MNC-I C3 PLANS AND POLICY NOTES (#29)

As of 19 July 2007

WARPLANS:
1. TOPIC: Operations Phantom Thunder (Summer 2007 Offensive) (Update)

DISCUSSION: On 15 June 2007 MNC-I reached its peak combat strength with the final plus-up BDE (2/3 HBCT) and 3 CAB achieving full operational capability in MND-C and the 13th MEU beginning operations in AO Anaheim in North Eastern MNF-W. MNC-I has increased the scope and intensity of offensive operations to take the fight to the enemy. While increasing the OPTEMPO of enduring operations MNC-I and subordinate units have initiated several new major operations to include Operation Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah, Operation Marne Torch in Arab Jabour, Operation Faridh Al-Amin vic Lake Thar Thar, and Operation Marne Avalanche in Iskandariyah and will continue to conduct new operations throughout the summer. Phantom Strike, a series of independent but related operations designed to disrupt an anticipated AQI surge in attack preceding the observance of Ramadan will be conducted from the current time until the first week of September.

While the focus of plus-up forces is Baghdad and the Baghdad belts. MNC-I continues to apply pressure on insurgent networks across the breadth of the country. While Baghdad remains the Corps’ main effort, Baqubah and the Diyala River Valley are currently the Corps’ top priorities for corps assets. While focusing on protecting the Iraqi population MNC-I will expand operations to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary in areas CF has traditionally had minimal presence while maintaining forces to foster further improvement in those areas that are showing initial signs of success.

POC: 

2. TOPIC: Operation Phantom Strike (Disrupting an AQI Surge) (Update)

DISCUSSION: AQI is expected to attempt a surge in activities during the latter half of August and the first half of September both as part of a historical pattern associated with Ramadan, and as an attempt to influence CF governments and publics in advance of the scheduled September Assessment from GEN Petraeus to Congress.

MNC-I will conduct a series of operations to disrupt or prevent AQI from carrying out planned attacks. The term “Phantom Strike” which previously referred specifically to MNC-I operations against networks emplacing deep buried IEDs, has now been expanded to an umbrella term for all operations which disrupt AQI’s ability to conduct operations from now through the first week of September. Operations may target AQI IED networks, AQI Sanctuary/Staging Areas, AQI HVIs, or other targets which will disrupt AQI’s ability to increase their level of attacks prior to Ramadan.

MSCs have provided MNC-I with an initial timeline of their anticipated operations in support of Operation Phantom Strike. MNC-I will prioritize Corps level enabler support to these operations, and assist in coordinating operations across or adjacent to MSC boundaries.
**WAY AHEAD:** Briefing to CG, MNC-I: Date TBD

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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3. **TOPIC:** Operation Phantom Hammer (Operations to regain control of Diwaniya) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Operations in Diwaniya will be conducted in four-phases, designed to regain control of Diwaniya from insurgent elements. During Phase I, MNC-I prepares a CONPLAN to deploy sufficient forces to a temporary operating area IVO Diwaniyah to conduct clearing operations to reestablish ISF control of the city and enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment. MNC-I C3 Plans hosted a planning conference in Al Faw palace from 0800-1700 on 07JUL07 and again from 0800-1500 on 08JUL07, to integrate corps enablers, CF, and ISF forces into the courses of actions. Phase I ends when CONPLAN is briefed to the MNC-I CG on 16 Jul 07. Phase II, set the conditions, will begin upon approval of CONOP, and will consist of increasing situational awareness through intelligence build-up. Phase III, decisive operations, will begin when commander MNC-I directs execution of plan, and will remove insurgent threat from Diwaniya. Phase IV, secure Diwaniya, returns control of Diwaniya to legitimate authorities.

**WAY AHEAD:** Briefing to CG, MNC-I: 12 JUL 07; Tentative Planning session with MND-CS, MND-C, IGFC, 8IA, and Corps Planners at Camp Echo on 21 or 23 JUL 07.

**POC:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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4. **TOPIC:** Border Security (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** Appendix 10 (Border Security Operations) to Annex C to OPORD 07-01 was published on 1 June. The order details a border strategy involving a four prong approach to border operations to create security in depth. The four areas of emphasis; POEs, borders, smuggling routes within Iraq, and smuggling networks; are complementary with operations in one helping to set the conditions for increased effectiveness in others. These operations will be accompanied by a coordinated IO effort at all echelons to convince Iraqis that they benefit collectively and individually by observing and enforcing GOI border laws and regulations. While none of these areas of emphasis are new this strategy seeks increased effectiveness as more forces are committed to border security, more intelligence collection and analysis is dedicated to target lethal smuggling, and a coordinated effort is made to create synergy between the four areas of emphasis. MNC-I is currently prioritizing the Southern Iraq/Iran border (Diyala, Wasit, Maysan, and Basrah Provinces) where the primary EFP and advanced weaponry support to extremists is assessed to enter Iraq. The framework of the border strategy, however, will be applicable to the overall mission to include TFF networks on the Syrian border which is currently an area of emphasis for MNF-I planning.

Due to poor security, corruption, and divided loyalties of border security personnel; it is assessed that much of the external support to extremists within Iraq passes directly through the Land POEs. Given this assessment, establishing continuous coalition force presence at key POEs has become a top priority for both MNF-I and MNC-I. MNC-I is willing to pull BTTs from other DBE organizations and consolidate them at POEs if required to achieve this continuous coverage.

**NEXT ACTION:**
MNC-I will work closely with MNF-I on developing and implementing the MNF-I Near Term Action Plan for interdicting Foreign Fighters.

MNC-I continues to pursue options to improve the security and functioning of POEs on the Iranian border as a first step in a broader effort to improve security along the border. MND-N has completed its mission analysis for providing continuous coverage at Muntheria POE, and MND-SE owes plans and associated costs for providing continuous CF coverage at AL Sheeb and Shalamshah POEs. MND-C continues to pursue forward basing options for BTTs at Badra vic Zurbatiyah, and is planning to develop a series of checkpoints inside the border once the full contingent has arrived in Wassit Province.

Al Qaim POE in Al Anbar province was scheduled to open in the first half of August, but opening has been delayed pending resolution of international agreements between Iraq and Syria. MNF-W will remission a BTT to cover this POE once it is opened.

5. TOPIC: Operation BEDROCK (Clearing AQI from Quarries) (Update)

DISCUSSION: MNC-I ICW the MSCs and CJSOTF has been preparing a contingency plan for a Corps level engagement of AQI targets in an area at the juncture of MND-N, MNF-W, and MND-B commonly referred to as “The Quarries Area”. MNC-I had originally anticipated executing this operation in early August, but to date intelligence has not indicated an enemy presence in the area that warrants an operation at the scale envisioned in the Operation Bedrock Planning.

MNC-I C3 Plans will continue to collect MSC input to complete the CONPLAN, but there is no expectation that it will be executed as a Corps Level Operation in the near future. Scheduled MSC CONOP backbriefs to the MNC-I CG have been canceled. At this time there is no plan to form a JSOA in the area as originally envisioned in the Operation Bedrock Plan. Specific targets within the Quarries Area are likely to serve as objectives for smaller scale raids (predominantly by CJSOTF assets) as part of Operation Phantom Strike.

NEXT ACTION: NA

6. TOPIC: ISF Endstate for Baghdad (No Change)

DISCUSSION: Since the last update, the ISF Endstate for Baghdad presentation was presented to the C3 for further guidance. In addition to the suggestions discussed in the last update, the C3 recommended an expansion of Baghdad’s rural Security Districts to include Hussiniyah and Khan Bani Saad.

NEXT ACTION: Continue to conduct integrated staff planning with the BOC planners, MNSTC-I, the MNDs, and IAG. Work together with MND-N and MND-B to develop a concept for expanding the rural Security District of Khan Bani Saad. It is still anticipated that at some further future date the plan will be socialized with the BOC leadership. When the Corps Commander returns from leave it is anticipated this brief will go to him for his guidance.

KEY DATES: N/A

1.4b, 1.4d
7. **TOPIC:** ISF Development (No Change)
**DISCUSSION:** Since the last update, Plans in coordination with IAG, has been tasked to develop a mission analysis to develop the mission of the BCT tailored for the advisory/assistance role (formerly known as the Advisory/Assistance Brigade). This planning effort is designed to flesh out the requirements for the BCT. MNC-I and IAG will continue to attend MNF-I FUOPs planning efforts to assist them in developing the requirements for the BCT tailored for the advisory/assistance role.
**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to develop a mission analysis to include an IPB and other associated requirements in anticipation of presentation.
**KEY DATES:** No meetings scheduled at this time.
**POC:**

8. **TOPIC:** Elections (No Change)
**DISCUSSION:**

--- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED ---
On 26 June 2007, the Elections Working Group reviewed the status of the following action items:

**Provincial Powers Law:** This legislation has not progressed beyond the second reading. USM-I believes that there are two different drafts of this legislation, implying that it still being discussed in committee. This legislation is not required prior to provincial elections.

**Elections Law:** This legislation has not been drafted and is needed prior to Provincial Elections. It will provide the legal framework for Provincial Elections in Iraq. There has been a suggestion that the 2005 Elections Law will be redrafted; USM-I cannot confirm at this time. USM-I is pushing for the Elections Law to be passed by the Council of Representatives by 15 September 2007.

**IHEC** received training on scope of duties by UNAMI and the Indian Electoral Commission over the past two weeks. The next step for the IHEC is to confirm the heads of the 19 Governmental Electoral Offices (GEO) (one per province and two in Baghdad). The process for this is that each Governor submits 5 candidates for the post of Director in their Province, and the IHEC will choose the most qualified candidate. Following the selection of the Directors of the 19 GEO, the IHEC will begin to set the conditions for voter registration. Voter registration will be covered in future Elections updates.
Elections Working Group
26 JUN 07

• WHEN: Monthly meeting; last Tuesday of the month
• WHO: UN, USM-I POLOFF, USAID, OPA, SPA (plans, strategy), MNC-I C3 Plans, MNC-I C9, PRT
• TOPIC:
  – Legislative Framework
    • Provincial Powers Law (should be passed prior to elections, but not required)
    • Elections Law (target date SEP)
      – Not entirely sure what it says
      – Public Policy Group (DC Think Tank) is writing a draft
      – Key is the criteria to establish residency (who votes and where do they vote?)
      – May push “rolling elections” to “re-do” the low voter turnout provinces (Anbar, Diyala, Salah Ad Din)
  – IHEC is in charge, not US, not UN
    • 9 election commissioners
    • 2 weeks training by UN in India
    • Permanent staff of 700
    • Independent funding (not under a ministry)
  – Biggest Challenge
    • Voter Registration (target date SEP/OCT)
      – Biometric approach will take 12-18 months (might do for National Elections in Dec 2009)
      – 543 food distribution centers would become voter registration centers (security)
      – Will be open for 1-3 weeks in order to register voters
    • Provincial Elections (120 days after registration is complete (FEB 08))
    • MNC-I Challenge: Support ISF Security (voter registration, ballots, PSD, polling sites)

-- ELECTION NOTES ARE UNCLASSIFIED --

Provincial elections cannot proceed until all related legislation is resolved, making elections unlikely before February 2008. Provincial elections have the potential to pull more Sunnis into the political process and improve governance in some provinces, such as Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, and Ninewa. When the elections occur, it is likely that politically organized Sunni Arabs and Sadrists, neither of whom participated in the last round of provincial elections, are positioned to make significant gains, however, Sunni insurgents who oppose elections will likely intimidate neutral or pro-GOI Sunnis from going to the polls. Elections by themselves will not reduce violence; the critical factor in the reduction of sectarian violence continues to be improving the security conditions for the citizens of Iraq.

It is reasonable to assume that there are some in the GOI who stand to lose power when an election occurs, and will attempt to postpone the Provincial Elections until January 2009 when the National Elections are next scheduled to occur. Presently, sub-provincial elections cannot legally occur; if sub-provincial elections are held, perhaps in a city or a district, the “elected officials” would have no legal status and control neither levers of legitimate power nor a legal financial stream.

The concept of a “tribal council”, whereby leaders of several tribes might come together to form an informal council, is encouraged as a stabilizing force to augment and support the efforts of the Provincial Governors and the legitimate Provincial Council, as long as it does not attempt to usurp or wrest legitimate power away from the Provincial Governor.
9. **TOPIC:** Alternate Ground LOC (GLOC) Considerations (No Change)  
**DISCUSSION:** DLA is working initiatives with SDDC, CDDOC, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, CTO, and MNF-I R&S to move more CL IV through Jordan for MNF-W customers and through Port of Um Qasar (Iraq) for MNF-SE and CS customers. Shifting the MSR coming out of Kuwait from Tampa to Aspen resulted in a restricted flow of supplies. Bde RIPs will take priority over movement of certain classes of supplies. Moving the supplies in through alternate ports will help alleviate delays in delivery. We are able to move non-military supplies through Jordan and increasing the amount of supplies moved through ports other than Kuwait will decrease congestion along the MSR into Iraq and also help improve flow rates.  
**NEXT ACTION:** +Awaiting action from higher.  
**POC:**  

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10. **TOPIC:** Infrastructure Security Strategy (No Change)  
**DISCUSSION:** MNC-I has begun parallel planning with MNF-I as we attempt to address the security issues and concerns of oil and electrical infrastructure in Iraq. Planners are participating in a number of MNF-I working groups in order to better understand the relationship between the attacks and the effects on the ability of infrastructure to deliver energy both oil and electricity to the populace as well as government wealth generation. ICW JWAC, a review of energy infrastructure is taking place which seeks to determine how to improve the availability of electricity to Baghdad in the shortest time possible. The review will consider the energy infrastructure priorities of the Iraqi ministries (the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Ministry of Defence). On completion, the review will be compared to an analysis of threats to energy infrastructure. The vastness of energy infrastructure prevents total security but the combination of the infrastructure review and the threat analysis will enable security to be focused in areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high. Once we have confirmed our focus for energy infrastructure security, the Iraqi Ministries, (Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Electricity, and Ministry of Defence) will be engaged to ensure coherence of effort. The IA is responsible for the security of infrastructure.  
**NEXT ACTION:** Combine infrastructure review and threat analysis to identify areas where likelihood of attack and impact of attack are both high.  
**POC:**  

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11. **TOPIC:** Transition of IA Divisions (Update)  
**DISCUSSION:** The transition to Iraqi Security Forces control of the ten IA Divisions developed under the COIN force program remains at 80% complete:  
- 1-2 IA Div Transition of Authority (TOA) admin requirements are being researched to effect transition NLT 31 Aug 07.
5IA TOA requirements are being reviewed following PM Al-Maliki’s placement of 5IA Div under the Diyala Operations Center as at 18 Apr 07. An abbreviated TOA process is being developed for approval.

7IA TOA programmed for 01 Nov 07. Planning has commenced by MNF-W and MNC-I (C3 Plans) to commence the validation and transition programs. The MNC-I FRAGO is being drafted for staffing pending requirements definition by IGFC and C3.

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

12. TOPIC: Diyala River Valley (DRV) Operation (New)
DISCUSSION: C3 Plans has commenced planning for an operation to clear the DRV. A C3 Plans OPT is planned to occur during the period 25 -31 Jul 07.

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

13. TOPIC: Southwest Support Zones (No Change)
DISCUSSION: C3 Plans is conducting mission analysis on the area from Amiriyyah (in MNF-W) to Iskandariyyah (MND-C) and from Lake Razazza to the Euphrates River; also known as the Southwest Support Zone. Concern is that threat forces have freedom of action in this area and use portions of this area as a sanctuary. Operation River Walk II near Amiriyyah and operations in Zaidon by MNF-W has reduced threat presence in that portion of the Southwest Support Zone. Upcoming MND-C operations, such as Marne Avalanche, will disrupt enemy activity in the Iskandariya portion of the Southwest Support Zone. To date no operation has disrupted enemy activity along the depth of the Southwest Support Zone. Mission analysis continues in order to determine whether a larger operation will significantly impact enemy operations south of the Euphrates River Valley.

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
15. **TOPIC:** Base Consolidation and Closure (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** In the ongoing efforts to turn over battle space to the ISF, MSC close or transfer bases to GOI approved receiver (MOD, MOI, MOF) under a "condition based" approach. Base transfer / closures is a conditions based approach driven by three major considerations: stability in the AO, ISF ability/capability to assume & hold battle space and funding for base consolidation. The current methodology is bottom-up driven with MSC nominating bases for transfer / closure, gaining approval, and following a 100 day notional timeline, which serves as a guide to accomplish necessary steps in the transfer / closure process.

**Next Action:** All base transfers/closure nominations have to be approved by CG. No further action required for 3ID CAB at Stryker, and GEO BDE + BNs at Camp Delta and 2/3 HBCT (Brigade #20) at LSAA, Taji, Liberty, Falcon, and Kalsu.

**Future Actions:** IZ Transition is back on the table which entails the consolidation of MNF-I presence in the IZ from 13 to 3 locations; with two being MND-B bases (Union III and Prosperity). The transition also requires the transfer of Base Union I (Oct08), Freedom Rest (Jul08), the relocation of CSH to VBC (Sep08) and the relocation of GRD to VBC (June08). As part of the consolidation, MND-B will have to relocate from Union III NLT Jan 08 and transfer the base to JASG, which begins construction and renovations to relocate MNF-I FWD by Oct 08. MND-B is currently assessing capacity...
at Prosperity to absorb forces from Union III. The Executive Base Management Board with COS has been suspended until further notice; will conduct Base Working Groups twice a month. As part of future basing plans, we are conducting analysis of current capacity at long term COB IOT build required additional capacity to support RIP/TOA and consolidation efforts.

**Bases transferring / closing in the next:**

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<td>14 AUG 07</td>
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<td>Cedar II / 13th SC-E</td>
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**Key dates:** Next BMWG 14 July 07 @ Phantom CR / 1300

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16. **TOPIC:** Major Cultural / Religious Events (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:**

3 Rajab or 18 July 07: Death of 10th Imam (buried in Samarra)

25 Rajab or 9 Aug 07: Death of 7th Imam (buried in Kadamiyah)

The 10th Imam, Ali il Hadi (the Pure One) died as a result of poisoning and is buried in Samarra. He was generous, kind, and noted for his politeness. The Al Askari Mosque in Samarra, also known as the Golden Mosque, was partially destroyed on 22 February 2006 by terrorists. Reconstruction of this mosque has been guaranteed by the UN, however reconstruction has not yet begun, nor will it until the security situation improves. The commemoration of the death of the 10th Imam will likely draw huge crowds in Samarra.

The 7th Imam, Musa al Kazim (the Patient One) died as a result of poisoning after suffering 14 years in prison. He was generous, brave, and possessed great self-control over his anger. Two years ago, people inciting a riot from within the massive crowd at the commemoration of the death of the 7th Imam resulted in a stampede that collapsed the nearby bridge in Northern Baghdad and caused the death and injury of hundreds of worshipers. The commemoration of the death of the 7th Imam and the commemoration of the stampede at the Kadimiyah Bridge will likely draw huge crowds in Northern Baghdad.

Reference to all operationally significant religious and political events located on C3 Plans and Policy website, posted 10 Jan 2007. The beginning of Islamic months in Iraq starts with the observation of the crescent moon with the naked eye (giving a variance of +/- one day per month), so the dates are approximate.

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS:** Moderate threat; large crowds may entice insurgents to attempt a high-profile attack.

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17. **TOPIC:** IA Legal Advisor Partnership Program (IALAPP) (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** The MNC-I OSJA IALAPP stated priorities are: (1) Oversee IGFC Legal Advisor training; (2) Clarify IA powers of arrest for all IA elements subject to different C2 arrangements; and (3) Encourage centralized IGFC Detainee procedures and policies.

**NEXT ACTION:** Ongoing projects include:
- The MOD has completed training for all new and existing Legal Advisors on the recently passed Military Procedure Law and Military Penal Code (together, the new Iraqi Armed Forces Military Justice system);
- The IGFC Deputy Legal Advisor has been transferred to a newly formed Counter Terrorism unit in MOD. The new Deputy Legal Advisor is formerly of the MOD Legal Directorate. was previously the Deputy Legal Advisor at 2IA;
- Continue training on IA ROE including an information paper, PowerPoint training slides, and ROE Cards;
- Working with MNSTC-I on formulating proper Detainee SOPs and policies;
- Currently working on agreements with DOJ, DOS, and GOI for all future Judicial Review Teams of investigative judges in MND-B, MND-N, and MNF-W, and working on internal MNC-I SOP for conducting the operations;

KEY DATES:  None.

POC:  

ISF:

1. TOPIC:  IA Future FAQ Rotations (Update)
DISCUSSION:  C3 Plans requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, constraints and risks used to forecast which IA units are available to deploy in support of Baghdad Security Operations. Briefed C3 10 JUN, Options 2 & 4 preferred. MG Berragan concurred, but believes that 3 DIV HQ in Baghdad requires further analysis. Hard copy of slides passed to BG Wolff, MNSTC-I, on 11 JUN. 4/7 IA has been replaced by 4/11 IA as a priority on the FORCEGEN Tracker. It is forecasted to be FOC on 1 APR 08. 1/3/10 IA rotation on schedule. IGFC recommended extending 2/2/10 IA; no decision.

NEXT ACTION:  20 JUL FAQ Rotation Breeze
KEY DATES:  11-12 AUG rotation

POC:  

2. TOPIC:  Integration of SIBs into the regular IA (Update)
DISCUSSION:  Closely linked with the Infrastructure Security Strategy is the issue of developing capability with the Iraqi Army to effectively secure energy infrastructure. The forces currently assigned to this task are the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, (SIBs), whose performance was below that required to provide effective protection to critical energy infrastructure. The SIBs are to be fully incorporated into the Iraqi Army. This process will involve: Firstly, withdrawing SIBs from infrastructure security duties. Secondly, back-filling infrastructure security duties with a sufficiently capable IA Bn. Thirdly, moving the SIB unit to the K1 Regional Training Centre where they will receive some individual training. It appears MNSTC-I is now able to provide only a small amount of the original training requirement. This passes risk to MNC-I who must develop the capability of new IA units in order to make them fit-for-purpose. MNSTC-I will issue OCIE to all former SIB personnel attending training. Fourthly, following training the Bn is re-designated with an IA army designation and is ready for duties.

SECRET/REL TO USA and MCFI//
Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Theoretically the new IA Bn can be deployed on any duty but it is expected they will initially be deployed on the infrastructure security task. There are a number of outstanding issues concerning which have yet to be addressed: Availability of equipment (especially heavier crew-served weapon systems) to bring the new Battalion’s MTOE to the IA standard, and basing of battalions following re-flagging. In line with the concept of Iraqi Transition, MNC-I C3 Plans is partnering and supporting the IGFC to develop plans that will turn MOD/JHQ direction into activity. MNC-I C3 Plans attended a meeting on 7/18 where the IGFC briefed their Concept of Operations and back-filling plans. The information gained from this meeting is now being considered. MNC-I C3 Plans, ICW IAG, has been working to determine how existing MiTT capability can be re-deployed to better meet MNC-I’s priorities for developing the Iraqi Army.

NEXT ACTION: Brief C3 Plans and Policy on “How can MNC-I harvest current Transition Teams from “more” capable IA units to help develop new, “less” capable IA units produced through SIB integration or PM Initiatives.”

POC:

3. TOPIC: Equipment/Logistical Support to Brigades and Battalions (Update)

DISCUSSION: The next units scheduled to come down in support of FAQ will be 1/3/10 and 1/2/10. They are expected to arrive on 11 AUG in Baghdad. Equipment shortfalls have been addressed and there are none as of this time. The two battalions have been notified to bring their fuel vouchers, which has been a problem in the past with other battalions. 1/3/10 is planned to be based at JSS Thrasher and 1/2/10 is expected to be based at Lion’s Den.

MNSTC-I J-4 Maintenance is addressing the HMMWV parts problem. They have devised a new plan for ordering. Requisitions will go from the battalion, to the division, then to the RSU. If the RSU does not have the part in stock they will turn to the repair shop. If the shop does not have the part then a request is made to J-4 Maintenance at which time they will expedite delivery via a contractor in Virginia. They estimate the new process will take 45 – 60 days to deliver a part to the RSU which is a big difference from the usual 180+ day time frame. Brake pads will hopefully be delivered to Al Kasik and K-1 this week. Code out procedures for HMMWVs has been delivered to the MNDs for dissemination down to the IA divisions.

Currently there is no process to get parts for Badgers that are not covered by warranty. MNSTC-I is looking into the situation, but currently there is no contract with a third party yet.

Orders have been issued by the BG of IGFC to deliver 6,000 uniforms to each of the IA divisions (except for 9th and 12th who are only receiving 1000 uniforms each). C3 ISF brought the issue of ordering of winter uniforms to the attention of the IGFC to avoid problems encountered last year with lack of OCIE. The BG of IGFC has issued an order for the G-4 to order necessary items for the winter months to come. Even through the order has been issued there is still concern since no one seems to know the delivery date, and how the winter uniforms are to be distributed. I will still keep pressing the issue.

There will be an IGFC G4 conference in the Tigris room next week on the 24th of July at 1000 till 1400.
**NEXT ACTION:** C3 ISF LOG continues to monitor equipment status of IA units and especially those supporting FAQ.

**KEY DATES:** 13 AUG - 22 AUGUST: 10th division units coming to Besmeyah/Baghdad

**POC:**

| (b)(3), (b)(6) |

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4. **TOPIC:** Border Strategy, Security and Interdiction (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** MNF-I STRAT FUOPS began planning and development on National Border Strategy Goals and Security of Iraqi Seaports, 29 Mar 07. Planning efforts included Maritime Strategy development, security planning on seaports, and any campaign plan objectives for the future operations areas relevant to the drafted MoD Campaign plan (integration of MoD/MoI activities, to include interdiction behind Iraqi borders). MNF-I continues to refine mission analysis & force ratio laydown, develop proposed timeline / way ahead and focus efforts to secure and achieve international certification for Iraq’s Seaports. Action on Iraq’s seaports and bringing them under the operational control of MOI continues with USDHS, USM-I and MNF-I as the primary actors in this effort. MNF-I has scheduled a meeting on 28-29 Jul 07 involving the Iraqi Navy, Coast Guard and DBE staff as well as US Navy, DHS and Coalition players in order to finalize details required to create a Memorandum of Understanding amongst the agencies responsible for the security of Iraq’s territorial waters, inland waterways and seaports. Additionally MNF-I began an OPT early May to develop an action plan on interdicting the flow of foreign fighters movement and infiltration inside Iraq which entails a focused, synchronized CF and DBE operation. The goal is to reduce the capabilities of AQI and extremists that destabilize Baghdad. All parties engaged in the initiative will participate in a status meeting to gauge progress on initiative milestones on 14 Jul 07.

**NEXT ACTION:**
- Continue to monitor developments of Seaport Strategy
- Complete process to resolve all issues pertaining to a Navy/Coast Guard/DBE Memorandum of Understanding.
- Follow-up on assigned task in support of the initiative.

**KEY DATES:**
14 Jul- Progress review on counter initiatives
28-29 Jul- Navy/Coast Guard/DBE conference (At the IZ)

**POCs:**

| (b)(3), (b)(6) |

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5. **TOPIC:** Border Operations (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** The Backscatter contract - The New American Science & Engineering (AS&E) contract is broken down into maintenance and training. The maintenance portion is written for a six month period with the ability to extend twice, 3 months at a time. The technician training portion is written for only 90 days and will be preformed with a competent Iraqi maintenance and motor mechanics. The American Science & Engineering (AS&E) maintenance technicians are currently deployed in three (3) 2-Man teams to assess and facilitate maintenance / repair for the 15 deadline Backscatter vans scattered across four of Iraq’s DBE Regions. Priority of support for POEs is to...
Rebea’a, Zurbatia, Al Qaim, Haj Ormeran, Safwan, Waleed, Bashmakh, Shalamcha, Trebil.

**NEXT ACTION:**
Continue to monitor status of operations.

**KEY DATES:**

**POCs:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**6. TOPIC:** Replacement of 3rd SIB (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** 3rd SIB has been removed from the task of infrastructure security and will be the first SIB unit to undergo integration into the IA. They have been replaced by Commander 4th IA Div. Their AO is being secured by 3-3/4.

**NEXT ACTION:** Nil.

**POC:**

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**7. TOPIC:** Borders Poe Roles and Responsibilities (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** DBE remains without a dedicated POE Director, since the assassination of MG Emad Mohsen Al Shaheen. BG Farhoud is now the acting National POE Director. A permanent POE Director is needed to make lasting change IAW CF objectives across all POEs in Iraq. If appointed soon, a new POE director will be the ninth in the last 24 months. Lack of a National Director degrades accountability of regional POE directors resulting in poor operating standards abroad

**NEXT ACTION:**
1. Plan orientation and deployment for remaining 5 Regional advisors.

**KEY DATES:**
TBD – new or current POE Director assigned with permanent orders.

**POC:**

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**8. TOPIC:** 11 IA HQ Force Generation and Deployment for FAQ (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** 11 IA is a PMI unit currently undergoing force generation at Old MOD. It will be composed of 2nd and 5th of the 6th IA, and an additionally generated BDE. It is expected to eventually replace 9 IA forces within Baghdad. On 20 May 07, 2/6 IA was re-designated as 1/11 IA. The BDE remains OPCON to 9 IA until further notice. Received 1st ORA report (ORA 4). IOC initially announced as 6 JUN, but as of JUL, we awaiting M7 to write order to make official. Currently; the 11 IA DIV HQ is manned at 108% strength.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor MNSTC-I transfer of MiTTs and IGFC FORCEGEN actions

**KEY DATES:**
JUN – AUG 07 staff training
SEP 07 validation exercise (proposed)
1 OCT 07 FOC

**POC:**

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**9. TOPIC:** IA End State (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** C3 requested C3 ISF prepare a presentation on the facts, assumptions, and concept to determine a projected IA enduring posture. The third draft was
presented to [b][3], [b][6] on 8 Jun 07. Briefed to C3 10 JUN. Revisions made to the briefing with C3 input. On 13 JUN, the current version is being staffed with IGFC MTT and will be briefed to MOD on 16 JUN.

Per IGFC MTT [b][3], [b][6], briefing was given on 16 JUN, but no decisions were made at or since the briefing. On the CF side, MNSTCI has initiated a study of the Iraqi Army end state which will involve a team from the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). No further information is available on this planned study.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to track progress with IGFC MTT. Remain situationally aware of MNSTCI initiated CAA study

**KEY DATES:** TBD

**POC:**

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**FORCE GENERATION:**

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1. **TOPIC:** MNC-I RFF 656 Riverine JUONS (Update)

**DISCUSSION:** RFF 656, released 17 Jun 06, requests Riverine capability to deny Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. JFCOM RFI dated 30 Sep 06 indicated RFF 656 not be sourced due to RFF 397 (for MNF-W). JFCOM requested input on feasibility of force provided under RFF 397 supporting both MNC-I requirements. Joint Staff determined both RFFs would not be sourced and directed CENTCOM to source internally. MNF-West riverine capability response was unable to support due to commitment of capability to the security of Haditha Dam complex.

ONS submitted by MNF-I on 30 Nov 06. HQDA (DAMO-CIC) reviewed ONS and returned disapproved 8 JAN 07. Discussion with CENTCOM and MNF-I over best “Way Forward.” JUONS approved at CENTCOM on 10 April. Defense rapid acquisition assessment presented and forwarded for approval, prior direction being tasking of Department of the Navy to meet requirement. Still developing interim solution based on expected production time line of at least 24 months to fill Navy RIVERON structure. The CENTCOM (CC-0188) Riverine Patrol Boats JUON, endorsed by BGen R.C. Fox, JCS J8, as an Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN) and forwarded to the JRAC for immediate disposition.

Coalition partners contacted to determine capabilities/feasibility of support. Current responses are all negative, two countries pending response.

Iraqi boat manufacturer located and being queried through C9 on capability to produce riverine type boats. Link up made through MND-B G9 and contracting response pending.

Joint Capabilities Board met without significant results, intent to place in Navy Operations Channels appears to be primary COA. JRAC received topic on 7 June. Joint Coordination Board met on 13 June, mission is directed to Navy for solution, minimal movement. At the request of VADM Morgan (N3/N5), the DJ8 removed the Riverine JUONS topic from discussion at the 6 Jul 07 Joint Coordination Board. The JS J3 intends to formally direct JFCOM to develop a joint in-lieu-of solution and get the global force management process moving. VADM Morgan believes that the prospective outcome may help Navy accelerate both training and the delivery of Riverine equipment...
to CENTCOM. Updated response to RFF 656 provided to MNF-I to provide additional information regarding this planning.

Iraqi Navy capabilities that are available but require maintenance or manning are being investigated as alternatives. Compatible JP8 outboard motors are located for this or commercial options. MNF-I concurrence completed/forwarded to CMATT for MOU negotiation. Iraqi Navy Commander has concurred and will release the six FABs, MOU is at Iraqi JHQ for approval. Engine requisition and boat utilization will be by MND-C. FRAGO published in 26Jun07 DTU, specifying commercial watercraft option to MNDs utilizing OMA funds and internal assets. Ms Cagan’s (DASD) office distributed to coalition representatives MNC-I CG letter of need with MNF-I CG concurrence and Riverine briefing. Message of need sent by OSD sent to possible Coalition partners, 11 July. DA LNO has located Coast Guard watercraft available for transfer, coordinating property book and transaction in conjunction with MND-N. Feasibility of Transportation Corps Medium Boat or Harbormaster Detachments serving as watercraft operators, maintainers and trainers via RFF being researched. Units are qualified to operate the watercraft but lack watercraft, sufficient weapon systems, and sufficient unit level maintenance capability.

**NEXT ACTION:** Continue to research Joint, Coalition, and Iraqi Options to provide the capability and overcome funding, manning, legal, and acquisition constraints. Locate and requisition required major components to support selected commercial options. Project Officer prepared to assist MNDs with commercial requests. See Riverine Research and Actions Folder, Folder, C3 Plans and Policy Web page on SIPR and CENTRIX.

**KEY DATES:**

| POC: | (b)(3), (b)(6) |

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2. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) #780 for Military Combat Tracking Dogs (CTD) (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests the development and deployment of Combat Tracking Dogs to the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). CTD are an emerging capability within the Department of Defense and exist at the moment only within the United States Marine Corps. A training program must be initiated to provide a renewable, enduring base for CTD until the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This capability will provide a vital resource for Coalition Forces deployed theater wide. Currently there are six CTD Teams in the ITO, with only 1.44 in the DOD inventory. MNC-I requires the fielding of 2 CTD Teams for a total of 1.44 teams. Transmitted to Force 23 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 2 JUN 07. Released from CENTCOM 3 Jul 07. JUONS in-staffing at MNC-I. Anticipate ONS Board 8 Jul 07 then forward to MNF-I 10 Jul 07.

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to RFI as required, assist with JUONS as required.

**KEY DATES:** LAD 30 SEP 07

| POC: | (b)(3), (b)(6) |

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3. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) #133 For 1 X Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Troop (145 PAX) to support MNC-I Asymmetric Warfare Operations (No Change)

**DISCUSSION:** This is a request to formalize an existing and recurring requirement for forces in Iraq, not an addition of forces. AWG is internally sourced and conducts
SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI//

internal rotations. The AWG was established to identify, mitigate and defeat emerging Asymmetric Warfare (AW) threats. It provides AW subject matter expertise and advice to units on counter AW techniques, tactics, and procedures IOT exploit the enemy. AWG also provides a critical linkage between CJSOTF/JSOC operations, capabilities, and techniques and the conventional forces IOT enhance their operational/targeting capabilities and effectiveness. Transmitted to Force 22 MAY 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 30 MAY 07. Draft GENADMIN returned to CENTCOM from staffing. Released from CENTCOM as RFF 777.

NEXT ACTION: Respond to RFI’s as appropriate.

KEY DATES: No LAD: Ongoing requirement sourced by internal rotations.

POC: 

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4. TOPIC: Request for Forces (RFF) For the 1.4b Brigade MNC-I RFF #136 (Update)

DISCUSSION: This RFF requests 1.4b augmentees from the United States Army Georgia National Guard (GAANG) to deploy with the coalition partner. This capability is required to fully integrate a coalition partner combat brigade into counterinsurgency operations in Wasit Province, Iraq. Transmitted to Force 13 JUN 07. In staffing at CENTCOM. Released from CENTCOM to JS as RFF 783 on 12 JUL 07.

NEXT ACTION: Track progress through CENTCOM.

KEY DATES: 1.4b BDE deploys to theater AUG 07. LAD 10 AUG 07.

POC: 

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5. TOPIC: GFMAP 648 MoD 3 (IAG) (Update)

Discussion: This RFF requests 1 X Division MiTT to support 11th IA Division, adds medics for the Motor Transport Regiment (MTR) and LOG BN MiTTs. It adds EOD Manning and MP Manning for division MiTTs. It also adds 1.4b BTTs to support current Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) force structure. Total increase of 1.4b Pax. To CENTCOM 22 FEB 07. Release to Joint Staff and renamed GFMAP 648 Mod 3. TGT SDOB TBD. JFCOM Sourcing RFF Rollup 15 MAY shows Partial Solution Submitted (1.4b PAX) with Non-concur on remaining capability, TGT SDOB 17 MAY 07. In SDOB for 25 MAY. Have submitted RFI through MNF-I requesting status on remaining 1.4b PAX of the RFF. 1.4b sourced in EXORD Mod 22. P4 Memo submitted by BG Pittard through GEN Petreus to ADM Fallon requesting assistance. AO Force Sourcing SVTC slides 19 Jun 07 state “Partial solution ordered (1.4b PAX). Continue staffing remaining PAX (4 MiTTs). TGT SDOB: 26 JUL 07.” Force Provider non-Concurs to remaining 4 MiTTs. Joint Staff recommends that RFF be closed.

NEXT ACTION: Have requested status through MNF-I. CENTCOM researching status of second P4 sent from GEN Petraeus to ADM Fallon on this issue.

KEY DATES: None at this time.

POC: 

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6. TOPIC: GENADMIN 774 (RFF #MNC-I 130) Medical: Mental Health, Preventative Medicine, and Medical Logistics (No Change)

DISCUSSION: During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 3 non-transformed Sustainment Brigades that provide daily care to the 164,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09
(3) transformed Sustainment Brigades whose MTOEs do not contain Mental Health, Preventive Medicine and Medical Logistics are scheduled to deploy. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. Total of 1,489 Personnel. Transmitted to Force for staffing 24 MAR 07. Transmitted to CENTCOM 5 APR 07. Presentation had been anticipated to ADM Fallon 8 MAY 07. GENADMIN 744 MNF-I Health SVC Augmentation released 12 JUN 07

**NEXT ACTION:** Respond to any RFIs.

**KEY DATES:** Various LADs.

7. **TOPIC:** FY 08 SECFOR (Update)
   **DISCUSSION:** CC published modification 767 to the FY08 requirements submission establishing 2 BDE level URFs for MNC-I SECFOR requirements (URFs 13258, 13259). The intent is to utilize unit level sourcing at the BCT level for SECFOR across the CENTCOM AOR. ARNG has nominated 76th IBCT to source URF 13258 and 39th BCT to source URF 13259. These requirements are published in the JS GFMAP MOD 1. Planned MOB dates are 12 DEC 07 for 76th BCT and 27 DEC 07 for 39th BCT.
   **NEXT ACTION:** Continue Coordination with ALCON.
   **KEY DATES:** NA
   **POC:**

8. **TOPIC:** 07-09 SECFOR Requirements (No Change)
   **DISCUSSION:** The 58TH AND 116TH BCTS were scheduled to mobilize based on a 60 day post mobilization training model. MOB dates were planned based on this model which is being developed in response to the new Total Force Utilization Policy and has not been approved for use by the 58th and 116th BCTs. The 58th and 116th BCTs require an 89 day training model to achieve the required level of training to conduct convoy security and force protection missions. FORSCOM initiated LAD shift requests for 58th and 116th BCTs company requirements (approximately 30 days). MNC-I submitted a mitigation plan to MNF-I 18 MAY 07 that addresses all but 1 of the LAD shift requests. MNC-I submitted a 19 day RC BOG extension (1041 EN) to MNF-I on 01 JUL 07 to address the remaining LAD Shift request. FC and 1A are concurrently staffing the inbound units ability to meet an earlier LAD.
   **NEXT ACTION:** Monitor RC BOG extension request for 1041 EN and inbound units feasible LAD.
   **KEY DATES:** NA
   **POC:**

9. **TOPIC:** Request For Forces (RFF) MNC-I RFF #133 Multiple Requirement from 4TH ID (Update)
   **DISCUSSION:** Screening complete through staff on items requested by 4TH ID. Memorandum for CG 4TH ID signed by CG MNC-I and transmitted. Two potential items remain for an RFF; one area (Engineers) would be unlikely to be filled, the other (CA) is also unlikely fill.
   **NEXT ACTION:** Staff coordination to determine way ahead for those two items.
   **KEY DATES:** LAD of 1 DEC 07 for most elements.
10. **TOPIC:** 15:12 BOG Policy (Update)  
**DISCUSSION:** JS released a message concluding the 15:12 adjudication. We continue to pursue the extension of 4 x PSDs to provide personnel support to extended Legacy BNs.  
**NEXT ACTION:** Board units based upon published JS spreadsheets.  
**KEY DATES:**

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<td>CC FY 08 Force Flow Conf</td>
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11. **TOPIC:** 1.4a Update  
**DISCUSSION:** Received the CC FY 09 PLANORD 19 JUL 07.  
**NEXT ACTION:** Establish and brief the CG on FY 09 Requirements.  
**KEY DATES:**

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12. **TOPIC:** RFF 719 MoD 5 Request for Engineer Battalion HQ and 4 Horizontal Companies (No Change)  
**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests horizontal construction assets to complete the workload increase generated by the increased forces in Baghdad in support of OPERATION FARDH AL-QANOON. Requested engineer force structure will construct 52 X Joint Security Stations and 9 X Gated Communities, repair, improve and maintain the Baghdad Security Belt, build combat outposts in the communities in Baghdad, and conduct route sanitation and rapid crater repair within the MND-B AOR. There is currently no solution for the EN BN HQ requested in RFF 719. It appears that CENTCOM will directed to relook at this request and provide a reply as to whether an internal sourcing solution can be achieved. Additionally, there is no sourcing solution for the four EN Companies requested. Same direction at internal sourcing may apply. It appears that the sourcing solution is still unresolved. The following actions are being considered by JFCOM: Reallocate already ordered units or extend units in place. Restaffing for RC solution, which will drive the 15 Apr07 LAD to nearly OCT 07. Draft sourcing solution utilizing realignment of assets in theater to be returned with non-concurrence by MNC-I C3, C-7, and GO. Sourced with a headquarters and one company in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21. Two companies will not be sourced. CENTCOM stated during 22 Jun Friday Night Fights that the P4 from ADM Fallon to GEN Patraeus will state that CENTCOM is unable to source this requirement.  
**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor deployment through MRM.  
**KEY DATES:** LAD 1 DEC 07
13. TOPIC: RFF 712, 4 x MP CO (CS) RFF (No Change) Monitor Only
DISCUSSION: This RFF requests 4 additional MP (CS) COs to support the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) development program. The CG, MNF-I directed an expanded IPS development program and designated 2006 as "The Year of the Police" which represented a tremendous capacity surge in which the first PTTs were fielded in Mar-Apr 06. RFF will provide increased PTT capability and will fill the total PTT requirement over 1.4a PTTs. RFF submitted to MNF-I on 9 Dec 06. MNC-I Chop on MNF-I staffing provided 16 Dec 06. RFF submitted to CENTCOM on 24 Dec 06. CENTCOM draft MOD 1 to RFF 697 for the 4 MP COs sent out for chop. S, 3 Jan 07. Rolled into RFF 712 with six other MP Cos. Joint Staffing 19 JAN 07. Four new requirement companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12, 13, and Draft 14. LADs of 15 JUL and 1 SEP 07. 1.4a ILO companies sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mods 12 and 13. Various LADs.
NEXT ACTION: Monitor Joint staffing and provide any requested input.
KEY DATES: Requested LAD of 15 Jul 07.
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

14. TOPIC: RFF 695 for 316TH ESC (No Change) Monitor Only
DISCUSSION: 316th ESC RFF requests 1.4a pax to provide staff augmentation, ISF support, and distribution management capability to this USAR unit that will deploy under a new Modular MTOE of 1.4a pax; reduction of 1.4a personnel) compared to the 13th SCE, and 1.4a personnel) compared to 3rd COSCOM. Additional personnel will enable 316th ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics support and sustainment operations across the ITO. Reduced manning based on transformation to Single Log C2 with 1st Theater Support Command (TSC) assuming portions of overall theater sustainment mission from the ESC. Timeline for 1st TSC to assume Single Log C2 is a minimum of 6 months into the 316th ESC rotation (~Jan 08). CENTCOM RFF 695 released 9 Nov 06. Sourced in 07-09 EXORD Mod 7. CENTCOM also states in EXORD that this enduring request will be sourced after 07-09 via a JMD. Since then, CCJ! And CCJ4 have stated via e-mail that the JMD is not the correct method of sourcing this requirement and do not endorse the creation of a JMD to support this requirement. MNC-I C4 is discussing with XVIII ABN Corps to discuss a way ahead and will provide a recommendation.
NEXT ACTION: - Awaiting recommendation from MNC-I C4 and results of XVIII ABN Corps discussions
KEY DATES:
- 15 Jul 07: LAD for 316th ESC Personnel
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

15. TOPIC: RFF 667 MoD 1, Increase in Forces for TF ODIN (No Change)
DISCUSSION: (Modification initially submitted for 1.4a X pax. Restudy of the issues resulted in a change to 1.4a X pax. Restaffing through MNC-I.) This Modification to RFF 667 requests 1.4a X additional personnel to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and
information processing and analysis in support of technology developed aviation assets. Identified shortages in critical skills sets render headquarters unable to process volumes of data previously unforecast. Currently TF \textsuperscript{1.4a} is operating only five of the twenty-four Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms projected for deployment within the next six months. The \textsuperscript{1.4a} X identified personnel will enable TF \textsuperscript{1.4a} to conduct 24 hour operations and process technical information to assist in defeating the IED threat. Released to Joint Staff 12 FEB 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 18. (Update) Sourcing of ARST element sourced by the USAF has raised concerns of not being able to meet their Joint Staff assigned LAD of 24 August 07. This will create a significant gap of capability for TF \textsuperscript{1.4a} and severely limit its analytical element if these Pax do not meet LAD.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor sourcing from USAF to ensure Pax meet assigned LAD in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18. (URF 10220)

**KEY DATES:** 24 August 07 is currently assigned LAD.

**POC:**

16. **TOPIC:** RFF 733 for 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) (No Change) Monitor Only

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 2 X Fires BDE HQ (-) to make up for an identified shortfall in MND-B and MND-N. Released to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Chops due back to JS: 11 APR 07. Sourced OIF 07-09 EXORD Mod 21.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor progress of staffing within Joint Staff.

**KEY DATES:** LAD for MND-B: 11 AUG 08. LAD for MND-N: 12 MAY 08.

**POC:**

17. **TOPIC:** RFF742: Military History Detachments (No Change) Monitor Only

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests 3 X Military History Detachments (total 9 Pax) to fill identified shortfalls within the Corps. Units without Military History detachment coverage will be unable to contribute to Lessons Learned or to the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Released to CENTCOM 13 FEB 07. Released by CENTCOM to Joint Staffing 12 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF 07-09 EXORD MOD 18.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor arrival of units.

**KEY DATES:** LAD is 31 AUG 07.

**POC:**

18. **TOPIC:** RFF 735 Requests for Optometry Support (No Change) Monitor Only

**DISCUSSION:** During OIF rotation 06-08 MNC-I has 11 Optometrists that provide daily care to the 133,000 U.S. personnel. For OIF rotation 07-09 this will be down to 2 Optometrists to provide daily care to all U.S. personnel. The Sustainment Brigades currently in Iraq have organic Optometry teams. The Sustainment Brigades due in OIF 07-09 have undergone transformation and no longer have Optometry Teams. This RFF is a one-for-one replacement of the capability lost due to transformation. The one and only Optometry team scheduled to arrive for OIF 07-09 cannot support all 133,000 U.S. personnel. Transmitted to Joint Staff 7 MAR 07. Sourced in OIF EXORD 07-09 Mod 17.

**NEXT ACTION:** Monitor staffing through DEPORD.

**KEY DATES:** LADs: 1 JUN 07; 27 JUN 07; 14 JUL 07
20. **TOPIC:** Request for Forces (RFF) for Relief of 1-325 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) *(New)*

**DISCUSSION:** This RFF requests a full spectrum counterinsurgency capable battalion to RIP/TOA with 1-325 PIR. 1-325 PIR deployed between 23 Jul 06 and 16 Dec 06, completed a 20 day dwell and returned to theater ISO 2/82 ABN on 06 Jan 07. Based on CENTCOM business rules, BOG for 1-325 PIR was established as 11 Nov 07, separate from its parent command (2/82 ABN) whose BOG is 03 Apr 08. This result in a significant capability gap for an extended period of time, which MNC-I will be unable to adequately fill given the tempo of current BCT plus up operations. Maintaining the current level of effort throughout Iraq is key to the success of the plus up. This is jeopardized if 1-325 PIR BOGs without an on time relief that is full spectrum COIN capable. Providing a like replacement with zero gap in capability is the best course of action to ensure success.

**NEXT ACTION:** Present to Chief of Staff Board 21 JUL 07

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 1 OCT 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)
Forces (URF) order limiting them to personnel with a mission set requiring personnel. For the past three OIF rotations Soldier strong command elements have been assigned to provide force protection and administrative management for FOBs supporting the Mosul area of operations. FOB Marez RAOC units have assumed the mission of providing all aspects of base defense, force protection, and base support for FOBs Marez, Marez East and MAF, and have relied heavily on external support from tenant units to augment their staffs. This reliance reduces Marez tenant unit combat power, diminishes unity of command and command and control, reduces continuity as tenant units rotate out, and does not ensure a standard level of training or equipping of RAOC forces. The total requirement is for additional personnel.

**NEXT ACTION:** Chief of Staff Board on 21 JUL 07.

**KEY DATES:** LAD: 18 NOV 07

**POC:** (b)(3), (b)(6)