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UNITED STATES ARMY
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

BAGHDAD, Iraq

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26 JUNE 2007

(This transcript was produced from
tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of
Military History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(6) This is (b)(6)

writing a story on the Multinational Corps-Iraq in the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Today is 26 June 2007, and I am about to interview (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Effects Coordinator Cell, Multinational Corps-Iraq, at the Headquarters of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6), I wondered if we could begin by having you say your full name.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6) And what is your position in the Effects Coordination Cell?

(b)(3), (b)(6) I am the Chief of Targeting and the Deputy for the Reconciliation and Engagement Cell. That is known as DREC.

(b)(6): All right. Can you

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1 tell me a little bit about your background,
2 branch?

3 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

4 Eighteen-year Field Artillery Officer. Spent
5 my entire career in general Artillery
6 assignments, primarily at the Corps and below
7 level. Deployed to Desert Storm as a fire
8 support officer. Two Middle East
9 deployments. While I was at Fort Stewart,
10 commanded out in battery at Fort Stewart, and
11 then had had three deployments to the Middle
12 East in OIF operations from Fort Hood, either
13 in 1st Cavalry Division and now I'm with III
14 Corps.

15 [REDACTED]: Can you talk a little
16 bit about those previous deployments in OIF?

17 [REDACTED] Yes. In 2002
18 I deployed before it was known as OIF to
19 CFLIC, Coalition Forces Land Control and
20 Command, Headquarters in Camp Doha, Kuwait,
21 during the period of the 1003-V planning,
22 which was the war plan for OIF.

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
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(b)(6) : And you were there for

a year?

(b)(3), (b)(6) OIF-II

deployment was March 2004 to March 2005, and then my previous deployment was six months, August 2002 through January -- or February 2003.

(b)(6) : Right. So then you

were with the 1st Cavalry Division at that time?

(b)(3), (b)(6) : OIF-II, I was

the 1st Cavalry Division, yes, sir.

(b)(6) : Can you -- I know you

said it once before, but because you have two

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1 positions, can you say those two positions
2 that you occupy right now?

3 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes. I am the
4 Corps Chief of Targeting, which spans both
5 lethal and non-lethal targeting, and I am the
6 Deputy for the Reconciliation and Engagement
7 Cell, which is primarily an extension of our
8 non-lethal targeting aspects with other
9 (Inaudible) operation, including governments
10 and security primarily.

11 I am the Deputy, because we are
12 expecting at some point maybe down the road
13 to get a 06 in that's getting by name
14 selected to come forward to lead the
15 important effort of reconciliation
16 (Inaudible).

17 [redacted] (b)(6) I'll get to
18 reconciliation in a minute. What I want to
19 do is talk a little bit about what you do as
20 Chief of the targeting.

21 Before that, I want to ask you in
22 your own words what the Effects Coordination

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1 Cell does.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. The
3 Effects Coordination Cell for our rotation is
4 referred to as the Joint Fires and Effects
5 Cell, which is termed the JFEC, and what we
6 do is coordinate a number of disparate
7 activities for the Corps. By that, I mean
8 that we coordinate traditional, lethal fire
9 support, artillery, counter-(Inaudible)
10 radars, counter-artillery radars, close air
11 support operations through our JOC Fire Cell.

12 General McAllen (Phonetic) is also
13 responsible for coordinating the information
14 operations line of operation for the Corps.
15 That includes the Corps IM Cell which is
16 resident as part of our Joint Fires and
17 Effects Cell, as well as the IOTF, the
18 Information Operations Task Force that is an
19 extension of our IO efforts.

20 We also own the Electronic Warfare
21 Coordination Cell, known as the EWCC. That
22 is the coordinating agency for the Corps for

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1 both ground electronic warfare and air
2 electronic warfare assets.

3 (b)(6) Does that include UAV?

4 (b)(3), (b)(6): We do not
5 control UAVs. However, we do coordinate for
6 the use of UAVs for targeting ISR operations,
7 primarily through our JOC Fires Cell that
8 works on the JOC floor in Current Operations.

9 Another piece of the JFEC is the
10 Effects Assessment Cell, which does the
11 campaign level effects assessment for
12 Multinational Corps-Iraq as well as feeding
13 the preponderance of information to
14 Multinational Forces-Iraq for General
15 Petraeus' overall strategic campaign
16 assessment.

17 Then lastly, the piece that I own
18 is our Targeting and Reconciliation and
19 Engagement Cell. There's two halves to that
20 cell, one-half of it being our traditional
21 lethal targeting arm that primarily is
22 concerned with operational targeting and HVI

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1 targeting, not so much what the units are
2 doing out on the ground in current operations
3 but the --

4 [REDACTED] (b)(6): HBI is?

5 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm sorry,
6 sir. HVI is High Value Individual, but we
7 have extended that to our operational
8 targeting construct, which is really designed
9 at going after the network as a whole, not
10 just the individuals that make up the
11 insurgent network but the functions that a
12 network does, to include logistics,
13 financial, command and control, IO and all
14 the different functions that the network has.
15 We try to counter that in a holistic
16 solution.

17 So we are not only going after the
18 command and control nodes, which are
19 primarily the focus of our high value
20 individual targeting efforts. We try to do
21 that to complement and supplement the
22 tactical high value individual oriented

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1 operations that the units do during everyday
2 strike operations.

3 The other half of the Targeting
4 and Reconciliation Engagement Cell is what is
5 known as the reconciliation engagement cell,
6 which is the REC, which has swelled
7 significantly over the last 60 or so days.

8 When we first arrived here, we had
9 a very small non-lethal targeting section
10 comprised of mostly field artillery guys and
11 some other folks that worked side by side
12 with me and my targeting operations, because
13 non-lethal and lethal targeting have to be
14 deconflicted and coordinated, but with
15 reconciliation as a major line of operation
16 from MNFI level and MNCI level, we have
17 brought in a much larger cast of personnel
18 from both inside the Corps as well as outside
19 the Corps.

20 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : Okay. Very good.

21 Very good rundown.

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : I have one

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1 more section that we also coordinate inside
2 the JFEC is what is known as CRAM, which is
3 the Counter-Rocket and Artillery System, and
4 it is a large operation that provides both

5
6 1.4a, 1.4g

7 very large effort, a lot of money, lot of
8 coordination, includes (Inaudible) gun
9 systems, LCMR radars, traditional firefighter
10 counter-motor radars, raid cameras and other
11 types of devices for both search, warn and
12 respond to the indirect fire threat that
13 affects all of our FOBs here in Iraq.

14 So that is the other section that
15 we do own.

16 (b)(6)

17 All right. The Corps
18 did not bring a corps artillery here. Is
19 that correct?

20 (b)(3), (b)(6)

21 Yes. The
22 corps artillery, III Corps Artillery, much to
our chagrin, deactivated on 16 September
2006, and when the Corps Artillery

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1 deactivated, we did not bring the Corps
2 Artillery as it was previously designed here
3 to Iraq.

4 We are very fortunate, though, and
5 were able to fence off about 85 folks from
6 the previous Corps Artillery from Fort Sill
7 to deploy with the Corps here to Iraq to
8 complement the soldiers in the fire support
9 element at Fort Hood to get the amount of
10 people required to do the mission on the
11 ground.

12 The way the current Corps
13 (Inaudible), it is inadequate to meet the
14 requirements of what the JTF has to do here,
15 and we had to bring a portion of the
16 remaining personnel from when the Corps
17 Artillery deactivated forward here to Iraq.

18 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), the JFEC
19 (Inaudible) is the former and last III Corps
20 Artillery commander.

21 [redacted] (b)(6): You talked about the
22 number of people that came from the III Corps

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1 Artillery. I wondered if you can talk in
2 general terms about the numbers of people
3 totally in the JFEC; that is, in the Effects
4 Coordination Section, and in your sections,
5 your two sections.

6 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. Sir, is
7 that just for the Targeting and
8 Reconciliation or is that JFEC in a large --

9 [redacted] (b)(6) : JFEC, the large -- the
10 whole organization.

11 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay.
12 Everything that General McDonald owns in the
13 JFEC right now is [redacted] 1.4a military, and our
14 contractor numbers are approximately -- not
15 counting reach-back, approximately about [redacted] 1.4a
16 [redacted] 1.4a folks additionally. So it's about [redacted] 1.4a to
17 [redacted] 1.4a It fluctuates a little bit, depending
18 on what contractors are in country and which
19 ones are leaving.

20 We have a very large contractor
21 support presence for IO and in the IOTF.
22 Military, though, we are at the number as I

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1 said, and the vast majority of them came from
2 Fort Sill, and we had about [1.4a] of us that are
3 resident at Fort Hood.

4 We also had to use good artillery
5 communications and intel personnel that were
6 assigned to the former corps artillery to do
7 jobs outside of their normal MOSs to fill the
8 billets that were required throughout all the
9 disparate activities that the JFEC does.

10 [b)(6)] Okay. How about your
11 targeting?

12 [b)(3), (b)(6)]: The Lethal
13 Targeting Cell right now, counting myself, is

14 [1.4a]
15 Warrant Officers that are 131 Alpha Artillery
16 Targeting ones, and [1.4a] Series Intel NCOs.

17 That is a relatively small
18 targeting cell, because it leverages the
19 intel -- intelligence functions from the
20 case, and is linked into Operations for
21 planning, both in our FUOPS and our plans and
22 in Current Ops. So that cell touches

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1 all three of the planning horizons that the
2 Corps operates in, as well as facilitates
3 communications with higher, primarily with
4 CENTCOM, as well as with lower through the
5 MNDs to include (Inaudible) and the task
6 force JFEC folks that are here in country.

7 On the Reconciliation Engagement
8 Cell side, a much larger construct. As I
9 said, we came over with about a [1.4a]
10 initially, and that has since grown to billet
11 space for [1.4a] people from across the different
12 commands, to include MNFI Strategic Effects,
13 MNFI EFEC, which is the Force Strategic
14 Engagement Cell, ORA, Task Force [1.4a] which is
15 JSOC, (Inaudible), Task Force [1.4a] which is
16 the Detainee Operations Command, and
17 MIDSTCKI, which is the Iraqi Training
18 Command. I can never remember exactly what
19 their headquarters stands for, but basically
20 it's the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Training
21 Command, and we also have JWAC personnel from
22 the Joint Warfare Analysis Center that are

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1 attached to my folks for additional nodal and
2 intelligence analysis.

3 [redacted] (b)(6) : So when you were
4 describing your Reconciliation and Engagement
5 Cell, you mentioned the people from
6 Multinational Force-Iraq. Do they come to
7 your cell? Are they now attached to the MNC
8 REC?

9 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, sir.
10 General Petraeus and General Odierno see the
11 Force Special -- Strategic Engagement cell,
12 which is led by a two-star General at Force,
13 and the Reconciliation Engagement Cell here
14 at Corps as being symbiotically linked
15 together, and have to be fused in all things
16 that we are doing from the tactical
17 operational engagements method nested with
18 the strategic engagements, so that there is
19 shared situational understanding between
20 General Petraeus and General Odierno going
21 forward.

22 Obviously, we are connected

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1 digitally through various websites, e-mail,
2 BGCs, etcetera, but we also have done human
3 exchange of liaison officers between our cell
4 and the EFEC.

5 We have got one lieutenant colonel
6 Syops Officer full time in the EFSEC, and
7 they have provided one officer as well from
8 Force. So that there is both human and
9 digital connectivity.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : Where you as the Chief
11 of the Targeting and the Deputy REC -- Where
12 do you spend most of your time?

13 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Actually, most
14 of my times is in meetings, but other than in
15 meetings I reside here in the Palace, here in
16 Al Faw. I reside on the third floor in the
17 Joint Fires and Effects Cell. That is where
18 the REC is based, at least for now, because
19 General McDonald is the Corps Effects
20 Coordinator, and he is the General Officer
21 agent that General Odierno has identified as
22 the lead for reconciliation lines of

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1 operation within the Corps.

2 So we are located close to where
3 his office is in the JFEC. We may move, but
4 it remains to be seen, just because our
5 footprint keeps getting larger and larger
6 with the amount of personnel that we bring.

7 (b)(6): Now what I meant was,
8 besides meetings, do you spend most of your
9 time in the reconciliation area,
10 reconciliation and engagement area, or do you
11 spend most of your time on the targeting, or
12 do you divide it, that kind of thing?

13 (b)(3), (b)(6): Right. Right.

14 Well, I'm afraid that's an excellent point,
15 sir. When we first got here, the engagement
16 side of our targeting cell was the much
17 smaller piece of what was going on. Even
18 though the units at the tactical level have
19 been doing tactical level engagements for
20 four years since they have been here, the
21 movement toward reconciliation was only just
22 beginning and really was only happening out

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1 west, and there was not a huge Corps role.

2 So the first four or so months
3 that we were here, I was 95 percent focused
4 on lethal targeting, and then in the mid-
5 april time frame we really kicked into
6 getting -- actually, let me take that back.

7 Early March time frame, General
8 Lamb had a special little group of folks,
9 before the EFEC, that was working some things
10 at Force. We did some very special things
11 that were not really above board -- that's
12 not the right word -- that were not supposed
13 to be well known activities. That was very
14 closely coordinated between Force and Corps,
15 and then in mid-March we started getting more
16 formalized between Force and ourselves, and
17 then in mid-April is when reconciliation came
18 out of the closet, and we have been going
19 full steam ahead since mid-April.

20 Now I'm very fortunate to have 1.4a

21 1.4a

22 1.4a Right now, I am 99 percent

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1 focused on Reconciliation and Engagement,
2 since I am the Acting Chief, and about one
3 percent focused on Lethal Targeting, because
4 those TDPs are set, and our Battle Room is
5 set, and the Warrants are handling that side,
6 which is not -- Not that it's not important,
7 but it is just lower in priority vice the
8 Reconciliation and Engagement piece because
9 on the reconciliation side we were
10 developing strategy, TDP tactics,
11 organization, all at the same time.

12 So there was a tremendous amount
13 of organizational effort from initially just
14 within the JFEC, and now throughout the Force
15 staff, to get this thing moving, because it
16 is a top priority for both General Petraeus
17 and General Odierno, and as we saw yesterday,
18 even at the post level.

19 (b)(6) Right. I want to talk
20 a little bit about -- actually, a lot about
21 reconciliation.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Everybody

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1 wants to, sir.

2 [REDACTED] (b)(6): You know, just the
3 term reconciliation implies that it is
4 reconciliation between the Sunnis and the
5 Shias, but what appears to me is that it is
6 really -- Out in Anbar, for example, it's
7 really the tribes -- the Sunni tribes
8 deciding that they have had enough of AQI, Al
9 Qaeda in Iraq, and are siding with the
10 Coalition.

11 So if you want to say it's
12 reconciliation between those Sunni tribes and
13 the Coalition, I can see the use of that
14 term. But don't we really want
15 reconciliation between the Shia and the Sunni
16 sects in this country to make it more
17 peaceful?

18 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir,
19 absolutely. It's more than Sunni and Shia,
20 because the Kurd situation in the north
21 cannot be forgotten.

22 [REDACTED] (b)(6): Right.

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1 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : But you are
2 correct, and we had even discussed earlier on
3 about changing terms from reconciliation,
4 because it does not really -- the way we are
5 currently executing it, it's not really
6 reconciliation the way we envision it in the
7 longer term.

8 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : Right.

9 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : But we decided
10 not to do that, because that term was already
11 out there in multiple forums and in the
12 media, and very senior levels of the
13 administration had already used that term,
14 and we were kind of stuck with where we are.
15 So what we try to say is
16 reconciliation now is us and whoever is
17 fighting each other as well as fighting us,
18 and getting those parties, whoever they may
19 be, to turn their weapons toward Al Qaeda and
20 stop attacking Coalition forces and ISF
21 forces. That's Step One.

22 Step Two is we want them to stop

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1 fighting among themselves, if it is inter-
2 tribal, and go back and start to build a
3 world/local, even in the city, peaceful
4 environment.

5 Then, three, once those conditions
6 are established, there is some semblance of
7 the cycle of violence being broken where we
8 can actually get GOI to bring in these
9 various non-Shia forces.

10 Our west, the Sunnis (Inaudible)
11 very correctly is that the tribes did turn
12 against AQI, because they were tired of what
13 AQI was doing to them, and lack of essential
14 services, governing pieces coming to Anbar,
15 and they knew the only way they could do that
16 was to get peace, which they have done so, in
17 coordination with us, to fight AQI, and they
18 are doing it very effectively.

19 The GOI indirectly acknowledged
20 Sheikh Sittar and his movement, and they have
21 a peaceful coexistence at this point, but is
22 it truly reconciled with a formal

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1 declaration? No, it is not. And are we
2 working toward getting those things brought
3 to the table in a more formal manner? Yes,
4 we are. But we do not do reconciliation as
5 DDR, but we do see it as a precursor to get a
6 more stable environment in the near term,
7 primarily in the next 60 to 120 days.

8 [REDACTED] (b)(6): Right.

9 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): And then we
10 will -- We will try not to, but if we do, we
11 will act as the intermediary to get the GOI
12 to engage disparate sectarian groups so that
13 there is ability to bring as many people into
14 the GOI political process fold as possible,
15 and any reconcilables that will not come to
16 the table we will take care of through lethal
17 means.

18 [REDACTED] (b)(6) All right. Let's talk
19 about Anbar for a minute. You mentioned a
20 Sheikh in the answer to your last question,
21 Qasar, I believe.

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): Sittar, sir,

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1 S-i-t-t-a-r.

2 [REDACTED] (b)(6): Is he the senior
3 Sheikh out there?

4 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): That is an
5 interesting question. That would be all
6 classified information.

7 [REDACTED] (b)(6): Right.

8 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): He is not
9 tribally acknowledged as the senior sheikh.
10 However, he is an up and coming sheikh that
11 has power and has been willing to bring folks
12 forward to fight AQI, and has done so, and
13 has been willing to engage with the Coalition
14 and, obviously, we have we have then provided
15 a very significant amount of support to his
16 organization.

17 [REDACTED] (b)(6): When did -- and
18 speaking of Anbar still, when did we begin to
19 see a movement toward this Step One of
20 reconciliation?

21 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.
22 Actually, it started -- The early stage of

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1 it, when this is all said and done, will come
2 out as by being between the April and June
3 time frame of last year.

4 ORA and the (Inaudible) had
5 started to do some work, obviously, very slow
6 moving in the initial parts, and then it
7 really caught fire and moved more quickly.
8 But this has been an ongoing effort for over
9 a year now.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(6): Right. Would you
11 reflect on this a little bit? Is it
12 primarily, do you think, due to our efforts
13 or due to the tribes just getting fed up, or
14 do you see some combination of the two?

15 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6): Certainly,
16 again this is not our official Corps
17 position. This is my personal position, and
18 my experiences from being here now for the
19 third time is that it is a combination of the
20 two, with more of it being toward the tribes
21 themselves; because the tribes have been
22 alive and well in Iraq for thousands of

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1 years. Long before there was Iraq, long
2 before there was an America, the tribes were
3 here, and they will continue to be here well
4 into the future, no matter what happens to
5 Iraq. The tribes will continue.

6 We tend to overlook that social
7 structure, because it is not familiar to us
8 in our western mindset of how we see nation
9 state and governmental organizations.

10 The tribes have been hurting since
11 the Coalition invasion in 2003, because their
12 way of life has been disturbed. Saddam
13 allowed them in various places to continue to
14 exist with smuggling and other types of money
15 to keep them relatively pacified so they did
16 not turn against the government, and a lot of
17 those activities were ceased once we removed
18 the prior regime.

19 Over the years they have become
20 more and more frustrated with the inability
21 to provide economically for their tribesmen,
22 which is completely understandable, and they

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1 realize that we aren't going anywhere until
2 AQ leaves, and AQ is not doing anything to
3 advance their cause with the Sunni or with
4 the other Iraqi locals, and the tribes have
5 turned against AQI.

6 We are seeing it more than just in
7 Anbar. We have folks working with us against
8 AQI in all of the MND battle spaces now, with
9 the exception of down southeast, which is
10 primarily a Shia haven.

11 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : What I'm really trying
12 to get at is: What steps has the Corps, the
13 MNC, whether it was in 2006 or today, taken
14 to facilitate this process of the tribes
15 turning against AQI? How have we
16 facilitated that?

17 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. First
18 and foremost is we, we being -- Did you say
19 Force as well or just Corps?

20 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : Just our actions as
21 Corps. I'm thinking mostly MNF-West.

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Okay. West --

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1 and all of our MND, what started in West has
2 done a lot to bring in the local sheikhs,
3 local tribes, local leaders, and engage in
4 dialogue with them, and determined to work
5 with them through our channels with GOI, the
6 Government of Iraq, to provide the services
7 and requirements that they need in their
8 local areas.

9 We also -- The MEF also worked
10 very hard with the Ministry of Interior to
11 get eight what are called provisional
12 security force units authorized, and this was
13 prior to the main reconciliation movement.
14 They have been in existence for about eight
15 or so months now.

16 Those forces are basically
17 provincial police units that are heavily
18 tied to Sheikh Sittar and his folks, but are
19 equipped and funded by MOI. Of those eight
20 that MOI authorized, currently they have only
21 manned three, but they are in the process of
22 recruiting and standing up the other eight,

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1 and those are arrayed across Anbar in areas
2 where the tribes and local leaders want to
3 provide local security, because all
4 reconciliation is local, just like politics,
5 because it is politics, and first and
6 foremost, the folks that are coming forward
7 to work with us don't really care so much
8 about Iraq and the great questions, but
9 really just want whatever they want, which is
10 peace and security for their families and
11 their clans in their home communities.

12 [REDACTED] (b)(6) : Okay. Let's move into
13 MND-North area and talk about a little bit
14 about the reconciliation efforts there.

15 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : First and
16 foremost, as we talk about the reconciliation
17 efforts, this has been an ongoing staffing
18 effort that will continue in the future as we
19 determine what our true left and right limits
20 are for legal authorities as well as what is
21 going to be acceptable to the commanders here
22 on the ground based on the conditions that we

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1 have here in Iraq.

2 So we are working many different
3 resourcing options, because as we said
4 earlier, what we are trying to do right now
5 is basically triaging the different groups
6 that are working together to be able to bring
7 them into the fold with GOI and help husband
8 along GOI's engagement with these folks in
9 the longer term.

10 Clearly, the focus is on getting
11 some sort of security progress in that 60 to
12 120 days prior to General Petraeus having to
13 return with the Ambassador in September to
14 testify before Congress.

15 Up north, a much different
16 situation than Anbar. The Anbar model is not
17 transferrable across Iraq. As I said
18 earlier, all the reconciliation is local, and
19 one has to tailor the package, depending on
20 where you are operating.

21 Up north, the challenge,
22 obviously, is it is Sunni, Sunni patrolled,

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1 very Sunni dominated, the heart of the old
2 regime, very much a worry area for the Maliki
3 government, and MND-North is doing a
4 fantastic job of getting engaged to help
5 mitigate the risks and results of the two
6 Samarra mosque bombings, as well as our
7 ongoing operations in Diyala and Baqubah.

8 We see the stability in Diyala,
9 Saladin and (Inaudible) being directly tied
10 to anchoring the northern shoulder of
11 Baghdad. So that, if we can get the
12 accelerants to stop coming in from the north
13 into Baghdad, we can hopefully reach some
14 reduced level of violence from Baghdad and
15 then into the western parts of Iraq.

16 [REDACTED] Okay. So you think
17 they are doing a pretty good job up there,
18 and there is still some work, though, to be
19 done?

20 [REDACTED]: Absolutely.
21 We are just in the beginning stages of
22 getting this moving because of the Sunni-Shia

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1 conflict and the inability of the GOI to see
2 past Baghdad, and the other artificials
3 measures that we had imposed due to the way
4 that the elections were held and the
5 inability to get provincial elections on the
6 table in the near term is hamstringing our
7 ability to rapidly have a political change to
8 provide a mechanism of hope for the people;
9 and we are working that very, very hard at
10 the Embassy and with GOI to try to get
11 provincial elections on the calendar by
12 province, hopefully, so that we can give the
13 folks that are wanting to come into the fold
14 some vestige of hope to come into the
15 process.

16 Right now we are asking them to
17 come in to support GOI. However, GOI does
18 not deliver essential services too well nor
19 is there a voting mechanism to get people
20 represented into the political process, both
21 of which are foreign here, and we should not
22 expect rapid cultural changes in just three

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1 or four years in things that have not
2 happened here ever.

3 So we constantly need to remind
4 ourselves of that as we go forward here.
5 This is not a western culture that
6 understands these kinds of things that we are
7 talking about.

8 (b)(6): Okay. Let's move into
9 Baghdad. You've already covered a lot of the
10 problem areas in the outlying -- in the
11 Baghdad belts, with the exception maybe of
12 the southern and MDC area. But I would like
13 for you to talk briefly about the
14 reconciliation efforts in Baghdad. How do
15 you think that is going, with the JSSs and
16 the COPs and the Safe Neighborhoods and the
17 Safe Markets?

18 Is that leading to reconciliation?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I would
20 say right now is -- This is a long term
21 effort, and we've only been at (b)(6)
22 (Phonetic) for a few months. It is going to

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1 take a us a longer period of time, because we
2 have just gotten all 20 of the brigades here
3 about 10 days ago. 15 June is when we
4 finally had all the surge forces here, and it
5 will take sometime for those effects to be
6 seen inside Baghdad.

7 Baghdad, obviously, is the
8 epicenter of this conflict, and is by far the
9 most difficult to get things accomplished due
10 to the proximity of the various dynamic
11 forces to the seat of power, NGOI, in the
12 green zone.

13 The JSSs, the COPs and our
14 movement with the (Inaudible) has been very
15 helpful. As one can see clearly, murders are
16 down tremendously from where they were a year
17 or so ago or even into this fall. However,
18 we have had a huge amount of demographic
19 shifting inside the Baghdad limits which will
20 make reconciliation efforts going forward
21 more difficult.

22 We have had tremendous progress,

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1 though, in a small area, in Abu Ghraib, over
2 the last 10 days. After about a seven month
3 effort, we have got about 1900 Sunni IPs
4 (Phonetic) that are getting vetted as we
5 speak in Abu Ghraib to come into the IP
6 system.

7 This was a very contentious issue
8 with GOI, because they are very hesitant of
9 large blocks of Sunnis coming into the ISF
10 structures so close to Baghdad, because there
11 is a perception that these are coup forces
12 that will end up turning against the
13 government if there is, in fact, a Coalition
14 drawdown in the near term.

15 **(b)(6)**: All right. Let's talk
16 a little bit about MND-Center. It's a little
17 bit different situation there, but there is
18 still some fault lines between the Sunni and
19 the Shia in that area and AQI. Obviously,
20 that's part of the Baghdad Belt. Talk about
21 what MNC is doing in there.

22 **(b)(3), (b)(6)** Right. Sir,

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1 Roger. The MND battle space is something for
2 me personally that is pretty important, where
3 when I was in Brigade 3, we owned the outer
4 sheet area of Baghdad, which is southern
5 Baghdad, which touches North Babel, which is
6 primarily MND-Center battle space.

7 Prior to MND-Center getting here,
8 that entire area was an economy of force for
9 the last three or four years due to lack of
10 coalition forces able to work that battle
11 space.

12 That battle space is extremely
13 important to Baghdad and to the greater war
14 effort, because it sits on, as you mentioned,
15 the fault lines between the Sunni areas in
16 the north and the very much Shia areas in the
17 south, and additionally, it also sits on the

18  1.4b, 1.4d

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20 southern belts which come into Baghdad. All
21 of that transits through MND-Center battle
22 space.

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1 Additionally, it has got a lot of
2 mixed sect as well as mixed tribe, which is
3 just as important, in a lot of cases more
4 important than sect. That has caused a lot
5 of tension and fighting among the tribes in
6 the MND-Center area, and this has been going
7 on for a long period of time. However, with
8 the lack of Coalition presence there, we have
9 just not been aware of it, and it is very
10 opportune for us to get MND-Center in, like
11 we did this spring, to work this battle
12 space.

13 It is extremely critical to
14 Baghdad, and is going to pay us tremendous
15 benefits once we have got them fully up to
16 speed. They are just getting going now in
17 full momentum, and we are already seeing
18 tremendous results in the area, just because
19 of having the amount of Coalition presence,
20 leadership and concentration of effort in
21 that area.

22 (b)(6) Okay. I just have a

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1 couple of more questions to ask, (b)(6)

2 (b)(3), (b)(6)

3 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sure.

4 (b)(6): You know, I've noticed

5 -- I looked at the Coalition campaign
6 strategy or campaign plan, concept plan,
7 dated 6 March, and I come back in June and I
8 look at the Op Order 0701. What I have
9 noticed strikingly is, although -- There are
10 a tremendous amount of similarities, but one
11 of the key tasks that wasn't there in March
12 is there today in 0701, and that is
13 reconciliation.

14 That's a reflection of the
15 Commanding General's interest, is it not?
16 And I wondered if you would speak to how
17 General Odierno has placed a great deal of
18 emphasis on this aspect of reconciliation,
19 far beyond simply moving it up in the queue
20 to, I think it was, the second of the key
21 tasks listed in 0701.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

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1 Sir, he clearly sees right now two
2 priorities, Operation Phantom Thunder which
3 is our surge operation, and not number two
4 but One-Alpha is reconciliation.

5 He has articulated that, and we
6 expect that will be our two top things
7 between now and the end of our rotation,
8 because we are going to ride the surge as
9 long as we can keep the 20 brigades here, and
10 obviously, we want to leverage every bit of
11 military benefit the surge creates security-
12 wise so that we can accelerate the
13 reconciliation effort.

14 Sir, as you mentioned, there was a
15 drastic change between March and 0701. That
16 happened for a number of reasons.

17 This groundswell was going to
18 happen if we did something about it or not.
19 The leadership very well understood that, and
20 we decided early on to get on board and
21 leverage that, hopefully, for a positive
22 outcome, and not let it go astray without

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1 harnessing the vast energy that we had gotten
2 -- that we see in this groundswell.

3 This is something that is a huge
4 shift from the first three to four years of
5 the fight here in Iraq. We tended to have a
6 very neutral populous up until now where
7 there's folks around the country that are
8 willing to turn against AQI and move forward.

9 The key challenge for the
10 Coalition right now is to ensure that GOI can
11 provide basic governance assets and services
12 to its people so that they can continue as a
13 legitimate government to allow our drawdown
14 of Coalition forces.

15 (b)(6): All right. That's all
16 the questions I have at this time. Is there
17 anything you would like to add that you think
18 needs to get on the record?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6): I would tell
20 you that what we need to be cognizant of
21 going forward from here and to take away from
22 where we are so far in Iraq, and one hopes

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1 and we will continue to work toward a
2 successful outcome, is the ability to see
3 through past just the military line of
4 operation and fully integrate our political
5 government and interagency partners earlier
6 rather than later into what we are doing in
7 the overall campaign so that we do not get
8 hamstrung by inability to provide the
9 political governance requirements that the
10 military cannot do just by the way that we
11 are designed in our construct.

12 We need to have a better
13 organizational construct to do that earlier
14 on so we are working multiple lines of
15 operation simultaneously from the get-go and
16 not doing things in a linear fashion.
17 Nothing in Iraq is linear. It is all
18 simultaneous.

19 [redacted] (b)(6) All right. Thank you.

20 That concludes the interview with

21 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

22 Thank you very much, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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