U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

C-3

FUTURE OPERATIONS CELL

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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FEBRUARY 8, 2006

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

Approved for Release

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
1   P R O C E E D I N G S

2   [(b)(6)]: This is [(b)(6)] the

3   Writing Historian for 3 Corps and the U.S. Army Center

4   of Military History. Today is 8 February 2008, and we

5   are at al Faw Palace outside of Baghdad, Iraq.

6   [(b)(3), (b)(6)], would you please introduce

7   yourself, and tell me what your positions are?

8   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: [(b)(6)]

9

10

11

12   (b)(6)

13

14

15   [(b)(6)]: Right. And when did you take

16   over the Chief of Operations?

17   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] During this period, it was

18   9 January. Then I had served brief periods before

19   during [(b)(3), (b)(6)] leave period and also during the 18th

20   Airborne Corps MRX.

21   [(b)(6)]: Right. Now let me talk a

22   little bit about your duties as the Chief of

1   Operations.

2   Okay. I will pause.

3   (Short break.)

4   [(b)(6)]: This is a pick-up after we had

5   to break, and I am going to repeat the question.

6   Could you tell us a little bit about your duties as

7   the Chief of Operations?

8   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: The Chief of Operations

9   normally runs the day to day battle, and that is

10   reacting to situations on the battlefield, receiving

11   reports, obtaining information, keeping the command

12   group informed of the actual real time, day to day

13   activities, and then if something unexpected occurs,

14   then we take appropriate action by energizing the

15   appropriate unit to resolve a particular problem,

16   whether it is a prison uprising or whether there is an

17   IED or a downed aircraft that occurs.

18   [(b)(6)]: So let me ask you: If a

19   situation report comes in, or a SITREP, from a unit

20   that is a CCIR, which is a critical information

21   requirement, commander's critical requirement--

22   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: That's correct.

1   [(b)(6)]: -- do you immediately notify

2   General Odierno, or how do you go through that

3   routine?

4   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Our reporting process, if

5   there is a CCIR that comes in, the first thing we do

6   is we validate that information as quickly and as best

7   we can, given the time available, and then what we

8   normally do is produce what we call a story board

9   which lays out graphically where the incident

10   occurred.

11   It lays out the facts associated with the

12   incident, and then it describes what actions the unit

13   has taken to resolve it, and then any BDA, battle

14   damage assessment, that is associated with that,

15   casualties, coalition force, Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police

16   or civilians, will be indicated on those story boards.

17   But it paints a picture, and it enables somebody to

18   very quickly grasp what has happened, where it has

19   happened, why it has happened, what actions are being

20   taken, and then what needs to happen next.

21   [(b)(6)]: And how does the Commander

22   gets notified of that?

5

1   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Normally, he is notified

2   through the passage of that story board via e-mail,

3   and sometimes we -- Well, actually, in almost all

4   cases we will follow up with a telephonic notification

5   of his staff that there is a CCIR that has occurred.

6   [(b)(6)]: And do you also notify th[(b)(3), (b)(6)]

7   3, [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

8   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: We do. Yes, there is a

9   standard distribution list for e-mail that goes out

10 throughout the command notifying really key staff

11 members. For example, a lot of times when an incident

12 occurs, there is public affairs impacts. So we want

13 to make sure the PAO is aware.

14   We also want to make sure our information

15 operations officer is aware, so that they can begin to

16 prepare any statements or plans that we need to

17 publish in case there is some sort of either

18 misrepresentation of the incident or that we need to

19 capitalize on this.

20   For example, this morning's news event of

21 the video that were captured that showed children

22 being trained as terrorists -- this is information

1   that we need to get out to the public to let people

2   know that AQI does not have good interests in mind,

3   and we need to let the rest of the world know that.

4   [(b)(6)]: Do you -- I know the Chief of

5   Operations works for the C-3, [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Do you

6   ever have to go through him or do you notify the

7   Commander simultaneously with the C-3?

8   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: We normally notify

9   simultaneously. However, if there are -- Let's say,

10   for example, that I get information that there is a

11   special operation event or we need to target somebody

12   that may be a key leader within AQI or some other

13   extremist group.

14   I will make notification to the command

15   group, but I will personally come down and brief

16   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] and often that results in me going up

17   and briefing the CG after I have done that. But if

18   there is some of that that will require a personal

19   visit to the CG other than just a notification of a

20   CCIR that occurred on the battlefield, some of those

21   -- then before I personally go to see the CG, I will

22   always go to the C-3 first.

1   [(b)(6)]: How often does that occur, do

2   you think, your estimate?

3   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I would say -- Well, I

4   guess early on it was about once a day, sometimes

5   twice a day. Toward the end of our stay here, it was

6   less, but where it really occurs is when you have a

7   downed aircraft or major event like that or if you

8   have a major bombing of a market area, for example,

9   where there is a significant number of casualties, we

10   want to be able to keep him up to date, particularly

11   because those things reach the press very quickly.

12   So we have to ensure that we push

13   information to the Commander very quickly so that he

14   has situational awareness and that he can respond, if

15   necessary, to any of the reports that come out, and

16   certainly at least represent the military's

17   perspective on what has happened so that the viewing

18   audience can see what the reporters are saying and as

19   well as how the military is interpreting that.

20   Other items may be if we are targeting

21   specific individuals, which early on we did do that,

22   and particularly in the evenings. There were times

1 when I would pay two or three visits to the boss to

2 get approval to target certain high value individuals,

3 what we call HVIs.

4 [(b)(6)]: Right. I'm interested in the

5 story board construct because, of course, I have seen

6 those. I think you indicated that your staff, the

7 Chief of Operations staff, makes those up. Is that

8 correct?

9 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: That's correct. We have

10 two folks on our Operations sections, our battle

11 majors, that their whole purpose is to evaluate

12 reports that come in, determine whether, in fact, they

13 do meet the CCIR criteria, and then if they meet that

14 CCIR criteria, that is what generates a story board.

15 [(b)(6)]: So what role does the unit

16 that reports the incident, the CCIR, have in that?

17 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Well, they have the same

18 CCIR. So they know what we are looking for. So they

19 will make an evaluation when something happens.

20 Normally -- I mean, they get it right most

21 of the time. However, there are times when there may

22 be some interpretation as to whether or not it meets

1   CCIR criteria, and then that's when we have to get our

2   staff involved to make the judgment.

3   [(b)(6)]: Speaking of your staff, as the

4   Chief of Operations, can you describe how large it is

5   and how integrated it is with other sections? You

6   have representatives from divisions and other staff

7   sections on your staff.

8   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right. I guess we've got

9   to look at it in two ways. We've got the JOC-4, which

10   is the Joint Operations Center-4, which as you well

11   know is a fairly significant, theater size room with

12   representation from almost every staff element, LNOs,

13   outside of the organization -- and I don't know the

14   exact number of folks that are in there, but it's

15   probably 100 to 125, if not more.

16   So they don't all work for me, but they

17   all in an indirect way keep me informed of key things

18   in their area, so that I have good SA, situational

19   awareness, on what is going on, particularly the real

20   time events.

21   Then as issues come up, if I need specific

22   information to ask questions, those representatives

1   are there from all the staff sections so that we can

2   reach out and touch somebody very quickly to get the

3   information we need.

4   So from the JOC perspective, certainly, we

5   have a very huge staff representation. From the Chief

6   of Operations within the G-3 realm itself, we are

7   subset of that staff in key areas that include our two

8   watch OICs, our battle Major, our battle Captains, our

9   story board maker, and then we've got our ORS

10   (Phonetic) Section.

11   So there's probably about 15 to 20 folks

12   that work as a part of the Chief of Operations Section

13   that really are the core group of the Joint Operations

14   Center.

15   (b)(6)   : I would like to transition a

16   little bit now to the Future Operations side. But

17   from your position as the Chief of Operations, can you

18   talk -- Since you have seen both sides now and

19   operated from both sides, can you talk about the

20   interface and, in particular -- of those two sections,

21   and in particular, the generation of the fragmentary

22   orders, your orders factory from FUOPS?

1   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]   Yes. First, I'd like to

2   say, number one, I think this is probably one of the

3   most congruent organizations I've been a part of, both

4   -- across all three planning horizons, Plans, FUOPS,

5   and Current Ops.

6   I would say, with relationship that [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

7   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]   and I had when he was the CHOPS and I was

8   FUOPS, you couldn't divide the two organizations, a

9   very seamless integration.

10   In fact, we assisted very closely on the

11   very quick hit missions, for example, VIP visits. We

12   would get very little notice, sometimes 12 hours, and

13   when we were lucky maybe 72 hours. So those missions

14   were turned very quickly, and often the CHOPS would

15   find out about them before I would.

16   So he was very quick to notify us.

17   Likewise, if we did get wind of one through Force or

18   the PJCC -- I don't remember what that acronym stands

19   for, but they are the VIP managers at Force -- they

20   would let us know. We would make sure we quickly

21   informed the CHOPS and the C-3 so that they were aware

22   of the visits and, of course, the battle space owner

1 as well.

2   Those missions turned very quickly,

3 sometimes as short as 12 hours, but normally somewhere

4 between about 12 and 72 hours.

5   [(b)(6)]: And you publish a fragmentary

6 order on those visits as well?

7   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right. Typically, we would

8 publish a separate frag order for those. There were

9 also times -- We really have two methods of publishing

10 orders. One is called the daily tasking, the DTU,

11 daily tasking unit -- I'll have to verify that.

12   In those, they are usually simple tasks.

13 Any staff element can publish items in the DTU. So

14 for example, C-9 would often publish information about

15 CERP funding. Our transition cell would often publish

16 routine taskings about redeployments or deployments

17 that gave units standardized instructions on what to

18 expect and lay out the time requirements.

19   Then FUOPS -- Sometimes we publish some of

20 our VIP visits through the DTU, but quite often they

21 were stand-alone orders because of the time frame that

22 we had to get them published. So we use both entities

13

1   to do that.

2   Our orders were generally not major muscle

3   movements like you would see from Plans. They were

4   usually smaller in nature, maybe a smaller operation,

5   for example, an operation in Diwaniyah where we

6   provided some engineer support, some MP support.

7   It wasn't something that took a major

8   planning staff to develop, but it was something that,

9   within Future Operations Cell, we had the expertise

10   resident or could tap into that.

11   Then we could spend some time in an OPT,

12   operational planning team, to develop the details.

13   Sometimes it would involve a reconnaissance to the

14   area to get additional information, and then we would

15   go ahead and publish the frago on that.

16   So smaller scale than, say, Plans campaign

17   order for a major operation like Phantom Phoenix or

18   Phantom Thunder, but those are the type of things that

19   we dealt with in the Future Operations arena.

20   [(b)(6)]: Right. And I know that there

21   is a series of what I will call black operations,

22   Black Avalanche, Black Eagle.

1   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right.

2   [(b)(6)]: Speaking of Diwaniyah, and

3   Black Anvil. There's a whole list of them on your

4   website, and also the Silver series also.

5   I think the Silver series had to do with

6   infrastructure. Is that right?

7   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: No. The reason we got --

8   We selected the colors, because, one, anything with a

9   color on it, you knew it came from FUOPS.

10   [(b)(6)]: Right.

11   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: So if it was Black Anvil,

12   it was associated with the 07-01 Op Order published by

13   Plans, which was really the 07-01 campaign plan. As we

14   transitioned to 08-01, we changed it to silver.

15   [(b)(6)]: Okay.

16   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: So you have a link to the

17   overarching op order for which these fragmentary

18   orders supported. So there was a direct link.

19   [(b)(6)]: That's good. Okay.

20   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: So part of that is pride of

21   ownership. FUOPS wanted their name associated with

22   colors and, quite frankly, the units knew when they

1   were getting a colored order, it was coming from

2   FUOPS, and it usually meant it was a good product. So

3   we took a lot of pride in that.

4   In the naming of the orders, we were also

5   pretty careful about picking names that -- how would

6   you say it? Respectful is a way to say it, but we

7   wanted to pick names that had meaning, that were

8   somewhat tied to the operation itself, but described

9   a bit of authenticity and, in essence, the bottom line

10   of this naming convention is what happens is we do

11   lose soldiers, and if you lose a soldier, it certainly

12   sounds much more authoritative and important if

13   somebody was lost in a Black Eagle or a Black

14   Avalanche as to some other football name -- you know,

15   the Hoosiers Operation or something of that effect.

16   So there was a little bit of seriousness

17   behind the order naming convention as well. So we

18   just took pride of ownership, also keeping in mind

19   that this operation would come back to some in a very

20   unfortunate way, but we wanted a good solid name that

21   somebody could stand back and say, yeah, I did lose my

22   son in that war, but he was lost on Operation Black

1   Eagle, which was a significant operation in Diwaniyah,

2   and it adds a bit of respect to the process.

3   [(b)(6)]: I'd like to ask about actually

4   Operation Black Eagle, and that is the reinforcement

5   to Diwaniyah, Multinational Division-Center South

6   where you sent some enablers down and, I think, one

7   infantry battalion.

8   Can you talk a little bit about that, and

9   also, if you can recall -- I mean, I have the frago

10   for that -- the approximate start date and end date.

11   What I can't find or seem to find is a frago that

12   brought that infantry battalion, for example, back.

13   So could you talk me through that?

14   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Yes. I think -- I don't

15   remember the specific time frame that it occurred.

16   I'm thinking it was probably sometime late spring-

17   summer.

18   [(b)(6)]: Right.

19   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: And it was for about a

20   three or four-week period, and it was --

21   Ultimately, the decision was made to have

22   a BCT commander, '06, co-locate with them in Center-

17

1   South. So he sent his tactical operations center down

2   there to manage these battalion level operations,

3   which also -- They integrated the ODAs from CJSOTF as

4   well, as well as the local ISF, which was the Iraqi

5   Army and Iraq Police.

6   So that operation essentially went through

7   and cleared Diwaniyah. They went through the streets

8   of Diwaniyah, and it was very effective, short term,

9   violence reduced, order restored, but probably one of

10   the weaknesses of that is we did not have the -- and

11   I'm going to say we did have IA, which helped to keep

12   law and order for sometime, but we didn't have the IP

13   presence that we needed that can maintain that

14   consistent built-up area security in Diwaniyah. We

15   just didn't have the IPs developed.

16   So we eventually came back and, of course,

17   followed up with Lion's Pounce here recently, and we

18   have certainly put a lot more effort into the IP

19   development, both right at the conclusion of Black

20   Eagle as well as building up through Operation Lion's

21   Pounce, and we have that enduring security in the city

22   through IPs, because the IA itself has got a much

1 broader area of responsibility and cannot get

2 completely tied down into the city of Diwaniyah,

3 although there is a presence there.

4 [(b)(6)]: Yes. You know, I remember

5 Black Eagle, and I presume that you named it Black

6 Eagle for the -- MND-Center South has a [1.4b]

7 division. So the [1.4b] Eagle -- I guess that's why

8 you named it black Eagle.

9 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right.

10 [(b)(6)]: And it was ongoing in June

11 when I was here. Then when I came back in September-

12 October, I remember the representative at the battle

13 update assessments from Center South in September and

14 October was -- especially in September, I seem to

15 recall, was always briefing that the situation was

16 tenuous down there.

17 Then when I come back in January, it seems

18 to be al calm down there. So what I'm trying to find

19 out, and it's difficult to do through just an

20 examination of the fragos, although they do help, is

21 what happened in Center South between, let's say,

22 September and today?

1   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Well, the key thing is the

2   last Commander that Center South has -- and he just

3   departed, and the name escapes me at the moment.

4   [(b)(6)] : Bouk (Phonetic), Major General

5   Bouk.

6   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Yes, it is. Very effective

7   commander. So I'll tell you, in my opinion, what made

8   the difference is leadership. He was not afraid to

9   "go outside of the wire" and get into the city and

10   have a presence. That's what it takes, and he was

11   able to do that.

12   [(b)(6)] : And that-- And can you talk a

13   little bit about Lion's Pounce, too?

14   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Lion's Pounce, I guess --

15   We'll set it in context, and again Diwaniyah is an

16   important area. Again, it is just outside of the

17   Belts, which is a focus area. Of course, Baghdad is

18   a focus area, and now North is the major focus area

19   with AQI, although there is Shia extremist influence

20   in Diwaniyah which is the concern.

21   [(b)(6)] : Mostly Shia.

22   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : Right.

1   [(b)(6)]: And JAM, Special JAM.

2   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: JAM, disparate moderates,

3 kind of -- It's the crossing point and, certainly,

4 there is strong influence from Najaf and Karbala in

5 that area. So it's kind of a political hot point for

6 Shia extremist groups.

7   So they always attract, as a place that

8 they can base out of. So the challenge there is, if

9 we clear it, can we maintain that presence to keep it

10 clear, and that was the challenge that we had. With

11 Lion's Pounce, again, we had to go back in.

12   As we were successful in driving them out

13 during Black Eagle, without that enduring presence

14 through a solid IP and IA presence in Diwaniyah, we

15 weren't able to retain that. So we had to go back in

16 with Lion's Pounce which, very similar again, was to

17 go in and clear the city again, and this time we were

18 establishing combat outposts, and they would set up a

19 couple of JSSes.

20   So that helps build that enduring

21 security. So that presence -- you know, the emphasis

22 provided by General Bouk, I think, made the

1 difference, and the willingness to get out and stand

2 up those JSSes and COPs were critical to the success.

3 But, I mean, it's too early to tell.

4 We can occupy those. We are already

5 getting indications that there is a desire for the

6 extremists to return back. So we are going to have to

7 see what happens.

8 [(b)(6)]: Okay, thank you. I just

9 wanted to clarify that particular operation and that

10 particular Multinational Division. But I would like

11 to go back now to Future Operations.

12 In your last interview, you did describe

13 the organization of your frago factory and some of the

14 special programs, the biometrics, sniper defeat, and

15 the effects infrastructure cell.

16 In the last interview, you did talk about

17 the effects and how they are integrated in actually

18 across the board in C-3, but what I would like you to

19 do is, if you could, please go into a little bit more

20 detail about the Infrastructure Cell.

21 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Okay. I think the last

22 time we talked, the Infrastructure Cell was stood up,

1   kind of working. They are part of FUOPS. At that

2   time, they probably were doing some -- taking down

3   some of the more traditional FUOPS missions, but they

4   had an infrastructure focus.

5   Well, as it developed, [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

6   really took on that mission and essentially I

7   resourced him and almost fenced him for focusing

8   strictly on infrastructure.

9   So he had [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

10   [(b)(3), (b)(6)].

11   Then they had a [(b)(3), (b)(6)] from the IO cell,

12   and we also had a [1.4b]

13   officers who rotated. Well, one rotated in, and

14   another one right behind him.

15   So he was able to focus his efforts on

16   that area. Certainly, infrastructure took on a very

17   important role here. In fact, I would argue that our

18   focus on infrastructure really led the way for MNFI to

19   build their energy fusion cell, because of a lot of

20   the work that we did, which started out with an

21   operation that was called Spigot, and it was working

22   on the oil distribution and production, transition to

1 Operation Fair Play, which became a very successful

2 operation moving fuel out of Baji to Diyala, to Anbar,

3 north up to Ninevah.

4   That   is   really   what   this   whole

5 Infrastructure Cell grew from. Then as we determined

6 the link between electricity and oil, we continued to

7 grow and expand into electrical systems, both power

8 generation and distribution systems where we would

9 ensure that we had the lines throughout the area

10 fixed.

11   Of   course,   that   provided   the   basic

12 services across the country. Of course, there are

13 some priorities they had there focused on key and

14 essential   services.   Then they had government

15 services, and then distributions to households and

16 that type of focus.

17   So this certainly got quite a bit of

18 attention, and if you've watched the morning BUA with

19 General Petraeus, there is a priority slide on oil,

20 infrastructure, as well as a picture slide that lays

21 out where problems lie or attacks or faults in the

22 system. Same thing with the electrical

1   infrastructure.

2   So what we were able to do with that is

3   really react quickly and integrate not only the Iraqi

4   Security Forces but, as required, providing assistance

5   from Coalition forces to help those infrastructure

6   repairs.

7   [(b)(6)] :   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]   briefed at the

8   C-3/G-3   conference   yesterday,   didn't   he,   on

9   infrastructure?

10   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] :   Yes, he did.

11   [(b)(6)]   Okay.   I wondered if you could

12   help walk me through a typical frago production.

13   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] :   Yes.   Typically, what we

14   do--

15   [(b)(6)] :   Let's say, apart from a

16   particular operation.   Let's say a routine that has

17   like 12 or 15 different tasks, kind of almost routine,

18   it looks like.   How do you bring all those disparate,

19   sometimes, tasks together?

20   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] :   I think the best -- Let me

21   see what would be a good example.   We could look at

22   perhaps --

1   [(b)(6)] :   Redeployment instructions --

2   I see that all the time on them.

3   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] :   Those aren't -- Those are

4   fairly routine. I mean, the tasks don't change. The

5   coordinating instructions don't change. The only

6   thing that changes is the unit and the date. So there

7   is not much effort that goes into those, once you've

8   got the system in place. I'm trying to pick one

9   that's got a little bit more meat to it.

10   Well, let's take something current right

11   now like one that we just dealt with on CERP

12   distribution, for example.

13   This one would be generated probably

14   between C-9 and C-9, funding related, but it also

15   projects related, and there is probably some C-8 work

16   that would go into that, determining the priorities

17   for reconstruction and how this CERP money may support

18   reconstruction.

19   So typically, what you would have is you

20   would have C-9, C-8, C-7 engineers in a OPT. You

21   would probably have some PAO.

22   [(b)(6)] :   OPT is?

1   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Operation Planning Team.

2   [(b)(6)]: Okay, that you bring together,

3 you in FUOPS?

4   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I may not. Well, in this

5 case FUOPS may not be involved. This is one where the

6 C-9 may take the lead, because he has overall

7 authority for CERP funding and that piece of it. So

8 he may take the lead on that.

9   Now if there were security concerns

10 associated with executing this particular project,

11 then you may have a FUOPS rep in there who will help

12 tie the security requirements into that. But that OPT

13 would form with those representatives and, let's say,

14 IO so that if there is a good news story that would

15 come out of this, or PAO.

16   If we are rebuilding a mosque, we want to

17 advertise that, get that out, not only to the American

18 population -- it shows what we are doing -- but we,

19 more importantly, want to get it out to the Iraqi

20 population so they know what their government is doing

21 for them, and they a balanced picture of both Shia

22 reconstruction and Sunni reconstruction, so that can

27

1   see that there is no sectarians.

2   So as this plan comes together, we want

3   all these people to have their play in it, so that not

4   only do we end up building or improving a shrine, but

5   that mission results in a story that is told about

6   what's happened, so that the country sees progress,

7   sees   the   government   moving   forward,   sees   the

8   willingness of Coalition forces to support both Shia

9   and Sunni sects with money, with support, trying to

10 take a balanced approach.

11   So   these   are   all   things   that   are

12 considered when you put a frago together, and it is

13 through that OPT process that you get the right

14 players in the room with the right expertise who can

15 craft the tasks that need to be accomplished under

16 each subordinate unit, whether it is an MND or it may

17 be a staff section -- for example, the PAO or IO

18 officer who needs to produce some products to support

19 that effort.

20   Then   once   they've   got   all   of   those

21 captured, then we put that order out for staffing, and

22 it usually staffs anywhere from 24 to 72 hours, and it

1   goes back to the key sections so that everybody has a

2   chance to read the whole plan and comment on it,

3   either no, we disagree with this, or you missed this,

4   we need to add this. Then this is really the voting

5   process on the order.

6   At that point, after it is staffed, then

7   the comments will come back through the Chief of

8   Operations who then reviews the order and the

9   comments. If there is any strong disagreement with

10   the order, they will nonconcur, and that prevents the

11   order from being published, usually, until we get that

12   issue resolved.

13   For those nonconcurs that we can't get

14   resolved, then I will make recommendations to the C-3

15   as to whether or not we override the nonconcur and

16   simply publish anyway or we simply not publish, but in

17   most cases we will try to get it resolved and then, if

18   not resolved, then we simply publish over the

19   nonconcur, usually for good reason.

20   [(b)(6)]: You know, I looked at the

21   integration of the 3d Infantry Division, Multinational

22   Division -- that became Multinational Division-Center.

29

1   There was a great deal of staffing effort that went

2   into that, it looks like from the records.

3   I did see some nonconcurrence in that.

4   That must have been a very difficult one to resolve.

5   I believe you had a conference on that, but I can't

6   remember or I can't tell from the documents.

7   Do you remember that?

8   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I don't remember that

9   specific order. I do remember that we did have a

10   number of OPTs that supported that one. There were

11   some issues there, but they were eventually resolved

12   through the OPT process and ultimately through,

13   actually, the G-3s and C-3s finally coming to a

14   decision on how to approach that.

15   [(b)(6)]: Okay. Now this is more of a

16   reflective question. You are at the end of your tour,

17   and you have nearly 15 months behind you as the Chief

18   of Future Operations and as the Chief of Operations.

19   Looking back for the FUOPS Section, what

20   would you say are some of the key turning points that

21   you've seen happen with the Corps, looking at it again

22   from your perspective as the Chief of Future

1   Operations?

2   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I think first I've got to

3   start with what the underlying focus of our whole

4   effort here in this 15 months has been, and it is

5   something that I've thought about for quite sometime.

6   I think, in my opinion, the key factor in

7   the Corps' ability to produce results and be

8   successful in the security realm, first off, lies with

9   a Corps Commander who just seemed to have an innate

10   feel for what needed to be done, and he zeroed in on

11   that, focusing in on that particular weapons system,

12   which was the IED in all its various forms, and he

13   went after it, all aspects of it, its networks, its

14   locations, its methods.

15   I think that alone was probably what I saw

16   as being able to pick the right area to focus on and

17   then exploit it. I think that was very difficult for

18   the enemy to deal with, whether it was AQI or whether

19   it was Shia. Didn't matter, because we focused in on

20   the problem as it was influenced by either AQI

21   approach or, you know, extremist group approach, and

22   we were able to work that.

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1   [(b)(6)]: So the formation of the COIC

2   was --

3   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I think the COIC played a

4   very significant role in keeping the Commander and

5   command group informed of what was happening on the

6   battlefield. I think their analysis was exceptional,

7   and it really enabled the Commander to see the

8   battlefield and to see what happened, because where

9   there were IEDs, there was AQI. Where there were

10   EFPs, there were Shia extremists.

11   So once you exploited that, that led you

12   to where the threat was, and the COIC was very much an

13   enabling aspect of that. So I think that was well

14   spent. It was a fairly expensive endeavor, but it was

15   a key endeavor.

16   [(b)(6)]: Right. Do you know if the

17   follow-on Corps is going to keep the COIC?

18   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: They are.

19   [(b)(6)]: They are?

20   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Yes. I think they had

21   started -- I think they were slow to realize it, but

22   I think they realized its value, although at this

1 stage of the game the COIC is probably less important

2 than it was when we took over.

3 [(b)(6)]: Right.

4 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: So it still has a role.

5 It's something that needs to be watched, but it may

6 not be the focal point. They will need to find their

7 new focal point.

8 [(b)(6)]: Right.

9 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: So a key turning point.

10 [(b)(6)]: So that's one key turning

11 point, the focus on the IEDs, the Commander's feel for

12 that focus and the structural processes that he put

13 into place on the Corps staff.

14 What else do you think was important?

15 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I think -- I don't know

16 that it was a turning point, but -- I think the focus

17 on the infrastructure wasn't a turning point, but it

18 was a strong enabler. I think it was a rallying point

19 for a number of pieces, and sometimes I'm not sure

20 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] gets enough credit for this, but

21 infrastructure by itself, I think we would all agree,

22 is important that we all want the basic services

1 provided to us. But what enabled us to get that

2 moving -- or not what enabled us -- What required us

3 to get that moving, it required the Iraqi Army to play

4 a role.

5 It required the Ministry of Oil, Ministry

6 of Electricity and their facility protection services

7 all to take responsibility and to work together. So

8 what infrastructure did, not only were we trying to

9 fix and provide basic services, it became a driving

10 factor to force the government to work together.

11 That is something that needed to happen.

12 So I think that helped us develop the government

13 through solving the infrastructure problem, but it

14 brought IPs together.

15 It brought Iraqi Army together. It

16 enabled Coalition forces to assist, but we really

17 didn't want to take responsibility. We tried to shy

18 away from that, but it became very much of a strong

19 driving factor.

20 So I think there is a by-product that a

21 lot   of   folks   haven't   recognized   that   this

22 infrastructure problem helped us solve, but I think it

1 helped us develop Iraq.

2 [(b)(6)]: Right. Okay. It certainly

3 helped the Corps focus, and also can you talk a little

4 bit about, in the infrastructure area in particular,

5 the relationship with Multinational Force in this

6 effort?

7 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I think -- Again, I think

8 the Corps was very proactive on this, and our focus on

9 infrastructure, as I mentioned earlier, I think, was

10 something that enabled the Multinational Force-Iraq to

11 develop their energy fusion cell.

12 They could see we had an infrastructure

13 cell, but they wanted to do it on a much grander

14 scale, which was needed, because they had to reach out

15 to the different ministries and really integrate the

16 political aspect now with the security aspect, so that

17 they could both expand their oil and electric

18 capacity, their exports, as well as ensure that the

19 systems in place were functioning properly, were

20 mechanically sound.

21 We were minimizing or helping reduce the

22 attacks so that they could sustain their electrical

35

1 infrastructure and oil infrastructure.

2 [(b)(6)]: You know, I've read through

3 your historical report or your AAR, and got one or two

4 questions on that. But I noted that you haven't

5 signed it yet. Have you approved that, the one that

6 I have?

7 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Yes, it's fine.

8 [(b)(6)]: It's okay? Okay.

9 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: It's final now. I'm not

10 sure which version you have, but I think the one that

11 I turned in to [(b)(3), (b)(6)] --

12 [(b)(6)] Yes, that's the one I've got.

13 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: -- is signed. That's the

14 one I'm operating off of.

15 [(b)(6)]: Okay. In that, you said the

16 security line of operation, and the Corps established

17 three lines of operation, was the FUOPS focus for C-3.

18 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right.

19 [(b)(6)]: But the infrastructure part of

20 it certainly played a role in kind of the other, the

21 governance, economics. So it seems like that you --

22 You certainly overlap into those other lines of

1 operation.

2 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Yes. Technically, the

3 infrastructure probably could have fallen into C-7

4 where it's infrastructure development and governance,

5 economics. However, given -- FUOPS kind of reached

6 out and took it -- I'll just say that -- outright. We

7 took on that task, but part of the reason we did that

8 is because there was such a heavy security requirement

9 to facilitate repairs.

10 So to strictly leave that in the C-7

11 arena, it didn't work very well. Remember, this

12 started with this Operation Fair Play.

13 [(b)(6)]: Right.

14 [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Which centered around the

15 Baji oil refinery, and at that time was corrupt, was

16 influenced by extremists, AQI, and so for us to get

17 control of the Baji refinery -- and not us get

18 control, but give Iraqis control -- we had to tackle

19 the threat that was associated with that.

20 So as we looked at oil and the influence

21 that was generated from that, because keep in mind,

22 Baji -- our concern there is that the activities at

1   Baji at the refinery itself and the distribution of

2   oil itself was funding AQI activities.

3   So we wanted to understand how that was

4   happening, and then prevent that funding from being

5   used against our own soldiers through AQI activities.

6   So that was the driving factor that took us into Baji

7   in the first place.

8   Then from there, as we started looking at

9   how to do that, it was very difficult to tackle some

10   of these threats, but what we did settle on is, if we

11   could ensure that the fuel was safely transported from

12   the point of origin to the distribution points within

13   the province, we would cut out any of the middle man

14   and any of the black market activities that surrounded

15   that, thereby reducing the AQI funding.

16   [(b)(6)] : And make sure those shipments

17   didn't get intercepted or converted.

18   [(b)(3), (b)(6)] : That's exactly right.

19   [(b)(6)] : And I heard a story in the

20   BUA, I think, just yesterday -- may have been two days

21   ago -- about the Marines out in Anbar found that the

22   Iraqis had stopped a shipment -- I think it was oil --

1   from [1.4b] and the Iraqi Police had apparently

2   stopped them and were going to send them to Basra, and

3   the MNF-West caught wind of that. They sent some

4   people out, finally got them straight and sent on

5   their way.

6   So that is kind of, I guess, an example of

7   the kind of perhaps corruption or inefficiencies of

8   the Iraqis that Operation Fair Play stepped in to make

9   sure that sort of thing didn't happen. Is that right?

10   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: That was our goal. Now we

11   aren't ever going to get rid of all the corruption and

12   all   of   the   black   market   activities   that   are

13   associated. That is part of their way, in many

14   respects. We are trying to take out the big pieces of

15   that.

16   So I think we have been fairly successful

17   in doing that. We haven't eliminated it, but I think

18   what we have done is, by securing shipments to al

19   Anbar, we have ensured that there is a significant

20   amount of government priced fuel that is available in

21   the Anbar province, which is much less than the black

22   market price.

1   So the more that we were able to do that,

2 I mean, the better off we were to serve the Iraqi

3 people and eliminate a fair amount of that corruption.

4 But I don't think we have eliminated all of it.

5   [(b)(6)]: Right.

6   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: We just don't have the full

7 control. Even in the process of Fair Play, I suspect

8 some   of   these   trucks,   once   they   get   to   the

9 distribution center, either they don't empty all their

10 fuel or there may be other little tricks of the trade

11 that sneak off here or there, but by and large, we

12 have certainly taken a chunk out of that.

13   [(b)(6)]: I think I have one last --

14 well, actually two questions.

15   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Okay. I have plenty of

16 time.

17   [(b)(6)]: Looking back over the 15

18 months again -- and this is more of a structural or a

19 process question, and you have alluded to the answer

20 already, but I want to focus on this.

21   From your vantage point as the FUOPS

22 Chief, what do you think the key contributions of

1   FUOPS to the Corps Headquarters in bringing the Corps

2   to this fight for the last 15 months?

3   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Well, I think first off is

4   we had a fairly robust FUOPS size, that we could take

5   on some of the more significant planning efforts that

6   might typically be passed on to the Plans sections and

7   turn them fairly quickly.

8   [(b)(6)]: Translate them into actual

9   orders, I guess?

10   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right. Fairly quickly.

11   I think we did a good job, by and large,

12   of integrating all the requisite staff expertise

13   through that process, which FUOPS -- Usually, they are

14   manned so thin, they don't have the capability to do

15   that, but I think our manning and our ability to reach

16   out and touch all the different staff sections to pull

17   into the planning process, we were able to do that.

18   I think we were fortunate -- You know,

19   certainly, I'm from Fort Lewis. My deputy was from

20   Fort Lewis, and probably one of my key orders writers

21   was from Fort Lewis, all very capable people.

22   I mean, [(b)(3), (b)(6)] is one of the best

1 order writers. He can turn a product on a dime very

2 quickly and have everybody together, synchronized,

3 pull all the right people in and make sure they are

4 all informed, and was able to do this very well.

5 [(b)(6)] brought tremendous amount of

6 experience, simply because he has been on numerous

7 deployments as a Special Ops officer, and he had a

8 very good understanding of the environment, because he

9 had been up in Mosul before.

10 So he understood the nature of the

11 business here, how to work with tribal leaders,

12 sheikhs, what some of the challenges are in terms of

13 corruption, how the operational environment was laid

14 out, where the hot spots are. He had a good

15 understanding of how AQI worked up in the Mosul area.

16 So we had a good team of folks here that

17 could very quickly adapt and contribute to the

18 problems that we were facing, and were very aggressive

19 in going out and seeking work as opposed to trying to

20 avoid it.

21 I mean, the sign that hung over our door

22 is FUOPS is always open for business. And

1   infrastructure -- does it belong in C-7? Maybe it

2   did, but FUOPS took it and, because of the security

3   aspects, developed it and grew it into a pretty good

4   cell.

5   Biometrics was in C-2 sections. FUOPS

6   reached out and grabbed it, and biometrics is probably

7   one of the best news stories that is going to come out

8   of this group. It was developed into a viable weapons

9   system, so to speak.

10   Sniper defeat was sitting on the shelf,

11   needed to be worked. FUOPS reached out and grabbed it

12   and developed, and ended up generating requests for

13   about $2 billion worth of sniper defeat equipment and

14   vehicles.

15   So there are a lot of things that we just

16   didn't wait for somebody to give it to us. We went

17   out and found it and got it and developed it.

18   [(b)(6)]: How long did it take, do you

19   think, once you got here -- and I know you came from

20   Fort Lewis; you brought 19 people with you. When you

21   hit the ground here, I know you all were running hard.

22   Looking back over the record of December

1   and January with the surge taking place, things must

2   have been going 1,000 miles an hour. But how quickly

3   do you think the FUOPS was able to, for instance,

4   touch the right guy in C-7 or C-9 to know, so you

5   really began to reach optimum speed?

6   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I think it didn't take us

7   very long at all, number one, because again, as I

8   mentioned, the folks that we brought here with us --

9   Penfield, very capable of running OPTs; [(b)(3), (b)(6)],

10   very capable of running OPTs -- knew the expertise

11   that was required.

12   I think that is something that he brought.

13   Had I not come with somebody with the background,

14   experience of [(b)(3), (b)(6)] -- I'll tell you, he is

15   probably one of the finest officers I have served

16   with. Without that experience that he had here in

17   Iraq -- He had a good understanding of who really

18   needed to be involved, not within the Army but outside

19   of the Army, when you needed to pull an Air Force in.

20   So I think his expertise was very key to

21   FUOPS standing up quickly and helping us get our OPT

22   process started.

1   Once we got that going -- I mean, we

2   developed it as we were preparing to deploy. We did

3   one exercise with 3 Corps, but once we got here and we

4   were able to reach out and produce a few very well

5   coordinated products, I think we were able to show 3

6   Corps that, hey, these guys from Fort Lewis can play

7   ball.

8   Once they figured out we could play ball,

9   they were very receptive and were willing to let us

10   run. I mean, it didn't take that. Up front, they

11   were very open and very receptive of us from the

12   beginning, but there is always some sort of, you know,

13   prove yourself process. I didn't feel like I was

14   under that or that we were under that, but I think

15   simply just stepping up to the plate, saying, hey,

16   we're ready to play, they could see that. And we felt

17   very much like a team.

18   Leaving here, you know, my farewell

19   ceremony with Odierno is, hey, we -- He said to me,

20   hey, we consider you one of us; we consider you one of

21   3 Corps. I really felt that way from the beginning.

22   But again, it's that whole thing I talked about up

45

1   front, was I think we were received very well. We

2   were needed, and I think we are able to respond well

3   to a need.

4   So I think that whole aspect was very

5   positive. This is one of the most congruent Corps

6   staffs I have ever been around, just fairly unique, in

7   my opinion.

8   [(b)(6)]: From an outsider like myself

9   coming in here, I can see that congruency in the

10   Corps. The Corps seem to -- The Corps staff seem to

11   work very, very smoothly and focused, and everybody

12   going forward in the right direction.

13   I didn't see a lot of -- In fact, I can't

14   even recall any backbiting that you would normally see

15   on a high staff.

16   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: Right.

17   [(b)(6)]: Or frustration. I really

18   didn't even see any frustration, although there must

19   have been, I'm sure.

20   One last question, [(b)(3), (b)(6)] If you

21   would, if I haven't asked any question, this is your

22   opportunity to make a kind of a final statement, and

1   we did this at the end of the last interview with you.

2   If you have anything more that maybe, you know, you

3   want to get out on tape that I didn't ask the right

4   question.

5   [(b)(3), (b)(6)]: I think you've asked a lot

6   of great questions, and I think you have kind of

7   sensed some of the things that may have been a little

8   bit different than normal deployments.

9   I think I hit the key point up front when

10 I talked about -- I've been trying to put my finger on

11 what was the decisive thing that I think helped guide

12 and lead us to success, and I think that is the

13 Commander that just had the feel for the battlefield.

14 I think overall what is happening, though,

15 I think as an overall picture is General Petraeus,

16 when he came on board. I think he has been able to

17 complement the success of General Odierno and his

18 focus on improving security in Iraq, and has really

19 been able to leverage some of the ministries and work

20 the political side fairly effectively.

21 There's probably some things I really

22 don't have a good grasp on, but certainly how he is

1 working Moqtada al Sadr and keeping the JAM freeze in

2 effect and trying to keep that whole Shia aspect calm

3 while we focus on AQI, and yet still try to bring in

4 Sunnis. He seems to be balancing all those things

5 fairly well.

6 So I think during our watch, I think we

7 have been very fortunate to have the right group of

8 people together with the right skills at the right

9 levels to focus on the right aspects of the problem.

10 You just don't have that very often, I

11 think. This is a fairly unique situation, in my

12 opinion.

13 [(b)(6)]: No, I think you absolutely hit

14 it right on the button there.

15 Well, we have been going for about an

16 hour, [(b)(3), (b)(6)]. Thank you very much, and best of

17 luck to you on your trip back to Fort Lewis. I guess

18 that's tomorrow, right?

19 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Either tonight or tomorrow.

20 But have you got anything else? I mean, I'm sure I'll

21 be pondering here for the next couple of months.

22 [(b)(6)]: No.

Approved for Release