INTERVIEW OF CHIEF, PLANS AND POLICY MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

9 JUNE 2007 BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.)
This is writing a story on Multinational Corps–Iraq and the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

This is the MNC–I historian.

Today is 7 June 2007, and we are about to interview the C–3 Chief, Plans, Multinational Corps – Iraq, at the Headquarters, Multinational Corps – Iraq, Al Faw Palace, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.

could you briefly take a few minutes to describe your background and experience that prepared you for this position?

Background: Simply to the normal progression of schools, with the single exception that I am not a School of Advanced Military Studies graduate.

Did you command a brigade?

No, I have not commanded a brigade.

The last command that I held was commanded three different battalions.

Three battalions?
Yes, sir.

What branch are you?

I am Infantry, sir.

Infantry. Okay. Okay. How long have you been the Chief of Plans for the Corps?

One year, sir.

One year? So you were at Fort Hood, and you then probably participated in the preparatory exercises and training exercises before the deployment. Is that correct?

Yes, sir, that's correct.

Can you take a few minutes to describe those exercises as you remember them, because I know they were back in June and July of 2006, and describe if you think they were useful for you as the Chief of Plans?

I'll say at the outset that they were very useful. Having just graduated from the U.S. Army War College in June, I made it to Fort Hood to attend the second two weeks of the mission rehearsal exercise.

The mission rehearsal exercise for the second half of that was the actual execution, the first week being the ramp-up. We were given several things to plan. It was
then that I met the team. We formed the team at that time. (b)(3), (b)(6) had been the senior planner two rotations ago. So I benefitted from his experience in drawing the team together. We finished that week, and then there was one other block that week that we had that we brought in several academicians later in the summer, actually in October right prior to our deployment, that served to sand down all the rough edges, if you will, and put the finishing touches on our training to that point to properly prepare us for this deployment.

And did you come over here also on some visits with this corps?

Yes. Yes, there was one leader's reconnaissance that we were able to conduct prior to the deployment back in August of last year.

And how long was that?

It was less than a week.

Less than a week?

Less than a week, but it was still very --

Did you meet with your counterpart in 5th Corps?
At that time? Well, actually, no, I did not meet with my counterpart. He was on EML at the time, but I was -- I'm sorry.

Okay. EML, meaning?

I beg your pardon, R&R, for sake of a better, more readily recognized term. He was on R&R. So what that afforded me was an opportunity to get around my soon-to-be area of responsibility within the Corps staff.

Okay. Were you aware of the plans that they were making at that time for their Operations Order 0603?

Yes, sir, I was.

Okay. Before we get into that part, though, could you tell me a little bit about your section, the Plans Section, how it is organized, how many people, and who are the key planners that you have working for you?

Okay. By name or are you talking about --

Well, let's take it step by step. How are you organized?

Okay. For point of clarification, I am the Chief of Plans and Policy. Therefore, I have three
different sections under Plans and Policy.

One is Plans. One is Force Generation, and the last is the Iraqi Security Forces. All three fall under my office.

The Plans, as I have already stated, is headed up by the Chief of War Plans, (b)(3), (b)(6). We have one campaign planner, a contingency operations planner, a coalition planner, several of the coalition partners, Australian and from the U.K., and they form the core of the Corps Plans team. Then naturally, you have the remainder of the rest of the staff will then plus-up that, the Corps Plans team to be the Plans Team.

All told, there are -- I'm in charge of and supervise 60 people within Plans and Policy.

Force Generation is a smaller cell, six people, headed up by a colonel -- (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6) Yes, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I have a -- He has a deputy. I have then several people who work for the two of them in doing different things within the Force Generation.

The last section is the Iraqi Security Forces.
That, too, is headed up by a Colonel, a U.K. Colonel, and he has a small team as well, roughly -- again, only six people, and they are essentially the people who keep track of the database of all of the information that comes from all the different divisions, and the military transition teams feed information into a database called Scoreboard, and they compile that data on a monthly basis. That data then serves as the basis for a briefing to the Transition Readiness Assessment to General Petraeus.

Oh, to General Petraeus?

Yes, General Petraeus. We crunch that for him.

You said throughout your whole section, you got 60. So it's not just 60 in the Plans. It would be like 48 in the plans then, I guess. Is that right? You had six in Force Generation and six in Iraqi Security Forces. So Plans and Policy --

Roughly, yes. Yes, roughly. But I need to further clarify that, although I'm working here and we are over here as Multinational Corps-Iraq, I still am in charge of the people, the one civilian -- Department of the Army civilian and the 12 or so contractors that I have back
at Fort Hood. I still maintain contact with them and direct actions as well.

And are they part of the 60?

They are part of the 60, yes.

Okay, okay.

It's a good question.

What do they do back at Fort Hood?

Primarily, training. They naturally are looking -- They've extended the horizon for after we return and we are getting to the unencumbered corps aspect upon our return. So we are planning for that, and then also planning for the training for the next up to three years, so that when we hit the ground when we redeploy, we will be able to do so.

You will have all your ranges arranged for and everything?

Major training exercises, etcetera.

As you prepared for the Multinational Corps-Iraq at Fort Hood last year, in general what were some of the major key plans that you worked on? You mentioned that you had already taken a look at 0603, and I assume that you were working on the Corps plans, your 3rd Corps imprint...
to that plan.

We thought -- The team, the Plans team -- we thought at one point that we were going to be one of the last -- Before the Multinational Force-Iraq and Multinational Corps-Iraq combined the headquarters, we thought we were going to be the last MNC-I, Multinational Corps-Iraq, headquarters, and we even took that -- at least I did -- that we might be putting the finishing touches on our deployment here to Iraq.

So when we looked at a normal campaign plan and the different phasing of a normal campaign plan, we had been -- In my estimation, we had been in Phase 4, which is stabilized. Phase 5 is enable civil authority.

So last summer, I had discussed with the rest of the planners how we would go about doing exactly that, and that's exactly what we are doing now with the publishing of 0701, and how you enable Iraqi civil authority and lessen our footprint here and draw down our forces to be able to at some point get to an enduring level here in country, and redeploy from the joint forces.

So I know that kind of jumps over 0603, but I would submit to you that 0603 was an interim step. After
0601 they had been working off of 0601 for a while. They scheduled to publish 0603 in the November time frame, which they did on about the end of the first week. It looked very much like 0601, and then things changed in December.

Right. Right. How much attention, back at Fort Hood now, did you pay to the emerging COIN strategies -- COIN is counter-insurgency strategies -- during your preparation? And in particular, what I am trying to get a connection with is -- because the FM 3-23, I think -- 24 just came out in January, and you probably saw a draft of it.

So, you know, what I'm trying to get at is if there was any connection between your planning and the emerging doctrine.

Yes, there was, matter of fact. We were one of the recipients of the draft. We were asked to provide comment. So I sat down with several of the planners, and had to pull our thoughts on that together, the III Corps response.

It became a major effort. It was sort of a month that we had some time to pull our thoughts on that together, and all the while that we are doing this, becoming actually more -- I mean, several of the planners had just come from

*SECRET*
the School of Advanced Military Studies, one of them being
So taken from -- and me coming from the War
College, coming from the schoolhouse, immersed in doctrine,
knowing that this is what -- because we had discussed it. We
were looking to operate or conduct those operations, counter-
insurgency operations, providing response to the draft field
manual, further ingrained it, if you will, into what we were
doing on a regular basis, and we started looking more at --
less at the offensive operations, knowing full well that we
were still going to have to do that, but the counter-
insurgency operations and, specifically, stability, stability
operations.

: Right.

: So, yes, having something --
Providing comment on 3-24 actually did help.

: Do you recall that month that you
looked at the manual, the draft manual, September or October?

: That sounds -- I was going to say
that. I believe it was after our leadership conference in
August. So I don't know. I can't recall for certain.

Okay. From the TOA forward, 14
December, when you published your own initial fragos (Phonetic) on about the 30th of December -- and I found a briefing that was dated 28 December that enunciates the Corps Commander's mission and strategy for the initial set-up fragos -- were you following the basic strategy of V Corps as outlined in 0603?

We were at the time. We were in the middle or had just received the changes in bridging strategy --

Right.

-- from V Corps. Force had just briefed us in the Force conference room, and I would have to say, yes, we were.

Well, what I was also trying to get at: Where were you anticipating -- There must have been some talk about an increase of troops in December. But I don't know that, and I wondered if --

Yes. There was a Request for Information that did come in December that -- very simply, what would you do if you had five additional brigades?

Now I haven't been privy to all the conversations. We had just arrived.
led one of the liaison officer teams over here prior to the
remainder of -- an advance party prior to the main body of
III Corps coming.

So he had a better grasp by about 30 days of what
was happening here on the ground, but this Request for
Information did come in December. It was born out of a
conversation at the four-star level that we were not privy
to.

So we set about simply answering the RFI. It,
for whatever reason, gained some traction and took off, and
there was a difference of opinion between Multinational Force
Headquarters and Multinational Corps Headquarters as to what
to make of this RFI, because it was a departure from what V
Corps had been working on, and that is transition over to
(Inaudible) and handing this over to the government of Iraq.

Well, one of the reasons I mention
that is because in 0603 they used the word transition quite a
bit.

Yes.

And I didn't see that in your first
mission brief on 28 December that enunciates mission tasks.
In fact, 0603 didn't even have tasks in it that I could see.
You guys -- III Corps always puts -- seems to put tasks in their briefings and their orders, but V Corps didn't. But they used the word transition and V Corps, and all of a sudden, that disappeared from the lexicon in your Corps, in III Corps.

I wondered if you recall that. Was there any debate on that?

Yes, I do recall it and, no, there was very little debate. We were told -- We were given specific instructions, and that --

Here is the wording of 0603. It says: "Mission: No change from Op Order 0601. MNC-I conducts operations to restore order using predominantly nonkinetic means to transition security responsibilities to the government of Iraq," and so on and so on.

Your initial mission statement doesn't even use that word, transition, at all. Now I think it may mention it farther on down in the brief, but it's certainly out of the mission statement. Seems like an entirely new approach, to me.

Would you characterize it as that, or not?

You could say so, yes. You could
say so, yes. There were -- Yes. I'll leave it at that.

(b)(6): I am going to pause at this time and let (b)(3), (b)(6) ask questions.

(b)(3), (b)(6): I want to ask in particular about this first kind of tract little piece where there was this request for information about, okay, what would you do with five additional brigades.

Would you have in your notes somewhere when specifically that date was or is that something that is still a trackable document that's available out there somewhere?

(b)(3), (b)(6) The first thing that comes to mind is on or about the 20th of December, and I believe, because we had done -- We had done -- or we did such a detailed work-up to recount that, I believe one of the planners, if not (b)(3), (b)(6), still has that.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. In the broader sense, once this change of direction kind of came into play, I just am curious to know, what did that mean to the Plans Section in particular about -- What was going through your mind in terms of what did that mean to you all in terms of what you were going to need to do to make that happen? What kind of things did that put in motion as it became apparent that that
was the direction things were going to go?

It was pretty much opposite. With V Corps and the transition in ramping down of forces and transitioning to the government of Iraq, and then to come in to have some conditions on the battlefield change or to at least have a different read, because you now have a different commander, an operational level commander, looking to -- with a different intent, different vision, we then had to think differently, take on an offensive mindset, if we were to secure Baghdad, protect the populous, and then proliferate that throughout the Iraqi theater of operations, and then be able to interdict the accelerants, that we called them, into the Baghdad area.

We figured that if we could do that -- Actually, the Commander thought that, if he could do that, we could finish this successfully and turn the thing over to the government of Iraq.

At the point that we took over transfer of authority, it was evident to us that he did not believe that we were at that point.

Who is "he"?

The Commander. I'm sorry.
Here. General Corelli or General Odierno?

No, no, General Odierno. General Odierno.

He did not believe that we were at the point to --

Continue the transition and turn it over as is to the government of Iraq. There were things that he -- I can't speak for him, but it was our understanding that there were things that could be done to get to a different point in time or on the ground where we would be in a better position to do so, and work better with the government of Iraq in helping them, enable them to take control of their own nation.

Was there a pivotal time that you recall in terms of -- If 20th of December is when this RFI came -- you mentioned, interestingly, that there was some disagreement between MNFI-I and MNC-I about what did this mean.

How long between that sort of initial "wow, this something different; what do we make of this" -- Was there then a subsequent pivotal point in time where it became
crystal clear, and was it a formal process where the Commander or someone else in the chain brought key players together and said, okay, this is where we are going now? Was that a verbal or was it -- Was there a pivotal moment when there was a gathering of the key staff, so to speak, to say, okay, here is what we are doing?

(b)(3), (b)(6): I don't recall there being that moment. There were several parallel actions that were ongoing, and we were essentially responding to the RFI, to the request for information, responding to his guidance, and it wasn't in the setting as you have described.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Okay. So just more a continued evolution of, as you said, parallel actions to the communications that put all this into motion?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Okay.

(b)(6) Let me follow up on that, on something that you said seemed to indicate -- Now General Odierno and your Corps come in, and you bring with it a different mindset and a different approach, and you said -- I believe you said more aggressive approach.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Offensive mindset.
Offensive mindset. That's correct.

More offensive mindset.

There seemed to be a disconnect between Odierno's offensive mindset and General Casey's transition and General Cherelli's transition strategy and bridging strategy, if you will.

Did that -- Can you talk a little bit about that? From what you saw as the planner -- I mean, I'm not asking you to speculate, but to describe what you saw as the planner. I mean, I could imagine something like General Casey, with a new guy coming in, saying you got it, go take it, even though it was against maybe General Casey's philosophy, or it could have been different than that. I don't know.

It was my sensing that Lieutenant General Corelli was turning the reins over, and he didn't believe that he was done yet. In my mind, I believe he wanted to do more or felt he could do more, but he was still -- transfer authority was going to go on.

General Casey was providing direction to continue to conduct the transition, execute the transition bridging strategy, and that briefing that he provided -- that he and
staff provided toward the end of January gives us about a 30-
day time frame in which we came in with a different mindset.
We received the request for information: What would you do
with five additional brigades?

Based on a conversation, again that I wasn't
privy to, and instead of transitioning and reducing our
footprint, General Odierno was taking us the other way to
prosecute his vision of how he wanted to attack the problem
here in-country.

Throughout that month time period, there were a
couple of instances in which General Odierno wanted to do
something or accomplish something along his line of logic
that he was informed by Multinational Force-Iraq that that's
not -- that wasn't within General Casey's left and right
limit, so to speak.

General Casey's left and right limit?

As the Force Commander, he
establishes the left and right limit or he provides guidance
to General Odierno, guidance and direction.

There were, as I said, a couple of instances in
which General Odierno wanted to do something, and General
Casey said that he would either not get an asset, not get a
resource, whether it be a request for forces, something as we were planning over that month-long time period to get five more brigades into the fight, so to speak.

General Casey -- It didn't appear that General Casey was wanting to support General Odierno.

(b)(6) I think I understand what you're trying to say.

All right.

Your MNC-I coalition campaign operational concept dated, I believe, 6 March '07 is a very thorough and well written, I think, campaign narrative. Who was the primary author?

(b)(3), (b)(6) That's (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir.

(b)(6) I think you've already answered this, but I'm going to go ahead and ask it anyway. Does it represent an iterative evolutionary approach from the MNF-I joint campaign plan, April '06, and the MNF-I 2007 joint campaign action plan draft dated January of '06, which I'm sure you've looked at, or would you characterize it as a new approach?
I'm sorry. Which approach?

Would you characterize it as an evolutionary or an iterative approach or would you characterize it as a completely new approach? I'm talking about the March -- the 6 March MNC-I campaign plan, coalition campaign operational concept. I'm sorry.

Did you see it just as a continuation of what had come before or was it a totally new direction? Is that what you are --

Right.

I wouldn't see it as an -- I see it as a totally -- a new direction.

Right.

Last year being the year of transition, year of the police. Correct. I'd say it was a new direction.

Okay. That's what I thought you would say.

The coalition campaign operational concept in March looks like it might reflect the campaign design chapter, Chapter 4 in FM3-24. What do you say to that? I mean, that's my look at it. I looked at Chapter 4. I looked
at campaign, the operational concept. They look not exactly
similar, but along the same lines.

(b)(3), (b)(6) No, in that (b)(3), (b)(6) again, did the work that he did last year on the draft of the field
manual. It was naturally what he went back to in the
promulgation of this order.

(b)(6) Now for that plan in March, was there
any or what, if any, had been the MNF-I's influence,
recognizing that General Petraeus and his crew came in on the
10th of February and this plan, this operational concept,
comes out on 6 March '07?

(b)(3), (b)(6) And again, your question: What, if
any --

(b)(6) Yes -- had been MNFI-I's influence on
that operational concept?

(b)(3), (b)(6) No, there was a distinct -- It was
distinct, because we had read some of the articles that
General Petraeus had written.

I have a copy of his counter-insurgency rules on
my wall in my office.

(b)(6) So it would be influenced, but
probably kind of indirect influence from Petraeus' thoughts
and ideas?

Yes, indirectly at the outset.

Because I know that General Petraeus has a CAG, an initiatives group, or some smart guys up there. I just wondered if they came down and advised you or (Inaudible) you at all.

No.

Can I ask a question along those lines?

Was there -- especially in the Plans decision, can you tell me anything about the relationship with the MNF-I plans? When I say that, I say under General Petraeus, once they did arrive, and at what point did you start receiving their formal planning documents upon which to start developing MNC-I's planning documents, or was that more of an informal process, as you've kind of indicated here? Was it a matter of reading his articles or was there a definitive hand-down, if you will, of their plan to MNC-I?

Well, no, there wasn't, but I will say that the strategic plans, the SPA -- (Phonetic), very helpful --

At Multinational?
Yes, at Multinational Force for Plans, very, very supportive. They did provide quite timely -- when they did generate their interim document in February. But because we were steadily planning and generating following General Odierno's vision, what they provided -- and I will say that we had people sitting in on their process; so that helped facilitate.

So in a parallel manner, as we did with generating operations order 0701, we continued to march, if you will. So when they did publish, we made certain that we were nested naturally within everything.

They have yet to publish their JCP, their joint campaign plan, but we firmly believe that we are well within because of the parallel planning and the collaborative effort between the two headquarters really assisted in our ability to generate our operations order.

So you could say that their effort, their process, their draft document, did in fact help to inform generating ours.

And when did they do their draft?

Well, the JCAP, the interim was out -- again, was out -- It was April. I'm sorry I misspoke. I
wasn't February. It was April.

But you had already published your --

Well, we had done the operational concept, yes. But again, ours has been almost just a running process since we transferred authority, because we went through 0603 to answer or to build on what we had received from V Corps, and then we had to change, and then we pursued generating 0701 to the way ahead.

What form does that collaborative process take? Do you all actually get in a room together periodically? Is it by BTC? What process seems to be working, since that really seems to be a key nuance to what is working well?

To a lesser extent, not so much in a room together, the two staffs planning. But again, we would -- I sent either (Phonetic) or over to the International Zone, and he would sit in on the process and, most specifically and most recently, was in -- I would send him down for several days at a time over several weeks, the past several weeks, to sit in on not just generating Annex B to their
joint campaign plan, which is the security line of operation. He would also then sit in, naturally, to the generation of the -- you know, the discussion on the base document for the Multinational Force-Iraq joint campaign plan.

So that was our in, so to speak, of their process. He would then share with us the security line of operation annex, because that is General Odierno's responsibility, the security.

Then when they published the draft annex, they would share it. It wasn't kept close hold. They would share it with us, and then ask us to provide comment. We did that on several iterations.

So therein lies the collaborative effort, if you will, and I would submit to you that it's a -- It has something to do with the fact that we are geographically separate.

We are here, and down they are down at the IZ. So there were a couple of occasions on which we talked across the computer, the information work station, but it was primarily I sent a planner there or two planners there, and then they would share the documents with us.

I see in both the new operations
order that just came out this month and your operational concept really quite a sophisticated and much different approach than had been before, and I've looked at all the orders before, including the one for General Metson (Phonetic), III Corps, when they were over here before.

I'm just wondering, does that represent growth in just experience gained here, because I know all you guys have served multiple tours over here or most of the senior officers have served multiple tours. I just wondered. What do you think about that?

Do you think it's -- because we've been fighting this war for five years, but I see your plan as not only much more sophisticated but probably the right approach. But I mean, I'm not judging at all, but --

No, I'm glad you think so. It is a function of experience, starting at the very top with General Odierno, having again as the Chief of War Plans, this being his second tour, the three having commanded the brigade here.

I've been in theater down at CENTCOM for two years prior to this, and probably the most curious aspect of this is that our campaign planner, -- no
previous combat experience. So he's fresh out of the schoolhouse, fresh off of having provided the comments on the field manual 2-24, counter-insurgency operations, and he's the one who wrote that. He's the one who penned the Op Order.

Do you -- Do you or did you ever think you have -- you would have sufficient troops to task ratio, as outlined in the COIN manual, to solve this counter-insurgency? Do you think now you have enough or do you ever think it?

Having commanded, you can never have enough soldiers.

I mean, I saw a planning document from your section -- I think it was from your section -- that said, even with the surge, you don't have enough troops as outlined in the new COIN manual. And I think they -- They give the ratios and, if I remember right, it's like 30 or 35 to one in the COIN manual; the best we can get, including all the Iraqi security forces and the U.S. forces, is like 20 to one. Is that right?

No. The COIN manual says 20 to one, and the best we can get is about 35 to one, something like that. Do you
recall that?

Yes, I do. We had that discussion, but we tended to steer away from it, because we believed—and General Odierno in conversations, discussions, guidance that he provided to us—that we believed that the number of brigades that we had coming in was about right.

Now I'll follow that up with a statement that he made to us in the Plans the other day, that based on where we're at now, we could use probably one more brigade, three battalions.

If you were to talk to Multinational Division-Baghdad at the outset of planning for this, they had requested three more battalions, one more brigade than the Army or Marines were able to provide us.

So I believe we are doing fine where we're at right now. When we first started and then now that we have the fifth plus-up brigade on the ground and we are getting them to their full operational capability, the one brigade or three more battalions, understandably, would help us get at some of the other problems and help bring this to an end more quickly than if we, naturally, wouldn't have them, because we would be able to dedicate that additional force on those
problem areas, and it will just take us a little longer given
the current set that we have, the 20 brigade combat teams
that we have on the ground. But I believe we're doing fine
with what we have on the ground now.

Even then, I have to bring up the point that that
last one just arrived.

Right.

So it's too early to assess.

I still have a couple of nuts
and bolts questions.

First of all, are we okay on your time?

That's fine.

We ended up starting a little
later than planned.

As far as the operations within Plans, one of the
terms I have heard people discuss is effects integration. Is
that a concept that comes into play in the Plans Section or
how -- I'm just kind of interested to know the synergy that
happens within the C-3 Section overall.

How do you pull together with the Future Ops
folks, with Current Ops? What's the process that happens,
and is that unique to the way III Corps is doing business
compared to other units?

The last part of your question, I can't answer, because I don't know how the other Corps are working the effects aspect of the process. How we attacked this was the objectives that you find in the concept, and then in the order were provided to General McDonald in the Effects Cell upstairs, and then they set about -- after having heard and then read the Operations Order, took the objectives and established minutes of effectiveness, minutes of performance measures of effectiveness against those objectives, and then devised their board, if you will, or presentation or their tracking mechanism to see or to track how well we are getting at on each of the objectives that supports the Commander's plan, and that is briefed then to the Commander and the 3 and the Chief.

So it's not something that -- They are on the second floor. We are on the first floor. I've got Effects guys. I have Effects planners in Plans. So some of General McDonald's -- a couple of his folks are -- primarily one, (b)3, (b)6, (Phonetic), he's the Effects planner that sits in the Plans shop or on the Plans team. So he is my connectivity to it in the Effects Cell.
How would you describe where the line falls between what Plans handles and what Future Ops handles? Is there a line in the sand there? How do you guys split that out?

It's actually pretty good that you asked that question, and I'm glad this is on a tape recorder, because I will tell you that the two dozen people that are here from 1st Corps, from Fort Lewis, are a blessing from Fort Lewis.

When I first got to Fort Hood for the second week of the mission exercise, we were still struggling with that exact concept, Plans, FUOPS, Current Ops.

Normally, I would be the C-5. There was a C-5 in III Corps the last time. It was (b)(3), (b)(6). Somebody made a decision prior to my arrival at Fort Hood not to take a C-5 or not to have a C-5 on the staff. So then (b)(3), (b)(6), the C-3, decided to make it 3-3, which is Current Ops, 3-5 which is Future Ops, and a 3-7 which is Plans.

Because we got that plug of two dozen people --

Now, granted, not all 24 sit in C-3. There's a couple in C-4, but the predominant plug -- almost all of them have formed the 3-Ops Cell, and what that did was enable Plans,
to be able to then extend the horizon and look out further on planning; because if you were to talk to (Phonetic) who was Jeff's predecessor as the Chief of War Plans of V Corps, one of the biggest issues that he had was that he didn't have the benefit of a Future Ops.

Therefore, he was always planning the near-end fight. He had trouble extending the horizon. So the 4-Op says it was constituted here on our staff to enable us to do that.

So they look out for about six weeks, and then we take it from six weeks on out, and that is a very arbitrary line, because in the grand scheme and when you read our doctrine, the C-3 is the guy who makes the call as to where that line is -- you know, literally -- and then he looks at, okay, how much of the workload does each 3-3, 3-5 and 3-7 have. And there will be times when I will get -- If our workload gets light, I'll get some close-in, near-term issues to solve.

If I get bogged down, you might give one to FUOPS if we've got a longer time on it.

That's probably why, you know, your
order and your operational concept appear so different and, I think, so much more sophisticated and better than previous ones. That is, the structural difference between FUOPS and Plans.

I bet that contributes to it.

(b)(3), (b)(6): It does. It does. We get some real go-getters in the FUOPS, too. and his crew have (Inaudible).

(b)(3), (b)(6): Do you ever own the Frago process?

No. I do not.

So that really all falls to Current and Future Ops?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Primarily, Future Ops. I will -- There will be times when I will provide -- for lack of a better description -- the guts of the order, the tasks, the overall concept, to Future Ops, and they will then -- I'll conduct a handoff with Future Ops. They will generate the order.

(b)(6): But you guys wrote this order 0701?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, we did. Yes, we did.

(b)(6) Not FUOPS?
1 (b)(3), (b)(6): Right. That's correct.
2 (b)(6): Full-fledged technical (Several words inaudible).
3 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, Fragos (Phonetic) note, correct.
4 (b)(6): Okay.
5 (b)(3), (b)(6): I just want to make sure I understood the delineation there, too.
6 (b)(6): Let me jump in here. Operational reserve -- It appears that MNC -- and I know you all have wrestled with this. I've seen evidence of it. But it appears that the Corps does not have an operational reserve, number one. Is that true? Is that a true statement?
7 (b)(3), (b)(6): We had one until we committed it.
8 (b)(6): When was that?
9 (b)(3), (b)(6): That was when 32 was committed up north to Baqubah. 3-2 had been, up until that point, what we call above ground. They were over on the west side of Baghdad, not maintaining terrain. They were not holding a piece of terrain and not responsible. They weren't a terrain owner.
So they were above ground, and that terminology was coined by V Corps. But when we saw, you know, things happening the way they were, we started --

This was early March?

Yes. When we saw AQI, Al Qaeda, start -- As we were achieving success, we'd like to believe, in Baghdad, they got out -- the enemy got out to that area up in Diyala Province, and the Commander made a decision to dedicate the reserve, mission in reserve, up to Baqubah, and that's where they are at right now.

But right now you don't have any. Is that correct?

That's correct. That is correct.

So if a problem comes up someplace, if General Mixon, for example, wants more reinforcements, what is the Corps Commander -- What choices does he have?

We have attempted to articulate in a fragmentary order to have the Divisions designate a unit that -- a battalion level, a battalion level organization, to be able to disengage and respond -- you know, the company, in the first 36 hours and the remainder -- with attack, and then
the remainder of the battalion within 48 hours.

So there is a -- Because he committed the reserve, he asked FUOPS to generate this order so that he could have already provided a warning order, so to speak, to each of the Division Commanders to say, okay, because I have committed my reserve, I need you to think through this; and if I should pick up the phone and call you, I need you to be able to execute.

So they should have gone through that planning process to have that up and running.

That's fairly recent, though, isn't it?

It is very recent. Very recent.

Incidentally, the COIN manual nowhere in it has the word reserve in it, and you know, from what I've seen here, if there is a hole in that -- It's a great manual, but if there is a hole, it doesn't address, you know, how you conduct those kinds of offensive operations without a reserve. And I've seen it play out here with mostly, I guess, MND-North and General Mixon requesting reinforcement.

The borders: How do you wrestle the borders? How do you plan for -- to seal the borders? And this is not
only your problem, but I meant certainly addressing it as you see it as the planner. But it's really a long term problem, and it's also an MNFI problem.

That's how we are approaching it. That is how we are approaching it. In fact, over the last few weeks, Multinational Force-Iraq has held an operational plans team to get at the foreign fighters and facilitators, and their focus has been to the west, because naturally, the -- Well, as we understand it, the foreign fighters and facilitators, terrorists' primary route is coming in from Syria.

So that's been their focus at this -- While they have been planning on that and asking for us to sit in and provide comment, our focus, or General Odierno's focus, is to the east.

Right.

So we have maintained since January that our stance should be non-invasive, but the borders and the ports
of entry are primarily Force's responsibility, but the
government of Iraq should be the ones on the ground with the
actual hands-on.

I go back to the Prime Minister's emergency
measures that he put in place at the beginning of the year.
One of those was to secure the borders and ports of entry --
well, it's primarily the ports of entry -- for 72 hours; you
know, actually, a little longer than that.

We were to assist during a time frame -- prior to
that time frame, to assist the border element at each one of
those ports of entry, but then step back and allow them,
meaning the government of Iraq, to enforce the emergency
measures, the inspections, etcetera.

Right now, we don't have any -- Other than at the
ports of entry, we don't have forces on the border sealing
the border, and that OPT for it would be -- Operational Plans
Team -- That effort still continues. It hasn't come to a
close yet. But that's still where we're at.

Right.

Ours is to remain removed from --
- To help the government of Iraq with the ports of entry, but
not be at the ports of entry with weapon in hand blocking or
stopping traffic or conducting the inspections, and we are also not patrolling the borders, because our focus, naturally, is inside and on the routes -- right now, as it stands, major routes from those ports of entry down into Baghdad. So our surveillance means from the air are doing the same thing.

**Right.**

I have one last question. You talked about the relationship between yourself and higher headquarters, MNFI, in the planning process.

What is the relationship between the planning process at your level and the Multinational Division troop forces? Is there a collaboration there? What's -- Is there much ongoing connectivity there?

We have plans -- We have elements from each one of the Divisions that are resident right there in our workspace. We share everything with them. They go back --

What's their rank?

Primarily Majors, and I have a couple of Lieutenant Colonels, and I've got a DA, a Department of the Army, element as well. But anyway, the
planners from each of the Divisions -- they attend everything that we do. They receive the information. We don't keep anything close hold. They, naturally, correspond with their Divisions.

We talk with the lead planners. For example, (Phonetic), down at MND-Baghdad. We talk with him regularly; with the Marines our west, at least once a week, if not two, to their LNO.

So that we don't have a forum, if you will. We don't sit down with them on a monthly or quarterly basis or anything like that. We get good mileage out of the LNOs.

Great.

Let me ask a couple of -- I've just got a couple of more questions.

Center of gravity: Was there a discussion on the change? You had the center of gravity as Baghdad, to secure Baghdad. That was the Corps' center of gravity, and now you've changed -- in 0701 you've changed it to Iraqi populations. Center of gravity is the Iraqi populations.

Can you talk a little bit about why that change was made?
We believe that, if we could protect the populous of 7-plus million people, the hub of -- what I called the hub of all activity in another interview -- it would have a way of proliferating throughout the country.

So that's why we decided to focus on securing and protecting the populous of Baghdad, and not at the expense of the rest of the country either, because they are doing much of the same thing throughout the country up north, west, down southeast, that Multinational Division-Baghdad is doing in Baghdad, with the clear control and (Inaudible) of the major populations centers, etcetera.

On the MNFI campaign strategy -- and you've basically answered this. But you seem so far ahead of anything that they have put out, because they haven't put out a new campaign strategy.

Are they, in a sense, following what you are already doing? Is their campaign plan that is going to come out -- is it going to change anything in your campaign plan and strategy?

To our knowledge, no, it won't serve to change anything. Once again, it gets back to their
sharing their product with us, even though they haven't published it yet. And the only reason why they haven't is because General Petraeus has yet to brief the Secretary of Defense. That's basically it -- all it is.

Recognizing that forward hope is not in the planner's lexicon, please give me a realistic assessment of the MNCl planning in order. What's your assessment, your assessment on the success of this plan?

My assessment is that we, in fact -- There was the function of time, and you read about it in the field manual, and patience and level of force, interaction with the local populous.

Because of the numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines that we have on the ground, we need time, now that we have the 20th Brigade Combat Team on the ground, to be able to complete the clear/ control/retained tasks that we have that are in the order, primarily through our main effort, the city of Baghdad, to be able to realize -- and I don't like to use -- I'll say success, success as it applies to the operation order.

I don't see that happening for a while yet. As we do that, as we are able to control, then retain, and we
can get at the other things in the grand scheme -- that fifth failure I was talking to you about in the campaign plan about enabling civil authority, the infrastructure and essential service needs -- we can get at those things.

So it's much in line with what General Odierno has been speaking all along, that General Petraeus has been espousing.

I just thinking about that last year when I was at the War College, and after I found out that I was coming to Fort Hood as the Chief of Plans, that I started thinking about it back then and sketching things and capturing thoughts and that kind of thing.

I believe we are on glide path, but we need time to be able to -- To answer your question, I believe we are on glide path, and I believe we are headed in the right direction.

Do you think December of '07, which I believe is written in -- certainly written in the campaign operational concept --

: And the Commander's intent.

And the Commander's intent.

: That's correct.
(b)(6): -- is realistic?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Did you mean December '08?

(b)(6): No, December '07.

(b)(3), (b)(6): No, December '07. No, the Commander wrestled with that. We discussed back at Fort Hood last year about being able to effect some kind of change by -- because our original rotation was supposed to be up in November.

He was looking for that momentum to be able to achieve something, irreversible momentum, by December; and that -- We talked better than hour at a senior plans meeting one morning just on that alone. Great conversation. Great dialogue.

General Odierno still firmly believes that we can get there from here, and I believe, in answering this question and dovetailing off of my previous response to you, I believe so. I believe we can get there from here. I believe, like I said, we are on that glide path to being able to do that by December, even if you were to superimpose provincial elections over the top of that as well, which is here in the offing as well as we continue to enable civil authority.
Speaking of -- I'm glad you brought up provincial elections. I had seen in one of the V Corps plans that they -- one of their assumptions was that the provincial elections would have already been held, provincial governments' elections would already be held by this time.

: Yes, sir.

And they haven't been.

Right, sir.

Is there something in the offing, you said? We know it's a GOI, government of Iraq, responsibility.

: Yes, it is. I've been in discussions in which we as a Headquarters realized that we have 20 brigade combat teams on the ground. Because we have that amount of forces here on the ground, we foresee a need to talk to -- engage the government of Iraq to help them see the goodness in conducting those provincial elections while we have this amount of force on the ground, so that we can assist them, as we have done over the last year or two, but again trying to keep the Iraqi forces, naturally -- the Iraqi Army, naturally, in the lead there; and even more so, the Iraqi police, because we need to keep -- We continue to train
and build the capacity and capability of the Iraqi Army, but the policing function of a society is what democracy is all about.

As we enable civil authority, the police need to step up. That is why the V Corps -- Last year was the year of the police. They did some yeoman's work in helping getting that together.

We need to now get to the graduate level, and I think we are doing that. But we need to keep pressing them and working with the police and working with the government of Iraq to help them see the goodness in conducting these provincial elections between now and spring of next year.

A final question, unless has something.

What plans are in the works now? For example, are you working on any contingency planning for downsizing the force or glide pathing to 15 and 12 and 10 brigades, regardless of the success or not of the current plan?

: In answering your question, we are responding and attending a Central Command two-week planning time period the 11th through the 21st. I'm sending the Chief of War Plans,
contingency operations planner, (b)(3), (b)(6) down to sit in on and provide the Multinational Corps-Iraq perspective on the operational needs of the theater posture. It's a Theater Posture Planning Conference that is being held by Central Command down in Qatar.

At that conference, they will get at exactly what you just described, scaling down of the BCTs and the Division Headquarters, the Coalition, to an enduring, set threshold. But it's just knowing that, you know, as we draw down forces, as we further enable civil authority, we know that we have to reduce our footprint.

So that's why this planning is taking place.

But your section in Plans here at the Corps -- you haven't done any planning on that -- in that regard, have you?

: Based on -- I'll go all the way back to the beginning of our conversation. It was what I drew up at the War College last year. So I knew eventually that we would have to do this.

: I've actually seen a lot of stuff on V Corps that had planning and basing that was concurrent.

Correct. BRAC Order Iraq --
yes, that terminology. But our look at this -- and you asked the question within Plans. Because I more or less broached the subject with (b)(3), (b)(6) during the summer of last year, and how would we go about doing this, and then it was pretty much shelved around the time that we deployed, or right prior to when we deployed, and then we deployed, and then what happened in December/January time frame.

Then we got it back out and dusted it off, knowing full well that there are things happening back in the States that are going to eventually drive us to this.

So I guess the answer to your question is yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6): One of the things that came up just yesterday in the battle update assessment was General Petraeus implying that there was a formal plan waiting to be enacted and how that was just about to happen as five additional brigades on the deck.

Is there an operational plan that is pending action that is a specific unified piece that's waiting to go into effect now that we have all those elements there?

(b)(3), (b)(6): The answer to your question is no. And the reason why: There was -- He's speaking figuratively about getting the 20th Brigade Combat Team on
the ground with the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade.

Now we have our full complement. What we planned for and started receiving in January with the second brigade of the 82nd Airborne that arrived, which is the 1st Brigade Combat Team, we are now -- we have received our full complement of what the services said they would provide.

His comment yesterday was: Now we have our set, and now we are going to get about what we --

(b)(3), (b)(6): It was never implied? There is no (Inaudible) operation?

(b)(3), (b)(6): No. No. Now we have our full complement, and now we are ready to get after the enemy in support of the Commander's vision.

(b)(6) Well, that's all we have for (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) We would like to thank you very much for your time and your answers to these questions. Thank you very much.

(b)(3), (b)(6): That completes this interview.