MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Apr 07
JAM Recent Reporting

- Late March, Sadr City JAM elements procure rockets, IED making materials
  - (b)(6) attempts to acquire 1,000m of wire for IEDs
  - Sadr City JAM commander confirmed delivery of possible 60mm rockets
- Sadrist associate concerned over CF ‘shelling’ of JAM near Sadr City
  - Believes CF attack clearing way for Sunni extremists to come into area

Assessment: Both rogue and mainstream JAM elements likely obtaining materials in preparation for additional retaliatory attacks to pressure CF for the release of Gays al-Khazali and other senior members. Sadrists likely to denounce alleged CF operations near Sadr City to expand public support for JAM during Fardh al-Qamoos.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadrists position on Kirkuk referendum
  - Senior Sadrist CoR member Nassar al-Rubaie calls for signature campaign to delay Kirkuk referendum

- JAM special groups conflicting loyalties
  - All loyal to Sadr in varying degrees
  - Subordinate leaders have competing agendas
  - 5,000 members in special groups, allegedly little organization

Assessment: Sadrists will likely continue attempts to prevent Kurdish incorporation of Kirkuk. Secret cells may experience greater turmoil among leadership during Sadr's absence, but will maintain capability to attack CF.
24 – 30 March 2007

- 58 Nationwide Ethno-Sectarian Incidents
  - Total casualties: 304 killed, 297 injured

- 44 Nationwide Execution Incidents
  - 118 killed
  - 20% of total casualties
  - 39% of deaths
  - Daily average of 6 executions

March 2007

- 425 total ethno-sectarian incidents
- 2133 total civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 637 execution deaths

**Assessment:** Ethno-sectarian casualties increased primarily due to HP attack in Tal Afar, subsequent reprisals. Expect AQI to continue employing HP attacks in attempt to incite sectarian violence, undermine security successes.
**Ethno-Sectarian Conflict**

**Baghdad Incidents 17 MAR 07 – 23 MAR 07**
- 70 Sectarian Incidents
- 60 Execution Incidents
- 153 Total Casualties

**Baghdad Incidents 24 MAR 07 – 30 MAR 07**
- 32 Sectarian Incidents
- 25 Execution Incidents
- 166 Total Casualties

- **Baghdad Incidents: 32**
  - Total casualties: 107 killed, 59 injured
- **Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions:**
  - 25 execution incidents, 39 killed

**Assessment:** Ethno-sectarian incidents within Baghdad decreased; majority of casualties due to S-VEST attack in Sha'ab Market. Expect continued lower levels of execution incidents as security operations limit militants’ freedom of maneuver, JAM restraint.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadrists reportedly deliberating response to CF operations
  - Three proposed COAs among Sadrists leaders to respond to ‘occupiers’
    - ‘All-out defense’
    - ‘Cleaning and purging’ trend
    - Disengagement to avoid targeting

- Retaliatory attacks continue in Wasit between Badr Organization and JAM
  - JAM planning renewed anti-Badr campaign if certain conditions not met

Assessment: MAS’s absence and ambiguous guidance complicates decision making among mainstream Sadrists who remain divided over whether to resume attacks against CF. Negotiations between JAM and Badr unlikely to end tension in Wasit; rift will continue to grow between JAM and other Shi’a organizations as JAM members perceive themselves as lone Shi’a target of CF.
Stuff to talk about with (b)(3), (b)(6)
1. Direct relations and infiltration
2. JAM pointing out weak leadership and at the same
3. Sensitive reporting
4. ??
Threat Update

- AQI activity in Khalis
  - Reporting indicates intent to attack between 3-9 April
    - Complex attack
      - Planners reportedly former regime IA
      - 7 April - Anniversary of collapse of former regime
      - Control necessary to ensure freedom of movement in Diyala
      - AQI views Khalis as last city in Diyala without large presence
      - Reporting indicates attack will be comprised of large number of fighters
  - Increased HP attacks in Khalis last 7 days
    - 3 April – VBIED detonated at IP checkpoint
    - 2 April – SVEST attack on market
    - 29 March - complex triple SVBIED attack on a market
  - Recent HP attacks in Khalis demonstrate increased AQI focus
    - All three incidents demonstrated significant effort in planning, execution of attacks

Assessment: Reporting of 7 April attack in Khalis unconfirmed by separate channels. Increased extremist OPTEMPO in Khalis over last week, suggests attempt to intimidate population before upcoming attack intended to bring Khalis under general AQI control.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data
JAM Recent Reporting

- Two senior Sadrist allegedly dismissed from parliament bloc
  - Salam al-Maliki, Qusay Abdul Wahab ‘fired’ for alleged contact with U.S. officials
  - Maliki denied U.S. contact, sacking
  - U.S. Embassy would neither confirm, deny contacts
- Senior Sadr bloc member pushing for release
  - (b)(6) detained since Jan 07, served as Sadr’s primary spokesman in Baghdad
- Confusion among JAM leaders regarding Baghdad chain of command
  - Subordinate commander unable to determine brigade commander
    - Some leaders fled Baghdad preceding Fardh al-Qanoon
    - Recent capture of other leadership
    - Ongoing reorganization in response to turmoil

Assessment: Dismissal likely public demonstration to keep Sadrist in line, Sadrist will continue to assert anti-EC position in media statements. Release could allay JAM fears entire movement is being targeted, bring coherence to Baghdad JAM. Confusion among JAM elements likely reflects command and control limitations due to recent leadership changes.
AQI in Taji and Tarmiyah

- AQI cells in Taji, Tarmiyah among most capable in Baghdad and belts
  - 2 Feb: AH-64 Apache downing near Taji
  - 16 Feb: Attack on CF patrol boat
  - 19 Feb: Complex attack on Tarmiyah JSS
  - 20 Feb: Chlorine VBIED attack

- AQI may have ordered some fighters to Baghdad Belts in response to Fardh al-Qanoon
  - Fighters would enhance existing capabilities in Taji, Tarmiyah

- Taji, Tarmiyah staging area for AQI
  - Area used to launch attacks into Baghdad
  - Relatively permissive operating environment
  - Tigris River Valley Foreign Fighter Facilitation Route through Taji

Assessment: AQI in Taji and Tarmiyah are significant threat to Iraqi stability and CF due to capability, strategic location. Removal of Taji and Tarmiyah as safe haven through continued tribal engagement, CF operations may disrupt FF flow into Baghdad and reduce AQI effectiveness.
- 6 reported attacks against Musayyib-to-Baghdad South 400kV lines
- 4 instances of reported AIF activity 1 – 30 March
Assessment: While no specific threats identified against 400kV infrastructure, overall threat assessed as HIGH. Based on historical patterns, AIF elements will likely be informed of line status and target newly restored infrastructure to undermine GOI and assert control over population.
### Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)
- ISI/AQI volume down from 430 to 270
  - Al-Baghdadi warned T&FF groups that his plans to cause disagreement between them; labeled US Arab Governments, Ba'athist, moderate Islamic groups as enemies
  - Claimed 21 beheadings in Diyala between 9 and 26 Feb
  - Claimed downed helo on 13 Mar in Mosul; damaged Apache 1 Apr in Al-Karmah
- AS propaganda volume down from 40 to 19
  - Denied joining forces with IAI, Salah Al-Din BDE, and 1920's REV BDE
  - Abu-Abdallah warned Muslims against government ‘deception tactic’
- IAI propaganda volume up from 32 to 37
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up from 61 to 87
  - Naqshbandi Order denied participating in Coordination Office

### Sunni Resistance
- Propaganda volume up from 8 to 16
  - 1920 REV BDE announced death of Harith Al-Dari, accused AQI of assassinating him
  - Coordination Office announced; claimed several Jihadist groups joined forces
  - Al-Rashidin Army denied cooperating with Iraqi Government

**Assessment:** AQI attempting to incite increased ethnic, sectarian violence in the north through selective propaganda focus. Groups publicly maintaining hard-line, denying mergers and reconciliation while talks continue. 1920 REV BDE anti-AQI theme is likely to increase tensions between AQI and Sunni Resistance groups.
Threat Update

- Demonstration in Najaf
  - Sadr orders 9 APR 07 demonstration in Najaf to call for removal of Coalition Forces
  - Emphasizes Iraqi unity and nationalist themes
  - Only previous OMS-wide demonstration on 9 APR 05, peaceful, 10-15K

- Possible spontaneous, sympathetic demonstrations in Baghdad
  - No specific reporting for demonstration
  - Baghdad OMS/JAM leaders may want to show solidarity

- Threat to demonstrators in Najaf, Baghdad
  - No specific reporting of AQI attack
  - ISF will be present in Najaf
  - Baghdad demonstrations likely small, temporary targets of opportunity

Assessment: Large Shi'a congregation presents high-profile AQI target. JAM will portray any successful AQI attack as CF's inability to provide security. Najaf chosen for easier control of environment. Demonstrations in Najaf, Baghdad likely to remain peaceful; attacks on IZ by JAM rogue elements possible.

SCRIPT:
JAM Recent Reporting

- 5 April IED attack in Basrah
  - JAM member Haidar Sabah reportedly informed of attack with 4 killed, 2 injured
  - Sabah linked to anti-CF activity in Basrah
- Gol official and MAS agree to continue coordination
  - MAS feels recent events hindering process
  - Says UI groups provoking JAM
- (b)(6) reportedly in Iran 1 April

Assessment: (b)(6) recent location in Iran suggests he may have met with MAS to discuss response to Qays al-Khazali's detention. Basrah IED attack possibly attempt by 'special group' leaders to demonstrate continued capabilities despite senior leaders' detention. MAS likely to maintain only limited contact with Gol during absence.
IN TODAY’S OUTLOOK WE EXAMINE

1920 Revolution Brigades: Implications of Split

- 1920 Rev Bde division into two factions
  - Islamic Jihad Corps: Mosul, Kirkuk, T Abu Ghuraib, Baghdad
    - Likely to maintain militant anti-CF focus
    - Rejected calls to negotiate with GoI, CF
  - Hamas of Iraq (Islamic Conquest Cor) Diyala, Anbar, Baghdad
    - Likely to introduce political focus, sustain militant position
    - Avoided public condemnation of engagement
    - Claims affinity with Hamas of Palestine; opposition to common Zionist, crusader foes, but no operational links

**Assessment:** The 1920 Rev Bde schism is likely a result of internal tensions over organizational strategy; expect tactical military cooperation to continue. Hamas of Iraq will likely distance itself publicly from Islamic Jihad Corps as prelude to potential engagement opportunities.
Threat Update

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1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(6)

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Planned demonstration in Najaf, Baghdad, possibly in Kut
  - New reporting indicates potential for violence
  - Sadrist circles speculating about Sadr’s possible reappearance

- JAM allegedly planning attacks against CF, Sunnis early April
  - Possibly in Rusafa 9 April
  - Approx. 500 JAM members reportedly prepared for Sadr ordered attacks

Assessment: 9 April demonstrations likely to be peaceful, but isolated violence possible. JSS’s, iZ most likely targets for separate attacks. Sadr’s return 9 April unlikely, despite propaganda potential of emergence coinciding with demonstrations.
JAM Recent Reporting

- 9 April demonstrations
  - Large numbers of likely JAM members traveling south from Baghdad
  - Destinations include Najaf and Karbala
  - Separate reporting of possible demonstrations at several locations in Baghdad

- Sadr issued message through OMS office in Najaf
  - Called for Iraqi unity in face of CF
  - No overt call for attacks on CF

Assessment: 9 April demonstrations likely to be more widespread than previous reporting indicated; expected to remain largely peaceful. Sadr’s message allows for violent interpretation by more militant elements; attacks separate from protests possible. Goal of demonstrations and Sadr statement are reaffirmation of JAM strength and ability to affect national issues.
31 March – 6 April 2007

- 82 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties: lowest since August 2006
    - 158 killed
    - 78 injured
- 74 Nationwide Execution Incidents
  - 143 killed
    - 61% of total casualties
    - 91% of deaths
  - Daily average of 11 executions

April 2007 Outlook

- 343 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 545 projected execution deaths
- 1524 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence

Assessment: Ethno-sectarian incidents increased during past week; however, fewer casualties due to decrease in HP sectarian attacks.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

Baghdad Incidents 24 Mar 07 – 30 Mar 07
- 35 Sectarian Incidents
- 28 Execution Incidents
- 130 Total Casualties

Baghdad Incidents 31 Mar 07 – 06 Apr 07
- 45 Sectarian Incidents
- 44 Execution Incidents
- 30 Total Casualties

- Baghdad Incidents: 45
  - Total casualties: 55 killed, 15 injured; lowest since June 2006

- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions: second week with majority outside Baghdad
  - 44 execution incidents, 53 killed

Assessment: Ethno-sectarian incidents increased slightly; decrease in total casualties due to single sectarian-related HP attack. Significant decrease in executions in East Rasheed possibly due to disruption of torture house in Massafee.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend conducted nonviolent demonstration from Kufah to Najaf
  - Estimated 8-15,000 demonstrators attended march chanting pro-Sadr, anti-CF slogans

Assessment: Relatively small number of demonstrators, lack of demonstrations elsewhere suggest support for Sadr may be weakening. Sadr’s failure to appear in Najaf likely disappointed followers, demonstrates priority of his own safety above followers’.
Regional Update

• (U) UNHCR Iraq Conference 17-18 April in Geneva
  – UNHCR estimates 1.9 million displaced internally, 730,000 since January 2006
  – Goal of conference is awareness, formation of partnerships
  – Follow-up to High Commissioner’s March visit in Iraq with senior GoI officials
  – Conference closed to press, except opening events
  – Participants of note:
    • Heads of Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Emirati Red Crescent Societies
    • Iraqi Minister of Displacement and Migration
    • Syrian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • US Under-Secretary, Assistant Secretary of State

(CFR/REL) Assessment: Event will likely draw wide media coverage, while closed nature of forum will allow for some substantive progress on refugee issues.
JAM Recent Reporting

- New reporting of JAM special groups’ selection procedures, organization
  - BDE commanders screen, forward nominees from company/platoon commanders to
    Najaf OMS office for approval
  - After approval, candidates receive specialized training
  - Multiple special groups assigned to each BDE

- Sadr allegedly feared Qays al-Khazali would attempt coup d’état within JAM

**Assessment:** Possibly as many as 30-45 special groups throughout Baghdad and southern Iraq. Sadr’s previous fears of Qays al-Khazali usurping his authority may explain their troubled relationship into 2007.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend criticized G0I statements on maintaining CF presence in Iraq
  - Trend reportedly considering withdrawal from government

- Despite intercession by senior Sadrista, MAS will not relent over dismissal of Salam al-Maliki and Qusay Abd al-Wahhab

**Assessment:** Sadrists will continue effort to pressure G0I for CF time-table withdrawal, though a complete Sadrist withdrawal from the G0I is currently unlikely. While Sadr privately refuses to rescind the dismissal of Maliki and Wahhab, the two Sadrists will likely remain a part of the movement.
Assessment: The overall threat to the Basrah-to-Baghdad product pipelines is assessed as high upon completion of repairs. The threat to the 18" Crude pipeline remains high. The most likely threat of interdiction is along the approach to Baghdad north of Iskandariyah, due to the presence of Sunni insurgent elements within the southern Baghdad belt and the co-location of the lines.
AQL / ISI Propaganda: On the defensive

- IAI denounced AQL
  - refuted Al-Baghdadi’s last statement
  - accused AQL of crimes against Sunni civilians, religious leaders
  - asked Bin-Ladin to take responsibility for group
  - Deliberately used ‘Al-Qa’ida in Iraq’ instead of ‘Islamic State of Iraq’

- Kuwaiti Pro-Jihad Sunni cleric (b)(6) issued Fatwa recommending AQL ‘retract the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq’

- ISI / AQL forced to defend. ISI position
  - AQ writer (b)(6) suggested (b)(6) retract Fatwa on Islamic State of Iraq
  - ISI forums criticized IAI, countered (b)(6) halted posting of all IAI statements

Assessment: IAI attack on ISI exposes the extent of the divide between AQL and Iraqi extremist groups, supporters. Criticism of ISI’s Islamic Caliphate calls into doubt ISI’s religious credentials and exposes ISI to attack from all sides.
Reported Plan to Attack IZ Checkpoints

- Single report indicates a terrorist group may intend to target IZ checkpoints with SVESTs.
  - Report indicates 3 x UI males and 2 x UI females to stage in West Rashid prior to attack
  - Source credibility undetermined
  - CIQC issued situational awareness report 131633APR07

- IZ continues to be a high priority target for all terrorist groups

- 12 April - SVEST detonated in ICC building

- 12 March - 2 SVESTs F/C in the IZ

Assessment: Attacks on IZ undermine perceptions of security, potentially destabilize the GoI while generating significant media attention. Insurgents may be emboldened to conduct additional SVEST attacks against the IZ in light of recent success. Extremists likely consider checkpoints easier targets, with some attacks used to breach the CP.
Al-Duri – Fighting for Control of NBP

- Al-Duri will continue attempt to undermine Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad’s (MYA) Iraqi support base
  - Reaching out to tribes

- Al-Duri will likely promote a militant, Iraq-centric operational agenda to distinguish from Syrian-based MYA
  - Possible name change to organization
  - Plans to elect new leadership

- MYA is unlikely to feel threatened by al-Duri’s efforts and will continue dual-tracked strategy
  - Anti-CF publicly
  - Supporters considering dialogue with COI

Assessment: Despite efforts to undermine MYA, al-Duri is unlikely to regain his previous level of control. Tension between MYA and al-Duri will polarize NBP supporters into two camps. MYA unlikely to change strategy. He will reassert his operational credentials to discredit al-Duri, appeal to militants.
Threat Projection

- Threats to Tigris River Bridges
  - Multiple reports indicate unspecified terrorist group may plan to use IEDs or VBIEDs to blow up bridges
  - Reporting cites Bab al Mu'azam, Adhamiyah, and al Sha'ab Bridge as potential targets
  - No specific timing
  - CIOC issued a situational awareness report

- Two recent HP attacks on infrastructure targets in Baghdad
  - 12 Apr: VBIED on Sarafiyah Bridge
  - 14 Apr: VBIED on overpass leading to Jadriya Bridge
  - AQI claimed or assessed responsible for both attacks

Assessment: Infrastructure attacks in Baghdad endeavor to undermine Fardh al-Qanoon successes, destabilize GOI, ensure continued AQI relevance. Group will adopt, shift target sets in reaction to changing security environment.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend says split from Gol inevitable
  - According to head of Sadrist Political Committee al-Mutayyiri, ‘withdrawal may take place in matter of days’

- Committee of 10 senior Sadristas formed to operate in Sadr’s absence
  - Probably working directly for MAS
  - Committee allegedly includes: (b)(6)

Assessment: Recent threats to withdraw from the Gol are likely in response to operations targeting JAM in southern Iraq and lack of Gol support for a CF withdrawal timeline. A permanent withdrawal is unlikely as it would isolate the Sadrist movement and ruin Sadr’s position as a legitimate Shi’a leader. Reported ten-person committee will likely maintain effective C2 during Sadr’s absence.
JAM Recent Reporting

• 16 April, Sadr Trend withdrawal from ministries to be declared at press conf.
  – Discontent with GoI refusal to set CF withdrawal timeline
  – Five Ministries: Tourism, Transportation, Health, Agriculture, State for CoR Affairs

• If Sadrists escalate to full pullout from CoR, quorum more difficult
  – Sadr Trend controls 28 CoR seats
  – Hydrocarbon, de-Ba’athification reform vulnerable to delays

Assessment: Sadr Trend withdrawal from ministries unlikely to significantly impact government functions; full withdrawal from CoR would likely impede passage of key legislation. Given lack of success of previous withdrawal, future attempt would serve only to further increase tensions within OMS.
7 April – 13 April 2007

- 92 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties lowest since June 06
    - 120 killed
    - 15 injured

- 70 Nationwide Execution Incidents
  - 99 killed
    - 73% of total casualties
    - 83% of deaths
  - Daily average of 10 executions

April 2007 Outlook

- 374 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 524 projected execution deaths
- 1076 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence

Assessment: Despite 20% decrease outside the capital, ethno-sectarian incidents increased slightly overall, due to increase in Baghdad incidents. Casualty figures continued decline due to few effective sectarian high profile attacks.
Assessment: Levels of sectarian violence will continue to fluctuate, based on ongoing security operations. Focus will continue in KAC, Adhamiyah as Shi'a, Sunni groups vie for control of fault line areas.
Threat Update

- Large, complex attack on Karmah IP Station, OP Omar
  - AQI plan to target IP and CF between 14-27 Apr
  - AQI attackers allegedly will arrive in 30 vehicles
  - Last attack on Karmah IP was complex attack 12 Apr
    - SVBIED, SAF, IDF and RPG
    - 8 x CF WIA
    - 8 x AIF killed
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report

Assessment: Alleged AQI leader of attack controls several insurgent cells operating in the Karmah and Fallujah areas. Use of 30 vehicles likely inflated number. Attack will likely include IDF, RPG, and SAF, (S)VBIED possible.
Threat Update

- AQI Threat to Muthana Bridge in Baghdad
  - AQI elements targeting bridge supports
    - To be carried out by AQI elements from Gumayrah, Mushahadah
    - Planned to take place at night, from surrounding trees
    - Group currently located at Mjuran Arshad al Yasin and Mjuran Saba’ Irbahulm al Hasan Farms near Kadhamiyah
    - Unspecified timing of attack
  - Threats to bridges increased in light of recent attacks
    - 12 April – Successful VBIED attack on Sarafiyah Bridge
    - 14 April – Unsuccessful VBIED attack on Jadiyya Bridge
    - Recent reporting, recovered documents indicate increased AQI focus on bridges

Assessment: Near term attempt to attack Muthana Bridge with VBIEDs possible, unlikely AQI has institutional knowledge required to properly construct and emplace charges sufficient to cause catastrophic loss of bridge structure.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

CIDNE Trends Data
Reuters http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224
NY Times online article
Threat Update

- SVBIED attack on Fallujah Government-Military Operations Center (GMOC)
  - AQI plan to target IP and IA, allegedly in response to IP Chief’s refusal to recognize ISI
  - Last attack on Fallujah IP was complex attack 28MAR07
    - 2 x SVBIEDs (Chlorine), SAF, IDF
    - 17 x CF WIA
    - 57 x ISF WIA
    - 1 x CIV INJ
    - 5 x AIF killed
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report 171549APR07

Assessment: ISF resistance to AQI overtures likely to elicit attacks against symbols of GoI authority in Anbar. Attack planning is consistent with AQI TTPs, will likely include IDF, SAF, SVBIED(s).
Threat Update

- Assassination plans in Qadisiyah Governorate
  - UI JAM members plan to assassinate four members of governing council
    - Chairman of Governorate Council
    - Fadilah, SCRI, Hizb al-Wafaq al-Watani Council Members
  - Motivation for attack is council members’ support for CF in Diwaniyah
  - Attack date unspecified, planned for after CF withdrawal following Operation BLACK EAGLE
  - CIOC issued a situational awareness report 171602APR07

Assessment: Ongoing intra-Shi'a conflict in southern Iraq likely additional motivation for planned attack. Attack possibly kidnapping, execution or direct attacks. The attack is consistent with known JAM TTPs and attack motivations.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Internal views on Sadrist GoI pullout
  - Senior Sadrist Hajji Shibl believes withdrawal a mistake

- Senior Sadrist (b)(6) named part of committee tasked with selecting members of Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
  - (b)(6) said candidates should have no bias toward a particular political party

Assessment: Shibl's statement reflects growing disagreement among senior Sadrists over the movement's participation in the GoI. Despite (b)(6) comments, he will likely work to ensure IHEC members are sympathetic towards Sadrists' agendas.
JAM’s Future With Ahmad al-Sheibani

- Senior Sadrist Ahmad al-Sheibani likely to resume position as one of the top three influential Sadrist leaders.
  - Released 21 Mar 2007 after over 2 years in Coalition custody.
  - Detained 21 Sep 2004 for involvement in the 2004 Sadrist uprising in Najaf.
  - Prior to detention, served as Sadr’s chief adviser, JAM leader.
- Previously associated with the Sadrist “militant wing”
  - Associates included Qais al-Khaz’ali and Jabbar al-Khafaji.
- Al-Sheibani already returned to senior position.
  - Currently serves on 10-person committee in Najaf designated to act in Sadr’s absence.

Assessment: Considering al-Sheibani’s militant ideology and his prominent role in the 2004 Najaf uprisings, his senior position in the movement and access to Sadr could help lead the organization into a more confrontational position with CE in the coming months.
Regional Update

- (U) Iraqi debt forgiveness
  - Saudi Arabia confirmed agreement to forgive “80 percent” of estimated $15-18 billion
  - Total debt: $340-380 billion
    - ~ $140 billion in loans
    - ~ $199 billion in war compensation

- (U) UNHCR Iraq Conference concluded
  - Permanent UNHCR representative to be based in Baghdad
  - All parties committed to not turning away refugees
  - Specific assistance to be determined in coming months
    - Iraq pledged $25 million to support IDPs, refugees in neighboring countries

(C/REL) Assessment: While a relatively small portion of outstanding debt, the Saudi loan forgiveness is likely an attempt to demonstrate leadership in the region, counter perceived Iranian influence with GOL; potential for further progress on debt forgiveness at upcoming conference in Egypt.
JAM Recent Reporting

- JAM attempting to expand political legitimacy and membership
  - Utilizing public work projects; providing villages with water, electricity, etc
  - Trying to discredit GoI to gain public support
- Ongoing disagreement within JAM whether to engage politically or respond violently

Assessment: JAM elements likely to continue public work projects in low income villages, where public more reliant on outside assistance, receptive to JAM. (b)(6) comments suggest senior Sadrist parliamentarians in political wing sharply disagree with Najaf headquarters over optimal COA for the movement.
Mujahidin Army: Pragmatic Islamists

• Mujahidin Army (MA) balances nationalist and Islamist goals
  – Ideologically Islamic but less extreme than AS and AQI
  – Does not subscribe to AQI’s broader goals of transnational jihad
  – Some members seek MNF-I tactical alliance, others ideologically opposed
  – Tolerant of Sunni engagement in political process

• Leadership perceptions of threats to Sunni interests shifted in 2006
  – Challenging AQI in association with Islamic Army of Iraq and AS
  – Recognizes MNF-I will eventually leave and is positioning for post-withdrawal

• Public statement supporting possible negotiations with MNF-I
  – 26 March interview on Al-Jazirah with MA Spokesmen

Assessment: A cease-fire with CF is a realistic goal but enforcing member compliance will be difficult. MA will likely continue to pursue an agreement with CF to the extent it’s leadership assesses it could provide viable alternatives to continued fighting in the insurgency.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior Sadrists say JAM will not retaliate for recent Baghdad bombings
  - Asserts Shi’a residents want JAM to return to the streets in force
  - “We can not move without approval from the government”
- Threats of PM assassination
  - JAM “intelligence” reportedly alerted PM’s office of possible assassination attempt; group plotting assassination not identified
  - Separate reporting suggests JAM is planning an assassination attempt on PM

Assessment: Mutalyiriyi attempting to demonstrate Sadrists cooperation with the GoI during Baghdad security operations, while implying need for JAM, rather than ISF, to provide security. Other Sadrists will likely continue to exploit bombings, allege popular demands for JAM’s return to the streets. JAM message possibly attempt to appear supportive, while also applying pressure to GoI.
Insurgent Propaganda: Shifting Trends, Searching for Unity

- Insurgent IO trends
  - Predictable surge in propaganda volume following key events such as announcement of FAQ, Baghdad Int’l Conf, Iraqi Freedom Day
  - Propaganda focus shifted from offensive to defensive/reactionary

- Widely covered statement from Umar al-Baghdadi invited AS, IAI, 1920 Rev BDE to join ISI

- Ansar al-Sunnah attempt to appear united undermined by public defections

- Denied reconciliation and merger talks

Assessment: Groups will continue to issue statements showing Sunni resistance unity while at the same time vying for control of the Sunni insurgency. Expect surge in propaganda one week prior to upcoming Neighbors’ Conference, with all major groups issuing denouncements.

Members of legal commission criticized Emir and resigned from AS
**Threat Assessment:**

**Anniversary of Saddam Hussein’s Birthday**

- Anniversary of Saddam Hussein’s birthday 28 April
  - Celebrated as a public holiday under former regime
  - Last celebrated in 2002

- Threat of increased attacks
  - No current threat reporting to suggest increased attacks against CF, ISF, or civilians

**Assessment:** The overall threat for this event is LOW. There is no intelligence to suggest that Saddam’s birthday will result in increased attacks against CF, ISF, or civilians. Former regime elements are unlikely to use the event to increase attacks against GOI, CF targets.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior Baghdad JAM commander (b) plans to purge JAM of disloyal members
  - Meeting held on 18 Apr to discuss plan
  - a close associate of National JAM commander Abbas al-Kufi
  - Definition of “loyalty” unclear

- Salam al-Maliki and Qusay Abd al-Wahab reinstated to Sadrist bloc
  - OMS Political Committee said “innocence from the charges against them has been established”

Assessment: Indications of further purges within JAM demonstrate continued attempts by al-Kufi to reassert control over Baghdad JAM, remove elements whose activities draw undesired attention to JAM, OMS, Sadir. Maliki and Wahab’s reinstatement was expected. The OMS Political Committee likely feared their continued separation from Sadrist bloc could cause a splinter bloc.
Constant CF operational activity in Diyala has limited sectarian tensions vice anti-CF targeting.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14 April – 20 April 2007</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 104 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Total casualties:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 310 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 322 injured</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 94 Nationwide execution incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 137 killed</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 22% of total casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 44% of total deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Daily average of 18 executions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**April 2007 Outlook**

- 409 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 536 projected execution deaths
- 1350 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence

**Assessment:** Ethno-sectarian casualties increased due to effective HP attacks targeting Shi'a concentrations of civilians in Baghdad. Majority of sectarian violence in past two weeks focused in the capital, declining in provinces.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

Baghdad City Incidents 07 APR 07 – 13 APR 07
- 62 Sectarian Incidents
  - 52 Execution Incidents
  - 70 Total Casualties

Baghdad City Incidents 14 APR 07 – 20 APR 07
- 73 Sectarian Incidents
  - 64 Execution Incidents
  - 81 Total Casualties

Assessment: Increase in executions suggests JAM beginning to return to Baghdad, lessening restraint among low-level members in response to HP attacks in Rusafa, West Rashid.
**Threat Update**

- Suicide attack on school in Mosul
  - AQI reportedly plan to target CF, IP during visit to unidentified school in Mosul 24 or 25 April
  - Separate reporting suggests possible AQI attacks against IP in Mosul scheduled for 24 April
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report 1.4c

**Assessment:** CF, ISF cooperation in support of local services likely to elicit attacks against symbols of GoI authority in Mosul. AQI possesses capability, intent, attack planning is consistent with AQI TTPs and recent focus on Mosul IP, will likely include SVVESTS or SVBIED(S).
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend planning to retain influence within ministries despite publicly announced withdrawal

- Senior Sadrist Baha al-Araji gives different reasons for withdrawal
  - Asserts Sadr Trend wants end to sectarian quota system
  - Believes technocrats should be given important ministerial positions
  - Claims Sadrists plans to remain part of UIA

Assessment: Despite public attempts to support a non-sectarian agenda, Sadists will likely use less visible subordinate positions within ministries to continue pursuing anti-Sunni and anti-CF agendas. Significant pressure from Shi'a religious clerics will likely compel Sadists to remain in UIA despite significant disagreements with the Shi'a coalition.
Stuff to talk about with §(3), §(6)
1. Direct relations and infiltration
2. JAM pointing out weak leadership and at the same
3. Sensitive reporting
4. ??
JAM Recent Reporting

- OMS officials in Sadr City and Najaf reportedly propose to nominate different candidates for Minister of Transportation
  - Sadr City OMS intends to nominate (b)(6) and (b)(6)
  - Najaf OMS official Riyadh al-Nuri supports Ahmad al-Sharifi

- As of mid April, senior Sadr aide Ahmad al-Shaybani reportedly 1.4b, 1.4d

Assessment: Supporting the nomination of either (b)(6) would contradict previous Sadrist statements calling for independent technocrats to fill ministry positions. Shaybani likely 1.4b, 1.4d to meet with Sadr and discuss leadership changes for mainstream JAM, special groups.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Insurgent Opposition to AQI

- Ansar Al-Sunna (AS), Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), Mujahidin Army (MA) debating relationship with AQI publicly, privately
- Opposition to AQI from leadership of AS, IAI, MA will likely cause defection of more extreme elements to AQI
- Localized elements of AS, IAI, MA will continue to cooperate tactically with AQI
- AQI will continue to pursue dual-track approach to counter AS, IAI, MA
  - Targeting leaders who oppose AQI
  - Co-opting other members into AQI

Assessment: Opposition to AQI will continue to vary by location and group. Increased insurgent leadership opposition to AQI is unlikely to prevent elements of AS, IAI, MA from conducting attacks against CF in the near-term.
Threat Update

- Continued AQI Targeting of Zoba’i Tribal Opposition
  - AQI reportedly planning to attack Zoba’i tribal leaders including ‘abd al-Rahman Thahir al Dhari
  - Planned attack in response to alleged meeting between shaykhs and CF in early April
  - Zoba’i leader Harith Thahir al-Dhari, assassinated by AQI 27 Mar 07 in Abu Ghraib
  - Goals of attack are elimination of key leaders in local opposition to AQI, intimidation of al-Zoba’i and other potential opposition tribes

Assessment: Al-Zoba’i shaykhs fill key leadership posts in growing opposition to AQI. Expected AQI intimidation campaign will attempt to prevent Abu Ghraib becoming another Ramadi.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior Baghdad JAM commander al-Hilfi outlined supposed jurisdictional differences between JAM and “Special Groups” in mid-Apr
  - Alleged JAM has authority in major cities
  - Asserted Special Groups have control outside cities
  - Believes JAM members can arrest Special Group members operating within cities
  - Did not define exact nature of both groups’ powers

- Najaf OMS sent a team to Hurriyah in late Apr
  - Sent to dismantle a renegade JAM group

Assessment: Hilfi is likely attempting to assert JAM control over Special Groups through his jurisdictional definitions; however, such definitions contradict other reporting. Mainstream and Special Group members are unlikely to entirely conform to these guidelines, causing additional infighting, similar to that currently reported in Hurriyah.
Insurgent Propaganda

- AQI further attempts to legitimize ISI
  - Announced formation of ISI cabinet and ministers
  - Warned Sunnis not to turn against ISI

- Attempt to bolster public face while subtly attacking AQI
  - Alluded to ignorance in AQI methods, “emotional behavior”

- Insurgent attack claim trends
  - AQI requires continued growth in volume, claims of effective attacks to maintain support base and appearance of momentum
  - AQI surges attack claims in response to threats to its military power (FAQ), while other Sunni groups respond to international media events (International Conference)

Assessment: Sunni groups continue attempt to maintain facade of unity, while developing subtle attacks on each other. Expect AQI to focus on political statements as counter to attacks on ISI legitimacy, while sustaining attack claims, as failure to demonstrate results would hinder AQI fundraising.
JAM Recent Reporting

- JAM Special Group leaders Abu Zaki, Abu Dharr reportedly frustrated with some JAM members
  - Believe Special Groups should not be tied to presumably mainstream JAM elements
- Former senior JAM leaders rumored to be resuming duties in Baghdad
  - Mustafa al-Bahadli, Ali al-Musawi, Ala al-Khawajah reportedly removed in Nov as part of JAM effort to expel rogue elements
- JAM temporarily closes Nasiriyah office fearing CF retaliatory attacks

Assessment: Frustrations of Abu Zaki, Abu Dharr likely an indication of Special Groups’ desire to maintain independence from mainstream JAM elements in order to ensure effective operations, prevent compromise. Returning JAM leaders likely to resume anti-CF and possibly sectarian activities. JAM Nasiriyah office’s closing unlikely to disrupt JAM activities in the area.
Competing Communication Strategies of 1920 Rev Bde & Hamas-Iraq’s

• Following late March split, 1920 Rev Bde and Hamas-Iraq employing competing communications strategies targeting same audience

• Hamas-Iraq working to build credibility as insurgent organization
  – Seeking to allay internal fears of being ‘pro-CF’ through anti-CF operations
  – 04 Apr, Hamas-Iraq claimed responsibility for alleged destruction of CF military vehicle

• 1920 Rev Bde will focus on reaffirming operational, nationalistic and religious credentials
  – 1920 Rev Bde reply to Umar al-Baghdadi statement used to detail 1920 Rev Bde aspirations for Iraq while articulating support for insurgent unity, criticism of ISI TTP’s

Assessment: Split affords 1920 Rev Bde and Hamas-Iraq the opportunity for more coherent, targeted, and agile communication strategies. Both organizations will compete for support, but 1920 Rev Bde’s established message, reputation is positioned to have greater success within the insurgency due to Hamas-Iraq’s need to establish insurgent credentials before acceptance of its political agenda.
1.4b, 1.4d

JAM Recent Reporting

- Mid-Apr, Ahmad al-Shaybani reportedly replaced ‘Abbas al-Kufi as national JAM commander
  - According to claims by high-level OMS official
- 27 Apr, al-Kufi planned to travel to likely 1.4b to possibly be dismissed by MAS
  - Sadr indicated his intention to dismiss al-Kufi one week prior
  - Al-Shaybani also recently 1.4b, 1.4d

Assessment: Sadr likely decided to place al-Shaybani into a senior position soon after his release 21 March from CF detention. Al-Shaybani is much more respected by Sadr and other JAM leaders than al-Kufi. Al-Shaybani’s role in the 2004 uprisings, militant background could better prepare JAM for future confrontations with CF; leadership will likely help organize JAM, consolidate more solidly under Sadr’s control.
Threat Update

- Large scale attack against CF in village near Muqdadiyah
  - Late Apr, AQI planned to attack military base in Shakarat
    - Likely referring to patrol base K-Wall located in Shakarat
  - 24 APR – Dump truck stolen IVO Muqdadiyah, has not been recovered
    - Possibly intended for employment as VBIED
  - AQI advised local residents to leave their homes
  - Prior to OP Saber Blvd (14-22MAR) Shakarat area assessed to be AQI forward logistics area for weapons caching, VBIED, IED manufacture
  - CIOC issued a situational awareness report 29115SDAPR07

Assessment: No other reporting in the past thirty days of large scale attack in the Shakarat village or Muqdadiyah; however, other Diyala River Valley complex attack plots detailed in recent threat stream. Attack will likely target PB K-Wall in Shakarat, as it is perceived as less hardened than large FOB’s located nearby. Methodology will likely be similar to attack in as-Sadah including SVBIEDs, IDF, RPGs.
21 April – 27 April 2007

- 134 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 233 killed
    - 72 injured

- 120 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 203 killed
  - 67% of total casualties
  - 87% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 29 executions

Monthly Roll-up

- 6% increase in ethno-sectarian incidents
- 26% decrease in civilian casualties due to sectarian violence

Assessment: Total incidents increased over the past week, while ethno-sectarian HP casualties decreased. Expect reprisal executions to continue next week with casualty trends fluctuating due to HP attack effectiveness.
**Baghdad City Incidents 14 APR 07 – 20 APR 07**

- 70 Sectarian Incidents
- 61 Execution Incidents
- 410 Total Casualties

**Baghdad City Incidents 21 APR 07 – 27 APR 07**

- 77 Sectarian Incidents
- 72 Execution Incidents
- 132 Total Casualties

**Assessment:** Sectarian violence in the capital maintained a steady increase following prior week’s HP attacks. Sectarian-related incidents primarily occurred in West Rashid and Adhamiyah, with majority of the bodies found in Shi’a neighborhoods, indicating probable SAM Special Groups involvement.