Abstract

Allardice begins with his professional background and goes into the reason for MNSTIC's reorganization in late 2007, and his ascension to Director of Defense Affairs. The old organization was extremely misaligned for this mission, or any mission. The functional capabilities teams are culturally inappropriate, and arrogance drives much of the US Army's operations in Iraq. Efforts to build the Iraqi Air Force have been ridiculously late and terribly underfunded. The Air Force should have been a much higher priority from the very beginning, perhaps the highest priority, the one thing that could most quickly have restored Iraqis' morale and nipped an insurgency in the bud before it got underway by building a sense of national cohesion and power. Transcription priority: Medium, just to hear that he actually says what I've said he says.

Background

Allardice graduated from the US Air Force Academy in 1980 with a degree in engineering. At the Air War College, he did regional studies on central Asia. His CAPSTONE assignment was to Azerbaijan. He had no idea at the time that he would be engaged in a drawn-out conflict in the region. His last job was running personnel matters on the Air Staff, and it was focused on airman development, culture, and values, from the airman all the way up to senior leaders. The concern was how to build up the competencies of senior leaders. He was also in charge of Air Force uniforms and developed the Airman Battle Uniform. This exposed him to the acquisition process. This was all fortuitous because it prepared him extremely well for the tasks he faces today in building up the Iraqi Air Force.

He commanded Task Force from Germany in running air operations in Afghanistan in September and October 2001. In March 2003, he commanded the Air Task Force in the 173rd Airborne Drop in northern Iraq. Went to McChord AFB.

7:44 In March 2007, he deployed to Iraq to take over CAFTT. With the MNSTCI Re-Organization, he became the Interim DDA Director in December 2007. As of 1 January 2008, he began doing both DDA and CG, CAFTT.

On the Directorate of Defense Affairs

Why did MNSTCI form a DDA?
The role of MNSTCI is to build up Iraq to generate forces for Iraq. So how do we organize to assist the GOI in building up its forces, generate force, sustain force, and replenish force. So, we needed an organization focused on the Ministry of Defense, hence the DDA. I am building up the separate services.

11:45. DDA has CAATT, the CMaSTT, and the CAFTT. DDA also has advisor teams focused on the MoD and the JHQ, and he has enablers focused on six different functional capabilities involving ministerial capacity: acquisition of people, training and development, force management, budget, acquisition of material, and sustainment.

14:00 The basic struggle is "we have a task, because of the counterinsurgency, to generate forces, is we have got to generate forces, have to generate forces now, we've got to build up the Army, is basically the imperative, although that sells the Air Force short. There is an argument that another brigade is more powerful than an Air Force contribution. I'd offer that needs to be explored. I sharply, strongly disagree with it. I'm an airman, but I've also seen the difference of airpower, and I think we've completely, completely ignored that in this counterinsurgency, now I've got that off my chest. From an institutional capacity perspective . . . by the way, we only ignore it in Iraq. We can not fight a counter-insurgency without air power, the Army proves that every single day with helicopters, with UAVs, with kinetic from the air, and yet we did not start building that capacity in Iraq until 2007. We are three years late on that contribution."

15:07 So, back to DDA. We are focused on generating and sustaining forces, so there is a significant imperative to generate forces, and Iraqis can not generate force as fast as the US can. The focus of CAFTT is on generating capacities. The Iraqis have a very small capability to generating forces. The CMATT's focus has been on generating forces, not generating capacities, despite what they say. What CMATT is really doing is shoving the Iraqis aside and doing it themselves. When I drill down, I find the CMATT is doing the work for the Iraqis, not helping the Iraqis do it.

17:30 The US is doing direct injection of money, planes, instructor pilots, and DDA synchronizes it all. At CAFTT, I am generating capacity. The engagement team is made up of several advisors. There is a team for the Min of Def. The advisors are experts in transition teams.

20:00 Why did we establish the DDA? We established DDA because everything was unsynchronized, and Allardice's role is to synchronize the effort. It [CAFTT, CMATT, CMaSTT] was in horrible shape. We have advisors who were not communicating. We have a collective body of advisors who have never gotten feedback on what they were doing. Dubik would hold talks with the MOD, but we were not teeing up efforts to guide Dubik's discussions with MOD, and we would not get feedback on what they had discussed.

For example, Allardice found that no one knew what the budget process was, and lack of awareness of the process fosters frustration all around. Key American advisors did not understand the Iraqi processes.
What are the three top points to tee up for LTG Dubik?

There are tension points between generating force and building ministerial capacity. I don't think it is either/or, I think it is both/and. I don't think Dubik thinks it is either/or, but I do think the people in the trenches think it is either/or, so we have to lead them to a position where they understand it is 'this AND that.' With the MoD, I want LTG Dubik to start focusing on . . . as the environment has become more secure, and its getting more and more successful with security, you have to rapidly re-orient on building relationships with the Iraqis so that we can advise them on building capacity. I believe the Iraqi institutional capacity will become self-sustaining this year. We have to align ourselves to them. This is the year of re-orientation on their processes.

29:12 Under Force Generation, I would give us and A-; under Force Sustainment, a B-, and an F for Institutional Capacity. Dubik's focus is that the enemy is time and political will, both US and Iraqi.

For example, we built the six Functional Capabilities Teams to our processes, not to the Iraqis’. Somebody said this was a joint concept, it's not, it's an Army concept. In a meeting with advisors, I had many functional experts, but I asked how many had been formally trained to be an advisor, and the answer was 1.4a Just think of the implications of that. And it was so exciting to me, because it means they all get excited about their Western views, and then insert themselves intrusively into this culture. We assume that they want our management systems, but we need to learn their language of process. We mistakenly apply our styles to them. We need to understand them (the Iraqis), not them us.

33:40 On developing senior leaders, institutional capacity is something you have to do at the right time. The US Army approach to the MiTT team is a pretty good program, but the skill set is different for senior leaders than what you need at the tactical leader. The competencies required for senior-level leaders are much different than what you need for operational or tactical leadership. For example, a RAND study showed that the most important competency needed for success at the senior level was enterprise perspective. You can have great domain knowledge, but if you don't have enterprise perspective, then you default to what you know, the domain knowledge, and that doesn't work in the environment overarching all the domains, which means you are sub-optimized.

35:30 Now, juxtaposing that argument here, it means that my advisors are functional experts, but no nothing about Iraqi ministerial processes. They don't know how to navigate the Iraqi budget processes. So the default is to their functional expertise, and they draw charts the Iraqis then don't understand.

Back to the advisor issues, when they stood up these advisor teams for the MoD and the JHQ, they thought they needed advisory teams to stand up these capacities. What happens organizationally is you wind up with these two separate organizations. So Dubik was getting prepped to go talk to MoD (Abu Qadr) and JHQ (Babikir). JHQAT said turn
right, MoDAT said turn left, and the advisors were no help navigating it. They were on opposite sides of the table.

38:30. I don't know how big the MoD and JHQs are, 1 or 2K. He sees a lot of arrogance among Americans. The Iraqi decision making process incorporates everything common to every bureaucracy, the formal, the informal, and the independent. When Americans get confused and call things "sectarian;" it is just a cop out. We don't understand this place. Our peak decision making hours are 0900 to 1500. The Iraqis aren't around, and we figure they're lazy. In fact, they relax during the day, and work late into the night, with their key decisions between 1800 and 2400. We have to adjust to their schedule. The advisors in the MoD/JHQ effort should have synchronized their efforts, but we're not even synchronized among the GOs. The advisor's job is to learn how to influence their processes. It takes an advisor up to 9 months just to learn their process.

How many of the problems that Americans' point to as being 'sectarianism' is just our not understanding the Iraqis' processes and challenges?

42:34. I think the sectarian charge is a cop out. There is some sectarianism, but almost always it is a cop out. I honestly believe the US Army came in here with the attitude of 'get out of my way, I'm going to do this,' and I see evidence of that everywhere, both as an Air Force guy and as the DDA. And I just shake my head, and I've had it. I'll give you an example. As an Air Force guy, I went over to hold a meeting with the Corps about future basing." I told them I'd heard some things and I just wanted to check them out about what their intents were on basing. I had a map showing where the Iraqis were intending to set up, and they pulled out their map showing where they intended to set up. I laid the Iraqi map for Iraqi basing over the Americans' American basing map, and they lined up almost perfectly. And this was really offensive to me as an American, they said "They [the Iraqis] can't go there; the Army's going there." The US Army wanted these bases to park their brigades, and figured the Iraqis would just have to go somewhere else. It was the arrogance of the approach that was really offensive.

44:42. The US should be really embarrassed over the palaces. It is outlandish and offensive beyond belief that we are occupying the Iraqis palaces. I escorted the CG of the Iraqi Air Force, which operates in a shack, into the ACCE's palace. The ACCE is about 32 people, and they're occupying this palace. Look at Al Faw palace and all these other places. We question them not wanting to build up infrastructure, and meanwhile we're living in their palaces. And these are their palaces, aren't they? They are going to be in their palaces. Just my opinion, and I see it. This is not lost on me. What are we doing in their palaces? If we don't understand that, if we are so arrogant, if we don't understand that occupying their palaces has an impact, then how can we really argue the sectarian thing? It is intellectual laziness, and I've seen it in spades in the DDA role, what I've described to you. The advisors should have a comprehensive and synchronized approach." But even the GOs are not synchronized. I've walked into meetings with Iraqi leaders before and after other US GOs, and I had no idea what these other GOs talked about or that they were having these meetings. The Iraqis must have a ball laughing about us.
I struggle with this because I'm trying to get the DDA synchronized.

We have to do direct injects to make the system work, but we need a feedback loop to ensure the system works. The Iraqis have a feedback loop. We need to understand it.

49:44. LTG Dubik knew immediately that we were misaligned, and DDA is the fix, but the only real sin here is not generating forces.

**On CAFTT**

50:14 *How have we neglected or missed opportunities with the Air Force?*

It is so simple, and people just have no idea. Now, about the CAFTT, let's look at this. Let me think. I got here in March. In January '07, the Iraqi Air Force was generating about [or not?] 30 sorties a week. I would characterize it as a flying club. My predecessor did outstanding work securing funds to buy some air planes that hadn't arrived yet. So the Iraqi Air Force consisted of a few propeller driven air craft. Now, here's my . . . let me give you my . . . you can get the history of the Air Force from other sources, let me give you my impressions. Don't let me get away from this without telling you about last night. Really, really interesting meeting with [6][6] and Gen Abadi, which most people, which is a connection that most people at MNFI and MNSTCI don't realize that I have a connection there.

52:17 In the Middle East, these is back on how they communicate. In the Middle Eastern culture, and I'm not being too cute, the number of camels you have matters. Okay. "Why are you a rich man?" "I have 40 camels, how many do you have?" "5" "I'm richer than you." "What do you do with 40 camels?" "I don't do anything with them. I have 40; you have 5; I'm richer than you." "Yeah, you are richer than me." Who cares what he does with them? He's got 40 camels, he can do what he wants. It is part of the culture. UAE. How many F-16s have they got? You probably don't know, but ask other country around here and I'll bet you they'll know. What do they do with them? I don't know. Ever drop a bomb. In practice sometimes. What are they there for? To fly around, look cool, make the population feel important, strong. They have F-16s. Demonstrates relationship with the United States, demonstrates power, air power, one of the most modern fighters in the world, and the people that can fly them. So, the . . . whether it is more pragmatic or utilitarian, to the Iraqis, being a pilot is an end in itself. I used to joke about that, but it's not a joke anymore. It is really important. "You should go fly." Why should I go fly, I'm already a pilot, I don't need to fly. I get the girls, I get the money, what more could I want? I have the status, I became a pilot, why would I want to risk my life, I'm a pilot.

54:00. These stories are to build an intellectual backdrop.

There is something to say about the strength of the nation in the Mid-East is measured by the quantity, quality, type of force. So, in my heart, I do not understand this notion of . . . now I figure I'm smarter than the average guy, but I'm not a genius . . . why do I need fourteen divisions? Because the US Army ran some models that said you've got to have
600,000 people to win the COIN fight. Now, it’s a little bit disappointing, not to mention a little bit staggering, but Gee, the last I heard, you don't need one soldier to win a COIN fight. You need everybody's mind. You can win the COIN fight, you can win a counterinsurgency with . . in theory, with zero military people, or you can lose it with a billion people, because it is all about getting in the mind of the people. Now, I'm getting a little extreme here to illustrate a point. But its about being in the minds of the people, so the legitimate government. So I started talking to the Iraqis.

56:04. Now, in the tribal culture, if I kill your brother, you're going to kill my brother. When the US Army comes in here and kills people, they're going to kill back. What stops the cycle of killing? What stops the cycle is 1) having a strategy to go after Al Qaeda. How did we get to them? We recognized the people we rejected. We let the tribal chiefs have their way. What I'm trying to get to is it’s a different dimension than killing people. It's about winning people. And sometimes, to win people, you've got to kill some people, and sometimes we may not want to be the ones to kill people. So what becomes important are the things that can assist the Iraqis to kill people.

57:12. What is important is mobility and precision. In the surge, we relied heavily on air and ground power. The Iraqi people recognize the sound of the UH-1, and they come out of their houses excited to hear it because they recognize it means Iraqi power. The CAFTT priority is to get them [Iraqis] in the air.

We started too late on the Air Force. We shoved used propeller planes and old C-130s on a proud people. Gen Kamal made fun of the 'Seekers' we gave him. These were old E models C-130s, hard to work with, and the Air Force is the pride of the people. The IAF wants jets for people's pride. We're building a 14-division Army, but what about an Air Force?

Kamal is the Air Force. Abadi is the Vice Chief of Staff, a Four-star air force general. He is not about paperwork productivity, but decision making.

Last night, met with Kamal. He noted that they rebuilt Iraqi infrastructure within a year of the 1991 war. Iraqis feel like we are recognizing their capacity. Kamal will get a good Air Force C-130J.

How did we screw it up?

Fortunately, Iraqis now really respect Petraeus and credit him with having learned [strong implication is Petraeus gradually learned from his early mistakes and is finally on the right path]. They respect him more, apparently because he has learned over time, finally.

Allardices most lasting impression is how absolutely incredible our airmen are. They are 3-10 times more capable than any other servicemembers here. We have passed over majors doing incredible stuff with high morale. The backbone of the IAF is the USAF.
An Air Force maintenance officer did a briefing on modernization for me, and Sec Def embraced it.

It was fascinating to come to Baghdad almost 4 years to the day after the 26 March 03 airdrop of the 173rd Airborne, arriving here on 25 March 03. The strength of a nation is measured in its air power.