U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

C-3

FUTURE OPERATIONS CELL

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

FEBRUARY 8, 2008

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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PROCEDINGS

(b)(6): This is (b)(6) the
Writing Historian for 3 Corps and the U.S. Army Center
of Military History. Today is 8 February 2008, and we
are at al Faw Palace outside of Baghdad, Iraq.

(b)(3), (b)(6): would you please introduce
yourself, and tell me what your positions are?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6): Right. And when did you take
over the Chief of Operations?

(b)(3), (b)(6): During this period, it was
9 January. Then I had served brief periods before
during (b)(3), (b)(6) leave period and also during the 18th
Airborne Corps MRX.

(b)(6): Right. Now let me talk a
little bit about your duties as the Chief of
Operations.

Okay. I will pause.

(Short break.)

This is a pick-up after we had to break, and I am going to repeat the question. Could you tell us a little bit about your duties as the Chief of Operations? The Chief of Operations normally runs the day to day battle, and that is reacting to situations on the battlefield, receiving reports, obtaining information, keeping the command group informed of the actual real time, day to day activities, and then if something unexpected occurs, then we take appropriate action by energizing the appropriate unit to resolve a particular problem, whether it is a prison uprising or whether there is an IED or a downed aircraft that occurs.

So let me ask you: If a situation report comes in, or a SITREP, from a unit that is a CCIR, which is a critical information requirement, commander's critical requirement-- That's correct.
(b)(6): -- do you immediately notify General Odierno, or how do you go through that routine?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Our reporting process, if there is a CCIR that comes in, the first thing we do is we validate that information as quickly and as best we can, given the time available, and then what we normally do is produce what we call a story board which lays out graphically where the incident occurred.

It lays out the facts associated with the incident, and then it describes what actions the unit has taken to resolve it, and then any BDA, battle damage assessment, that is associated with that, casualties, coalition force, Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police or civilians, will be indicated on those story boards. But it paints a picture, and it enables somebody to very quickly grasp what has happened, where it has happened, why it has happened, what actions are being taken, and then what needs to happen next.

(b)(6): And how does the Commander gets notified of that?
Normally, he is notified through the passage of that story board via e-mail, and sometimes we -- Well, actually, in almost all cases we will follow up with a telephonic notification of his staff that there is a CCIR that has occurred. And do you also notify the: We do. Yes, there is a standard distribution list for e-mail that goes out throughout the command notifying really key staff members. For example, a lot of times when an incident occurs, there is public affairs impacts. So we want to make sure the PAO is aware.

We also want to make sure our information operations officer is aware, so that they can begin to prepare any statements or plans that we need to publish in case there is some sort of either misrepresentation of the incident or that we need to capitalize on this.

For example, this morning's news event of the video that were captured that showed children being trained as terrorists -- this is information...
that we need to get out to the public to let people know that AQI does not have good interests in mind, and we need to let the rest of the world know that.

(b)(6): Do you -- I know the Chief of Operations works for the C-3, (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you ever have to go through him or do you notify the Commander simultaneously with the C-3?

(b)(3), (b)(6): We normally notify simultaneously. However, if there are -- Let's say, for example, that I get information that there is a special operation event or we need to target somebody that may be a key leader within AQI or some other extremist group.

I will make notification to the command group, but I will personally come down and brief and often that results in me going up and briefing the CG after I have done that. But if there is some of that that will require a personal visit to the CG other than just a notification of a CCIR that occurred on the battlefield, some of those -- then before I personally go to see the CG, I will always go to the C-3 first.
How often does that occur, do you think, your estimate?

I would say -- Well, I guess early on it was about once a day, sometimes twice a day. Toward the end of our stay here, it was less, but where it really occurs is when you have a downed aircraft or major event like that or if you have a major bombing of a market area, for example, where there is a significant number of casualties, we want to be able to keep him up to date, particularly because those things reach the press very quickly.

So we have to ensure that we push information to the Commander very quickly so that he has situational awareness and that he can respond, if necessary, to any of the reports that come out, and certainly at least represent the military's perspective on what has happened so that the viewing audience can see what the reporters are saying and as well as how the military is interpreting that.

Other items may be if we are targeting specific individuals, which early on we did do that, and particularly in the evenings. There were times
when I would pay two or three visits to the boss to get approval to target certain high value individuals, what we call HVIs.

(b)(6) Right. I'm interested in the story board construct because, of course, I have seen those. I think you indicated that your staff, the Chief of Operations staff, makes those up. Is that correct?

(b)(3), (b)(6) That's correct. We have two folks on our Operations sections, our battle majors, that their whole purpose is to evaluate reports that come in, determine whether, in fact, they do meet the CCIR criteria, and then if they meet that CCIR criteria, that is what generates a story board.

(b)(6) So what role does the unit that reports the incident, the CCIR, have in that?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Well, they have the same CCIR. So they know what we are looking for. So they will make an evaluation when something happens.

Normally -- I mean, they get it right most of the time. However, there are times when there may be some interpretation as to whether or not it meets
CCIR criteria, and then that's when we have to get our staff involved to make the judgment.

(b)(6): Speaking of your staff, as the Chief of Operations, can you describe how large it is and how integrated it is with other sections? You have representatives from divisions and other staff sections on your staff.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. I guess we've got to look at it in two ways. We've got the JOC-4, which is the Joint Operations Center-4, which as you well know is a fairly significant, theater size room with representation from almost every staff element, LNOs, outside of the organization -- and I don't know the exact number of folks that are in there, but it's probably 100 to 125, if not more.

So they don't all work for me, but they all in an indirect way keep me informed of key things in their area, so that I have good SA, situational awareness, on what is going on, particularly the real time events.

Then as issues come up, if I need specific information to ask questions, those representatives
are there from all the staff sections so that we can
reach out and touch somebody very quickly to get the
information we need.

So from the JOC perspective, certainly, we
have a very huge staff representation. From the Chief
of Operations within the G-3 realm itself, we are
subset of that staff in key areas that include our two
watch OICs, our battle Major, our battle Captains, our
story board maker, and then we've got our ORS
(Phonetic) Section.

So there's probably about 15 to 20 folks
that work as a part of the Chief of Operations Section
that really are the core group of the Joint Operations
Center.

(b)(6): I would like to transition a
little bit now to the Future Operations side. But
from your position as the Chief of Operations, can you
talk -- Since you have seen both sides now and
operated from both sides, can you talk about the
interface and, in particular -- of those two sections,
and in particular, the generation of the fragmentary
orders, your orders factory from FJOPS?
Yes. First, I'd like to say, number one, I think this is probably one of the most congruent organizations I've been a part of, both across all three planning horizons, Plans, FUOPS, and Current Ops.

I would say, with relationship that and I had when he was the CHOPS and I was FUOPS, you couldn't divide the two organizations, a very seamless integration.

In fact, we assisted very closely on the very quick hit missions, for example, VIP visits. We would get very little notice, sometimes 12 hours, and when we were lucky maybe 72 hours. So those missions were turned very quickly, and often the CHOPS would find out about them before I would.

So he was very quick to notify us.

Likewise, if we did get wind of one through Force or the PJCC -- I don't remember what that acronym stands for, but they are the VIP managers at Force -- they would let us know. We would make sure we quickly informed the CHOPS and the C-3 so that they were aware of the visits and, of course, the battle space owner
as well.

Those missions turned very quickly, sometimes as short as 12 hours, but normally somewhere between about 12 and 72 hours.

(b)(6): And you publish a fragmentary order on those visits as well?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right. Typically we would publish a separate frag order for those. There were also times -- We really have two methods of publishing orders. One is called the daily tasking, the DTU, daily tasking unit -- I'll have to verify that.

In those, they are usually simple tasks. Any staff element can publish items in the DTU. So for example, C-9 would often publish information about CERP funding. Our transition cell would often publish routine taskings about redeployments or deployments that gave units standardized instructions on what to expect and lay out the time requirements.

Then FUOPS -- Sometimes we publish some of our VIP visits through the DTU, but quite often they were stand-alone orders because of the time frame that we had to get them published. So we use both entities
to do that.

Our orders were generally not major muscle movements like you would see from Plans. They were usually smaller in nature, maybe a smaller operation, for example, an operation in Diwaniyah where we provided some engineer support, some MP support.

It wasn't something that took a major planning staff to develop, but it was something that, within Future Operations Cell, we had the expertise resident or could tap into that.

Then we could spend some time in an OPT, operational planning team, to develop the details. Sometimes it would involve a reconnaissance to the area to get additional information, and then we would go ahead and publish the frago on that.

So smaller scale than, say, Plans campaign order for a major operation like Phantom Phoenix or Phantom Thunder, but those are the type of things that we dealt with in the Future Operations arena.

(b)(6): Right. And I know that there is a series of what I will call black operations, Black Avalanche, Black Eagle.
(b)(3), (b)(6): Right.

(b)(6): Speaking of Diwaniyah, and Black Anvil. There's a whole list of them on your website, and also the Silver series also.

I think the Silver series had to do with infrastructure. Is that right?

(b)(3), (b)(6): No. The reason we got -- We selected the colors, because, one, anything with a color on it, you knew it came from FUOPS.

(b)(6): Right.

(b)(3), (b)(6): So if it was Black Anvil, it was associated with the 07-01 Op Order published by Plans, which was really the 07-01 campaign plan. As we transitioned to 08-01, we changed it to silver.

(b)(6): Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6): So you have a link to the overarching op order for which these fragmentary orders supported. So there was a direct link.

(b)(6): That's good. Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6): So part of that is pride of ownership. FUOPS wanted their name associated with colors and, quite frankly, the units knew when they
were getting a colored order, it was coming from FUOPS, and it usually meant it was a good product. So we took a lot of pride in that.

In the naming of the orders, we were also pretty careful about picking names that -- how would you say it? Respectful is a way to say it, but we wanted to pick names that had meaning, that were somewhat tied to the operation itself, but described a bit of authenticity and, in essence, the bottom line of this naming convention is what happens is we do lose soldiers, and if you lose a soldier, it certainly sounds much more authoritative and important if somebody was lost in a Black Eagle or a Black Avalanche as to some other football name -- you know, the Hoosiers Operation or something of that effect.

So there was a little bit of seriousness behind the order naming convention as well. So we just took pride of ownership, also keeping in mind that this operation would come back to some in a very unfortunate way, but we wanted a good solid name that somebody could stand back and say, yeah, I did lose my son in that war, but he was lost on Operation Black
Eagle, which was a significant operation in Diwaniyah, and it adds a bit of respect to the process.

I'd like to ask about actually Operation Black Eagle, and that is the reinforcement to Diwaniyah, Multinational Division-Center South where you sent some enablers down and, I think, one infantry battalion.

Can you talk a little bit about that, and also, if you can recall -- I mean, I have the frago for that -- the approximate start date and end date. What I can't find or seem to find is a frago that brought that infantry battalion, for example, back. So could you talk me through that?

Yes. I think -- I don't remember the specific time frame that it occurred. I'm thinking it was probably sometime late spring-summer.

Right.

And it was for about a three or four-week period, and it was -- Ultimately, the decision was made to have a BCT commander, '06, co-locate with them in Center-
South. So he sent his tactical operations center down there to manage these battalion level operations, which also -- They integrated the ODAs from CJSOTF as well, as well as the local ISF, which was the Iraqi Army and Iraq Police.

So that operation essentially went through and cleared Diwaniyah. They went through the streets of Diwaniyah, and it was very effective, short term, violence reduced, order restored, but probably one of the weaknesses of that is we did not have the -- and I'm going to say we did have IA, which helped to keep law and order for sometime, but we didn't have the IP presence that we needed that can maintain that consistent built-up area security in Diwaniyah. We just didn't have the IPs developed.

So we eventually came back and, of course, followed up with Lion's Pounce here recently, and we have certainly put a lot more effort into the IP development, both right at the conclusion of Black Eagle as well as building up through Operation Lion's Pounce, and we have that enduring security in the city through IPs, because the IA itself has got a much
broader area of responsibility and cannot get completely tied down into the city of Diwaniyah, although there is a presence there.

Yes. You know, I remember Black Eagle, and I presume that you named it Black Eagle for the -- MND-Center South has a [1.4b] division. So the [1.4b] Eagle -- I guess that's why you named it black Eagle.

Right.

And it was ongoing in June when I was here. Then when I came back in September-October, I remember the representative at the battle update assessments from Center South in September and October was -- especially in September, I seem to recall, was always briefing that the situation was tenuous down there.

Then when I come back in January, it seems to be al calm down there. So what I'm trying to find out, and it's difficult to do through just an examination of the fragos, although they do help, is what happened in Center South between, let's say, September and today?
Well, the key thing is the last Commander that Center South has -- and he just departed, and the name escapes me at the moment. Bouk (Phonetic), Major General Bouk.

Yes, it is. Very effective commander. So I'll tell you, in my opinion, what made the difference is leadership. He was not afraid to "go outside of the wire" and get into the city and have a presence. That's what it takes, and he was able to do that.

And that-- And can you talk a little bit about Lion's Pounce, too? Lion's Pounce, I guess --

We'll set it in context, and again Diwaniyah is an important area. Again, it is just outside of the Belts, which is a focus area. Of course, Baghdad is a focus area, and now North is the major focus area with AQI, although there is Shia extremist influence in Diwaniyah which is the concern.

Mostly Shia.

Right.
And JAM, Special JAM.

JAM, disparate moderates, kind of -- It's the crossing point and, certainly, there is strong influence from Najaf and Karbala in that area. So it's kind of a political hot point for Shia extremist groups.

So they always attract, as a place that they can base out of. So the challenge there is, if we clear it, can we maintain that presence to keep it clear, and that was the challenge that we had. With Lion's Pounce, again, we had to go back in.

As we were successful in driving them out during Black Eagle, without that enduring presence through a solid IP and IA presence in Diwaniyah, we weren't able to retain that. So we had to go back in with Lion's Pounce which, very similar again, was to go in and clear the city again, and this time we were establishing combat outposts, and they would set up a couple of JSSes.

So that helps build that enduring security. So that presence -- you know, the emphasis provided by General Bouk, I think, made the
difference, and the willingness to get out and stand up those JSSes and COPs were critical to the success. But, I mean, it's too early to tell.

We can occupy those. We are already getting indications that there is a desire for the extremists to return back. So we are going to have to see what happens.

(b)(6) Okay, thank you. I just wanted to clarify that particular operation and that particular Multinational Division. But I would like to go back now to Future Operations.

In your last interview, you did describe the organization of your frago factory and some of the special programs, the biometrics, sniper defeat, and the effects infrastructure cell.

In the last interview, you did talk about the effects and how they are integrated in actually across the board in C-3, but what I would like you to do is, if you could, please go into a little bit more detail about the Infrastructure Cell.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. I think the last time we talked, the Infrastructure Cell was stood up,
kind of working. They are part of FUOPS. At that
time, they probably were doing some -- taking down
some of the more traditional FUOPS missions, but they
had an infrastructure focus.

Well, as it developed, (b)(3), (b)(6)
really took on that mission and essentially I
resourced him and almost fenced him for focusing
strictly on infrastructure.

So he had (b)(3), (b)(6)

Then they had a (b)(3), (b)(6) from the IO cell,
and we also had a 1.4b
officers who rotated. Well, one rotated in, and
another one right behind him.

So he was able to focus his efforts on
that area. Certainly, infrastructure took on a very
important role here. In fact, I would argue that our
focus on infrastructure really led the way for MNFI to
build their energy fusion cell, because of a lot of
the work that we did, which started out with an
operation that was called Spigot, and it was working
on the oil distribution and production, transition to
Operation Fair Play, which became a very successful operation moving fuel out of Baji to Diyala, to Anbar, north up to Ninevah.

That is really what this whole Infrastructure Cell grew from. Then as we determined the link between electricity and oil, we continued to grow and expand into electrical systems, both power generation and distribution systems where we would ensure that we had the lines throughout the area fixed.

Of course, that provided the basic services across the country. Of course, there are some priorities they had there focused on key and essential services. Then they had government services, and then distributions to households and that type of focus.

So this certainly got quite a bit of attention, and if you've watched the morning BUA with General Petraeus, there is a priority slide on oil, infrastructure, as well as a picture slide that lays out where problems lie or attacks or faults in the system. Same thing with the electrical
infrastructure.

So what we were able to do with that is really react quickly and integrate not only the Iraqi Security Forces but, as required, providing assistance from Coalition forces to help those infrastructure repairs.

(b)(6): (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed at the C-3/G-3 conference yesterday, didn't he, on infrastructure?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, he did.

(b)(6): Okay. I wondered if you could help walk me through a typical frago production.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes. Typically, what we do--

(b)(6): Let's say, apart from a particular operation. Let's say a routine that has like 12 or 15 different tasks, kind of almost routine, it looks like. How do you bring all those disparate, sometimes, tasks together?

(b)(3), (b)(6): I think the best -- Let me see what would be a good example. We could look at perhaps --
Redeployment instructions --

I see that all the time on them.

Those aren't -- Those are fairly routine. I mean, the tasks don't change. The coordinating instructions don't change. The only thing that changes is the unit and the date. So there is not much effort that goes into those, once you've got the system in place. I'm trying to pick one that's got a little bit more meat to it.

Well, let's take something current right now like one that we just dealt with on CERP distribution, for example.

This one would be generated probably between C-9 and C-9, funding related, but it also projects related, and there is probably some C-8 work that would go into that, determining the priorities for reconstruction and how this CERP money may support reconstruction.

So typically, what you would have is you would have C-9, C-8, C-7 engineers in a OPT. You would probably have some PAO.
Operation Planning Team.

Okay, that you bring together, you in FUOPS?

I may not. Well, in this case FUOPS may not be involved. This is one where the C-9 may take the lead, because he has overall authority for CERP funding and that piece of it. So he may take the lead on that.

Now if there were security concerns associated with executing this particular project, then you may have a FUOPS rep in there who will help tie the security requirements into that. But that OPT would form with those representatives and, let's say, IO so that if there is a good news story that would come out of this, or PAO.

If we are rebuilding a mosque, we want to advertise that, get that out, not only to the American population -- it shows what we are doing -- but we, more importantly, want to get it out to the Iraqi population so they know what their government is doing for them, and they a balanced picture of both Shia reconstruction and Sunni reconstruction, so that can
see that there is no sectarianism.

So as this plan comes together, we want all these people to have their play in it, so that not only do we end up building or improving a shrine, but that mission results in a story that is told about what's happened, so that the country sees progress, sees the government moving forward, sees the willingness of Coalition forces to support both Shia and Sunni sects with money, with support, trying to take a balanced approach.

So these are all things that are considered when you put a frago together, and it is through that OPT process that you get the right players in the room with the right expertise who can craft the tasks that need to be accomplished under each subordinate unit, whether it is an MND or it may be a staff section -- for example, the PAO or IO officer who needs to produce some products to support that effort.

Then once they've got all of those captured, then we put that order out for staffing, and it usually staffs anywhere from 24 to 72 hours, and it
goes back to the key sections so that everybody has a chance to read the whole plan and comment on it, either no, we disagree with this, or you missed this, we need to add this. Then this is really the voting process on the order.

At that point, after it is staffed, then the comments will come back through the Chief of Operations who then reviews the order and the comments. If there is any strong disagreement with the order, they will nonconcour, and that prevents the order from being published, usually, until we get that issue resolved.

For those nonconcurs that we can't get resolved, then I will make recommendations to the C-3 as to whether or not we override the nonconcour and simply publish anyway or we simply not publish, but in most cases we will try to get it resolved and then, if not resolved, then we simply publish over the nonconcour, usually for good reason.

(b)(6) : You know, I looked at the integration of the 3d Infantry Division, Multinational Division -- that became Multinational Division-Center.
There was a great deal of staffing effort that went into that, it looks like from the records. I did see some nonconcurrency in that. That must have been a very difficult one to resolve. I believe you had a conference on that, but I can't remember or I can't tell from the documents. Do you remember that?

[b](b)(3), (b)(6): I don't remember that specific order. I do remember that we did have a number of OPTs that supported that one. There were some issues there, but they were eventually resolved through the OPT process and ultimately through, actually, the G-3s and C-3s finally coming to a decision on how to approach that.

[b](b)(6): Okay. Now this is more of a reflective question. You are at the end of your tour, and you have nearly 15 months behind you as the Chief of Future Operations and as the Chief of Operations.

Looking back for the FUOPS Section, what would you say are some of the key turning points that you've seen happen with the Corps, looking at it again from your perspective as the Chief of Future
Operations?

(b)(3), (b)(6): I think first I've got to start with what the underlying focus of our whole effort here in this 15 months has been, and it is something that I've thought about for quite sometime.

I think, in my opinion, the key factor in the Corps' ability to produce results and be successful in the security realm, first off, lies with a Corps Commander who just seemed to have an innate feel for what needed to be done, and he zeroed in on that, focusing in on that particular weapons system, which was the IED in all its various forms, and he went after it, all aspects of it, its networks, its locations, its methods.

I think that alone was probably what I saw as being able to pick the right area to focus on and then exploit it. I think that was very difficult for the enemy to deal with, whether it was AQI or whether it was Shia. Didn't matter, because we focused in on the problem as it was influenced by either AQI approach or, you know, extremist group approach, and we were able to work that.
So the formation of the COIC was --

I think the COIC played a very significant role in keeping the Commander and command group informed of what was happening on the battlefield. I think their analysis was exceptional, and it really enabled the Commander to see the battlefield and to see what happened, because where there were IEDs, there was AQI. Where there were EFPs, there were Shia extremists.

So once you exploited that, that led you to where the threat was, and the COIC was very much an enabling aspect of that. So I think that was well spent. It was a fairly expensive endeavor, but it was a key endeavor.

Right. Do you know if the follow-on Corps is going to keep the COIC?

They are.

They are?

Yes. I think they had started -- I think they were slow to realize it, but I think they realized its value, although at this
Stage of the game the COIC is probably less important than it was when we took over.

: Right.

So it still has a role.

It's something that needs to be watched, but it may not be the focal point. They will need to find their new focal point.

: Right.

: So a key turning point.

: So that's one key turning point, the focus on the IEDs, the Commander's feel for that focus and the structural processes that he put into place on the Corps staff.

What else do you think was important?

: I think -- I don't know that it was a turning point, but -- I think the focus on the infrastructure wasn't a turning point, but it was a strong enabler. I think it was a rallying point for a number of pieces, and sometimes I'm not sure gets enough credit for this, but infrastructure by itself, I think we would all agree, is important that we all want the basic services
provided to us. But what enabled us to get that moving -- or not what enabled us -- What required us to get that moving, it required the Iraqi Army to play a role.

It required the Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Electricity and their facility protection services all to take responsibility and to work together. So what infrastructure did, not only were we trying to fix and provide basic services, it became a driving factor to force the government to work together.

That is something that needed to happen. So I think that helped us develop the government through solving the infrastructure problem, but it brought IPs together.

It brought Iraqi Army together. It enabled Coalition forces to assist, but we really didn't want to take responsibility. We tried to shy away from that, but it became very much of a strong driving factor.

So I think there is a by-product that a lot of folks haven't recognized that this infrastructure problem helped us solve, but I think it
helped us develop Iraq.

(b)(6): Right. Okay. It certainly helped the Corps focus, and also can you talk a little bit about, in the infrastructure area in particular, the relationship with Multinational Force in this effort?

(b)(3), (b)(6): I think -- Again, I think the Corps was very proactive on this, and our focus on infrastructure, as I mentioned earlier, I think, was something that enabled the Multinational Force-Iraq to develop their energy fusion cell.

They could see we had an infrastructure cell, but they wanted to do it on a much grander scale, which was needed, because they had to reach out to the different ministries and really integrate the political aspect now with the security aspect, so that they could both expand their oil and electric capacity, their exports, as well as ensure that the systems in place were functioning properly, were mechanically sound.

We were minimizing or helping reduce the attacks so that they could sustain their electrical
infrastructure and oil infrastructure.

(b)(6): You know, I've read through your historical report or your AAR, and got one or two questions on that. But I noted that you haven't signed it yet. Have you approved that, the one that I have?

(b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, it's fine.

(b)(6): It's okay? Okay.

(b)(3), (b)(6): It's final now. I'm not sure which version you have, but I think the one that I turned in to --

(b)(6): Yes, that's the one I've got.

(b)(3), (b)(6): -- is signed. That's the one I'm operating off of.

(b)(6): Okay. In that, you said the security line of operation, and the Corps established three lines of operation, was the FUOPS focus for C-3.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right.

(b)(6): But the infrastructure part of it certainly played a role in kind of the other, the governance, economics. So it seems like that you -- You certainly overlap into those other lines of
operation.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. Technically, the infrastructure probably could have fallen into C-7 where it's infrastructure development and governance, economics. However, given -- FUOPS kind of reached out and took it -- I'll just say that -- outright. We took on that task, but part of the reason we did that is because there was such a heavy security requirement to facilitate repairs.

So to strictly leave that in the C-7 arena, it didn't work very well. Remember, this started with this Operation Fair Play.

(b)(6) Right.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Which centered around the Baji oil refinery, and at that time was corrupt, was influenced by extremists, AQI, and so for us to get control of the Baji refinery -- and not us get control, but give Iraqis control -- we had to tackle the threat that was associated with that.

So as we looked at oil and the influence that was generated from that, because keep in mind, Baji -- our concern there is that the activities at
Baji at the refinery itself and the distribution of oil itself was funding AQI activities. So we wanted to understand how that was happening, and then prevent that funding from being used against our own soldiers through AQI activities. So that was the driving factor that took us into Baji in the first place.

Then from there, as we started looking at how to do that, it was very difficult to tackle some of these threats, but what we did settle on is, if we could ensure that the fuel was safely transported from the point of origin to the distribution points within the province, we would cut out any of the middle man and any of the black market activities that surrounded that, thereby reducing the AQI funding.

(b)(6): And make sure those shipments didn't get intercepted or converted.

(b)(3), (b)(6): That's exactly right.

(b)(6): And I heard a story in the BUA, I think, just yesterday -- may have been two days ago -- about the Marines out in Anbar found that the Iraqis had stopped a shipment -- I think it was oil --
from 1.4b and the Iraqi Police had apparently stopped them and were going to send them to Basra, and the MNF-West caught wind of that. They sent some people out, finally got them straight and sent on their way.

So that is kind of, I guess, an example of the kind of perhaps corruption or inefficiencies of the Iraqis that Operation Fair Play stepped in to make sure that sort of thing didn't happen. Is that right?

(b)(3), (b)(6): That was our goal. Now we aren't ever going to get rid of all the corruption and all of the black market activities that are associated. That is part of their way, in many respects. We are trying to take out the big pieces of that.

So I think we have been fairly successful in doing that. We haven't eliminated it, but I think what we have done is, by securing shipments to al Anbar, we have ensured that there is a significant amount of government priced fuel that is available in the Anbar province, which is much less than the black market price.
So the more that we were able to do that, I mean, the better off we were to serve the Iraqi people and eliminate a fair amount of that corruption. But I don't think we have eliminated all of it.

\[\text{(b)(6)}\] Right.

\[\text{(b)(3), (b)(6)}\] We just don't have the full control. Even in the process of Fair Play, I suspect some of these trucks, once they get to the distribution center, either they don't empty all their fuel or there may be other little tricks of the trade that sneak off here or there, but by and large, we have certainly taken a chunk out of that.

\[\text{(b)(5)}\] I think I have one last -- well, actually two questions.

\[\text{(b)(3), (b)(6)}\] Okay. I have plenty of time.

\[\text{(b)(6)}\] Looking back over the 15 months again -- and this is more of a structural or a process question, and you have alluded to the answer already, but I want to focus on this.

From your vantage point as the FUOPS Chief, what do you think the key contributions of
FUOPS to the Corps Headquarters in bringing the Corps to this fight for the last 15 months?

Well, I think first off is we had a fairly robust FUOPS size, that we could take on some of the more significant planning efforts that might typically be passed on to the Plans sections and turn them fairly quickly.

Translate them into actual orders, I guess?

Right. Fairly quickly.

I think we did a good job, by and large, of integrating all the requisite staff expertise through that process, which FUOPS -- Usually, they are manned so thin, they don't have the capability to do that, but I think our manning and our ability to reach out and touch all the different staff sections to pull into the planning process, we were able to do that.

I think we were fortunate -- You know, certainly, I'm from Fort Lewis. My deputy was from Fort Lewis, and probably one of my key orders writers was from Fort Lewis, all very capable people.

I mean, is one of the best
order writers. He can turn a product on a dime very quickly and have everybody together, synchronized, pull all the right people in and make sure they are all informed, and was able to do this very well.

(b)(6) brought tremendous amount of experience, simply because he has been on numerous deployments as a Special Ops officer, and he had a very good understanding of the environment, because he had been up in Mosul before.

So he understood the nature of the business here, how to work with tribal leaders, sheikhs, what some of the challenges are in terms of corruption, how the operational environment was laid out, where the hot spots are. He had a good understanding of how AQI worked up in the Mosul area.

So we had a good team of folks here that could very quickly adapt and contribute to the problems that we were facing, and were very aggressive in going out and seeking work as opposed to trying to avoid it.

I mean, the sign that hung over our door is FUOPS is always open for business. And
infrastructure -- does it belong in C-7? Maybe it did, but FUOPS took it and, because of the security aspects, developed it and grew it into a pretty good cell.

Biometrics was in C-2 sections. FUOPS reached out and grabbed it, and biometrics is probably one of the best news stories that is going to come out of this group. It was developed into a viable weapons system, so to speak.

Sniper defeat was sitting on the shelf, needed to be worked. FUOPS reached out and grabbed it and developed, and ended up generating requests for about $2 billion worth of sniper defeat equipment and vehicles.

So there are a lot of things that we just didn't wait for somebody to give it to us. We went out and found it and got it and developed it.

(b)(6): How long did it take, do you think, once you got here -- and I know you came from Fort Lewis; you brought 19 people with you. When you hit the ground here, I know you all were running hard.

Looking back over the record of December
and January with the surge taking place, things must have been going 1,000 miles an hour. But how quickly do you think the FUOPS was able to, for instance, touch the right guy in C-7 or C-9 to know, so you really began to reach optimum speed?

I think it didn't take us very long at all, number one, because again, as I mentioned, the folks that we brought here with us -- Penfield, very capable of running OPTs; very capable of running OPTs -- knew the expertise that was required.

I think that is something that he brought. Had I not come with somebody with the background, experience of -- I'll tell you, he is probably one of the finest officers I have served with. Without that experience that he had here in Iraq - He had a good understanding of who really needed to be involved, not within the Army but outside of the Army, when you needed to pull an Air Force in.

So I think his expertise was very key to FUOPS standing up quickly and helping us get our OPT process started.
Once we got that going -- I mean, we developed it as we were preparing to deploy. We did one exercise with 3 Corps, but once we got here and we were able to reach out and produce a few very well coordinated products, I think we were able to show 3 Corps that, hey, these guys from Fort Lewis can play ball.

Once they figured out we could play ball, they were very receptive and were willing to let us run. I mean, it didn't take that. Up front, they were very open and very receptive of us from the beginning, but there is always some sort of, you know, prove yourself process. I didn't feel like I was under that or that we were under that, but I think simply just stepping up to the plate, saying, hey, we're ready to play, they could see that. And we felt very much like a team.

Leaving here, you know, my farewell ceremony with Odierno is, hey, we -- He said to me, hey, we consider you one of us; we consider you one of 3 Corps. I really felt that way from the beginning. But again, it's that whole thing I talked about up
front, was I think we were received very well. We were needed, and I think we are able to respond well to a need.

So I think that whole aspect was very positive. This is one of the most congruent Corps staffs I have ever been around, just fairly unique, in my opinion.

(b)(6): From an outsider like myself coming in here, I can see that congruency in the Corps. The Corps seem to -- The Corps staff seem to work very, very smoothly and focused, and everybody going forward in the right direction.

I didn't see a lot of -- In fact, I can't even recall any backbiting that you would normally see on a high staff.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Right.

(b)(6): Or frustration. I really didn't even see any frustration, although there must have been, I'm sure.

One last question, (b)(3), (b)(6) If you would, if I haven't asked any question, this is your opportunity to make a kind of a final statement, and
we did this at the end of the last interview with you.

If you have anything more that maybe, you know, you want to get out on tape that I didn't ask the right question.

(b)(3), (b)(6) I think you've asked a lot of great questions, and I think you have kind of sensed some of the things that may have been a little bit different than normal deployments.

I think I hit the key point up front when I talked about -- I've been trying to put my finger on what was the decisive thing that I think helped guide and lead us to success, and I think that is the Commander that just had the feel for the battlefield.

I think overall what is happening, though, I think as an overall picture is General Petraeus, when he came on board. I think he has been able to complement the success of General Odierno and his focus on improving security in Iraq, and has really been able to leverage some of the ministries and work the political side fairly effectively.

There's probably some things I really don't have a good grasp on, but certainly how he is
working Moqtada al Sadr and keeping the JAM freeze in
effect and trying to keep that whole Shia aspect calm
while we focus on AQI, and yet still try to bring in
Sunnis. He seems to be balancing all those things
fairly well.

So I think during our watch, I think we
have been very fortunate to have the right group of
people together with the right skills at the right
levels to focus on the right aspects of the problem.

You just don't have that very often, I
think. This is a fairly unique situation, in my
opinion.

(b)(6): No, I think you absolutely hit
it right on the button there.

Well, we have been going for about an
hour, (b)(3), (b)(6). Thank you very much, and best of
luck to you on your trip back to Fort Lewis. I guess
that's tomorrow, right?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Either tonight or tomorrow.

But have you got anything else? I mean, I'm sure I'll
be pondering here for the next couple of months.

(b)(6): No.