WARPLANS:
1. **TOPIC:** Operation BEDROCK (Clearing AQI from Quarries) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** The juncture of MND-N, MNF-W, and MND-B is an area called “the quarries” which never had lasting CF presence and is used by AQI to exploit the seam between MSCs for freedom of transit, training, staging attacks, and temporary sanctuary. The area is strongly defended primarily to the East and South by deep buried IEDs, and is an area of concentrated surface to air attacks.

A PLANORD for Corps level containment and search and attack operations in the quarries area was published on 28 June. The PLANORD tasks MSCs and staff elements to develop plans to kill or capture AQI in the quarries area, disrupt AQI operations, destroy caches, and establish a holding force to prevent AQI from future overt use of the area.

Currently Kinetic Operations are anticipated to begin on or about 1 August, but LTG Odierno directed planning for early execution so that Corps is prepared to act if the intelligence build indicates that immediate action is warranted.

**NEXT ACTION:** MNF-W, MND-B, MND-N, and CJSOTF-AP back brief their CONOPS to MNC-I on 17 July.

**POC:** 

(b)(3), (b)(6)

2. **TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Strike, Focused Operations against IED networks (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** On order, MNC-I conducts focused offensive operations against specified IED networks across the operational environment in order to neutralize IED cells. We will conduct aggressive, offensive operations, focused on interdicting and disrupting IED emplacers and builders to enhance CF freedom of maneuver and reduce CF casualties caused by IEDs. Key tasks include: conducting focused analysis of IED hot spots in order to refine C-IED intelligence; focusing corps ISR assets against IED hot spots; conduct aggressive, offensive C-IED operations; and conduct sensitive site exploitation of identified IED support activities. The end state of this operation is to disrupt threat IED operations in known hot spot areas; increase MNC-I freedom of action; decrease CF casualties caused by IED; and increase security to the people of
Iraq. Operations will be conducted in three-phases. During Phase I, planning phase, MNC-I leads a planning effort to integrate corps enablers designed to aggressively clear IED “hot spots” and synchronize with operations across the ITO. Phase II, focused intelligence build, will begin upon approval of this operation, and will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up, including an extensive zonal IED analysis by the COIC. Phase III, focused C-IED operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will direct MNDs and key enablers to aggressively clear IED “hot spots” within MND operational environment.

WAY AHEAD: Briefing to CG, MNC-I: 12 JUL 07

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. TOPIC: Operation Phantom Hammer, Operations to regain control of Diwaniya (Update)

DISCUSSION: Operations in Diwaniya will be conducted in four-phases, designed to regain control of Diwaniya from insurgent elements. During Phase I, MNC-I prepares a CONPLAN to deploy sufficient forces to a temporary operating area IVO Diwaniyah to conduct clearing operations to reestablish ISF control of the city and enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment. MNC-I C3 Plans hosted a planning conference in Al Faw palace from 0800-1700 on 07JUL07 and again from 0800-1500 on 08JUL07, to integrate corps enablers, CF, and ISF forces into the courses of actions. Phase I ends when CONPLAN is briefed to the MNC-I CG on 16 Jul 07. Phase II, set the conditions, will begin upon approval of CONOP, and will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up. Phase III, decisive operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will remove insurgent threat from Diwaniya. Phase IV, secure Diwaniya, returns control of Diwaniya to legitimate authorities.

WAY AHEAD: Briefing to CG, MNC-I: 12 JUL 07; Planning session with MND-CS, MND-C, IGFC, 81A, and Corps Planners at Camp Echo on 18 JUL 07.

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. TOPIC: Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (No Change)

DISCUSSION: On 15 June 2007 MNC-I reached its peak combat strength with the final plus-up BDE (2/3 HBCT) and 3 CAB achieving full operational capability in MND-C and the 13th MEU beginning operations in AO Anaheim in North Eastern MNF-W. MNC-I has increased the scope and intensity of offensive operations to take the fight to the enemy. While increasing the OPTEMPO of enduring operations MNC-I initiated several new major operations and will continue to conduct new operations throughout the summer. On 15 June MND-C initiated Operation Marne Torch clearing the Arab Jabour Region South of Baghdad. MND-N’s Operation Arrowhead Ripper began on 19 June to securing the populace in Baqubah. In the next few months more major operations will be initiated to include Marne Avalanche vicinity Iskandariyah in the Southern Belts, and Operation Bedrock to clear AQI from the Quarries area northwest of Baghdad.

The focus of the plus-up forces was Baghdad and the Baghdad belts. MNC-I will continue to apply pressure on insurgent networks across the rest of the country. While Baghdad remains the Corps’ main effort, Baqubah and the Diyala River Valley are top
priorities for corps assets. While focusing on protecting the Iraqi population MNC-I will expand operations to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary in areas CF traditionally had minimal presence while maintaining forces to foster further improvement in those areas that are showing initial signs of success.

POC: ___________________________________________  (b)(3), (b)(6)

5. TOPIC: Integration of SIBs into the regular IA (Update)
DISCUSSION: Closely linked with the Infrastructure Security Strategy is the issue of developing capability with the Iraqi Army to effectively secure energy infrastructure. The forces currently assigned to this task are the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, (SIBs), whose performance was below that required to provide effective protection to critical energy infrastructure. The SIBs are to be fully incorporated into the Iraqi Army. This process will involve: First, withdrawal of SIBs from infrastructure security duties. Secondly, back-filling infrastructure security duties with a sufficiently capable IA Bn. Thirdly, moving the SIB unit to the K1 Regional Training Centre where they will receive 8 weeks training and take receipt of IA equipment. This training will consist of 5 weeks Basic Combat Training followed by 3-weeks additional general infantry skills training. MNC-I C3 Plans is working with MNSTC-I to introduce a leadership package for NCOs and Officers during this 3-week Phase. Fourthly, following training the Bn is re-designated with an IA army designation and is ready for duties. Theoretically the new IA Bn can be deployed on any duty but it is expected they will initially be deployed on the infrastructure security task. There are a number of outstanding issues concerning which have yet to be addressed: Availability of equipment (especially heavier crew-served weapon systems) to bring the new Battalion’s MTOE to the IA standard, and basing of battalions following re-flagging. In line with the concept of Iraqi Transition, MNC-I C3 Plans is partnering and supporting the IGFC to develop plans that will turn MOD/JHQ direction into activity. MNC-I C3 Plans will attend a meeting with the IGFC on 16 Jul 07 where the IGFC will brief their Concept of Operations and back-filling plans. MNC-I C3 Plans, ICW IAG, has been working to determine how existing MiTT capability can be re-deployed to better meet MNC-I’s priorities for developing the Iraqi Army.
NEXT ACTION: Attend IGFC’s briefing for their Concept of Operations.
POC: ___________________________________________  (b)(3), (b)(6)

6. TOPIC: Border Security (No Change)
DISCUSSION: Appendix 10 (Border Security Operations) to Annex C to OPORD 07-01 was published on 1 June. The order details a border strategy involving a four prong approach to border operations to create security in depth. The four areas of emphasis; POEs, borders, smuggling routes within Iraq, and smuggling networks; are complementary with operations in one helping to set the conditions for increased effectiveness in others. These operations will be accompanied by a coordinated IO effort at all echelons to convince Iraqis that they benefit collectively and individually by observing and enforcing GOI border laws and regulations. While none of these areas of emphasis are new this strategy seeks increased effectiveness as more forces are committed to border security, more intelligence collection and analysis is dedicated to target lethal smuggling, and a coordinated effort is made to create synergy between the
four areas of emphasis.

1.4b, 1.4d

NEXT ACTION:

MNC-I will work closely with MNF-I on developing and implementing the MNF-I Near Term Action Plan for interdicting Foreign Fighters.

MNC-I continues to pursue options to improve the security and functioning of POEs on the border. MND-N has completed its mission analysis for providing continuous coverage at Muntheria POE, and MND-SE owes plans and associated costs for providing continuous CF coverage at AL Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs. MND-C continues to pursue forward basing options for BTTs at Badra vic Zurbatiyah, and is planning to develop a series of checkpoints inside the border once the full contingent has arrived in Wassit Province.

Al Qaim POE in Al Anbar province was scheduled to open in the first half of August, but opening has been delayed pending resolution of international agreements between Iraq and Syria. MNF-W will remission a BTT to cover this POE once it is opened.

POC:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

7. TOPIC: ISF Endstate for Baghdad (No Change)

DISCUSSION: Since the last update, the ISF Endstate for Baghdad presentation was presented to the C3 for further guidance. In addition to the suggestions discussed in the last update, the C3 recommended an expansion of Baghdad’s rural Security Districts to include Hussiniyah and Khan Bani Saad.

NEXT ACTION: Continue to conduct integrated staff planning with the BOC planners, MNSTC-I, the MNDs, and IAG. Work together with MND-N and MND-B to develop a concept for expanding the rural Security District of Khan Bani Saad. It is still anticipated that at some future date the plan will be socialized with the BOC leadership. When the Corps Commander returns from leave it is anticipated this brief will go to him for his guidance.

KEY DATES: N/A

POC:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. TOPIC: ISF Development (Update)

DISCUSSION: Since the last update, Plans in coordination with IAG, has been tasked to develop a mission analysis to develop the mission of the BCT tailored for the advisory/assistance role (formerly known as the Advisory/Assistance Brigade). This planning effort is designed to flesh out the requirements for the BCT. MNC-I and IAG will continue to attend MNF-I FUOPs planning efforts to assist them in developing the requirements for the BCT tailored for the advisory/assistance role.
NEXT ACTION: Continue to develop a mission analysis to include an IPB and other associated requirements in anticipation of presentation.
KEY DATES: No meetings scheduled at this time.
POC: 

9. TOPIC: Elections (No Change)
DISCUSSION:

-- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --

On 26 June 2007, the Elections Working Group reviewed the status of the following action items:

Provincial Powers Law: This legislation has not progressed beyond the second reading. USM-I believes that there are two different drafts of this legislation, implying that it still being discussed in committee. This legislation is not required prior to provincial elections.

Elections Law: This legislation has not been drafted and is needed prior to Provincial Elections. It will provide the legal framework for Provincial Elections in Iraq. There has been a suggestion that the 2005 Elections Law will be redrafted; USM-I cannot confirm at this time. USM-I is pushing for the Elections Law to be passed by the Council of Representatives by 15 September 2007.

IHEC received training on scope of duties by UNAMI and the Indian Electoral Commission over the past two weeks. The next step for the IHEC is to confirm the heads of the 19 Governmental Electoral Offices (GEO) (one per province and two in Baghdad). The process for this is that each Governor submits 5 candidates for the post of Director in their Province, and the IHEC will choose the most qualified candidate. Following the selection of the Directors of the 19 GEO, the IHEC will begin to set the conditions for voter registration. Voter registration will be covered in future Elections updates.
Elections Working Group
26 JUN 07

• WHEN: Monthly meeting; last Tuesday of the month
• WHO: UN, USM-I POLOFF, USAID, OPA, SPA (plans, strategy), MNC-I C3 Plans, MNC-I C9, PRT
• TOPIC:
  – Legislative Framework
    • Provincial Powers Law (should be passed prior to elections, but not required)
    • Elections Law (target date SEP)
      – Not entirely sure what it says
      – Public Policy Group (DC Think Tank) is writing a draft
      – Key is the criteria to establish residency (who votes and where do they vote?)
      – May push “rolling elections” to “re-do” the low voter turnout provinces (Anbar, Diyala, Salah Ad Din)
  – IHEC is in charge, not US, not UN
    • 9 election commissioners
    • 2 weeks training by UN in India
    • Permanent staff of 700
    • Independent funding (not under a ministry)
  – Biggest Challenge
    • Voter Registration (target date SEP/OCT)
      – Biometric approach will take 12-18 months (might do for National Elections in Dec 2009)
      – 543 food distribution centers would become voter registration centers (security)
      – Will be open for 1-3 weeks in order to register voters
    • Provincial Elections (120 days after registration is complete (FEB 08))
    • MNC-I Challenge: Support ISF Security (voter registration, ballots, PSD, polling sites)

-- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --

Provincial elections cannot proceed until all related legislation is resolved, making elections unlikely before February 2008. Provincial elections have the potential to pull more Sunnis into the political process and improve governance in some provinces, such as Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, and Ninewa. When the elections occur, it is likely that politically organized Sunni Arabs and Sadrists, neither of whom participated in the last round of provincial elections, are positioned to make significant gains, however, Sunni insurgents who oppose elections will likely intimidate neutral or pro-GOI Sunnis from going to the polls. Elections by themselves will not reduce violence; the critical factor in the reduction of sectarian violence continues to be improving the security conditions for the citizens of Iraq.

It is reasonable to assume that there are some in the GOI who stand to lose power when an election occurs, and will attempt to postpone the Provincial Elections until January 2009 when the National Elections are next scheduled to occur. Presently, sub-provincial elections cannot legally occur; if sub-provincial elections are held, perhaps in a city or a district, the “elected officials” would have no legal status and control neither levers of legitimate power nor a legal financial stream.

The concept of a “tribal council”, whereby leaders of several tribes might come together to form an informal council, is encouraged as a stabilizing force to augment and support the efforts of the Provincial Governors and the legitimate Provincial Council, as long as it does not attempt to usurp or wrest legitimate power away from the Provincial Governor.
10. **TOPIC:** Alternate Ground LOC (GLOC) Considerations (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** DLA is working initiatives with SDDC, CDDOC, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, CTO, and MNF-I R&S to move more CL IV through Port of Um Qasar (Iraq) for MNF-W customers and through Port of Um Qasar (Iraq) for MNF-SE and CS customers. Shifting the MSR coming out of Kuwait from Tampa to Aspen resulted in a restricted flow of supplies. Bde RIPS will take priority over movement of certain classes of supplies. Moving the supplies in through alternate ports will help alleviate delays in delivery. We are able to move non-military supplies through and increasing the amount of supplies moved through ports other than Kuwait will decrease congestion along the MSR into Iraq and also help improve flow rates.

**NEXT ACTION:** +Awaiting action from higher.

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11. **TOPIC:** Infrastructure Security Strategy (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I has begun parallel planning with MNF-I as we attempt to address the security issues and concerns of oil and electrical infrastructure in Iraq. Planners are participating in a number of MNF-I working groups in order to better understand the relationship between the attacks and the effects on the ability of infrastructure to deliver energy both oil and electricity to the populace as well as government wealth generation. ICW JWAC, a review of energy infrastructure is taking place which seeks to determine how to improve the availability of electricity to Baghdad in the shortest time possible. The review will consider the energy infrastructure priorities of the Iraqi ministries (the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Ministry of Defence). On completion, the review will be compared to an analysis of threats to energy infrastructure. The vastness of energy infrastructure prevents total security but the combination of the infrastructure review and the threat analysis will enable security to be focused in areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high. Once we have confirmed our focus for energy infrastructure security, the Iraqi Ministries, (Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Electricity, and Ministry of Defence) will be engaged to ensure coherence of effort. The IA is responsible for the security of infrastructure.

**NEXT ACTION:** Combine infrastructure review and threat analysis to identify areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high.

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12. **TOPIC:** Southwest Support Zones (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans is conducting mission analysis on the area from Amiriyah (in MNF-W) to Iskandariyah (MND-C) and from Lake Razazza to the Euphrates River; also known as the Southwest Support Zone. Concern is that threat forces have freedom of action in this area and use portions of this area as a sanctuary. Operation River Walk II near Amiriyah and operations in Zaidon by MNF-W has reduced threat presence in that
portion of the Southwest Support Zone. Upcoming MND-C operations, such as Marne Avalanche, will disrupt enemy activity in the Iskandariya portion of the Southwest Support Zone. To date no operation has disrupted enemy activity along the depth of the Southwest Support Zone. Mission analysis continues in order to determine whether a larger operation will significantly impact enemy operations south of the Euphrates River Valley.

13. **TOPIC:** Coalition Participation (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** The following is a list of significant changes anticipated in the coalition during the remainder of 2007.
14. **TOPIC:** Base Consolidation and Closure (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** in the ongoing efforts to turn over battle space to the ISF, MSC close or transfer bases to GOI approved receiver (MOD, MOI, MOF) under a “condition based” approach. Base transfer / closures is a conditions based approach driven by three major considerations: stability in the AO, ISF ability/capability to assume & hold battle space and funding for base consolidation. The current methodology is bottom-up driven with MSC nominating bases for transfer / closure, gaining approval, and following a 100 day notional timeline, which serves as a guide to accomplish necessary steps in the transfer / closure process.

**Next Action:** All base transfers/closure nominations have to be approved by CG. No further action required for 3ID CAB at Stryker, and BNs at Camp Delta and 2/3 HBCT (Brigade #20) at LSAA, Taji, Liberty, Falcon, and Kalsu.

**Future Actions:** IZ Transition is back on the table which entails the consolidation of MNF-I presence in the IZ from 13 to 3 locations; with two being MND-B bases (Union III and Prosperity). The transition also requires the transfer of Base Union I (Oct08), Freedom Rest (Jul08), the relocation of CSH to VBC (Sep08) and the relocation of GRD to VBC (June08). As part of the consolidation, MND-B will have to relocate from Union III NLT Jan 08 and transfer the base to JASG, which begins construction and renovations to relocate MNF-I FWD by Oct 08. MND-B is currently assessing capacity at Prosperity to absorb forces from Union III. The Executive Base Management Board with COS has been suspended until further notice; will conduct Base Working Groups twice a month. As part of future basing plans, we are conducting analysis of current capacity at long term COB IOT build required additional capacity to support RIP/TOA and consolidation efforts.

**Bases transferring / closing in the next:**

- **30 days:** Basrah Palace / MND-SE (14 AUG 07)
- **60 days:**
- **90 days:** Cedar II / 13th SC-E (31 OCT 07)

**Key dates:** Next BMWG 14 July 07 @ Phantom CR / 1300

15. **TOPIC:** Major Cultural / Religious Events (Update)

**DISCUSSION:**

- **3 Rajab or 18 July 07:** Death of 10th Imam (buried in Samarra)
- **25 Rajab or 9 Aug 07:** Death of 7th Imam (buried in Kadamiyah)

  The 10th Imam, Ali il Hadi (the Pure One) died as a result of poisoning and is buried in Samarra. He was generous, kind, and noted for his politeness. The Al Askari Mosque in Samarra, also known as the Golden Mosque, was partially destroyed on 22 February 2006 by terrorists. Reconstruction of this mosque has been guaranteed by the UN, however reconstruction has not yet begun, nor will it until the security situation improves. The commemoration of the death of the 10th Imam will likely draw huge crowds in Samarra.
The 7th Imam, Musa al Kazim (the Patient One) died as a result of poisoning after suffering 14 years in prison. He was generous, brave, and possessed great self-control over his anger. Two years ago, people inciting a riot from within the massive crowd at the commemoration of the death of the 7th Imam resulted in a stampede that collapsed the nearby bridge in Northern Baghdad and caused the death and injury of hundreds of worshipers. The commemoration of the death of the 7th Imam and the commemoration of the stampede at the Kadimiyah Bridge will likely draw huge crowds in Northern Baghdad.

Reference to all operationally significant religious and political events located on C3 Plans and Policy website, posted 10 Jan 2007. The beginning of Islamic months in Iraq starts with the observation of the crescent moon with the naked eye (giving a variance of +/- one day per month), so the Gregorian dates are approximate.

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS:** Moderate threat; large crowds may entice insurgents to attempt a high-profile attack.

**POC:**

16. **TOPIC:** IA Legal Advisor Partnership Program (IALAPP) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** The MNC-I OSJA IALAPP stated priorities are: (1) Oversee IGFC Legal Advisor training; (2) Clarify IA powers of arrest for all IA elements subject to different C2 arrangements; and (3) Encourage centralized IGFC Detainee procedures and policies.

**NEXT ACTION:** Ongoing projects include:
- The MOD completed training for forty-one new IA Legal Advisors on the recently passed Military Procedure Law and Military Penal Code (together, the new Iraqi Armed Forces Military Justice system); MOD is currently training 15 senior Legal Advisors on the same from 10-18 June, and will train 25 more in July.
- IGFC and MNCI co-hosted a one-day IALAPP conference for the Senior Legal Advisors on 13 June; topics included Martyr Payments, Detention Operations, Human Rights, and Working with CDRs during Operations; Speakers included (MOD Human Rights Advisor), and (IGFC Legal Advisor).
- Continue training on IA ROE including an information paper, PowerPoint training slides, and ROE Cards;
- Working with MNSTC-I on formulating proper Detainee SOPs and policies;
- Currently working on agreements with DOJ, DOS, and GOI for all future Tiger Teams of investigative judges in MND-B, MND-N, and MNF-W, and working on internal MNC-I SOP for conducting the operations;

**KEY DATES:** None.

**ISF:**

1. **TOPIC:** National Police (NP Replenishment and Samarra) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** 6/2 NP are an ineffective, dangerous force within Samarra based on prevalent sectarian actions. CF wants to move the unit out of the city and back to Baghdad. Options for backfill include: 1) 3/2 NP who are finishing up training and were recruited specifically for the security of the Shrine; 2) 4/4 IA taking complete control of
the security of Samarra; or 3) 3/2 NP finish their training early and be assessed as IPs reporting to the PDoP. MOI to decision on the course of action is pending. CF is prepared to assist with the Iraqi decision.

**NEXT ACTION:** NP summit meeting at NP Site 1 to clarify details

**KEY DATES:** 18 July 2007-NP Summit Meeting

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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2. **TOPIC:** Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** MNF-I STRAT FUOPS began planning and development on National Border Strategy Goals and Security of Iraqi Seaports, 29 Mar 07. Planning efforts included Maritime Strategy development, security planning on seaports, and any campaign plan objectives for the future operations areas relevant to the drafted MoD Campaign plan (integration of MoD/MoI activities, to include interdiction behind Iraqi borders). MNF-I continues to refine mission analysis & force ratio laydown, develop proposed timeline / way ahead and focus efforts to secure and achieve international certification for Iraq’s Seaports. Action on Iraq’s seaports and bringing them under the operational control of MOI continues with USDHS, USM-I and MNF-I as the primary actors in this effort. MNF-I has scheduled a meeting on 28-29 Jul 07 involving the Iraqi Navy, Coast Guard and DBE staff as well as US Navy, DHS and Coalition players in order to finalize details required to create a Memorandum of Understanding amongst the agencies responsible for the security of Iraq’s territorial waters, inland waterways and seaports. Additionally MNF-I began an OPT early May to develop an action plan on interdicting the flow of foreign fighters movement and infiltration inside Iraq which entails a focused, synchronized CF and DBE operation. The goal is to reduce the capabilities of AQI and extremists that destabilize Baghdad. All parties engaged in the Foreign Fighters initiative will participate in a status meeting to gauge progress on initiative milestones on 14 Jul 07.

**NEXT ACTION:**
- Continue to monitor developments of Seaport Strategy
- Complete process to resolve all issues pertaining to a Navy/Coast Guard/DBE Memorandum of Understanding.
- Follow-up on assigned task in support of the Foreign Fighters initiative.

**KEY DATES:**
14 Jul- Progress review on counter Foreign Fighter initiatives
28-29 Jul- Navy/Coast Guard/DBE conference (At the IZ)

**POCs:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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3. **TOPIC:** Border Operations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The Backscatter contract - The New American Science & Engineering (AS&E) contract is broken down into maintenance and training. The maintenance portion is written for a six month period with the ability to extend twice, 3 months at a time. The technician training portion is written for only 90 days and will be performed with a competent Iraqi maintenance and motor mechanics. The American Science & Engineering (AS&E) maintenance technicians are currently deployed in three (3) 2-Man teams to assess and facilitate maintenance / repair for the 15 deadline Backscatter vans.
scattered across four of Iraq’s DBE Regions. Priority of support for POEs is to Rebe’a’a, Zurbatia, Al Qaim, Haj Ormeran, Safwan, Waleed, Bashmakh, Shalamcha, Trebl.

**NEXT ACTION:**
Continue to monitor status of operations.

**KEY DATES:**

**POCs:**

**4. TOPIC:** Equipment/Logistical Support to Brigades and Battalions (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The next units scheduled to come down in support of FAQ will be 1/3/10 and 1/2/10. They are expected to arrive on 11 AUG in Baghdad. Equipment shortfalls are to be addressed far in advance before their arrival, although not many are expected due to current equipment levels and past responsible efforts on the part of the 10 DIV and MND-SE. 1/3/10 is planned to be based at JSS Thrasher and 1/2/10 is expected to be based at Lion’s Den.

Orders have been issued by the BG of IGFC to deliver 6,000 uniforms to each of the IA divisions (except for 9th and 12th who are only receiving 1000 uniforms each). C3 ISF brought the issue of ordering of winter uniforms to the attention of the IGFC to avoid problems encountered last year with lack of OCIE. The BG of IGFC has issued an order for the G-4 to order necessary items for the winter months to come.

**NEXT ACTION:** C3 ISF LOG continues to monitor equipment status of IA units and especially those supporting FAQ.

**KEY DATES:** 27 JULY – 10 AUGUST: 10th division units coming to Besmeyah/Baghdad

**POC:**

**5. TOPIC:** Replacement of 3rd SIB (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** 3rd SIB was removed from the task of infrastructure security and is the first SIB unit to undergo integration into the IA. They were replaced by Commander 4th IA Div. Their AO is being secured by 3-3/4.

**NEXT ACTION:** Nil.

**6. TOPIC:** Borders Poe Roles and Responsibilities (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** DBE remains without a dedicated POE Director, since the assassination of MG Emad Mohsen Al Shaheen. BG Farhoud is now the acting National POE Director. A permanent POE Director is needed to make lasting change IAW CF objectives across all POEs in Iraq. If appointed soon, a new POE director will be the
ninth in the last 24 months. Lack of a National Director degrades accountability of regional POE directors resulting in poor operating standards abroad. DHS will receive 20 contracted border SMEs from Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) in support of the Corps, mid May.

**NEXT ACTION:**
1. Plan orientation and deployment for remaining 5 Regional advisors.

**KEY DATES:**
TBD – new or current POE Director assigned with permanent orders.

**POC:**
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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**7. TOPIC:** 11 IA HQ Force Generation and Deployment for FAQ (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** 11 IA is a PMI unit currently undergoing force generation at Old MOD. It will be composed of 2\(^{nd}\) and 5\(^{th}\) of the 6\(^{th}\) IA, and an additionally generated BDE. It is expected to eventually replace 9 IA forces within Baghdad. On 20 May 07, 2/6 IA was re-designated as 1/11 IA. The BDE remains OPCON to 9 IA until further notice. Received 1\(^{st}\) ORA report (ORA 4). IOC initially announced as 6 JUN, but as of JUL, we are waiting on M7 to write an order to make it official. Currently, the 11 IA DIV HQ is manned at 106% strength.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor MNSTC-I transfer of MiTTs and IGFC FORCEGEN actions

**KEY DATES:**
JUL – AUG 07 staff training
SEP 07 validation exercise (proposed)
1 OCT 07 FOC

**POC:**
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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**8. TOPIC:** IA Future FAQ Rotations (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. [b](3), [b](6) briefed MG Berragan, who concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN. MoD desires to speed FORCEGEN of 3/11 IA (former 6/6) and 4/7 IA. 4/7 would be assigned in Baghdad until eventual transfer to AO Denver in Anbar. Additionally, 3/2/4 IA, 4/2/4 IA has been extended 90 days and 1/4/10 IA may request extension.

**NEXT ACTION:** Present to LTG Odierno

**KEY DATES:** TBD

**POC:**
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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**9. TOPIC:** IA End State (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, and concept to determine a projected IA enduring posture. The third draft was presented to [b](3), [b](6) on 8 Jun 07. Briefed to C3 10 JUN. Revisions made to the briefing with C3 input. On 13 JUN, the current version is being staffed with IGFC MTT and will be briefed to MOD on 16 JUN.
Per IGFC MITT, briefing was given on 16 JUN, but no decisions were made at or since the briefing. On the CF side, MNSTCI has initiated a study of the Iraqi Army end state which will involve a team from the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). No further information is available on this planned study.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to track progress with IGFC MITT. Remain situationally aware of MNSTCI initiated CAA study

**KEY DATES:** TBD

**POC:**

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**FORCE GENERATION:**

1. **TOPIC:** MNC-I Riverine JUONS (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requests Riverine capability to deny Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. JFCOM RFI dated 30 Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 not be sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W). JFCOM requested input on feasibility of force provided under RFF 397 supporting both MNC-I requirements. Joint Staff determined both RFFs would not be sourced and directed CENTCOM to source internally. MNF-West riverine capability response was unable to support due to commitment of capability to the security of Haditha Dam complex. ONS submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06. HQDA (DAMO-CIC) reviewed ONS and returned disapproved 8 JAN 07. JUONS approved at CENTCOM on 10 April. Defense rapid acquisition assessment presented and forwarded for approval, prior direction being tasking of Department of the Navy to meet requirement. Interim solution required based on expected production time line of at least 24 months to fill Navy RIVERON structure. The CENTCOM (CC-0188) Riverine Patrol Boats JUON, endorsed by BGen R.C. Fox, JCS J8, as an Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN) and forwarded to the JRAC for immediate disposition.

Coalition partners contacted to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Current responses are all negative, two countries pending response. Message of need sent by OSD sent to possible Coalition partners, 11 July. Iraqi boat manufacturer located and being queried through C9 on capability to produce riverine type boats. No response yet, but Iraqi company capable of building required systems has the request. MND-B G9 is also engaging the company.

Joint Capabilities Board met without significant results. JRAC received topic on 7 June. Joint Coordination Board met on 13 June, mission is directed to Navy for solution. At the request of VADM Morgan (N3/N5), the DJ8 removed the Riverine JUONS topic from discussion at the 6 Jul 07 Joint Coordination Board. The JS J3 intends to formally direct JFCOM to develop a joint in-lieu-of solution and get the global force management process moving. VADM Morgan believes that the prospective outcome may help Navy accelerate both training and the delivery of Riverine equipment to CENTCOM.

Iraqi Navy capabilities that are available but require maintenance or manning are being investigated as alternatives. Compatible JP8 outboard motors are located for this or commercial options. MNF-I concurrence completed/forwarded to CMATT for MOU negotiation. Iraqi Navy Commander has concurred with provision of six FABs, MOU is at Iraqi JHQ for approval. Engine requisition and boat utilization will be by MND-C.

FRAGO published in 26Jun07 DTU, specifying commercial watercraft option to MNDs
utilizing OMA funds and internal assets. DASD) office distributed to coalition representatives MNC-I CG letter of need with MNF-I CG concurrence and Riverine briefing. DA LNO has located Coast Guard watercraft available for transfer, coordinating property book and transaction in conjunction with MND-N. Feasibility of Transportation Corps Medium Boat or Harbormaster Detachments serving as watercraft operators, maintainers and trainers via RFF being researched. Units are qualified to operate the watercraft but lack watercraft, sufficient weapon systems, and sufficient unit level maintenance capability.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research Joint, Coalition, and Iraqi Options to provide the capability and overcome funding, manning, legal, and acquisition constraints. Locate and requisition required major components to support selected commercial options. Project Officer prepared to assist MNDs with commercial requests. See, Folder, C3 Plans and Policy Web page on SIPR and CENTRIX.

**KEY DATES:** JCB 6 Jul 1730 JWIC, CACE,  
POC:  

1. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) 780 for Military Combat Tracking Dogs (CTD) (Update)  
**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests the development and deployment of Combat Tracking Dogs to the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). CTD are an emerging capability within the Department of Defense and exist only within the United States Marine Corps. A training program must be initiated to provide a renewable, enduring base for CTD until the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This capability will provide a vital resource for Coalition Forces deployed theater wide. Currently there are CTD Teams in the ITO, with only in the DOD inventory. MNC-I requires the fielding of CTD Teams for a total of teams. Transmitted to Force 23 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 2 JUN 07. Released from CENTCOM 3 Jul 07. JUONS instaffing at MNC-I. Anticipate ONS Board 8 Jul 07 then forward to MNF-I 10 Jul 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI as required, assist with JUONS as required.

**KEY DATES:** LAD 30 SEP 07  
POC:  

1. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) #133 For 1 X Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Troop PAX) to support MNC-I Asymmetric Warfare Operations (No Change)  
**DISCUSSION:** This is a request to formalize an existing and recurring requirement for forces in Iraq, not an addition of forces.  

1.4a, 1.4g  

Transmitted to Force 22 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 30 MAY 07. Draft GENADMIN returned to CENTCOM from staffing. Released from CENTCOM as RFF 777.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI’s as appropriate.

**KEY DATES:** No LAD: Ongoing requirement sourced by internal rotations.
5. TOPIC: GFMAP 648 MoD 3 (IAG) (Update)
Discussion: This RFF requests 1 X Division MiTT to support 11\textsuperscript{th} IA Division, adds medics for the Motor Transport Regiment (MTR) and LOG BN MiTTs. It adds EOD manning and MP manning for division MiTTs. It also adds 4 X BTTs to support current Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) force structure. Total increase of 1\textsubscript{4a} X Pax.
To CENTCOM 22 FEB 07. Release to Joint Staff and renamed GFMAP 648 Mod 3. TGT SDOD TBD. JFCOM Sourcing RFF Rollup 15 MAY shows Partial Solution Submitted (1\textsubscript{4a} PAX) with Non-concur on remaining capability, TGT SDOD 17 MAY 07. In SDOD for 25 MAY. Have submitted RFI through MNF-I requesting status on remaining 1\textsubscript{4a} PAX of the RFF. in EXORD Mod 22. P4 Memo submitted by BG Pittard through GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon requesting assistance. AO Force Sourcing SVTC slides 19 Jun 07 state “Partial solution ordered 1\textsubscript{4a} PAX). Continue staffing remaining PAX (5 MiTTs). TGT SDOD: 26 JUL 07.”

NEXT ACTION: Have requested status through MNF-I. CENTCOM researching status of second P4 sent from GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon on this issue.

KEY DATES: None at this time.

POC: None at this time.

6. TOPIC: GENADMIN 774 (RFF #MNC-I 130) Medical: Mental Health, Preventative Medicine, and Medical Logistics (No Change)
DISCUSSION: During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 3 non-transformed Sustainment Brigades that provide daily care to the 164,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 (3) transformed Sustainment Brigades whose MTOEs do not contain Mental Health, Preventive Medicine and Medical Logistics are scheduled to deploy. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. Total of 1\textsubscript{4a} Personnel. Transmitted to Force for staffing 24 MAR 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 5 APR 07. Presentation had been anticipated to ADM Fallon 8 MAY 07. GENADMIN 744 MNF-I Health SVC Augmentation released 12 JUN 07
NEXT ACTION: Respond to any RFIs.
KEY DATES: Various LADs.
POC: None at this time.

7. TOPIC: 07-09 SECFOR Requirements (Update)
DISCUSSION: The 58TH AND 116TH BCTS were scheduled to mobilize based on a 60 day post mobilization training model. MOB dates were planned based on this model which is being developed in response to the new Total Force Utilization Policy and has not been approved for use by the 58th and 116th BCTs. The 58th and 116th BCTs require an 89 day training model to achieve the required level of training to conduct convoy security and force protection missions. FORSCOM initiated LAD shift requests for 16 x MNC-I company requirements (approximately 30 days). MNC-I submitted a mitigation plan to MNF-I 18 MAY 07 that addresses all but 1 of the LAD shift requests. MNC-I submitted a 19 day RC BOG extension (1041 EN) to MNF-I on 01 JUL 07 to address the remaining LAD Shift request. FC and 1A are concurrently staffing the inbound units ability to meet an earlier LAD.

NEXT ACTION: Monitor RC BOG extension request for 1041 EN and inbound units feasible LAD

KEY DATES: NA

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

8. TOPIC: Theater Security BDE (TSB) (Update)
DISCUSSION: 1/82 BCT (-) completed the TOA with 1-34 BCT 11 JUL 07.
NEXT ACTION: Remove item from this summary.

KEY DATES: 11 JUL 07

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. TOPIC: FY 08 SECFOR (No Change)
DISCUSSION: CC published modification 767 to the FY08 requirements submission establishing 2 BDE level URFs for MNC-I SECFOR requirements. The intent is to utilize unit level sourcing at the BCT level for SECFOR across the CENTCOM AOR. ARNG has nominated 76th IBCT to source and 39th BCT to source. These requirements are scheduled to be briefed to the SECDEF for inclusion in the JS FY 08 EXORD o/a 13 JUL 07.

NEXT ACTION: Continue Coordination with ALCON.

KEY DATES: 13 JUL 07

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. TOPIC: Request For Forces (RFF) MNC-I RFF #133 Multiple Requirement from 4TH ID (No Change)
DISCUSSION: This request from 4th Infantry Division is undergoing screening to determine those items appropriate for an RFF or as a request for individual augmentation. The entire request is for approximately personnel in varying disciplines. These areas include:

1.4a
Signed and released to MNF-I. Next step will be to develop the RFFs.

NEXT ACTION: Completion of screening process through staff elements.

KEY DATES: LAD of 1 DEC 07 for most elements.

POC: 

11. TOPIC: 15:12 BOG Policy (No Change)

DISCUSSION: Units requiring adjudication submitted via GENADMIN message. We have received word that we were not supported by JS in our adjudication requests. Documentation of that decision has been requested.

NEXT ACTION: Board units based upon published JS spreadsheets.

KEY DATES:

POC:

12. TOPIC: (Update) 1.4a

DISCUSSION: Awaiting publication of the CC and MNF-I planning orders for the FY 09 rotation. Anticipated release is mid July.

NEXT ACTION: Establish and brief the CG on FY 09 Requirements. Monitor FY 08 sourcing issues to be published the beginning of JUL. Attendees to conferences at Scott AFB and MacDill AFB will have only one week between conferences. Flying back from and to CONUS in one week is neither cost nor time efficient. Will consider less of a footprint at GO/FO conference.

KEY DATES:

POC:

13. TOPIC: RFF 719 MoD 5 Request for Engineer Battalion HQ and 4 Horizontal Companies (No Change)

DISCUSSION: This RFF requests horizontal construction assets to complete the workload increase generated by the increased forces in Baghdad in support of OPERATION FARDH AL-QANOON. Requested engineer force structure will construct 52 X Joint Security Stations and 9 X Gated Communities, repair, improve and maintain the Baghdad Security Belt, build combat outposts in the communities in Baghdad, and conduct route sanitation and rapid crater repair within the MND-B AOR. There is
currently no solution for the EN BN HQ requested in RFF 719. It appears that CENTCOM will directed to relook at this request and provide a reply as to whether an internal sourcing solution can be achieved. Additionally, there is no sourcing solution for the four EN Companies requested. Same direction at internal sourcing may apply. It appears that the sourcing solution is still unresolved. The following actions are being considered by JFCOM: Reallocation already ordered units or extend units in place. Restaffing for RC solution, which will drive the 15 Apr07 LAD to nearly OCT 07. Draft sourcing solution utilizing realignment of assets in theater to be returned with non-concurrence by MNC-I C3, C-7, and GO. Sourced with a headquarters and one company in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21. Two companies will not be sourced. CENTCOM stated during 22 Jun Friday Night Fights that the P4 from ADM Fallon to GEN Petraeus will state that CENTCOM is unable to source this requirement.

NEXT ACTION: Monitor deployment through MRM.
KEY DATES: LAD 1 DEC 07
POC: ____________________________ 

14. TOPIC: RFF 712, 4 x MP CO (CS) RFF (No Change) Monitor Only
DISCUSSION: This RFF requests 4 additional MP (CS) COs to support the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) development program. The CG, MNF-I directed an expanded IPS development program and designated 2006 as "The Year of the Police" which represented a tremendous capacity surge in which the first PTTs were fielded in Mar-Apr 06. RFF will provide increased PTT capability and will fill the total PTT requirement to over 90% (1.4a PTTs). RFF submitted to MNF-I on 9 Dec 06. MNC-I Chop on MNF-I staffing provided 16 Dec 06. RFF submitted to CENTCOM on 24 Dec 06. CENTCOM draft MOD 1 to RFF 697 for the 4 MP COs sent out for chop. S: 3 Jan 07. Rolled into RFF 712 with six other MP Cos. Joint Staffing 19 JAN 07. Four new requirement companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12, 13, and Draft 14. LADs of 15 JUL and 1 SEP 07. Six ILO companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12 and 13. Various LADs.

NEXT ACTION: Monitor Joint staffing and provide any requested input.
KEY DATES: Requested LAD of 15 Jul 07.
POC: ____________________________

15. TOPIC: RFF 695 for 316TH ESC (No Change) Monitor Only
DISCUSSION: 316th ESC RFF requests 1.4a pax to provide staff augmentation, ISF support, and distribution management capability to this USAR unit that will deploy under a new Modular MTOE of 1.4a pax; reduction of 1.4a compared to the 13th SCE, and 1.4a compared to 3rd COSCOM. Additional personnel will enable 316th ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics support and sustainment operations across the ITO. Reduced manning based on transformation to Single Log C2 with 1st Theater Support Command (TSC) assuming portions of overall theater sustainment mission from the ESC. Timeline for 1st TSC to assume Single Log C2 is a minimum of 6 months into the 316th ESC rotation (~Jan 08). CENTCOM RFF 695 released 9 Nov 06. Sourced in 07-09 EXORD Mod 7. CENTCOM also states in EXORD that this enduring request will be sourced after 07-09 via a JMD. Since then, CCJ! And CCJ4 have stated via e-mail that the JMD is not the correct method of
sourcing this requirement and do not endorse the creation of a JMD to support this requirement. MNC-I C4 is discussing with XVIII ABN Corps to discuss a way ahead and will provide a recommendation.

**NEXT ACTION:**
- Awaiting recommendation from MNC-I C4 and results of XVIII ABN Corps discussions

**KEY DATES:**
- 15 Jul 07: LAD for 316th ESC Personnel

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16. **TOPIC:** RFF 667 MoD 1, Increase in Forces for TF 1.4a (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** (Modification initially submitted for X pax. Restudy of the issues resulted in a change to X pax. Restaffing through MNC-I.) This Modification to RFF 667 requests X additional personnel to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and information processing and analysis in support of technology developed aviation assets. Identified shortages in critical skills sets render headquarters unable to process volumes of data previously unforecast. Currently TF 1.4a is operating only five of the twenty four Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms projected for deployment within the next six months. The X identified personnel will enable TF 1.4a to conduct 24 hour operations and process technical information to assist in defeating the IED threat. Released to Joint Staff 12 FEB 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 18. (Update) Sourcing of ARST element sourced by the USAF has raised concerns of not being able to meet their Joint Staff assigned LAD of 24 August 07. This will create a significant gap of capability for TF 1.4a and severely limit its analytical element if these Pax do not meet LAD.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor sourcing from USAF to ensure Pax meet assigned LAD in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18.

**KEY DATES:**
- 24 August 07 is currently assigned LAD.

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17. **TOPIC:** RFF 733 for 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) (No Change) Monitor Only

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) to make up for an identified shortfall in MND-B and MND-N. Released to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Chops due back to JS: 11 APR 07. Sourced OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor progress of staffing within Joint Staff.

**KEY DATES:**
- LAD for MND-B: 11 AUG 08
- LAD for MND-N: 12 MAY 08

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18. **TOPIC:** RFF742: Military History Detachments (No Change) Monitor Only

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 3 X Military History Detachments (total 4 Pax) to fill identified shortfalls within the Corps. Units without Military History detachment coverage will be unable to contribute to Lessons Learned or to the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Released to CENTCOM 13 FEB 07. Released by CENTCOM to Joint Staffing 12 MAR 07Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor arrival of units.

**KEY DATES:**
- LAD is 31 AUG 07.
19. **TOPIC:** RFF 735 Requests for Optometry Support (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has four Optometrists that provide daily care to the 133,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 this will be down to one Optometrist to provide daily care to all U.S. personnel. The Sustainment Brigades currently in Iraq have organic Optometry teams. The Sustainment Brigades due in OIF 07-09 have undergone transformation and no longer have Optometry Teams. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. The one and only Optometry team scheduled to arrive for OIF 07-09 cannot support all 133,000 U.S. personnel. Transmitted to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF EXORD 07-09 Mod 17.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor staffing through DEPORD.

**KEY DATES:** LADs: 1 JUN 07; 27 JUN 07; 14 JUL 07

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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