MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Jan 08
Strategic Theme 1: Despite Sadr's preference to restore C2 over SG, efforts will be futile. Sadr continues, somewhat reluctantly, to peel away SG.

Kazim Isawi may be given new role over JAM SG
Reference 26DEC07

Formerly headed senior military supervision committee in Najaf
Reference 20NOV07

Worked to remove disobedient SG leaders, including (b)(6)
Reference 20NOV07
Sadr dispatched a high-level delegation to Karbala
- Negotiated with Karbala governor, governorate council representatives
- Launched a “Rule of Law” Initiative

Governorate leaders hope to conclude a more detailed agreement with Sadrists very soon

At closing joint press conference, Karbala’s Governor and Sadrist Senior Delegate:
- Described discussions as positive
- Emphasized security and stability
- Recalled the destructiveness of recent violence

(C//REL) Assessment: OMS continuing outreach to improve image, posture, and increasing influence in anticipation of provincial elections. Increased coordination with provincial governments and Rule of Law Initiative further reinforce the freeze and isolate criminal elements.

Asharq al-Awsat Newspaper, 30DEC07
Al Mutamar Newspaper, 31DEC07
Syria/Israel: Possible Overtures Toward Peace

• (U) 25 Dec, Israeli PM Olmert received US Sen. Specter, Rep Kennedy
    – Indicated Israel receptive to US mediation efforts with Syria
    – Stated interest in restarting peace talks; awaiting “signal” from Damascus

• (U) 30 Dec, Specter met with Syrian Pres. Asad, conveyed message from Olmert
    – Syrian state-run media called on US to begin direct dialogue and “bridge the gap” with Syria
    – Stated US most capable of pushing peace process forward

• (U) 31 Dec, Specter told reporters Israel understands peace with Syria must include return of Golan Heights

[CLASSIFIED] Assessment: Despite Syria’s recent negative reaction to US criticism of Syria’s interference in Lebanon, Damascus will work with the US government if cooperation serves its interests. Syria’s need for US mediation over the Golan could lead to better cooperation on Iraqi security.

(U) 25 Dec, Israeli PM Olmert received US Sen. Specter, Rep Kennedy; Olmert indicated Israel receptive to US mediation efforts with Syria
(LA Times, 31 DEC 07, Specter and Kennedy Travel to Damascus....)
Olmert stated interest in restarting peace talks, awaiting “signal” from Damascus
(Reuters, 26 DEC 07, Olmert awaiting Syrian Signal about talks)
(U) 30 Dec, Specter met with Syrian Pres. Asad, conveyed message from Olmert
(LA Times, 31 DEC 07, Specter and Kennedy Travel to Damascus....)
Syrian state-run media called on US to begin direct dialogue and “bridge the gap” with Syria, stated US most capable of pushing peace process forward
(AP News, 31 DEC 07, Syrian State Media Calls for US to Launch....)
(U) 31 Dec, Specter told reporters Israel understands peace with Syria must include return of Golan Heights
(LA Times, 31 DEC 07, Specter and Kennedy Travel to Damascus....)
Supporting Traffic

Bullet 1:
20071229 RUETERS; Iraq to Discuss Border Agreement with Iran
20071230 Islamic Republic News Agency; Iran, Iraq Form Committee to Dredge Arvand
IAP20070905 950131 Tehran IRNA (Open Source Center): “Iran has Tiny Slice in Iraq’s Lucrative Market- Bussinessman”
opensource,dni.ic.gov

Bullet 2:
20070901 950096 Tehran Iranian Students News Agency (Open Source Center): “Iran-Iraq First Economic Seminar and Exhibition”
opensource,dni.ic.gov

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i), (b)(6)
Follow-On OMS/ISCI Dialogue

- Early January, OMS/ISCI Officials met in Nasiriyah
- Reportedly Muqtada al-Sadr, among other Iraqi leaders, called for dialogue
- (U) ISCI issued a press statement
  - Called for Shi'a unity
  - Acknowledged contribution of Sunni Awakening to a decline in violence
  - Called for continuation of fight against AQI
- (U) January OMS/ISCI meeting followed:
  - Early October 2007 agreement between ISCI/OMS
  - Establishment of local ISCI/OMS joint committee structure
  - December provincial agreements in Basrah, Karbala

Assessment: OMS/ISCI agreement and dialogue contribute to external pressure on Sadrist Trend to refrain from violence. Sadrist participation in negotiating structures, balanced inducements, and improved Iraqi security environment all significantly raise cost to Sadr of lifting the freeze and make lifting of the freeze less likely.

Sources:

- Early January, OMS/ISCI Officials met in Nasiriyah
  1.4c
- Muqtada al-Sadr called for dialogue
  1.4c
- (U) ISCI issued a statement
  Associated Press, 04JAN08
- January OMS/ISCI meeting follows
  1.4c 8 Nov 07
  Asharq al-Awasat Newspaper, 30 Dec 07
Structure and Personnel of Men of Muqtada al-Sadr Group Defined Late November 2007

JAM Affiliates Tahsin and Jalilmal-Nuri Purportedly Join Forces with Shi’ā Insurgent Akram al-Kabi After Meeting in Al Amarah, Mid-December 2007

Shaykh Ahmad al-Shaybani Rperesntative Request Meeting with Iraq-Based Associates of Jaysh al-Mahdi Figure Abu Dura to Emphasize Importance of Group’s Allegiance to Muqtada al-Sadr; Ahmad Hatu Learns of Men of Muqtada al-Sadr Organization, Early December 2007.
7 Jan Coordinated Attack on Adhamiyah CLC Leader

- Suicide bomber targeted COL Riyadh at Sunni Endowment Office, 1020L
  - Detonated after shaking COL Riyadh’s hand
- SVBIED detonated against convoy transporting victims, 1037L
  - Pursued convoy, detonating on 4th vehicle; other 3 vehicles continued to hospital
- COL Riyadh and 11 others killed, 26 injured
- COL Riyadh was member of Sunni Endowment and led the Adhamiyah CLC

Assessment: AQI, likely Rusafa network, specifically targeted COL Riyadh due to his position leading CLC in Adhamiyah. Second attack intended to ensure death of primary target rather than targeting first responders; demonstrates level of threat AQI perceives CLC leaders represent to extremist objectives.

Sources:

- Rueters, 080107, U.S. Blames al Qaeda as bombs kill 14 in Iraq
- Associated Press, 080107, Baghdad Suicide Bombings Kill Key al Qaeda Opponent in Latest Extremist Backlash


Other references: Sharqiyah TV.
Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)

- Issues statements to discredit Awakening
  - Not an actual solution to security problems
  - Scheme of Coalition
- Seeks to maintain an insurgency with Iraqi face, discourages Foreign Terrorists
- Plays down his absence in Iraq, claiming:
  - He is wanted for prosecution by GoI
  - His return would not be good for Iraqi populace
- Praises Iraqi soldier for alleged killing of three US soldiers

Assessment: AMS searching for relevance in Iraq. Recent statements are blatant attempts to portray situations in Iraq as favorable to AMS goals of remaining viable answer for Sunnis and continued resistance of CF. Al Dhari’s explanation of absence from Iraq likely sign she feels pressure for not being in the country.

Sources:
(U) Statements intended to discredit Awakening: Daily Select Propaganda Report, 05JAN08; GMP20080104614002, 042130ZJAN08, “Iraq’s AMS al Dhari on Sunni-Shiite Dispute, IS Occupation, Saudi Role”

(U) Ensures Iraqis able to maintain insurgency, discourages FT: Daily Select Propaganda Report, 05JAN08; GMP20080104614002, 042130ZJAN08, “Iraq’s AMS al Dhari on Sunni-Shiite Dispute, IS Occupation, Saudi Role”

(U) Al Dhari plays down his absence in Iraq: Daily Select Propaganda Report, 05JAN08; GMP20080104614002, 042130ZJAN08, “Iraq’s AMS al Dhari on Sunni-Shiite Dispute, IS Occupation, Saudi Role”

(U) Praised Iraqi Soldier for alleged killing of three US soldiers: GMP20080106676001, 05JAN08, “Iraq’s AMS Says Killing Three US Troops by Iraqi Soldier Heroic Deed”; Daily Propaganda Report, 06JAN08

Strategic Theme: The Association of Muslim Scholars is still a vital part of Iraqi society. Their statements are designed to turn Iraqis against Coalition Forces and the GoI, incite resistance to current programs such as CLCs, and Awakenings, and to draw more support.
Sources:
- Kuwait KUNA, 080108, Arab League Launches ‘Arabs Hand in Hand w/ Iraqis’ Solidarity Campaign
- UNHCR, 071218, Iraqi Musician Launches Fund-Raising Campaign
IAEA Chief El Baradei To Visit Iran

- Meeting to take place 11 – 12 January
  - Tehran officially invited El Baradei
  - El Baradei meeting with senior Iranian officials

- Goals of meeting:
  - Develop means to enhance and accelerate implementation of nuclear safeguards
  - Push Iran into speeding up steps to resolve remaining questions in IAEA inquiry
  - Enable IAEA to secure confidence over past and present record of Iran’s nuclear activities

Sources:
Islamic Republic News Agency 7 January, 2008, “Aqazadeh Confirms ElBaradei’s Iran Visit”
Dow Jones Newswire, 7 January 2008, “IAEA Chief ElBaradei To Visit Iran This Week”
Reuters, 7 January, 2008, “IAEA’s ElBaradei to visit Iran this week”
Tehran Mehr News Agency, 8 January, 2007, “UN Nuclear Chief ElBaradei To Visit Iran”
Page 15 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d
False Statements Within Sunni Insurgency

• (U) Al-Rashidin Army (ARA) and Al-Fatihin Army (AFA) issue joint statement denying connection to secular Ba’ath Party
  – Alleged Ba’athist use of lies and propaganda to cover failures
  – Assert these false statements only help “crusader intelligence and distortion campaign”
  – Blame statement for confusion within resistance ranks

• (U) ARA and AFA affiliations
  – ARA is a member of Jihad and Change Front (JACF)
  – AFA recently withdrew from Jihad and Reformation Front (JARF), will possibly join JACF

(C//REL) Assessment: Ba’ath Party claims affiliation with Sunni resistance groups to obscure its own waning relevance. Denial of association by several groups shows current low status of Ba’ath Party. Continued turmoil, fluidity within Sunni resistance can be leveraged by GOL and Coalition to cause further splintering.

Sources:
(U) DSFR08107 January 07, 2008
(U) DSFR08103 January 03, 2008
(U) GMP20080107459003 071539Z JAN 08

Strategic Theme: In spite of their best efforts (propaganda, SCJL) the Ba’ath party has been unable to rally the Sunni insurgency to its ideas. Indeed by making false claims and spreading disinformation has likely hurt and divided the Sunni resistance even more then some CF efforts. AFA leaving JARF shows the fluid state that the Insurgency finds itself in. It is highly likely there will be more moves and denouncements in the months to come as groups and confederation compete for influence and power. These changes leave the coalition with exploitable options

Rapid Switching of groups
False propaganda statements-counter claims
Turmoil within the insurgency
Looking for influence
Exploitable
ATMOSPHERICS IN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUQTADA AL SADR AND IRAQI NATIONAL GATHERING AND THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAHADA (U)

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

1.4b, 1.4d in final attempt to resolve differences, late December 2007

1.4c

Evidence of close relationship between Adnan al-Shahmani and Badr

1.4c

Adnan al-Shahmani describes progress made by the Iraqi National Gathering

1.4c
12 November correlation to annual 2 Dhul-Qadah (Anniversary of Sadr's death)

Source: www.geocities.com/BourbonStreet/Quarter/1803/mmsalsadr.html
Published from Kuwaiti Al-Watan Newspaper, March 1999.
Converted using about.com islamica-gegorian calculator.

• No threats currently reported
  - Large gatherings of Shi’a expected during festivities
  Source: CIOC Information Paper 5 November 07, Commemoration of the Death of Sadiq al Sadr

• Attacks possible targeting Sadrists during commemoration ceremony
  Source: CIOC Information Paper 5 November 07, Commemoration of the Death of Sadiq al Sadr

• Possible threats include VBIEDs, intra-Shi’a violence

Previous commemoration incidents
• 2006: Five VBIEDs detonate resulting in 181 civilians killed / 247 wounded
  Source: TRENDS TEAM

• 2005: 800,000 JAM members peacefully marched on the streets of Najaf with no reports of violence
  Source approved downgrade of classification to S//REL

Assessment: Currently one credible threat against pilgrims, IEDs, SVEST and mortar attacks while in transit throughout Baghdad. All Shia’ shrines are vulnerable. Special Groups likely to target Coalition Forces with EFPs and IDF.
OMS meeting with Dhi Qar officials (OSC, GMP20080103634001, P 060547Z JAN 08, U, Source: al-Amarah News Network)

Details of peace initiative (OSC, GMP20080103634001, P 060547Z JAN 08, U, Source: al-Amarah News Network)

Meetings in Karbala, Basrah (OSC, GMP20080106676002, P 060729Z JAN 08, U, Source: al-Amarah News Network; OSC, EUP20071213950003, P 130835Z DEC 07, U, Source: al-Sharqiyah Television)

OMS advocates more meetings (OSC, GMP20080103634001, P 060547Z JAN 08, U, Source: al-Amarah News Network; OSC, GMP20080106676002, P 060729Z JAN 08, U, Source: al-Amarah News Network)

Other sources used in script (OSC, GMP20080108690002, P 081545Z JAN 08, U, Source: al-Muwatin; OSC, GMP20071220642002, P 202017Z DEC 07, U, Source: al-Sharqiyah Television)
Strategic Theme: It appears that the IAI is using western media to get the message out they are the defenders of the Iraqi people, they want to distance themselves from AQI, and that they would like to set up a government free of any (CF) Using media is not new however going direct to western sources has increased in the last several months.

Using PR
Possibly garner sympathy (appeal to those who oppose the war)
Why not work with the awakening

It is important to note that the IAI is a member of the Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance (PCIR), which has announced a 14-point political program and stated their intention to enter this arena. The IAI’s inclusion in the PCIR also allows the group to further distance itself from AQI; a group that they assert has no political program and is not interested in adapting in order to fit the evolving environment.
UN and Iran Set Deadline to Clear-Up Nuclear Issues

• (U) IAEA Chief, El Baradei, concluded talks with Tehran, 13 Jan 08:
  – Met with several high-level officials
    • S. Khamenei, President Ahmadi-Nejad
  – Set four-week deadline for addressing outstanding questions
  – Agreed to address all questions with a defined timetable; a first for Tehran
  – Agreed to unlimited inspections of all nuclear facilities

• (U) Key Issues:
  – Uranium enrichment
    • Discovery of weapons-grade enriched uranium
    • Possibility of military applications of nuclear technology

Supporting Traffic

Bullet 1:
20071229 RUETERS; Iraq to Discuss Border Agreement with Iran
20071230 Islamic Republic News Agency; Iran, Iraq Form Committee to Dredge Arvand
20080101 Tehran Iranian Students News Agency; Iran Excepts No Change in Algiers Agreement
ISCI support to ING:

ISCI supporting ING in order to weaken Sadr Movement; ISCI provides direct funding to ING

Used “close links have reportedly emerged between Shahmani and the Badr Org”

Shahmani engaging JAM leaders:

Used “Leader of ING is reportedly seeking to establish contact with Ahmad al-Fartusi, former Basrah JAM Commander and is continuing to seek Office space in Basrah.”
Strategic Impact: This document explains in AQI’s own words the losses the group suffered in Anbar province and organizational weaknesses the group is operating under as a result of Coalition/Iraqi successes and AQI’s own mismanagement of its resources. As a result, although historical (circa Nov info), the document presents significant IO opportunities for MNF-I to exploit, showcasing AQI’s exploitation of both foreign and Iraqi supporters and providing a non-Coalition, non-GoI assessment of AQI’s failings.
(U) 75% of Iraqi reservoirs below 2006-2007 levels (U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Euphrates/Tigris River Watershed Assessment, 1/11/08)

(U) Power production at Hydro power plants 72% lower than maximum capacity (ITAO, IRMO Electric Daily Units Performance Report, 1/15/08 & 1/15/07)

(U) Lack of winter rain impacting agriculture in western and northern Iraq (Iraq Updates, “Minister says drought threatening crops this year”, 12 Jan 08; AFP, “Drought adds to woes of Iraqi farmers”, 8 Jan 08; Iraq Updates, “Drought threatens parts of Iraq Agriculture minister acknowledges parts Nineveh province in grip of drought due to lack of winter rains”, 8 Jan 08)

(U) Spring snow melt may bring relief (U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Euphrates/Tigris River Watershed Assessment, 1/11/08)

Strategic Theme #1: Lowered level of living conditions may increase dissatisfaction with GoI.

Strategic Theme #2: Water conservation and fair distribution of water throughout Iraq may become necessary to alleviate the side effects of water shortages.
JAM Brigade in Financial Troubles

- South Karkh Brigade Commander investigating discrepancies, possible embezzlement
  - Family members of “martyr” JAM members not receiving payments
  - Committee formed to handle payments
  - Members can not provide proof of expenditures
  - Possible change in procedures forthcoming

Assessment: Freeze forbids criminal activities which have been a main source of JAM income. Because exceptions are not authorized at national level, Najaf JAM leaders could reduce funding to JAM groups, such as in Karkh, which do not appear to be adhering to order. Non-compliant groups could increase criminal activity to compensate for lost income.

Sources:

26-08, 112003Z Jan 08, JAM S. Karkh Bde Experiencing Financial Problems

500159, 081902Z Jan 08, Shi’a insurgent Razzaq Abu Ali Takes Responsibility for Matter Previously Handled by Hajji Mahdi; Relieved of Other Responsibilities Pertaining to Funds Distribution
OMS Seeking GOI Concessions

• (U) On 18 January, Salah al-Ubaydi, OMS spokesman announced:
  – Freeze may not be extended, unless GoI constrains ISF activities in southern provinces
  – If Sadr does not extend freeze, JAM still expected to obey the law
  – Renounced JAM membership of criminal elements

• (U) On 14 January, Ubaydi linked freeze extension to prisoner issue and results of an OMS investigation of the security situation in southern provinces

• (U) On 04 January, Ubaydi reiterated freeze and:
  – Condemned ISF arrests of Sadr Trend elements
  – Warned GoI against signing a “pact with US Forces”

(U) 17 January, Ubaydi announces:
AFP, 18JAN08

(U) 14 January, Unidentified Senior Sadrist linked freeze extension to prisoner issue
Addustour Newspaper, 15JAN08

Al Sadr Trend Figure says Al-Mahdi Army Committed to Suspension Decision

Political Developments and Comments

Iraq: Al-Sadr Trend says no Decision Yet to Extend Freezing Al-Mahdi Army
Sources:
• 151808Z Jan 08, 1.4c

• 13 Jan 08, 1.4c

• 13 Jan 08, 1.4c

• Theme: CLCs continue to be an effective force multiplier against AQI as they fill security gaps in their area of operations. Their effectiveness in curtailing AQI’s freedom of movement and operations will persist in drawing attacks from AQI and on a smaller scale, JAM.
Sources:

• Daily Select Propaganda Report, 20 January 2008: “A founder and former leader of the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) is interviewed by al Arabiyah television”
• Daily Select Propaganda Report, 11 January 2008: “An Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) spokesman is interviewed by an American anti-war journalist”
• Daily Select Propaganda Report, 09 January 2008: “The Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) denies all connections to the awakening; declares their intention to fight the US “to the end”

Strategic theme 1: Sunni nationalist insurgent leader affording legitimacy to the ISF, while also stating a CF withdrawal is not in the best interest of Iraq. Such statements pave the way for Sunni resistance members to try to work within the political process to achieve their objectives.

Strategic theme 2: This statement contrasts with recent IAI statements which could possibly signify internal fractures within the organization b/w those who might be willing to try to work within parameters of political process and those who are more militant. This could present opportunities for CF and GoI to further fractionalize the group.
UN Sanctions Against Iran Again on Table

- (U) Six key powers met in Berlin over Iran's nuclear program, 22 Jan
  - Discussed third set of UN resolutions
  - Agreed on content for draft resolution
  - Set to deliver to UN Security Council by end of month

- (U) Recent nuclear-related activity
  - IAEA Chief El Baradei's Tehran visit
  - US NIE on Iranian nuclear program
  - Russian delivery of nuclear fuel

- (U) Key issues:
  - Uranium enrichment
  - Possibility of weaponization

Supporting Traffic

BBC News Internet:
“Iran Sanctions on the Table in Berlin”, 22 Jan 08
“Iran nuclear answers ‘in a month’, 13 Jan 08”
“Russia ignores West’s Iran Fears”, 17 Dec 07

“Diplomatic Efforts in Iran Nuclear Issue Must be Intensified – Chinese FM”, OSC

“Fifth Batch of Russian N-Fuel For Basheh NPS Brought to Iran” OSC,

6 Powers Agree on Draft Iran Sanctions”, 22 Jan 08, Associated Press

“Germany Urges Broadening Iran Sanctions”, 17 Jan 08, Deutsche-Welle
In mid-January 2008, senior Syria-based facilitator for al-Qa‘ida in Iraq informed previously detained Kuwait-based facilitator that he needed him to give money to an unidentified associate to purchase 100 American military uniforms and sent the associate to a specific location to acquire the uniforms and have them transported to Syria.

Knowing the fabric pattern of the material would help ascertain if the American military uniforms, once made, would be used in Iraq or in Lebanon for possible future attacks. Lebanon military currently uses the woodland pattern. ACUs, DCUs, and Marine desert camouflage are currently used in Iraq and can be found in Kuwait.
Ninewa Provincial Director of Police (PDoP) Assassinated

- BG Salih Assassinated
  - Methodology indicates AQI likely responsible
  - Bomber disguised as Iraqi Security Force member detonated on BG Salih's PSD
  - BG Salih surveying 23 January Mosul explosion site
  - BG Salih died of his wounds while enroute to Mosul General Hospital

- MG Riyadh, Ninewa Operations Commander instituted curfew, 24 January

- Terrorists reportedly intend to detonate 4 VBIEDs in Mosul after lifting of the curfew, 25 Jan

Assessment: Impact of BG Salih's death uncertain, as he was commander for only a month. The current security situation will test MG Riyadh in his new command as Ninawa OPS Commander. A concerted ISF/CF effort will be needed to maintain security and avert further violence in the province.

Sources: MNF-N Storyboard

1.4c
Sahwah al-Iraq Political Progression

- SAI Preparing for Elections
  - 50+ Offices throughout Anbar
  - Springboard for National elections
- Offices Reflect Strategic Planning
  - Recruitment and Education
  - Security and stability
  - Training with CF/IP
  - Promote legitimacy
- Potential Opposition to SAI
  - AQI
  - Tribal
  - Political

Assessment: SAI leaders capitalize on stable security situation to create a political party. Local offices promote grassroots image and support by addressing domestic concerns. As SAI grows in prominence opposing groups will likely come forward to discredit or diminish their influence.

Sources:

SAI Preparing for Elections

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

Offices Reflect Strategic Planning

1.4c

Potential Opposition to SAI

1.4c

Additional Sources:

1.4c

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
Non-Compliant Special Groups Call for Action

• Three members issue orders to kill Sahwah
  – Sahwah interfering with JAM activity
  – (b)(6) considered Sahwah spies, wanted them targeted and expelled
  – (b)(6) ordered (b)(6) to commence attacks
  – (b)(6) gave mid-December order to attack Sahwah; involved in January killings of Sahwah members

• Sahwah effectiveness catalyst for attacks as non-compliant Special Groups feel pressure

Assessment: Sahwah activity along with pressure from Sadr to come into freeze compliance and targeting by Coalition Forces, greatly limit freedom of operations. Continued pressure from Sahwah forces supported by CF will further hamper non-compliant Special Group activity in Baghdad.

Shia Insurgents (b)(6) Order Attacks Against Increasingly Effective Sahwa Forces; Sahwa Members Killed at Behest of Muhammad Shakir, Early Jan 2008 500467-08, 171516Z Jan 08

Baghdad Special Groups Commander (b)(6) Modifies Order to Kill Sahwa Leaders, Mid-December 2007, 6753-07, 261540Z Dec 07
Sources:
DefenseLink: Explosions Destroy Minarets at Golden Mosque; U.S. Officials Condemn Attacks, 12 Jun 2007;
Washington Post: Bombing Shatters Mosque in Iraq, 23 Feb 2006;
BBC News: Calm Urged Amid Iraq Shrine Bombs, 13 Jun 2007;
MNCI CACE: Anniversary of the Al-Askari “Golden” Mosque Bombing, 22 Jan 2008;
Sources

1) Daily Select Propaganda Report DSPR - 23 JAN 08 - JARF and the HAMAS-Iraq/JAMI Front announce an 'Iraqi resistance campaign for supporting Gaza'

2) Daily Select Propaganda Report DSPR - 26 JAN 08 - Thirteen Iraqi insurgent groups announce the start of a joint operation in support for their brothers in Gaza and al of Palestine
ING Financial Concerns

- Financial shortfalls are of great concern to ING leaders
- Leadership desire to keep organization free from outside influence
  - Refused funding from outside Iraq
- Senior members believe support base growing in non-Kurdish provinces
  - Seeking Sunni and Christian support
  - Claimed endorsement from 4-party group (ISCI, Da’wa, PUK, KDP)
  - Believed to have attracted some JAM members

Assessment: Financial shortfalls may slow ING political growth, diminishing its ability to weaken Sadr’s support base. While the depth of ING’s funding support is unknown, financial shortfalls may create additional engagement opportunities, providing the capability to influence the ING.

Source:

Financial shortfalls:
1.4c Late-January 2008

Prevent outside influence:
1.4c 21 Jan 08

Growing support for ING:
1.4c 23 Jan 08
Supporting Traffic

Bullet 1:
IAP20080124397005
AFP 28 Jan 08 – Ahmadinezhad to Visit Iraq within Two Months
AFP 28 Jan 08 – Iran Raises Concerns with US About Iraq Talks

Bullet 2:
IAP20080128950142
Potential Shift in Foreign Terrorist Facilitation Routes

- AQ senior leadership receptive to terrorists establishing route into Iraq
  - Facilitation of communications & personnel
  - Effort disrupted by Turkey arrests
- Iraq based AQ facilitators approve new route from
  - New route for FT facilitation into Iraq
  - Possibly hundreds of terrorists available through AQ network

Assessment: AQ is exploring ways to improve AQI facilitation efforts as a result of setbacks in facilitation. Efforts remain in the beginning stages, but could improve foreign terrorist flow into Iraq. Authorities would likely monitor foreign terrorist flow through Iran to Iraq; it is unknown if they would perceive this flow as a threat.

Sources:

1.4c