MNSTCI is a unique, and they have just reorganized. The situation shows reorganization to be almost constant, and they are looking to future changes. The priority has changed from boots on the ground to ministerial capacity. Dubik’s congressional testimony on 16 January was really focused on how long this mission will last. We also discussed CLCs, NATO, the Operations Centers, and a bit on the IAG and MiTTs. You need the briefing slides on organization to fully get all the points made.

MNSTCI is a combined organization confronting many issues unique to an ad hoc organization. They have a convoy company whose mission is to escort MNSTCI personnel around various camps in Baghdad, in the so-called ‘Red Zone.’ By working with CMH, they determined it is a provisional infantry company. Most of its personnel are 11 series, plus they have medics. The company commander is an armor officer. The unit’s convoys have been engaged by IEDs, and this raised the question of whether they qualified for IEBs. MNSTCI held a board to determine the matter. The personnel met nearly all of the criteria. They are infantry troops assigned to a recognized infantry unit. However, the regulation requires they “close with and engage the enemy to destroy him with direct fire.” Getting hit by an IED is not the same thing. Such a circumstance would qualify them for a Combat Action Badge, but the CAB is not authorized for infantry assigned to an infantry unit. In any case, MNSTCI makes recommendations; they don’t decide the final matter.

The mission of J3: it was the lead agent for the bottoms up review, the process. It worked in concert with the J1. A key thing that LTG Dubik . . .

MNSTCI is different from a Corps unit, which all came to Iraq together. MNSTCI’s personnel all came as individual augmentees and teams on RFFs. MNSTCI’s JMD has 60 to 70% of its personnel coming from RFFs. It has many training teams. One of Dubik’s focuses has been to do mission analysis. We want to correct sourcing issues and get the right TDA. In a JMD, that means mostly WIAS. We have many teams, and those are on RFF structures.

The bottoms-up review was trying to figure out the best structure, that was the goal. We figured out a few primary areas of concern: personnel, training, professional
development, acquisition (J4 stuff, J7 facilities, J8 resources), replenishment, force management (J5), and budgeting. Before, our priority was to get Iraqi boots on the ground, churn out the police and the soldiers. Now, the focus is on building ministerial capacity. In the future, as we finish the COIN, the focus will be on dividing the effort into MOI handling police and internal matters and MOD handling external threats. Today, both MOI and MOD are focused on the COIN, but that can’t be a permanent state of affairs. The CG (Dubik) has asked the MSCs to focus on the ministries.

**MNSTCI Organization**

From Organizational Structure Chart, Jan ’08. Under the Directorate of Defense Affairs (DDA), MG Allardice commanding, the Transition Teams are small. They are tied into the Functional Capability Directorate. These include the CAFTT, the CAATT, and the MsSTT, all of which are RFF teams. Under INCTFTT, RDM L Winters, the Iraqi Special Forces ATT has a team advising the SOF.

The SAO does Foreign Military Sales. Until Dec ’07, this was an O-6 billet, now it is a two-star.

**Evolution Slide**

He walked me through a slide that shows all the many different transition teams, how they reorganized for January ’08, and how SAO eventually predominates.

**Functional Capability Directorate**

Headed by (b)(3), (b)(6) it assists all the transition teams and handles congressional RFIs.

The Strategic Initiatives Group, under (b)(3), (b)(6) (an Arabic FAO) ensures our organizational coherence and handles queries to get the right answers.

**Dubik Testimony**

On Saturday, 12 Jan, (b)(3), (b)(6) learned that Dubik would have to testify before Congress on MNSTCI on Thursday. The CoS, (b)(3), (b)(6) called (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him that MG Jones had to get back to the states quickly to brief up LTG Dubik on all the issues. (b)(3), (b)(6) handled many of the questions, which concerned the capabilities of the ISF. The bottom line question from the congressmen was what was the timeline for the operation? They wanted to know how long standing up the ISF was going to take. (b)(3), (b)(6) answer is everything is conditioned based. It depends on the enemy, on the Awakening Groups. The ultimate goal is to get the Iraqi Army out of doing internal security, but we have to defeat AQI first and we can’t put a timeline on that. One Congressman said, “Americans want a calendar on their refrigerator that shows how long this will continue.” (b)(3), (b)(6) answer is the situation is not subject to a refrigerator calendar. The enemy is smart, and we are not and cannot be in a reactionary mode. How long? We don’t know. We don’t know the future. We are building capacity of forces and of the ministries. The idea is that we do the mission, and Iraqis watch; then Iraqis do the mission, and we overwatch; then Iraqis do the mission, and we’re out.
control $5 billion in ISF funds, but these can only be used for ISF purposes, the MOI and MOD, but not another ministry. There are many questions about how we spend money. We’re trying to stabilize the economy, electricity, and exports, and trying to pay poor Iraqi men instead of letting the enemy pay people to attack us. We need to work at giving Iraqis skill sets to put them to work rather than having them attack us for money.

**CLCs**
The CLCs are an MNCI project. They recruit, pay, and train them. We only have enough capacity to absorb 20% of the CLCs into the ISF. The CLCs are locally based, not so the Iraqi Army, so we create a mobile force that can be moved into a conflict area; the CLC’s will not leave home. We have a methodical process to vet the CLCs with biometrics for personnel accountability.

**The NATO Training Mission**
LTG Dubik also commands this. He visited Camp Dublin, outside VBC, last week. He met Carabinieri and CPAATT. They are providing an eight week police refresher training course. It consists of four weeks of training, a week break, and three more weeks of training. During his visit, he talked with an Iraqi battalion commander who had his troops there from the Mansoor Iraqi police battalion. The battalion commander greatly appreciated this focused training because of the opportunity to pull his entire unit off the line and focus on training for eight weeks. The training was many simple things. We walked into a classroom and saw a hundred junior police being trained by a caribineiri. It was going from Italian into Arabic, with slides in Italian and Arabic. This is very beneficial to the national police, and it is growing their capacity. Camp Dublin is by VBC. We work hand in hand with NATO, but we do not task them.

**Operations Centers**
MNSTCI built the National Operations Center. We did that with MNSTCI is using ISF funds, designated for ISF, to build the operations centers. We did this in Diyala, in Samarra, for the MoI OC at Camp Shield, etc. MNSTCI’s role is to give them communications, infrastructure, and equipment. Now, there is no established training team designed to stand up an operations center, as J3, was tasked to advise on operations center procedures, but he has no ops center training team. The OCs in Samarra and many other places were established in reaction to the enemy. There were problems in an area, PM Maliki said “establish an OC there,” so MNSTCI built an OC following such guidance in Ninewa and Samarra. But, there was no template for creating these things or getting them operational.

Coalition personnel often expect that our way of doing things is “THE” way of doing things, and expect the Iraqis to do it that way. He told his deputy, that the MOI/MOD must shape the template. They put a template together in October 07. This template details the requirements for communications, infrastructure, and manning. We put this template on the shelf. In late November, PMM said he needed an OC
Ninewah and Anbar. We engaged the PM on how to do it and did good coordination. We got with the coalition force on the ground in Ninewa (Maj Gen Hertling in MND-N), and carefully coordinated it all. We found the location, wrote contracts, contracted communications. Hertling committed to helping the Iraqis get it going. The timeline was to occupy the OC by 15 January and make it fully operational by 15 April. On 3 January, flew up to the Ninewa OP. They now have the basic structure in place and MOI/MOD sent 32 Iraqis up to man it and get it going. In Samarra, similarly, MNSTCI applied the template and got the funding going, but didn’t do the process right. Coordination faltered. PM appointed a general, but still there is no staff. It showed too much in the reaction mode.

**Iraqi Assistance Group**

The commander is BG Yarborough. 1st ID currently has this mission. They work with the Corps MiTTs. They coach, teach, and mentor on the ground. The maneuver battalions on the ground have internal teams. We have an IAG LNO and hold bi-weekly VTCs with the fusion cell. All MNDs, MNSTCI, etc attend that. We discuss on the issues MND by MND in order to synchronize our efforts. MNSTCI’s role is force generation, issuing weapons, and the logistics aspect.

An example is 3rd Brigade 14th Div out of Basra with the British under BG Swann. They came to Besmaya for Unit Set Fielding. 14th Div leadership had come up previously for the site survey. They were issued their M16s/M14s, did biometric for personnel accountability, unit training, issuing of equipment, and do range firing. We also have an EOD school. The MiTT links up.

The ISF has grown and grown and grown. We continue to generate and replenish the force.

Iraqis have a UCMJ, but Iraqi soldiers can just quit. After Saddam, Iraqis fear an authoritarian structure, so they do not want to punish desertion. We are trying to build logistics, maintenance, and sustainment. Each division is getting one logistics battalion, and each division either has its own division training center, or it is located at a training facility. We also have to build capacity in the MOI with the police. Training police is a new challenge given all their specialized requirements (SWAT, Traffic, patrol, investigation, etc.) Hence, timelines are all the more difficult.