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(b)(3), (b)(6)

10 January 2008

IZ: AEA

by (b)(3), (b)(6)

MNFI Historian

Interviewer Comments: *This was a good, straightforward interview that helped me understand a little better the issues of targeting, orders, and assessments. It would be worth following up to see where and how MNFI StratOps has the orders and RFIs. It would also be good to get to the (b)(1), 1.4a and find ways to interview particularly interesting prisoners. These notes should be a sufficient accounting of the interview. Transcription priority: low.*

(b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged the interview belongs to US Central Command

(b)(3), (b)(6) arrived here in July after finishing at the War College. It was hard to know what the situation was before he arrived, or to know how little he knew. The last of the surge forces had arrived, and forces were just going in to clear Ba'qubah. This was at the height of the violence. IZ was getting IDF every other day.

His cell has the three strategic functions. MNFI has the kinetic functions.

Under Targeting (b)(3), (b)(6) provides the interface to Central Command on strategic issues, such as the Restricted Target List. The effort includes interdicting foreign terrorists outside of Iraq, in Syria, and in source countries. He deals with the interagency, and with the flow of Iranian influence. 1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

Under Orders, he handles staffing all MNFI orders through the orders desk through to final signature, handles everything that tasks all directorates and subordinates, and the RFI desk. This includes local RFIs to different directorates. It is a centralized way to get inquiries done. He also handles external RFIs from Central Command to us to ensure coordinated responses.

Effects Assessment consists of the weekly statistics given during the BUA. SPA has pretty much taken this over. He still works with the Security line of operation in the JCP because Barbero owns it and numerous other reports. Feeds stuff to the Secretary of Defense in the weekly update including in the 9010 report. Barbero serves as the rep to the Centcom Component Commander's Brief. (b)(3), (b)(6) also gives input to the Quarterly Assessments Conditions Brief. We published a new JCP just before Christmas.

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I asked him to expand more on his role with detainees, which he had mentioned.

He handles issues involving the higher profile releases, those which require staffing. This includes releasin [redacted] 1.4b It is possible we can use these releases as leverage to get [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d

I asked him to describe places he has visited. He has been to Camp Cropper and found it was smaller than he expected. It was well-run, professional atmosphere. He saw those who had just arrived for in-processing, as well as the youth facility.

He visited the COIN Academy in Taiji. When brigades come into country, the academy pulls the brigade leadership down to company level as well as key staff for four or five days to focus on how to do COIN.

Being in Iraq has been a great opportunity. He arrived at the height of the violence, and has seen the process of bringing the CLCs on board. The tide has turned.

He has learned 1) if you were here a year or two ago, what you knew then doesn't matter. It is a completely changed environment. The facts on the ground have changed. Things have moved very dynamically. 2) How complex Iraq is. He's seen AQI, foreign extremism, Sunni militias, irreconcilables, ISCI/Badr, the inter-Shia conflict, the GOI pieces and the ministries. As security improves, the GOI wants more autonomy. We increasingly must account for the GOI. There is the problem of how to balance accounting for GOI and respecting it with OPSEC. All elements here are not trustworthy.

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