, a week here?

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1 [redacted]: Yes, I think
2 seven or eight days.

3 [redacted] What was your
4 impression of how the Effects Cell here at V
5 Corps was running, if you remember?

6 [redacted]: I do remember. I
7 felt -- and this is not a criticism. So
8 please, I don't want it to be on record as a
9 criticism. But it appeared to me that a good
10 portion of the staff, the Effects piece and
11 the overall staff, were in a grind.

12 They were just grinding on a
13 weekly meeting to produce a product. That
14 was my observation, that the staff was just
15 grinding.

16 What that prevented, in my
17 opinion, key staff officers from doing was to
18 step back and think, instead of being focused
19 on process and following a rote battle
20 rhythm, every meeting -- you know, every
21 Tuesday we are going to have this meeting and
22 so forth -- and just, I didn't think, allowed

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55

1 people to think and read and understand and
2 keep situational awareness of what was going
3 on and what was required to help the
4 Divisions. That was my observation, and it's
5 -- That's not a criticism.

6 [redacted] (b)(6): I think I just have
7 one more.

8 You said the results in the number
9 of positive -- you said earlier you were
10 seeing a number of positive indicators in
11 atmospheric. I wonder, could you provide
12 just one or two examples of those positive
13 indicators?

14 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6): I think, since
15 [redacted] (b)(6) (Phonetic) began, sectarian
16 violence is down. I think, if you look at
17 the casualties, they are down over the past
18 60 days. I think, if you look at the work
19 that MNC-I, MMF-I, Embassy officials have
20 done in reconstruction, basic services, that
21 there is progress, albeit not as fast as we
22 would like.

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1 For example, when we arrived, the
2 sewer system in Baghdad was in shambles. It
3 still is in bad shape, but a lot of the
4 effort was going into fix small pieces of the
5 sewer system based on separate, independent
6 analyses of the problem rather than a
7 systemic, holistic view of the sewer system.

8 Over the past six months or so,
9 the collective we, MNC-I Headquarters, not
10 the JFEC, not any one person but just the
11 staff, worked very hard with MNF and GRD,
12 Gulf Regional Division, to complete a
13 holistic analysis, and now have identified
14 the critical nodes that have to be repaired.

15 What's really good about that
16 story is the government -- I'm sorry, the
17 Iraqis are now in those meetings and those
18 analyses. You know, to put it pretty simply,
19 the sewer guy from Rashid is now at the
20 meeting saying here's my problem and, no,
21 that's not the problem. So I think we've
22 brought in the Iraqis to solve some of the

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1 problems.

2 I think, if you read some of the
3 atmospheric from the IQATF, which we talked
4 about earlier, the cultural advisors, and
5 read some of their reports, there are
6 indications that there's positive momentum,
7 but there are also indications of not so
8 positive momentum. So is it balanced?
9 No, it's not balanced perfectly, but I sense
10 some forward movement.

11 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : I said I had -- that
12 was my last, but I do have one --

13 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : That's quite all
14 right.

15 [REDACTED] (b)(6) When you got here, you
16 were under MNF run by General Casey. On the
17 10th of February, of course, General Petraeus
18 and his new staff came in.

19 I wondered if you could comment on
20 any perceived differences between the two,
21 even if they are just style.

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right. Well,

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1 style is an obvious. Different style. I
2 think the biggest difference between the two
3 commanders is General Petraeus' engagement of
4 his staff to keep focused at the strategic
5 level and the GOI.

6 I think he's got -- If you look at
7 the BUIS (Phonetic) that occurred before
8 General Petraeus came, and look at the ones
9 that are now, you will see a much different
10 focus or orientation of the Multinational
11 Forces staff. They are focused on things
12 that -- where we need them to be focused on:
13 Governance, political things, significant
14 reconstruction, those things that need
15 interface with the government of Iraq.

16 I think that's the biggest
17 difference between the two commanders.

18 (b)(6): That's all I have.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6): I have one last
20 one, if you will oblige me.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) Oh, sure.
22 (b)(3), (b)(6): I just wanted to

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

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1 know, relative to the fact that III Corps
2 kind of came in under an operational plan
3 which was essentially one of, hey, continue
4 to sort of draw back and very quickly moved
5 instead into a now we are going to surge with
6 five additional brigades, does that pose any
7 unique challenges to the Effects Section?

8 [redacted] I wouldn't say
9 unique challenges, and I don't think
10 challenges anymore so than any other of the
11 staff sections other than just an increase in
12 workload and Op tempo.

13 [redacted]: My last question
14 will just be: Is there anything we haven't
15 asked you that you are still thinking, hey,
16 they didn't ask me this; this is kind of
17 important. I want to make sure this gets
18 said.

19 Anything that's still on your mind
20 that we haven't touched on?

21 [redacted]: No, I can't think
22 of anything. I'm really excited that you all

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

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1 are doing this, and I hope it will be able to
2 get out maybe in an unclassified version
3 somehow. Otherwise, our history will be on
4 the shelves in the library at Fort
5 Leavenworth or at Carlisle or wherever it
6 ends up.

7 I think there's a great story to
8 tell, and I hope we can just get it out.

9 [redacted] (b)(6) : (Several words
10 inaudible) The Center is committed to do it,
11 but it will be based on -- Well, go ahead.

12 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. We'll go
13 ahead and conclude this interview.

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~~* S E C R E T *~~