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Embassy Annex, International Zone, Baghdad

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Abstract

(b)(3), (b)(6) is responsible for the Security LOO in the JCP. He is a SAMS graduate and former brigade commander and has been a Special Assistant to CSA and others. He served Shinseki from '02 to '03 and joined MNFI in September '07. The drop in violence from the surge has been encouraging, but we need political and economic progress. Looking at the situation optimistically, the GoI was going to have to deal with Basra and Sadr City eventually. Now it is. Turkey and the PKK are very difficult because they impose huge opportunity costs.

Interview

~~(S/NF)~~ As the Chief of Security Strategy, I own the Security Line of Operation. I wrote the update with 169 tasks in the JCP and I constantly assess it. I have Iraqi Border Security, which amounts to 25% of my job. I have the Counter PKK policy, and we've had fifty Turkish cross border operations. I handle political and military ops with Turkish leaders. I have Strategic Forces Agreement operations input in dealing with authorities and its language and how it affects everything else.

Background

(b)(6)

(U) As far as things that have influenced my career, I would point to the School for Advanced Military Studies for giving me a true professional education in how to think about strategic issues. Also, the opportunity to command was important. I took command after the brigade returned from Iraq, and we did not deploy during my tenure, so I missed an opportunity there.

(U) The individual that has most influenced me is Ambassador (Retired general) Dale Daily. He did the most to counsel me on my career. I still see him on VTCs regularly.

SA to the CSA, June '02 to June '03

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(U) I arrived just after the Crusader struggle ended. It had been a public spectacle. General Keane, the VCSA, had been announced as Shinseki's replacement, which was an embarrassment for the CSA. It attempted to make him a lame duck. This particularly did not make sense because Shinseki had just announced Transformation in October '01. No one understood what was going on. Shinseki was a solid professional and very conscious of duty and honor. He did not compromise his best political military judgment, but he was very careful in public. In '02, he went on a war footing. He went out to visit every division and all the brigades to hear their out briefs for their preparations for Iraq. We did things like accelerate Blue Force Tracker fielding to get stuff to the troops.

Joint Staff Chief of War Plans, '05-'07

(U) I was on the Joint Staff through September of '07 and the plan was to stay. I was on my way to being the SA to the CJCS when that position changed. Suddenly I was in limbo. I pressed to get to Iraq, and I was picked up for it. MNFI created this position when I arrived, and I immediately inherited the task of revising the Security LOO in the JCP. My cell handles all security issues falling short of SPA Strategies.

(U) Getting situational awareness was not too hard for me because I already had a lot of visibility on the issues from having dealt with all of them at the Joint Staff. That helped me step right into the JCP process with little difficulty.

The Situation in Fall '07

(U) The surge was in full swing. We had had the drop in violence and there was a certain amount of optimism. We recognized we needed to transition things to the Iraqis, and we knew we'd never have enough TTs. Turkey was relatively quiet. The Sadr Freeze was in effect. We were beginning to see the clear, hold, retain and the JSSs and COPs paying off. We needed a certain level of security to create space for political and economic progress.

Speaking optimistically . . .

(U) The 800 pound guerrilla is being dealt with. Basra and Sadr City have to be dealt with. Now, suddenly, PM Maliki is doing just that, and he is confronting AQI in the north.

(U) Security is not an absence of violence; it is the absence of violence that is due to a peaceful compromise which does not currently exist. We were getting diminishing returns [on our security operations?]. We needed political breakthroughs. What we're seeing could be political breakthroughs, but it is hard to assess. So much of what we're seeing has a political component. What the GoI thinks and decides about Iran. It is all about establishing a better negotiating position.

Turkey

~~(S/NF)~~ Turkey is incredible complex. It involves the PKK and PJAK. The PKK are Turkish citizens with a safe haven. They are struggling for Kurdish rights. They have chosen terrorist tactics. The Kurdish Regional Government has an affinity for them. The

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KRG is a major voting bloc in the Maliki government, and they are in a position of influence over coalition policy.

~~(S//NF)~~ The US has provided intel to Turkey to restore the relationship damaged in 2003. We've seen very aggressive organization of operations in Turkey since December, including 50 cross border operations, including the 8 days at the end of February. The KRG often screams bloody murder and threatens to undermine the GoI. The KRG has snubbed the Secretary of State. We have the opportunity cost of all these things to political progress. Cross border operations disrupts things and the KRG plays its role . . .

I ran out of time due to another appointment. I need to schedule a follow up with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to continue discussing all these issues.

Approved for Release