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Very impressive.
Much further
along than I'd have thought
Brutally forthright

JOINT STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT TEAM

very good.
Sustainable here
Sustainable here?

look
alternatives?

I have to
judge the
summer.

Sovereignty

Must take down
16 of men of
Health?

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Much more
enthusiasm than
Capability

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Mission Analysis Back-brief

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May not work
And need to think
them



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Agenda

- JSAT Mission
- JSAT Composition and Organization
- Initial Planning Guidance
- JSAT Methodology and work plan
- Situation
- Revised Assumptions
- Problem Statement
- Campaign Goals – Current and Revised
- Initial Concept
- Key Initial Findings and Judgments
- Way Ahead
- Summary
- Ambassador's and Commander's Guidance

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JSAT Mission



To assess the situation, to review the existing campaign plan in light of that situation, and to recommend refinements to the campaign plan to ensure integration of all instruments of national power and the efforts of coalition partners in time, space and purpose to achieve the coalition's goals and objectives

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JSAT Composition and Organization

• Directing Group

- (b)(6) – DOS
- (b)(6) – CENTCOM
- (b)(3), (b)(6) – MNF-I
- (b)(6) – USM-I
- Ambassador Robert Ford – DOS

• Working Group

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| - (b)(6) | - (b)(6) – IISS |
| - (b)(6) – DOS | - (b)(3), (b)(6) – CFLCC |
| - (b)(3), (b)(6) – CSI | - (b)(6) – US Embassy Tel Aviv |
| - (b)(6) – NWC | - (b)(6) – BG Sao Paulo |
| - (b)(6) – DOS | - (b)(6) – DOS |
| - (b)(6) – DOS | - (b)(6) – DfID |
| - (b)(6) – SPA | - (b)(6) – GPR |
| - (b)(6) – CALL | - (b)(6) – US CENTCOM |
| - (b)(6) | - (b)(6) – Council on Foreign Relations |
| - (b)(6) – DoD | |
| - (b)(6) JHQ(UK) | |

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JSAT Working Groups and Task Forces

Four Working Groups:

- Political
 - Internal Engagement and Influence
 - Governance Capacity Development
 - Rule of Law
- Economic
- Security and Security Sector Reform
- Diplomacy and Strategic Communications

Task Forces:

- Situation
- Assessment
- Communication
- Reconciliation
- Mission/Force Organizational Effectiveness/Transition
- External Resources, Actions and Authorities

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Initial Planning Guidance

- Review the Campaign Plan in light of the changed sectarian environment now shaping events in Iraq
- Determine the minimum acceptable conditions for transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces and to begin withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq
- Determine the coherence and relevance of the Lines of Operation (LOO) already articulated in the campaign plan with specific emphasis on scale of effort and any new lines that should be developed
- Examine the desired effects within each LOO to test their relevance to the current situation
- Recommend adjustments to objectives and effects within each LOO with particular emphasis on that that is achievable within a 12-18 month time horizon
- Identify the obstacles to progress and address the methods by which we will ameliorate or eradicate them
- Identify constraints on the coalition
- Draft a new plan to be presented to us and, potentially, to the Coalition Conference in early May 2007. The plan should carry the coalition effort through to the end of 2008 but not tie us to delivery of objectives measured by time

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JSAT Methodology and Work Plan (Highlights)

- Situation review and assessment
- Intelligence briefings and topical seminars
- Theater visits
- Compile initial findings – agree on broad concept
- **Report initial findings and recommendations**
- Refine goals and objectives
- Small group planning along lines of operation
- In progress review
- Draft plan development
- Outbrief
- Draft plan production and handoff to SPA/JSPA
- End of mission

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Situation - General

Nature of the Conflict –

- **Communal struggle for power and survival** between rival political, ethnic and sectarian groups; violence has polarized political identities along ethnic and sectarian lines
- **Insurgency** against the central government and the coalition continues and sets conditions for terrorism and sectarian conflict
- 1.4c, 1.4d
- Underlying and contributing to instability is a *failed state* that does not fulfill its basic responsibilities to its people

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Situation – Obstacles to Progress

- **Continued sectarian behavior** by organizations and individuals in the Gol and security forces put the Coalition in the position of supporting one side in an intensifying communal struggle
- **Gol actions are inconsistent with and undermine coalition objectives;** weak and ineffective institutions lack legitimacy among minority populations
- Coalition can exert influence, but lacks **sufficient leverage** to dictate Gol behavior or impose will on parties to the conflict
- We are **running out of time** – lack of time emboldens enemies, discourages friends, and leads to short term “solutions” to long term problems
- Iraqi communities and organizations are **positioning themselves for future conflict** rather than endeavoring to achieve stability through power sharing; they can wait us out

We need more leverage and more time.

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Recommended Revised Planning Assumptions

1. The GOI is the legitimate constitutional authority
2. **Absent external influences, the GOI will continue its sectarian behavior that destabilizes Iraq**
3. **We can change the behavior of the GOI with application of incentives and disincentive**
4. **The GOI and Coalition do not currently share the goals/endstate** ^{same}
5. Coalition forces will have the necessary authorities contained in UNSCR 1723 beyond December 2007, extending them at least through December 2008
6. The coalition will be able to maintain twenty US BCTs in ITO through Jan 2008 and coalition partner troop contributions will continue present trends; the coalition will be able to maintain a significant, although reduced, military effort in Iraq at least through December 2008
7. **Transition prior to the achievement of stability will result in a rapid descent into chaos**
8. External military aggression by conventional forces will not significantly threaten Iraq nor will major combat operations elsewhere divert significant coalition forces from the ITO throughout the life of the campaign plan
8. Iraqi government institutions must be strengthened
9. **Absent coalition involvement, the Iraqi government alone will remain unable to adequately secure necessary support from external actors**
10. **Stability in Iraq will require the acquiescence of neighboring countries; this will not be achieved without a sustained coalition effort**
11. **Organizational changes to MNF-I and the US Mission will be required to achieve campaign plan goals**

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Problem Statements



- In the near term (6-9 months):
 - How do we use current security improvements to generate momentum toward sustainable stability?
- In the medium term (9-21 months):
 - How do we maintain security momentum while reducing coalition presence?
 - How do we move toward an enduring regional, national and local political solution consistent with coalition interests?

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Current Joint Campaign Goals

Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable groups, bringing the remainder into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror

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Proposed Joint Campaign Goals

- **Near Term**
 - End large scale sectarian violence and defeat AQI/insurgency such that economic and political development can proceed; conditions set for substantial progress on national reconciliation
 - Set conditions for maintaining improved security while coalition forces are slowly reduced
- **Intermediate Term**
 - Negotiate a power sharing agreement that leads to sustainable security
 - Improve GOI and ISF capacity and legitimacy
 - Integrate or demobilize militias
- **Long Term Interests**
 - Preserve credibility with our allies and adversaries
 - Maintain regional stability
 - Deny terrorist sanctuary and weaken terrorist organizations
 - Maintain free flow of oil
 - 1.4b, 1.4d
 - Prevent humanitarian crisis; fulfill moral obligation to Iraqi people

Defeat: To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfill his intention

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Concept

- **POLITICAL STRATEGY**

- 2008 deal (both internal and external) yielding comprehensive cease fire
- 2007 groundwork; confidence building measures

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2008 objectives unobtainable without 2007 groundwork

- **INFLUENCE STRATEGY**

- Defeat irreconcilables
- Increase leverage on reconcilables to compromise
- Design strategy of engagement with regional stakeholders to increase leverage

- **OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS**

- Reconfigure LOOs
- Reduce violence

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Key Findings and Initial Judgments

Political –

- Need an integrated political strategy that guides all instruments of national power at every level (from the national strategic to the tactical)
- Apply leverage to the key international and Iraqi actors to move them towards the desired goals
- Concept - exploit the momentum created by the initial success of the BSP by extending the reduction in violence so that we can bring about the basis for a sustainable political settlement, that may be marked by a ceasefire, during 2008
- Move the key Iraqi internal political actors towards political reconciliation through a set of bargains, primarily between the Sunni and Shiite reconcilables and moderates. These internal bargains need to be embedded in a process of international negotiation

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Key Findings and Initial Judgments

Economic –

- The Iraqi budget execution process is fundamentally dysfunctional. Most spending authority in hands of three individuals
- The USG has no overarching development or assistance strategy in Iraq
- Iraq's most critical short-term economic priority is job creation
- Shi'a control and abuse of key service ministries and sectors (notably health and banking) are engendering sectarian strife
- There are inherent tensions between our short-term and long-term development priorities
- The oil sector as a whole is in desperate need of overhaul
- Iraq's provinces have radically different development needs; a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate
- The current U.S. Mission structure undermines effectiveness in economic and development policy formulation and execution

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Key Findings and Initial Judgments

Security –

- CF and reliable ISF are not sufficient to provide security or services across Iraq
- CF and reliable ISF may be sufficient to provide political leverage for inducing reconciliation by punishing non-cooperation and rewarding cooperation
 - Non-military power at the disposal of CF is less sufficient than the military dimensions
 - The military must provide tools for rewarding cooperation and punishing non-cooperation
 - Political negotiators must interact very tightly with military leadership to produce success
- ISF remains too small to cope with the situation
- Ultimate size and structure of the ISF should be subjects of negotiation in the political process that yields reconciliation

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Key Findings and Initial Judgments

Diplomatic –

- External actors, especially Iraq's neighbors, condition the Iraq battlefield in a major way
- Our political-military approach inside Iraq will directly affect the calculations of these external actors
- There will be no internal political deal without an external political deal to match. Achieving the external deal will require engaging all of Iraq's neighbors, without exception
- Our diplomatic efforts must therefore be carried out in close coordination with the internal political-military campaign

1.4b, 1.4d

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Key Findings and Initial Judgments

Communication –

- The current organization is fragmented and over-redundant (app. 30 media products mission-wide) 'too many cooks'
- There is currently insufficient coordination, both internally and with regional embassies and Arab media centers
- Embassy PD: staffing crisis, survival mode, reactive, marginalized from front office
- Political and short-term Western headline pressure continues to drain resources from the effort to win target Iraqi and Arab opinion
- No regular formal or informal contact with Iraqi and Arab journalists and editors, due to security and absence of central venue (formerly Convention Center)
- Media: plenty of monitoring, limited/sporadic engagement (heavy w/U.S. audience, moderate w/Iraqi audience, non-existent w/larger Arab audience), zero accountability
- GOI and ISF IO capability inconsistent at best, sectarian or non-existent at worst

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Way Ahead

- Refine assessments; develop and integrate plans across lines of operation
- Deliver interim report and receive additional guidance (6 April)
- Develop a contingency plan based on inability to achieve necessary conditions or if planning assumptions prove false
- Develop annexes or reports in critical areas
- Informal discussion with group members (date TBD)
- Deliver briefing and draft JCP (13 April)
- Respond to guidance and refine draft
- Outbriefs and deliver draft plan (19 April)

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Summary of JSAT Current Thinking

- Lower the bar: sustained stability
- GoI/ISF sectarian behavior is the principal obstacle to achieving our goals
 - Identify and use leverage to influence behavior
- External strategy essential to internal strategy
- Tighter integration needed between political strategy, tactical activity and non-military action
- If we cannot slow the Washington clock, success will be extremely difficult
- If achieving our near term goal is not consistent with given restraints, then we must develop a contingency plan to minimize damage to coalition interests
- Organizational changes to MNF-I and the US Mission are required to achieve campaign plan goals

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