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INTERVIEW OF

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PROCEEDINGS

This is writing a story on the Multinational Corps-Iraq in the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Today is 26 June 2007, and I am about to interview Effects Coordinator Cell, Multinational Corps-Iraq, at the Headquarters of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory, outside of Baghdad, Iraq.

I wondered if we could begin by having you say your full name.

And what is your position in the Effects Coordination Cell?

I am the Chief of Targeting and the Deputy for the Reconciliation and Engagement Cell. That is known as DREC.
tell me a little bit about your background, branch?

Yes, sir. Eighteen-year Field Artillery Officer. Spent my entire career in general Artillery assignments, primarily at the Corps and below level. Deployed to Desert Storm as a fire support officer. Two Middle East deployments. While I was at Fort Stewart, commanded out in battery at Fort Stewart, and then had had three deployments to the Middle East in OIF operations from Fort Hood, either in 1st Cavalry Division and now I'm with III Corps.

Can you talk a little bit about those previous deployments in OIF?

Yes. In 2002 I deployed before it was known as OIF to CFLIC, Coalition Forces Land Control and Command, Headquarters in Camp Doha, Kuwait, during the period of the 1003-V planning, which was the war plan for OIF.
And you were there for a year?

OIF-II deployment was March 2004 to March 2005, and then my previous deployment was six months, August 2002 through January -- or February 2003.

Right. So then you were with the 1st Cavalry Division at that time?

OIF-II, I was the 1st Cavalry Division, yes, sir.

Can you -- I know you said it once before, but because you have two
positions, can you say those two positions that you occupy right now?

Yes. I am the Corps Chief of Targeting, which spans both lethal and non-lethal targeting, and I am the Deputy for the Reconciliation and Engagement Cell, which is primarily an extension of our non-lethal targeting aspects with other (Inaudible) operation, including governments and security primarily.

I am the Deputy, because we are expecting at some point maybe down the road to get a 06 in that's getting by name selected to come forward to lead the important effort of reconciliation (Inaudible).

I'll get to reconciliation in a minute. What I want to do is talk a little bit about what you do as Chief of the targeting.

Before that, I want to ask you in your own words what the Effects Coordination
Cell does.

Yes. The Effects Coordination Cell for our rotation is referred to as the Joint Fires and Effects Cell, which is termed the JFEC, and what we do is coordinate a number of disparate activities for the Corps. By that, I mean that we coordinate traditional, lethal fire support, artillery, counter-(Inaudible) radars, counter-artillery radars, close air support operations through our JOC Fire Cell.

General McAllen (Phonetic) is also responsible for coordinating the information operations line of operation for the Corps. That includes the Corps IM Cell which is resident as part of our Joint Fires and Effects Cell, as well as the IOTF, the Information Operations Task Force that is an extension of our IO efforts.

We also own the Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell, known as the EWCC. That is the coordinating agency for the Corps for
both ground electronic warfare and air electronic warfare assets.

(b)(6) Does that include UAV?

(b)(3), (b)(6) We do not control UAVs. However, we do coordinate for the use of UAVs for targeting ISR operations, primarily through our JOC Fires Cell that works on the JOC floor in Current Operations.

Another piece of the JFEC is the Effects Assessment Cell, which does the campaign level effects assessment for Multinational Corps-Iraq as well as feeding the preponderance of information to Multinational Forces-Iraq for General Petraeus’ overall strategic campaign assessment.

Then lastly, the piece that I own is our Targeting and Reconciliation and Engagement Cell. There's two halves to that cell, one-half of it being our traditional lethal targeting arm that primarily is concerned with operational targeting and HVI
targeting, not so much what the units are doing out on the ground in current operations but the --

(b)(6): HBI is?

(b)(3), (b)(6) I'm sorry, sir. HVI is High Value Individual, but we have extended that to our operational targeting construct, which is really designed at going after the network as a whole, not just the individuals that make up the insurgent network but the functions that a network does, to include logistics, financial, command and control, IO and all the different functions that the network has. We try to counter that in a holistic solution.

So we are not only going after the command and control nodes, which are primarily the focus of our high value individual targeting efforts. We try to do that to complement and supplement the tactical high value individual oriented
operations that the units do during everyday strike operations.

The other half of the Targeting and Reconciliation Engagement Cell is what is known as the reconciliation engagement cell, which is the REC, which has swelled significantly over the last 60 or so days.

When we first arrived here, we had a very small non-lethal targeting section comprised of mostly field artillery guys and some other folks that worked side by side with me and my targeting operations, because non-lethal and lethal targeting have to be deconflicted and coordinated, but with reconciliation as a major line of operation from MNFI level and MNCI level, we have brought in a much larger cast of personnel from both inside the Corps as well as outside the Corps.  


(b)(3), (b)(6): I have one
more section that we also coordinate inside the JFEC is what is known as CRAM, which is the Counter-Rocket and Artillery System, and it is a large operation that provides both very large effort, a lot of money, lot of coordination, includes (Inaudible) gun systems, LCMR radars, traditional firefighter counter-motor radars, raid cameras and other types of devices for both search, warn and respond to the indirect fire threat that affects all of our FOBs here in Iraq.

So that is the other section that we do own.

All right. The Corps did not bring a corps artillery here. Is that correct?

Yes. The corps artillery, III Corps Artillery, much to our chagrin, deactivated on 16 September 2006, and when the Corps Artillery
deactivated, we did not bring the Corps Artillery as it was previously designed here to Iraq.

We are very fortunate, though, and were able to fence off about 85 folks from the previous Corps Artillery from Fort Sill to deploy with the Corps here to Iraq to complement the soldiers in the fire support element at Fort Hood to get the amount of people required to do the mission on the ground.

The way the current Corps (Inaudible), it is inadequate to meet the requirements of what the JTF has to do here, and we had to bring a portion of the remaining personnel from when the Corps Artillery deactivated forward here to Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the JFEC (Inaudible) is the former and last III Corps Artillery commander.

(b)(6)

: You talked about the number of people that came from the III Corps
Artillery. I wondered if you can talk in general terms about the numbers of people totally in the JFEC; that is, in the Effects Coordination Section, and in your sections, your two sections.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. Sir, is that just for the Targeting and Reconciliation or is that JFEC in a large --

(b)(6): JFEC, the large -- the whole organization.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Okay.

Everything that General McDonald owns in the JFEC right now is military, and our contractor numbers are approximately -- not counting reach-back, approximately about folks additionally. So it's about to It fluctuates a little bit, depending on what contractors are in country and which ones are leaving.

We have a very large contractor support presence for IO and in the IOTF. Military, though, we are at the number as I
said, and the vast majority of them came from Fort Sill, and we had about [1.4a] of us that are resident at Fort Hood.

We also had to use good artillery communications and intel personnel that were assigned to the former corps artillery to do jobs outside of their normal MOSs to fill the billets that were required throughout all the disparate activities that the JFEC does.

Okay. How about your targeting?

The Lethal Targeting Cell right now, counting myself, is [1.4a] Warrant Officers that are 131 Alpha Artillery Targeting ones, and [1.4a] Series Intel NCOs. That is a relatively small targeting cell, because it leverages the intel -- intelligence functions from the case, and is linked into Operations for planning, both in our FUOPS and our plans and in Current Ops. So that cell touches
all three of the planning horizons that the Corps operates in, as well as facilitates communications with higher, primarily with CENTCOM, as well as with lower through the MNDs to include (Inaudible) and the task force JFEC folks that are here in country.

On the Reconciliation Engagement Cell side, a much larger construct. As I said, we came over with about a initial space for people from across the different commands, to include MNFI Strategic Effects, MNFI EFEC, which is the Force Strategic Engagement Cell, ORA, Task Force which is JSOC, (Inaudible), Task Force which is the Detainee Operations Command, and MIDSTCKI, which is the Iraqi Training Command. I can never remember exactly what their headquarters stands for, but basically it's the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Training Command, and we also have JWAC personnel from the Joint Warfare Analysis Center that are
attached to my folks for additional nodal and intelligence analysis.

(b)(6): So when you were describing your Reconciliation and Engagement Cell, you mentioned the people from Multinational Force-Iraq. Do they come to your cell? Are they now attached to the MNC REC?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir.

General Petraeus and General Odierno see the Force Special -- Strategic Engagement cell, which is led by a two-star General at Force, and the Reconciliation Engagement Cell here at Corps as being symbiotically linked together, and have to be fused in all things that we are doing from the tactical operational engagements method nested with the strategic engagements, so that there is shared situational understanding between General Petraeus and General Odierno going forward.

Obviously, we are connected
digitally through various websites, e-mail, BGCs, etcetera, but we also have done human exchange of liaison officers between our cell and the EFEC.

We have got one lieutenant colonel Syops Officer full time in the EFSEC, and they have provided one officer as well from Force. So that there is both human and digital connectivity.

Where you as the Chief of the Targeting and the Deputy REC -- Where do you spend most of your time?

Actually, most of my times is in meetings, but other than in meetings I reside here in the Palace, here in Al Faw. I reside on the third floor in the Joint Fires and Effects Cell. That is where the REC is based, at least for now, because General McDonald is the Corps Effects Coordinator, and he is the General Officer agent that General Odierno has identified as the lead for reconciliation lines of
operation within the Corps.

So we are located close to where his office is in the JFEC. We may move, but it remains to be seen, just because our footprint keeps getting larger and larger with the amount of personnel that we bring.

(b)(6): Now what I meant was, besides meetings, do you spend most of your time in the reconciliation area, reconciliation and engagement area, or do you spend most of your time on the targeting, or do you divide it, that kind of thing?

(b)(3),(b)(6): Right. Right.

Well, I'm afraid that's an excellent point, sir. When we first got here, the engagement side of our targeting cell was the much smaller piece of what was going on. Even though the units at the tactical level have been doing tactical level engagements for four years since they have been here, the movement toward reconciliation was only just beginning and really was only happening out
west, and there was not a huge Corps role.

So the first four or so months that we were here, I was 95 percent focused on lethal targeting, and then in the mid-April time frame we really kicked into getting -- actually, let me take that back.

Early March time frame, General Lamb had a special little group of folks, before the EFEC, that was working some things at Force. We did some very special things that were not really above board -- that's not the right word -- that were not supposed to be well known activities. That was very closely coordinated between Force and Corps, and then in mid-March we started getting more formalized between Force and ourselves, and then in mid-April is when reconciliation came out of the closet, and we have been going full steam ahead since mid-April.

Now I'm very fortunate to have

Right now, I am 99 percent
focused on Reconciliation and Engagement, since I am the Acting Chief, and about one percent focused on Lethal Targeting, because those TDPs are set, and our Battle Room is set, and the Warrants are handling that side, which is not -- Not that it's not important, but it is just lower in priority vice the Reconciliation and Engagement piece because on the reconciliation side we were developing strategy, TDP tactics, organization, all at the same time.

So there was a tremendous amount of organizational effort from initially just within the JFEC, and now throughout the Force staff, to get this thing moving, because it is a top priority for both General Petraeus and General Odierno, and as we saw yesterday, even at the post level.

(b)(6) Right. I want to talk a little bit about -- actually, a lot about reconciliation.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Everybody
wants to, sir.

(b)(6): You know, just the term reconciliation implies that it is reconciliation between the Sunnis and the Shias, but what appears to me is that it is really -- Out in Anbar, for example, it's really the tribes -- the Sunni tribes deciding that they have had enough of AQI, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and are siding with the Coalition.

So if you want to say it's reconciliation between those Sunni tribes and the Coalition, I can see the use of that term. But don't we really want reconciliation between the Shia and the Sunni sects in this country to make it more peaceful?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, absolutely. It's more than Sunni and Shia, because the Kurd situation in the north cannot be forgotten.

(b)(6): Right.
But you are correct, and we had even discussed earlier on about changing terms from reconciliation, because it does not really -- the way we are currently executing it, it's not really reconciliation the way we envision it in the longer term.

Right.

But we decided not to do that, because that term was already out there in multiple forums and in the media, and very senior levels of the administration had already used that term, and we were kind of stuck with where we are.

So what we try to say is reconciliation now is us and whoever is fighting each other as well as fighting us, and getting those parties, whoever they may be, to turn their weapons toward Al Qaeda and stop attacking Coalition forces and ISF forces. That's Step One.

Step Two is we want them to stop
fighting among themselves, if it is inter-tribal, and go back and start to build a world/local, even in the city, peaceful environment.

Then, three, once those conditions are established, there is some semblance of the cycle of violence being broken where we can actually get GOI to bring in these various non-Shia forces.

Our west, the Sunnis (Inaudible) very correctly is that the tribes did turn against AQI, because they were tired of what AQI was doing to them, and lack of essential services, governing pieces coming to Anbar, and they knew the only way they could do that was to get peace, which they have done so, in coordination with us, to fight AQI, and they are doing it very effectively.

The GOI indirectly acknowledged Sheikh Sittar and his movement, and they have a peaceful coexistence at this point, but is it truly reconciled with a formal
declaration? No, it is not. And are we working toward getting those things brought to the table in a more formal manner? Yes, we are. But we do not do reconciliation as DDR, but we do see it as a precursor to get a more stable environment in the near term, primarily in the next 60 to 120 days.

(b)(6) Right.

(b)(3), (b)(6) And then we will -- We will try not to, but if we do, we will act as the intermediary to get the GOI to engage disparate sectarian groups so that there is ability to bring as many people into the GOI political process fold as possible, and any reconcilables that will not come to the table we will take care of through lethal means.

(b)(6) All right. Let's talk about Anbar for a minute. You mentioned a Sheikh in the answer to your last question, Qasar, I believe.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Sittar, sir,
S-i-t-t-a-r.

(b)(6): Is he the senior Sheikh out there?

(b)(3), (b)(6): That is an interesting question. That would be all classified information.

(b)(6): Right.

(b)(3), (b)(6): He is not tribally acknowledged as the senior sheikh. However, he is an up and coming sheikh that has power and has been willing to bring folks forward to fight AQI, and has done so, and has been willing to engage with the Coalition and, obviously, we have provided a very significant amount of support to his organization.

(b)(6): When did -- and speaking of Anbar still, when did we begin to see a movement toward this Step One of reconciliation?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Actually, it started -- The early stage of
it, when this is all said and done, will come out as by being between the April and June time frame of last year.

ORA and the (Inaudible) had started to do some work, obviously, very slow moving in the initial parts, and then it really caught fire and moved more quickly. But this has been an ongoing effort for over a year now.

(b)(6): Right. Would you reflect on this a little bit? Is it primarily, do you think, due to our efforts or due to the tribes just getting fed up, or do you see some combination of the two?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Certainly, again this is not our official Corps position. This is my personal position, and my experiences from being here now for the third time is that it is a combination of the two, with more of it being toward the tribes themselves; because the tribes have been alive and well in Iraq for thousands of
years. Long before there was Iraq, long before there was an America, the tribes were here, and they will continue to be here well into the future, no matter what happens to Iraq. The tribes will continue.

We tend to overlook that social structure, because it is not familiar to us in our western mindset of how we see nation state and governmental organizations.

The tribes have been hurting since the Coalition invasion in 2003, because their way of life has been disturbed. Saddam allowed them in various places to continue to exist with smuggling and other types of money to keep them relatively pacified so they did not turn against the government, and a lot of those activities were ceased once we removed the prior regime.

Over the years they have become more and more frustrated with the inability to provide economically for their tribesmen, which is completely understandable, and they
realize that we aren't going anywhere until AQ leaves, and AQ is not doing anything to advance their cause with the Sunni or with the other Iraqi locals, and the tribes have turned against AQI.

We are seeing it more than just in Anbar. We have folks working with us against AQI in all of the MND battle spaces now, with the exception of down southeast, which is primarily a Shia haven.

What I'm really trying to get at is: What steps has the Corps, the MNC, whether it was in 2006 or today, taken to facilitate this process of the tribes turning against AQI? How have we facilitated that?

Okay. First and foremost is we, we being -- Did you say Force as well or just Corps?

Just our actions as Corps. I'm thinking mostly MNF-West.

Okay. West --
and all of our MND, what started in West has
done a lot to bring in the local sheikhs,
local tribes, local leaders, and engage in
dialogue with them, and determined to work
with them through our channels with GOI, the
Government of Iraq, to provide the services
and requirements that they need in their
local areas.

We also -- The MEF also worked
very hard with the Ministry of Interior to
get eight what are called provisional
security force units authorized, and this was
prior to the main reconciliation movement.
They have been in existence for about eight
or so months now.

Those forces are basically
provincial police units that are heavily
tired to Sheikh Sittar and his folks, but are
equipped and funded by MOI. Of those eight
that MOI authorized, currently they have only
manned three, but they are in the process of
recruiting and standing up the other eight,
and those are arrayed across Anbar in areas where the tribes and local leaders want to provide local security, because all reconciliation is local, just like politics, because it is politics, and first and foremost, the folks that are coming forward to work with us don't really care so much about Iraq and the great questions, but really just want whatever they want, which is peace and security for their families and their clans in their home communities.

Okay. Let's move into MND-North area and talk about a little bit about the reconciliation efforts there.

First and foremost, as we talk about the reconciliation efforts, this has been an ongoing staffing effort that will continue in the future as we determine what our true left and right limits are for legal authorities as well as what is going to be acceptable to the commanders here on the ground based on the conditions that we
have here in Iraq.

So we are working many different resourcing options, because as we said earlier, what we are trying to do right now is basically triaging the different groups that are working together to be able to bring them into the fold with GOI and help husband along GOI's engagement with these folks in the longer term.

Clearly, the focus is on getting some sort of security progress in that 60 to 120 days prior to General Petraeus having to return with the Ambassador in September to testify before Congress.

Up north, a much different situation than Anbar. The Anbar model is not transferrable across Iraq. As I said earlier, all the reconciliation is local, and one has to tailor the package, depending on where you are operating.

Up north, the challenge, obviously, is it is Sunni, Sunni patrolled,
very Sunni dominated, the heart of the old
regime, very much a worry area for the Maliki
government, and MND-North is doing a
fantastic job of getting engaged to help
mitigate the risks and results of the two
Samarra mosque bombings, as well as our
ongoing operations in Diyala and Baqubah.

We see the stability in Diyala,
Saladin and (Inaudible) being directly tied
to anchoring the northern shoulder of
Baghdad. So that, if we can get the
accelerants to stop coming in from the north
into Baghdad, we can hopefully reach some
reduced level of violence from Baghdad and
then into the western parts of Iraq.

Okay. So you think
they are doing a pretty good job up there,
and there is still some work, though, to be
done?

Absolutely.

We are just in the beginning stages of
getting this moving because of the Sunni-Shia
conflict and the inability of the GOI to see past Baghdad, and the other artificials measures that we had imposed due to the way that the elections were held and the inability to get provincial elections on the table in the near term is hamstringing our ability to rapidly have a political change to provide a mechanism of hope for the people; and we are working that very, very hard at the Embassy and with GOI to try to get provincial elections on the calendar by province, hopefully, so that we can give the folks that are wanting to come into the fold some vestige of hope to come into the process.

Right now we are asking them to come in to support GOI. However, GOI does not deliver essential services too well nor is there a voting mechanism to get people represented into the political process, both of which are foreign here, and we should not expect rapid cultural changes in just three
or four years in things that have not happened here ever.

So we constantly need to remind ourselves of that as we go forward here. This is not a western culture that understands these kinds of things that we are talking about.

Okay. Let's move into Baghdad. You've already covered a lot of the problem areas in the outlying -- in the Baghdad belts, with the exception maybe of the southern and MDC area. But I would like for you to talk briefly about the reconciliation efforts in Baghdad. How do you think that is going, with the JSSs and the COPs and the Safe Neighborhoods and the Safe Markets?

Is that leading to reconciliation?

Sir, I would say right now is -- This is a long term effort, and we've only been at (Phonetic) for a few months. It is going to
take a us a longer period of time, because we have just gotten all 20 of the brigades here about 10 days ago. 15 June is when we finally had all the surge forces here, and it will take sometime for those effects to be seen inside Baghdad.

Baghdad, obviously, is the epicenter of this conflict, and is by far the most difficult to get things accomplished due to the proximity of the various dynamic forces to the seat of power, NGOI, in the green zone.

The JSSs, the COPs and our movement with the (Inaudible) has been very helpful. As one can see clearly, murders are down tremendously from where they were a year or so ago or even into this fall. However, we have had a huge amount of demographic shifting inside the Baghdad limits which will make reconciliation efforts going forward more difficult.

We have had tremendous progress,
though, in a small area, in Abu Ghraib, over the last 10 days. After about a seven month effort, we have got about 1900 Sunni IPs (Phonetic) that are getting vetted as we speak in Abu Ghraib to come into the IP system.

This was a very contentious issue with GOI, because they are very hesitant of large blocks of Sunnis coming into the ISF structures so close to Baghdad, because there is a perception that these are coup forces that will end up turning against the government if there is, in fact, a Coalition drawdown in the near term.

All right. Let's talk a little bit about MND-Center. It's a little bit different situation there, but there is still some fault lines between the Sunni and the Shia in that area and AQI. Obviously, that's part of the Baghdad Belt. Talk about what MNC is doing in there.

Right. Sir,
Roger. The MND battle space is something for me personally that is pretty important, where when I was in Brigade 3, we owned the outer sheet area of Baghdad, which is southern Baghdad, which touches North Babel, which is primarily MND-Center battle space.

Prior to MND-Center getting here, that entire area was an economy of force for the last three or four years due to lack of coalition forces able to work that battle space.

That battle space is extremely important to Baghdad and to the greater war effort, because it sits on, as you mentioned, the fault lines between the Sunni areas in the north and the very much Shia areas in the south, and additionally, it also sits on the southern belts which come into Baghdad. All of that transits through MND-Center battle space.
Additionally, it has got a lot of mixed sect as well as mixed tribe, which is just as important, in a lot of cases more important than sect. That has caused a lot of tension and fighting among the tribes in the MND-Center area, and this has been going on for a long period of time. However, with the lack of Coalition presence there, we have just not been aware of it, and it is very opportune for us to get MND-Center in, like we did this spring, to work this battle space.

It is extremely critical to Baghdad, and is going to pay us tremendous benefits once we have got them fully up to speed. They are just getting going now in full momentum, and we are already seeing tremendous results in the area, just because of having the amount of Coalition presence, leadership and concentration of effort in that area.

Okay. I just have a
couple of more questions to ask, (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sure.

(b)(6)

You know, I've noticed -- I looked at the Coalition campaign strategy or campaign plan, concept plan, dated 6 March, and I come back in June and I look at the Op Order 0701. What I have noticed strikingly is, although -- There are a tremendous amount of similarities, but one of the key tasks that wasn't there in March is there today in 0701, and that is reconciliation.

That's a reflection of the Commanding General's interest, is it not? And I wondered if you would speak to how General Odierno has placed a great deal of emphasis on this aspect of reconciliation, far beyond simply moving it up in the queue to, I think it was, the second of the key tasks listed in 0701.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Yes, sir.
Sir, he clearly sees right now two priorities, Operation Phantom Thunder which is our surge operation, and not number two but One-Alph is reconciliation.

He has articulated that, and we expect that will be our two top things between now and the end of our rotation, because we are going to ride the surge as long as we can keep the 20 brigades here, and obviously, we want to leverage every bit of military benefit the surge creates security-wise so that we can accelerate the reconciliation effort.

Sir, as you mentioned, there was a drastic change between March and 0701. That happened for a number of reasons.

This groundswell was going to happen if we did something about it or not. The leadership very well understood that, and we decided early on to get on board and leverage that, hopefully, for a positive outcome, and not let it go astray without
harnessing the vast energy that we had gotten -- that we see in this groundswell.

This is something that is a huge shift from the first three to four years of the fight here in Iraq. We tended to have a very neutral populous up until now where there's folks around the country that are willing to turn against AQI and move forward.

The key challenge for the Coalition right now is to ensure that GOI can provide basic governance assets and services to its people so that they can continue as a legitimate government to allow our drawdown of Coalition forces.

(b)(6): All right. That's all the questions I have at this time. Is there anything you would like to add that you think needs to get on the record?

(b)(3), (b)(6): I would tell you that what we need to be cognizant of going forward from here and to take away from where we are so far in Iraq, and one hopes
and we will continue to work toward a successful outcome, is the ability to see through past just the military line of operation and fully integrate our political government and interagency partners earlier rather than later into what we are doing in the overall campaign so that we do not get hamstrung by inability to provide the political governance requirements that the military cannot do just by the way that we are designed in our construct.

We need to have a better organizational construct to do that earlier so we are working multiple lines of operation simultaneously from the get-go and not doing things in a linear fashion. Nothing in Iraq is linear. It is all simultaneous.

All right. Thank you.
That concludes the interview with

Thank you very much,