INTERVIEW
OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES MCDONALD
EFFECTS COORDINATOR
MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

JULY 31, 2007

This transcript was produced from tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.
Today is Tuesday, the 31st of July 2007 at approximately 1307, and I am here at the Al Faw Palace at the headquarters for Multi-National Corps Iraq outside of Baghdad, interviewing Brigadier General McDonald, who is the Multinational Corps Iraq's Effects coordinator.

Sir, could I ask you to introduce yourself in your own voice with your rank, first name, middle initial and last name?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Sure. I am James M. McDonald -- I go by Mark -- Brigadier General, and I am the Effects Coordinator, but if I was to actually name it, probably I would be the fires coordinator, fires lethal and non-lethal. Effects is a little bit misleading.

Yes, sir. Can you go into a little more depth about what does that title mean?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Yes. There's a
couple of definitions of effects. There's the (Inaudible) combat (Inaudible) effects where they are talking about effects based approach to operations, where we would run our entire operation based off of the effects that the commander has told us he wants to achieve.

That works at the CENTCOM level and above.

The Army's doctrine that the Army has decided to stay with is that we operate off the mission and commander's intent. So our commander has given us a mission. He has given us the intent. He has given us his objectives, and we achieve the objectives.

We do it through full spectrum operations, and that's why I get into why I would get into what I help with here is fire is lethal and non-lethal. Lethal fires are your Air Force elements or ground fires elements. Non-lethal fires -- the whole gamut of everything else: Reconstruction; reconciliation; information operations; (Inaudible) operations.

I could look here at the list, and I could give you the dope, because I've got them all listed out. I may have it already on there, too.
We do assessments, and we do counter-rocket, artillery and mortar. So really, we take care of the non-lethal fires. Electronic warfare is one.

(b)(3), (b)(6) All right, sir. Sir, can you tell me a little bit about when did you first come to this billet? Were you part of the III Corps staff? Were you brought on specifically for this assignment? Can you talk me through a little bit of that?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Yes. I was brought on for this assignment, reassigned to III Corps Headquarters in -- I believe it was June, early June, and we went straight -- It was late May or early June when we went straight into our MRX.

(b)(3), (b)(6) So you did have a chance to work with III Corps before coming to theater?

BRIG. GENERAL McDonald: Yes. We didn't really have a chance to work together before the MRX. Quite honestly, our team wasn't pulled together for the MRX. There was a timing problem there. I think, with the delay for 18th Corps, they've got that sorted out now. I think they've pretty much got their team together.
At which point were you able to figure out what the team would look about, realizing that there may have been an opportunity to look at what V Corps was doing? Can you talk me through a little bit of how you decided to assemble the time, what you decided it would look like, what the Commander's guidance was relative to that and the resources you may have had available?

BRIG. GENERAL MCDONALD: Yes. The Commander told me to take a look at how III Corps had already set themselves up and to take a look at how V Corps was operating, and then watch it for a while and make some suggestions to him if we should adjust anything.

The process we went through was we immediately walked in -- I immediately walked in. We went through our MRX. So I got the academic part laid out, nuts and bolts, here's how V Corps is doing it; here's how DIFCOM (Phonetic) suggests you do it, and some pretty bright guys had already put on paper how III Corps was going to do it. So we looked at that, and that's the model we used for the MRX. It was the

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next week.

It worked okay. We just kind of got our feel for how we were going to operate mechanically. We really didn't get into any operations. But then I took the rest of the summer to observe V Corps very closely. We watched all their critical BTCs, participated in -- Actually, we didn't participate. We just observed.

Then I went around to different agencies, some things that I wasn't as familiar with as I should have been: Information operations; computer network operations, many different things like that. So I went around to kind of get a feel for that, went to CENTCOM to see how the targeting process worked.

Then after we watched that for the summer, we made one pretty significant change, and that was, if I was to describe the way V Corps did business, they had Operations over here doing all the operations kind of things in the C-3 shop; and they had Effects over here, basically all the things I've talked about, but they had all their planners over here with those.

So they were planning all of their
activities separately from the planners that were planning in the C-3 shop. They would have a big coordination meeting at the end of the week. All their planners would be there. The entire staff would come listen to it. They would go through. They would talk about all the different things that they were going to do, and that was called the synchronization meeting, effects synchronization coordination.

Then they published an effects tasking order after that. I read carefully each week, the effects tasking order, and I watched the process for about six months, and it was a very time consuming process to prepare that briefing.

The effects tasking order came out. I talked to -- When I came over for pre-deployment site survey, I talked to all the Assistant Division Commanders. I asked them what they did with the effects tasking order, and to an individual none of them had ever seen the effects tasking order, which kind of clued me in that the effects tasking order was not a very effective method to transmit that information down to your subordinates for execution.
After watching it for about six months, we realized that at the end of that meeting we really started to realize it. I'm not being critical of V Corps. I understand this was their process, and this is what I watched, and this is why we changed the way we did business.

Near the end I noticed that they were briefing the Commander on many things that they had briefed him on before, and his commend were you have briefed me on this; why isn't this done? And it really did not end up with an effective execution tool.

I fell back on my old fire support experience, because -- you being a field artilleryman will understand this -- there's really two kinds of fire plans you make. There is one where the Commander makes his plan for his scheme maneuver, and the fire supporter is over here, and he makes his plan for scheme maneuver, and at some point they've got to mesh them together, and it's usually not a good plan; or the way that is most effective. The Commander and the fire supporter are together, and they develop the
scheme of maneuver -- The Commander develops the scheme of maneuver, but at the same time the fire supporter with him is developing the fire plan.

They integrate it from planning all the way through execution, and it is usually a lot better plan. So we decided to take the same approach.

We took all the individual planners out of the cells that we had them in, and we had Force field artillery planners, fires planners, assessments planners, EW planners, information operation planners.

We had all of those, and the air planners, and we put them in the Plan shop. We are embedded in the JOC floor for concurrent ops. We are FUOPS, and we embedded in Future Ops.

So now anytime we plan an operation, it is planned full spectrum, and as we go through the planning, the rest of the shop does the execution of that full spectrum synchronized plan that we develop.

And that's the most significant change that we have made here, which gets back to -- That's a little different than the JIFCOM effects based approach to operations.
The effects based purely -- If you went purely with effects based approach to operations, we would analyze what effects needed to be done, and then the operations side potentially would -- Well, the Commander would listen to the effects. He would issue his guidance, and then C-3 would go move out on that.

We are a joint headquarters. We do effects assessments, because we know there are effects that need to be achieved. So we are organized to assess those effects for the Commander so he can make a determination whether he wants to make adjustments to his plan.

So we do effects assessment, but I would not say we do effects based approach to operations. We do Commander's mission and intent and his objectives, and we plan accordingly.

Sir, given the --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Was that clear?

Yes.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Okay. I want to make sure.

Yes.
BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: It's a pretty complicated subject.

Well, it was -- I understand the pieces, and listening to you does -- It clears it up in my mind. Okay, that's how it's lined up.

Have you been pleased with the results of that change that you decided to make about how to integrate the effects part into all of the C-3 function areas on the JOC-4 and FUOPS and in Plans? Have you gotten --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: We have made adjustments as we have gone, but I am much happier with that than I would have been if we stayed with the other construct here.

Because this piece of the puzzle, I'm sure, that the Commander is near and dear to achieving what he wants to achieve, can you talk to me about what the relationship with General Odierno has been like, what's the method of communication that you are usually able to relay to him how -- Is there a regular brief that takes place that focuses on effects
for him, especially with regard to the assessments piece? How is that information conveyed to the Commander, and how do you see the nuance of that interaction happening?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Well, since I told you we really don't do effects, I really don't talk very much about effects.

Yes. Thank you for keeping me honest.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: I'm staying with you. I've got our synchronization schedule where I go through and I look at the different forms that we inform the Commander on the execution of the different pieces. Every morning, Monday through Saturday, we go to an MNFI (Inaudible), and generally covered in there -- not each one, but sometime across all the week, Force field artillery, counter-rocket artillery, and mortars, (Inaudible) fires, electronic warfare and our Air Force support are covered.

Then they are also covered at the there BUAs (Phonetic) that we do in the evening in the Corps level.
Reconciliation: He gets briefed on reconciliation at the O&I. There is a separation section for reconciliation.

And the O&I is?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Operations and Intel update that he gets on Sunday. I'm just looking for the specific things that we brief him on. We give him an update for an hour with the primary staff -- or key staff and him on Tuesday evenings.

Every third week we do a full update to the Corps and the Force and the Embassy on reconciliation. That pretty much covers it down on reconciliation.

Information operations: We have a COM Blue (Phonetic) working group where we sync information operations and public affairs on Tuesdays. We also have a LEU update to the Commander at least two times a month, and in that LEU update, one of the LU updates is information operations. The other is our effects assessment board where we monthly out-brief him on effects assessment.

We also send him a weekly update on

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assessment of indicators for (Phonetic) as well. And we do have the -- I mentioned every third week we covered down with the Force Commander and Embassy as well on reconciliation. We also cover down defeat extremists every third week, and (Phonetic) every third week, and the (b)(6) we cover down on economics and reconstruction, and on the Defeat Extremists, (b)(6) and reconciliation, we give an IO update on our IOs with each one of those major pieces.

I think those are the four that he gets these different pieces presented to him in.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Is the command relationship, sir, you work directly for the Commander or is there an intermediate step that you have?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: I work directly for the Commander.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Are there --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: I have to coordinate very closely with the two Deputies and the Chief of Staff. Probably the most -- Potentially the most difficult pieces to work would be the
relationship with the C-3 and the Chief of Staff.

Now I have been a Chief of Staff for installation. I was Chief of Staff for Fort Sill, and I understand duties and responsibility of the Chief of Staff. Because of that, I respect it. I mean, if we are doing something and it needs synchronizing across the organization, I always go through the Chief of Staff, because the Chief has to know everything that's going on.

So now I don't work for the Chief of Staff, but I will tell you, I pass stuff through the Chief of Staff; because for the organization to run better, it works that way.

That's one of the problems with standing up something like an effects coordinator that has planners, that has execution elements. It has different things going on. It could be very easy to try to stand alone and just go do your thing.

Case in point: C-9 and C-7. The C-7 works about 90 percent of the time for the Chief of Staff doing engineer work that the Corps needs done for him. The C-7 also covers down on monitoring...
reconstruction around Iraq, and that really kind of falls more into the effects world.

So I always keep the Chief informed whenever I'm doing something with C-7, so he knows what is going on, because that's his gap.

C-9 is very similar. You could make an argument that C-9 maybe should work for the effects coordinator. I'll go discuss that with 18th Corps next week when I go for their academics. We will have a frank discussion, and then they will get a chance to talk to the Chief of Staff the next week when he goes for academics, and I think it best that they talk to us independently so they can come up with a better decision.

I'm anxious to see what they decide. We'll see where that goes.

Sir --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Having said that -- I'm sorry?

No. Actually, I was going to ask you at some point what is the relationship with the C-9, in particular, knowing that
they --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: I haven't said that. The relationship with the C-9 is -- It's Joe Anderson. He is the Chief of Staff. Joe and I agreed early on that we were both going to task these guys, and he told me if I need them and let them go, and it's worked out pretty well. But Joe and I agreed to agree, and I think it's worked out pretty well.

With regard to some of those other cross-relationships, you mentioned PAO, for instance, C-9, a little bit of C-7. So have those relationships -- Have they been working how you hoped they would be? How do you see pulling those folks in?

Also the relationship with higher -- is there a component that you do and spend a lot of time with MNFI?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Yes. I already talked about C-7 and C-9. So I think I've covered that pretty aptly.

The PAO is really a coordination relationship more than anything or an information relationship, because we have very purposefully
designed this so the PAO works for the Chief, and IO works for me, and we don't mix the two.

The only thing we do is once a week we come to the table. I talk about my themes and messages, or actually (b)(3), (b)(6) does. He talks about the IO themes and messages. (b)(3), (b)(6) talks about the public affairs themes and messages and guidance, and the engagements individual, because engagements tends to run over -- He talks about the different engagements that have gone on, and I make sure they are synchronized.

I don't tell the PAO what to do. I don't tell the PAO what not to do. We do look and make some decisions if we need to adjust where we are going, because it has to be synchronized.

: Who owns that engagement piece, sir? Is that --

BRIG. GENERAL MCDONALD: That's with me.

: Okay.

BRIG. GENERAL MCDONALD: It's engagements and reconciliation.

: Okay. That's educating
for me. Sitting in the BUA (Phonetic) day in and day out, that's interesting to me to know that that's yours.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Engagements is a kind of an odd arrangement. I mean, generally, engagements happen. I mean, you can engineer some engagements, and we do. But they also just happen and, really, most of the engagements that happen just happen through the normal staff process, and the person that prepares the Commander -- that's his small group outside of his office.

Now we pull -- We've got a piece on that. We pull an intel update. We pull a data dump. We send it down to them. But they have other information they know. They go on all the trips with him. So they pull everything together. His Special Assistant does, too. And if it's something that is very critical, we pull her in and work it collectively.

Then there are engagements that are affiliated with the reconciliation as we go through our different schemes of reconciliation. When we see that it is time for the Commander to get involved or
if he needs to get involved, then we take it to him, tell him what we propose he do (Inaudible).

(b)(3). (b)(6): Sir, with regard to the relationship with MNFI, and I guess I would say and down as well, the relationship with the Multi-National Force or Divisions --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Yes. It's almost a one-for-one relationship. There are fire cells below us. There are reconciliation cells above and below us. There are information ops cells above and below us.

Let me gander back at this list, and see if there is anything they really don't have sent up. You know, fires really kind of stops at this level. There's not a fire cell up at Force. Their ops cell -- we would work with him if we had any issues.

Effects assessment: Truthfully, I wouldn't say it's nested as the assessments processor is nested, because each -- You know, Force uses one method to assess. We use another method. Our divisions use a different method.
At first, I thought that was going to be a problem, but as long as our objectives, our missions and objectives are nested, that's what is important, not how we measure or what we are measuring. It's what we measure, and we do a bottoms up crosswalk and a top down crosswalk on our system. So we know that the divisions are nested with us, and we know that we are nested with the Force headquarters.

So pretty much a one-to-one staff coordinating directive. If we have actual things that we need directed, then we get our planner. We put in a process, and we get a frag order, and we send the frag order out. There is no effects tasking order that occurs. We are not a tasking agency.

Now normal coordination occurs, requests for information, sending information back and forth, staying nested. I mean, our IO cell has a weekly coordination meeting that the divisions attend. Our reconciliation cell has a weekly meeting that the division reconciliation cells and the Force reconciliation cells attend. So we do normal meetings for that coordination.
For example of something like IO, is there much -- I guess what I'm looking for: Is there a whole 'nother layer that's happening at the Force level on that or is it more of a minimal role and an oversight role?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: At the Force level, they are responsible for two things: One, policy guidance and direction at the strategic level; and they are responsible for things that are beyond our capability, either physically beyond our capability -- we don't have production capability to do -- but mostly beyond our authorities.

On our IO products, we are not allowed -- or we are not empowered to go outside of Iraq. Our IO efforts, our IO is to change behavior of people in Iraq. So if we recognize that there is some IO work that needs to be done in neighboring countries, we nominate it up to them. They coordinate with CENTCOM, and CENTCOM takes that up.

Sir, one of the areas that, if I am understanding properly, was an evolving mission was the reconciliation cell component. Can
you speak to me a little bit about the evolution of that and where are we with that?

BRIG. GENERAL MCDONALD: I sure can. Late spring we were doing an effects assessment piece. We had done our internal effects assessment piece as well as we were doing the one up at Force; and as we measured through the effects assessment, it started based on some of the just reconciliation opportunities that had popped up with some of the work that had been done at Force and at local levels that this may be an area that was ripe to really push forward on.

So we suggested that at the Force assessment, quarterly assessment, and it pretty much got bought into. I had a couple of guys do a little work, a kind of development concept. General Odierno liked it, gave some more guidance. We fleshed it out. We pitched it to the Ambassador and General Petraeus. They really thought it was good.

At the same time, they had been doing reconciliation type work with their DCG. It was really like a one-man operation with two or three people supporting it.
So at the same time we are doing this, they were about to up-gun their organization as well.

So we decided to reorganize. We've got about a person cell now that covers down on this from Intel all the way through to battle tracking and a common operational picture for reconciliation.

Force has brought in a cell about the same size. They got a Major General in charge of it, and a career diplomat, a two-star equivalent rank, and we work very closely with them as we've gone forward, and we have gone from two reconciliation efforts that we were working on, and we have empowered the units to go out and start this. And let me just rephrase the words.

It's really more local accommodation at this point. It is not necessarily a reconciliation. What we are doing is taking groups that, in some instances, did support al Qaeda, in some instances don't support -- didn't support al Qaeda, but groups that have decided, one, al Qaeda is bad. Al Qaeda is not good for Iraq, and al Qaeda is not good for them. So they have decided to turn against al Qaeda.

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Kind of turning against al Qaeda on your own is a pretty dangerous thing. So they willingly partnered up with us, because we are happy to have them do this.

What are they doing? Most of them just want to be recognized and join the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and we are making arrangements, and that's a great deal of our local accommodation, is bringing those groups together, getting those lists, getting them up and through the system so that they can join in and be part of the government and support the government while fighting against al Qaeda.

Some at this point don't want to be part of the Iraqi Security Forces. They just want to protect their local heritage. So we are making accommodations for them to do that.

Most of them are happy to give intelligence, and what they give is what I call intelligence on steroids. You know the intel process. You get a little hint here. You develop it. You work it. You put out RFIs. You go through. You
watch. You monitor, and then maybe -- maybe somebody can determine that there is an HVI (Phonetic) in this vicinity, and we can take the necessary steps to attack it.

MND-Central's area, for instance: Two weeks ago, they rolled up 10 HVIs.

Again, sir, HVI is?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: High value individuals. These high value individuals were in that targeting process, I thought, long before this targeting process. It got streamlined. You're hunting him? He's in that house. You're hunting him? He's in that house. You're hunting him? He's in that house, and you don't need to get in a hurry, because he got shot in his legs, and he's not going anywhere.

And then we wrapped these people up just like this.

So mostly, great intel and great cooperation efforts. In some instances, we have hired them through our cert contracting, and there is a clause in there where you can hire for infrastructure security to guard principal roads, to guard...
checkpoints along the roads, to guard entry to critical infrastructure.

You could even say at times it was gated off the community, a critical piece of infrastructure is the gate coming in and out of the community so that the wrong people can't come in and out, and we've hired them to do that, almost like you would hire a contract security force.

For the record, make sure everybody understands, we are not arming nor are we giving ammunition to any of these forces. We don't need to arm them. They come with plenty of arms. They come with usually adequate ammunition, and they certainly don't have any difficulties getting their ammunition.

Would they like arms and ammunition? Yes, but we are not authorized to, and we have made it very clear that we are not going to do this. We are getting a lot of press that says we are. The cold facts are we are not. JSOTO (Phonetic) is not, and other agencies are not, just point blank.

Sir, with regard to that reconciliation cell, again do you recall the specific
date that you put that in place? I know you mentioned, generally speaking, I think, around March.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: I think we actually stood up our cell on the -- for some reason, it's the 15th or 18th of May, because when we were IO sitting.

Great. That narrows it down enough that we can --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: You can check with He can tell you the exact date.

: Great. Just to clarify, sir, so the purpose of the reconciliation cell is they are --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: The purpose of the reconciliation cell is that to take those people that are willing to stop fighting us and start taking action against al Qaeda, is to empower them to do that.

And empower them through the coordination piece?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: What I was just
talking about, coordination, hiring them and/or getting them into the Iraqi Security Forces.

And does this piece --

You talked about the MNFI component piece likewise that was stood up. Does that create the interface to resolve the government of Iraq issues in terms of who do you hire as a policeman, whose is going to -- Well, cert funding is planning for the short term.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Yes. I mean it's a central question. We have a meeting. The government of Iraq has stood up a cell to manage this, and that is called IFCNR, and I am not sure -- The Iraqi Committee National Reconciliation?

We'll track that down.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: But it's not really national reconciliation at that level. They have an official body in a ministerial capacity for national reconciliation. That is not this body. This body is formed to help us get at exactly what you are talking about. How do we take these groups and shepherd them through to the Iraqi Security Forces?

Also, that body is to get the government
comfortable with this, because the majority of the organizations and people that have come to us -- and they are mostly tribes. The majority of the tribal organizations that have come to us are Sunni.

The majority of the Iraqi government is Shia, and they are a little nervous about these people organizing in a security sense, and we are working very closely with them at every step.

Yesterday I took a spreadsheet, and I briefed them on everything we are doing. We are trying to make this as transparent as possible. We don't want them to think that we are organizing a group of Shia -- I'm sorry, a group of Sunni that will eventually turn and take their government down.

I speak to them just like I'm speaking to you, trying to explain to them what we are doing and why we are doing it, and it is an ongoing effort, strong effort.

There is a potential right now of close to 20,000 individuals that want to be in this process. In Diyala we have 4,313 people signed up for the Iraqi Police. In Abu Ghurayb we've got about 2,455
applications in at the GOI level at this committee I
told you about. Some of those people won't be allowed
in after they go through that national vetting, but we
think about 1800 or so will be, and they will join the
Iraqi Police Forces.

I could just walk it off with you on all
the different efforts, but that's not the purpose of
this. But it's just to let you know this is not a
casual endeavor that's being taken right now.

(b)(3), (b)(6): I just wanted to ask one
more question along these lines, sir, because it's
interesting historically, because it's the kind of
thing that, you know, this isn't what we train our
company commanders, our battalion commanders, our
brigade commanders to do.

How are you seeing them respond to sort of
this uncharted waters, if you will, about how to do
this?

BRIG. GENERAL MCDONALD: You know, they
respond pretty well, because I would submit to you,
what we did is recognize the efforts that they've got
going on. So we just kind of grouped them together
and put them together, and empowered them to do it.

We went through this process, created a frag order that laid out what they could do and what they couldn't do, what cert would allow, what rewards allow, and alternatively, what is not allowed, and we sent these orders out to empower them, to number one, direct them to do it and, two, empower them to do it.

Basically, what we said we were going to do, we knew we had the population out there. We needed to give our commanders the direction, and we needed to give our commanders the tools to be able to do it.

Great.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: And we decided to go ahead and do it. We did not have GOI buy-in at that point. If we waited for GOI buy-in, we would still be thinking about it. So we did this, and I believe the force and force leadership support this. This is opinion. They supported this, and they want it to go forward, because they knew they would have to use this as a forcing function; because this is a way to bring the insurgency into the government.
I just told you about almost 6,000 people. The potential will be on government will be on government payrolls now, and that could grow. That could grow rapidly.

Now what we don't want to do is just create a security state. So we would encourage the government to get on with some employment schemes as well. Haven't seen much movement there, but we are encouraging them to.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Given that we started this -- and stop me if this isn't in your visibility -- has the Government of Iraq since bought on? You mentioned that they have formed a coordination cell as well. Does that imply that, okay, we are on board with the reconciliation effort?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Number one, the Prime Minister has a huge blank in his platform on national reconciliation. So he publicly states he is going to nationally reconcile, and I've said this is not national reconciliation. But these steps will help lead toward national reconciliation.

Now to specifically answer your question,
have they bought into it, exactly how it's going? I would say, no, not yet. Have they realized this is occurring, and they are going to have to do something with it? The answer is yes. Are there indications are that they are going to accept some form of this, and I think the answer to that is yes as well. they are.

I mean, you see some of the results that they are accepting it. Things they still need to do. One, they need to empower -- Through their MOI and their MOD, they need to empower their police and army commanders to openly cooperate with these efforts.

Right now, they are not stopping these efforts, but you won't find many that will jump in there and help, because they are not authorized to. They are good soldiers. They are good policemen. They follow orders. They have not received orders to cooperate with these people and in some cases were insurgents not long ago.

That does get at the notion of amnesty, forgiveness, immunity. I mean, there's a lot of different words to describe a process that, as you
reconcile, you do some sort of forgiveness. That's a policy level issue that will be worked through, but the government of Iraq has said that they will entertain and they will get to some sort of amnesty.

Changing gears altogether, sir, I wanted to talk about the surge. Certainly, as we look back on this period of the fight in Iraq -- this is a III Corps guy here, General Odierno, General Petraeus.

The surge is certainly the hallmark of certainly the last eight, ten months now. Was there a particular aspect of the surge that has had an effect on your responsibilities or has it pretty much been business as usual, no real impact of that surge?

BRIG. GENERAL McDonald: Well, you know, I mean, when we surged, we went ahead and looked at the different areas. You know, as we got more troops, we got more psychological operations forces in, and we were able to surge a little bit in the IO, fires in particular.
So we surged a little bit to be able to double that capacity. We moved that firing element up into the north area. So we had the west and north covered, and now the Marines were bringing in a high mark battery. So they will be able to cover their area. We will probably move that down and get better coverage even yet.

We put in an RFF to increase CAS (Phonetic) from about 68 hours up to close to 100 hours, and that's been achieved. We surged in the electronic warfare area.

So, basically, any of those areas that we need to support, we've put in appropriate RFFs, and RFFs are request for forces, and we got the appropriate forces come along with it.

So, yes, we have surged in our efforts as well.
It's actually interesting, sir. I was out yesterday with 25 Cav going through their area, just on battlefield rotation with the battalion commander.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: He's doing a great job. That guy -- you know, he's already written a paper, and I suspect he will author a few more things, because he -- We had two areas we started in, Sadr City and there.

Sadr City was working. The guy we were working with, (Phonetic), was working great, and he had an assassination attempt on him, and he quit. And that effort had stopped.

Curt's effort continued on with lots of adversity. He has worked through everything. Talented young man, doing a great job.

Yes, it's very interesting dynamics there, and you've kind of touched on some of the aspects of getting by internally. Certainly, the (Inaudible) and the IA, I think --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Well, we really started in one of the very difficult areas. Are we
back up?

Yes, we are, sir.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: We were talking about Abu Ghurayb and the reconciliation that's going on there with 25 Cav and (Phonetic). But the dynamic there is it's in Baghdad, basically. The closer you get to Baghdad, the more difficult reconciliation gets.

It's in an area that's always been a very difficult area, a very Sunni area. That is also the gateway to Anbar. If you are coming into Baghdad from Anbar, you come through Abu Ghurayb.

So one would say, if you think it's organized this way -- and I'm not saying it is, but I'm saying there are people that would think this way -- then if you want to protect Baghdad from the Sunni, then you have Shia control Abu Ghurayb. But if you want to make it accessible, then you have Sunni patrol Abu Ghurayb.

Most of the people that are coming in in this reconciliation there are Sunni, some of them under (Phonetic) who -- we know he was
involved Jaish al-Islami, and we suspect a lot of his people were, which was an insurgent group against the government of Iraq, and probably supported al Qaeda, most likely supported al Qaeda.

Since they have joined this effort, violence has gone down to a very manageable state. IEDs, IED factories, everything like that has been pointed out. I mean, a place that you would have described as lawless four months ago, five months ago, is basically down to control, and they still haven't joined the Police force yet.

They are just organized on their own. I suspect Abu Azam is paying them. I don't think we are. Pretty sure we are not. But we think the majority of them are going to get in the Police force, and that's a big step for the government.

That's a huge step, and that's why we have been so patient with them. You got to work through this thing. You can't make them do it. Well, you could, and it wouldn't last, but they have to buy into it. And they are in that instance.

You get even closer to the center of
Baghdad, Amiriyah. We've got the Amiriyah Volunteers. I think that's what we call them now, because it's acceptable. They were the Amiriyah Patriots, and the Amiriyah Freedom Fighters, not a big group, maybe 30-45, but again I think they were JAI, and they are just dead set against JAM -- not JAM -- dead set against al Qaeda, and probably still dead set against JAM as well. We'll have to work through that.

They are on one of our local security contracts to guard pieces around Amiriyah, and we are taking the Director of National Security Agency down to meet with (Phonetic) on the 9th.

So we are making progress, because the first time I talked to (b)(6) about this group in May, early May, he was absolutely dead set against it. Now he is going to go meet with them.

So there is progress being made. There is progress being made, and that's good, because for the country to get forward, these groups all will have to get together and they have to start working together, and you got to start somewhere. Here is a place to start.
Lots of interesting technologies fall under your purview, sir. Are you at this point coming away with some ideas about why these are really the technologies that I'm most impressed with that are going to shape the way we fight wars in the future or that really earned their pay, so to speak, so far in the fight?

I realize that covers everything from --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Well, it does. I mean, there are some that we probably can't --

I don't want to go--

BRIG. GENERAL McDonald: -- some programs that I work that we can't talk about in this forum. I don't want to talk about anything above the Secret level.

BRIG. GENERAL McDonald: Yes. But capabilities in the IO world, not really a technological capability other than computer network operations, which again are going to go beyond what we can talk about here. But that is a field for great growth and great, great possibilities.

Counter-rocket, artillery and mortars:
You know, when we -- We are a mobile army, trained, equipped, organized to be a mobile army, to fight a battle, and now we are not.

We are a static army. We are in set locations, fighting in the city and fighting against an enemy that doesn't have a robust indirect fire capability in the classic sense. They don't have batteries and battalions organized, and they can't mass on it. But they have an abundance of indirect fire capabilities, mostly rockets and mortars.

I don't know when is the last time we were shot at with artillery, not since I've been here this tour. And you can take a mortar out of a house, set it up, shoot three rounds, and go back. None of our equipment, none of our counter-mortar or counter-artillery are locating radars.

We are designed to operate against one, two rounds in the city and go away. They were designed for volley fires, to pick up a battery location so we could put a high volume of fire back and shut down the enemy's artillery and rocket systems.
So we've had to adapt. The radar experts have gone through and worked through the issues with clutter and the real technical difficulty of picking up a single round in a busy city, because there are a lot of other things out there that radars pick up.

They have done pretty well with that. I mean, our acquisition rate is probably around 70-80 percent, (Inaudible) very difficult target set. Along with that, we decided we would do some things to protect ourselves and protect our soldiers, mostly to protect our soldiers and some of our critical structures.

We have hardened some. Mess halls, you will see. They are hardened roof (Inaudible) and things like that, high volume, high capacity buildings. We have set up a small not as accurate **SECRET**
As you know, I mean, even if you can't get under cover, if you just lay down, your chances are just increased in defeating the effects of artillery probably by 90 percent.

So that's been a technological breakthrough. And also tied into that is an intercept capability, which we have never had before. We took the Navy (Phonetic) that they use to shoot down missiles coming in on ships, and we've modified it, put it on trailers, and we've got three locations now with Anaconda up in Balad, here at Victory Base, and down at the Basra air station.

That is working pretty well. It's got about a percent -- no, actually, it was and it may be higher now, because the Basra one is really well designed. It's well designed, because the terrain is very flat, and it's circling the airfield.

We've got two, almost two years of experience with it. We just put that in. Unfortunately, they are receiving heavy volume of fire. So they are shooting lots.
We shot down about 1.4a rockets and/or mortars in the first year and a half, and this last three months down there we have already shot down 1.4a.

Now that is a technology that is developing. Truthfully, there's some problems with it. The warning system I have talked about is a big system. You got to lay cable, lay a land line. You put it in. If you're going to move it, you got to tear it all out. It is not a mobile system.

We need to figure out how to make that a mobile system, mobile in the fact that we could put it on this FOB and then move it to that FOB, and even more importantly, if we are going to make this a system of record, we need to figure out how to make it truly mobile so that, as we are moving, we can protect our force.

Likewise, the FALINKS is just huge. I mean, it is strictly static, and its footprint is very small. So for the amount of money we are paying for it and the number of rounds we've shot down, which I think is about 1.4a maybe close to 1.4a now -- I mean, that's a lot of bucks for the bang. However, the
development of the technology -- If you could get it down and in some future developments on it, that would be very exciting.

The potential is that we could have a system that would support our maneuver forces, where our maneuver forces would be able to move without the effects of indirect fire effect, which will be tremendous.

So it is doing a pretty good job with cobbling the systems together, but I think we have learned enough that we can really get after a system -- and I'm talking a future system; you asked me about technology, and I think that there is a possibility that we could have a future system that would radically alter the way you would conduct ground combat, if you could take away the enemy's -- or take away the majority of the enemy's ability to interdict you with indirect fire.

EWCC -- The Army walked away from electronic warfare several years ago. We have had to rely on a joint solution, mostly Navy and Marines, some Air Force, to help us; because we got a large
The Army stood up a school. We are starting to train people, but it is going to take a few years for us to really -- I mean, we can't train in 10 weeks what you need to know to be able to manage a division, a corps level fight on electronic warfare. It's going to be a joint solution for several years until we've got people with five, ten years worth of experience who can really get at that.

So we've had to go through a series of systems where we are able to commensurate and get accurate grids down at the battalion level. PSSOFF -- and I don't know what it means. I said it slowly,
because if you put it altogether, it's "piss-off."

With a name like PSSOFF, you know it's got to be --

BRIG. GENERAL McDonald: It is precision targeting software, is what it does. You know, it allows you to get a good grid.

that you want to put it in, not just hit the building.

You can hit this side, that side. It is very good for this type of fight, low collateral damage, maybe too low.

I mean, we have had some soldiers complaining, you know, because they are used to us bringing an Air Force fighter by and leveling the house or a guided MLRS, which has got about a and it goes in, and it will usually -- It usually destroys the building that you are trying to destroy, not the buildings next to it.

This one goes in and blows up. If it's in the room that the person is in, it probably kills him.

If you are on the other side of the house, soldiers
are a little disappointed at times, because they see it going in and, all of a sudden, the door comes open and the guy is walking out of the house dusting himself off.

So good with bad. Low collateral damage, lowers your effects. In the scheme of things, it is a very good tool to have in an urban fight.

effective. We use quite a lot of them and use it very effectively.

So if the Air Force is not flying that day and you want to take down a building, you can do it with the MLRS.

Sir, for the term GMLR--

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Yes. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System.

Is that just a name that changed? I was used to hearing MLRS. Is that just the same thing, slightly different terminology?
BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Well, it's got a GPS guidance package on it. So it will go to the grid that you are talking about. And what you are familiar with with MLRS is the MLRS with the (Inaudible). It spreads (Inaudible) all over. This is unitary, just AT warhead.

Sir, I don't want to cut into the rest of your schedule. If you've got a few more minutes, great. If you need to press on, we'll go ahead and wrap up now.

I didn't get a chance to really kind of turn it over to you and say -- and ask --

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Well, I think I had told you what I would have told you. The most important points are the changes that we made when we came in here, that we are doing what I would describe to you as full spectrum operations.

I would not describe it to you as I'm doing effects. We are doing full spectrum operations.

We are taking and complementing what the Commander wants to do with all of these capabilities I just told you about.
We got a robust system to do it. We have experts in each one of these areas. IO: I was a little leery about coming in here on IO, because I figured IO was going to be like watching Armed Forces Network commercials, not very effective. I have since been very impressed.

I will tell you, part of the reason that people are ready to turn against al Qaeda is because they can't turn on the television, they can't pick up a newspaper and they can't turn on the radio without hearing a message of unity, without hearing a message that talks to them about how bad al Qaeda is, and al Qaeda is not for the good of Iraq. It's for the good of al Qaeda, for example.

I've got a Colonel in charge of it who is an expert IO guy, a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of it who is an expert IO guy. I've got a psychological operations task force. I've got a battalion commander who is an expert SYOPS guy.

I've got the IO Task Force who's got an expert SYOPS guy in charge of it. I mean, the Army has developed the capability. The capability that I
was talking about for electronic warfare, we have for information operations, and it's not just Army either.

I shouldn't have said Army, because it is a joint capability, joint venture. The Colonel that I told you about, the colonel in charge, is Air Force.

So IO, we know what to do. Part of the reason -- and when you are back home and you hear we are not running an IO war -- it's because we don't IO the people of the United States of America. The people in the United States don't know what we are doing. They don't see what we are doing, and you don't win a war with IO.

Now IO in a broader sense -- because what I just talked to you about is the five pillars of IO that the Army is using. In the broader sense, the IO pillars would include PA. You know, that's a different story.

I'm not saying we are not winning that. I'm not saying we are not losing that. I'm just saying that's what, I think, most people are commenting on, because that's what they see.

: Great. Any other

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comments, sir?

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Let me look. No, I don't think so.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great, sir.

BRIG. GENERAL McDONALD: Thanks for asking.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Thank you very much, sir.

Appreciate your time.

That concludes this interview.

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