C3 Plans and Policy Top Ten Notes for 9 August 2007

C3 Plans and Policy Notes:
1. Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 07 Review (NEW)
2. MNC-I Shia Engagement Strategy (NEW)
3. IA Future FAQ Rotations (Update)
4. Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (Update)
5. Build POE Capability - Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction (Update)
6. MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine (Update)
7. MNC-I Request for Forces # 143 - Engineer Assets for MND-C. (New)
8. Operation Phantom Hammer (Operations to regain control of Diwaniya) (Update)
9. Request For Forces MNC-I # (RFF) 146 Executive Police Advisors (New).
10. Operation Phantom Strike (Disrupting an AQI Surge) (Update)

1. TOPIC: Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 07 Review (NEW)
DISCUSSION: Leading an extended MNC-I staff planning reviewing of the final, signed MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 2007. Point papers (written for previous versions of the JCP) are being updated to reflect issues with the final edition.
NEXT ACTION: Forward compiled point papers for CG review.
KEY DATES: None at this time.

2. TOPIC: MNC-I Shia Engagement Strategy (NEW)
DISCUSSION: Plans has been tasked to develop a mission analysis pursuant to developing a comprehensive Shia engagement strategy that encompasses the spectrum of Shia entities: militias, irreconcilables, as well as those that might favor reconciliation utilizing lethal and nonlethal means. The purpose of this strategy is to provide clarity for subordinate commands in their engagement with the Shia.
NEXT ACTION: Mission received from CG 06 Aug 07; Conducted initial OPT meeting 08 Aug 07; Daily 2 x hour planning sessions are planned Thursday through Sunday in order to brief the results of mission analysis to the CG on Monday, 13 August.
KEY DATES: 13 August Mission Analysis brief to CG.

3. TOPIC: IA Future FAQ Rotations (Update)
DISCUSSION: C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. MG Berragan concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN. 4/7 IA has been replaced by 4/11 IA as a priority on the FORCEGEN Tracker. It is forecasted
to be FOC on 1 APR 08. 1 AUG, IGFC announced that 1/4/10 and 2/2/10 were once again extended. FUOPS currently working COA for replacing 4th rotation with permanent IA units.

**NEXT ACTION:** Discuss COA with IGFC

**KEY DATES:** IGFC discussion this week

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**4. TOPIC:** Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** On 15 June 2007 MNC-I reached its peak combat strength with the final plus-up BDE (2/3 HBCT) and 3 CAB achieving full operational capability in MND-C and the 13th MEU beginning operations in AO Anaheim in North Eastern MNF-W. MNC-I has increased the scope and intensity of offensive operations to take the fight to the enemy. Operations Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah, Operation Marne Torch in Arab Jabour, Operation Hardh Al-Amin in the Lake Thar Thar region and Operations Dragon Fire and Gates of Freedom in the Rashid and Mansour Security Districts respectively have already made significant strides in securing the Iraqi populace and reducing AQI and Shia extremists freedom of movement.

MNC-I remains on the offensive with MND-B conducting Operations Dragon Hammer and Dragon Anvil clearing and defeating AQIZ in Rashid and Arab Jabour and Operation Iron Blitz to clearing West of Taji. MND-N will continue to attack AQI in the Diyala River Valley with the continuation of Operation Arrowhead Ripper, and prevent them from gaining sanctuary elsewhere by defeating AQI in the Kirkuk/Tuz area as part of Operation Bronco Ripper. MND-C continues to clear the Southern Baghdad Belts with Operations Avalanche, Operation Husky, and Operation Marne Torch II. MNF-W continues to clear remaining AQI elements in MNF-W with Operation Black Diamond in Karmah, and Operation Pegasus Bridge along their Eastern Boundary, and prepares Fallujah for IP control with Operation Alljah.

While the focus of plus-up forces is Baghdad and the Baghdad belts. MNC-I continues to apply pressure on insurgent networks across the breadth of the country. While Baghdad remains the Corps’ main effort, Baqubah and the Diyala River Valley are currently the Corps’ top priorities for corps assets. While focusing on protecting the Iraqi population MNC-I will expand operations to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary in areas CF has traditionally had minimal presence while maintaining forces to foster further improvement in those areas that are showing initial signs of success.

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**5. TOPIC:** Build POE Capability - Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction – (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Current MNF-I planning efforts for key land POEs include building POE capability. As part of this effort the Corps will push an initial 4 station BAT system w/ supporting VSAT and required equipment out to the Rabiyah POE within the week. The purpose is to determine the feasibility & serviceability of these systems at a POE. This effort will serve to be the basis of planning for follow-on implementation of same
systems out at the other major POE's. Personnel & equipment deployed this week and
will be in place by 09 Aug 07. Additionally MNF-I began an OPT early May to develop
an action plan on interdicting the flow of foreign fighters movement and infiltration inside
Iraq which entails a focused, synchronized CF and DBE operation. The goal is to
reduce the capabilities of AQI and extremists that destabilize Baghdad. Current MOD1
to MNF Frago - Interdiction of FF & F is out for staffing and under review by Corps Staff.

**NEXT ACTION:**
- Continue Corps planning efforts to building POE capability

**KEY DATES:**
09 Aug – MNF-I Staff conduct formal brief on the Border – POE Update to MNF-I Cdr.
10-12 Sep 07 (Tentative) Border Enforcement Conf with neighboring countries at the
US Embassy (DHS Host).

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6. **TOPIC**: MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requested Riverine capability to deny
Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. JFCOM RFI dated 30
Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 not be sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W), directed
CENTCOM to source internally. ONS submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06, disapproved
8 JAN 07. Joint Capabilities Board met without significant results. At the request of
VADM Morgan (N3/N5), the DJ8 removed the Riverine JUONS topic from discussion at
the 6 Jul 07 Joint Coordination Board. The JS J3 directed JFCOM to develop a joint in-
lieu-of solution and get the global force management process moving, Global Force
Management Board projected for 6 Sep 07. Updated response to RFF 656 provided to
MNF-I to provide additional information regarding this planning.

Coalition partners contacted to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Current
responses are all negative, two countries pending response. [Declassified]
DASD) office distributed to coalition representatives MNC-I CG letter of need with MNF-I CG
concurrence and Riverine briefing. Message of need sent by OSD sent to possible
Coalition partners, 11 July

Iraqi boat manufacturer HEESCO will produce boats(6-9mon) or repair/upgrade
boats.(60-90 days) MND-B will be first customer. Boat design and FAB repair are first
order followed by repainting of Coast Guard transfers and then actual production. Intent
is production of two watercraft to confirm capabilities then additional based on mission
load. Big concern is that ISF forces are not going to local companies to get this type of
specialty equipment and MOD failure to accept an already produced in country
produced sea vessel is hurting this company.

Iraqi Navy capabilities are available, Iraqi Navy Commander has concurred and will
release the six FABs, MOU is with him for signature. Engine requisition and boat
utilization will be by MND-B, engine PR&C submitted, Contracting.

FRAGO published in 26Jun07 DTU, specifying commercial watercraft option to MNDs
utilizing OMA funds and internal assets. DA LNO has located 11 Coast Guard
watercraft, 6 LNT 19 AUG.
Feasibility of Transportation Corps Medium Boat or Harbormaster Detachments serving as watercraft operators, maintainers and trainers via RFF being researched. Will be submitted if Navy/Joint Staff does not provide a solution. Units are qualified to operate the watercraft but lack watercraft, sufficient weapon systems, and sufficient unit level maintenance capability.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research options to provide the capability within funding, manning, legal, and acquisition constraints. Project Officer prepared to assist MNDs with commercial requests. See Riverine Research and Actions Folder, Deputy folder, C3 Plans and Policy Web page on SIPR and CENTRIX.

**KEY DATES:**

7. **TOPIC:** MNC-I Request for Forces # 143 - Engineer Assets for MND-C. (New)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF includes: 1 X Engineer Brigade Headquarters, 2 X Multifunctional Engineer Battalion Headquarters, 2 X Clearance Companies, 1 X Engineer Support Company, 1 X Survey and Design Detachment, 1 X Concrete Section, 1 X Horizontal Construction Company, and 1 X Vertical Construction Company to support combat and construction operations in Multi-National Division Center Area of Operations. This RFF requests the validation of the Echelon Above Division (EAD) engineer assets required to support combat and construction operations in the MND-C AO. Planning assumptions during the initial support estimate for surge operations included a timeline that predicted surge operations to be complete by 1 August 2007. This assumption has not been validated, and MND-C cannot sustain combat operations without appropriate EAD engineer assets in line with doctrine and those allocated to other Multi-National Divisions. Assets assigned to the Corps Engineer Brigade are tasked at capacity, and utilization rates are not predicted to decrease in the next 12 months. To maintain the momentum and tempo of current operations, assets within the Iraqi theater cannot be reallocated to support MND-C. To MNF-I 6 AUG 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFIs as required.

**KEY DATES:** LADs from 15-30 SEP 07.

8. **TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Hammer (Operations to regain control of Diwaniya)

**DISCUSSION:** Operation PHANTOM HAMMER is a four-phased operation designed to regain control of Diwaniya from insurgent elements. During Phase I, MNC-I prepares a CONPLAN to deploy sufficient forces to Temporary Area of Operations Thunderbird IVO Diwaniyah to conduct clearing operations to reestablish ISF control of the city and enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment. Tentatively, the forces to be employed in this operation include the equivalent of one 1-4b Battalion, one US Infantry Battalion, two IA Battalions from 8IA DIV, and corps enablers. Phase II, set the conditions, will begin upon approval of CONOP, and will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up. Phase III, decisive operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will clear Diwaniya north of the Hilla
River. Phase IV, secure Diwaniya, returns control of Diwaniya to legitimate authorities. MNC-I planners, IGFC representatives, MND-C planners went to Diwaniyah on 21 July 2007 and again on 30 July to conduct combined and joint planning session with MND-CS, 8IA DIV, IGFC, and MND-C to confirm the concept of operations for operation PHANTOM HAMMER. A scheme of maneuver was agreed upon at the 30 July planning session, and graphics to portray that scheme of maneuver will be posted to the C3 plans and policy webpage on SIPR under Named Operations; Phantom Hammer.


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9. TOPIC: Request For Forces MNC-I # (RFF) 146 Executive Police Advisors (New).
DISCUSSION: This RFF requests a total of five Executive Police Advisors to provide expertise in senior law enforcement planning, policy, and political skill. MNC-I requires the skill in law enforcement administration and political awareness that only a seasoned Executive Police Advisor can provide to the senior leadership of the Corps. This RFF requests a senior Executive Police advisor for the Multinational Corps and Multinational Division Commanders. The Corps and Division Commanders have incredible police and training skills within the Military Police leaders and staff officers of the Corps, but as military professionals may not have the breadth of knowledge that a Chief of Police, Police Superintendent, or Federal Deputy Director may possess. As the Coalition reestabishes the rule of law at all levels, these senior Executive Police Advisors will be a vital element in establishing the supervisory and national level police expertise, and the interface with political leaders. More junior police will lack the law enforcement administration experience to assist the Iraqi government at the highest levels. Experienced senior police executives will be able to coach senior Iraqi police as well as to advise the Corps and Division Commanders. This RFF is based on a recommendation for this capability by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. To MNF-I 6 AUG 07.
NEXT ACTION: Respond to RFIs from MNF-I.
KEY DATES: LAD: 15 DEC 07
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10. TOPIC: Operation Phantom Strike (Disrupting an AQI Surge) (Update)
DISCUSSION: AQI is expected to attempt a surge in activities during the latter half of August and the first half of September both as part of a historical pattern associated with Ramadan, and as an attempt to influence CF governments and publics in advance of the scheduled September Assessment from GEN Petraeus to Congress.
MNC-I will conduct focused operations to disrupt or prevent AQI from carrying out planned attacks. The term “Phantom Strike” which previously referred specifically to MNC-I operations against networks emplacing deep buried IEDs, has now been expanded to an umbrella term for all operations which disrupt AQI’s ability to conduct operations from 15 August to 15 September. Operations may target AQI IED networks,
AQI Sanctuary/Staging Areas, AQI HVIs, or other targets which will disrupt AQI’s ability to increase their level of attacks prior to Ramadan.

MSCs briefed their concepts for conducting Phantom Strike to the MNC-I Commander on 3 August during the Commander’s conference. MNC-I will prioritize Corps level enabler support to these operations, and assist in coordinating operations across or adjacent to MSC boundaries.

WAY AHEAD: C3 FUOPS coordinates with the MSCs to synchronize the timing and assist in any required boundary changes for Phantom Strike Objectives which cross or are adjacent to MSC boundaries.

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