Daily BUA Intel Slides

Dec 06
Area of Interest Update

- Pro-Syrian Lebanese opposition calls for protests; Pope visits mosque; SVBIED detonates in Somalia
  - Hezbollah and main allies called for peaceful protest and open-ended sit-in beginning today in Beirut
    - Hezbollah statement claimed protests to demand formation of “national unity government”
    - Anti-Syrian leaders voiced concern protests could lead to street violence, complicate current crisis
      - Majority of pro-Syrian opposition is Shi’a
      - Anti-Syrian alliance led by Saad al-Hariri, a Sunni
  - Pope Benedict visited Sultan Ahmet mosque in Istanbul, toured with Istanbul’s Grand Mufti
    - Pope stated “This visit will help us find the means and ways of peace for the good of all humanity”
    - Pope has offered strong endorsement for Turkey EU bid
  - Suicide operative dressed as female detonated SVBIED in Baidoa at police checkpoint
    - Baidoa seat of UN-supported interim government
    - Somali Deputy Defense Minister claimed three total SVBIEDs detonated, three AQ members captured

- Hezbollah will likely mobilize popular base for significant anti-government demonstrations; expect popular counter-movement to develop.

Sources:

Reuters, 30 Nov 06, Lebanon’s Pro-Syrian Opposition Calls for Protests

BBC, 30 Nov 06, Hezbollah Calls for Huge Protests

Reuters, 30 Nov 06, Pope Makes Historic Mosque Visit, Appears to Pray

BBC, 30 Nov 06, Car Bomb Blast Rocks Somali Town
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 30; up 5 from the previous day
  - 4 Shi'a, 1 Sunni, 25 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 41 killed, 8 wounded; down 43 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 29 incidents, 41 killed; down 28 from previous day
  - 19 occurred in Baghdad; 21 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 20; up 3 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 21 killed, 8 wounded; down 1 from previous day
  - 2 Shi'a, 1 Sunni, 17 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - IDF attack in Karkh; 8 wounded

Assessment: IDF attack in Karkh reflects continued activity by Rusafa-based Shia militants. Expect incidents to decrease today in accordance with typical Friday trend.
JAM Update: 1 December

• Recent reporting:
  — Sadrists building alliance among CoR members to demand CF withdrawal
    • Minimum condition for Sadrists to rejoin the IG is ‘a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces’
    • Sadrist CoR member stated some have ‘started contacting us to take a similar position’
      — 28 Nov, 11-member Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue expressed interest in joining Sadrist suspension from CoR
      — September, Sadr presented petition in signed by 104 CoR members demanding CF withdrawal
  — 30 Nov, JAM activity in Samawah
    • 100-150 JAM members attacked Governor’s office, PJCC with SAF, IDF
    • Protesting Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) charges against JAM member
    • IA responded; negotiations underway between OMS, PJCC

Assessment: Sadrists’ intention to build anti-CF alliance implies members intend to return to CoR; suspension by cabinet ministers likely to continue in near term. Sadrists will face strong hurdles in gathering enough support to impact CoR legislation; however, September petition indicates Sadr may have ability to do so. JAM continues to challenge provincial governments and local ISF, attempting to assert dominance and maintain freedom of action.

SOURCES:
Current Situation

- Attacks in Muqadiyeh
  - 30 Nov, IDF attack targeted civilians
    - Rounds impacted house NE of city
    - Resulted in significant casualties
    - 7 casualties required CF emergency evacuation
  - Follows recent IED attack targeting civilians
    - 27 Nov, attack resulted in 5 LN Killed, 25 wounded
      - Cell phone shop attacked with SAF; IED detonated on gathered crowd, likely targeting first responders, bystanders
  - November civilian casualties in Muqadiyeh highest since January
    - Civilian casualties more than double October
    - November represents return to summer civilian casualty level
  - Unit analysis indicates Sunni insurgents likely conducted attacks
- Sunni insurgents targeting civilians, instigating sectarian attacks to leverage pre-existing tribal tensions; part of overall effort to reduce confidence in security forces, local government’s ability to maintain stability, protect the populace.

Notes & Sources:
MND-N INTSUM 081
MNC-I SIGACT
Outlook: T&FF, Insurgent IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI volume up 47 to 142 claims; No HP attack claims; 4 Badr, 17 JAM
  - Dismissed unity calls with Shi'a; called for Sunni to join mujahidin
  - Distributed flyers at Ramadi mosques/schools; warned men not to attend school
  - Posted leaflet denouncing Anbar tribe working with Iraqi Army/Coalition Forces
- AS propaganda up 15 to 50 claims; No HP attack claims
  - Announced additional 17 Sunni policemen left police services
- IAI propaganda up 9 to 45 claims
  - Condemned the arrest warrant against AMS scholar Shaykh Al-Dari
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume down 18 to 28 claims

Sunni Resistance

- Volume down 131 to 28 claims; decrease driven by drop in attack claims
- Al-Dari stated arrest warrant in his best interest; intends to return to Iraq
  - Called on Arab League and United Nations to not recognize IG
- AMS spokesman Muhammad al-Fayid blamed militias for 23 November Sadr City attack

Assessment: Propaganda volume down 84 to 292 claims; decrease driven by drop in Sunni Resistance group activity. Anti-Iraqi Government (IG) themes dominated statements made by Sunni insurgents. Expect continued Sunni insurgent condemnation of IG and Shi'a militias until security issues affecting Sunni neighborhoods are resolved.
The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQISL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI’s anti-Shi’a death squad front.

Shi’a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi’a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi’a enclaves from “Ba’athi Belts” by portraying themselves as Shi’a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi’a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi’a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, combat sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Hezbollah-led rally demands new Lebanese government
  - Approximately 800,000 pro-Syrian protesters rallied in front of government offices, thousands continue indefinite sit-in
  - PM Fouad Siniora vowed to resist “coup attempt”
    - Siniora: “We are determined to stay the course, as our gov’t is legitimate, constitutional...enjoys the confidence of parliament”
    - Spiritual leader of Lebanese Sunnis gave Friday prayers inside prime minister’s office in show of support
  - Lebanese Army deployed armor units in positions around gov’t buildings, Beirut LOCs
    - Hezbollah claimed protests would remain peaceful
  - Hezbollah Deputy Chief stated protests would continue until Siniora’s cabinet falls
    - Vowed not to allow gov’t to continue ruling Lebanon with an “American administration”
    - Stated Hezbollah has “several steps” available if gov’t does not respond to demonstrations
  - Pro-Syrian Christian opposition leader General Michel Aoun stated gov’t not one of nat’l unity, unconstitutional
    - Aoun: “I call on the prime minister and his ministers to resign”

- Hezbollah demonstrated capability to mobilize significant body against government, expect continued pro-Syrian popular protests, sectarian, factional divisions likely to become increasingly manifest.

Sources:

Reuters, 1 Dec 06, Huge Hezbollah-led Rally Demands Lebanon Govt Quit

BBC, 1 Dec 06, Huge Beirut Rally Demands Change

BBC, 1 Dec 06, Lebanese PM Vows to Defy Protests
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 22; down 6 from the previous day
  - 1 Shi'a, 21 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 31 killed; 2 wounded; down 16 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 21 incidents; 31 killed; down 10 from previous day
  - 17 occurred in Baghdad; 26 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 17; down 3 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 26 killed; down 3 from previous day
  - All were unattributed

- Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Incidents higher than typical Friday level; executions remain high of ethno-sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, while high profile incidents continue in Diyala.
Recent reporting:
- Late Nov, confusion within JAM after removal of senior commanders
  - JAM associates in Sadr City believe JAM is suffering serious lack of control, organization
  - Communications, organizational difficulties not confined to Sadr City
  - Problems exacerbated by dismissals of senior Baghdad commanders including General Supervisor for Baghdad, Mustafa al-Bahadi

- 28 Nov, JAM element holds Sheikh of JAM-affiliated mosque hostage in northern Baghdad
  - Sheikh apparently angered JAM unit by not allowing them to store weapons in the mosque

- Amarah JAM elements allegedly to receive training in Iran
  - Prominent JAM figure organizing training camp for 8 personnel
  - Training will consist of IED construction, methods of initiation

Assessment: Extent of re-organization underlines depth of structural issues Sadr perceives within JAM. Detainment of mosque sheikh, possibly by rogue elements, reflects JAM use of intimidation to maintain freedom of action. Southern JAM associates seeking to increase effectiveness, strengthen links to Iranian sponsors after recent Mayspan leadership changes.

SOURCES:
GCHQ(T) 1.4c 30 Nov 06, Confusion in Sadr City following removal of senior JAM commanders
USJ-800 1.4c 1 Dec 06, JAM holds Sheikh hostage
MND(SE) FHT 1.4c 30 Nov 06, JAM to receive training in

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
**SCRIPT:**

**Notes & Sources:**
MNC-I C2 PS WATCH Daily EXSUM 1 Dec 06
CIDN Database Trends Data
MNC-I Counter Sniper Conference Slides 28 Nov 06
Daily Sniper Report, 1 Dec 2006
Outlook: Harith al-Dhari Activity

- Arrest warrant issued for al-Dhari by Iraqi government (IG); IG claims al-Dhari linked to extremists; IG later claimed warrant was for interrogation
  - MUC spokesman Muhammad al-Faydi disputed al-Dhari’s involvement with terrorism, called for IG ‘resignation’
- Al-Dhari countered IG claim; denounced sectarian violence, 23 Nov attack
- Sadr urged al-Dhari to issue fatwa against killing of Shi’a and forbidding Sunni membership in AQI
  - al-Dhari refuted Sadr’s request for fatwa; stated fatwas exist forbidding the killing of all Iraqis; fatwas should not be sectarian based
- Al-Dhari enjoys strong support within Iraq, from foreign leaders; gains support and legitimacy as a senior national representative of Sunnis
  - Adnan Dulaymi, Saleh Mutlaq called for revocation of arrest warrant
  - Iraqi Islamic Party claimed warrant signaled end of reconciliation hopes

Assessment: Al-Dhari denounced 23 November attacks in attempt to distance himself from past statements supporting AQI’s role in the resistance. Sunni elements will continue to perceive public government action against prominent Sunni personalities as sectarian bias, serving to unify Sunni groups in defiance and undermine reconciliation efforts.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi’i extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife force Sunni and Shi’i to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI’s anti-Shi’a death squad front.

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- KSA detains militants; Hezbollah-led protests continue; Russia supports Iran import restrictions
  - Saudi Interior Ministry spokesman announced detention of 139 suspected Islamist militants
    - Stated arrests made over past two months
    - Captured equipment includes suicide attack devices, propaganda allowing attacks against businesses
  - Thousands of Hezbollah supporters remain camped in central Beirut in protest of Siniora government
    - Protesters vowing to stay until Siniora gov’t falls
      - Similar to protests following Hariri assassination in Feb 05 which brought anti-Syrian gov’t to power
      - Siniora insisted his gov’t will not yield to demonstrations
    - Most businesses, banks remain closed within city
    - Egyptian Pres Mubarak warned demonstrations could take sectarian form, transform Lebanon into battlefield
  - Foreign Minister Lavrov announced Russia prepared to support sanctions to restrict Iranian imports
    - Lavrov: “We are not against sanctions aimed at preventing nuclear material and sensitive technology from getting into Iran”
- UNSC likely to begin drafting resolution for Iranian sanctions this week; expect Iranian rhetoric to discourage Russian/Chinese support for sanctions.

Sources:
Reuters, 2 Dec 06, Saudi Detains 139 Suspected Militants: Arabiya

Reuters, 2 Dec 06, Hezbollah-led Protesters Paralyze Central Beirut

BBC, 2 Dec 06, Protesters Set Up Camp in Beirut

Interfax, 1 Dec 06, Russia to Back Iran Sanctions on Sensitive Technologies--Lavrov
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 16; down 6 from the previous day
  - 1 Shia, 15 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 43 killed, 24 wounded; up 16 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 14 incidents, 24 killed; down 7 from previous day
  - 8 occurred in Baghdad; 13 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 10; down 7 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 32 killed, 24 wounded; up 30 from previous day
  - 1 targeted Shia, 9 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - 3 VBIEDS in Rusafa; 18 killed; 24 wounded

Assessment: Sunni extremists attempting to perpetuate ethno-sectarian violence through high profile attacks. Expect Shia death squad retaliations within next 24-48 hours.
SOURCES: Opensource: BBC Monitoring: Iraq Briefing 1600GMT 2 Dec 06, Politics: Sadr bloc to set up anti-occupation group in parliament, JAM commander planning to flee to Syria, 2 Dec06 MND(SE) FHT JAM attack local IPS Update, 30Nov
• VBIEDs in Baghdad
  – 3 coordinated VBIEDs detonated in Rusafa
    • Detonations resulted in extensive casualties
      – Comes nine days after 5 x VBIEDs detonated in, around Sadr City, resulting in significant casualties, post-attack reprisals in Baghdad, Diyala
    • Unit analysis indicates Abu Nur VBIED network responsible for both attacks

  – 2 Dec, OP Armadillo attempted to interdict suspected Abu Nur attack
    • Unit analysis suggests OP possibly forced shift to secondary target, possibly mitigating casualties

  • Baghdad VBIED attacks increasing
    • October, November tied for most VBIEDs detonated in a month
      – October marked by targeting of CF/ISF, likely in response to September statement by AAM, typical Ramadan trend to target CF
      – November characterized by targeting of civilians
    • VBIED attacks outside Baghdad decreased during November

• AQI continues strategy to inflame sectarian violence in Baghdad, focusing attacks on Shi'ia civilians; attack possibly demonstrated capability to rapidly adapt to CF operations. Nationwide decrease combined with sustained high levels in Baghdad, indicate greater nationwide resources devoted to VBIED operations within capital.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources
MNC-I [1.4c]
SPOT OBIZ-DET-B-051-07
CIDNE DATABASE TRENDS DATA
MNF-I BUA SLIDE, 20 NOV 06
Outlook: AQI Targeting Priorities

- AQI increases targeting of civilians in Baghdad
  - Steady increase in high-profile attacks targeting civilians since September
    - HP attacks against civilians rose from monthly average of 40% of total HP attacks in September to 64% in November
    - AQI conducted 56 HP attacks, 9 civilian mass casualty attacks; accounted for 72% of civilian casualties Iraq-wide, up from 60% in Sep
  
- Ramadan (24 Sep – 24 Oct) likely influenced targeting strategy
  - During Ramadan, AQI attempted to create perception of instability by increasing number of attacks; kept civilian casualties low to avoid backlash for attacking Muslims during holy month
  - After Ramadan, AQI no longer constrained, returned to sectarian strategy of inflicting mass civilian casualties
  - Nov casualty rate rose to 19 per HP attack from 7 per HP attack in Oct

Assessment: Expect continued attacks attempting to provoke Shi'a response, stoke sectarian violence. Lower than average HP attacks in other regions may indicate AQI is diverting resources to Baghdad in attempt to maintain current high-profile attack levels, capitalize on current tensions.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

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Area of Interest Update

- Group of 6 nearing Iran resolution; Egypt arrests terror suspects; tensions rise in Lebanon
  - French FM Blazy stated Group of 6 “nearing agreement” on UN resolution for Iran
    - Despite reported differences, group seeking to impose economic, commercial sanctions against Iran
  - Egypt announced arrest of 12 foreign and national terror suspects
    - Group reportedly included American, several Europeans, and Egyptians planning domestic, foreign terror attacks
  - Hezbollah supporter killed following rally in Beirut; Arab League, European intervention underway
    - Shi’a protester shot while returning from Beirut protests through Sunni neighborhood; several others injured
    - Arab League chief Musa, German FM Steinmeier, EU foreign policy chief Solana all making efforts at calm
      - Musa in Lebanon to talk with all sides, "proposing ideas...to formulate framework"; Steinmeier to visit Damascus, push for Syrian recognition of current Lebanese Government
  - Expect proposed sanctions to be diluted based on Chinese, Russian efforts. Violence following Lebanese protests likely to spark further Beirut unrest.

Sources:
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 36; up 10 from the previous day
  - All were unattributed, ethno-sectarian executions
  - Total casualties: 59 killed; down 33 from previous day

- Baghdad incidents: 31; up 11 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 54 killed; down 29 from previous day

- Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Rise in ethno-sectarian executions reflects death squad retaliation for recent high profile attacks. Expect execution levels to remain steady.
**JAM Update**

- Recent reporting:
  - JAM reportedly operating illegal checkpoints on ASR Lincoln between Baghdad, Sa’ab al Bour
    - Members target Sunnis, commercial trucks; allegedly responsible for various IED, SAF attacks against CF
    - IP reportedly transport Sunni victims’ bodies to morgue in Baghdad area
  - Director of OMS, head of JAM in Basrah allegedly tightened security measures at OMS office
    - Efforts to ensure JAM operations security maintained
  - Atmospherics of recent Basrah operations mixed
    - OP ROCKETEER not well-received by local populace, as JAM actively threatening reprisals against anyone selling information to MNF
    - OP SINBAD viewed as worthwhile; LNIs desire expansion
- Sadr Activities:
  - Late November 06, Sadr reportedly despondent about failure to force CF withdrawal

**Assessment:** Basrah JAM tightening security to protect remaining leaders; future operations. Efforts to prevent cooperation with MNF through intimidation ongoing as populace supports reduction of militias. In spite of disappointment, Sadr will continue public/private efforts to discredit MNF, IG, while attempting to bolster Sadrist movement as national solution.

**SOURCES:**

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i), 1.4c

- dr despondent
- Basrah Security, 2 Dec
- Basrah atmospherics, 2 Dec
- checkpoints, 2 Dec
• **VBIED attack in Mosul**
  - Targeted IA General’s convoy
    - Possible assassination attempt on Kurdish General
  - High profile attacks decreased in Mosul, Ninewah in November
    - Likely impeded by security operations
  - November total attacks highest level this year in Mosul
    - Attack surge during second week of month, attack at Governor’s residence
    - Predominantly IED, SAF
      - ISF, CF remain primary target
    - **Overall casualties down from October**
      - Increase for CF, civilians; decrease for ISF
      - Unit reporting indicates continued intimidation, harassment attacks targeting ISF, other government workers; IP maintaining high op tempo in Mosul

• **Attack targeting IA General part of larger T&FF strategy to intimidate security forces, undermine efforts toward stability. Higher overall attack levels, targeting indicate attempt to maintain pressure on IG, demonstrate continued relevance following CF operations in November.**
**CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS**

<table>
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<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Reporting: 25 November to 1 December 06</th>
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| Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making |       | PM Maliki met with US President Bush in Amman on 30 Nov, despite threats from Sadr to pull-out of politics; Maliki warns Shi'a colleagues not to pursue sectarian interests.  
Sadrist in CoR temporarily suspend their participation in IG after PM met with POTUS, talks of forming new alliance with Sunni, Christian parties |   |
| Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces   | down 5% from last week | National Sectarian incidents: 174; down 5% from last week  
National Sectarian casualties: 458; down 52%  
National executions: 305 KIA; down 2%  
Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 132; down 4%  
Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 210; down 72%  
Baghdad executions: 234 KIA; down 25% |   |
| Ethno-sectarian mobilization                                             | up    | Sunni extremists, AQI reportedly placing IEDs, snipers, mortar teams near Adhamiyah  
Notable increase reported in militia activity in Muthanna Province as Iraqi hand over to PIC; JAM elements reportedly migrating from Oades yath to Muthanna |   |
| Population movements                                                     | ↔     | Displaced families: IOM: 40,057 (No Change); MoOS: 55,003 (No change) |   |

**Assessment:** Overall situation remains serious. Despite reduction in ethno-sectarian casualties in Baghdad, national ethno-sectarian violence remains high. PM Maliki's resolve to attend meeting with President Bush and his calls for Shi'a politicians to deny sectarian agenda, demonstrates commitment to nationalism. However, IP involvement in sectarian violence continues to undermine IG credibility.
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SOURCES:

1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

06, Sadr despondent
18026, Basrah Security, 2 Dec
18028, Basrah atmospherics, 2 Dec
Illegal Checkpoints, 2 Dec
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      - Increase for CF, civilians; decrease for ISF
      - Unit reporting indicates continued intimidation, harassment attacks targeting ISF, other government workers; IP maintaining high op temo in Mosul

• **Attack targeting IA General part of larger T&FF strategy to Intimidate security forces, undermine efforts toward stability. Higher overall attack levels, targeting indicate attempt to maintain pressure on IG, demonstrate continued relevance following CF operations in November.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Reporting: 25 November to 1 December 06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making</td>
<td>Down</td>
<td>• PM Maliki met with US President Bush in Amman on 30 Nov, despite threats from Sadr to pull-out of politics; Maliki warns Shi’a colleagues not to pursue sectarian interests</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Sadrist in CoR temporarily suspend their participation in IG after PM met with POTUS, talks of forming new alliance with Sunni, Christian parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unrestricted, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces</td>
<td>Down</td>
<td>• National Sectarian incidents: 174; down 5% from last week</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• National Sectarian casualties: 458; down 52%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• National executions: 305 KIA; down 2%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 132; down 4%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 210; down 72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Baghdad executions: 234 KIA; down 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian mobilization</td>
<td>Up</td>
<td>• Sunni extremists, AQI reportedly placing IEDs, snipers, mortar teams near Adhamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Notable increase reported in militia activity in Muthanna Province; in progress hand over to PIC; JAM elements reportedly migrating from Qadesyah to Muthanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population movements</td>
<td>↔</td>
<td>• Displaced families: IOM: 40,057 (No Change); MoEM: 55,003 (No change)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment:** Overall situation remains serious. Despite reduction in ethno-sectarian casualties in Baghdad, national ethno-sectarian violence remains high. PM Maliki’s resolve to attend meeting with President Bush and his calls for Shi’a politicians to deny sectarian agenda, demonstrates commitment to nationalism. However, IP involvement in sectarian violence continues to undermine IG credibility.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQISL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.

- Shi'a extremat influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d poses the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Russia, China reluctant prior to G5+1 meeting; Saudi Arabia calls for clerics to combat militant ideology
  - G5+1 met in Paris to discuss sanctions resolution
    - Proposed resolution would include freeze of int’l assets, travel ban on nuclear program officials
    - Russia, China continued to indicate reluctance to endorse resolution
      - Russian FM Lavrov: “we believe it is irresponsible to impose these kind of sanctions”
    - Ahmadinejad warned European participants over consequences of sanctions, threatened severed ties:
      - “If you insist on your path against Iran’s right, Iran will count it as enmity... and reconsider its relation to you”
  - Saudi Interior Minister stated clerics must do more to subdue militant ideology
    - Prince Nayef: “All our clerics must act... it is their role to correct the convictions in the minds of youth”
  - Beirut protests continue; police reported street clashes last two nights in Sunni districts
    - Lebanese Army commander warned protests, clashes could spiral into sectarian conflict
- G5+1 unlikely to reach consensus in Paris; Russia, China want resolution viewed as Western initiative, likely intend to portray capitulation due to Western pressure.

Sources:

Reuters, 5 Dec 06, US Pressures Russia Before Iran Sanctions Talks

Reuters, 5 Dec 06, Clerics Should Combat Militant Ideology, Saudi Says

BBC, 5 Dec 06, Beirut Funeral for Shi’a Protester
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

• National ethno-sectarian incidents: 54; up 18 from the previous day
  – 4 targeted Shi'a, 1 Sunni, 49 unattributed
  – Total casualties: 103 killed; 15 wounded; up 48 from previous day

• National ethno-sectarian executions: 49 incidents; 66 killed; up 7 from previous day
  – 38 occurred in Baghdad; 54 killed

• Baghdad incidents: 41; up 10 from previous day
  – Total casualties: 91 killed; 15 wounded; up 31 from previous day
  – 3 targeted Shi'a; 38 unattributed

• Significant incidents:
  – VBIED, SVBIED in Baghdad; 44 killed; 8 wounded

Assessment: Sunni extremists attempted to perpetuate ethno-sectarian violence with high profile attacks throughout Baghdad province. Expect high levels of ethno-sectarian executions to continue along sectarian fault lines in Baghdad.
Sadr Activities:
- Sadrists reportedly consulted Sistani’s office over MNF mandate, Hakim’s Washington trip
  - Sadrists object to PM’s decision to exclude CoR regarding extension of UN mandate, Hakim’s visit to Washington
  - Before voicing criticism, Sadrists wanted to ensure Sistani had not given approval
    - Sistani is reportedly supportive of the PM

Recent reporting:
- Early Dec, JAM leader allegedly ordered Sunnis evacuated, banned from Mahmudiya
  - JAM reportedly forbidding any Sunni to remain 24hrs after the order was issued
- Abu Dura associate planning to acquire significant number of explosive devices from southern Iraq on 2 Dec
  - Intended to seek assistance from senior Sadr aide

Assessment: Sadrists attempting to gauge Sistani’s reaction to recent events; Sistani’s apparent support for PM Maliki’s decision likely a disappointment. Evacuation deadline for Sunnis in Mahmudiya may reflect escalation of JAM campaign to assert control over southern Baghdad LOCs, secure approaches to city, mitigate Sunni threat.

Sources:
Dec 06, Sadr staff clear lines with Sistani’s office over 06, JAM leader orders Sunnis evacuation, banned from
Dec 06, JAM associates plan to acquire 1,000 bombs
HP attacks on civilians in Baghdad
- SVBIED attack against minibus in Adhamiyah
  - Minibus belonged to Shi'a organization
    - Vehicle stopped in kill zone of SAF attack; SVBIED detonated
  - Secondary VBIED detonated in vicinity as casualties were transported out
    - No additional casualties reported
- VBIED attack at gas station in Bayaa
  - Detonation resulted in extensive casualties
    - Secondary VBIED F/C, likely targeting first responders
  - Several incidents noted this year at gas stations
- Since 23 Nov Sadr City attacks, 16 of 18 Baghdad HP incidents targeted civilians
  - Targeting of Shi'a marketplaces, areas to maximize casualties
- Current December high profile casualty rate progressing to meet or exceed previous months
  - Follows 2 record months for total VBIED attacks

AQI continues strategy to inflame sectarian violence in Baghdad, concentrating VBIED resources to inflict maximum Shi'a civilian casualties. Aggressive approach intended to counter perceived JAM expansion, bait Shi'a militias into further escalation of sectarian violence.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:
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CIDNE DATABASE TRENDS DATA
MNF-I BUA SLIDE 061203
Outlook: Comparison of Samawah, Amarah violence

- Recent Samawah and Amarah confrontations emerged out of existing tensions between JAM, Badr-dominated IP
  - October: Amarah JAM assassinated head of Maysan IP Intelligence; Badr responded by kidnapping the brother of JAM leader
  - Samawah: Badr-dominated Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU) targeting JAM; JAM attacked government offices in attempt to gain release of members detained by CIU
- Perceptions of JAM success, Badr weakness in Amarah emboldened JAM to push for more political leverage
  - JAM/OMS extracted concessions from IG representatives, local Amarah leadership; demanded Badr-backed Provincial Director of Police be removed
- Negotiations to end violence strengthened role of local tribes, IA, IG and OMS
  - Tribal leaders served central role in negotiations with government, ISF and OMS
  - IA presence helped contain fighting in both Amarah, Samawah
  - IG-led Maysan Emergency Security Committee prevented resumption of violence; local leaders receptive to direct involvement of IG
  - Samawah tribes reportedly made separate truce with OMS in Najaf, bypassing IG
- Key differences:
  - Political dominance of Sadrist in Maysan allowed OMS to capitalize on JAM perceived success, mitigate negative public reaction to Amarah violence
  - Samawah IP have proven stronger than JAM; unsympathetic SCIRI/Badr provincial leadership may limit concessions to OMS in exchange for cessation of JAM violence

Comments: JAM-initiated violence against IP reflects common JAM tactic to increase perceived authority and gain political advantage. Amarah success may have encouraged more aggressive JAM posture in Samawah and could potentially be used in other provinces such as Dhi Qar. Expect similar conflicts to erupt in provinces where JAM-Badr contest for control.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi’a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi’a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQISL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI’s anti-Shi’a death squad front.

- Shi’a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi’a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi’a enclaves from “Ba’athist Belts” by portraying themselves as Shi’a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Hezbollah vows more pressure; French FM claims progress; Ethiopian troops allegedly in Somalia

- Hezbollah announced plan to escalate anti-gov’t campaign, called for new mass demonstration Sun
  - Hezbollah statement: “We hope that this day [Sun] will be a historic and decisive day in which... a gov’t of national unity replaces the one-sided government”
  - Also instructed followers “to prepare for new methods and forms of peaceful protests”

- French foreign minister declared “substantial progress” after meeting for sanctions against Iran
  - Stated G5+1 unable to reach agreement, outstanding issues remain; negotiations will resume in New York

- Witnesses claim Ethiopian troops active in Somalia
  - Approximately 500 Ethiopian troops reportedly traveled south on main LOC toward Baidoa
    - Allegedly included technicals, heavy weapons
  - Ethiopian Information Ministry denied claim

- Hezbollah likely to incrementally apply pressure, to include deniable acts of violence. Militias backed by opposing regional governments likely to vie for control of southern Somali areas following end of seasonal rains in late December.

Sources:

Reuters, 6 Dec 06, Lebanese Opposition Vows Bigger Push to Topple Govt

BBC, 6 Dec 06, Paris Talks Can’t Reach Iran Deal

Reuters, 6 Dec 06, Ethiopian Troops Moving on Somali Supply Route
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 28; down 26 from the previous day
  - 3 targeted Shi’a; 25 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 58 killed; 38 wounded; down 22 from previous day
- National ethno-sectarian executions: 25 incidents; 37 killed; down 29 from previous day
  - 18 occurred in Baghdad; 28 killed
- Baghdad incidents: 21; down 20 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 46 killed; 34 wounded; down 26 from previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi’a; 20 unattributed
- Significant incidents:
  - IED, Rusafa; 15 killed; 25 wounded
  - VBIED, Sadr City; 3 killed; 8 wounded

Assessment: Ethno-sectarian executions continue along Baghdad fault lines as death squads and Sunni extremists engaged in cyclical violence. Expect violence to remain steady today and decline tomorrow.
JAM Update: 7 December

- Recent reporting:
  - Senior JAM commander, Hasan Salim, reportedly seeking to infiltrate associate into Green Zone security position as of early Dec
    - Salim allegedly believed JAM would benefit from placement of associate
    - Position possibly dangerous for associate, viewed by JAM colleagues as cooperation with CF
  - JAM members reportedly expressed discontent over spammed text message
    - Message claimed JAM responsible for destruction of Sadr City electrical station components
  - 5 Dec, Maysan Emergency Security Committee reportedly maintaining stability in Amarah
    - Limited JAM presence on Amarah streets
    - Key JAM demand: Provincial Director of Police Abu Maythem’s removal—still not resolved

**Assessment:** Hasan Salim’s personal interest in placing associate indicates perception of significant benefit to JAM; infiltration likely intended for reconnaissance, facilitation of operations against CF. JAM concerned text message spam will undermine image as services provider. Amarah JAM will abide by terms of truce as long as it appears ESC will force Abu Maythem’s departure; Maythem expected to eventually leave post.

**SOURCES:**

1.4c JAM commander interested in Associates participation with Security position within Green Zone.

MND(SE) SITREP AS AT 052100CDEC06, Governance
Current Situation

- Sectarian attacks in Baghdad
  - IED outside old MOD building, Rusafa
    - Attack targeted civilians, resulting in significant casualties
  - VBIED in Sadr City
    - Near Thatheen Police Station
    - First VBIED attack in Sadr City since 23 November multiple VBIED event
  - MoD reported Ansar al Sunna targeting Baghdad Universities
    - Students, staff warned to stop attending schools
    - As portraying action to counter death squad members on campus
  - Uncorroborated MOI reporting highlights further incidents
    - Reported explosion destroys minaret of Sunni mosque in Bayaa
    - Mortar attack reported 1 KM NW of IED attack, significant casualties
    - Time, location of incident almost identical to MOD IED attack; probably same event
    - SAF attack against IP general responsible for security at MoHE

- Sectarian reprisal/instigation attacks continue across Baghdad. Sunni extremists endeavoring to foment cycle of violence, discredit JAM as Shi’a protector through Sadr City VBIED, project image as Sunni defender.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

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<th>MNC-I</th>
<th>1.4c</th>
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</table>
Data represents reporting from both FusionNet and CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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Area of Interest Update

- Nasrallah vows not to give up anti-gov’t protests; UN issues Palestinian humanitarian report; UNSC authorizes stability force for Somalia
  - Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, addressed Beirut protest; vowed not to give up anti-gov’t effort
    - Nasrallah addressed several thousand supporters via television broadcast aired on large screens
    - Lebanese army commander directed troops to remain neutral, avoid “current political polarization”
    - Pro-gov’t supporters held rally in north Lebanon
  - UN report indicates Palestinian humanitarian situation dire, appeals for $450 million in aid
    - Report states 2/3 of Palestinians live in poverty; basic services, health care, education deteriorating
    - Unemployment 40% in Gaza, 25% in West Bank
  - UNSC approved resolution authorizing stability force for Somalia, partially lifted arms embargo
    - Resolution aims to protect interim government
    - Union of Islamic Courts expressed anger, referred to proposed deployment as foreign invasion

- Expect large-scale anti-gov’t protest in Beirut Sunday. Deteriorating economic conditions in Gaza will continue to fuel extremism.

Sources:

Reuters, 7 Dec 06, Lebanese Army Chief Urges Troops to Remain Neutral

BBC, 7 Dec 06, UN Appeals for Palestinian Funds

Reuters, 7 Dec 06, Rage and Delight at Somali Peacekeeper Move

BBC, 7 Dec 06, Islamist Warning for Somali Force
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 11; down 17 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 10 unattributed
  - All were ethno-sectarian executions
  - Total casualties: 15 killed; down 81 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 11 incidents, 15 killed; down 22 from previous day

- Baghdad incidents: 9; down 12 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 12 killed; down 68 from previous day
  - All were unattributed

- Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Reduction in ethno-sectarian violence as Sunni extremists, ISIS militants, and ISIL constitute. Expect previous levels to continue after Friday Prayers.
Recent reporting:
- JAM commander Abu Mustafa possibly spreading false information to disguise his plans, location
  1.4b, 1.4d
  - Using differing stories to disguise his position

- Sadrists CoR members claim to have gathered between 110 to 115 MP signatures opposing the extension of CF presence
  - Calling recent UN mandate extension unconstitutional
  - Claimed up to 124 signatories for similar petition in Sep

- Early Dec, Sadr allegedly directed JAM to conduct raids throughout Sadr City
  - Ordered raids on homes connected with terrorists, Sunnis
  - Senior JAM commander Abbas al-Kufi reportedly to be sent to Sadr City from Najaf

Assessment: Abu Mustafa’s disinformation effort reflects increasing concern for OPSEC among JAM leaders. If reported petition numbers reflect actual CoR voting intentions, Sadrists potentially have substantial votes to pass anti-CF legislation or block passage of UN mandate extension. Alleged orders by Sadr, presence of al-Kufi may indicate action to address Sadr City security concerns following 23 Nov VBIED attacks.

SOURCES:
USJ- 6 Dec, JAM commander Abu Mustafa continues JAM activities, maintains disinformation attempts.
USH- 7 DEC 06, Sadr allegedly directs JAM to conduct raids throughout Sadr City, early Dec
IOTF Headlines Snapshot, 7 Dec 06, Radio Dijla POL
Current Situation

- Oil smuggling near Salah ad Din
  - Multiple tankers spotted at pipeline IVO Bayji
    - Unit reporting estimated 28 x 10,000 gal tankers
    - Aviators witnessed personnel from tankers tapping pipeline
    - Pipeline thought to be shutdown
  - Open source reporting indicates corruption within Ministry of Oil
    - Minister of Oil Shahristani presented evidence of Bayji refinery employees selling petroleum to insurgent groups
    - Ministry has announced plan to combat corruption
  - Recent incidents threaten to cause production shortfall
    - 27 Nov Explosion at Kirkuk Oil Processing Plant damaged pipelines
    - Potential for shortages of gasoline, kerosene supplies during winter months

- Theft, smuggling of oil feeding perception of IG inability to maintain critical capabilities and deliver essential services. Use of black market oil for personal gain, insurgent funding likely to exacerbate public discontent with IG as winter months progress.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:
Sir, in today’s Outlook we examine Terrorist and Sunni insurgent IO themes. Overall, media volume is up 70% this week, the increase attributable to amplified attack claims made by Al Qai’da in Iraq’s concept of an Islamic state, the Islamic State of Iraq.

Notable AQI assertions included statements taking credit for the alleged downing of 6 US aircraft northwest of Baghdad on 27 November, and the supposed addition of two previously unknown extremist groups under the ISI banner.

Ansar al Sunna posted two statements and a video on 4 & 5 December targeting Sunni professors and students at Baghdad universities. In the first statement, Ansar al Sunna offered to rescue Sunni students and professors from death squads and militias. Later that day, a web-posted video called on Sunni students and professors to suspend all academic activities for the 2006-2007 school year. Finally, on 5 December, Ansar al Sunna posted a final warning to all universities in Baghdad to cancel all classes for the 2006-2007 academic year and advised Sunni professors and students to beware of Shiite militias and “government death squads” trying to kidnap and kill them.

Sunni Resistance claims were highlighted by the apparent re-emergence of so-called Saddam Fedayeen. A group identifying itself as Saddam’s Fedayeen Troops posted a statement renewing allegiance to Saddam Hussein, promising defeat for
Coalition Forces, and promising the demise of the Prime Minister. The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party blamed the US and Iran for Iraq’s status in a statement posted on a jihadist website, calling the current conflict a diversion from the “Iraqi armed revolution” that will not prevent the downfall of the US and Iran.

*Extremists emphasized themes of operational viability while Resistance groups laid IO groundwork for eventual departure of Coalition Forces through the communication of anti-Iranian themes.*
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Area of Interest Update

- Lebanese PM accuses LH of coup plot; Haniyah vows to keep fighting; Islamists report “heavy fighting” in Somalia
  - Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora accused Hezbollah leader Nasrallah of plotting coup
    - Claimed Nasrallah’s announced plan to form interim administration amounts to coup plot vs. 14 March gov’t
    - Nasrallah stated opposition open to negotiations; continues to insist on veto-wielding share of power
  - Hamas Prime Minister Haniyah in Tehran, vowed to keep fighting thanks in part to Iranian support
    - Haniyah stated Hamas would never recognize Israel, would continue resistance until Jerusalem liberated
      - Thanked Iran for providing “strategic depth”
    - Iran reportedly sent $120 million to Hamas government to offset Western financial sanctions
  - Somali Islamist leader stated interim gov’t fighters supported by Ethiopians attacked Islamist positions
    - Engagement purportedly occurred 110 km southwest of Baidoa; first reported direct contact with Ethiopians

- Hezbollah’s stated openness to negotiate may indicate willingness to accept compromise with 14 March coalition gov’t; worsening sectarian dimension likely to complicate political solution.

Sources:

BBC, 8 Dec 06, Hezbollah Chief ‘Plotting Coup’

Reuters, 8 Dec 06, Palestinian PM in Tehran Nods to Iranian Support

BBC, 8 Dec 06, ‘Heavy Fighting’ in Somali Town
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

• National ethno-sectarian incidents: 27; up 16 from the previous day
  – 1 targeted Shi'a, 26 unattributed
  – All were ethno-sectarian executions
  – Total casualties: 34 killed; up 19 from previous day

• Baghdad incidents: 22; up 13 from previous day
  – Total casualties: 29 killed; up 17 from previous day
  – 1 targeted Shi'a, 21 unattributed

• Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Shi'a death squads continue ethno-sectarian executions, particularly in Diwira. Expect Sunni extremists to agitate ethno-sectarian violence with high profile attacks.
JAM Update: 9 December

Recent reporting:
- Sadrists spokesman threatened attacks against Basrah Governorate buildings if detainees captured in 8 Dec CF raid were not released
  - Detainees are members of spokesman’s tribe, likely JAM affiliated
- Additional reports of Basrah JAM attack plans
  - 9 Dec, JAM elements allegedly planning large explosive attack
    - Probably in response to raid by CF forces
- 6 Dec, JAM members reportedly attended staged funeral for Abu Dura
  - Abu Dura originally rumored to have died in Samarra
  - Follows JAM commander Abu Mustafa’s recent disinformation effort on his whereabouts

Assessment: JAM likely to conduct attacks in response to detainments in Basrah. Protests at government buildings staged to coerce release of arrested members, although publicly issued ultimatum unusual for Sadrist spokesman. Abu Dura’s “funeral” likely JAM manipulating rumor to alleviate pressure from CF operations; expect continued attempts at disinformation regarding senior leadership.

SOURCES:
USJ 1.4c 8 Dec, JAM attend fictitious funeral for Abu Dura to mislead CF
GCHQ(T) 1.4c 8 DEC 06, JAM planning large explosive attack, likely to occur in Basrah
Open Source: Al-Sharqiyah: 32 Iraqis killed in US bombardment of Al-Ishaqi; Other Developments
Outlook: Atiyah Likely to Return to Pakistan

- Al-Qaida Senior Leadership (AQSL) Emissary Atiyah likely to return to Pakistan rather than continue efforts to travel to Iraq
  - Atiyah has been in Iran since Feb 06
    - Making arrangements for movement back into Pakistan; tried several times to cross into Iraq
    - Sending envoy “Yusuf the Mauritanian” on fact-finding mission to Iraq

- Directly affects planned AQI, Ansar al-Sunna (AS) merger
  - Atiyah tasked by UBL to unite jihadist factions in Iraq
  - Atiyah was uniquely qualified due to his religious credentials, ties to AS

- AQSL’s failure to send Atiyah, other senior AQ commanders to Iraq making AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri (AAM) feel isolated, under pressure
  - AAM sought to share leadership responsibilities, bring AQI’s agenda closer to that of AQSL
  - AQSL desired more influence over Iraq jihad

Assessment: Rather than sharing leadership duties with others, AAM must take on additional responsibilities, while AQI-AS merger remains improbable. High workload, absence of senior AQ commanders may force AAM to promote Iraqi leaders to lessen growing divide between foreign, Iraqi fighters.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

- Sunni Reactionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated. Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Abbas plans new elections; Lebanese Pres blocks Hariri tribunal; Iran sets condition for bilateral talks
  - Palestinian officials stated President Abbas planning to discontinue unity talks, call early elections
    - Abbas planning official announcement this week
      - Abbas: “I am not closing the door on dialogue, but will personally not take part in it. I have done my part and I see no choice but to go back to the people.”
    - New elections will reportedly include Pres, Parliament
    - Unity talks broke down over Hamas demand to maintain control of key ministries: Finance, Interior
    - Hamas spokesman challenged Abbas’s authority to call parliamentary elections:
      - “We will not allow any coup against this government.”
    - Pro-Syrian Lebanese President formally rejected cabinet proposal for Hariri tribunal
      - Claimed cabinet had lost its legitimacy, unconstitutional
      - PM Siniora expected to seek parliamentary approval
    - FM Mottaki stated Iran will not hold bilateral talks with US unless timetable announced for withdrawal
  - **Prolonged Abbas announcement likely brinkmanship tactics; Hamas will seek to prevent elections by offering minimum perceived necessary for unity deal, increasing rhetoric to challenge Abbas’s constitutional authority.**

Sources:

Reuters, 9 Dec 06, Abbas Weighs Poll After Talks Fail

BBC, 9 Dec 06, Lebanese Leader Blocks UN Court

Reuters, 9 Dec 06, Iran Sets Conditions for Talks With US on Iraq
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 17; down 10 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 16 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 25 killed; 44 wounded; up 35 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 16 incidents; 20 killed; down 14 from previous day
  - 15 occurred in Baghdad; 19 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 15; down 7 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 19 killed; down 10 from previous day
  - All were unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - VBIED in Karbala; 5 killed, 44 wounded

Assessment: Dora remains focus area for sectarian violence, while Sunni extremists attempt to strike Shi'a religious symbols in Baghdad, Karbala. Expect increased incident levels to resume today.
JAM Update: 10 December

- Recent reporting:
  - Early Dec, JAM commander confused about command structure in Al Mashtal area, Baghdad
    - Commander suggested JAM suffering lack of organization
    - Similar confusion reported about Sadr City JAM
  - JAM commander Abu Dura reportedly in Iran
    - Dure with family, receiving aid from unknown source
    - Follows reports JAM staged his funeral last week
  - Samawah JAM keeping ceasefire terms made with IP, IG
    - No militia are to be on the streets
    - JAM agreed to Samawah IP control
    - Government authorities will address problems
  - Local population in Samawah reportedly would rather see IP, IA resolve security issues than CF
    - Believes this would result in less bloodshed
    - Most locals did not support 30 Nov JAM attack

Assessment: Confusion among JAM commanders may reflect impact of Sadr’s recent reported purges, shifting of commanders. Reports of Abu Dura in Iran supports earlier details of disinformation JAM to mislead CF/ISF. JAM acquiescence to ceasefire terms reflects IG and Samawah tribal leaders’ effectiveness in negotiations, probable pressure from Najaf OMS leadership.

SOURCES:

USJ 1.4c 8 Dec, JAM commander confused about command structure

USJ 1.4c 9 DEC 06, Rogue JAM commander Abu Dura Alive and Well

MND(SE) 1.4c 7 Dec, JAM/IPS/IA agreements from ceasefire meeting

MND(SE) 1.4c 7 Dec, Samaawa/Khidr/Nasiriyah- General Atmospherics
Current Situation

• High profile attack in Karbala
  – SVBIED detonated near Imam al-Abbas shrine
    • IPs reported finding handcuff on steering wheel
    – Attack likely targeted civilians; significant casualties reported
    • Imam al-Abbas shrine is one of the holiest in Shi’a Islam
      – Important point during annual Ashura, Arba’een commemorations
  – First attack near key Shi’a holy sites since July
    • 18 Jul, SVBIED detonated across street from Kufah Mosque in Najaf
      – Upset crowds threw rocks at responding ISF
      – Kufa mosque a common location for Muqtada al Sadr to preach; associated with JAM/OMS
    • 6 Jul, SVBIED targeted Iranian Shi’a tourists to Kufah Mosque
  – No attack claims; targeting, methodology indicate AQI

• Following relatively subdued Shi’a militant response to last month’s Sadr City bombings, AQI continues efforts to intensify strife, ignite cycle of retaliatory violence by targeting iconic Shi’a holy sites, civilians.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

MNC-I

1.4c

1.4c

MNF-I BUA slides

1.4c
Recent reporting indicates external funding sources to resistance groups active in support of insurg ops against CF/isf

Resistance groups also maintain ability to sustain ops through robust funding streams from criminal activities, including oil theft, black market sales, kidnapping, etc.

Activity on part of funding networks in ERV indicates regenerative nature of these cells. External sources nice, but not necessary
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable reliability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence, 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Hundreds of thousands rally in Beirut; Israeli officials claim AQ threat; Haniyah predicts violence
  - Hezbollah demonstrated significant opposition show of force with largest anti-government rally to date
    - Crowd estimates ranged from hundreds of thousands to two million (population approx. 4 million)
    - Hezbollah deputy chief stated: "I tell you that after the (Israeli) aggression... there is no place for America in Lebanon"
    - Tens of thousands of pro-government supporters staged rally in northern Sunni city of Tripoli
  - Israeli government officials announced Al Qa’ida has established presence in southern Lebanon
    - Stated AQ actively recruiting in Palestinian refugee camps within southern Lebanon
    - Claimed AQ intends to attack UN peacekeepers
  - Hamas PM Haniyah predicted early elections would lead to violence during Iranian trip
    - Haniyah: "The proposal... about holding early elections is the start of the creation of disorder in Palestine"

- Hezbollah’s increased popular mobilization will sharpen sectarian divisions; AQ likely seeking to capitalize on Western targets, opportunity to foment sectarian strife in Lebanon.

Sources:

Reuters, 10 Dec 06, Beirut Rally Piles Pressure on US-backed Govt

Reuters, 10 Dec 06, Israel Sees al Qaeda Hitting Lebanon Peacekeepers

Reuters, 10 Dec 06, Palestinian PM Says Elections Would Lead to Unrest
JAM Update

• Recent reporting:
  – 10 Dec, Sadr reportedly issues statement
    • Called all Iraqis to demand MNF withdrawal
      – Urging a united voice: “Occupier, get out of my country, we do not need you”
  – Sadrist spokesman justifies JAM violence in Italian media interview
    • “We are protecting our people from Al-Qa’ida, car bombs, Ba’thists, Americans”
    • “JAM must be institutionalized to work for all Iraqis”
  – 10 Dec, JAM elements encourage colleagues to assist in retaliation for capture of commander, Abu Mustafa
    • Abu Mustafa reportedly captured on 9 Dec
  – Basrah JAM company commander allegedly ordered platoon leaders to collect names, addresses of Sunnis for assassination
    • Members reportedly instructed to attack in a ‘deniable manner’

Assessment: Sadr continues effort to build popular support towards CE withdrawal. Sadrists attempting to legitimize militant JAM actions as necessary to protect Shi’a. Institutionalization comment indicates desire to integrate JAM into mainstream security forces. Basrah company commander’s order to assassinate Sunnis reflects localized attempts to instigate sectarian violence.

SOURCES:
Open Source: Multinational Force TV, Radio, Web roundup for 10Dec06: Radio Dijla, Sadr Call
Open Source: Sadr City spokesman Defends al-mahdi army’s actions
USJ 06, 10 Dec, JAM members Encourage colleagues to take up arms in retaliation for capture of commander Abu Mustafa, 10 Dec
MND(SE)J2 INTSUM 0 Nov-4Dec
Current Situation

- Security concerns at Bayji energy facilities
  - Bayji Power Plant shut down all units due to lack of manpower
    - Employees did not report for work; security issues noted
      - Area of operation will see 40% reduction in electricity
  - 9 Dec, Bayji Refinery ceased production due to intimidation of tanker truck drivers
    - Drivers threatened by cell phone that they would be attacked and killed on the road if they attempted to transport oil from plant
    - Refinery cannot ship heavy fuel oil; storage capacity currently full
    - Provinces of Irbil, Dahuk, Sulaymaniya, and Kirkuk will face shortage of benzene and kerosene within days
  - CF operations continue in nearby Sinya
  - Ongoing issues at Bayji facilities
    - Extremist, Resistance theft and black market sale of petroleum products
    - Infrastructure damage due to weather, sabotage
- AQI, Sunni Resistance groups likely behind intimidation in Bayji; attempting to counter CF operations by exacerbating public discontent with essential services over a larger region, diminish public support for the IG. Groups will capitalize on subsequent black market sales for funding.

Notes & Sources:
MNC-I Storyboard 1.4c BAYJI POWER PLANT SHUTDOWN
MNC-I 1.4c
MNC-I 1730 BUA, 1.4c
MNC-I Intelligence Summary, 10 Dec 06
Outlook: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- National Incidents: 198; up 14% from previous week
  - 61 targeted Shi'a, 48 Sunni, and 89 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 373 killed, 108 injured; up 5% from previous week

- National Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 185 incidents, 267 killed; down 12% from previous week
  - Ethno-Sectarian Executions accounted for 56% of total casualties, 72% of deaths
  - Daily average of 26; elevated from pre-Golden Mosque baseline of 3

- Baghdad Incidents: 154; up 17% from previous week
  - 65 targeted Shi'a, 47 Sunni, 42 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 316 killed, 104 injured; up 98% from previous week

- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 144 incidents, 213 killed; up 20% from previous week

Assessment: Significant increase in Baghdad casualties due to Sunni extremist high profile attacks. Overall casualties, incidents increased slightly. Expect incidents to remain steady for the next week.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shia to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and armed influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraq government failure to eliminate death squads, exclude sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue [1.4b, 1.4d] pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
**Area of Interest Update**

- **Assassination in Gaza; Arab League working deal in Beirut; Russia ups nuclear support to Iran**
  - 3 school-aged children of top Fatah intelligence officer killed en-route to school in Gaza
    - Boys were children of Baha Balousheh, who led crackdown against Hamas militants during 1990s
    - Incident follows Sunday’s attack against Hamas-affiliated Interior Minister’s convoy
  - Arab League envoy attempting to broker unity government in Beirut
    - No final agreement, although Syrian support announced
  - Russian Atomic Energy chief Kiriyenko announced support for Iranian nuclear program while in Tehran
    - Stated Iran’s ‘inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear activities’
    - Stated Russia’s intent to accelerate efforts to ensure November 2008 commission of Bushehr Reactor
    - Also announced joint energy endeavors, commercial aircraft sales, Caspian seaport development, and planned launch of joint satellite in 2009

- **Gaza assassination will increase tensions, tit-for-tot violence between Fatah, Hamas. Russian nuclear support to Iran will further split G5+1 sanction efforts.**

**Sources:**

- BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”
- BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”
- OSC IAP 1.4c kiriyenko stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
National ethno-sectarian incidents: 39; up 10 from the previous day
- 2 targeted Shi'a, 37 unattributed
- Total casualties: 54 killed; up 22 from previous day

National ethno-sectarian executions: 36 incidents; 51 killed; up 14 from previous day
- 33 occurred in Baghdad; 48 killed

Baghdad incidents: 36; up 13 from previous day
- Total casualties: 51 killed; up 12 from previous day
- 2 targeted Shi'a, 34 unattributed

Significant incidents:
- 23 hostages rescued in Mansour

Assessment: Western Baghdad remains the focus for ethno-sectarian executions as Shi'a Militants vie for control in mixed areas. Expect incidents to remain steady.
JAM Update

• Recent reporting:
  – Sadr reportedly issued statement on Iraq Study Group
    • ‘Iraq Study Group report will end, divide Iraq’
    • Renewed his call for CF withdrawal timetable
    • CoR Sadrist adopt ‘neutral stance’ and say report is a ‘political game’
  – Sadr’s CoR member responds to effort for moderate bloc in parliament
    • ‘Iraq doesn’t need new maneuverings in parliament. We will stand with anyone who shares our position on demanding CF to leave Iraq’
  – Supporters held demonstrations to protest CF raid against OMS office in Kut
    • Demonstrators calling on CF to release OMS director

Assessment: Sadr exploiting release of ISG report to sustain message insisting on timetable for CF withdrawal. Public statement by Sadrist CoR member indicates growing concern regarding formation of moderate political bloc and its potential impact on OMS/JAM. Expect retaliatory JAM attacks, including IDF and increased IED/EFP activity in Wasit following OMS member’s arrest.

SOURCES:
Open Source: Iraq: MNF Newspaper Roundup for 11Dec
IOTF News Summary 11 Dec
Open Source: Iraq: MNF TV, RADIO, WEB Roundup for 11Dec
Current Situation

- Attacks on ISF IVO Mosul
  - 11 Dec, multiple incidents targeting IPs
    - Complex attack on escort for Mayor of al Hadir, including SAF, RPG fire; IED later found in vicinity
    - 9 IP casualties; Mayor unharmed
    - IPs attacked upon arriving at scene of 2 x IED in Mosul
      - Reportedly sustained mortar, RPG, and SAF; no IP casualties
      - Similar techniques used before to target responding ISF
    - Mosul IP reportedly victim of ESM, car stolen
  - HP attacks targeting IP continue this month
    - 3 Dec, VBIED at IP station
    - 4 Dec, VBIED attack on Kurdish general's convoy
    - 9 Dec, SVBIED, PSAF attack on IA
  - ISF/CF operations continue to target terrorist, insurgent operations and networks in Mosul
  - T&FF continue attacks against IP/IA as part of ongoing intimidation efforts; attempting to maintain freedom of operation in Mosul. Expect high profile, complex attacks to continue as extremists endeavor to counter ISF/CF operations.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:
MNCI SIGACTS
## CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Reporting: 2 – 8 December 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>• National Security Advisor Dr. Rubbaie stated “Only way to destroy sectarian violence and terrorism is by supporting our armed forces”&lt;br&gt;• Vice President Abdel al-Mahdi says Hakim’s visit to US not sectarian based, but representative of all Iraqis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>• National Sectarian incidents: 168; up 14% from last week&lt;br&gt;• National Sectarian casualties: 481; up 5%&lt;br&gt;• National executions: 257 KIA; down 12%&lt;br&gt;• Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 154; up 17%&lt;br&gt;• Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 420; up 98%&lt;br&gt;• Baghdad executions: 213 KIA; up 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian mobilization</td>
<td>↔</td>
<td>• 3 Dec, Italian newspaper interview, Sadr stated: “We will launch a jihad against the Americans unless they immediately transfer all power over security to the Iraqis in January” (Jan 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population movements</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>• Displaced families: IOM: 40,896 (Up 835); MoD: 55,031 (no change); primarily reflects changes in Diyala, Salah ad Dijn Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessment:
Overall situation remains serious. Ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad returned to heightened levels following week of reductions due to curfews. NSA Dr. Rubbaie and VP al-Mahdi statements against ethno-sectarian violence designed to counter dependence on local armed groups for security. Sadr’s call for jihad unlikely to mobilize general Shi’a population; however, it would escalate level of IAM attacks against CT, as well as Sunnis.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife force Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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| 1.4b, 1.4d |

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Area of Interest Update

- Palestinian judge murdered, PM Haniyah cuts travel short; nations react to Iranian conference
  - Judge dragged from taxi outside courthouse, executed by gunmen in Gaza
    - Judge also served as local Hamas military commander
  - 2nd judge murdered in same area in a week; follows murder of Fatah intelligence officer’s children
  - PM Haniyah announced he would cut travel short following news of judge’s assassination
    - PM visiting Khartoum as part of month-long tour of Arab/Muslim nations
    - Claimed current violence ‘alien to the Palestinians’
    - Publicized Sudanese aid of $10m to Palestinians
      - $250m aid reportedly pledged by Iran earlier this week
  - France, Russia officially condemned Iranian Holocaust conference
    - French FM Blazy stated intention to prosecute French academic who spoke at conference
    - Russian FM objected to ‘distortion of historical events, suppression of the truth’

- *Factional violence in Gaza endangering unity gov’t efforts, while Haniyah attempts to secure alternate funding to maintain core Hamas principals, bolster leverage in future negotiations.*

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IAP 1.4c “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 47; up 27 from the previous day
  - 2 targeted Shi'as; 45 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 86 killed; 13 wounded; down 195 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 45 incidents; 82 killed; up 59 from previous day
  - 36 occurred in Baghdad; 61 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 38; up 21 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 65 killed, 11 wounded; down 244 from previous day
  - 2 targeted Shi'as; 36 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - VBIEDs against Kamalia Mosque, civilians in New Baghdad; 4 killed, 11 wounded

Assessment: Rise in ethno-sectarian executions due to Shia death squad retaliation of previous day’s high profile attack. Expect current levels to remain steady until Friday prayers.
JAM Update: 14 December

• Recent reporting:
  – Sadr reportedly removed Qays al-Khazali and Akram al-Kabi from JAM leadership positions
    • Khazali and Kabi believed to be involved in leading attacks against CF
      – Sadr created committee to oversee activities instead
  – Sadrist spokesman denies JAM’s role in sectarian killings in TV interview
    • JAM not a militia: Ba’thists, Americans, Al-Qa’ida, ‘force us to carry up arms to defend ourselves’
    • ‘We have not, will not kill Iraqis; Dirty Squads are under control of the Americans’
    • ‘Americans are directly responsible for what is happening in Iraq’

Assessment: Sadr frustrated by performance of Kabi, Khazali, as well as their independence; removal would reflect Sadr’s desire to better control anti-CF activities, sideline potential rivals. Sadrists attempting to legitimize militant JAM actions as necessary to protect Shi’a, build popular support for CF withdrawal.

SOURCES:

GCHQ 1.4c 6, 13 Dec, Sadr replaces Qays al-Khaz‘ali
DIRNS 1.4c 12 DEC 06, Iran pressures Sadr
G 1.4c Sadr movement official denies JAM role in sectarian killing
Current Situation

- High profile attacks in Baghdad
  - 2 separate VBIED attacks targeted mosque, civilians in New Baghdad
    - VBIED targeted Kamalia (Shi'a) Mosque
      - Mosque reportedly JAM-affiliated
    - 2 x VBIEDs detonated against Shi'a civilians
      - IPs quoted in open sources saying attack targeted day laborers
  - Targeting similarities between yesterday’s events, Tuesday’s SVBIED attack in Rusafa
    - Incident targeted civilians at day laborers’ gathering point
  - No attack claims; targeting, methodology implicates AQI

- AQI continues efforts against Shi'a gatherings, mosques, utilizing high profile attacks to maximize casualties and escalate sectarian cycle of violence.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:
Data represents reporting from both FusionNet and CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

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Area of Interest Update

• Palestinian PM denied entry to Gaza; Fadlallah weighs in on unity government
  – PM Haniyah halted on Egyptian side of border while returning from fundraising trip
    • Rafah border terminal closed to prevent PM from bringing estimated $35 million into Gaza
    – Haniyah accumulated money and pledges for more during recent travels to Sudan, Iran
  – PM’s entry will be permitted without cash; money likely to be transferred to Arab League account
  – Israeli officials assert money would be used to fund militant activities
  – Hamas militants seized terminal in protest
  – Lebanese Hezbollah spiritual leader Sheikh Fadlallah urged Palestinians to cease violence, unite
    • Fadlallah urged factions to stop threatening Palestinian cause
    – Encouraged inter-factional dialogue to prevent national goals based on “US and Israeli...viewpoints”

• Increasing factional discord threatening to destabilize Gaza. Seizure of funds will further hinder Hamas operations in near term.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IA 1.4c “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

• National ethno-sectarian incidents: 36; down 11 from the previous day
  – All were ethno-sectarian executions
  – 2 targeted Sunni; 34 unattributed
  – Total casualties: 49 killed; 1 wounded; down 79 from previous day

• Baghdad incidents: 35; down 3 from previous day
  – Total casualties: 49 killed; down 57 from previous day
  – 1 targeted Sunni; 34 unattributed

• Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Retaliatory executions continue in mixed areas of Baghdad as ethno-sectarian violence remains steady. Expect decreased levels to occur as Friday Prayers commence.
JAM Update: 15 December

Recent reporting:

— Sadr, Fadilah parties reportedly agreed to work together
  • JAM seeking profit from Fadilah oil smuggling
  • Fadilah hopes alliance will rebuild their image following government discovery of their smuggling activities

— JAM reportedly conducting night training in Amarah
  • Conducted in schools every night except Friday
  – Schools run normally during daytime
  • Different locations used by each JAM unit specializing in different weapon system
  • Previous reports of JAM restructuring into units specializing in weapon system

Assessment: Despite antagonism between OMS and Fadilah, Sadrist-led Fadilah is likely seeking an interim political alliance to counter emerging SCIRI/Badr-led moderate political bloc. JAM seeking to leverage Fadilah oil connections to secure additional funding source. Amarah JAM elements seeking to increase effectiveness of restructured units by conducting specialized weapons training for operations against rival Shi'a factions.

SOURCES:
MND(SE) 13 Dec, JAM night training
(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) 13 Dec, two militias agree to work together
SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:
OUTLOOK: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)
- ISI/AQI volume down 298 to 175 claims; 3 VBIED, 8 Badr, and 16 JAM
  - Condemned Iraq Study Group report; compared ‘Baker-Hamilton’ to Sykes-Picot Agreement; condemned other Muslims by calling them insincere in their cause
  - Urged AS, IAI, MA to join ISI; threatened “Tears of blood” for not joining
  - Claimed shootdown of US plane on 17 Nov; UAV on 16 Nov in Baghdad area
- AS propaganda up 35 to 84 claims; 2 Badr, 9 JAM
  - Statements and fliers asking for school closures in Baghdad, support of campaign
  - Claimed to have shot down a UAV near Al-Latifiyah on 21 Nov
- IAI propaganda down 17 to 61
  - Claimed to shoot down a US cargo plane near Samarra on 26 Nov
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up 19 to 68
  - MA claimed to have taken control of and captured a UAV near Fallujah on 1 Dec
  - Posted video of interrogation blaming SCIRI and Badr for Nov 23 Sadr City bombings

Sunni Resistance
- Volume up 5 to 63 claims, mostly attacks
- Released 15th “Echo of the Two Rivers”, a compilation of insurgent operations

Assessment: Propaganda volume down 264 to 451 claims. Decrease driven by drop in ISI attack claims. Continued emphasis on downed US aircraft and the Iraq Study Group report. AS attempting to gain popular support through messages at universities. Expect ISI to continue to call for unity of groups under their banner.
The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/separate sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQIS on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.

Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from under 1.4b, 1.4d. pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Clashes in Palestine: Iran holds nationwide elections; aborted Somalia peace talks
  - Hamas militants, supporters clashed with Fatah-allied police in Gaza, West Bank
    - Violence erupted following incident at Rafah border crossing Thursday
    - Fatah police reportedly exchanged fire with Haniyah's PSD while entering terminal, sparking Friday's violence
  - Iran held nationwide vote for local councils, Assembly of Experts
    - Polling hours extended due to reported "massive" voter turnout
    - 46 million eligible voters chose among 250,000 candidates for 100,000 local council seats; results due today or tomorrow
  - Somali President Yusuf rules out peace talks with Islamist rebels
    - Stated Islamist support for Al Qaeda conflicts with peace efforts
    - Islamists threatened holy war by Tuesday if Ethiopian 'advisors' assisting government do not withdraw

- Factional violence in Palestine continues; situation likely to deteriorate further as PM Haniyah, emboldened by recent fundraising, maintains anti-Israel stance.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IA "Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities"
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

• National ethno-sectarian incidents: 36; same as the previous day
  – All were unattributed
  – Total casualties: 75 killed; 2 wounded; up 27 from previous day

• National ethno-sectarian executions: 35 incidents; 75 killed; up 26 from previous day
  – 25 occurred in Baghdad; 61 killed

• Baghdad incidents: 26; down 9 from previous day
  – Total casualties: 52 killed; 2 wounded; up 15 from previous day
  – All were unattributed

• Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Sectarian incidents remained steady during reporting period, although elevated above Friday norm. Expect high profile attacks as extremists strive to perpetuate sectarian violence.
JAM Update

• Recent reporting:
  — CoR Sadrists reportedly compiling list of demands
    • Allegedly includes closure of US/UK embassies, timetable for CF withdrawal, vote of no-confidence in government, adherence to de-Ba’athification law
    • May be pre-conditions for return to CoR
  — Amarah Emergency Committee for Security Affairs (ECSA), IPS reportedly sent PDoP Abu Maythem on leave for one month
    • Maythem allegedly stole a large sum of money from IP before he left; ECSA investigating
  — Samawah situation
    • Criminal Intelligence Unit reportedly arrested 45 JAM members earlier in Dec
    • Higher JAM leaders in Samawah reportedly in hiding
    • 8 Dec, CoP refused offer from JAM leader to provide security assistance

Assessment: Alleged Sadrist demands would represent next step for self-suspended CoR members. Abu Maythem’s leave of absence as PDoP may be permanent; would resolve primary JAM demand to maintain Amarah ceasefire. Samawah police enforcement of ceasefire agreement disrupting JAM operations; forcing JAM to explore other options to counter IP persistence.

Sources:
FM GCHQ(T) 15 Dec, Sadrists demand the closure of the US, UK embassies
MND(SE) 12 Dec, Maysan- PDP-Current Situation
MND(SE) 14 Dec, Samawah-CIU arrest 45 JAM members
MND(SE) 2 Dec, IPS Chief of Police says no to JAM security piquet
Current Situation

- December suicide attacks
  - Suicide attacks on pace to equal lowest level since August
  - 19 suicide attacks reported nationwide as of 15 December
    - Less than half November total of 44
    - Average monthly events June – November: 46 per month
  - Primary target remains ISF
    - Statistically, twice as many attacks target ISF as CF
  - Suicide attack locations continue to be concentrated MND-B, followed by MND-N, MNF-W
  - SVBIED remains preferred suicide attack method
    - Since 1 June, over 80% of suicide attacks have been SVBIEDs
  - December attacks down for various reasons
    - ISF, CF operations constraining flow of FF at Syrian border
    - Upcoming Hajj
    - Seasonal weather
      - Cold, precipitation slows transit time of FF over northern routes from Syria

- Methodologies and targeting remain consistent in spite of decreased numbers of suicide attacks. Expect reduced rate of attacks through Hajj, remainder of December into next year.
OUTLOOK: Anbar Resistance Activities

- Anti-AQI efforts in Anbar growing
  - Dec, 1920 Rev Bde, AQI in Fallujah engaged in conflict, maintain differing ideologies
  - Nov, 1920 Rev Bde and Jaysh Islam (JI) join tribes in Fallujah and surrounding areas to counter AQI targeting of Sunni civilians

- Resistance groups remain active against CF in Anbar
  - Dec, 1920 Rev Bde carries out attacks against CF and Iraqi forces in Hit, Durh, al Qa‘im and Ramadi
  - Nov, 1920 Rev Bde claimed series of attacks against CF in Hadithah
  - Now, 1920 Rev Bde utilized [1.4b] in al Qa‘im

- Extensive Resistance funding in Anbar
  - Dec, Ramadi-based Sunnis providing money from [1.4b] sources to Anbar insurgents for attacks against CF, IP, IA
  - Nov, Usamah Khamil Sakar, financier for 1920 Rev Bde in Ramadi, reportedly receives funds from personnel within [1.4b]
  - Nov, Muhammad Mahmoud Latif, leader for 1920 Rev Bde, launders money from [1.4b] to insurgents in Ramadi

Assessment: Potential for increased violence as Resistance, extremist groups attack each other, CF. AQI willingness to target Resistance leaders inspiring violent reprisals from Resistance groups. Tribal successes against AQI in Anbar likely to encourage Resistance efforts to counter AQI infringement of perceived territories while continuing to target CF.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQISL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.

- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

- Sunni Reactionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue interference pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
**Area of Interest Update**

- Escalating tensions in Gaza  
  - Multiple attacks effected rival factions  
    - FM convoy attacked; raid against presidential security forces base; mortars impacted Pres Abbas’ residence  
      - Attacks caused several civilian casualties, reflect factional nature of violence  
    - Palestinian leaders conveyed dual messages  
      - Pres Abbas continued efforts toward new elections, encouraged restraint  
        - Fatah official said unity gov’t negotiations still possible; decried Hamas violence, invoked Arafat’s legacy  
      - PM Haniyah rejected new elections as unconstitutional, said further violence would result  
        - Called for restraint, reminded citizens of “occupation”  
    - Internal, external elements working to promote calm  
      - Several jihadist groups holding meetings with factions  
        - PFLP, DFLP, IU coordinating between groups  
      - Egypt, Libya, Iran, Germany preparing mediation  

- In mixing hardline stances with calls for calm, Abbas, Haniyah vying for upper hand. Low-level factional violence likely to continue in near term.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IA 1.4c “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
JAM Update

• Recent reporting:
  - JAM members reportedly murdered Iraqi Army officer in Basrah
    • Officer believed responsible for recent seizure of JAM weapons
    • Members allegedly used marked IP car for assassination
  - JAM leader reportedly raised price of ‘protection tax’ in Jihad neighborhood, Baghdad
    • Tax allegedly to fund placement billboard-sized photographs of Sadr throughout area

Assessment: JAM members in Basrah area continue reprisal attacks against members of ISF. JAM elements extorting funds from local residents to finance criminal operations, propagate security dominance in key neighborhoods and contested areas of Baghdad.

SOURCES:
MND(SE) 1.4c Basrah JAM kill Lt Col 24EFIS, (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) Raised protection task
SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

Fox News
CNN
OUTLOOK: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- National Incidents: 224; up 13% from previous week
  - 98 targeted Shi’a, 74 Sunni, 52 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 423 killed, 296 wounded; up 49% from previous week

- National Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 215 incidents, up 16%; 337 killed; up 26% from previous week
  - Ethno-Sectarian Executions accounted for 47% of total casualties, 80% of deaths
  - Daily average of 32, elevated from pre-Golden Mosque baseline of 3

- Baghdad Incidents: 194; up 26% from previous week
  - 95 targeted Shi’a, 73 Sunni, 26 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 369 killed, 273 wounded; up 53% from previous week

- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions:
  - 190 incidents, up 16% from previous week
  - 286 killed; up 34% from previous week

Assessment: Overall incidents increased for third consecutive week, while casualties increased sharply. Baghdad sectarian violence dominated by Shi’a death squad retaliation for HP events. Expect elevated executions to focus in west Baghdad, punctuated by high profile attacks.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads. Control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Limited violence as Palestinian ceasefire holds; preliminary Iranian election results
  - Sporadic violence following official acknowledgement of ceasefire by Hamas, Fatah
    - Parties met to reinforce agreement Monday night
    - Minor skirmishes, street demonstrations continued
  - President Abbas continued push for elections
    - Speaking with visiting UK PM Blair, reiterated intent to move forward, break unity government deadlock
    - Publicly stated desire to meet with Israeli PM Olmert
  - Hamas maintained defiance of Abbas’ actions
    - Hamas plans to boycott “unconstitutional” elections
  - Early election results from Iran show moderates, reformists gained significant ground
    - Gov’t noted 60% turnout (29 million) of eligible voters
    - Reformist ex-president Rafsanjani led electees to Assembly of Experts
    - No allies of Ahmadinejad won city council elections

- Political brinksmanship continues as sides seek upper hand. Expect external efforts by supporters of respective factions to intensify deadlock.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IAP 1.4c “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 40; up 16 from the previous day
  - 1 targeting Shi'a; 39 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 71 killed; 15 wounded; up 28 from previous day
- National ethno-sectarian executions: 39 incidents; 67 killed; up 9 from previous day
  - 36 occurred in Baghdad; 65 killed
- Baghdad incidents: 37; up 15 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 69 killed, 15 wounded; up 31 from previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 36 unattributed
- Significant incidents:
  - 2 VBIEDs in Bayaa; 4 killed, 15 wounded

Assessment: West Baghdad remains focus area of death squad activity. Expect current ethno-sectarian violence levels to continue following Sunni extremist high profile attack.
Recent reporting:
- Dhi Qar JAM reportedly being directed by Iranian intelligence elements to conduct assassinations against former Ba'athists
  - JAM elements have allegedly killed a total of three Ba'athists
  - List of targets allegedly given to JAM by agents
- Nasiriyah JAM have reportedly been using internet to access commercially available photos
  - Photos are printed, used to determine distances for IDF attacks against CF bases
- 18 Dec, Basrah JAM elements reportedly aware of Sayyid Naji’s arrest in Baghdad

Assessment: agents likely using JAM as surrogate to further common agenda to target former regime, Ba'ath party members. Sayyid Naji’s arrest will provoke strong reaction from southern JAM elements; reprisal attacks and increased operational security among senior leaders likely.

SOURCES:
GCHQ(T) 1.4c Sayyid Naji’s capture
24EFIS JAM assassinations directed by II
24EFIS (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(l) JAM internet intel
### Current Situation

- **VBIEDs found and cleared**
  - December on track to see highest rate of VBIEDs F/C in 2006
    - 43 VBIED events month to date;
      - 19 VBIEDs (44%) F/C
    - Significant increase over next highest F/C month (February - 30%)
    - YTD, 148 VBIEDs F/C (21% of total events)
      - MNF-W had the highest F/C rate; relatively few VBIEDs compared to Baghdad, but included 100% F/C rate for 5 separate months this year
  - Ongoing CF/ISF operations, LN concern regarding VBIEDs decreasing detonations
    - Mid-Dec, reported rollup of Abu Nasser, 13 associates
      - Key leader in Abu Nur VBIED network in Baghdad
    - More interception of potential VBIEDs
      - Larger numbers of better trained ISF operating in high VBIED occurrence areas
      - Improved public vigilance

- **CF/ISF operations, improved vigilance by citizens, capture of key VBIED facilitators/network members helping to reduce overall detonations so far in December. Expect extremist networks to continue efforts toward increased efficacy of premier weapon.**

### SCRIPT:

### Notes & Sources:

- Fox News
- CNN
### CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Reporting: 9 – 15 December 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making</td>
<td>⇆</td>
<td>PM. Maliki, SCIRI/Badr; Kurdish parties and Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party negotiating to create new &quot;moderate core&quot;; Minister of Iraqi National Reconciliation Congress to meet in Baghdad on 16 December; Sadists refuse to &quot;sit at a table with Saddamists and Ba'athists. No one should sympathize with them&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>National Sectarian incidents: 224; up 13% from last week; National Sectarian casualties: 719; up 49%; National executions: 337 KIA; up 26%; Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 184; up 26%; Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 542; up 53%; Baghdad executions: 285 KIA; up 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian mobilization</td>
<td>⇆</td>
<td>Several VBIED attacks in Baghdad (Rusafa, New Baghdad, Doura) targeting Shi'a crowds and mosques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population movements</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>Displaced families: IOM: 42,234 (Up 1338); MoDM: 55,003 (No change); Majority displaced from Babylon, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbaia, Maysan, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Tameem, Ba Anbar, Baghdad, Wasit and Diyala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment:** Overall situation remains serious. Sadists continue political isolation; if successful, new moderate bloc will create genuine opportunity to marginalize Sadr, remove political impediments to confronting JAM. Population movements continue at low level, do not constitute a crisis. AQI continues use of high profile attacks to escalate sectarian violence and create instability.
The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi’a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi’a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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Sunni Reactionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi’a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi’a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from unduly pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Renewed efforts to quell violence in Gaza; Ahmadinejad supporters lose traction in elections
  - Gun battles between rival Fatah and Hamas militants erupted, ending Sunday’s ceasefire
    - PM Haniyah made televised address calling for calm, denouncing intra-Palestinian bloodshed
    - Factions agreed to remove militants from streets, formed joint ops center to respond to clashes
    - Jordan's King Abdullah offered to mediate between factions following latest tensions
    - German FM Steinmeier accelerated efforts to reinvigorate Middle East Peace ‘Quartet’ negotiations
  - Poll results from last week’s elections show loss of ground by Pres Ahmadinejad, supporters
    - Biggest winners appear to be ‘moderate conservatives’
      - Group reportedly disenchanted with Ahmadinejad’s ‘needless provocation of the West, faltering economy’
    - Reformists showed noteworthy gains in both council elections and Assembly of Experts

- Palestinian faction leaders still vying for lead. Discontent reflected in Iranian elections likely to spur reduced rhetoric, little substantive change.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”
BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”
OSC IAP 1.4c “Kiriyenko stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 33; down 7 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 32 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 63 killed, 10 wounded; down 10 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 31 incidents; 63 killed; down 4 from previous day
  - 29 occurred in Baghdad; 59 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 30; down 6 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 59 killed; down 6 from previous day
  - All were unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - IDF in New Baghdad near market; 3 wounded
  - Explosion in Baqubah; 7 wounded

Assessment: Bayaa ethno-sectarian executions likely in retaliation for previous day's high profile attack; increased executions continue in Ghazaliyah. Expect current levels to continue into Friday.
JAM Update: 20 December

- Sadr’s Activities:
  - Sadr has reportedly dismissed Ahmad al-Mutayyiri, member of his Political Committee
  - Mutayyiri allegedly went on a pilgrimage, likely the Haji, without Sadr’s permission
  - Mutayyiri was considered a rising leader in OMS

- Recent reporting:
  - Mid-Dec JAM commander in Sadr City reportedly declared subordinates should not attack just ‘any Sunni’
  - JAM must limit attacks against Sunnis, other groups working against them
  - Policy’s purpose allegedly to preserve some JAM relations with broader Sunni population

- Basrah JAM elements responsible for IDF attack against the Shatt al’Arab hotel on 18 Dec

Assessment: Mutayyiri was key political advisor whose removal will likely have a negative impact on Sadr’s inner circle. Sadr City commander’s new policy did not specifically mention Coalition, but CF likely viewed as group working against JAM. Policy may reflect Sadr’s effort to mitigate negative JAM image, rein in sectarian violence.

SOURCES:
USJ-  EW POLICY
GCH  MAS INFLUENTIAL AIDES
GCH  MAS EXPELLED MEMBER OF POL COM
GCH  ORRECTION, JAM RETALIATE
Current Situation

- Political developments
  - New moderate political bloc publicly announced this week
    - Bloc spans ethnic, sectarian, political lines
      - Still lacks numbers to achieve quorum in CoR
    - Multiple religious leaders welcomed new agreement
  - JAM/OMS Response
    - Concerned about marginalization in future Council of Representatives political blocs, loss of ministerial positions
    - Working to find alternative party alliances that will support CF withdrawal
  - Risks of New Alliance
    - Threat of increased violence
      - JAM instigation of further confrontation with CF to regain political leverage
      - Split of Shi’a parties increases risk of intra-sectarian conflict in Baghdad and Southern Iraq
    - Alienation of other Sunni parties within the government
- Moderate bloc still needs other parties’ commitment to achieve quorum. Cross-sectarian alliances built around issues of CF presence, concerns over sectarian violence likely to be unstable. Risk of violence against CF, ISF, civilians likely to be higher in near term, depending on JAM/OMS response.

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

Fox News
CNN
OUTLOOK: Enlisting Clerical Support

- Senior clerics, representatives vocalizing support for IG, new moderate bloc, reconciliation
  - Ayatollah Sistani recently reiterated calls for unity; indicated early Dec support for PM al-Maliki key issues
  - September, Sistani praised reconciliation efforts, “justice, fairness, renunciation” of violence
  - Ayatollah’s Al-Fayyad and al-Najafi welcomed new moderate bloc, saying: “We support any step in favor of Iraq to end bloodshed and enhance unity”
- Group monitoring Coalition policies, watching support to IG
  - Senior Shi’a clerics including Sistani reportedly gave prior approval to an article published in the Iraqi press criticizing the Iraqi Study Group report

Assessment: Senior clerics view al-Qaeda, former Ba’athists as most serious security threat; also view Sadr as threat to stability, likely see current initiatives as opportunity to marginalize him. Senior clerics can lend useful support to aid moderates, sideline hard-liners; not ready to step beyond “guiding role” into direct political participation.
The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi’a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi’a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQIS on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI’s anti-Shi’a death squad front.

Shi’a extremists influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi’a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi’a enclaves from “Ba’athist Belts” by portraying themselves as Shi’a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi’a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated. Shi’a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Threat Projection

- Senior Political Figures
  - No credible threats identified
- Mass Casualty Attack
  - Multiple reports of VBIEDs targeting Rusafa, Sadr City, Douma, Hayy Jamilah
  - Sunni insurgents targeting Iraqi governmental officials in Kirkuk
- Large-Scale Attack
  - AQI preparing coordinated VBIED attack against Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Hilla
  - Sunni insurgents planning complex attack against CF in Adhamiyah
  - JAM planning simultaneous IDF attacks against four, East Baghdad FOBs
  - Sadr reportedly agreed to use of anti-aircraft missiles against Coalition aircraft
- Sectarian Violence
  - Complex (mortar/ambulance VBIED) attack planned for Sadr City/Sh'a'ab
- National Infrastructure
  - No credible threats identified
- Chemical Threat
  - No credible threats identified
- Significant Dates
  - 29 Dec: Death of 9th Imam (Shi'a)
  - 25 Dec: Christmas
  - 28 Dec: Death of 5th Imam (Shi'a)
  - 29 Dec – 2 Jan: Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca)

Assessment: AQI determined to maintain pace of VBIED attacks in Sadr City, Rusafa, Adhamiyah; continues to adopt VBIED, anti-coalition attacks to circumvent CF/ISF security efforts. Level of sectarian violence to remain steady, focused in Mansour, Douma. Expect 22 - 32 high profile attacks during this week. Near-term chemical threat remains low; AQI intent to develop/acquire unconventional attack capability continues.
Priority Intelligence Requirements

1. How are AQI/AS pursuing the strategy of inciting civil war? What is the structure and nature of VBIED networks?
   - AQI continues to provoke national sectarian violence by conducting high-profile, mass-casualty attacks against Shi'a populations; sectarian attacks most prevalent in Baghdad
   - Attempting to infiltrate Sunni neighborhood watches in Baghdad and leveraging fear of Shi'a militia attacks to portray themselves as defenders of Sunnis
   - VBIED networks are a loose confederation of community-based, independent cells which share resources and conduct coordinated attacks
   - VBIEDs remain AQI's primary weapon to incite sectarian violence through mass-casualty attacks; VBIED attacks are most prevalent in Baghdad
   - Pursuing dual strategy of coercion and negotiation to regain influence over Sunni tribes in Anbar; continuing efforts to placate and co-opt tribal groups while attacking those who continue to work with CF and IG
   - The 'Islamic State of Iraq' has so far failed to gain much support from Sunni groups

2. Where are the critical support bases and infrastructure to support terrorist operations and who/where are the key enablers?
   - Internal support bases: Baghdad Belts, primarily southern belt, providing support to operations in Baghdad; lake Thar Thar area in Anbar; Haditha to Bayji LOO, west of Tal Afar; Diyala; and Salah ad Din
   - External support bases: four interconnected facilitation networks in Syria; numerous facilitators internal and external to Iraq provide resilience and redundancy

3. Is the new government broadly perceived as representative and are its policies and programs generating continued support for the political process? dubious
   - October polling data shows:
     - 41% believe PM Maliki and his Cabinet can change the IG in the next 12 months
     - 38% believe government will improve in next 12 months (30% in September)
     - 29% believe IP/NP/IA have ability to improve security over next 12 Months (31% in September)
Priority Intelligence Requirements

4. Has unrestrained, self-sustaining sectarian strife spread?
   - Sectarian violence primarily contained within Baghdad but spreading to surrounding areas as JAM seeks to control lines of communication into the capital; not yet unrestrained, but self-sustaining between extremists in western Baghdad
   - Increased use of IDF against mosques and built up areas in Baghdad suggests escalation of ethno-sectarian conflict and lessening of restraint by both Sunni and Shi'a extremists

5. Are Shi'a militias pursuing an organized strategy, and if so, how is this being achieved?
   - JAM strategy encompasses social, political and economic influence via control of basic services, provision of employment, presence in government institutions (official and elected), and infiltration of security forces
   - Operations in Baghdad and along LOCs into the capital enable JAM to portray itself as defender of Shi'a population against real and perceived Sunni intimidation and attacks.
   - Local JAM leaders conduct activities in own interest but generally support Sadr's desired end state; Sadr has overarching influence but no formal political power
   - Increasing political competition between Shi'a groups in the south in build-up to provincial elections and transfer to PIC; some friction between JAM and Badr, particularly in Amarah

6. Are there indications of forced population movements?
   - Number of displaced families: IOM-42,234 (up 1,338), MoDM-55,003 (no change)
   - Majority of IDP flowing out of Babylon, Baghdad Basrah, Dhi-Qar, Karbala, Mayyada, Anbar, Darala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, Tameem, into Anbar, Baghdad, Wasit and Diyala
Priority Intelligence Requirements

7. Have Sunni Resistance strategies and objectives changed?
   - Objective remains departure of CF and re-establishment of Sunni influence; asymmetric attacks against CF, NP, IP, and IA continue
   - Resistance groups respond to Shi'a militia threats and defend Sunni communities, but generally do not retaliate against Shi'a civilians
   - Cooperation with AQI and extremists to attack CF and IP continues; opposition to AQI exists in areas of Anbar where AQI has crossed Resistance red lines

8. Is Coalition outreach strategy with Sunnis increasing support for the Iraqi government? Are outreach efforts generating political backlash?
   - Security concerns slowing reconstruction and economic recovery efforts in Sunni areas, preventing outreach efforts from gaining traction among Sunnis
   - Cooperation between the national government and Sunni tribal groups seeking to counter AQI influence in Anbar; release of reconstruction funds improves prospects Anbar Sunnis will more broadly support the IG
   - Many Shi'a resent outreach efforts towards Sunnis
   - No significant progress on implementation of national reconciliation plan

1.4b, 1.4d

10. Is violence in Iraq undermining the loyalty, discipline, and effectiveness of the Iraqi Army and Police Services?
   - Reluctance of NP and IPS to tackle JAM leadership in Baghdad indicates sectarian loyalties/intimidation influencing operations
   - Reporting continues to implicate some NP/IPS in death squad activities
   - Recent retaliatory attacks in Baghdad conducted by JAM with protection continue to undermine credibility of predominantly Shi'a ISF
11. Are IG ministries developing critical capabilities to deliver essential services, address the insurgency and reduce ethno-sectarian tensions?
   - Ineffective and corrupt ministerial employees hamper efforts to improve government performance and allow militias and other criminal elements to infiltrate ministries.
   - Logistic, financial, and administrative problems within MoD and MoI still affecting the operational effectiveness of some elements within the IA and IPS.
   - Fuel and electricity shortages continue to undermine public confidence in IG.

12. Who are the death squad members, where are they located, and who is providing them with sponsorship and support?
   - JAM death squad activities in Baghdad funded from kidnap ransoms, sale of weapons, drugs, and black-market gas.
   - JAM leveraging contacts in ministries to facilitate illicit activity; using ministerial resources (including vehicles, uniforms and facilities) in conduct of these activities.

13. Is Muqtada al-Sadr directing JAM to attack CF?
   - Sadr has increased anti-CF rhetoric, reportedly permitting JAM to use SAMs against Coalition aircraft – potentially in anticipation of confrontation with CF, but still does not openly condone attacks on CF.
   - Sadr usually unconcerned with day to day direction of JAM activities; gives mostly strategic-level guidance, which he leaves to subordinates to interpret and implement.
   - Sadr impatient with current attempts by Sadrist within CoR and JAM to push for CF withdrawal, may take on more personal responsibility for both political and military resistance to CF, indications of JAM reorganization and personnel changes.

14. What activities are groups conducting in Kirkuk which would undermine security and inflame ethnic tensions in the city?
   - JAM pursuing limited cooperation with Badr, Iraqi Turkomen Front, Arab Front along political and militant lines to enhance influence, oppose Kurdish expansion.
   - AQ/AS conducting high-profile attacks against CF, ISF, Kurds to expand ethnic violence, discredit Kurdish authorities.
Area of Interest Update

- Zawahiri appeals to Palestinians in latest video release; Hamas rejects message
  - Al Qaeda deputy Ayman al Zawahiri called on Palestinians to reject new elections, embrace jihad
    - Zawahiri emphasized impending failure of elections proposed by President Abbas
      - "Any path...other than jihad will...lead to waste and loss"
    - Attempted to de-legitimize President Abbas
      - Referred to him as "America's man in Palestine"
    - Exhorted Palestinians to hold on to Shari'a as only law, regain all of Palestine
      - "Every Muslim is duty-bound to regain any land that was a land of Islam"
    - Claimed US actions are doomed to failure
      - "You are not negotiating with the real powers"
  - Hamas discarded message, asserted independence
    - Reiterated disdain for AQ, its struggle against Israel

- Al Qaeda attempting to rally Hamas, supporters to defy elections, reinvigorate attacks against Israel. Message not likely to incite local violence, although attacks by regional AQ operatives possible.

Sources:

- BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”
- BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”
- OSC IAP 1.4c Kiriyenko stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities"
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 43; up 10 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 42 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 76 killed, 22 wounded; up 25 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 41 incidents; 72 killed; up 9 from previous day
  - 38 occurred in Baghdad; 66 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 39; up 9 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 69 killed, 22 wounded; up 32 from previous day
    - 1 targeted Shi'a, 38 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - 2 SVBIED's in Karadah; 4 killed, 22 wounded

Assessment: West Baghdad ethno-sectarian executions continue to comprise majority of incidents, casualties; Sunni extremists work to stoke sectarian violence. Expect decrease for Friday prayers.
JAM Update: 21 December

- Recent reporting:
  - Second in command of Iraqi Immigration at BIAP has alleged strong ties to JAM
    - Received position by reportedly providing false documents
      - Provides direct assistance to members transiting BIAP
    - 19 Dec, Basrah JAM sub-commander provided SPG-9 rounds for unspecified testing
      - Rounds have been previously used by JAM elements in Najaf
      - Same commander is supplying 60mm mortar rounds to an unknown associate

Assessment: Members/associates persist in infiltrating into government positions to facilitate JAM freedom of movement, operations. Continuous efforts to develop new TTPs, improve munitions an attempt to increase attack effectiveness, may indicate arms shortages.

Sources:
GCHQ(T) 1.4c JAM TESTING SPG-9 ROUNDS
24 EFIS (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) INFRINGEMENT AT BIAP
USJ 1.4c SUMMARY OF BADR REPORTS
• VBIED Threats to Shi'a civilians

Current Situation
– As of 11 Dec, coordinated attack planned for Najaf, Diwaniyah, Hilla
  • Reporting indicates attack consisting of large number of VBIED’s
    – Total number likely to be significantly less than reported (45)
  • Any large gathering could be targeted; intent is to cause mass casualties, foment intensified sectarian violence
  • To date, report is uncorroborated

– Near-term ambulance VBIED attack threat
  • Corroborated reports indicate attack using 5 ambulance VBIEDs to target Sadr City, Sha’ab section of Adhamiyah
    – Ambulance VBIED attack would be preceded by mortar attack and would target first responders

– VBIED attacks consistent with known Sunni TTP’s
  • Sunni extremists continue effort to undermine public trust of ISF
    – Attempting to destabilize society, portray themselves as “protector of Sunni”, create environment where Sunni’s are forced to support AQI or risk violence at hands of militias

• Threat streams of pending high profile attacks reinforce intent of AQI, other extremists to foster disorder. Expect high profile attacks to continue targeting Shi’a gatherings, iconic sites.
Data represents reporting from both FusionNet and CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ IS INCREASINGLY TRANSITIONING INTO A STRUGGLE BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHI'A EXTREMISTS SEEKING TO CONTROL KEY AREAS IN BAGHDAD, CREATE/PROTECT SECTARIAN ENCLAVES, DIVERT ECONOMIC RESOURCES, AND IMPOSE THEIR POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS AGENDAS. BAGHDAD DEFINES THE CONFLICT AND REMAINS THE FOCUS FOR SECTARIAN VIOLENCE. DEATH SQUADS LOCKED IN MUTUALLY-REINFORCING CYCLES OF SECTARIAN STRIFE FORCING SUNNI AND SHI'A TO ACCEPT MILITIAS FOR SAFETY. SECTARIAN VIOLENCE SPREADING TO DIWALYA, KIRKUK WITH COMPETITION FOR PROVINCIAL INFLUENCE. SOUTHERN IRAQ AND ANBAR CONFLICTS OVER POLITICAL AND TRIBAL CONTROL, CF PRESENCE.

SUNNI EXTREMISTS CONTINUE EFFORTS TO EXPEL CF, MAKE IRAQ UNGOVERNABLE AND PERPETUATE SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN BAGHDAD, DIWALYA AND KIRKUK. AQI LEADERSHIP INCREASINGLY CONVERGENT WITH AQISL ON GOALS AND STRATEGY. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI’s anti-Shi'a death squad front.

SHI’A EXTREMIST INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL POLITICAL AGENDAS THROUGH INFILTRATION AND INTIMIDATION FURTHER CHALLENGES ISF/CF ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY. SHI’A EXTREMISTS SPONSOR DEATH SQUADS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE BAGHDAD TO SECURE SHI’A ENCLAVES FROM “BA’THIST BELTS” BY PORTRAYING THEMSELVES AS SHI’A PROTECTORS AND ELIMINATING SUNNI COMPETITION; PRIME AGENTS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE.

SUNNI REJECTIONISTS CONTINUE DECENTRALIZED, DISORGANIZED EFFORT TO EXPEL CF, PREVENT SHI’A ECONOMIC, TERRITORIAL GAINS AND REVERSE SUNNI POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION. SOME HARDLINERS, INCREASINGLY AUGMENTS RANKS OF SUNNI EXTREMISTS, PROVIDING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SKILLS. MODERATES WILL ACCEPT RECONCILIATION, DISARMMENT ONCE DEATH SQUADS ELIMINATED, SHI’A MILITIA DISARMED AND KEY POLITICAL DEMANDS MET.

MALIKI GOVERNMENT ASSERTING ITSELF ON SECURITY ISSUES. SECTARIAN AGENDAS WITHIN KEY MINISTRIES, QUESTIONABLE DEPENDABILITY OF MOI ELEMENTS, RIVALRY FOR CONTROL OF KEY RESOURCES AND LIMITED INFLUENCE OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OUTSIDE BAGHDAD REMAIN CHALLENGES. IRAQI GOVERNMENT FAILURE TO ELIMINATE DEATH SQUADS, CONTROL SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, GENERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND ESTABLISH AN INCLUSIVE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FREE FROM UNDUE PRESSURES POSE GREATEST LONG-TERM RISKS TO MNF OBJECTIVES.

1.4b, 1.4d
Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IA 1.4c “Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 15; down 28 from the previous day
  - All were unattributed
  - Total casualties: 44 killed; down 54 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 14 incidents; 44 killed; down 28 from previous day
  - 13 occurred in Baghdad; 43 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 14; down 25 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 43 killed; down 48 from previous day
  - All were unattributed

- Significant incidents: NSTR

Assessment: Decreased incidents likely due to extremists focusing HP attacks on ISF; ethno-sectarian executions concentrated in West Baghdad. Expect incidents to remain low during Friday prayers.
140

SOURCES:
Associated Press,
Al-Jazzera,
Current Situation

- High profile attack in Baghdad
  - Prospective IPs targeted by SVEST at recruiting station in Muthana, Baghdad
    - Attacker mingled with recruits, detonated upon approaching entrance CP
      - Multiple recruit, IP casualties
    - Apparent second attack thwarted
      - SVEST attacker arrested IVO Police Academy
    - Reports of other SVEST attackers in the area remain uncorroborated
  - December SVEST attacks against ISF could meet or exceed 2006 high
    - 2006 high of 7 set in September; December month-to-date is 5
      - 2006 Monthly average – 2.5
    - SVEST attacks most prevalent IVO Mosul
  - No attack claims; SVEST consistent with AQI TTP’s

- AQI focusing SVEST attacks against IA/IP, related targets nationwide; part of larger intimidation campaign to inhibit further development of effective, locally-manned security forces. Multiple SVEST tactic reflects desire to increase lethality, generate larger IO impact.
Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)
- ISI/AQI volume up 135 to 310 claims; 2 SVBIED, 2 VBIED, 10 Badr, 30 JAM
  - Claimed 29 Nov SVBIED in Al-Tharthar; 12 Dec SVBIED in Baghdad
  - Claimed to shoot down UAV on 12 Dec IVO Bayji
  - Announced merger of "The Caliphate Web Channel" and Al-Firdaws TV channel
- AS propaganda down 51 to 33 claims; 1 Badr
  - Released 30-min video of attack against IA facility in Balad Ruz
- IAI propaganda up 45 to 106 claims; 1 VBIED, 2 JAM
  - Al-Anbar branch of IAI allegedly joined ISI; report not released via usual channels; authenticity not verified; neither IAI nor ISI has officially commented
  - 11 Dec, claimed to shoot down a Blackhawk helicopter on near Salman Pak
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume down 2 to 66
  - Video released proclaiming effectiveness of Baghdad Sniper video in "media war"

Sunni Resistance
- Volume down 32 to 31; mostly attack claims
  - Iraqi Ba'ath party discusses Iran-US alliance, Baker-Hamilton report, US failure in Iraq

Assessment: Propaganda volume increased, driven by surge in ISI attack claims. Downed aircraft a consistent weekly theme. Sunni Resistance propaganda focused on discrediting CF, exaggerating effectiveness of Resistance operations. Allusion to US-Iran alliance likely timed to coincide with, discredit IG reconciliation efforts.
The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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Sunni Reactionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi’a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi’a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue influence.

14b, 1.4d
Area of Interest Update

- UN announces sanctions against Iran
  - United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously Saturday to impose sanctions
  - Demands cessation of all enrichment-related activities, work on heavy water projects
  - Sanctions include economic, counter-proliferation measures
    - Prohibits supply of materials which could contribute to nuclear or ballistic missile programs
    - Foreign-controlled assets of designated persons must be frozen
    - Prohibits foreign training of Iranians in nuclear-related disciplines
  - Russian UN Ambassador Churkin stressed plan to repeal sanctions
    - Contingent upon IAEA verification of uranium enrichment cessation
    - Churkin ensured Bushehr reactor construction not affected
  - Iranian UN ambassador decried “sad day for nonproliferation”
    - Called sanctions illegal, focused on Israeli nuclear “threat”
    - Official Iranian open sources called measures ‘double-standard’

- Unanimous sanctions package follows 5 months of UNSC consideration. Expect Iran to continue comprehensive diplomatic, ID, economic efforts to divide UNSC members over implementation, IAEA inspections.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IAP 1.4c Kiriyenko Stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 27; down 5 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 1 Sunni, 25 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 48 killed; wounded 1; down 1 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 26 incidents, 47 killed; same as the previous day
  - 18 occurred in Baghdad; 24 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 18; down 7 from previous day
  - Total casualties: 24 killed; down 14 from previous day
  - 1 targeted Sunni, 17 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - 14 found dead SE of Suwayrah

Assessment: Decreased Baghdad ethno-sectarian executions likely due to inclement weather. Expect Baghdad executions to remain moderate until weather subsides.
Recent reporting:

- 23 Dec, open sources report conflict between ISF, JAM continued in Samawah
  - IP holding at least 17 JAM members, including imam of local JAM-aligned mosque
  - 22 Dec, incident began at mosque when IP confronted JAM for carrying weapons in breach of ceasefire agreement
- No agreement reached during 23 Dec talks in Najaf to bring Sadrists back into IG, CoR
  - Sadr bloc official states UIA has agreed to all Sadrists’ demands except CF withdrawal timetable
  - Discussions set to resume ‘within days’

Assessment: Samawah JAM elements will continue to challenge local authorities, demanding release of detained imam, fellow members; ISF demonstrating ability contain fighting. Sadr likely believes he has gained advantage in political standoff with IG. Sadrists will therefore continue attempts to extract agreement on group demands from Shia leaders, including keystone issue of CF withdrawal timetable, before returning to the IG or CoR.

SOURCES:
Open Source, Clash between IP and JAM continue
Open Source, Sadrists and IG, CoR
(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
JAM overtakes downtown Muhmudiyah
Current Situation

- Improvised incendiary device used against CF patrol in Ramadi
  - Attempt to disable M1 with “Molotov cocktail” thrown from rooftop
    - Consisted of a plastic bag filled with fuel, a detonator; magnet on exterior

- Recent utilization of hoax IED to target patrols IVO Fallujah, Ramadi
  - Hoax IED used to halt patrols, which are then targeted by sniper fire
    - Dec, 4 patrols targeted; several casualties resulted
    - Multiple unit reports of gray sedan fleeing the scene from several incidents
  - Variation of technique using sniper fire in conjunction with IED detonation

- TTP variations a response to ongoing MNF-W operations
  - Since initiation, Operation al Majid reduced IEDs by 70% in Haditha
  - CF compelling insurgents to use previously developed TTPs without standoff capability

- Adjustment of Insurgent IED TTPs in MNF-W reflects continued effort to maximize attack effectiveness, impede CF freedom of operations. CF countermeasures, vigilance create greater risk of employment for IED cells.

Notes & Sources:
OUTLOOK: New Ba’ath Party Goals & Activities

- Objectives include reclaiming Sunni control of Iraqi Government, removal of MNF
  - Utilizes IED, VBIED, IDE, SAF, sniper, kidnapping operations against MNF, Iraqi government (IG) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
  - Jaysh Muhammed, military wing of NBP, operates primarily in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah Ad Din Provinces

- NBP Leadership remains primarily in Syria
  - Political wing led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri
  - Consists of loose network structure; Syrian-based leadership has minor influence over local cells

- NBP provides support to multiple Sunni Resistance groups; will work with Sunni Extremists when it supports the NBP’s goals
  - Dec 06, Members from NBP, AQI met to collaborate on militant activities
  - Senior NBP member Sabbar Talhah al-Hayyani financed AQI, AS, and 1920 Rev Bde in Anbar from refuge in Syria

Assessment: NBP cells remain active in several northern provinces of Iraq. While some Sunni Resistance groups have opened talks with MNF-1, NBP leadership refuses negotiations, calling for increased attacks against CF, IG. Partnerships with AQI and Resistance Groups localized, born out of convenience; likely to dissolve once NBP goals are achieved.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife force Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control. CF presence.

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1.4b, 1.4d

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Area of Interest Update

- Ethiopia steps up efforts in Somalia; Olmert, Abbas meet in Israel; Iran rebuffs sanctions
  - Ethiopian PM Zenawi declared war against Somali Islamists, support for official government
    - Followed Ethiopian aerial bombing of Islamist positions
  - First official acknowledgement of Ethiopian efforts in Somalia
  - 15K Ethiopians aiding Somali gov’t; 2K Eritreans backing Islamists
  - Israeli PM Olmert, Palestinian Pres Abbas met Sunday to discuss prisoner discharge, release of funds
    - Olmert considering liberation of some Palestinian prisoners
    - Also spoke of disbursing $100 million to PA, on condition no funds are allotted to Hamas government
  - Iranian Pres Ahmadinejad rejected sanctions as worthless; warned others would be hurt worse
    - Nuclear chief Larijani said effective Sunday, Iran will intensify efforts at Natanz uranium enrichment facility
- Somalia threatening to become wider regional war. Abbas seeks funding to break economic gridlock, gain upper hand against Hamas.

Sources:
JAM Update: 25 December

• Recent reporting:
  – 24 Dec, tensions continue for third day between IP and JAM in Samawah
    • JAM shot celebratory fire during funeral for member killed during 23 Dec fighting; IP reacted strongly to gunfire
    • JAM responded with SAF attacks, IDF against Provincial Governate building; one IP confirmed KIA

• Sadr’s Activities:
  – Sadr has allegedly decided to disband JAM in provinces from which CF have withdrawn
    • Decision was reportedly made in context of 23 Dec meetings with UIA regarding Sadrist return to gov’t

Assessment: JAM elements in Samawah will continue to confront the local IG authorities, demand release for remaining detained JAM members. Local IP, IA likely strong enough to contain the situation. No evidence that Sadr has or intends to disband JAM in provinces that have already gone through PIC. Offer to disband JAM likely bargaining chip in ongoing negotiations with government to attain CF withdrawal timetable.

SOURCES:
Open Source, Clash between IP and JAM continue
GCHQ(T), 1.4c
Tensions in Samawah
- PJCC attacked by JAM using IDF, RPGs
  - ISF reported up to 200 JAM members present on the streets
    - Subsequent MITT reporting indicated clash occurred following ISF reaction to gunfire during funeral of dead JAM member
    - IA reportedly placed on standby to control LOCs into Samawah, prevent reinforcement by regional JAM
  - 24 Dec, PM Maliki deployed Baghdad-based NPs to Samawah
    - Group estimated to be approximately battalion size, likely a collection of available NP personnel
- Ongoing Samawah events precipitated by JAM violation of ceasefire
  - 22 Dec, JAM members openly carried weapons, breaching agreement; local govt initiated curfew in response, detaining several members, local imam
  - Not known if deployment of NPs was requested by or coordinated with local Samawah govt, ISF officials
    - Possibility for tensions between local IA, IP and Baghdad-based NP

Latest incident in Samawah does not constitute a crisis. Heavy handed response to JAM funeral by local ISF likely precipitated later attacks; however, JAM elements continue efforts to challenge local IG, ISF, in defiance of ceasefire.

Notes & Sources:

CCIR 14: 22 1200C Dec 06 SAF Attack on IP in As Samawah 17 AIF Detained
Current Situation

- Focused targeting of ISF in Diyala
  - SVEST attack in Muqdadiya
    - Detonated inside IP station resulting in multiple casualties
      - NCC reporting indicates attacker wore IP uniform to gain access
    - Similar to recent SVEST attack targeting IP recruiting station in Baghdad
  - Complex IED attack IVO Khanaqin (N of Muqdadiya)
    - Two simultaneous IED explosions, 400m apart, resulting in multiple casualties
      - Targeted 1-5 IA convoy bringing soldiers back from leave
  - Possibly in response to Operation Rabbit Hunter in Baquba
    - Negatively affected T&FF freedom of movement within Baquba
    - Detention of almost 50 suspects likely drove some T&FF north
  - No attack claims; methodology, targeting implicate AQI
    - Muqdadiya a center of gravity for Sunnis in Diyala

- T&FF continue attacks against IP/IA as part of ongoing intimidation efforts; attempting to maintain freedom of operation. Expect high profile, complex attacks to continue as extremists endeavor to counter ISF operations, stir ethnosectarian strife in Diyala.
**OUTLOOK: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict**

- National Incidents: 216; down 4% from previous week
  - 104 targeted Shi’a, 75 Sunni, and 37 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 405 killed, 53 wounded; down 36% from previous week
- National Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 209 incidents, down 3% from previous week
  - 397 killed, up 18% from previous week
  - Ethno-Sectarian Executions account for 87% of total casualties; 98% of deaths
  - Daily average of 31; elevated from pre-Golden Mosque baseline of 3
- Baghdad Incidents: 190; down 2% from previous week
  - 102 targeted Shi’a, 75 Sunni, 13 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 372 killed, 22 wounded; down 39% from previous week
- Baghdad Ethno-Sectarian Executions:
  - 187 incidents, down 2% from previous week
  - 369 killed; up 23% from previous week

**Assessment:** Week characterized by ethno-sectarian executions in Baghdad as death squads increased activity in Ghazaliyah, Hurriya. Overall casualties decreased due to limited effectiveness of HP attacks. Expect an increase in HP attacks targeting Haj pilgrims.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control. CF presence.

- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQISL on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.

- Shi'a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi'a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi'a enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shi'a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

- Sunni Reactionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi'a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated. Shi'a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d lose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Ethiopian jets bomb Somali airports; Israel to lift W. Bank checkpoints; Iran responds to sanctions
  - Ethiopian aircraft bombed Mogadishu, Baledogle airports
    - Gov’t stated attacks targeted influx of support to Islamists through both airfields
    - Somali, Ethiopian gov’ts accused Islamists of recruiting foreign fighters; Somali residents report hundreds of foreigners arriving to support Islamists
  - Israel announced it would ease restrictions on roadblocks in the West Bank
    - Defense Minister Peretz stated 59 of 400 checkpoints would be lifted
    - Affirmed strategy was part of effort to improve standard of living for Palestinians, hence improving security
  - Prominent Iranian reformist reacted to UNSC decision
    - Ahmad Shirzad acknowledged sanctions were ‘first step’ by UN, anticipates further actions
    - Endorsed greater Iranian interaction with int’l community
- Conflict in Somalia widening as Ethiopian gov’t takes greater role; increased Eritrean involvement likely in near term.

Sources:
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 41; up 3 from the previous day
  - 2 targeted Shia, 39 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 83 killed; 14 wounded; up 58 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 39 incidents, 72 killed; up 37 from the previous day
  - 28 occurred in Baghdad; 55 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 30; up 12 from the previous day
  - Total casualties: 66 killed, 14 wounded; up 58 from the previous day
  - 2 targeted Shia, 28 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - VBIEDs in New Baghdad: 10 killed, 7 inj.

Assessment: West Baghdad remains focus area of ethno-sectarian violence as death squads continue attempts to consolidate control in mixed neighborhoods. High profile attacks will perpetuate ethno-sectarian executions.
JAM Update

- Recent reporting:
  - Sadrists spokesperson says bloc will rejoin government if IG allows draft resolution on CF withdrawal to be submitted to CoR
    - Previous Sadrists resolution for CF withdrawal was tabled by CoR in Sep
    - Demand may involve new resolution
  - 25 Dec, media report clashes continue for fourth day between IP, JAM in Samawah
    - 3 reportedly killed; 2 IP reported wounded
    - Initial indications some Samawah JAM elements may have split from OMS
    - JAM elements reportedly coming from Najaf and Diwaniyah to join in fighting

Assessment: Most recent statement may indicate Sadrists softening on CF withdrawal timetable demand; may accept consideration of resolution by CoR without guarantee of passage to return to government. Possible split among Samawah JAM elements, reinforcements from outside city will complicate efforts by government. ISF, OMS to calm situation. ISF should still be able to mitigate the impact of the fighting.

SOURCES:
Open Source, BBC Monitoring 0400, 25 Dec, MP puts conditions on Sadr movement return to government
IOTF News Summary 25 Dec, Cycle of Violence
MND-CS INTSUM, 25 Dec
Current Situation

- Dec-Jan attack trends
  - Overall attacks increased slightly during the last week of the year in 2005, but followed normal attack cycle for the month
  - Significant “end of year/new year” HP spike
    - 2005 spike was one of the highest for the year; exceeded all others for the month
    - Similar spike likely this year
  - HP attacks led to increased retaliatory kidnapping and M&E
    - Likely to raise M&E incidents thru first week of Jan 07 before decreasing
    - Attacks on civilians rose 633% from Dec 05 (227 incidents) to Dec 06 (1665 incidents)

- Expect an “end of year/new year HP spike” to occur between 27 Dec and 2 Jan, consisting of 12 to 19 HP attacks. Attacks will spark new round of retaliatory violence leading to increased levels of M&E, which will last at least through first week of Jan 07.

Notes & Sources:
CIOC Trends
SIGACTS
CURRENT SITUATION

- **EFP events in Baghdad**
  - 4 Possible EFP events for 24 Hour Period, 24-25 December
    - 24 Dec, EFP found and cleared in Baladiat
    - 25 Dec, three EFP events
      - Found and cleared in Kamaliya
      - IED, possible EFP, detonation in Bayaa targeting CF
      - 2 x EFP array targeted CF in Dora
  - Previous single-day high in Baghdad was 5 EFPs on 11 November
    - December month-to-date events in Baghdad are above average at 23; monthly average since May 06 is 16.8
  - Baghdad EFP usage attributed to Shi’a militia groups
    - Historic reporting of attack distribution links EFP usage predominately to JAM, affiliated Shi’a militia groups
    - Unit reporting indicates possibility of increased attacks as CF footprint increases in historically JAM-dominated areas

- **Shi’a militants continue to employ EFPs as premier weapon against CF armor. Per current threat reporting, expect attacks to continue through early January with threat of EFPs increased along frequently traveled CE routes.**

Notes & Sources:

SIGACTS

1.4c

1st CAV G2 ACE assessment
### CIVIL WAR: INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Reporting: 16 – 22 December 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian identities are the overriding force driving decision-making</td>
<td>⇄</td>
<td>• New “moderate core” political alliance engages al-Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf</td>
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<td>• National Reconciliation Congress in Baghdad focus on ‘former Ba’ath party, constitutional amendments, decreasing need for MNF-I, tackling militias, political participation, national balance’</td>
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<td>• CoR imposes penalties for Cabinet members absent without reason</td>
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<td>Unrestrained, self-sustained sectarian strife across multiple provinces</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>• National Sectarian incidents: 216; down 4% from last week</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• National Sectarian casualties: 458; up 36%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• National executions: 397 KIA; up 18%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Baghdad Sectarian incidents: 190; down 2%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Baghdad Sectarian casualties: 394; down 39%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Baghdad executions: 369 KIA; up 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-sectarian mobilization</td>
<td>⇄</td>
<td>• Sadr reportedly disbanding certain JAM leadership positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population movements</td>
<td>⇄</td>
<td>• Displaced families: IOM: 42,234 (No update); MoDM: 55,903 (No update)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment:** Overall situation remains serious. Despite decrease in HP attacks in Baghdad, sectarian executions increased (second highest weekly total in 2006 after October) illustrates JAMs role as an accelerant in sectarian conflict within capital. Emerging “moderate core” enemy to Najaf will enhance Sadr’s political profile; Sadrist begin to regain momentum.
The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control. CF presence.

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Area of Interest Update

- Ethiopian forces push Islamists back; Islamists urge Muslims to join Somalia jihad; report on Iranian oil cites dwindling profits
  - Somali government, Ethiopian troops pushed Islamic council rebels back from Baidoa towards Mogadishu
    - Ethiopian PM Zenawi claimed “significant portion” of Islamist dead were foreign fighters
    - Senior leader of Islamists threatened a “new phase” in the war
      - Claimed Islamists would deploy suicide bombers against troops in Somalia, against Ethiopian city of Addis Ababa
  - Int’l jihadist leaders posted calls to join fighting in Somalia
    - Urged Muslims to “help their Somali brothers” against the “Ethiopian crusader”
      - Consistent with July threat by UBL to target countries supporting the Gov’t of Somalia to fight Islamists
  - Natl Academy of Sciences study claims Iranian oil revenues could dry up by 2015
    - Study estimates 10% yearly decline, oil infrastructure in disrepair
      - Contradicts reports of Iranian commercial contracts with China, other countries to exploit untapped oil resources
  - Claims of heavy FF presence, coupled with calls to increase support of jihad, may indicate FF diverting from other conflicts into Somalia in the near term.

Sources:
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 20; down 21 from the previous day
  - 2 targeted Shi'a, 1 Kurd, 17 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 68 killed, 106 wounded; up 77 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 16 incidents, 26 killed; down 46 from the previous day
  - 13 occurred in Baghdad; 22 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 16; down 13 from the previous day
  - Total casualties: 61 killed, 99 wounded; up 79 from the previous day
  - 2 targeted Shia, 14 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - 3 VBIEDs, Bayaa; 10 killed, 40 injured
  - VBIED, Adhamiyah; 25 killed, 54 injured
  - IED, Kirkuk; 3 killed, 7 injured

Assessment: Sunni extremists instigate ethno-sectarian violence through high-profile attacks in Adhamiyah, Bayaa. Expect Shi'a death squad retaliation within 24-48 hours.
Recent reporting:

- Amarah security situation deteriorating; recent increase in murders, kidnappings
  - 26 Dec, JAM member reportedly assassinated by unidentified gunman
  - 25 Dec, Provincial civil administration employee reportedly assassinated
    - Emergency Security Committee encountering problems directing ISF activities

- Sporadic fighting reported between IP and JAM in Samawah, 26 Dec
  - Reports of JAM members coming from Amarah to join the fighting
  - Deployment of National Police Battalion, 10th IA Div reportedly having stabilizing influence

Assessment: Recent low-level assassinations involving JAM in Amarah likely reflect difficulties of Provincial Emergency Security Committee’s efforts to confront JAM, disloyal ISF. Limited clashes within Samawah will likely continue, focusing particularly against static ISF, provincial government locations. Combined ISF capable of containing situation, limit ability for JAM to receive reinforcements.

SOURCES:
- MCFI
- MX
- MND

traveling from Amarah to attack British
Current Situation

- High profile attacks in Baghdad
  - Four VBIEDs targeted Shi'a civilians
    - Three VBIEDs detonated nearly simultaneously in Bayaa
      - Targeted Bayaa used car market in traditionally Shi'a neighborhood
    - Vehicle occupied by 3 LN males, observed leaving the scene prior to blast
  - VBIED attack in Adhamiyah
    - Attack occurred near a Sunni mosque in a mixed neighborhood
  - Attacks caused significant casualties

- Attacks follow several recent high profile incidents targeting Shi'a civilians
  - 13 Dec, SVBIED targeted day laborers in Rusafa
  - 5 Dec, VBIE in Bayaa targeted patrons at gas station; 2nd VBIE F/C
  - 2 Dec, 3 VBIEDs detonated almost simultaneously at a market, Rusafa
  - 23 Nov, multiple VBIEDs detonated in, around Sadr City

- No claims; targeting, methodology implicate AQI
  - Recent reporting indicates AQI's Abu Nur VBIED network would target Shi'a civilians and CF in Adhamiya

- AQI continues using high profile attacks to inflame sectarian tensions. Expect further attacks along periphery of Sunni neighborhoods as AQI seeks to establish safe havens in key areas.

Notes & Sources:
BBC News – “Dozens Killed by Baghdad Blasts” 26 DEC 06
MND-B SPOTREP 1.4c
SIGACTS

1st CAV G2 ACE assessment
OUTLOOK: Saudi Arabia and Iraq

- Saudi Arabia is unlikely planning direct intervention in Iraq, despite recent open source reporting indicating the opposite
  - 12 Dec, article quoting US, Arab diplomats claimed Saudis warned US Saudi govt may back Iraqi Sunnis
  - 29 Nov, a reported advisor to the Saudi government detailed options for Saudi intervention in Iraq should CF withdraw, including establishment, support to Sunni militias

“Stepping Into Iraq – New York Times 29 Nov
### STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT- LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

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| 1.4b, 1.4d |

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Area of Interest Update

- Islamists retreating in Somalia; Iran stiffens defiance; Sudan allows UN advisors
  - Somali gov’t, Ethiopian troops continued push towards capital of Mogadishu
    - Troops of Somalia Islamic Courts Council in full retreat towards capital; made veiled threats of guerrilla war
    - ISI issued statement calling on Muslims to support Somali Islamists
  - AU, Arab League, IAD met to end fighting; AU reportedly demanded Ethiopia, FF withdraw from Somalia
  - Iranian parliament voted to “revise” gov’t cooperation with IAEA following UNSC sanctions
    - “Revise” not elaborated upon; vote does obligate Pres Ahmadinejad to accelerate nuclear activities
  - UN advisors to enter Sudan within days
    - Sudanese Pres al-Bashir reportedly agreed to advisors following months of negotiations
    - Agreement opens door for follow-on support, possibly non-African peacekeeping forces
- Collapse of Somali Islamists likely to lead to insurgency before peace negotiations. Post-sanctions defiance will continue as Iran attempts to keep focus away from domestic troubles.

Sources:
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 22; up 2 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 21 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 48 killed, 20 wounded; down 106 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 21 incidents, 33 killed; up 7 from the previous day
  - 17 occurred in Baghdad; 30 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 18; up 2 from the previous day
  - Total casualties: 45 killed, 20 wounded; down 95 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 17 unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - VBIED, Adhamiyah; 15 killed, 20 wounded

Assessment: Despite Sunni extremist’s efforts to ignite ethno-sectarian violence with high profile attacks, incidents remain at moderate levels. Expect increased death squad activity in mixed neighborhoods within the next 24 hours.

Source: QNE
• Recent reporting:
  ~27 Dec, spokesman says Sadr called ‘for calm’ following the killing of Sahib al-Amiri, Director of Shahid Allah, in Najaf
  • Shahid Allah is key Sadrist political and outreach organization, distinct from OMS
  ~Spokesman stated ‘We believe Americans want to draw us into an open confrontation; we will not let the timing be theirs’
  • Hundreds of mourners reportedly marched in Najaf chanting anti-American slogans, denouncing PM Maliki
  ~JAM reportedly collecting information from taxi drivers about individuals traveling to and from Camp Delta, al-Kut
  • Taxi drivers supplying information on passengers, their final destination

Assessment: Amiri was likely close political advisor to Sadr; possessed prominent role among Sadrists nationwide and with population in Najaf. Continued protests likely; sanctioned or unsanctioned retaliatory attacks possible. Belief CF responsible for Amiri’s death will fuel Sadr, JAM fears of impending CF attacks.

Sources:
Open Source, BBC Monitoring Iraq Briefing 1600, 27 Dec
MND(CS) INTSUM 26DEC
Current Situation

- **Threats following Saddam’s failed appeal**
  - Possible threats to US interests
    - Open sources quoted former regime Ba’athists: “...resistance determined to retaliate... to harm America and its interests...”;
    - Stated “American administration will be held responsible”
    - Refers to Iraqi government as a “puppet”; no specific threats
    - Open source reporting on internet posting on Ba’ath party website
      - Site reportedly run from Yemen, where a number of exiled Ba’athists reside
    - Unknown when sentence will be carried out; Iraqi law mandates within 30 days
      - MCI personnel placed on 72 hour alert following announcement
    - Saddam issued response letter released yesterday
      - Called on Iraqis not to hate “invaders of their country”
      - Contradicts threats on same website
      - Letter reportedly written by Saddam 5 Nov
        - Date of conviction, sentencing

- **Expect a surge in opportunistic attacks against CF/ISF/IG shortly after execution is announced; rumors of event could spur attacks as well. Spontaneous public gatherings will also be at risk as Shi’a militants, Sunni extremists likely to increase targeting of rival assemblies.**
Data represents reporting from CIDNE (contains NJOC data).
Data time period: 190001DEC06 – 252400DEC06
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Area of Interest Update

- Government troops take Mogadishu; Hajj begins; Egypt provides weapons to PA
  - Somali gov’t, Ethiopian troops swept into capital of Somalia after Islamic Courts Council troops fled
    - Somali PM Gedi announced recapture of Mogadishu following 6 months of Islamist control
      - In Addis Ababa, Ethiopian PM Zenawi announced intent to ‘inflict total defeat’ on remaining Islamists
    - Islamists have reportedly withdrawn to southern port city of Kismayo; vowed to continue fighting
  - Hajj observance began in Mecca
    - Observers estimate 3 million pilgrims participating
      - Pilgrimage started in Mecca; celebrants move to Mount Arafat today, followed by stoning ritual Saturday
    - Egypt provided small arms, ammunition to Fatah loyalists
      - Israel reportedly supports transfer in order to empower Pres Abbas in struggle against Hamas

- Return of Somali government control to Mogadishu increases likelihood of clan-related violence; clan leaders will vie for influence in absence of Islamist control.

Sources:
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 28; up 6 from previous day
  - 1 Kurd, 27 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 59 killed; 33 wounded; up 24 from previous day

- National ethno-sectarian executions: 25 incidents; 43 killed; up 10 from the previous day
  - 17 occurred in Baghdad; 24 killed

- Baghdad incidents: 18; same as the previous day
  - Total casualties: 43 killed, 14 wounded; down 8 from the previous day
  - All were unattributed

- Significant incidents:
  - 9 bodies found in burning bus, Kirkuk
  - IED, Rusafah; 11 killed, 14 wounded
  - VBIED, Mosul; 2 killed, 18 wounded

Assessment: Increased death squad activity in retaliation for recent high profile attacks. Expect levels to remain steady or increase as Friday Prayers commence.

(Source: OIM)
JAM Update

Recent reporting:
- Sadrists official commented on security situation, ‘attempts to exclude Sadrists’
  - Criticized US efforts to pressure IG into action against JAM
  - Claimed ‘JAM will topple (Maliki) and establish a national salvation government’ if attempts are made to dismantle it
  - Gave US timeline ‘to improve the security situation,’ threatened call for early elections in lieu of improved security
- 15 Dec, JAM reportedly forcing Sunnis out of al-Mashtal neighborhood, Baghdad
  - Deliberate process, approved by senior JAM leaders
  - Shi’a families relocating from Sunni strongholds being allowed to move into vacated homes

Assessment: Sadrists media comments part of overall effort to initiate CF withdrawal timeline; attempting to legitimize militant JAM actions, intimidate IG while portraying themselves as leaders of greater Iraqi Shi’a. JAM continues dislocating Sunnis in mixed areas of Baghdad in an attempt to mitigate Sunni extremist threat, garner support through assistance to displaced Shi’a.

SOURCES:
- (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) 27Dec, JAM force the relocation of sunni populations out al-Mashtal
- 1.4c al-Jazirah “Behind the news” talk show discusses Sadr Currents Iraq role
Current Situation

- Ethno-sectarian incidents in Baghdad
  - Burning bus containing remains found in Karkh
    - Following extinguishment of fire, 9 civilians found on board; all had gunshot wounds
      - Incident occurred in mixed neighborhood of Karkh
    - 27 Dec, 6 victims found together in same neighborhood with gunshot wounds to head
      - Unknown sect, ethnicity of victims
  - Incident resembles July events in Ameriyah
    - Multiple victims with gunshot wounds found in burned bus
      - Additional victims found near bus
    - Incidents prompted spontaneous Shi'a retaliation, followed by organized JAM attacks
      - Ultimately inflamed wider events of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad
  - Extremists, militias continue reciprocal ethno-sectarian violence in mixed neighborhoods
    - Likely to prompt further near term, retaliatory incidents
  - Expect propagation of further ethno-sectarian violence in the form of retaliatory executions as Sunni extremists, Shi'a militants engage in tit-for-tat attacks, vie for territorial control.

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

Late Report CCIR – Murder of LN IVO Baghdad (Karkh): 6X LN Killed, 27 1500 DEC 06, discovered by 57 MP CO and IP discovered 6 bodies (5 male, 1 female)
OUTLOOK: IO Themes and Effects

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI volume down 159 to 151; 6 SVBIED, 2 SVIET, 1 VBIE, 5 Badr, 14 JAM
  - Al-Baghdadi offered US 30 days without attacks to withdraw from Iraq
  - Released multiple statements denouncing CF efforts in Iraq, stating the hopelessness of CF's position; claimed all CF bases, vehicles, and weapons as spoils of war
- AS propaganda volume down 10 to 23; 1 Badr, 3 JAM
  - Rejected calls for new reconciliation conference; "nothing but the sword"
- IAI propaganda volume down 75 to 31; 2 JAM
  - Released video showing beheading of JAM commander
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume down 46 to 20
  - Mujahidin Army opened new website and forum

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume up 2 to 33; mostly attack claims
  - General Command of Jihadist Armed Forces claimed new technology to defeat US armor; claimed successful attack on 21 Nov in Mosul
  - Call and Encampment Brigade released first statement and video after separating from 1920 Revolution Brigade; video showed attack on vehicle in Hit

Assessment: Propaganda volume down 47% from previous week; decrease driven by drop in AQI, IAI attack claims. AQI/ISI propaganda focused on portraying unsuccessful CF efforts in Iraq. Resistance messages highlighting splits likely reflect emerging differences among Resistance members on National Reconciliation efforts.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shi'a to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQIS on goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI’s anti-Shi’a death squad front.

Shi’a extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shi’a extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shi’a enclaves from “Ba’athist Belts” by portraying themselves as Shi’a protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

Sunni Reactionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shi’a economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated, Shi’a militia disarmed and key political demands met.

Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from unduly 1.4b, 1.4d box the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

- Bushehr Work Continues; Somali Prime Minister Returns to Capital; Palestinian-Israeli Talks
  - Russians complete phase at Iran’s Bushehr nuke plant
    - More than 95% of first nuclear power unit completed
    - Physical start up scheduled for September 2007
  - Somali Prime Minister returns to Mogadishu
    - Welcomed by thousands of cheering citizens
    - Airspace opened for humanitarian flights
    - Foreign fighters enter Kismayo
  - Palestinian-Israeli secret talks draw negative response
    - Israeli Foreign Minister secretly meeting with Palestinian Officials
      - Palestinian FM Media Official accused both sides of dragging Palestinian people into making concessions while under siege
    - Hamas continues attempts to draw Israeli response
      - Multiple rockets fired into Israel Friday

- Bushehr work continues due to exemption under UNSC Resolution 1737. Expect sporadic fighting to continue as Somali forces pursue islamists south of capital.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”
BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”
OSC IA 1.4c “Kiriyenko stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 13; down 15 from the previous day
  - 1 targeted Shi'a, 12 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 50 killed, 30 wounded; down 12 from previous day
- National ethno-sectarian executions: 11 incidents; 40 killed; down 3 from the previous day
  - 10 occurred in Baghdad; 37 killed
- Baghdad incidents: 11; down 7 from the previous day
  - Total casualties: 40 killed, 22 wounded; down 6 from the previous day
  - All were unattributed
- Significant incidents:
  - SVEST, Diyala; 7 killed, 8 wounded
  - IDF, Rusafah; 3 killed, 22 wounded

Assessment: Despite low ethno-sectarian incidents, casualties remain steady due to high profile attacks. Expect ethno-sectarian violence to rise in response to Saddam Hussein’s execution as targets of opportunity present themselves.
• Recent reporting:
  – Sadrist indicate return to government imminent
    • Spokesman states negotiations between IG, Sadrist have reached
      ‘advanced stage’
  – Senior Sadrist reportedly planning to disband JAM in areas
    where Iraq control security
    • As pre-conditions, they will demand guarantees and amnesty for
      past offenses
  – Sadr advisors allegedly fear CF have adopted new tactic of
    killing Sadrist in their homes
    • Reaction follows recent death of Sadr advisor Sahib al-
      Amiri in Najaf
  – New assassination squad formed by PDoP Abu Maythem to
    rid Amarah of JAM leaders, former regime personnel
    • Squad consists primarily of Badr members within IP
      – 7 deaths to date; no sign of retaliation from JAM
    • Maythem reportedly left Amarah on 26 Dec

Assessment: Sadrists pushing to return to IG, CoR, even without CF withdrawal timetable. No
concrete evidence Sadr intends to disband JAM; likely bargaining chip for return to
government. Sadrists view recent CF operations as threat to larger organization. Amarah
assassinations likely to continue despite Maythem’s possible departure; he will likely remain
engaged in Amarah conflict anticipating future JAM, Badr confrontation.

SOURCES:
MND(SE) FHT, 1.4c Badr assassination squads, 29Dec
GCHQ(T) 1.4c 06, 29Dec, Senior Sadrist plan to disband JAM
1.4b

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

Fox News
CNN
Ramadi attacks

Growing Resistance

1. Albu Risha tribal leaders are looking for ten insurgents wanted for attacks against IP and Civilians from the Albu Risha tribe

2. Families of the IP belonging to Albu Alwan were attacked with mortars in the Hay al Dhubbat district of Ramadi. Following the attack, Albu Alwan tribal leaders and local IP order to spare no insurgent or criminal of justice even if they are Albu Alwan

AQI response

1. AQI is selling fuel to local populace in an effort to gain popular support and to find new recruits IVO white apts in the Ta’mim district of Ramadi. To further their cause, AQI are selling fuel at very low price.

2. A mix of diplomacy, kinetic targeting of tribal leaders. Attack levels through winter months will remain below 2006 highs.
1.4b, 1.4d

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependency of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads, control sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.
Area of Interest Update

• Somali government forces advance; Iran announces loan; political uncertainty in Turkey
  – Somali government forces closed on Kismayo
    • Government called for talks to reduce bloodshed
    • Islamists, reportedly led by suspects in US embassy bombings, rejected talks
  – Iran unveiled $1 billion loan to Iraq
    • Aimed at reconstruction in areas of ‘mutual interest’
      – Iraqis must commit to using Iranian contractors, experts in order to receive money
  – Political uncertainty predicted in Turkey for 2007
    • Presidential election results could change Turkey’s government-religious balance
      – Currently, president maintains responsibility to enforce separation of religion, matters of state
• Contrary to previous plan, expect Somali forces to pursue Islamists into Kismayo. Iranian loan aimed at bolstering influence, presence within Iraq.

Sources:

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Outrage over killing of Gaza boys”

BBC News, 11 Dec: “Arab League hopes for Beirut deal”

OSC IAP 1.4c “Kiriyenko stresses Iran’s ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear activities”
**Ethno-Sectarian Conflict Update**

- National ethno-sectarian incidents: 19; up 6 from the previous day
  - 3 targeted Shi'a; 16 unattributed
  - Total casualties: 71 killed, 80 wounded; up 64 from previous day
- National ethno-sectarian executions: 16 incidents; 24 killed; down 16 from the previous day
  - 14 occurred in Baghdad; 21 killed
- Baghdad incidents: 15; up 4 from the previous day
  - Total casualties: 48 killed, 53 wounded; up 36 from the previous day
  - 2 targeted Shia; 13 unattributed
- Significant incidents:
  - VBIED, Najaf; 20 killed, 40 wounded
  - 2 VBIEDs, Hurriyah; 25 killed, 50 wounded
  - VBIED, Adhamiyah; 2 killed, 3 wounded

**Assessment:** High profile attacks accounted for majority of casualties. Execution incidents continue movement toward SW Baghdad as Shi'a extremists push into historically mixed neighborhoods.
Recent reporting:
- JAM reportedly issued ultimatum demanding Samawah CoP Col Ali be removed, all detained JAM members be released
  - If conditions are not met, JAM will resume attacks against IP, IA
  - Col Ali refuses negotiations with JAM, indicated he will deal with JAM through use of force
    - Col Ali reportedly has the support of the Provincial Council and the local Samawah population
- NW Baghdad JAM cdr reported replacement delayed, late Dec
  - Shaykh Husam’s alleged replacement, Nur Rahim al-Shimusi, unpopular w/ local leadership
    - Senior OMS/JAM leadership in Najaf, Karbala pushing al-Shimusi’s selection
  - Husam due to be replaced on 22 Dec
  - Could still be replaced as soon as early January

Assessment: Col Ali’s refusal to negotiate with JAM is consistent with his previous hard line against JAM; Ali’s position will likely be supported by key tribal leaders. Neither JAM nor Col Ali are expected to compromise on the ultimatum, increasing risk Col Ali will be targeted for assassination. Local JAM opposition to new commander indicative of JAM infighting, resulting from recent purges, reorganization.

SOURCES:
MND(SE) FHT 1.4c Samawah JAM, 27Dec
GCHQ(T) 1.4c, 29Dec, Replacement of JAM commander
Current Situation

- **High profile attacks across Iraq**
  - Multiple VBIEDs in Baghdad, Najaf
    - 2 X VBIEDs in Hurriyah
      - 2 x VBIEDs targeted civilians, causing multiple casualties, significant damage to shops
      - VBIED targeted civilians
    - VBIED targeting civilians detonated near Shi'a mosque
    - VBIED detonation reported in Bayaa; target not known
    - VBIED in Najaf struck a Kufa market
      - Wounded attacker captured; allegedly confessed to retaliatory intent, but later died in custody
  - **SVEST attack in Tal Afar**
    - Suicide bomber: likely targeting off-duty IP officers killed multiple LN bystanders
      - Follows 13 December SVEST attack in Tal Afar.
  - No attack claims; likely attributable to AQI, possibly in conjunction with Ba'athists
    - Attacks focused on targets of opportunity, generally within Shi'a areas
      - Attacker’s confession to IA in Najaf unsubstantiated
- **High profile attacks targeted Shi'a civilians, ISF**; likely targets of opportunity, possibly related to Hussein execution. Expect near term events to focus on CF/ISF, as Sunni extremists attempt to exploit perceived holiday lull.
OUTLOOK: AS: Defensive but capable in 2007

- Late-2006 detentions damaged leadership structure, but tactical operations continue unabated
  - Detention of Ansar al Sunna regional leaders and one national level commander forced defensive information operations; AS denied captures, increased attack claims
  - Decentralized network continues to allow sustained attack levels
- Detainees continue to indicate AS still experiencing financial difficulties
  - Funding problems have long led to alternative income generation methods and tactical alliances with financially stable groups
  - Money woes hinder AS’ ability to significantly increase independent attack capabilities
- Likelihood of merger with AQI/ISI remains dim
  - AS leadership continues to harbor contempt for AQI leadership; latest AQI outreach effort remains unanswered
  - Trusted AQISL religious adviser Atiyah Abd al Rahman’s decision to not enter Iraq likely scuttles chance of any merger in the near to medium term

Assessment: Recent setbacks have not shattered Ansar al Sunna. Institutional resiliency and decentralized operations have offset any impact on group attack capabilities or standing as the second most significant Iraqi jihadist group into 2007.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - LATE 2006

- The conflict in Iraq increasingly transitions into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create/protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their political and religious agendas. Baghdad defines the conflict and remains the focus for sectarian violence. Death squads locked in mutually-reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife forcing Sunni and Shia to accept militias for safety. Sectarian violence spreading to Diyala, Kirkuk with competition for provincial influence. Southern Iraq and Anbar conflicts over political and tribal control, CF presence.

- Sunni extremists continue efforts to expel CF, make Iraq ungovernable and perpetuate sectarian violence in Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. AQI leadership increasingly convergent with AQSs in goals and strategy. Capable cellular networks provide resilience, despite CF operations disrupting leadership. Attacks focus on civilians and ISF with Umar Brigade as AQI's anti-Shi'a death squad front.

- Shia extremist influence on national and provincial political agendas through infiltration and intimidation further challenges ISF/CF ability to maintain security. Shia extremists sponsor death squads within and outside Baghdad to secure Shia enclaves from "Ba'athist Belts" by portraying themselves as Shia protectors and eliminating Sunni competition; prime agents of sectarian violence.

- Sunni Rejectionists continue decentralized, disorganized effort to expel CF, prevent Shia economic, territorial gains and reverse Sunni political marginalization. Some hardliners, increasingly augmenting ranks of Sunni extremists, providing professional military skills. Moderates will accept reconciliation, disarmament once death squads eliminated. Shia militia disarmed and key political demands met.

- Maliki Government asserting itself on security issues. Sectarian agendas within key ministries, questionable dependability of MoI elements, rivalry for control of key resources and limited influence of central government outside Baghdad remain challenges. Iraqi government failure to eliminate death squads -Emergent sectarian violence, generate economic growth, and establish an inclusive political environment free from undue 1.4b, 1.4d - pose the greatest long-term risks to MNF objectives.