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Scott, Darryl A. Major General (USAF)  
Commander, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan  
GRD Compound, FOB Essayons, International Zone, Baghdad  
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by (b)(3), (b)(6)  
MNFI Historian

Interviewers Comments: This was a hastily arranged interview to get Scott's views just before he gave up command after 24 months in Iraq. He explained the huge contracting challenges we face as a result of exponential growth in our reliance on contractors and the reductions we've had in contracting officers. Moreover, contracting used to be just providing life support to the troops; now it is restoring infrastructure in austere environments for targeted populations--i.e. fixing Baghdad. It is a mind-boggling change. JCC-IA has increasingly worked closely with tactical commanders to follow up kinetic operations with swift contracting infusions to accomplish what had to be done. Scott described the inspiration he has taken from an Iraqi entrepreneur. Transcription priority: Medium to High for the subject matter. I believe my notes capture the essence of his points.

Maj Gen Scott has been in his current position since January 2006 (24 months).

Question 1: What would you tell the Secretary of Defense if you had 10 minutes with him?

There have been two dynamics impacting contracting since the end of the Cold War that the Secretary of Defense needs to appreciate. First, after the first gulf war, the decision to increasingly rely on logistical contracting meant commanders had to understand contracting. General P has 160,000 contractors working for him, but he has a shortfall in contracting officers to oversee what they are doing. We are working on that problem. This has become increasingly difficult over the last 17 years because as our reliance on contracting has gone up, the contracting officer career field has shrunk. Secretary Geren has received our recommendations. We need to turn around the force structure. The US Army needs 2,500 contracting officers (I didn't catch what number we had). The Air Force needs 2400. In order to learn the ropes, stay in, and make a difference, contracting officers have to have a path to senior leadership. That is what it will take to align contractors with the mission.

What we have in Iraq is the nature of foreseeable warfare. It is common to the global war on terror and to conventional operations. We have seen that we have to stabilize the target population. For the last 17 years, our focus has been on supporting the force. Not, it is how to rebuild, or build, public institutions. There is a vast difference between procuring drinking water for 23,000 troops on a base and repairing a water or sewer system for a city of millions. It is providing life support versus fixing a city. Our customers, the commanders, are not prepared for the details of using money as ammunition. Commanders need to know whether there is an effective vendor base of

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factories, shops, and economic systems. If that is not in the culture, then we can't get it there. What does it take to build an enduring supply chain? It has to be done at the strategic level. We have to empower commanders, and teach them. For example, there is an agricultural farm economy in the south. There is an industrial economy in the north capable of making farm machinery. Commanders have to link the farmers with the manufacturers, and they have to overcome all the religious, sectarian, criminal, ethnic, energy and infrastructure barriers that prevent the farmer and the manufacturer from working together. They have to overcome all the people who oppose southern farmers cooperating with northern manufacturers.

Question 2: How has strategy changed since January 2006?

In January 2006, the focus was on transition. The idea was to secure things, and immediately turn them over to Iraqis to hold. The Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006 changed everything [but MNFI strategy was very slow to respond]. Where we had been thinking about retrograding, it gradually became a desperate fight. In later '06, we were closing out reconstruction efforts. Then new requirements came up with the changed strategy. In 2006, we spent \$500 million on the ISF. In 2007, we spent \$1.2 billion. This was from the end of Operation Together Forward II until the beginning of Fardh al Qanoon. The focus changed from withdrawal to support with five more brigades.

We know that Relief and Reconstruction require deliberate action. In the states, it is a 60-day process to identify a project, cost it, bid it, sign the contract, and implement. Here, that is too long. Contracted relief and reconstruction must begin within a few days. If tactical units go into to clear and secure an area, the contracting must begin within 4 to 5 days to make a difference. We have to immediately spend money. The target is 48 hours after the conclusion of kinetic operations, we begin consequence management. We show people a secured area, rebuilding, opening stores, we're staying, offer humanitarian assistance, and then move on to more sophisticated efforts, such as sewer and electricity.

We have begun what we call "Effects-Based Contracting" and "Enterprise Management." We work closely with tactical commanders on their operations. Wherever their target and main effort is, we get ready with combined contracting support from what ever combination of regional contracting centers can best support the operation. In fardh al Qanoon, we coordinated among four RCCs. We shifted the contracting effort based on the workload. This is all designed around supporting the fight. With 4th Division and 1st Cavalry Division, by end of OTF II, we put together a staff planning team we called the J28 to develop contracting support. For Scott, it is like being a CFACC. He has to keep assets in motion around Baghdad. He spent considerable time with BG Brooks working it out. On a day to day basis, a cell of O-4s and O-5s keeps working it all out.

Question 3: What were your best and worst days?

Scott's worst day was 7 April 2007. He just returned from Afghanistan. His chief of staff, (b)(3), (b)(6) met Scott at BIAP, and Gilmo never met him at the airport.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) told Scott that Commander Phil M. Sweet had just been killed by an EFP while he was working on a project in Rusafa. The project was the Rusafa Rule of Law complex.

The best day was the next day, when Phil's troops mounted up and went back out to Rusafa to make sure the job got done. They did it to honor Phil, and to show that the insurgents and their violence were not going to win.

Question 4: What soldier, Iraqi, or senior leader made a particularly strong impression on you?

That would be (b)(6). He was an Iraqi who had gone to London. In 2003, he returned to Iraq with \$3,000 because he was convinced Iraq had a future. Now, he runs Alamco, a company with a revenue of \$140,000,000 a year. He employs 2,500 Iraqis, and build it up from nothing. I went with him to look at a water treatment plant. He told me all about the plan, the engineering, the issues to be dealt with. He is a project manager, but more than that he is a leader with a vision. His vision was non-sectarian, and for a non-sectarian Iraq. (b)(6) works in a quiet but driving way. Today, he is managing \$300,000,000 in open contracts. He builds you up. You can't spend 10 minutes with him and not be better for it.

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