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## MNC-I C3 PLANS AND POLICY NOTES (#24)

As of 14 June 2007

### WARPLANS:

#### 1. **TOPIC:** 20 BCT Plus-Up and Summer 2007 Operations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** All plus-up BCTs are now present in Iraq. MNC-I will achieve its anticipated peak strength in mid June with both the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU and the 3 CAB becoming operational on 15 June (In MNF-W and MND-C respectively). Beginning on or about 15 June, Corps elements will begin three new major operations:

- On 19 June, 3/2 SBCT(-) begin operations to defeat enemy in Baqubah IOT secure the population and enable Diyala provincial governance. This operation is supported by operations of 4/2 SBCT(-) and 3/1 BCT to Disrupt enemy operations in the Northern Baghdad Belts and Upper Diyala River Valley respectively.
- MND-C begins Marne Torch on on 15 June with 2/3 HBCT(-), supported by 3/1 and 2/10 BCTs clearing to defeat AQIZ/ Sunni extremists IOT deny the Arab Jabour region as a staging area for accelerants to sectarian violence moving into Baghdad and create improved security conditions to reduce the influence of irreconcilable insurgents in South Baghdad. On 25 June MND-C will initiate Operation Marne Avalanche to Disrupt AQIZ / Sunni and Shia extremists and deny staging areas for accelerants vic Iskandariyah.
- MNF-W will conducting clearing operations in AO Anaheim (Northeast portion of MNF-W) spearheaded by the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU to deny enemy sanctuary and freedom of movement and to set the conditions for the introduction of a permanent Iraqi security forces presence.

These operations will be accompanied by a "surge" in ongoing operations with increased visibility of coalition forces from 15-20 June to send a signal to both AIF and the Iraqi populace that CF is increasing its OPTEMPT. Anticipate more of these periods of heightened intensity in operations during the summer months.

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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#### 2. **TOPIC:** Operation Bedrock (Clearing AQI from Quarries NW of Baghdad) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** At the juncture of MND-N, MNF-W, and MND-B there is an area referred to as "the quarries" which has never had lasting CF presence and is assessed to be used by AQI exploiting the seam between MSCs for freedom of transit, training, staging attacks, and temporary sanctuary. The area is strongly defended primarily to the East and South by deep buried IEDs, and has been an area of concentrated surface to air attacks.

MNC-I is planning a Corps operation to clear and hold the quarries area to defeat AQI forces and deny enemy use of the area. Current planning envisions an Intel build phase running from the current time till approximately the end of July to develop target information and allow friendly forces to achieve enough success in ongoing operations elsewhere in the Baghdad belts to shift combat power to the quarries. Integrated with the Intel Build phase, precision strike operations will be conducted in the Quarries area

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
to set conditions for follow on operations, and create enemy reaction for ISR assets to collect against. Following the ISR build, and not earlier than 1 August, MNC-I envisions using forces from two MNDs (or MNF) to establish blocking forces around the quarries while a temporary boundary change is enacted to allow the third MND/F to clear the quarries. The final phase will involve transitioning to a holding force and reestablishing the normal MSC boundaries.

Key to the timing of this operation is the availability of the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU which will be OPCON'd to MNF-W and begin clearing operations in AO Anaheim (to the west of quarries) on 15 June. OPCON of the 13<sup>th</sup> MEU is scheduled to last till 17 August, but will likely be extended 30 days to 17 September. While the MEU may not have the central role in clearing the quarries area, its presence in MNC-I provides extra flexibility in a resource constrained environment.

C3 Planners received initial guidance on this operation from the CG on 28 May and are continuing to develop the CONOP.

**NEXT ACTION:** MNC-I will publish a PLANORD to establish a common understanding of the environment and operation, task applicable MSCs to prepare CONOPS for how they would execute either a blocking or clearing mission, and provide BPT tasks to supporting agencies and staff sections.

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**4. TOPIC:** Southwest Support Zones (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans is conducting mission analysis on the area from Amiriyah (in MNF-W) to Iskandariyah (MND-C) and from Lake Razazza to the Euphrates River; also known as the Southwest Support Zone. Concern is that threat forces have freedom of action in this area and use portions of this area as a sanctuary. Operation River Walk II near Amiriyah and operations in Zaidon by MNF-W has reduced threat presence in that portion of the Southwest Support Zone. Upcoming operations by MND-C, such as Marne Avalanche, will disrupt enemy activity in the Iskandariya portion of the Southwest Support Zone. To date no operation has disrupted enemy activity along the depth of the Southwest Support Zone. Mission analysis will continue in order to determine whether a larger operation will significantly impact enemy operations south of the Euphrates River Valley.

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**5. TOPIC:** Border Security (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Appendix 10 (Border Security Operations) to Annex C to OPORD 07-01 was published on 1 June. The order details a border strategy involving a four prong approach to border operations to create security in depth. The four areas of emphasis; POEs, borders, smuggling routes within Iraq, and smuggling networks; are complementary with operations in one helping to set the conditions for increased effectiveness in others. These operations will be accompanied by a coordinated IO effort at all echelons to convince Iraqis that they benefit collectively and individually by observing and enforcing GOI border laws and regulations. While none of these areas of emphasis are new this strategy seeks increased effectiveness as more forces are committed to border security, more intelligence collection and analysis is dedicated to target lethal smuggling, and a coordinated effort is made to create synergy between the four areas of emphasis. MNC-I is currently prioritizing the Southern Iraq/Iran border (Diyala, Wassit, Maysan, and Basrah Provinces) where the primary EFP and advanced weaponry support to extremists is assessed to enter Iraq. The framework of the border strategy, however, will be applicable to the overall mission to include TFF networks on the Syrian border which is currently an area of emphasis for MNF-I planning. .

MND-SE is preparing to increase the number of forces they have dedicated for border operations by fielding a POE company and three additional BTTs with the ability to surge to various POEs and DBE organizations as required.

**NEXT ACTION:**

MNF-I will publish a FRAGO on interdiction of Foreign Fighters and Facilitators in the near future. While this FRAGO is unlikely to cause major changes to MNC-I operations, it will require MNC-I support to transport and embed additional DHS and contracted Border advisory teams, and support the establishment of a National DBE HQ BTT at FOB Loyalty.

Appendix 10 (Border Security Operations) to Annex C to OPORD 07-01 tasks MND-N and MND-SE to develop CONOPS to support permanent BTT presence at Muntheria, Al Sheeb, and Shalamsheh POEs. BTTs in MND-CS have begun studying the requirements to establish permanent presence at Zurbatiyah POE, and MND-C will continue this task once they assume control of Wassit province.

MND-N is conducting planning to move TF Spectre to Diyala to provide coverage of the Iranian border, particularly in the Mandali region.

Al Qaim POE in Al Anbar province is scheduled to open in the first half of August. MNF-W will remission a BTT to cover this POE.

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**6. TOPIC:** Countering 1.4b, 1.4d (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** MNF-I FRAGO 07-132 (CII) was published on 17 APR 07. As a result, a standing OPT has been stood up at MNC-I to identify planning shortfalls and synchronize efforts. The OPT held its first meeting on 23 APR 07 and held its second meeting on 16 MAY. Issues discussed related to the developing border security plan and the expected MOD to MNF-I FRAGO 07-132. The MOD is still under development and has yet to be posted.

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**Next Action:**

Review the MOD to FRAGO 07-132.

**Key Dates:**

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**7. TOPIC:** Alternate Ground LOC (GLOC) Considerations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** DLA is working initiatives with SDDC, CDDOC, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, CTO, and MNF-I R&S to move more CL IV through Jordan for MNF-W customers and through Port of Um Qasar (Iraq) for MNF-SE and CS customers. Shifting the MSR coming out of Kuwait from Tampa to Aspen resulted in a restricted flow of supplies. Bde RIPs will take priority over movement of certain classes of supplies. Moving the supplies in through alternate ports will help alleviate delays in delivery. We are able to move non-military supplies through Jordan and increasing the amount of supplies moved through ports other than Kuwait will decrease congestion along the MSR into Iraq and also help improve flow rates.

**NEXT ACTION:** +Awaiting action from higher.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**8. TOPIC:** Infrastructure Security Strategy (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I has begun parallel planning with MNF-I as we attempt to address the security issues and concerns of oil and electrical infrastructure in Iraq. Planners are participating in a number of MNF-I working groups in order to better understand the relationship between the attacks and the effects on the ability of infrastructure to deliver energy both oil and electricity to the populace as well as government wealth generation. ICW JWAC, a review of energy infrastructure is taking place which seeks to determine how to improve the availability of electricity to Baghdad in the shortest time possible. The review will consider the energy infrastructure priorities of the Iraqi ministries (the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Ministry of Defence). On completion, the review will be compared to an analysis of threats to energy infrastructure. The vastness of energy infrastructure prevents total security but the combination of the infrastructure review and the threat analysis will enable security to be focused in areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high. Once we have confirmed our focus for energy infrastructure security, the Iraqi Ministries, (Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Electricity, and Ministry of Defence) will be engaged to ensure coherence of effort. The IA is responsible for the security of infrastructure.

**NEXT ACTION:** Combine infrastructure review and threat analysis to identify areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** Integration of SIBs into the regular IA (New)

**DISCUSSION:** Closely linked with the Infrastructure Security Strategy is the issue of developing capability with the Iraqi Security Forces to effectively secure energy infrastructure. The Iraqi Army has the responsibility of securing energy infrastructure. The forces currently assigned to this task are the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions,

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(SIBs), whose performance was below that required to provide effective protection to critical energy infrastructure. The SIBs are to be fully incorporated into the Iraqi Army. MNF-I will produce a FRAGO detailing the integration plan.

**NEXT ACTION:** Attend meetings to assist in the production of the MNF-I FRAGO.

**POC**

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Approved for Release

1.4b, 1.4d

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**11. TOPIC:** Base Consolidation and Closure (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** in the ongoing efforts to turn over battle space to the ISF, MSC close or transfer bases to either MOD or MOI under a “condition based” approach. Base transfer closures are driven by three major considerations: stability in the AO, ISF ability/capability to assume & hold battle space and funding for base consolidation. The current methodology is bottom-up driven with MSC nominating bases for transfer / closure, gaining approval, and following a 100 day notional timeline, which serves as a guide to accomplish necessary steps in the transfer / closure process.

**Next Action:** All base transfers/closure nominations have to be approved by CG. No basing changes for 3ID CAB (Stryker), and GEO BDE (Camp Delta). Elements from 2/3 HBCT (Brigade #20) will be based out of LSAA, Taji, Liberty, Falcon, and Kalsu.

**Future Actions:** IZ Transition is back on the table which entails the consolidation of MNF-I presence in the IZ from 13 to 3 locations; with two being MND-B bases (Union III and Prosperity). The transition also requires the transfer of Base Union I (Oct08), Freedom Rest (Jul08), the relocation of CSH to VBC (Sep08) and the relocation of GRD to VBC (June08). As part of the consolidation, MND-B will have to relocate from Union III NLT Jan 08 and transfer the base to JASG, which begins construction and renovations to relocate MNF-I FWD by Oct 08. MND-B is currently assessing capacity at Prosperity to absorb forces from Union III. The Executive Base Management Board with COS has been suspended until further notice; will conduct Base Working Groups twice a month. As part of future basing plans, we are conducting analysis of current capacity at long term COB IOT build required additional capacity to support RIP/TOA and consolidation efforts.

**Bases transferring / closing in the next:**

**30 days:** 0

**60 days:** Basrah Palace / MND-SE (31AUG07)

**Key dates:** Next BMWGs 16 & 30 June 07 @ Phantom CR / 1300

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**12. TOPIC:** Theater Reposturing (No Change)

**Discussion:** An initial briefing was provided to the Commanding General MNC-I on 05 June to obtain his guidance on long-range Theater Posturing. The CG gave guidance as to where the BCTs should be located for 15-12-10-7-4 BCT sets. The CG gave guidance as to where he thought the transition from current operations to developing a capable, credible ISF would take place. He provided better resolution on the command and control structure he envisions in the future. He asked the planners to go back and refine the Aviation and CSS basing footprint and Transition Teams, as well as the

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Brigade basing. Additionally, he asked for a refinement of the conditions and assumptions that allow the Corps to redeploy BCTs at each step.

**Next Action:** A follow up briefing will be provided to the MNC-I C3 in preparation for the conference on Friday, 08 June that will provide better fidelity on aviation, CSS basing, conditions and assumptions for each step, proposed force structure and a force disposition for each step. The Chief Plans, C3 Plans CONOP Planner and C4 Planner will attend and participate in the conference from 11-21 June in Qatar.

**Key Dates:** 11-21 June Theater Posturing Conference, USCENTCOM, Qatar.

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**13. TOPIC:** Major Cultural / Religious Events (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:**

<u>14 May 07:</u>	Founding of the State of Israel
<u>3 Jumada II or 19 June 07:</u>	Death of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet
<u>3 Rajab or 18 July 07:</u>	Death of 10 <sup>th</sup> Imam (buried in Samarra)
<u>25 Rajab or 9 Aug 07:</u>	Death of 7 <sup>th</sup> Imam (buried in Kadamiyah)

Fatima is considered the most holy woman in Shi'a Islam. Fatima was the only daughter of Prophet Muhammad and the wife of Ali, the 4<sup>th</sup> Caliph/1<sup>st</sup> Imam. She is often referred to as the "Mother of the Imams", and gave birth to Hassan (2<sup>nd</sup> Imam), Hussain (3<sup>rd</sup> Imam), Zainab, and Umma. She was considered pure and charitable, the famous Koranic verse 33:33 was revealed to Muhammad in her house and its narration by Fatima goes: "Show discretion in what you say. Stay in your homes and do not display your finery as women used to do in the days of ignorance. Attend to your prayers, give alms to the poor, and obey Allah and His apostle." After the death of Muhammad, when Ali (4<sup>th</sup> Caliph) did not come out of his house to give oath of allegiance to the 1<sup>st</sup> Caliph Abu Bakr, the door to the house was burned down and Fatima was injured and subsequently died of her wounds. Fatima died at 27 years of age; about 3 months after the death of the Prophet.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Imam, Ali il Hadi (the Pure One) died as a result of poisoning and is buried in Samarra. He was generous, kind, and noted for his politeness. The Al Askari Mosque in Samarra, also known as the Golden Mosque, was partially destroyed on 22 February 2006 by terrorists. Reconstruction of this mosque has been guaranteed by the UN, however reconstruction has not yet begun, nor will it until the security situation improves. The commemoration of the death of the 10<sup>th</sup> Imam will likely draw huge crowds in Samarra.

The 7<sup>th</sup> Imam, Musa al Kazim (the Patient One) died as a result of poisoning after suffering 14 years in prison. He was generous, brave, and possessed great self-control over his anger. Two years ago, people inciting a riot from within the massive crowd at the commemoration of the death of the 7<sup>th</sup> Imam resulted in a stampede that collapsed the nearby bridge in Northern Baghdad and caused the death and injury of hundreds of worshipers. The commemoration of the death of the 7<sup>th</sup> Imam and the commemoration of the stampede at the Kadamiyah Bridge will likely draw huge crowds in Northern Baghdad.

Reference to all operationally significant religious and political events located on C3 Plans and Policy website, posted 10 Jan 2007. The beginning of Islamic months in

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Iraq starts with the observation of the crescent moon with the naked eye (giving a variance of +/- one day per month), so the Gregorian dates are approximate.

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS:** Moderate threat; large crowds may entice insurgents to attempt a high-profile attack.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**14. TOPIC:** IA Legal Advisor Partnership Program (IALAPP) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The MNC-I OSJA IALAPP stated priorities are: (1) Oversee IGFC Legal Advisor training; (2) Clarify IA powers of arrest for all IA elements subject to different C2 arrangements; and (3) Encourage centralized IGFC Detainee procedures and policies.

**NEXT ACTION:** Ongoing projects include:

- The MOD completed training for forty-one new IA Legal Advisors on the recently passed Military Procedure Law and Military Penal Code (together, the new Iraqi Armed Forces Military Justice system); MOD is currently training 15 senior Legal Advisors on the same from 10-18 June, and will train 25 more in July.
- IGFC and MNCI co-hosted a one-day IALAPP conference for the Senior Legal Advisors on 13 June; topics included Martyr Payments, Detention Operations, Human Rights, and Working with CDRs during Operations; Speakers included

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

- Continue training on IA ROE including an information paper, PowerPoint training slides, and ROE Cards;
- Working with MNSTC-I on formulating proper Detainee SOPs and policies;
- Currently working on agreements with DOJ, DOS, and GOI for all future Tiger Teams of investigative judges in MND-B, MND-N, and MNF-W, and working on internal MNC-I SOP for conducting the operations;

**KEY DATES:** None.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**15. TOPIC:** Elections (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** On 23 January the Council of Representatives (COR) passed the law establishing the Iraqi High Elections Council (IHEC). The IHEC will establish the governing body for national and provincial elections in Iraq. The IHEC is also responsible for conducting the referendum in Kirkuk regarding TAL 58 and Article 140. The passing of the IHEC law starts a 60 day clock to nominate and assign council members. In a briefing dated 16 May 2007, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that the Council of Representative's (CoR) recent selection of nine commissioners for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) was "professional and objective." The nine members included one Turkoman, four Shi'a, 2 Sunni, and 2 Kurds. The President of the IHEC is Farij Mirza Al Haidri, the Vice President is Asawa Abdulhamid, and the Chief of Electoral Office is Karim Mahmoudal Tamimi. UNAMI observed the selection process and found that that the process was carried out in a professional and transparent manner.

Even with the successful selection process for the IHEC commissioners, provincial elections cannot proceed until all related legislation is resolved, making elections unlikely before spring 2008. Provincial elections have the potential to pull

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more Sunnis into the political process and improve governance in some provinces, such as Basrah. When the elections occur, it is likely that politically organized Sunni Arabs and Sadrists, neither of whom participated in the last round of provincial elections, are positioned to make significant gains, however, Sunni insurgents who oppose elections will likely intimidate neutral or pro-GOI Sunnis from going to the polls. Elections by themselves will not reduce violence; the critical factor in the reduction of sectarian violence continues to be improving the security conditions for the citizens of Iraq. Finally, the Kurds, who have little to gain from a new round of elections, may attempt to delay elections or link them to concessions on Kurdish autonomy, primarily tied to TAL 58 and Article 140.

The UN is taking the lead on a 120 day training program for GOI council members and their staffs. The logical next step is to conduct a national census; the last one was held in 1990. Recent reporting indicates that the national census may be linked to the establishment of a national identification card, which will take place in the coming months. The national identification card has both political backing and practical utility, so is likely to occur. Successful results of the national identification card biometrics program and the Iraqi census are two indicators that increase the likelihood that elections will occur sooner and more effectively than later. It is reasonable to assume that there are some in the GOI who stand to lose power in an election and will attempt to postpone the Provincial Elections until January 2009 when the National Elections are next scheduled to occur. Presently, sub-provincial elections cannot occur.

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**ISF:**

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**1. TOPIC:** ADM Fallon IP RFI (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** ADM Fallon directed MNC-I to identify an operational environment within Baghdad where the IP are conducting policing operations without support from the IA or CF or to identify IP units that are capable of functioning without IA or CF support in a given operational environment. [redacted] received briefing on 8 JUN and the C3 on 10 JUN. Revisions made to briefing with C3 input. Current version is being analyzed by MND-B PMO and 89th MP BDE for consideration to develop into an operational plan.

**NEXT ACTION:** MND-B PMO and 89th MP BDE provide input on planning for IP operations in Baghdad.

**KEY DATES:** 18 JUN review input and update briefing.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**2. TOPIC:** IA Future FAQ Rotations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefing was prepared and passed to IGFC MiTT for further input. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. [redacted] briefed MG Berragan, who concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN.

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**NEXT ACTION:** Present to LTG Odierno

**KEY DATES:** TBD

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**3. TOPIC:** IA End State (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, and concept to determine a projected IA enduring posture. The third draft was presented to COL Wilson on 8 Jun 07. Briefed C3 10 JUN. Revisions made to the briefing with C3 input. On 13 JUN, the current version is being staffed with IGFC MTT and will be briefed to MOD on 16 JUN.

**NEXT ACTION:** IGFC MTT provides input and briefing is revised as needed.

**KEY DATES:** TBD

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** Equipment/Logistics Support to Brigades and Battalions Reinforcing FAQ (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** 3/1/3, 4/1, and 1/4/1 have been extended for an additional 90 days in support of FAQ. This will reduce the stress on the MNSTC-I supply system, due to units reporting to support FAQ without equipment and uniforms. This caused MNSTC-I to pull from stock that was intended for Prime Minister's Initiative Units. After some coordinated encouragement between our logistics department and IGFC, 3/1/3 picked up their additional equipment needed due to additional soldiers, from their division HQ in Al Kaslik, on 31 May. We were also able to get 4/2/4 and 3/2/4 to pick up their equipment from their division on 6 June, to support their own new soldiers out of basic training. CMATT has been approached by us concerning the policy of recruits leaving the school without helmets and IBAs. Realizing the problem, they have changed the policy so that soldiers will be leaving basic training school with gear, except those who are attending the 13 week course.

**NEXT ACTION:** C3 ISF LOG continues to monitor equipment status of IA units supporting FAQ.

**KEY DATES:** TBD

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**5. TOPIC:** ISF Force Generation (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The 30K soldier expansion plan continues and is in the fourth iteration. This plan addresses the average of 1,500 soldiers lost per month (casualties, DFRs, and AWOL) and brings all units to 110% strength. Approximately 33,890 of the 30K were recruited and trained. Elements of the fifth iteration are in the midst of training, with a goal of 8500 graduates. Fourth iteration assignments to the IA are complete, with a total of 6,890 Jundee distributed among nine divisions. The IA force generation process is focused on the Prime Minister's Initiative Force.

**NEXT ACTION:** The PM's Initiative force generation is on going. 30K Expansion plan, fifth iteration will begin graduating in June.

C1 ISF and IAG are developing a plan to get accurate numbers of Jundi that show for training and final numbers of Jundi assigned to line units.

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**KEY DATES:** Weekly PM Initiative Workgroup at MNSTC-I on 141100JUN07.

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**6. TOPIC:** Border Strategy & Security (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** MNF-I STRAT FUOPS began planning and development on National Border Strategy Goals and Security of Iraqi Seaports, 29 Mar 07. Planning efforts included Maritime Strategy development, security planning on seaports, and any campaign plan objectives for the future operations areas relevant to the drafted MoD Campaign plan (integration of MoD/MoI activities, to include interdiction behind Iraqi borders). MNF-I continues to refine mission analysis & force ratio laydown, develop proposed timeline / way ahead and focus efforts to begin planning with Gol. Future planning efforts will continue by way of four key conferences that will result in a Gol plan to secure and achieve international certification for Iraq's Seaports. Additionally MNF-I began an OPT early May to develop an action plan on interdicting the flow of foreign fighters movement and infiltration inside Iraq which entails a focused, synchronized CF and DBE operations. The goal is to reduce the capabilities of AQI and extremists that destabilize Baghdad.

MNF-I FUOPS has presented the action plan to stem the flow of foreign fighters and facilitators from Syria into Iraq to the CG. MNF-I portion of the planning has been completed. Issues remain to be addressed by MNSTC-I and DHS.

MNF-I FUOPS and DHS have initiated planning and work sessions to facilitate MOUs and interdiction plans between the Iraqi Navy and Coast Guard.

**NEXT ACTION:**

OPTs including DBE to be held to resolve issues for maritime interdiction in Iraqi waters.

**KEY DATES:**

14 Jun – Joint Border Enforcement Work Group

14-18 Jun - Seaport Reconstruction & Sustainment Conference-Key focus: Seaport ops & Infrastructure / Port Certification

25-28 Jun – DHS Customs Border Conference-Key focus: Port security / Improve interdiction / Inspections & Seizures

03 Jul- Interdiction and Coastal Security Conference at Basrah

Aug 07 – UN Port Conference-Key focus: Centralized legal entity to govern Seaport development

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**7. TOPIC:** National Police Samara and NP Replenishment (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Current assessment of the NP policy and employment is ongoing. PM Maliki and MG Hussein (NP Commander) abolished initiatives of five specialty 'Unity' battalions returning badly needed, though partially trained national police recruits, back to their respective academies. The Al Askariyah Bde will also disband. MG Hussein is considering using the recruits as individual fills for 3<sup>rd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> BDEs. Currently the 1<sup>st</sup> BN, Al Askaria BDE is awaiting NP specific training at Muthana (Site 3). NPHQ is working to ensure all NP recruits complete NP training at NNPA after IP Basic Recruit Training. 3-3-1 NP BN, currently operating in Samarra, is scheduled to be relieved by the first elements of the 6th Bde in o/a 16 June 07. The expansion of FOB Uvanni, needed to house the Samarra security assets, is delayed due to contractual problems.

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Construction forecast is 45 days from contract award. LTG Adnan Thabit, Samarra Security Commander, is coordinating troop quartering at Samarra's abandoned schools and the tourism site. CF and ISF key leaders will conduct a leader's recon 14 June. Sequence for NP Numaniyah cohort training is 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, Mech Bde and QRF. In response to the Samarra Mosque bombing, the 6/2 NP BDE is moving to Samarra to conduct security operations. Significant issues requiring definition and attention are Force Generation, Logistical Support, Lines of Communication, and Brigade/Battalion Life Cycle employment.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor status 3-3-1 BN and development of the 6th Bde. Conclude assessment defining issues and developing information papers for the senior staff to support the National Police.

**KEY DATES:** 17 June, 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE begins cohort training at Numaniyah.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**8. TOPIC:** IA M16/M4/M203 Weapons Fielding and Training (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The Fielding of M16s to the IA began on 01 May and is ongoing after a temporary pause due to weapon availability. A new shipment of M16's was received on 30 May; and are being issued and fielded. 3/9 IA will complete fielding on 27 Jun 07. 2/9 IA will begin fielding on 01 Jul.

**NEXT ACTION:** 2/9 IA begins fielding

**KEY DATES:** 3 weeks time – end of 3/9 fielding and the start of the next unit.

01 Jul – 2/9 Begins fielding

01 Jul – BRC opens for fielding of M16

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**9. TOPIC:** Borders Poe Roles and Responsibilities (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** DBE remains without a dedicated POE Director, since the assassination of MG Emad Mohsen Al Shaheen. BG Farhoud is now the acting National POE Director. A permanent POE Director is needed to make lasting change IAW CF objectives across all POEs in Iraq. If appointed soon, a new POE director will be the ninth in the last 24 months. Lack of a National Director degrades accountability of regional POE directors resulting poor operating standards abroad. The proposal to re-align Sea and Airports under MOI has passed the Deputy Committee. Success of this action is key to future seaport operations. Final approval Date TBD. Centralized control of Land, Air and Seaports will help to improve progress of DBE control of Iraqi Border security. DHS will receive 20 contracted border SMEs from Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) in support of the Corps, mid May. Twenty contract SMEs have been provided to DBE Regions 2 and 3 to assist in training personnel from Ports and Border Forts. An additional 22 POE and fort contractors have arrived in country and are scheduled for orientation at Taji and subsequent deployment. No further POE/ fort advisors are expected at this time.

Five MPRI contractors have arrived in ITO and are in place at DBE regional HQs, 15 more DBE region advisers are pending arrival in Iraq.

**NEXT ACTION:**

1. Plan orientation and deployment for remaining 15 Regional advisors.

**KEY DATES:**

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TBD - Written orders from PM on realignment of airports and seaports from MOT to MOI  
TBD – new or current POE Director assigned with permanent orders.

POC:

**10. TOPIC:** Border Operations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The Backscatter contract between American Science & Engineering (AS&E) & CPATT is in the final phase of being signed. The contractor has initiated training back in the states w/ the 8 technicians and the Program Manager (PM). The PM will arrive in Baghdad on /about 10 June and will be responsible for the entire training program and the life support / welfare of the 8 member team. The 8 technicians will arrive on or about 20 June pending a required train-up period completion of CRC. This will be a one year contract broken down as a six month period with two additional 3 month add-on's which the US Govt. can extend or terminate after the first six months.

MNC-I has been notified by CPATT that there is a 15 day delay on implementation of this contract.

**NEXT ACTION:**

1. Arrange transport to DBE Regions as they arrive.

**KEY DATES:**

NLT 10 Jun – Contractor Deploy to DIV

POC:

**11. TOPIC:** Reconciliation and Provincial Security Forces (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** Currently MNCI, IAG, and CPATT are all attempting to lead the policy charge of PSF. There is little evidence of mission analysis, doctrine comprehension, or operational employment vision for the PSF initiatives. Well trained, well led, and disciplined police forces are the minimum requirements in establishing security forces. FM 3-24 COIN, FT Leavenworth case studies, and COIN experiences in Malaya, Cypress, Algeria, Afghanistan, and the Balkans all pointedly warn against large, unsupervised, poorly led, or poorly trained security forces, with extra emphasis on adhoc or irregular security forces. Provincial level security forces can significantly contribute to the COIN fight if corruption is intolerable, security members are well trained, competent leadership is available, and a supervising authority is emplaced. CPATT, meaning civilian contractors or their subordinate reserve personnel, believe 80 hours of podium based classes, weapons orientation, and available civil/tribal leadership is sufficient. GEN Petraeus stated in the 28 MAY 07 MNFI BUA, we cannot simply pay the tribes or be convinced these forces will stop shooting at us if we pay them. In regards to reconciliation, conceptual use of PSF as a reconciliation tool is significantly lacking.

**NEXT ACTION:** Staff FRAGO to MNDs requiring the reporting of PSFs and CF interaction. Work with PMO TO Develop and staff policy in the IPS Development program, Force Generation SOP. Track force generation and funding for PSF.

**KEY DATES:**

POC:

**12. TOPIC:** 11 IA HQ Force Generation and Deployment for FAQ (Update)

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**DISCUSSION:** 11 IA is a PMI unit currently undergoing force generation at Old MOD. It will be composed of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> of the 6<sup>th</sup> IA, and an additionally generated BDE. It is expected to eventually replace 9 IA forces within Baghdad. On 20 May 07, 2/6 IA was re-designated as 1/11 IA. The BDE remains OPCON to 9 IA until further notice.

Received 1<sup>st</sup> ORA report (ORA 4). **IOC confirmed 6 JUN.**

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor MNSTC-I transfer of MiTTs and IGFC FORCEGEN actions

**KEY DATES:** 1 OCT 07 FOC

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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## FORCE GENERATION:

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### 1. TOPIC: MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requests Riverine capability to deny Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Joint Staff returned RFF to CENTCOM due to SOCOM identifying issues in the RFF needing resolution. JFCOM RFI dated 30 Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 will not be sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W). JFCOM requested input on feasibility of force provided under RFF 397 supporting both MNC-I requirements. Joint Staff determined both RFFs would not be sourced and directed CENTCOM to source internally. MNF-West tasked to determine if riverine capability could be used to support other MNDs. MNF-West response (12 Nov 06) was unable to support due to commitment of capability to the security of Haditha Dam complex. ONS (as interim material solution) submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06. HQDA (DAMO-CIC) reviewed ONS and returned disapproved 8 JAN 07. Discussion with CENTCOM and MNF-I over best "Way Forward." JUONS approved at CENTCOM on 10 April.

Defense rapid acquisition assessment presented and forwarded for approval, prior direction being tasking of Department of the Navy to meet requirement. Still developing interim solution based on expected production time line of at least 24 months to fill Navy RIVERON structure. The CENTCOM (CC-0188) Riverine Patrol Boats JUON, endorsed by BGen R.C. Fox, JCS J8, as an IWN and forwarded to the JRAC for immediate disposition. IWN- Immediate Warfighter Need - which are specific hi-visibility JUONS that require resolution and capability fielding within 120 days or less.

Issue also addressed with Coalition partners to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Coalition Cell at MNF-I highlighted need during weekly coordination VTC, trying to identify countries with actual capability. **Current responses are all negative, two countries pending response.** Iraqi boat manufacturer located and being queried through C9 on capability to produce riverine type boats if legal and funding requirements can be met. Joint Staff review of Immediate Warfighter Needs is on 6 June and will be monitored in the C3 P&P conference Room at 2100hrs. Joint Capabilities Board met without significant results, intent to place in Navy Operations Channels appears to be primary COA. JRAC will receive topic on 7 June. **Joint Coordination Board met on 13 June, mission is directed to Navy for solution, minimal movement.**

Iraqi capabilities that are available but require maintenance or manning are being investigated as fall back alternatives if Joint Staff does not fill IWN. Initial contact through MNSTC-I shows Iraqi cooperation. I Decision brief will be presented based on

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IWN results to determine the way ahead. Decision Paper is staffed pending C3 and CoS approval to forward to MNF-I.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research Joint, Coalition, and Iraqi Options to provide the capability and overcome funding, manning, legal, and acquisition constraints.

**KEY DATES:** 20 June JCB

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**2. TOPIC:** 15:12 BOG Policy (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Units requiring adjudication submitted via GENADMIN message. We have received word that we were not supported by JS in our adjudication requests. Documentation of that decision has been requested.

**NEXT ACTION:**

Board units based upon published JS spreadsheets.

**KEY DATES:**

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**3. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) MNC-I #135 for Military Combat Tracking Dogs (CTD) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests the development and deployment of Combat Tracking Dogs to the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). CTD are an emerging capability within the Department of Defense and exist at the moment only within the United States Marine Corps. A training program must be initiated to provide a renewable, enduring base for CTD until the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This capability will provide a vital resource for Coalition Forces deployed theater wide. Currently there are six CTD Teams in the ITO, with only 1.4a in the DOD inventory. MNC-I requires the fielding of 2 CTD Teams for a total of 1.4a teams. Transmitted to Force 23 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 2 JUN 07. Request for JUONS to be staffed through PMO.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI as required, assist with JUONS as required.

**KEY DATES:** LAD 30 SEP 07

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**4. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) #133 For 1 X Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Troop (14 PAX) to support MNC-I Asymmetric Warfare Operations (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** This is a request to formalize an existing and recurring requirement for forces in Iraq, not an addition of forces. AWG is internally sourced and conducts internal rotations. The AWG was established to identify, mitigate and defeat emerging Asymmetric Warfare (AW) threats. It provides AW subject matter expertise and advice to units on counter AW techniques, tactics, and procedures IOT exploit the enemy. AWG also provides a critical linkage between CJSOTF/JSOC operations, capabilities, and techniques and the conventional forces IOT enhance their operational/targeting capabilities and effectiveness. Transmitted to Force 22 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 30 MAY 07. Draft GENADMIN returned to CENTCOM from staffing.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI's as appropriate.

**KEY DATES:** No LAD: Ongoing requirement sourced by internal rotations.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**5. TOPIC:** Sourcing solution for URF 7952 Corps Analytical Augmentation Element (CAAE) (New)

**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I C2 Non-Concurred on the proposed sourcing solution to the CAAE for the following reasons. A Joint sourcing solution for this requirement will create an additional turbulent RIP/TOA process to occur in the MNC-I Corps CACE when the CAAE redeploys in 12 months and the AC Army ACE personnel have a 15 month tour. This unnecessary RIP/TOA will also desynchronize the follow on rotations of CACE units, as well as the Corps rotation, which severely degrades pre-deployment training procedures and crucial integration of the two operations elements that work in the CACE. As stated in multiple previous sourcing conferences with CENTCOM and FORSCOM, this URF requires a UNIT sourcing solution and not individual augmentees. Joint personnel pulled from several different locations and put together into an Ad-Hoc unit to conduct this mission will severely degrade the MNC-I CACE's ability to conduct its mission. Based off of this sourcing recommendation all senior leadership positions are filled by Joint individual personnel (2LT's instead of the stated requirement of CPT's, E7's instead of CW2's) and the EUCOM personnel fill all the lower enlisted positions with none of their internal command and control. This is unacceptable and will leave a severe gap in management and cohesiveness that is essential to a successful CAAE operation. The leadership is critical to augmenting the Modular Corps' ACE which does not have the MTOE to support current MNC-I requirements.

**NEXT ACTION:** MNC-I C2 is coordinating with CENTCOM J2 and the source providers to create an improved sourcing solution. Recommendation: Source URF 7952 (CAAE) with a UNIT. If a joint solution is required due to the unit's inability to meet this requirement completely, then the joint sourced Individuals should be the lower rank and kept to a minimum so the CAAE can still maintain a 15 month deployment to align with the Corps ACE and prevent turbulence.

**KEY DATES:** Proposed LAD will be 8 OCT 07 for personnel.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**6. TOPIC:** GFMAP 648 MoD 3 (IAG) (No change)

**Discussion:** This RFF requests 1 X Division MiTT to support 11<sup>th</sup> IA Division, adds medics for the Motor Transport Regiment (MTR) and LOG BN MTTs. It adds EOD manning and MP manning for division MiTTs. It also adds 4 X BTTs to support current Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) force structure. Total increase of [redacted] 1.4a X Pax. To CENTCOM 22 FEB 07. Release to Joint Staff and renamed GFMAP 648 Mod 3. TGT SDOB TBD. JFCOM Sourcing RFF Rollup 15 MAY shows Partial Solution Submitted [redacted] 1.4a PAX) with Non-concur on remaining capability, TGT SDOB 17 MAY 07. In SDOB for 25 MAY. Have submitted RFI through MNF-I requesting status on remaining [redacted] 1.4a PAX of the RFF. [redacted] 1.4a sourced in EXORD Mod 22. P4 Memo submitted by BG Pittard through GEN Petreus to ADM Fallon requesting assistance.

**NEXT ACTION:** Have requested status through MNF-I.

**KEY DATES:** None at this time.

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**POC:**

**7. TOPIC:** GENADMIN 744 (RFF #MNC-I 130) Medical: Mental Health, Preventative Medicine, and Medical Logistics (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 3 non-transformed Sustainment Brigades that provide daily care to the 164,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 (3) transformed Sustainment Brigades whose MTOEs do not contain Mental Health, Preventive Medicine and Medical Logistics are scheduled to deploy. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. Total of 48 Personnel. Transmitted to Force for staffing 24 MAR 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 5 APR 07. Presentation had been anticipated to ADM Fallon 8 MAY 07. **GENADMIN 744 MNF-I Health SVC Augmentation released 12 JUN 07**

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to any RFIs.

**KEY DATES:** Various LADs.

**POC:**

**8. TOPIC:** 07-09 SECFOR Requirements (Updated)

**DISCUSSION:** The 58TH AND 116TH BCTS were scheduled to mobilize based on a 60 day post mobilization training model. MOB dates were planned based on this model which is being developed in response to the new Total Force Utilization Policy and has not been approved for use by the 58th and 116th BCTs. The 58th and 116th BCTs require an 89 day training model to achieve the required level of training to conduct convoy security and force protection missions. FORSCOM initiated LAD shift requests for 16 x MNC-I company requirements (approximately 30 days). MNC-I submitted a mitigation plan to MNF-I 18 MAY 07. **1 LAD shift request will require a 9 day extension unless further mitigation can be agreed upon. ARCENT is staffing a plan to mitigate the RSOI timeline. Current unit in theater is 1041 EN.**

**NEXT ACTION:** **Coordinate with ARCENT on reduced JRSOI timeline for 1041 EN.**

**KEY DATES:** NA

**POC:**

**9. TOPIC:** RFF # 733 MoD 1 (MNC-I 129) 142<sup>nd</sup> Fires BDE Supplement (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests additional personnel for 142<sup>nd</sup> Fires BDE (FB) HQ (-) for MND-N (URF 7752, OIF 07-09). This capability is at the request of 142<sup>nd</sup> FB and MND-N, and is required for the FB HQ (-) and the division to accomplish their missions. They will also be responsible for providing C2 and oversight for Fire Support assets and Effects-Based Operations (EBO) in support of MND-N and will conduct frequent combat logistics patrols across the entire AO to maintain over 40 artillery locating radar systems. The total requirement is for 20 additional personnel. Submitted to CENTCOM 13 APR 07. Received RFI's from CENTCOM 17 APR 07. Additional RFI for CENTCOM CDR Board. Approved as CC RFF 733 Mod 1, transmitted to JS sourcing 17 of 20 requested personnel.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to any RFI as required.

**KEY DATES:** Requested LAD of 9 SEP 07.

**POC:**

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**10. TOPIC:** Theater Security BDE (TSB) (Updated)

**DISCUSSION:** 1/82 BCT (-) will deploy to meet a LAD of 12 JUN 07 and fulfill the TSB mission. 1/82 (-) will be augmented by 1-9 FA. 13<sup>th</sup> SC (E) is tasked to backfill E/134 BSB at Camp Victory.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor execution.

**KEY DATES:** NA

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**11. TOPIC:** FY 08 SECFOR (Updated)

**DISCUSSION:** FC sent a CONOPS to MNF-I for sourcing all MNC-I SECFOR requirements with 2 ARNG BCTs. The intent is to utilize unit level sourcing at the BCT level for SECFOR across the CENTCOM AOR. CENTCOM released the SECFOR message (DTG: 041302Z JUN 07) regarding the BCT URFs and identified the MNC-I URF numbers as 13258 and 13259. JOPES will be updated this week to reflect the intent of this CONOP.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue Coordination with ALCON.

**KEY DATES:** NA

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**12. TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) MNC-I RFF #133 Multiple Requirement from 4<sup>TH</sup> ID (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** This request from 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division is undergoing screening to determine those items appropriate for an RFF or as a request for individual augmentation. The entire request is for approximately [1.4a] personnel in varying disciplines. These areas include:

1. Horizontal Construction Company
2. Construction Management Cells
3. Force Protection Cell Augmentation
4. Medical Support
5. Linguistic Coordination Cell
6. 09L Augmentation
7. Div and BCT SIGINT
8. SIGINT Terminal Guidance Team Augmentation
9. Cryptological Support Team Augmentation
10. Resource Management Cell
11. Information Operations Officers
12. Alternative Compensatory Control Measures Team
13. Political Advisor (POLAD)
14. Human Terrain Analysis Team and Human Terrain Team
15. Civil Liaison Team And Civil Information Management Team

Analysis is complete. Preparing memorandum for CG's signature; conducting final staffing of analysis through Corps staff sections.

**NEXT ACTION:** Completion of screening process through staff elements.

**KEY DATES:** LAD of 1 DEC 07 for most elements.

**POC:** [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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13. **TOPIC:** [1.4a] Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Attended the CENTCOM 07-09 Force Flow Refinement and FY 08 Force Flow Conference through 8 JUN 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Establish and brief the CG on FY 09 Requirements based on the results of the Theater Posturing Conference ending 22 JUN. Monitor FY 08 sourcing issues to be published the beginning of JUL.

**KEY DATES:**

- a. 23 - 27 Jul 07 CENTCOM FY 09 Requirements AO Conf Camp As Salayah, Qatar
- c. TBD Aug/Sep 07 CENCTOM FY 07 Force Flow Conf Scott AFB, IL
- d. 24 - 28 Sep 07 CENTCOM FY 09 Rqmts GO/FO Conf MacDill AFB, Tampa

**POC:** [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

15. **TOPIC:** RFF 719 MoD 5 Request for Engineer Battalion HQ and 4 Horizontal Companies (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests horizontal construction assets to complete the workload increase generated by the increased forces in Baghdad in support of OPERATION FARDH AL-QANOON. Requested engineer force structure will construct 52 X Joint Security Stations and 9 X Gated Communities, repair, improve and maintain the Baghdad Security Belt, build combat outposts in the communities in Baghdad, and conduct route sanitation and rapid crater repair within the MND-B AOR. There is currently no solution for the EN BN HQ requested in RFF 719. It appears that CENTCOM will directed to relook at this request and provide a reply as to whether an internal sourcing solution can be achieved. Additionally, there is no sourcing solution for the four EN Companies requested. Same direction at internal sourcing may apply. It appears that the sourcing solution is still unresolved. The following actions are being considered by JFCOM: Reallocate already ordered units or extend units in place. Restaffing for RC solution, which will drive the 15 Apr07 LAD to nearly OCT 07. Draft sourcing solution utilizing realignment of assets in theater to be returned with non-concurrence by MNC-I C3, C-7, and GO. Sourced with a headquarters and one company in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21. Two companies will not be sourced.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor deployment through MRM.

**KEY DATES:** LAD 1 DEC 07

**POC:** [(b)(3), (b)(6)]

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**16. TOPIC:** RFF 712, 4 x MP CO (CS) RFF (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 4 additional MP (CS) COs to support the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) development program. The CG, MNF-I directed an expanded IPS development program and designated 2006 as "The Year of the Police" which represented a tremendous capacity surge in which the first PTTs were fielded in Mar - Apr 06. RFF will provide increased PTT capability and will fill the total PTT requirement to over 90% (~215 of 235 PTTs). RFF submitted to MNF-I on 9 Dec 06. MNC-I Chop on MNF-I staffing provided 16 Dec 06. RFF submitted to CENTCOM on 24 Dec 06. CENTCOM draft MOD 1 to RFF 697 for the 4 MP COs sent out for chop. S: 3 Jan 07. Rolled into RFF 712 with six other MP Cos. Joint Staffing 19 JAN 07. Four new requirement companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12, 13, and Draft 14. LADs of 15 JUL and 1 SEP 07. Six ILO companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD MoDs 12 and 13. Various LADs.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor Joint staffing and provide any requested input.

**KEY DATES:** Requested LAD of 15 Jul 07.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**17. TOPIC:** RFF 695 for 316TH ESC (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** 316th ESC RFF requests [1.4a] ax to provide staff augmentation, ISF support, and distribution management capability to this USAR unit that will deploy under a new Modular MTOE of [1.4a] pax; reduction of [1.4a] personnel) compared to the 13th SCE, and [1.4a] personnel) compared to 3rd COSCOM. Additional personnel will enable 316th ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics support and sustainment operations across the ITO. Reduced manning based on transformation to Single Log C2 with 1st Theater Support Command (TSC) assuming portions of overall theater sustainment mission from the ESC. Timeline for 1st TSC to assume Single Log C2 is a minimum of 6 months into the 316th ESC rotation (~Jan 08). CENTCOM RFF 695 released 9 Nov 06. Sourced in 07-09 EXORD Mod 7. CENTCOM also states in EXORD that this enduring request will be sourced after 07-09 via a JMD. Since then, CCJ! And CCJ4 have stated via e-mail that the JMD is not the correct method of sourcing this requirement and do not endorse the creation of a JMD to support this requirement. MNC-I C4 is discussing with XVIII ABN Corps to discuss a way ahead and will provide a recommendation.

**NEXT ACTION:**

- Awaiting recommendation from MNC-I C4 and results of XVIII ABN Corps discussions

**KEY DATES:**

- 15 Jul 07: LAD for 316th ESC Personnel

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**18. TOPIC:** RFF 667 MoD 1, Increase in Forces for TF [1.4a] (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** (Modification initially submitted for [1.4a] X pax. Restudy of the issues resulted in a change to [1.4a] X pax. Restaffing through MNC-I.) This Modification to RFF 667 requests [1.4a] X additional personnel to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and

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information processing and analysis in support of technology developed aviation assets. Identified shortages in critical skills sets render headquarters unable to process volumes of data previously unforecast. Currently TF [1.4a] is operating only five of the twenty four Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms projected for deployment within the next six months. The [1.4a] identified personnel will enable TF [1.4a] to conduct 24 hour operations and process technical information to assist in defeating the IED threat. Released to Joint Staff 12 FEB 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 18.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to any RFI from JS

**KEY DATES:** N/A at this time

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**19. TOPIC:** RFF 733 for 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) to make up for an identified shortfall in MND-B and MND-N. Released to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Chops due back to JS: 11 APR 07. Sourced OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor progress of staffing within Joint Staff.

**KEY DATES:** LAD for MND-B: 11 AUG 08. LAD for MND-N: 12 MAY 08.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**20. TOPIC:** RFF742: Military History Detachments (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 3 X Military History Detachments (total [1.4a] Pax) to fill identified shortfalls within the Corps. Units without Military History detachment coverage will be unable to contribute to Lessons Learned or to the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Released to CENTCOM 13 FEB 07. Released by CENTCOM to Joint Staffing 12 MAR 07 Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor arrival of units.

**KEY DATES:** LAD is 31 AUG 07.

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**21. TOPIC:** RFF 735 Requests for Optometry Support (No Change) *Monitor Only*

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 11 Optometrists that provide daily care to the 133,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 this will be down to 2 Optometrists to provide daily care to all U.S. personnel. The Sustainment Brigades currently in Iraq have organic Optometry teams. The Sustainment Brigades due in OIF 07-09 have undergone transformation and no longer have Optometry Teams. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. The one and only Optometry team scheduled to arrive for OIF 07-09 cannot support all 133,000 U.S. personnel. Transmitted to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF EXORD 07-09 Mod 17.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor staffing through DEPORD.

**KEY DATES:** LADs: 1 JUN 07; 27 JUN 07; 14 JUL 07

**POC:** [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**22. TOPIC:** RFF #749 Requests for 1 X Religious Support Team (No Change) *Monitor Only*

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**DISCUSSION:** Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) requires an additional Chaplain Detachment "D" Team to provide Religious Support (RS) required by Title 10 and in support of the plus up of one Division level Religious Support Team (RST) in the MNC-I AOR. When deployed Division level RSTs are authorized one D Team (O-4, E-6) (2 pax). This D Team will augment the Division RST providing essential RS coordination of low density RS assets within the Division RST AOR and provide direct and area religious support to all authorized personnel on the Division AO Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). To Joint Staff 16 MAR 07. Chop suspense 5 APR 07. TGT SDOB 26 APR 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 18.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor requests for information from Joint Staff.

**KEY DATES:** Lad shift from 15 JUN to LAD 1 JUL 07.

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

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