MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Aug 07
Samawah: Refuge for Nasiriyah JAM

- An unknown number of JAM fighters ran from fighting in Nasiriyah to safe haven of Samawah
  - Reportedly staying at farm just outside city
  - Hide contains weapons including: mortars, grenades, PKCs, IEDs
- Separate group of nine JAM members fled Nasiriyah for Samawah on approximately 25 July
  - Members of Ali Kazim JAM cell, specializing in IEDs, rockets, sniping

**Assessment:** JAM fighters likely using Samawah as a refuge due to aggressive anti-JAM campaign by TSU in Nasiriyah. Likely to continue due to lack of CF presence in Samawah.
Anniversary of Hazrat Imam 9

August

• Event Background:
  – Considered the Holiest Shi’a Shrine in Baghdad
  – 1 million pilgrims expected at Kadhamiyah Shrine

• Past significant activity:
  – Nov 06: 122mm rocket attack on shrine
  – Aug 05: SVEST rumors caused stampede
    • Iraqi authorities reported 965 civilian deaths
  – March 04: 3x SVEST attacks near shrine
during Ashura festival
    • 60 civilians killed

• Potential threats to event:
  – Shrine, civilians possible targets
  – VBIED likely form of attack on crowds traveling to shrine
  – SVEST likely form of attack against crowds inside, near Shrine

Assessment: Attack possible on Kadhamiyah Shrine or celebrants. AQI has motivation, means, capability to incite sectarian violence. Security plan that incorporates curfews, limits vehicular movement could mitigate threats to this event.
Threat Update

- JAM allegedly plans armed march on Karada Peninsula 3 or 4 Aug
  - 350-500 marchers
  - About half to be armed
  - Planned to coincide with return of Iraqi soccer team
- Alleged goals of march include:
  - Create chaos on Karada after explosion of 2 car bombs
  - Attack office of al-Hakim
- Past OMS, JAM demonstration TTPs
  - Notification via mosques, media
  - Typically 30-60 minutes
  - Used as JAM recruiting tool

Assessment: Although there is no corroborative reporting of JAM march on Karada Peninsula, potential exists for insurgent activity surrounding return of soccer team. Any group's attempt at disruption of soccer team’s victorious return would be detrimental to group’s popular support.
Hamas-Iraq Expands Media Efforts

- (U) June 2007, various clips of attacks on CF
  - Mediocre production quality by Iraqi insurgent standards
  - English subtitles
  - A letter to President Bush describing “fruitless four years of war” and U.S. losses
- (U) Mid July – Q&A with Hamas-Iraq member
  - “We are being harassed in many different forms of media.”
  - Internet forums will become primary vehicle for promotion
  - Hamas-Iraq participation in “project integration” with other insurgent groups
**SCRIPT:**

**Notes & Sources:**

CIDNE Trends Data

Reuters [http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224](http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224)

NY Times online article
Expectations of US Arms Plan For Middle East: Iranian Perspective

(U) Proposed US >$20B arms deal:
- Announced less than a week after the second round of trilateral (US-Iran-Iraq) talks
- Saudi Arabia and five other Gulf countries to receive advanced weapons
- Israel, Egypt to receive 43B in military aid
- IRN FM ...“Illustrates US adventurism”

(U) Iranian views:
- US continues to destabilize the region, first in Iraq, now by arming Israel, and Sunni nations in an attempt to counter Iranian influence
- No affect on Iran’s nuclear program
- Iran continues to seek advanced weapons from Russia, China, N. Korea
  - Unconfirmed reporting, Iran to spend $1 BN on advanced Russian fighters
Elections in Lebanon

- (U) Elections held in Beirut, Metn districts to replace 2 assassinated lawmakers
  - President did not authorize
- (U) Beirut election won by ruling majority candidate; no opposition party candidate
- (U) Both sides claim victory, Metn district
  - Amin Gemayel, ruling coalition candidate
    - Father of assassinated legislator
    - Former president
  - Khamil Khoury, Free Patriotic Movement candidate
    - Allied with Hezbollah to promote peaceful coexistence
    - Claims Gemayel did not do enough to oust Syria
    - Party leader recently accused of meeting with Syrian Intelligence
- (U) Parliament Speaker stated he will not honor results of election

1.4b, 1.4c
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) National

28 July – 03 August 2007

- 90 Nationwide ESV attacks
  - Total ESV casualties:
    • 198 killed
    • 209 injured

- 71 Nationwide ESV execution attacks
  - 115 killed
  - 28% of total ESV casualties
  - 58% of total ESV deaths
  - Daily average of 16 ESV deaths

July 2007 Totals

- 459 ESV attacks
- 2,135 civilian casualties due to ESV
- 610 ESV execution deaths

Assessment: ESV increased in Diyala as AQI displaced from Baqubah. Attempted to intimidate local nationals, assert influence in outlying areas. Salah ad Din ESV increased as AQI focused IDF attacks on Shia religious sites to foment strife. Expect violence to remain focused in fault line provinces as insurgents, militias fight for dominance.
Assessment: Western Mansour, Adhamiya, East Rashid, AQI executing those who cooperate with ISF, CF. HP attacks against Shi'a civilians account for 54% of the total ESV deaths in Baghdad. AQI continues to resist West Rashid JAM expansion. Expect ethno-sectarian attacks to remain below pre-FAQ levels as AQI, JAM continue focus on ISF, CF. Attacks possible in Kadhamiyah as large gatherings of Shia likely for commemoration of death of 7th Imam on 9 August.
Latest Al-Qaeda Video Posting

- On 5 Aug, web links posted on jihadist sites to video featuring Adam Gaddahn and Ayman al Zawahiri

- Lengthy video praises 2006 attack on US mission in Karachi to make points:
  - “…spy dens, and military command and control centers” continue to be AQ targets, international law notwithstanding
  - Suicide operations justified by early Islamic historical cases
  - Calls on Pakistanis for “money and souls” for jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan

- Iraq cited only twice near end of video

1.4b, 1.4c
JAM’s Opposition to Embattled Basrah Governor

- 4 July letter from PM Maliki requests removal of Governor of Basrah
  - Request violates “constitutional principles” according to CoR Legal Committee
  - PM Maliki stated Wa’ilii had not fulfilled duties as Governor
- CoR considers Provincial Council’s May 07 vote of no confidence also unlawful
  - Voting location not “Official” and insufficient Counsel present to cast vote
- Ultimate legal determination lies with CoR Administrative Court
- If removed, a temporary Governor will be appointed until October 2007 elections

Assessment: Wa’ilii likely to stay in office due to contested procedure used by PM Maliki. An increase in violence by JAM aimed at Wa’ilii, other Fadillah Party members, ISF is likely due to opposition to Wa’ilii remaining in power.
SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

CIDNE Trends Data
Reuters http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224
NY Times online article
New Turkish Parliament Convenes

AKP: Justice and Development Party - 341 seats
- **Ideology**: Moderate Islamist
- **Objectives**: Economic and constitutional reforms, EU membership
- **View on KRG**: Work with GoI to eliminate KRG

CHP: Republican People’s Party – 99 seats
- **Ideology**: Secular/Nationalist
- **Objectives**: Protect secular government
- **View on KRG**: CBO necessary if GoI will not eliminate KRG

MHP: Nationalist Action Party – 70 seats
- **Ideology**: Nationalist/Far-right
- **Objectives**: National security
- **View on KRG**: Favors CBO to eliminate KRG

Independent/Other Parliamentary Members – 39 seats
- **Ideology**: Largely Kurdish (23 seats)
- **Objectives**: Kurdish rights
- **View on KRG**: Rights for Turkish Kurds outweigh any KRG affiliations

1.4b, 1.4c
Threat Update

- AQI may be planning chlorine TBIED attack in western Baqubah, 9 August
  - Possible tanker truck x2, against CIV
  - Al-Katun, al-Mafraq areas
- Trucks contain chlorine and unknown number of oxygen tanks
- Last successful chlorine attack in Iraq was 3 June in Baqubah, FOB Warhorse
- CIIOC issued situational awareness report 08 1624D AUG 07

Assessment: Though AQI traditionally targets CF, ISF when employing chlorine, they might use against civilians in attempt to deter cooperation with CF. Even marginally successful attack in civilian area may yield psychological effects.
Turkey’s Memorandum of Understanding With Iraq

- Memorandum of Understanding (MoU):
  - Transfer Iraqi natural gas through Turkey
  - Increase electricity transmission to Iraq
  - Discussed combating terrorism along border (KGK)

- Challenges:
  - Govt actions against the KGK will require Iraqi parliament approval
  - If approved, agreement would be binding for Kurdistan Region Government (KRG)
Iran’s Nuclear Setback

- (U) Russia: No fuel for Bushehr until Iran declassifies nuclear program
- (U) Builds on previous Russian-Iranian dispute
  - Quarrel over payments; Iran in arrears
  - Russian technicians withdrawn
  - Plant is “a shell,” still unfinished after 30 years
- (U) Iran: “will go elsewhere for fuel”
  - Requires 80 tons of fuel rods
- (U) Alternative: Fuel enrichment at Esfahan
“Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas Iraq” (IRMHI) Publishes First Magazine

- Released by Media Division of IRMHI
- Contents include:
  - Historic Statement of Hamas-Iraq
  - Statement about Hamas-Iraq and JAAMI merger
  - Main Article: “The Godliness of the Mujahid”
  - Production and promotion of “The Cycle of the American Soldier in Nature”
  - “Jihad in Islam: Favoring the Mujahidin”
  - “Scholars of Iraq: Shaykh Abd-al-Qadir al-Khatib”
  - “Shari’ah and Jihad: The Dividing Line Between Faith and Unbelief”
  - “The Jihadist Computer”
  - Filmed operations of the Al-Fatah al-Islami Brigades

Assessment: “Pioneers of Glory” is effort to expand media outreach to garner recruits and financial support, promote political views. Offers a more robust platform focused on IRMHI’s message, in contrast to AQI’s online attack statements and video compilations.
Sahawa al-Iraq (SAI) Political Aspirations

- Maliki considers SAI members to fill Tawafuq ministerial seats
  - Maliki views SAI as legitimate representation for Sunnis, turnaround from previous suspicions about SAI’s intentions
  - Possible means to strengthen government after numerous political parties boycott G+O

- Potential milestones to establish SAI as independent party
  - Run in Anbar provincial elections to establish presence
  - Run in Iraqi national elections, could win up to 1 COR seat and secure 1 ministerial seat
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV)

04 August – 10 August 2007
Weekly Nationwide
- 71 ESV attacks
- 149 Deaths

01 August – 11 August 2007
Monthly Nationwide
- 116 ESV attacks
- 280 Deaths

Assessment: ESV decreased most likely due to Baghdad vehicle movement ban, Death of 7th imam observances, and ongoing ISF/CF operations throughout Iraq. Expect ESV to increase following recent full in activity, yet remain below pre-Faridh al-Qarnoo levels.
Assessment: ESV in security districts decreased during religious observances of death of 7th imam; increased security measures, vehicle movement ban limited insurgent, militia freedom of maneuver. West Rashid relatively quiet, rogue JAM possibly attempt to avoid internal JAM disciplinary forces active in west Baghdad.
Intelligence Highlight

- Possible chlorine attack on civilians in Shakarat, 13 August, no casualties or damage reported
- No explosion heard, chlorine smell noted at PB K-Wal
- Announcement of attack on village loudspeaker; 200 villagers seen fleeing
- Previous reported chlorine attack threat, 9 August in Baqubah
- Last successful chlorine attack in Iraq, 3 June, also in Baqubah

Assessment: AQI possibly responding to CF/ISF successes in pushing them out of Baqubah, attempting to reassert themselves in outlying villages. Expect continued efforts by AQI to intimidate populace in Diyala Province.
OMS Military Supervisory Council

Head Fired

- Fallah al-Shanati allegedly fired by Ahmad al-Shaybani
  - Purportedly fired for actions against Special Groups in al Amarah
    - Shanati attempted to remove Special Groups Commander 'Abd al-Hamid
    - Resulted in the death of 4 Special Groups members and 1 Council member
  - Sadr is constantly changing leadership within the General Supervision Committee

Assessment: Shaybani likely feels Shanati exceeded his authority by attempting to remove al-Hamid. Replacement will likely be inexperienced handling national-level military issues. Shanati’s removal leaves Military Supervision Council short on experienced commanders. Effects unlikely to be felt at JAM tactical level.
Intelligence Highlight

- 14 Aug ~ 1930, Multiple-TBIED attack on CIV at bus stop in town near Tall Afar
  - 2 STBIEDs entered bus stop, detonated; 2 others adjacent
  - IDF followed
  - 30 killed, 60 injured, updates likely
- 15 Aug ~ 0038, 1 STBIED detonated in al Jazeera, approx 5.5 miles away
  - Damage unknown, possibly 175 buried in rubble
- 15 HP attacks this year in Tall Afar area, 4th and 5th since April
- 6th attack on bus stop in Iraq this year

Assessment: AQI targeting CIV in order to produce mass casualties and garner media headlines; attempting to maintain strategic LOCs. AQI operating in areas of lower CF presence in effort to avoid being killed or captured prior to being able to carry out attacks.
The crossing site at Safwan, IVO Navistar, is the only commercial crossing site between Kuwait and Iraq. Separating commercial and military activity at this critical junction is important militarily, economically and politically. ASR Aspen allows military equipment and most sustainment supplies to move from the port to Iraq without traversing any urban stretches of highway. Safwan is highly unstable and has a history of high criminal activity and low security presence. A crossing site that by-passes Safwan would avoid this threat.

The main threat groups along southern portion of MSR Tampa are Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Organization. EFPs are generally employed on the side or median of the road and are almost exclusively employed to target CF.

ASR ASPEN is a unlit, 25-26 foot wide, two-lane, soft-shoulder road. As mentioned earlier, ASR Aspen allows for 12 hour directional traffic from K-crossing to MSR Tampa. HET’s, which comprise 25% of all
MNC-I traffic, require a minimum of 28 feet for two-way traffic.

(S/MCFI) There is currently work underway to have RRP Radio Coverage throughout the entire route, but that project is currently ongoing. Inadequate SIGINT capabilities exists south of the ASR Aspen/ASR Papa intersection until the ASR Atlanta/ASR Aspen interchange.

(S/MCFI) The use of GSM is significantly reduced as no towers exists along the route. Ahteer and Iraqna are currently building towers in the area but a estimated timeline for completion does not exists.

(S/MCFI) EFPs are typically passive infra-red (PIR) or command wire (CW) initiated. Since July 2006, approximately 93% of all EFP’s with identified initiation types along MSR Tampa from K-crossing to the intersection with Aspen were PIR initiated. PIR initiators detect a heat differential due to motion. When it detects the heat a switch closes and the detonator on the EFP is initiated. The main threat area for these types of devices is the intersection of Tampa and Aspen.

(S/MCFI) The border area with Navistar continues to be a problem area with criminal activity. Hijackings remain prevalent in Safwan, a border village near Navistar.

(S/MCFI) ASR Aspen is 108 kilometers long and passes through mostly empty desert, and bypasses 150 kilometers of Iraqi/Kuwaiti interstate road with much higher civilian traffic volume. It provides substantially better force protection by its shear isolation away from any major populated areas.

Completion of the MSR Aspen Road Project will shorten the time required to transport military goods from Kuwait City north towards Baghdad. Should mitigate attacks against CF support convoys. With the TOA of Basrah province in Aug 07, insurgent and criminal elements, will exploit new security gaps in MND-SE, include probable CF interdiction along MSR Aspen.
JAM Activities in Husaniyah

- Due to July losses to CF/ISF Ops, Special Groups assumed lead of all JAM operations in Husaniyah, 8 Aug
  - Reportedly, JAM/SG presence recently increased from approx 25 to 200
- JAM recently experienced increase in numbers, morale after end of CF operation in July 07
  - Claimed “withdrawal” as JAM victory
- JAM blames poor quality of life in Husaniyah on CF
  - Claims CF actively hinder JAM from providing basic goods and services
  - Populace displeased, feel CF is punishing them, still majority tired of JAM presence

Assessment: Special Groups likely believe that control of Husaniyah necessary to ensure continued weapons flow into Baghdad. Anti-CF rhetoric likely attempt to gain public support for JAM, allow greater freedom of movement within the city, surrounding areas.
Turkish Parliament Begins Presidential Election Process

- (U) FM Gul Nominated For President
  - A founder of AKP, Sunni Muslim
  - Turkish General Staff insists on secular candidate
  - Previous candidacy led to early parliamentary elections in July 2007

- (U) Presidential Election Process
  - Parties Nominate Candidates: 10-20 Aug
  - Parties Vote on Candidates: 20, 24, 28 Aug
  - 367 votes (2/3 majority) required for first two rounds
  - 276 votes (simple majority) required for third round
  - By 01 Sep, president elected or parliament dissolved
Iran and the “Shanghai Five”

- Pres. Ahmadinejad to attend SCO Summit, Bishkek 16 Aug
  - Addressed Summit last year, Iran has observer status

- Iran seeks SCO full membership
  - Primary aim: join SCO mutual defense treaty
  - Some side benefits: banking, economic, links

- Russia, China on the record opposing Iran’s admission

- 2007 Summit Likely Agenda
  - Admission procedures
  - Gas Cartel
  - New Charter
Nasiriyah TSU Commander a Marked Man

• JAM weapons specialists traveled from Baghdad to Nasiriyah; possibly planning another assassination attempt on Tactical Support Unit (TSU) Commander. 
  - Previous attempts, 17 May and 17 June, retaliation for arrest of JAM members by TSU on 16 May
  - IED’s were used in both attempts
• Aws al-Khafaji issued order for Nasiriyah JAM to continue attacks on until he is dead

Assessment: Successful assassination would likely prompt widespread revenge attacks. Long term effects could include loss of current level of effectiveness of TSU, widespread JAM infiltration of local IR.
Sadrist CoR Reps Attempting to Unify After Public Statements

- All Sadrist CoR members scheduled to meet in Najaf on 24 Aug
- Sadrists reveal internal conflict in press statements on 11 Aug
  - Ahmed Sharifi announced himself as the new leader of the Sadrists' Political Council, saying Sadr declared boycott of political process
  - Senior Sadrists immediately counter Sharifi's statement
    - "We will continue our role to correct the government action"
    - Stated "al-Sharifi does not represent any Sadrist authority"
    - Some CoR discussed a possible lawsuit against Sharifi

Assessment: Though it is unlikely Sharifi has backing of many Sadrists, rift may be developing between some Sadrist CoR members over lack of participation in Gov. Due to apparently unauthorized declaration, unlikely Sharifi will be retained.
Extremist Websites Suffer Service Instability

- Sample of Disrupted Extremist Websites
  - Al-Hisbah
  - Al-Nusra Jihad Network
  - Risalat al-Ummah
  - Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)
  - Islamic Renewel Organization
  - World News Network
  - The Ansar Jihadist Group
  - Al-Ikhlaas Islamic Network
  - Al-Firdaws Jihad Network
  - Al-Buraq Islamic Network
  - Al-Bukhari Islamic Site

Assessment: Extremist forum managers recently forced into defensive posture. Internet no longer safe haven for extremist web content. Extremist counterattack threats likely to continue with little means to realize threat. Sheer determination will define future of extremist presence online.
Initial Iranian Reactions to Potential IRGC Designation

- During Friday prayers, Ayatollah Khamami blasts possible designation of IRGC under EO 13224
  - US will find itself “in another quagmire”
  - Considers designation a badge of honor for IRGC
  - “Sign of (US) despair” after “failed attempts” over nuclear energy issue
- IRGC: “iron will” to guarantee “historic victory”
- Official press reporting amplifies messages
  - Prominent play of criticism in Western media
  - Highlights EU’s reported ambivalence

1.4b, 1.4c
JAM Expanding Internal Training

- Former JAM member currently operating training camp in 1.4b
  - Trains JAM members to use IEDs, EFPs
  - Camp operating since May 2007
- JAM reportedly conducting training IVO Sadr City
  - Instructors train in 1.4b return to Iraq to train JAM
  - Offers training in new, advanced weapons
  - Experts sent to Husaniyah possibly received training in Sadr City

1.4b, 1.4d
1920 Revolutionary Brigade Southern Sector

- Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) leaders increasingly concerned about situation in south-central Iraq
  - Probable reference to increasing Shi’a militia violence toward Sunni population in mixed areas
  - AMS leaders plan to create tribal council to improve Sunni-Shi’a relations, address national issues

- 1920 Revolutionary Brigade establish Southern Sector to protect Sunni community
  - Media official Mustafa Hamden leading coordination of new initiative
  - Financial and manning requirements not being met

Assessment: Cross-sectarian tribal initiative provides opportunity for CF engagement. However, Shi’a are likely to view Sunni presence in southern Iraq as provocative and threatening. Violence likely to increase in short-term.
Event Background: Ramadan 2007
- Ramadan o/a 13 Sep - o/a 13 Oct
  - Month of fasting in daylight hours
- Lailat al Qar o/a 9 Oct - Night of Power
- Eid al Fitr o/a 13 Oct - End of Ramadan

Past Attacks Trends:
- Since 2003 a general increase of attacks
  - Direct Fire, ESV, IDF and IEDs
- Significant increase in attacks 2004 & 2006 with moderate increase in 2005
- 2006 violence result of Golden Mosque bombing

Potential threats:
- Open source report AQI threat to attack US Forces and collaborators
  - Prepared scores of men and VBIEDs
  - Statement distributed in mosques south of Baghdad
- Capability of targeting ISF, and CF
- Opportunity to effect US public perceptions

Assessment: As in past years, general surge of attacks during Ramadan is almost certain. Close alignment of 9/11 and MNF-I CG's Report to Congress opens the possibility that any spectacular attacks may provide insurgents with opportunity to create media sensation to discredit GOI, ISF and CF.
Nationwide Attack Trend Assessment

- Aug 07 attack trend projection:
  - Lowest attack level since Jun 06
  - Third month of decreasing attacks
- HP attack trend peaked Mar 06
  - Aug 07 projected as fifth month of decline
- IDF attack trend peaked Jun 06
  - Aug 07 projected as second month of decline
- AAIED attack trend not declining
  - Jul 07 highest month since Jan 06

Assessment: Declining rate of total attacks suggests effective CF, ISE security operations. Largest recent decrease in MND-B, partially result of curfew. AAIED trend suggests continued JAM Special Groups targeting CF. Expect continuing decrease in total attacks until annual Ramadan spike, beginning mid-September.
Ethnic Sectarian Violence (ESV)

11 August – 17 August 2007
Weekly Nationwide

- 74 ESV attacks
- 448 Deaths

01 August – 18 August 2007
Monthly Nationwide

- 188 ESV attacks
- 723 Deaths

Monthly ESV Projections

- 344 ESV attacks
- 1,191 Deaths

Assessment: ESV deaths increased due in large part to AQI attacks targeting Yazidi communities of al Jazeera and Khahtaniya. Expect weekly ESV attack volume to remain low as ISF/CF operations continue to limit enemy freedom of maneuver.
Assessment: Executions in Shi’a areas indicate JAM possibly continuing to clear remaining Sunni from Shi’a neighborhoods, while limited ESV activity in East Rashid reflects decline since mid-June. Lack of successful HP attacks in recent weeks likely due to cumulative effect of CF targeting, ISF security operations.
Threat Update

- JAM allegedly plans to assassinate Dhi Qar Province Governor Aziz Ogheli
  - Event to occur within 3-4 days
  - Method of attack identified as IED

- Third Governor targeted within 10 days:
  - 12 Aug, Qadisiyah Gov Jalil Khalil Hamzah assassinated; method IED
  - 19 Aug, Muthanna Gov Mohammad Ali Hassan’s assassinated; method IED

- Governors targeted because of their support to CF and their firm stance against JAM activities

- Gov Ogheli enlisted aid of influential Nasiriya Sheik to try to stop JAM attacks on local authorities

- CIOIC issued situational awareness report 15 1512D AUG 07

Assessment: JAM attempting to expand influence by intimidation of ISCI members. Other ISCI-affiliated political figures could be targeted as well.
AQI Mosul Network Attempting to Reconstitute

- Mosul AQI network restructured in the wake of significant leadership losses in recent months
  - Restructure result of CF successes against AQI; infighting made leadership in Mosul inefficient
  - Mosul divided into four sections, North, South, East, West
  - Each section assigned military commander
- AQI building VBIEDs in Mosul to use in attacks in Mosul and elsewhere
  - Production and distribution rising, increased attacks, discoveries
- Reported V/TFIED threats in Mosul
  - TFIED threat, 22 August at IP HQ
  - Multiple-VBIED threat streams

Assessment: Restructuring, reorganization have enhanced group’s effectiveness. Network likely to increase VBIED production, endeavoring to reinforce relevance. Increased VBIED facilitation activity supports completed reorganization.
Intelligence Highlight

- STBIED targeted IP in Bayji, 22 August
  - Education Center being used as temporary ESU outpost; next to Mayor’s Cell
  - 25 killed, 82 wounded; IP, CIV
- Previous recent incidents:
  - 4 July, VBIED against IP patrol
  - 25 June, complex attack on Bayji JSS
  - 17 June, complex attack on IP trainees
- AQI objectives in Bayji:
  - Disruption of reconciliation effort, tribal security
  - Foreign Fighter movement facilitation along Tigris River Valley

Assessment: AQI targeting IP to intimidate population, secure strategic LOCs. AQI being pushed out of Baqubah, Lake Thar Thar moving to perceived permissive environments; protecting revenue-producing operating area.
1.4b, 1.4d

(DECLASSIFIED) Supreme Leader is firm in domestic foreign policy; President A-N operates within his guidelines.

(DECLASSIFIED) Main objective of A-N travel is to secure political, economic, security alliances which will counter U.S. regional security initiatives.

- (U) A-N has conducted >30 state visits since becoming President in Aug 05
- (U) 2007 has been his busiest year, 15 visits
- (U) Visits by AOR: CENTCOM: 17; EUCOM: 5 (Africa); SOUTHCOM: 4; PACOM: 3; NORTHCOM: 2 (UN)
JAM Using Fuel to Generate Revenue

- JAM controlling fuel distribution in parts of Baghdad
  - Fueling stations controlled directly or through intimidation
  - Award fueling privileges to JAM members, supporters
- JAM selling stolen fuel on the black market
  - Inflate prices to fund JAM operations
- OMS creates fuel revenue monitoring office
  - Supervises revenues obtained, directs funds to finance weapons purchases

Assessment: JAM attempting to portray themselves as provider of services to Shi'a; make GoI appear incompetent. Possibly use gas stations to control local populace, provide incentive for JAM support/membership. These tactics could bring resentment of JAM as opposed to support.

(b)(6) 50 USC 3024(i)
Hamas-Iraq
- Jihadist Websites- OSC Summary in Arabic, 20070820, Islamic Resistance Movement

Jihad and Reformation Front
- Associated Press Worldstream, 20070813, As reported by Maamoun Youessef, Cairo, Egypt

1920 Revolution Brigades
- Jihadist Websites- OSC Summary in Arabic, 20070718, Hamas Iraq Interview

Assessment: Non-violent statements may appeal to wide audience. Overlapping statements effectively emphasize message. The Hamas-Iraq request to “boost our communication with Arab and Islamic depth” reinforces common political intentions envisioned by other Sunni Nationalist Resistance Groups.
IAEA and Iran – Agree to Agree...Again

(U) IAEA Dep Dir and Iranian Dep Nuclear Negotiator meet in Tehran, 21 August for 3rd and final round of talks

– Agree to establish a “final” timetable to clear up outstanding questions
– Details reported at IAEA meeting next month in Vienna

(U) Reactions to agreement mixed

– US says agreement is insufficient, does not bring Iran in line with UN demands
– Khamenei says no power can deter their nuclear technology program

(U) Iran says future inspections will include uranium enrichment and heavy water facilities

[Image: Assessment: IAEA and Iran eager to sell timetable as means to forestall potential next round of UNSC sanctions. Despite recent IAEA excursions to some Iranian nuclear facilities, enrichment unabated, “freeze for freeze” not feasible.]

All Sources are Open Source
Jaysh al Haqq’s Current Position

- Jaysh al Haqq – small Sunni Resistance group from Anbar area
  - Recent falling out with AQI; currently in open conflict
  - JAH claimed July successes against AQI
- JAH leader, Abu Ali al Baghdadi, had meeting with PM Maliki, late-June
  - Discussed JAH reconciliation concerns
  - Doubtful Gol able to deal with the issues
- Early August, Abu Ali began forming National Salvation Front in Anbar
  - Intended members to include well-known Anbar tribal movement, Sahawa al Anbar (SAA)

Assessment: JAH remains committed to removing CF from Iraq; however, they now view AQI, Shi’a militias as greater threats. Recent talks with Gol a step forward but grievances remain. JAH’s outreach to SAA indicates they desire to continue as a recognized player in political process.

- Jaysh al Haqq (JAH) is a small Sunni Resistance group from the Anbar area
  - Recent falling out with AQ; Claimed success against AQI in Abu Ghurayb and Amiriyah

- JAH leader initiated a meeting with PM Maliki likely held in late-June
  - DIRNSA 071536ZJUL07
  - London al Hayah (Internet Version) in Arabic, 20070615
  - London al Hayah (Internet Version) in Arabic, 20070719

- Abu Ali began forming National Salvation Front in al Anbar
  - DIRNSA 081717ZAUG07
Illegal Refineries Fueling Underground Economy

- Illegal refineries provide outlet, create market for stolen crude in north
  – Incentive for breaching crude pipelines
  – Distill a low octane motor fuel
  – Rudimentary technology, construction facilitates replication, mobility
  – Not always profitable, however
- Illegal micro-refineries common in Chechnya and Turkey
  – Those in N. Iraq based on Turkish components
- Minimal footprint
  – Small heat signature, sooty exhaust, distinctive odor

Assessment: Frequency of crude oil pipeline interdictions in the north suggests many illegal, private refineries driven by shortages of domestic oil products, profit potential. Automotive fuel most likely product; diesel or kerosene less profitable. Legalization has potential to supply local markets, stimulate employment and encourage innovation.
Syria to Eliminate Fuel Subsidy

- (U) Fuel subsidies to be eliminated at time “not far off”
- (U) Cost to Syrian government of subsidy would reach 350B Syrian pounds ($6.85B) in 2008
- (U) Subsidies encourage smuggling to neighbor nations where price is higher
- (U) Subsidy to be replaced by 12K Syrian pounds ($235)
  - Payable to Syrian families in two installments
  - Would not be paid to non-citizens
    - 1.4-1.7M Iraqi refugees reside in Syria
- (U) Similar measure in Iran led to violent protests

1.4b, 1.4c
Sadrists Propose Plan to Secure Neighborhoods

- 16 Aug Senior Sadrist leaders propose plan to President Talabani to secure Sadr City
  - Willing to stop mortar attacks from Sadr City against US forces if US agrees to stay out of Sadr City
  - Ahmad al-Shaybani involved in security initiative
  - Najaf next city to be secured, Shaybani to decide which areas off limits to U.S.
  - Senior OMS Political Committee member reportedly plans to meet with PM Maliki to discuss Sadrist’s plan

Assessment: Any agreement with Sadrist leaders expected to create safe haven for JAM within Sadr City. IDF attacks unlikely to significantly decrease since most attacks originate from outside Sadr City; rogue JAM also likely to continue attacks.
**Mosul AQI-VBIED Network Attacks**

**Ineffective**

- F/C reaches record high
  - VBIED production up, but volume of detonations unchanged
- Recent leadership changes yet to translate into increased effective attacks
  - Increased public reporting indicator of rejection of AQI in Mosul
- Mosul ISF demonstrating increasing effectiveness
  - Responsible for 83% of F/C this month

*Assessment:* Despite reorganization AQI Mosul network struggles to re-assert relevance. Concurrent improvement in ISF capabilities and increased reporting likely having effect on AQI operations. Expect network to continue attempts to re-establish its position through focused targeting of Mosul ISF.

- F/C reaches record high
  - *CIDNE Data*
- VBIED production up, but volume of detonations unchanged
  - *CIDNE Data*
- Recent leadership changes yet to translate into increased effective attacks
  - Multiple TD, IIR, and SIGINT reports that reflect AQI leadership changes in Mosul
  - Increased public reporting indicator of rejection of AQI in Mosul
    - Multiple TD, IIR, and THT reports that reflect increased public cooperation with ISF and CF in Mosul
- Mosul ISF demonstrating increasing effectiveness
  - *CIDNE Data*
  - Responsible for 83% of F/C this month
    - *CIDNE Data*
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Nationwide

18 August – 24 August 2007
Weekly Nationwide
- 61 ESV attacks
- 87 Deaths

01 August – 26 August 2007
Monthly Nationwide
- 264 ESV attacks
- 834 Deaths

Monthly ESV Projections
- 343 ESV attacks
- 1,024 Deaths

Assessment: ESV is expected to remain low in all provinces with the majority occurring in Baghdad, Diyala. Expect violence to remain focused in fault line areas as Sunni extremists and Shia militia vie for dominance over disputed areas.

- Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Nationwide
  - Trends Data Aug 07
• Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Districts
  • Trends Data Aug 07

Assessment: HP attacks show AQI’s continued resolve to foment ethno-sectarian strife. JAM is likely focused on clearing Sunni inhabitants from Shi'a strongholds. West Rashid continues to be an area where Sunni and Shia fight for terrain and dominance.
• 27-28 Aug, JAM battle with ISF (Badr) in Karbala during the Anniversary of the Birth of the 12th Imam
  – Weapons ban instituted by Gov of Karbala
  – JAM members attempted to enter shrine with weapons
  – Fighting occurred IVO Imam Husayn and Imam Abbas’ shrines
  – Stems from ongoing intra-Shi’a dispute
  – 27 reported deaths, 148 wounded

• ISF security measures to ensure public safety
  – ISF reinforcements sent from Baghdad, other provinces, curfew imposed, ordered pilgrims to be evacuated

• Sadr reportedly called for calm in Karbala
  – Asked followers “not to take part in the disturbances”

Assessment: Karbala fighting likely fueled by long standing tensions between OMS/JAM and ISCI/Badr. Sadrists will likely portray event as evidence Gov cannot be trusted with security of Shi’a populace, shrines. Further intra-Shi’a violence in the region likely.

• 27-28 Aug, JAM battle with ISF in Karbala during the Anniversary of the Birth of Mohammad al-Mahdi
  
  AP, 20070828, A Million Pilgrims Told to Leave Kerbala
  Al-Arabia-Dubai (in Arabic), 20070828, Iraq: 25 Killed, 65 Wounded in Kerbala Clashes

• ISF have taken security measures to ensure public safety
  CNN.com, 20070828, Curfew, Gun Ban Imposed After Fighting
  Reuters, 20070828, Pilgrims Flee Iraq City as Gun Battles Rage

• Sadr reportedly called for calm in Karbala
  Reuters, 20070828, Iraq’s Sadr Calls for Calm in Kerbala
Turkey: New President, New Challenges

• (U) President Abdullah Gul
  – Elected in third round of voting
  – Pledged to represent all Turkey, not just AKP supporters
  – Pro-active in terms of secularist concerns
• (U) Challenges Ahead
  – Possible legal issues- Welfare Party 1998
  – Republican People’s Party, CHP stance- boycott of functions, political maneuvering
  – Tensions with Turkish General Staff, TGS, regarding proposed changes to constitution

1.4b, 1.4c

• (U) President Abdullah Gul
  • See Sources below

• (U) Challenges Ahead
  • See sources below

• All bullets derived from Open Source
  • AP, 20070828, Gul Wins Turkey’s Presidency
  • The Financial Times Limited, 20070828, Turkey Elects Gul President
  • TelegraphRSS, 20070828, Warning by Military on Eve of Turkey Elections
  • Turkish Daily News, 20070815, Gul’s Reassurances of Upholding Secular Constitution
  • Turkish Daily News, 20070816, CHP to Boycott Cankaya
Sadr allegedly orders JAM to cease all activities, no exceptions
- Stand-down to last no more than 6 months
- Suspends “taking up arms against occupiers, as well as others”
- Encouraged self-control and cooperation with ISF
- Suspension to allow restructure of JAM to “preserve its principles”
- Prior to this announcement, Sadr called for calm during conflict between ISF and JAM in Karbala

Assessment: Likely in response to Governors’ assassinations, Karbala violence. Sadr likely attempting to counter poor public image these events put on Sadrist. Actions taken by JAM in coming months will illustrate extent of Sadr’s control over JAM. Rogue. 1.4b, 1.4d likely to continue operations.

- Sadr allegedly orders JAM to cease all activities, no exceptions
  - AP, 20070829, Cleric Freezes Activities of his Militia
  - TD-314/60801-07, C2, B2 Sadr Orders Stand-down
  - 17225-07, 212121ZAUG 07, Sadrist Condemn Killings in Diwaniya
  - 17693-07 291939ZAUG 07, Sadrist Official Unhappy About Decision, But Accepts It
  - BBC News, 070828, Sadr ‘Freezes’ Militia Activities
  - AFP, Iraq’s Sadr Orders Halt to Attacks on US-Led Troops

- Prior to this announcement, Sadr called for calm during conflict between ISF and JAM in Karbala
  - Reuters, 070828, Iraq’s Sadr Calls for Calm in Karbala
1920 Revolution Brigades Efforts to Exploit AQI

- 1920 Revolution Brigades (1920RB) using disinformation campaign to reinforce image of AQI & Iran as enemies of Iraqi people
  - Spreading warning of impending AQI chemical, biological attack on Mahmudiya
  - Plan to disseminate pamphlets tying attack to AQI, supply of agents from 1.4b & Afghanistan
  - ‘Mortar rounds contain cholera & unnamed chemical weapons’
  - Likely tied into Southern Sector initiative to unite Sunni & Shi’a

- Select 1920RB members have relationship with AQI in south, however 1920RB clearly exploiting AQI network
  - Biological threat recognized as unlikely by 1920RB Southern Sector leaders, but doubts not reiterated to lower-level members
  - Recent example - Sa’ad al-Shammari procuring weapons through AQI for 1920RB

Assessment: 1920RB has increasingly clear agenda to undermine, exploit AQI south of Baghdad. Increasing intra-Shi’a violence grants opportunity for Sunnis to aggressively assert their position. Exploitation of AQI likely to be growing trend nationwide, complicating ‘ground truth’ for CF, ISF operators.

- 1920 Revolution Brigade (1920 Rev Bde) using dis-information campaign to reinforce image of AQI & Iran as enemies of Iraqi people

- Select 1920RB members have relationship with AQI in south, however 1920RB clearly exploiting AQI network

1920 Rev Bde Members Concerned About Recent

1920 Rev Bde Official to Purchase Mortar

1920 Rev Bde Members Inventory Rockets, Mortars, RPGs
JAM Reaction to Sadr’s Freeze Order

- Baghdad units informed of order by late-day 30 August
  - Members not permitted to hold meetings, conduct any activities, or consider selves part of JAM
  - Violators possibly subject to punishment from Gol
  - Contradictory orders from Shaybani
  - Fear that Sadr planned to permanently dissolve organization
- JAM elements unhappy with order but complying
- Abu Karrar believed Special Groups not included in Sadr’s order
- 30 August, Shaybani denied making statement that freeze included attacks against CF

Assessment: JAM-SG will probably continue activities believing Sadr’s order does not apply to them. Backtracking statements likely in response to positive reaction from CF, concern over elements continuing attacks. Order may erode morale, encourage rogue activity.

- Baghdad units informed of order by late-day 30 August
  - All Levels of JAM Learn of al-Sadr’s Order to Cease All JAM Elements Learn of al-Sadr’s Order to Cease Fighting Shaybani Delivers Contradictory Orders to Associates After Freeze on Activities
- JAM elements unhappy with order but complying
  - JAM Weakened in Karbala, Unhappy with Freeze Order
  - Sadr Announces Freeze, JAM Member takes issue
- Abu Karrar believed Special Groups not included in Sadr’s order
  - JAM Elements Learn of al-Sadr’s Order to Cease Fighting
- 30 August, Shaybani denied making statement that JAM freeze included attacks against CF
  - Al-Jazirah, Al-Sadr Spokesman Denies Making Statement to Stop Operations Against US Forces
  - Shaybani Delivers Contradictory Orders to Associates After Freeze on Activities
Security worsens as MoI security forces take responsibility from MoD for protecting MoH

- Killing of Sunni’s who were claiming family member’s bodies reportedly resumes
- JAM given advance notice of Sunni’s intent to claim bodies – killed away from MoH facilities

MoH FPS that have undergone MoI sponsored training are returning to duty

- Despite MoI-sponsored vetting, FPS allegedly involved in sectarian violence
- FPS who were previously removed are being returned to duty at MoH

Assessment: Despite initial positive results of Oo BLACK CRESCENT while MoD assumed security responsibilities, JAMs influence in MoH FPS continues to have negative impact. Unreliable security situation at MoH will likely continue as long as JAM maintains influence, presence in FPS.

Security worsens as MoI security forces take responsibility from MoD for protecting MoH

Former MoH FPS Members Expected to Return to Duty (F3)

Corruption and Anti-Sunni Sectarian Violence Curtained Within Iraqi MoH Following the MoD’s Assumption of Security Responsibilities (F3)

MoH FPS that have undergone MoI sponsored training are returning to duty

Corruption and Sectarian Activity Continues at Medical City in Baghdad (A2)