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## C3 Plans and Policy Top Ten Notes for 26 July 2007

### C3 Plans and Policy Notes:

1. Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive)
2. Operation Phantom Strike, (Disrupting an AQI Surge)
3. Operation Phantom Hammer (Operations to regain control of Diwaniya)
4. MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine JUONS
5. Request for Forces (RFF) 780 for Military Combat Tracking Dogs (CTD)
6. IA Future FAQ Rotations
7. Integration of SIBs into the regular IA
8. Equipment/Logistical Support to Brigades and Battalions
9. Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction
10. Request to GOI to employ 34<sup>th</sup> BDE (Peshmerga) ISO MND-N ops

#### 1. **TOPIC:** Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** On 15 June 2007 MNC-I reached its peak combat strength with the final plus-up BDE (2/3 HBCT) and 3 CAB achieving full operational capability in MND-C and the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU beginning operations in AO Anaheim in North Eastern MNF-W. MNC-I has increased the scope and intensity of offensive operations to take the fight to the enemy. While increasing the OPTEMPO of enduring operations MNC-I and subordinate units have initiated several new major operations to include Operation Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah, Operation Marne Torch in Arab Jabour, Operation Faridh Al-Amin vic Lake Thar Thar, and Operation Marne Avalanche in Iskandariyah and will continue to conduct new operations throughout the summer. Phantom Strike, a series of independent but related operations designed to disrupt an anticipated AQI surge in attack preceding the observance of Ramadan will be **conducted from 15 August till 15 September.**

While the focus of plus-up forces is Baghdad and the Baghdad belts. MNC-I continues to apply pressure on insurgent networks across the breadth of the country. While Baghdad remains the Corps' main effort, Baqubah and the Diyala River Valley are currently the Corps' top priorities for corps assets. While focusing on protecting the Iraqi population MNC-I will expand operations to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary in areas CF has traditionally had minimal presence while maintaining forces to foster further improvement in those areas that are showing initial signs of success.

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

#### 2. **TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Strike (Disrupting an AQI Surge) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** AQI is expected to attempt a surge in activities during the latter half of August and the first half of September both as part of a historical pattern associated with Ramadan, and as an attempt to influence CF governments and publics in advance of the scheduled September Assessment from GEN Petraeus to Congress.

MNC-I will conduct focused operations to disrupt or prevent AQI from carrying out planned attacks. The term "Phantom Strike" which previously referred specifically to

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MNC-I operations against networks emplacing deep buried IEDs, has now been expanded to an umbrella term for all operations which disrupt AQI's ability to conduct operations from **15 August to 15 September**. Operations may target AQI IED networks, AQI Sanctuary/Staging Areas, AQI HVIs, or other targets which will disrupt AQI's ability to increase their level of attacks prior to Ramadan.

MSCs have provided MNC-I with an initial timeline of their anticipated operations in support of Operation Phantom Strike **and will backbrief their plans in greater detail to LTG Odierno on 3 August**. MNC-I will prioritize Corps level enabler support to these operations, and assist in coordinating operations across or adjacent to MSC boundaries.

**NEXT ACTION:** MND-N, MNF-W, MND-B and MND-C Briefing to CG, MNC-I on 3 Aug.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Hammer (Operations to regain control of Diwaniya)  
(Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Operation PHANTOM HAMMER is a four-phased operation designed to regain control of Diwaniya from insurgent elements. During Phase I, MNC-I prepares a CONPLAN to deploy sufficient forces to Temporary Area of Operations Thunderbird IVO Diwaniyah to conduct clearing operations to reestablish ISF control of the city and enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment. **Tentatively, the forces to be employed in this operation include the equivalent of one Polish Battalion, one US Infantry Battalion, two IA Battalions from 8IA DIV, and corps enablers.** MNC-I C3 Plans hosted a planning conference in Al Faw palace from 0800-1700 on 07JUL07 and again from 0800-1500 on 08JUL07, to integrate corps enablers, CF, and ISF forces into the courses of actions. Phase I ends when CONPLAN is briefed to the MNC-I CG on 16 Jul 07. Phase II, set the conditions, will begin upon approval of CONOP, and will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up. Phase III, decisive operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will remove insurgent threat from Diwaniya. Phase IV, secure Diwaniya, returns control of Diwaniya to legitimate authorities. **MNC-I planners, IGFC representatives, MND-C planners went to Diwaniyah on 21 July 2007 and conducted combined and joint planning session with MND-CS and 8IA DIV to confirm the concept of operations for operation PHANTOM HAMMER.**

**NEXT ACTION:** PLANORD to be published for staffing NLT 26 July 2007; published for execution NLT 29 July 2007. Phase III of PHANTOM HAMMER will begin NET 15 August 2007.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requested Riverine capability to deny Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. JFCOM RFI dated 30 Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 not be sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W), directed CENTCOM to source internally. ONS submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06, disapproved 8 JAN 07. Joint Capabilities Board met without significant results. At the request of VADM Morgan (N3/N5), the DJ8 removed the Riverine JUONS topic from discussion at the 6 Jul 07 Joint Coordination Board. The JS J3 **directed** JFCOM to develop a joint in-

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lieu-of solution and get the global force management process moving. Updated response to RFF 656 provided to MNF-I to provide additional information regarding this planning.

Coalition partners contacted to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Current responses are all negative, two countries pending response. (b)(6) DASD) office distributed to coalition representatives MNC-I CG letter of need with MNF-I CG concurrence and Riverine briefing. Message of need sent by OSD sent to possible Coalition partners, 11 July.

Iraqi boat manufacturer HEESCO will produce boats (6-9mon) or repair/upgrade boats (60-90 days). MND-B will be first customer. Boat design and FAB repair are first order followed by repainting of Coast Guard transfers and then actual production. Intent is production of two watercraft to confirm capabilities then additional based on mission load. Big concern is that ISF forces are not going to local companies to get this type of specialty equipment and MOD failure to accept an already produced in country produced sea vessel is hurting this company.

Iraqi Navy capabilities are available, Iraqi Navy Commander has concurred and will release the six FABs, MOU is with him for signature. Engine requisition and boat utilization will be by MND-B, engine PR&C being validated for signature when MOU is signed.

FRAGO published in 26Jun07 DTU, specifying commercial watercraft option to MNDs utilizing OMA funds and internal assets. DA LNO has located 11 Coast Guard watercraft. Transfer is approved, transportations and document numbers designated. Coordinating actual movement stateside owning units, boats going to MND-N and MND-B.

Feasibility of Transportation Corps Medium Boat or Harbormaster Detachments serving as watercraft operators, maintainers and trainers via RFF being researched. Will be submitted if Navy/Joint Staff does not provide a solution. Units are qualified to operate the watercraft but lack watercraft, sufficient weapon systems, and sufficient unit level maintenance capability.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research Joint, Coalition, and Iraqi Options to provide the capability and over come funding, manning, legal, and acquisition constraints. Locate and requisition required major components to support selected commercial options. Project Officer prepared to assist MNDs with commercial requests. See Riverine Research and Actions Folder, Deputy folder, C3 Plans and Policy Web page on SIPR and CENTRIX.

**KEY DATES:**

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**5. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) 780 for Military Combat Tracking Dogs (CTD) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests the development and deployment of Combat Tracking Dogs to the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). CTD are an emerging capability within the Department of Defense and exist at the moment only within the United States Marine Corps. A training program must be initiated to provide a renewable, enduring base for CTD until the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This capability will provide a vital resource for Coalition Forces deployed theater wide. Currently there are

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(b)(6) CTD Teams in the ITO, with only (b)(6) in the DOD inventory. MNC-I requires the fielding of (b)(6) 1.4a teams. Transmitted to Force 23 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 2 JUN 07. Released from CENTCOM 3 Jul 07. JUONS in-staffing at MNC-I. Anticipate ONS Board 8 Jul 07 then forward to MNF-I 10 Jul 07. **NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI as required, assist with JUONS as required. **Sourcing recommendation sent to JS; recommend closing staffing and CENTCOM work towards contracting until Services develop capability. "USMC has (b)(6) in theater. CENTCOM could redirect as needed."**

**KEY DATES:** LAD 30 SEP 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**6. TOPIC:** IA Future FAQ Rotations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. MG Berragan concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN. 4/7 IA has been replaced by 4/11 IA as a priority on the FORCEGEN Tracker. It is forecasted to be FOC on 1 APR 08. **10 IA was directed to extend 1/4/10 and 2/2/10 IA. On 23 JUL, we received IGFC confirmation that the rotation was back on. New units are 1/3/10 and 1/1/10 IA.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Identify TBD BN

**KEY DATES:** Move to BRC 7-9 AUG

TNG @ BRC 10-24 AUG

Move to BD 25-26 AUG

RIPTOA NLT 29 AUG

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** Integration of SIBs into the regular IA (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Closely linked with the Infrastructure Security Strategy is the issue of developing capability with the Iraqi Army to effectively secure energy infrastructure. **The forces currently assigned to this task are the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, (SIBs), whose performance was below that required to provide effective protection to critical energy infrastructure. The SIBs are to be fully incorporated into the Iraqi Army through a training and equipping process led by MNSTC-I. MNC-I is responsible for subsequent partnering and sustainment training. ICW IAG, C3 Plans are looking harvest MiTTs from more capable IA units to help develop the "less" capable IA units produced through SIB integration or scheduled IA growth.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Following direction received from the C3, develop detailed courses of action for harvesting MiTTs.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**8. TOPIC:** Equipment/Logistical Support to Brigades and Battalions (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The next units scheduled to come down in support of FAQ will be 1/3/10 and 1/2/10. Equipment shortfalls have been addressed and there are none as of this time. The two battalions have been notified to bring their fuel vouchers, which has been

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a problem in the past with other battalions. 1/3/10 is planned to be based at JSS Thrasher and 1/2/10 is expected to be based at Lion's Den. MNSTC-I J-4 Maintenance is addressing the HMMWV parts problem. They have devised a new plan for ordering. Requisitions will go from the battalion, to the division, then to the RSU. If the RSU does not have the part in stock they will turn to the repair shop. If the shop does not have the part then a request is made to J-4 Maintenance at which time they will expedite delivery via a contractor in Virginia. They estimate the new process will take 45 – 60 days to deliver a part to the RSU which is a big difference from the usual 180+ day time frame. **IAG is collecting information for J-4, to assemble the proper list of parts to keep in stock at RSU/GSUs.**

Code out procedures for HMMWVs has been delivered to the MNDs for dissemination down to the IA divisions. **IGFC notified the divisions at the IGFC G4 Conference, on Tuesday, that the vehicles that are totaled need to be run through the Code Out Process or the IGFC will not know to order replacements. Tires are still a very big parts problem. IGFC notified all G4 that the Iraqi military will be converting to all Western type vehicles by August of next year**

Currently there is no process to get parts for Badgers that are not covered by warranty. MNSTC-I is **actively looking for a 3 party to supply parts for the Badger.**

**NEXT ACTION:** C3 ISF LOG continues to monitor equipment status of IA units and especially those supporting FAQ.

**KEY DATES:** 10<sup>th</sup> division units coming to Besmeyah/Baghdad

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**9. TOPIC:** Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** MNF-I STRAT FUOPS began planning and development on National Border Strategy Goals and Iraqi Border Security, 29 Mar 07. **Current planning efforts for key land POEs include building POE capability by means of technology and increase presence ISO both the FF & F and CII fight. MNC-I staff continues to provide detailed requirements and plan for POE development.** Planning efforts for seaports included Maritime Strategy development, security planning on seaports, and any campaign plan objectives for the future operations areas relevant to the drafted MoD Campaign plan (integration of MoD/MoI activities, to include interdiction behind Iraqi borders). **MNF-I / DHS has scheduled a meeting on 24-25 Jul 07 involving the Iraqi Navy, Coast Guard and DBE staff as well as U.S. Navy, DHS and Coalition players in order to finalize details required to create a Memorandum of Understanding amongst the agencies responsible for the security of Iraq's territorial waters, inland waterways and seaports. MNF-I / DHS current efforts to bring Iraq's seaports under the operational control of MOI is projected for NLT AUG 07.** Additionally MNF-I began an OPT early May to develop an action plan on interdicting the flow of foreign fighters movement and infiltration inside Iraq which entails a focused, synchronized CF and DBE operation. The goal is to reduce the capabilities of AQI and extremists that destabilize Baghdad. **Current MOD1 to MNF Frago - Interdiction of FF & F is out for staffing and under review by Corps Staff.**

**NEXT ACTION:**

**-Continue to monitor developments of Seaport Strategy**

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-Complete process to resolve all issues pertaining to a Navy/Coast Guard/DBE Memorandum of Understanding.

-Follow-up on assigned task to in support of the Foreign Fighters initiative.

-Continue planning efforts to building POE capability

**KEY DATES:**

24-25 July 1000hrs - Border Conference that will focus on Iraqi coast guard & Navy integration, capability, roles and responsibility ISO current seaport effort.

04 Aug – MNF- I Staff conduct formal briefing on the Borders, POE's and FF interdictions to MNF-I Cdr.

10-12 Sep 07 (Tentative) Border Enforcement Conf with neighboring countries at the US Embassy (DHS Host).

**POCs:**

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**10. TOPIC:** Request to GOI to employ 34<sup>th</sup> BDE (Peshmerga) ISO MND-N ops (New)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans has requested MNF-I (through CG MNC-I) obtain formal GOI-KRG approval to employ the 34<sup>th</sup> BDE in support of MND-N operations in vicinity of the Diyala River Valley (DRV). The concept for 34<sup>th</sup> BDE is to conduct limited operations, under command of 5IA Div, from four (4) battalion-sized operating bases to the north of the DRV. These forces will augment and capitalize on recent MNC-I achievements.

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