Iran Changes IRGC Commander

- (U) Iran announced on 1 September IRGC Commander MG Safavi to be replaced by BG Mohammad Ali Jafari
- (U) Safavi to become Khamenei’s Senior Advisor on Armed Forces; was IRGC commander since ‘97
- (U) No reason given for replacing Safavi
  - Al Jazeera: “like giving him a medal, but at the same time he has been demoted”
- (U) Jafari former Head of IRGC Center for Strategic Studies
  - Previously IRGC Ground Forces Commander
  - Decorated Iraq-Iran War veteran
  - Identifies U.S. as Iran’s principal enemy
Sadr Freeze Order Update

• Majority of followers appear to be heeding order
  – Armed followers mostly absent from streets
  – Checkpoints around Sadr City unmanned

• Members prepared to take up arms if provoked by CF/ISF
  – Sadr announces after raid on Karbala OMS that he will rescind
    freeze order if military raids on his offices do not cease

• Ahrar Fayha al-Sadr Brigades statement
  – “We have decided that we will not abide by the decision to suspend activities
    of the Al-Mahdi Army”

• Posting from a jihadist Shi’a forum member
  – The sons of Imam al-Mahdi A’aj Army were “astonished and surprised by the decision to freeze this honorable army!”
  – Sadr’s decision has “negative psychological effects”
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV)

Nationwide

25 August – 31 August 2007
Weekly Nationwide

- 56 ESV attacks
- 81 Deaths

01 August – 31 August 2007
Monthly Nationwide

- 300 ESV attacks
- 884 Deaths

Assessment: ESV remained at reduced levels, with the majority of attacks occurring in Baghdad Province. Expect ESV to remain low due to intra-sectarian tensions among Shi’a militias and MAS’s orders to cease JAM operations.
Assessment: Assessed ESV attacks continued in West Rashid as JAM and AQI continue to fight for terrain. ESV in East Rashid remains low. Attacks in Adhamiyah may be due to JAM cells operating vic Qahira Fuel Station targeting local Sunnis. Activity in Kadhamiya, Mansour likely attributed to JAM continued push to expand in this fault line area.
Scholar Released Ahead of Human Rights Conference

• (U) Haleh Esfandiari passport returned; departed Iran, 3 Sep after 8-month ordeal
  – Accused of espionage, interrogated for weeks, televised “confession”
• (U) Ahmadinejad addresses Non Aligned Movement meeting, 3 Sep
  – Lumps Iraq conflict, Iranian nuclear ambitions with human rights, diversity
    • States “exclusivist and bullying powers” pressuring IAEA
• (U) Follows boasts of 3000 centrifuges
  – Contradicts IAEA reports
Lebanese Army Seizes Nahr al-Bared

- (U) Lebanese forces gain control of Palestinian refugee camp
- (U) Fighting began in May when Fatah al-Islam took control of camp
- (U) Shaker al-Abssi and Abu Salim Taha killed in attack, 2 Sep
- (U) Fatah al-Islam supplier of FFs into Iraq
  - Home for those who do not have a home “ideologically”
- (U) Syrian forces killed four members of Fatah al-Islam along Iraqi border, May 07
- (U) Saudi Arabia/ PLO commended Lebanese actions
Arab FMs to Discuss Iraq Solution

• (U) Arab Foreign Ministers to meet Wednesday in Cairo

• (U) Issues referred to Ministers for discussion include:
  – Ways to solve the Iraq problem
  – Establishment of Arab fund to help Iraqi refugees

• (U) Zebari- “All Arab countries are unanimous on importance of enhancing role of Arab League in Iraq”

• (U) Arab League Sec Gen Moussa- “Problem can not be solved by deployment of foreign troops”
  – Rules out deployment of Arab troops unless requested by GoI
JAM Claims Victory in Basra

• (U) Sadrists claim victory with 3 Sep turnover of Basra Palace
  – Sadr aide on British pull-out: “victory happened…under Muqtada’s leadership”
  – Basra local: “… a success for Mahdi Army and a victory for the people of Basra”

• (U) British move took residents by surprise
  – Fear that without British, Shi’a militias will “run amok”
  – Local IP “infested” with JAM, Iraqi Army’s strength viewed as insufficient

• (S//REL) Privately, Sadrists fear intensified Badr/JAM conflict in wake of British redeployment

**Assessment:** Sadrists will publicly use this as an example of “victory” for the Sadr Trend, proof that persistent attacks against CF will eventually force them out of Iraq. Nonetheless, prospect of intra-sect conflict likely to temper JAM leadership’s optimism given perception of other factions’ power.
**Hawijah Remains Insurgent Hot Spot**

- Hawijah area used for operations, planning by Sunni insurgent, terrorist groups
  - Staging area for operations into other areas
  - Safe-houses located in Kirkuk
- 20 August conference of local insurgent groups
  - Issued warning that after 20 Aug those working for CF would be killed
  - AQI not part of group
    - AQI intimidation campaign alienating locals

**Assessment:** Hawijah area continues to serve as vital insurgent hub in northern Iraq, particularly given its proximity to Bayji, Kirkuk. Local Sunni insurgent groups are likely distancing themselves from AQI in order to keep local support, bolster their numbers. AQI likely to increase attacks on soft targets.
Intelligence Highlight

- SVBIED south of Haditha, 1115D 6 September
  - Targeted combined patrol conducting mounted SVCP
  - 4x CF KIA, 2x IA WIA
- Recent reporting indicates terrorists plan to target Haditha area
- Methodology suggests AQI
- Tribal initiatives in MNF-W have limited success of AQI intimidation campaign

**Assessment:** AQI, having lost support in the west to tribal initiatives, is likely trying to regain prominence, reassert influence, take back territory. Targeting of CF, ISF to undermine tribes, GoI security measures.
Ramadan Threat Update

- Ramadan o/a 13 Sep – o/a 13 Oct
- AQI likely to attempt surge in Anbar, North, Baghdad, despite reduced capacity
  - Targets likely to include civilians, smaller CF bases, IP stations, mosques
  - S/VBIED, SVEST attacks most likely during daylight hours
- JAM-SG not abiding by cease fire
  - Likely to continue targeting CF
  - Probable IDF and IED attacks
- Threat reporting directly linked to Ramadan limited
  - Jihadist propaganda identifies alleged suicide brigade
  - AQ calls for world-wide effort during Ramadan

Assessment: Expect increased HP attacks during Ramadan, primarily 1000-1800. AQI likely to attempt resurgence in Ramadi, Fallujah. JAM-SG efforts to target CF with IEDs, IDF likely to increase prior to, during Ramadan.
UBL Video Release

- New 26 min UBL video entitled “The Solution” obtained 7 SEP
- Initial reporting is that video appears to be authentic, analysis ongoing
- Refers to American “failure” in Iraq
  - “Waging this unjust war... was entirely unnecessary, as testified to by your own reports”
  - Threatens to “continue to escalate the killing and fighting”
- The Solution- American people must embrace and join Islam

Assessment: Overt intent of video to convince American populace to abandon capitalism and embrace Islam. Underlying intent may be to put to rest speculation of death; propaganda coinciding with 9/11, Ramadan, CG testimony. No specific threat referenced.
Sadr’s Inner Circle Dynamics, Post “Freeze”

• Haydar al-Musawi increasingly influencing Sadr

• Sadr-Shaybani relationship reportedly deteriorating
  – Sadr disapproved of Shaybani’s handling of Karbala attacks
  – Shaybani’s position is reportedly insecure

• Sadr reportedly may return to Iraq
  – Reduce intra-Shi’a tensions in Karbala
  – Possibly attempt reconciliation with ISCI
  – Could withdraw from UIA
BRIEFING SEQUENCE
Sunday, 9 September 07

1. INTEL
2. STRATOPS
3. ENERGY FUSION CELL
4. CASUALTY SUMMARY
5. STRATEGIC EFFECTS COMMUNICATIONS
6. WEATHER
7. MNC-I OPERATIONS ROLLUP
8. TRANSITIONS CELL
9. MAC (SCJS)

ALL SLIDES ARE DUE NLT ONE HOUR PRIOR TO BUA
JAM to Target Diwaniyah Officials

- As of 4 Sep, JAM plans to target four Diwaniyah officials with EFP’s
  - Attacks to occur on Routes surrounding Camp Echo
  - Targeted for refusal to support JAM activities, operations, and philosophies
- Targeted Officials:
  - Gov Ahmad (Diwaniyah Gov)
  - Gen Hafiz (Intelligence officer)
  - Gen Jasim (PDoP)
  - [b][6] (IP Criminal Investigations Director)
- JAM believes high traffic volume at Camp Echo North entrance will easily conceal JAM activity in that area

Assessment: With previous successes emboldening them, JAM will likely continue assassination threats and attempts on local officials as long as they continue to publicly disapprove of JAM activities.
New Insurgent Coalition Front Announced

• Jihad and Change Front (JACF)
  – 6 September on Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel TV
    • (b)(6) / Rep of 1920 Rev Bde
      and spokesman of JACF
  – 8 Groups
    • 1920 Revolution Brigades
    • Al-Rashidin Army
    • Jaysh al-Muslimin
    • The Islamic Movement of Mujahidin in Iraq
    • Jund-al-Rahman Brigades
    • Al-Da’wah wa-al-Ribat (Call and Encampment) Brigades
    • Al-Tamkin (Empowerment) Brigades
    • Muhammad al-Fatih Brigades
  – Statement stipulates operating in groups necessary for “the coming stage.”
  – “Coming stage” requires fighting as “one rank” and requirement of a political council
    representing the voice of all Iraqi resistance factions.
Extremist Forum Members Discuss
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle

• Al-Ekhlass and al-Boraq web forums
  – Manufacturing contractors of MRAP listed
  – Discussed comments made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates in regards to MRAP being his top priority
    • Member stated, “The delay of bringing them causes the death of tens of soldiers – we ask Allah to make him [Gates] one of them in the near future – this is not difficult for Allah.”

• MRAP targeting discussion
  – “Its fate will be the same as previous armored vehicles.”
  – “It is clear that it was designed to resist the explosive packages, how about the incendiary packages?”
  – “They can be targeted by diesel or the napalm packages.”
  – “It seems like it is costly, heavy and loaded with soldiers.”
    • Hunt a large number of them and affect U.S. “expectations in Iraq.”
BRIEFING SEQUENCE
Monday, 10 September 07

1. INTEL
2. STRATOPS
3. ENERGY FUSION CELL
4. CASUALTY SUMMARY
5. STRATEGIC EFFECTS COMMUNICATIONS
6. WEATHER
7. MAC (SCJS)
8. R&S 607
9. MNC-I OPERATIONS ROLLUP
10. IDF
11. STRATEGIC OPS SUMMARY

ALL SLIDES ARE DUE NLT ONE HOUR PRIOR TO BUA
Sabrine Mosque in Mosul Destroyed

- IED attack on Mosul IP CP caused Sabrine Mosque to be collaterally destroyed
  - Intended target assessed to be IP CP 37 meters outside Mosque
  - 5 Sep SVBIED on IP CP may have caused structural instability
  - No known threats against Mosque
- Attack reportedly consisted of two IED’s and one RPG
  - IP CP reported no casualties or damage to CP
- Mosque reportedly used by AQI as meeting place
  - IP’s recently noted as using Mosque rooftop as fixed surveillance point
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) - Nationwide

01 September – 07 September 2007 - Weekly Nationwide

- 51 ESV attacks
- 81 Deaths

Monthly ESV Projections

- 320 ESV attacks
- 727 Deaths

Assessment: ESV remained at reduced levels, with majority of attacks occurring in Baghdad Province. Increase in ESV expected with the onset of month of Ramadan late next week.
Assessment: ESV attacks continued in West Rashid as JAM and AQI fight for terrain. Increase in Karkh possibly due to testing new CF unit or AQI and JAM attempting to assert control. JAM elements reportedly still targeting Sunni civilians in attempt to displace minority Sunni population. Overall decrease possibly due to MAS’s orders or may be a result of confusion.
**Iran Explores Inroads: Seeking Greater Influence in Iraq’s Economy**

- **(U) Sep 9-11: Tehran hosts Iraqi reconstruction conference; Rafsanjani gives inaugural speech:**
  - “…we are ready to establish relations with our neighbors…we have good experience in reconstruction…”
  - **Goals:** Gain economic collaboration between governments with emphasis on private sectors; Eventual establishment of “Islamic Common Market.”

- **(U) Iran looks to improve ailing economy:**
  - Potential for prosperous trading partner
  - Expansion of the two countries’ economic relations; potential to set standard for the Mid-East.
Cholera Outbreak in Northern Iraq – MoH Acts Quickly

- MoH takes the lead, first to respond with immediate aid; U.S. assistance advisory only
- Assistance being provided by numerous organizations: UN, WHO, IMC, UNICEF, ICRC
- 10 deaths; 627 confirmed cholera cases in Sulaymaniyah, Tamim, Irbil provinces since 23 Aug: 12 of 23 districts report cases
- Chronic food and water infrastructure problems cited as possible contributors to outbreak
- Turkey, Iran, and Jordan institute precautions; cholera tests done prior to crossing border

**Assessment:** This Iraqi MoH initiative should bolster public confidence in GoI’s ability to provide emergent health care, rapid response. Quick reactions by GoI, provincial and district-level MoH offices likely indicate improved working relations at all levels.
Ramadan Threat Update

- Iraqi Sunnis begin Ramadan 13 Sept, Shi’a likely to begin 14 Sept
- AQI likely to attempt surge in Anbar, North, Baghdad, despite reduced capacity
  - Targets likely to include civilians, smaller CF bases, IP stations, mosques
  - S/VBIED, SVEST attacks most likely during daylight hours
- JAM-SG not abiding by cease fire
  - Likely to continue targeting CF
  - Probable IDF and IED/EFP attacks
- Threat reporting directly linked to Ramadan limited
  - AQI plans large, coordinated operation in Tikrit
  - Broad, multi-group offensive planned for mid-late Sept

Assessment: Expect increased HP attacks during Ramadan, primarily 1000-1800. AQI likely to attempt resurgence in Ramadi, Fallujah. JAM-SG efforts to target CF with IEDs, IDF likely to increase.
Continued Degradation of South Karkh Network

- Financial facilitator Abu Fatima arrested by Iraqi and CF troops
  - Believed to be integral to the group’s operations
- Arrest will likely impact South Karkh’s future operations
  - Reporting indicates operations planned for September
- Additional key leaders killed or captured since 1 August
  - Reduced cell leadership and VBIED expertise
  - Significantly affected successful VBIED detonations on Karada and in traditional South Karkh AO
- No VBIED detonations in South Karkh AO in September

Assessment: Arrest likely to compound effects of recent kill/capture of the South Karkh VBIED network’s C2 node. Ability to operate will remain degraded as cell attempts to reconstitute.
Anbar Awakening Leader Assassinated

- Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezea Ftikhan al-Rishawi and bodyguards killed IVO home by IED
  - Previous assassination attempts by AQI
  - Family members previously killed by AQI including brother and father
- GoI statements condemn attack
  - Maliki statement- “has the fingerprints of the terrorist al-Qa'ida Organization”
  - MoI- “high-level investigation will be opened to disclose the perpetrators”
- Successor identified as Sheikh Ahmad Albu al-Rishawi, brother of Sheik Sattar

**Assessment:** AQI likely responsible for assassination of unifying, charismatic Sunni leader in attempt to deal a serious blow to reconciliation efforts, awakening movement, and CF momentum. GoI and CF responses have potential to either galvanize or fracture the awakening movements in Anbar and across Iraq.
Sadr Trend Reorganizing

- JAM reorganizing to gain legitimacy, public support
  - Propose replacing Battalion/Company commanders with locals
  - Recruiting new members
    - Offer religious training, money
  - Claim that repairing infrastructure will be a priority
- OMS Political Committee to undergo reorganization, change of personnel
- Sadrists also consider withdrawal from UIA

**Assessment:** Immediate goal is to improve standing within Shi’a community in wake of Karbala incident. Withdrawal from UIA would have no effect on alliance, but would free Sadr to explore other alliances. Sadrists will likely use prospect of their parliamentary seats to persuade alliances to pursue Sadrists agendas.
AQI Claims Assassination, Threatens Sh...
Assessment: If the MoO maintains production and import levels of the past three weeks throughout winter, they will likely avoid severe winter kerosene shortage. While Iraq will still experience an overall kerosene shortage, Iraqis have generally found a way to cope during winter months.

Kerosene Shortages Amplify Energy Crisis

- Kerosene stockpile inadequate, threatening winter shortages for the fifth consecutive year
  - MoO has stockpiled only 77.6M liters by 6 Sep 07
  - MoO had stockpiled 84.1M liters by 6 Sep 06

- Kerosene production increased, unlikely to meet winter high demand of 14M-19M liters per day
  - Production increased by approximately 5 M liters per day to 8 M liters per day over last 3 weeks
  - In mid-August MoO began importing about 1.2M liters per day

- Kerosene supply vulnerable to disruptions
  - Poor distribution to Baghdad and the northern provinces
  - Must sustain current high production rates and imports
Baghdadi Issues Threats in Audio Statement

- Condemns “betrayal” by Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq
  - Includes any group that cooperates with CF or Gol
  - Calls Sheikh Sattar chairman of the betrayers, infamous for apostasy and sin
- Vows to continue attacking Yazidis unless they hand over killers of Yazidi woman who married a Sunni
- Speaking of the Swedish Muhammed cartoon, reserves “right to punish those who committed this crime”
  - Offers $100K reward for killing of cartoonist, $50K for the newspaper editor
  - Threatens economy by attacking named Swedish companies
- Offers forgiveness during Ramadan for those who were deceived by the “Crusaders”

Assessment: AQI continues to use figurehead “Baghdadi” as propaganda tool to issue threats against tribal movements, non-Salafists. Expect AQI to continue campaign against tribal initiatives and Yazidis, likely using high-profile attacks.
NBP Faction Denies Talks; In Iraq They Plan Attacks

- Spokesman for the Izzat Ibrahim al Duri faction of the New Ba’ath Party (NBP) vehemently denies talks with CF
  - Former Prime Minister Alawi’s claimed NBP had joined in political talks with CF in early Sep
  - NBP deputy secretary emphasized the divide between the Muhammad Yunis Ahmad and Al Duri factions during late Aug TV interview
- Iraq-based NBP plans attacks
  - Reporting indicates possible Ramadan attack targets include Baghdad, Mosul and Diyala
  - In Sep cell leaders informed of upcoming VBIED attacks in Kirkuk
    - May be coordinating attacks with Al-Qaida in Iraq affiliates
    - Mosul Dam mentioned as a potential target

Assessment: NBP factions likely will not be able to reunite due to Duri faction maintaining hard line. NBP in Iraq continues to cooperate with and support other insurgent and terrorist groups; plus they plan and conduct attacks on CF, ISF.
BRIEFING SEQUENCE
Monday, 17 September 07

1. INTEL
2. STRATOPS
3. ENERGY FUSION CELL
4. CASUALTY SUMMARY
5. STRATEGIC EFFECTS COMMUNICATIONS
6. WEATHER
7. MAC (SCJS)
8. R&S 607
9. MNC-I OPERATIONS ROLLUP
10. IDF
11. STRATEGIC OPS SUMMARY

ALL SLIDES ARE DUE NLT ONE HOUR PRIOR TO BUA
Sadrists’ Withdrawal From UIA

- Senior Sadrist spokesman Salah al-Ubaydi announced 15 Sep withdrawal of Sadr Trend from Unified Iraqi Alliance, stating withdrawal “final”
  - GoI not meeting their demands
  - GoI failed to provide security
  - Political progress inadequate
- Sadrists considering alliance with Fadilah
- Efforts to force CF withdrawal to increase
- UIA calls on Sadrists to reconsider, calling for unity among all Iraqi political forces

Assessment: Departure from UIA likely an attempt to: • form political alliance they can control, • lessen ISCI political influence, continuation of OMS/JAM, ISCI/Badr conflict. Additionally, Sadrists to continue disparaging current GoI, but unlikely to have significant effect on CoR support for PM Maliki.
Assessment: ESV remained at reduced levels, with the majority of attacks occurring in Baghdad Province. An increase in ESV expected during the month of Ramadan; however, at lower levels than in 2006. Lower ESV likely result of confluence of JAM “freeze”, stabilization of forced displacements, disruption of AQI networks.
Assessment: JAM and Sunni extremists continued fighting for terrain in West Rashid; displacing residents from Hayy Saydiyah. Sunni and Shi’a elements’ struggles for control occurred in Rusafa along borders between Shi’a and mixed neighborhoods. Overall decrease in ESV may indicate JAM elements are adhering to MAS’s orders, disruption of VBIED networks, reduction of mixed areas.
UN to Hold Meeting on Iraq

- Meeting scheduled for 22 Sep
- Co-chaired by Ban Ki-moon and PM Maliki
- Attendees to include representatives for:
  - Permanent members of UNSC
  - Eight leading industrialized nations
  - Iraq’s neighbors
- Meeting to discuss implementation of Security Council Resolution 1770 and expediting assistance to Iraq

(C//REL) Assessment: Expect meeting to supplement ongoing series of neighbors conferences, working groups; specific focus on UN’s role in stabilizing Iraq, likely will discuss refugee issue; however, concrete steps contingent upon security situation.
AQI Responds to the Petraeus-Crocker Report

• AQI asserts Petraeus-Crocker testimony is attempt to ‘rescue’ President Bush
  – “The crusader enemy today is looking to mend the situation to get out of this critical impasse which is an embarrassment for Bush and his administration.”
  – The report attempts to “improve the image of the shaking American Army.”
  – “The fact is that the phenomenon of arming some tribes fully reflects the failure and confusion of America”
  – Two options for the occupation army, “the sweetest of which is bitter.”

Assessment: AQI attack on testimony likely an effort to boost failing campaign. Loss of key terrain reported as intentional strategic maneuver as opposed to being caused by CF, ISF and tribal militia efforts. Without demonstrated successes AQI will lose key support base.
Iranian-American Detainee Released

• (U) released 20 Sep
  – Passport not returned, requires special permission to leave Iran
• (U) Two other detainees previously allowed to leave Iran
  – (b)(6), 3 Sep
  – (b)(6), 18 Sep
• (U) still in custody
• (U) whereabouts unknown, went missing 8 March
Recent Political Maneuvering of the Sadr Trend

- As of 18 Sep, OMS Political Committee reorganizes with new head, members
  - New Members: Liwa’ Sumaysim (new head), Haydar al-Jabiri, Karar Salih al-Kahfaji
- ‘Abd al-Mahdi al-Mutayri to head new Consultative Committee, to work with Political Committee
- OMS seeking political alliance with Fadillah, Da’wa
- Sadrists threatening to withdraw support of PM Maliki unless he presses for CF withdrawal time-line

**Assessment:** Additions to Political Committee may indicate Sadr intends to increase political activity, may not trust previous members. Recent political movements of Sadr Trend may be attempt to exert more political pressure on the current administration, broaden scope of political influence.
Assassinations of Sistani Aides

- Two Sistani aides assassinated 20 Sep, attempted assassination of another
  - Sistani aides assassinated since June now stands at 7, 5 since Karbala incident
  - Previous trend was 1 to 2 killed per year
- Basrah mosques loyal to Sistani cancelled Friday Prayers, closed for 3 days in protest of killings
- Indefinite curfew reportedly imposed in Muthanna as of Friday

Assessment: Unusual increase in assassinations likely indicative of rising intra-Shi’a tensions, particularly since conflict in Karbala. Expect continued violence, especially in areas dominated by militia-infiltrated security services.
Reconciliation Opportunities in Shi’a South

- Dhi Qar tribal Sheikhs create Tribal BNs
  - MOI approved but subordinate to IPs
  - Low level, localized security operations
- Wasit tribes pledge to fight JAM
  - PM Maliki hailed tribal security initiative
  - Notable sheikhs denounced extremism
- Shi’a tribal sheikhs motivations
  - Reassert declining influence
  - Economic gain in weak economy
  - Growing displeasure with JAM criminal activities
- Shi’a tribal force benefits to GoI
  - Increased security
  - Source of intelligence
  - Lowers eligible militia recruits
  - Garners public support for GOI and CF

Assessment: Intra-Shi’a reconciliation opportunities for moderating Shi’a violence pose unique challenges. Factors such as security, religious authorities, economic development, political affiliations and self reliance further complicate the situation in southern Iraq.
Nationwide VBIEDs Poised for Record Low

Assessment: Focused targeting of VBIED network C2 nodes in Baghdad, tribal rejection, and CF/ISF clearing operations have produced a projected 57% reduction over the last seven months, coupled with a 78% reduction in VBIED casualties. Expect detonations to remain below average as remaining facilitators go to ground or are forcibly removed from the networks.

VBIED detonations decreased in early ‘07 as major C2 nodes of the Rusafa network were killed or captured.

July ‘07 South Karkh surged attacks on Karada Peninsula

South Karkh C2 Nodes removed since 1 August likely affected ability to carry out attacks in September

(S//REL) Three Year Nationwide S/VBIED Trends

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Approved for Release
AQI Planning Attacks on CF Bases and Concerned Citizens

- Possible coordinated attack being planned against COPs, PBs, or ECPs as well as Concerned Citizens in area of Al Bu’Aitha or Arab Jabour
  - To possibly occur after sunset, 25 or 26 Sep
  - AQI plans to attack with large numbers of fighters
    - Possibly 100 personnel already in area
    - Warning residents in area to leave or they might be killed during operation
    - Attack to be initiated by female suicide bomber wearing suicide vest followed by VBIEDs, rockets, mortars, RPG, and SAF
  - Intent is to overrun bases to force out CF
- CIOC issued situational awareness report 23 1536D SEP 07

Assessment: While AQI does have the ability to perform attacks using multiple methods, it’s unlikely they will have the specified number of personnel or the ability to accomplish a large scale attack of this magnitude.
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Nationwide

15 September – 21 September 2007
Weekly Nationwide

• 44 ESV attacks
• 81 Deaths

01 September – 21 September 2007
Monthly Nationwide

• 139 ESV attacks
• 221 Deaths

Monthly ESV Projections

• 236 ESV attacks
• 457 Deaths

Assessment: ESV attacks decreased during the first week of Ramadan, with a slight increase in deaths reported. The majority of attacks occurred in Baghdad and Diyala provinces. Lower ESV likely result of confluence of JAM “freeze”, disruption of AQI networks.
Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Districts

Baghdad District Attacks 15 SEP 07 – 21 SEP 07

Map classified S//REL

24 ESV Attacks
- 46 Total Killed
18 Execution Attacks
- 31 Total Killed

LEGEND

Execution
Other ESV

75% Shi’a
51% Shi’a / 25% Sunni
Unknown
51% Sunni / 25% Shi’a
Unknown
Mixed - No majority

Assessment: JAM and Sunni extremists continued fighting for terrain in the mixed neighborhoods of Rusafa. ESV deaths increased due to VBIED attacks targeting Shi’a civilians resulting in 15 civilians killed. Overall decrease in ESV levels, most notably in West Rashid, indicates some JAM elements are adhering to MAS’s orders, disruption of VBIED networks, reduction of mixed areas.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

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USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Iran Closes Border with Northern Iraq

• As of at least 24 Sep, Iran has closed border crossings in Iraqi Kurdistan region
  – Closures in response to arrest of Mahmudi Farhadi
  – Up to five crossings possibly closed
• According to press, Iran had threatened to close its border with northern Iraq as early as 22 Sep, soon after arrest of Farhadi
• Closure could “handicap trade” in the region during the month of Ramadan, KRG Spokesman suggests ways to reopen border
  – Use KRG channels in Iran, explain Kurds had nothing to do with arrest
  – Request GoI speak with Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad
Intelligence Highlight

- Suicide bomber targeted Diyala Governor
  - 10x CIV, 9x IP killed
  - 1x US, 30x ISF, 19x CIV wounded, including Governor’s brother
  - Baqubah IP Chief and Baqubah IP Operations Officer killed
  - Governor Raad received minor burns
  - Al Jazeera reported 18 killed, 30 injured
- Previous assassination attempts against Governor
- Relationship between BG Ali and 1920RB against AQI
- Methodology indicates AQI

Assessment: AQI targeting provincial government to demonstrate GoI inability to provide security, demonstrate continued presence, reassert relevance in Diyala, carry through on Ramadan threats.
Ahmadinejad’s Upcoming UN Speech: A More Defiant Iranian Posture

• 62nd UN General Assembly (UNGA) 25 Sep 07; visit will mark third time (2005, 2006) Ahmadinejad will have addressed the UNGA

• Ahmadinejad will stress the following themes:
  – US incapable of establishing security in Iraq, desires instability, pretext for continued occupation
  – US destabilizing Middle East
  – US and Israel waging war on Islam
  – Iran has absolute right to nuclear program
Iran Releases Last of Four Iranian-Americans

- (U) Peace activist and businessman released 25 Sep
  - Detained in May on charges of intending to harm national security
  - Bail of over $100,000 posted
- (U) Unclear if allowed to leave Iran
- (U) Coincides with President Ahmadinejad speaking at UN
- (U) Previous release of

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 20150501
1920 Rev Brigade Retain Insurgent Status

• Early September, 1920RB leader repeated hard-line position against political process under occupation
  – Website postings claimed numerous attacks throughout Iraq
  – Infiltrating “Awakening” movements to mask insurgent activity

• Some positive signs:
  – Elements in Diyala working with “Concerned Local Citizens”
    • Sunni - Shi’a community relations remain problematic
  – Continue to fight AQI; some success in Anbar province

Assessment: 1920RB elements remain active insurgents. Will continue to fight AQI. Likely to remain decentralized, some elements act independently. Change of stance on reconciliation from senior leaders would likely sway group members.
A Q I Attempting Ramadan Surge

- A series of key Coalition capture / kill operations may have only delayed AQI’s planned Ramadan attack surge
- Recent suicide attacks suggest AQI has at least partially repaired networks damaged by late-Aug and early-Sep CF operations
- 24 Sep, 8x HP attacks
  - SVVEST on Baqubah reconciliation meeting
  - VBIED in Kirkuk targeted Mayor
  - SVBIEED between Mosul and Tall Afar stopped by IA CP
- 25 Sep, 4x HP attacks
  - SVVEST, 2x SVBIEEDs target separate IP CPs in Mosul, Basra
- 26 Sep, 9x HP attacks
  - Separate STBIEEDs against anti-AQI Sunni sheik VIC Sinjar, Mosul courthouse
  - Double SVBIEED and SVVEST target IP in Sharqat and Mosul

Assessment: AQI is not assessed to be able to maintain this pace of attacks indefinitely. However, we expect additional suicide attacks, especially targeting ISF and Sunnis engaged in reconciliation, during remainder of Ramadan.
Page 55 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4e
Sadr Demonstrates More Control Over OMS Than JAM

- OMS compliant with Sadr’s orders
  - Development and restructure of OMS committees
- Sadr has limited control over criminal elements, extremists
  - JAM Operations resuming in Kadhamiyah
  - Kefah Al-Ghurayti continuing operations in Diwaniyah
  - Splinter groups forming to continue operations
IAI Forum Member Proposes Jihadist Union

• (U) On 24 September, a member of the Islamic Army of Iraq’s (IAI) online al-Buraq jihadist forum posted a proposal for unification of all jihadist groups in Iraq in a reformed Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC)

  – Members must include the AQI-led Islamic State of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, the Jihad and Reformation Front (JARF), and the Jihad and Change Front (JACF)

  – Suggested ISI should be a member of the new MSC, but not the ruling party

• (U) Joint aims would be to eradicate Sahawa al-Iraq (SAI), return al-Anbar to mujahidin, and deal “mortal blow” to American hopes of victory

(S//REL) Assessment: Engagement efforts with regional IAI leaders are ongoing in some areas of Iraq, and some elements of the group have been openly fighting AQI since early this year. However, that a proposal of this nature was posted by a purported IAI member suggests there are elements of the group that likely will remain irreconcilable.