MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

May 07
JAM Recent Reporting

• Envoys allegedly sent to Arab countries to set groundwork for Sunni-Shi’a alliance
  – MAS assigned Aws al-Khafaji, Ahmad al-Shaybani to carry-out regional tour to settle Sunni-Shi’a dispute

• Late Apr, likely JAM considering launching renewed IDF attacks against the IZ
  – Attacks in retaliation for previous clashes with CF in Baghdad
  – 10x107mm rockets in IZ 302200APR07, 5 of 6 POO in New Baghdad

Assessment: Alleged tour is likely a Sadrist propaganda effort to portray movement as non-sectarian, underscores Sadr’s continued attempts to highlight himself as an Iraqi nationalist; timing suggests possible attempt to draw media attention away from upcoming conference in Sharm el-Sheikh. Yesterday’s attack on the IZ and current reporting suggest JAM will likely continue IDF attacks against the IZ, CF bases as a means of retaliation.
Reported Death of AAM

• Abu Ayyub al-Masri (AAM) reportedly killed by tribal elements
  – Islamic State of Iraq has denied the death in internet postings

• Attack by tribal elements indicates fundamental AQI problems with core support base

• If killed, likely to be quickly replaced; minimal impact upon AQI operations
  – No heir-apparent identified

• Most significant impact of AAM removal would be between AQI and al-Qa’ida senior leadership in Pakistan

Assessment: Iraqi tribal targeting of AAM provides IO opportunities for GoI, CF. Replacement of AAM by non-Iraqi al-Qa’ida leader would clearly show foreign dominance in AQI, necessity of external support.
JAM Recent Reporting

• Relations between MAS, JAM Special Groups leader Akram al-Ka’bi reported strained
  – Ka’bi was due to meet in late-April with MAS in detention of (b)(6)
  – Planned meeting was to be second since

1.4c, 1.4b

Akram al-Ka’bi
JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr City OMS Chief, Shaykh Abd al-Zahra al-Suwaydi, reportedly returned from met with senior Sadrist
  - 30 Apr, Suwaydi met with Jalil al-Nuri, presumably in Najaf
  - 28 Apr, Suwaydi returned to Iraq via Basrah
  - Late Feb, Suwaydi left for medical operation

Assessment: Suwaydi likely met with Nuri to discuss JAM developments since Suwaydi’s departure to Suwaydi’s return will likely improve JAM coordination in Sadr City, where he remains the OMS chief.
Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4c
Threat Update

- Mass casualty attack against Karada targets
  - AQI plans to target densely populated areas in central Baghdad
    - Large bank, likely Rafidain al-Fradaws
    - Y Junction near French Embassy
  - 28 Apr, 2 x VBIEDs delivered from Shaishabar Valley to Southern Baghdad
  - 15 Mar, SVBIED attack VIC French Embassy at IA CP on RTE OILERS
    - 4 x CIV killed
    - 25 x CIV injured
  - CIOC issued situational awareness report 03 1520D MAY 07

Assessment: Targeting densely populated areas, especially predominantly Shi’a areas, in order to maximize casualties and gain media attention, is known AQI TTP. Timing of the attack is uncertain.
AQI Propaganda Trends

• Manipulation of facts to suit goals
  – Inflation of US casualties claims to at least double actual number
  – Used Pentagon April casualty report in attempt to refute MNF-W statement on decreased attack level in Anbar

• Silence on mass casualty attacks
  – Will not claim mass casualty attacks
  – Will not respond to CF attribution of mass casualty attacks to AQI

• Denial, redirection of any harmful or contrary statement about AQI
  – Attribution of online criticisms from fellow jihadists to CF IO

• Attack claims designed to display their fighters as invincible
  – Skilled combatants who allegedly never miss, get killed, or get captured
  – Claimed same bomber successfully completed 3 suicide attacks

• Two week shelf-life of topics
  – Compelled to show growth, progress
  – Assertions often unsupported by facts
JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior JAM Special Groups commanders maintained contact with a senior Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture official during late Apr and early May.

- Sadr City JAM elements falsely claiming Abu Dura’s presence in Baghdad.
  - Elaborate hoax allegedly an attempt to mislead CF, Sadr City residents.
  - No indications Abu Dura intended to return to Iraq.

**Assessment:** Some Sadrists within the GoI, especially those connected to Qays al-Khazali, likely to continue relationships with JAM Special Groups, including support to their activities. Abu Dura unlikely to return to Baghdad after brothers’ capture; JAM will continue propaganda alleging his return to boost morale.
NBP Attempts to Increase Iraqi Support Base

- Opposing NBP leaders engaging tribes in attempt to bolster and increase influence inside Iraq

  - Ahmed Hassan Kaka Obeidi, Muhammad Yunis Ahmad’s (MYA) key Iraq-based lieutenant, leading NBP’s effort to ensure tribal support, bolster NBP’s relevance
    - Focusing efforts on Diyala and at’ Tamim – areas of ongoing strength, relevance to Sunni Resistance
    - Using intimidation, anti-AQI sentiment, fears of Kurdish expansion to enlist local supporters

  - Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri attempting to leverage historical tribal relationships to undermine MYA’s leadership

**Assessment:** NBP leadership recognizes increasing relevance of tribes and their importance in ensuring NBP support in Iraq. Al-Duri is unlikely to make major gains, but MYA could compete with CF, GOI, insurgent groups for tribal influence. Successful GOI, CF tribal engagement represents opportunity to block NBP’s efforts, further diminish its influence with Sunni tribes.
JAM Recent Reporting

• As of 5 May, ‘Abbas al-Kufi and an associate were scheduled to travel to Basrah after visiting Baghdad.
  – Kufi returned on 2 May to Basrah after visiting Baghdad.

• Possible JAM Special Groups leader Abu Musa facilitating associates’ travel to Basrah.
  – Musa attempted to help other Special Groups members obtain passports.
Threat Update

- Mass casualty attack against IZ
  - UID workers in the IZ plan to target al-Tasnia al-Askari building with IED
    - Attack timing: end of week starting 06 MAY or beginning of week starting 13 MAY
    - 26 FEB, IED targeted GoI VP Mehdi at dedication ceremony of public building
      - 5 x CIV killed
      - 30 x CIV injured
    - CIIOC issued situational awareness report 06 1920D MAY 07

Assessment: IZ continues to be target of interest for all insurgent groups. Targeting ceremonies in effort to undermine perceptions of GoI security is a known TTP. Previous discoveries of smuggled explosive materials, past attacks suggest most likely COA is small IED targeting VIPs.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

28 April – 4 May 2007

• 149 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  – Total casualties:
    • 294 killed
    • 239 injured

• 135 Nationwide execution incidents
  – 215 killed
    • 40% of total casualties
    • 73% of total deaths
  – Daily average of 21 executions

May 2007 Outlook

• 531 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
• 1637 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
• 727 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Expect incidents to remain below pre-Fardh al-Qanoon levels, but continue trend of gradual increase. Expect cycle of sectarian reprisal executions to continue in mixed, fault line areas in response to recent HP attacks.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

Baghdad City Incidents 21 APR 07 – 27 APR 07
- 81 Sectarian Incidents
- 75 Execution Incidents
- 127 Total Casualties

Baghdad City Incidents 28 APR 07 – 04 MAY 07
- 92 Sectarian Incidents
- 86 Execution Incidents
- 134 Total Casualties

Assessment: Sectarian violence sustained in West Rashid, focused in Bayaa and Risalah neighborhoods. Continuing five-week rising trend, expect increase in executions as death squads conduct retaliatory attacks, counter-attacks.
JAM Recent Reporting

• MAS publicly launches initiative to purge JAM of ‘rogue’ elements
  – Intended to restore Sadr Trend’s ‘all encompassing nationalist character’
  – Allegedly includes expulsion of JAM leaders and political officials involved in sectarian conflict

• List of ‘rogue’ elements reportedly published
  – Implicitly admits JAM elements involved in sectarian violence
  – Names of ‘rogue’ elements unknown

Assessment: Publicity of reforms by MAS are likely effort to portray the Sadrist movement as a non-sectarian organization in attempt to distinguish it from other Iraqi political groups. Removal of ‘rogue’ JAM leaders could further divide the movement as expelled leaders will likely continue their activities independent of JAM leadership.
Recent Attacks near Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR)

- Substantial increase in attacks near the BOR since the start of Operation HONEST HANDS
  - No incidents in December or January within 5 km
  - 14 incidents since start of operation on 29 January; 7 assessed as related to BOR ops
  - 4 x IED, 1 x VBIED within 5 km since 15 April

- Oil Protection Force (OPF) personnel at the BOR maintain strong links to insurgency
  - OPF members have facilitated or actively participated in at least two attacks
  - 30 Apr IED targeting CF patrol took place 30 meters from OPF checkpoint

- Local leaders exerted significant influence over BOR operations, control of OPF prior to HONEST HANDS
  - Illicit oil theft source of significant revenue
  - Multiple sources indicate reduction of illicit activity at BOR since HONEST HANDS

Assessment: OPF members, influenced by corrupt local leaders with a stake in oil smuggling, will continue to actively and tacitly support attacks against ISF, CF in reaction to HONEST HANDS oversight.
Threat Update

• Coordinated attacks IVO Kirkuk
  – AIF are planning multiple HP events
  – 5 x VBIED, 2 x SVEST (both foreign fighters) targeting:
    • 3 x gas/oil facilities
    • 2 x IP facilities: HQ, ECP
    • Village VIC FOB Warrior
    • An unknown location in Kirkuk City
  – Pattern of similar attacks in Kirkuk every 5 to 8 weeks since August 06
    • 19 Mar: 4 x VBIED; targeted Human Rights Building, ISF and their families
    • 3 Feb: 1 x SVBIED, 6 x VBIED, 3 x IED; targeted KDP, PUK, known Kurdish interests
  – CIOC issued situational awareness report 10 1316D MAY 07

Assessment: Use of foreign fighters, SVESTs, SVBIEDs and VBIEDs indicates Ansar al-Sunna, AQI. Identified locations probable targets based on known TTP. Specific targeting of oil, gas facilities likely in response to recent efforts to repair infrastructure. Past coordinated attacks support credibility of reported planning, suggest attempt to heighten ethnic conflict in Kirkuk. Attack timing unknown.
JAM Recent Reporting

• As of early May, MAS reportedly considering return to Iraq
  - Timing of Sadr’s contemplated return unclear

  Sadr unlikely to return soon. Consideration likely result of unfavorable conditions rather than pressure from his supporters in Iraq; most street-level JAM fighters are either unconcerned over, or unconvinced of, Sadr’s absence.

• Abu Musa’s current responsibilities performing support work suggest the possibility he is a mid-level facilitator rather than a high-level leader of JAM Special Groups.
Threat Update

• SVEST threat to FOB Warhorse
  – 4 May, contractor coerced by AQI, Jaysh al-Sunnah Wa’il Jama’a (JSJ) to provide assistance with attack
  – JSJ leader Abu Abd al-Qahar involved in contractor’s coercion
    • Released from Camp Bucca in January
    • Reportedly took command of Dali Abbas elements
  – AIF plan to use badges and information from contractor to detonate a suicide bomber at an unspecified key base facility

• CIOC issued situational awareness report 11 1702D MAY 07
VBIED Attacks Targeting Bridges Outside Baghdad

- 11 May three VBIED attacks
  - Route Tampa bridge over Grand Canal damaged
  - 2 Diyala River Bridges
    - Provide major supply routes for Shi’a militia in East Baghdad
    - Attacks occurred within 5 minute period

- Previous AQI bridge attacks
  - 14 April – Unsuccessful VBIED attack on Jadriya Bridge
  - 12 April – Successful VBIED attack on Sarafiyah Bridge
  - Previous attacks assessed as AQI attempts to isolate Karkh from Rusafa

Assessment: Multiple coordinated attacks employing VBIEDs against infrastructure suggest extensive AQI planning, target selection. Likely attempt by AQI to limit re-supply of JAM elements in Baghdad; isolate predominately Shi’a populace from southern supply routes; inhibit CF freedom of maneuver. AQI will continue to employ coordinated HP attacks targeting key infrastructure in attempt to discredit GoI, Fardh al-Qanoon.
JAM Recent Reporting

- Mahmudiyah JAM Company plans reorganization of units
  - New Emergency Platoon
    - Composed of 5 members from each preexisting platoon, not new recruits
    - Intended to respond immediately for unspecified tasks, not exclusively limited to Mahmudiyah

- JAM in Nasiriyah reportedly acquire IP radios
  - Specific model allegedly unavailable commercially, how acquired not reported
  - Radios used to monitor IP activity
  - IP allegedly aware of compromised communications, unwilling to confront JAM
Abu Ghraib’s Anti-AQI Movement

• Tribal opposition to AQI has resulted in decreasing attacks against CF, ISF, civilians

• Zoba’i tribe leading local action to remove AQI from Abu Ghraib
  – Organizing locals into informal Anbar-like ERUs
  – Clashes between tribal elements and IA Muthanna Brigade recently reported

• AQI responding by intimidating civilians in Abu Ghraib, targeting ISF

Assessment: Sunni opposition to AQI is improving security in Abu Ghraib. AQI will defend Abu Ghraib foothold by targeting ISF, Sunni civilians in attempt to derail anti-AQI movement, provoke ISF-tribal clashes. Tribal willingness to sustain AQI opposition will be bolstered by support from Gol, CF. Gol sanction of AQI opposition in Abu Ghraib has potential to create opportunities for expansion of anti-AQI tribal resistance to other regions.
Iranian President visits UAE

• (U) First visit by Iranian head of state since 1979 revolution
• (U) Ahmadinejad called for end to US presence in the region
  – Desires countries themselves in the region to establish security and peace
  – Accused “occupiers” of attempting to incite sectarian violence
• (U) UAE freed 12 Iranian divers on eve of visit
  – Detained 1 May in international waters north of the island of Abu Musa
  – Sailors attempting to retrieve goods from ship sunk last year destined for Iran
  – Claim over island is disputed
AQI Targeting KRG in Irbil Province

• Two HP attacks in five days
  – 13 May – STBIED on Mahkmur KDP building
    • F/C Ambulance VBIED targeting MoC bldg
  – 09 May – STBIED on Irbil MoI building

• Irbil Province significance
  – Irbil City, capital of secular Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
  – Province relatively secure due to efforts of Kurdish (KDP, PUK) security forces
    • Last VBIED June 2005; last high casualty attack May 2005

• Targeting, methodology, indicate AQI
  – Khalid al Turki AQI emir of ‘Kurdistan’
  – Likely tactical cooperation with Ansar al-Sunna (AS)
5 May – 11 May 2007

- 110 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 237 killed
    - 62 injured

- 104 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 203 killed
  - 68% of total casualties
  - 86% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 29 executions

May 2007 Outlook

- 527 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,641 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 874 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Expect continued AQI high profile attacks in attempt to incite sectarian violence, discredit GoI, CF. Although sectarian violence reduced in Baghdad City, expect to see increased violence outside Baghdad, mainly in Diyala and Ninawa provinces.
**Ethno-Sectarian Conflict**

**Assessment:** Sectarian violence in Baghdad remains concentrated in West Rashid, focused in Aamel, Bayaa and Shurta neighborhoods. Expect sustained activity in these neighborhoods as Sunnis attempt to retake lost ground, while JAM counterattacks to defend stronghold. Attacks declined mainly in Mansour and Adhamiyah, likely due to JAM pulling back after increased activity last week.

**Baghdad City Incidents 28 APR 07 – 04 MAY 07**
- 76 Sectarian Incidents
- 71 Execution Incidents
- 136 Total Casualties

**Baghdad City Incidents 05 MAY 07 – 11 MAY 07**
- 76 Sectarian Incidents
- 71 Execution Incidents
- 170 Total Casualties

- **Baghdad City Incidents:**
  - Total casualties: 133 killed, 3 injured
  - Baghdad City Ethno-Sectarian Executions:
    - 88 execution incidents, 128 killed

- **Baghdad City Executions:**
  - Total executions: 128 killed
Iran Confirms Arrest of Iranian-American Academic

• (U) detained during personal visit
  – 30 December robbed of passports en route to airport for return to US
  – January to February, repeatedly questioned, pressured to confess to unspecified charges
  – Employer appealed to Ahmadinejad through Iranian UN Ambassador; no response
  – Arrested 7 May, currently held in Evin prison

• (U) Iran alleged arrest was “based on law”
  – Accused in Iranian media of being Mossad agent, seeking “velvet revolution”

• (U) Two other dual Iranian-American citizens currently prevented from leaving Iran, media dubbed “soft hostages”
AQI Employing Ambulance VBIEDs

- **Ambulance VBIED Incidents**
  - 14 May – F/C Ambulance VBIED outside IZ
  - 13 May – F/C Ambulance VBIED in Irbil
  - 29 March – SVBIED Ambulance detonated in Khalis targeting emergency responders

- **Recent Threat Reporting**
  - As of 5 May, AQI planned to use ambulances as SVBIEDs to target the IZ
  - 8 May reporting indicated AQI planned to use VBIEDs in coordinated attack on IZ

- **Threat reporting, methodology indicate AQI**
  - AQI planning includes use of Ambulance VBIEDs
  - Intent to target first responders, emergency personnel, bypass ISF, CF security measures

**Assessment:** Known TTP, recent threat reporting suggest AQI involvement in failed attempts to employ Ambulance VBIEDs. Yesterday’s incident may have been an attempt by AQI to test CF, ISF security, detection measures at IZ ECPs. AQI will continue attempts to utilize Ambulance VBIEDs to gain access to secured areas, target emergency response personnel.
Ongoing JAM Consolidation of BIAP Control

- MoT allegedly transferred Sunnis to other MoT positions
  - MoT official directing transfers unknown to source
  - Multiple sources report MoT members at BIAP support JAM
  - Purpose of transfers reportedly justification to displace Sunnis from homes in BIAP Village to clear space for JAM
  - Similar activity reported in late March 07
- 72 families supposedly evicted for not supporting JAM

Assessment: JAM continuing effort to control strategic POE in order to facilitate smuggling operations. JAM presence also likely an effort to monitor CF activities on adjacent FOBs.
Iraqi Sunni Insurgent Motivations

- Money and coercion/fear top reasons for joining AQI and other Sunni extremist groups
  - Combined they outnumber all other factors almost 2-to-1
  - Only 36% cited religious or nationalistic reasons

- Financial motivations at odds with AQI/ISI and other extremist groups' rhetoric

Review of 202 Iraqi detainee confessions; 42 provided motive for joining extremist group

*Detainee statements were collected between January and May; statements were intended to influence as well as inform; no foreign fighters were included

Assessment: AQI/ISI worldview remains at odds with the average Iraqi, as demonstrated in Anbar, other locations, supported by detainee statements. Improved economic conditions, combined with effective reconciliation efforts, will undercut core motivating factors among many of the Iraqi members of AQI, which are estimated to be 90% of total membership.
Page 31 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c
Recent JAM Activity in Dhi‘Qar Province

- Gradual increase in attacks
  - Highest level in April
  - All attacks targeted CF
- Sale of rockets and IEDs in Nasiriyah reported
  - Weapons allegedly acquired from JAM in Basrah
    - Basrah JAM reportedly receives weapons from Iran
    - IEDs reportedly IR trigger
- JAM allegedly coordinating with Bedouins to pace IEDs IVO Tallil AB

**Assessment:** JAM activity has increased over the last month in Dhi‘Qar Province, partially due to increased JAM presence following displacement during Fardh al-Qanoon, combined with increased CF operations in the province. JAM will continue to use established smuggling routes in order to sustain flow of weapons required for anti-CF operations.
Page 33 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c
Ongoing Iranian Economic Diplomacy

- (U) Iranian-Omani oil and gas agreement reached
  - MoU ceremony 15 May coinciding with President Ahmadinejad's visit
  - Goal of full implementation in 4 months
  - Joint company established for:
    - Development of fields
    - Export of Iranian gas to Oman
    - Marketing of liquefied gas
    - Investment in other countries

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Approved for Release
Threat Update

• Chlorine-augmented VBIEDs in Baghdad
  – Early May, AQI elements based south of Baghdad planned to smuggle trucks into Baghdad
    • Targets are unspecified Shi’a neighborhoods
    • Planners intended to acquire forged GoI documents
  – 14 Chlorine VBIEDs since Oct 2006
  – CIOC issued two situational awareness reports:
    • 16 1220D MAY 07
    • 17 0218D MAY 07

Assessment: Reporting and TTP suggest AQI involvement. Effort to secure forged GoI documents suggests desire to transit checkpoints. Timing of the attack is unspecified.
AAS/AQI Conduct Complex Attacks IVO Mosul

• 2 coordinated HP attacks on bridges
  – Route Baddush 6 Bridge
  – Aski-Mosul Bridge

• Complex attacks in Mosul
  – 2x VBIED targeting IP Trans-Jail
  – VBIED targeting IA patrol
  – VBIED F/C by IA patrol
  – Multiple SAF/IDF events

• Recent Threat Reporting
  – AQI planned complex attack on temporary detention center in Mosul
  – March 07: attack on Baddush prison west of Mosul released over 50 foreign fighters

Assessment: Known TTPs, methodology suggests Ansar al Sunna with support of AQI. AAS/AQI intent to restrict CF, ISF freedom of maneuver and attempt to free prisoners from detention facility in Mosul. These attacks represent a spread of successful TTPs from Baghdad-area AQI elements to counterparts in MND-N.
JAM Attacks in Nasiriyah

• 16 May, JAM elements attacked ISF, Badr members in Nasiriyah
  – Attacks started in downtown Nasiriyah; reportedly spread to other areas in Dhi Qar
  – Clashes allegedly incited by arrest of JAM members emplacing IEDs to target CF
  – Fighting subsided as of late 16 May

• As of mid-May, OMS is reportedly suffering from a lack of competent leaders and unity

Assessment: Attacks in Nasiriyah demonstrate JAM’s capability, intent to quickly retaliate against ISF, Shi’a rivals. While the Sadrist movement is generally suffering from leadership issues resulting from Sa’d’s absence, JAM is still capable of significant influence, intimidation, and violence, as evidenced by events in Nasiriyah.
JAM Baghdad Leadership Turnover

- Shaybani’s reversal of Kufi’s Baghdad leadership changes causing turmoil
  - Shaybani reinstated previously expelled Special Groups leaders
  - Forced Karkh commanders loyal to Kufi to resign
  - Kufi loyalists who remain in command suffer from low morale, confusion

- Sadr’s command and control within Baghdad weakened
  - Walid al-Zamili signing orders for Sadr, causing confusion among Baghdad JAM leadership
  - Baghdad OMS leaders perceive a lack of direction by Sadr; some raise concerns of a Special Groups coup
  - Special Groups ignoring Sadr directed proscription on attacks against CF and Sunnis

Assessment: Elevated leadership turnover rates are likely contributing to internal and sometimes violent dissent by Special Groups. Attacks against CF, reprisal killings will persist as JAM oversight remains weak and OMS fails to implement effective measures to control Special Groups.
Page 39 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c
Insurgent Propaganda: Hamas-Iraq

• Political platform designed to gather support from mainstream Iraqis and regional governments
  – Equality of citizens and civil rights
  – Dialogue instead of armed conflict between Iraqi people
  – Relationships with all countries, respect international law

• Platform counter to AQI’s goals
  – Maintain Iraq’s national integrity and territories
  – Respect and guarantee rights of all religious and ethnic minorities

Assessment: Hamas-Iraq is promoting itself as an Iraqi nationalist group developing into a legal political entity. Emphasis on Iraq integrity and civil rights runs counter to ISI’s caliphate and religion stance. Expect attempts to build legitimacy through claims of relations with Arab nations, attacks on CF, and social programs.
Syrian-Pakistani relations

• (U) Syrian FM Walid Al-Moualem visited Islamabad Friday
  – Met with President Musharraf, Pakistani FM
    • Expresed concern for instability in Iraq, specifically refugee flow to neighboring countries
    • Both agreed terrorism is negative for Muslim world, peace in Iraq is essential for region’s stability
  – Signed memorandum of understanding calling for periodic meetings
    • Review bilateral relations
    • Discuss issues of mutual concern
  – Both agreed to goal of preferential trade agreement in near term

(C//REL) Assessment: Increased bilateral relations necessary for Syria, given continuing pressure from West
JAM Recent Reporting

• According to press, clashes between JAM and ISF in Nasiriyah have ended
  – Fadhilah claimed spiritual leader Muhammad al-Yaqubi intervened to end conflict
  – Separately, OMS issued internet statement calling for ceasefire in Nasiriyah
  – Despite reported truce, JAM reportedly plans to target IA in Nasiriyah
• 6 May, senior Sadrist Jalil al-Nuri traveled from Najaf to Baghdad to organize anti-CF conferences
  – Mid-May, Nuri returned to Najaf

Assessment: Shi’a leaders likely negotiating permanent ceasefire in Nasiriyah as both sides desire end to fighting, though local leaders may direct reprisal attacks. Sadrists likely to continue organizing conferences protesting CF presence in order to build CoR support for a withdrawal timetable. Nuri’s involvement suggests his relationship with Sadr and OMS may be improving
Jaysh Muhammad

• JM attempting to consolidate and focus insurgent groups in northern Iraq toward expediting CF withdrawal
  – 16 May, Naqshbandi tribe intended to sign a “peace agreement” with JM
  – JM leaders seeking to concentrate insurgent efforts on attacking CF

• JM intent on increasing attacks against CF in Mosul, possibly Kirkuk
  – Order placed for $15,400 of raw TNT paste and sticks

• JM leaders historically willing to tactically cooperate with AQI; however, current target sets at odds
  – Mid-May reporting, senior ISI leadership directed operational elements to continue targeting all ISF and civilians supporting CF

Assessment: Anti-CF attacks will remain JM’s operational priority. Divergent views on non-CF targets, increasing Sunni opposition to AQI make JM allegiance to ISI unlikely. Expansion of tribal opposition to AQI in northern Iraq would likely further reduce viability of JM’s localized cooperation with AQI
Joint Iranian-Saudi Commerce Committee

- (U) Agreed on during weeklong Iranian trade exhibition in Riyadh
  - 12 contracts signed
  - 70 Iranian companies actively involved
- (U) Studying grounds for economic cooperation
  - Investments in other countries
  - Private sectors should be facilitated
- (U) Called for exchange of high economic delegations to discuss management of oil revenues for both countries
- (U) Called for joint shipping company and banking system to be established
- (U) Specialized trade delegations and trade centers within the countries

(C/REL) Assessment: Iran’s third such deal within the week shows increased effort to gain influence in the region through bilateral relations
Direct Fire Attacks on VBC

- 17 attacks since 13 May
  - 9 attacks in last two days
    - Concentrated IVO ECP 11 & 12
    - 2x CF WIA in complex attack 19 MAY
      - First complex attack this year
  - Weekly Attack Trends
    - Since JAN 07, weekly average of 4 attacks per week
      - 12 attacks week ending 18 MAY
    - 30 day average of 2 attacks daily
      - 5 attacks alone on 19 MAY

**Assessment:** As Operation Dragon Fire West continues to clear neighborhoods of Shurta and Jihad, uprooted militants are attempting to divert ISF, CF through attacks on VBC, probe security. Expect sustained elevated level of attacks on VBC with increasing coordination.
JAM Clashes with Shi’a Rivals

- JAM violently clashed with Fadhila in Baghdad’s al-Shu’alah district in early May
  - JAM reportedly burned photos of SIIC and Fadhila spiritual leaders, sparking response
- On 16 May, JAM arrests provoked attacks against Badr, ISF in Nasiriyah
  - JAM attacked home of Rapid Intervention Force commander, Badr member Abu Liqa’
- JAM objections to Basrah’s Fadhila governor caused fighting in mid-April

**Assessment:** From Baghdad to Basrah, JAM continues to settle differences with other Shi’a groups through violent means. Similar confrontations are likely to play out over the next several months as political rivals vie for power.
New Political Front

• National Front
  – Expected to make formal creation announcement, possibly by 20 May 07
  – Courting additional Shi’a Parties

• Could create cross-sectarian majority
  – Potential to compete with UIA politically
  – Possibly will be led by National List former PM ‘Ayad ‘Allawi or Tawafuq leader ‘Adnan al Dulaymi

• Potential for political instability
  – Possible no confidence vote if quorum can be reached by a political coalition

National Front’s Seats in Council of Representatives

44 – Tawafuq Front (Sunni)
25 – Iraqiyya (Secular)
11 – Hiwar Front (IFND) (Sunni)
 3 – Kurdistan Islamic Union (Kurd)
 1 – Iraqi Turkoman Front

87 – Total Seats; 32% of 275 Seats
115 – NF with Sadrists (42%)
128 – NF with Sadrists and Fadhila (47%)
115 – UIA now without Fadhila (42%)
87 – UIA without Sadrists and Fadhila (32%)

Assessment: The creation of cross-sectarian political front posses potential to further destabilize an already internally distraught UIA. The potential exists for Coalition to further foster cross sectarian engagement within GOI if political measures can be passed. Grand Ayatollah Sistani will likely attempt to block any attempt by a NF led coalition to oust PM Maliki or further erode UIA control of the CoR.
World Economic Forum on the Middle East

- (U) 18-20 May forum in Jordan included 16 heads of states, 56 countries represented

- (U) UAE announced launch of $10bn human development foundation
  - Goal is to bridge knowledge gap through investment in education

- (U) Jordan signs $2.5bn business deal
  - UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, France, Ireland, Japan, India, US, UK, China involved
  - Light rail system connecting Amman and Zarqa
  - Multi-nation investments in Jordan’s main Airport
  - $500 million foreign investment in Jordanian real estate
  - US-based Cisco announced extension of strategic relationship with government of Jordan

(C//REL) Assessment: Expanded regional economic cooperation suggests potential for sustainable economic development, modernization
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

12 May – 18 May 2007

- 90 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 187 killed
    - 83 injured

- 86 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 155 killed
    - 57% of total casualties
    - 83% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 22 deaths

May 2007 Outlook

- 520 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,343 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 838 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Ethno-sectarian violence sustained in MND-N, with localized decline in Ninewa, likely due to temporary AQI shift from ethno-sectarian targets to ISF, infrastructure, and political targets last week. Pattern since start of Fardh al-Qanoon suggests high probability for HP ethno-sectarian attacks this week.
**Ethno-Sectarian Conflict**

**Baghdad City Incidents 05 MAY 07 – 11 MAY 07**
- 81 Sectarian Incidents
- 76 Execution Incidents
- 175 Total Casualties
- Majority Shia
- Majority Sunni
- Mixed

**Baghdad City Incidents 12 MAY 07 – 18 MAY 07**
- 51 Sectarian Incidents
- 49 Execution Incidents
- 76 Total Casualties
- Majority Shia
- Majority Sunni
- Mixed

**Baghdad City Incidents: 81**
- Total casualties: 141 killed, 34 injured
- Baghdad City Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 76 execution incidents, 107 killed

**Baghdad City Incidents: 51**
- Total casualties: 72 killed, 4 injured
- Baghdad City Ethno-Sectarian Executions: 49 execution incidents, 71 killed

**Assessment:** Majority of bodies in West Rashid, Mansour. Shi’a and Sunni groups activity reduced as DRAGON FIRE WEST continues in West Rashid. Expect lower levels of execution incidents in West Rashid to continue as CF, ISF security operations limit freedom of maneuver. Increased sectarian violence in Mansour likely as groups fight to gain or maintain control over contested areas.
SA-22 Sale to Iran via Syria

• (U) Syria concluded $730 million deal with Russia for 50 SA-22 systems earlier this year
  – Syria agreed to supply Iran 10 of the 50 systems
  – Iran will pay for its 10 systems, subsidize Syrian portion of purchase
  – Moscow not officially notified of Syrian-Iranian agreement
  – Delivery to Iran expected in late 2008

• (U) SA-22 (Pantsyr-S1)
  – Close-in, point air defense system
  – Radar detection up to 30km
  – Carries up to 12 57E6 surface-to-air missiles on launchers
    • Max speed of 1,100 m/s
    • Range from 1km to 12km
Sadr Returns to Iraq

- Muqtada al-Sadr returned 19 May
  - Believed to be in Najaf
- Possible reasons for return
  - Personal assurances against detainment
  - Absence of rival ISCI leader Hakim due to illness
  - Desire to reestablish personal control of OMS and JAM
- Possible next steps
  - Lead Friday prayers at Kufa Mosque
    - Exploit opportunity to deliver anti-CF rhetoric
  - Assert OMS presence in disorganized UIA
  - Exploit reconciliation opportunities with Sunni outreach

Assessment: Sadr will likely remain in Iraq as long as he does not feel directly threatened. Expect Sadr to reassert himself among OMS/JAM leadership, increase efforts to build public and political support for a CF withdrawal timetable.
CF Impact on JAM in Diyala

- 13 May, a JAM commander in Diyala Province, Abu Muqtada, discussed leaving Iraq
  - Abu Muqtada reportedly fears CF detention
- 5 May, JAM members planned attack against AQI
  - Attack preparation halted due to CF patrol arriving in vicinity

Assessment: Coalition operations in Diyala are causing JAM to alter TTPs, disrupting leadership. However, JAM will sustain presence in the province to protect its self-proclaimed title as protector of Iraqi Shi’a.
Page 54 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c
IAEA Report on Iran to be Released Today

- (U) IAEA Chief El Baradei to report on Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council
- (U) Last minute visits to Isfahan and Natanz facilities conducted yesterday
  - Isfahan houses Iran’s uranium conversion facility
  - Natanz is the most sensitive plant; where the enrichment of uranium takes place
- (U) Unnamed diplomat stated the report should have “no surprises and everything in it will be negative for Iran”

(C//REL) Report likely to conclude Iran proceeding unabated, trigger third round of sanctions negotiations; expect Iran to sustain defiant position, continue development of nuclear program
Intelligence Highlight

• 22 May STBIED attack in West Rashid
  – STBIED targeted civilians
    • 30 LN killed; 30 LN wounded
    • Located in commerce district of predominately Shi’a area of Hayy Aamel

• Recent attacks
  – 19 May VBIED in West Rashid
    • 12 LN killed, 22 LN wounded
    • Targeted Shi’a populated area in Risalah; known JAM support zone
  – April averaged 1 HP attack targeting civilians in West Rashid every 4-5 days

Assessment: Expect continued AQI attempts to incite sectarian violence through HP attacks targeting civilians. Fault line area bordering Mansour/West Rashid remains the focus of AQI/JAM elements inciting sectarian violence in Baghdad.
JAM Weapons Trafficking

- IP, Port Security allegedly involved in weapons smuggling operations in Umm Qasr, Safwan
  - Infiltrated by JAM, moving mortars and IEDs from Basrah
    - Jan 07 to May 07, 17 IED attacks along MSR Tampa south of Basrah, VIC Safwan
- As of 8 May, Special Groups senior logistician reportedly conducting smuggling in Amarah

Assessment: JAM and special groups have a well established network of smuggling routes in southern Iraq, with Amarah and Basrah serving as hubs for further distribution. While majority of weapons smuggled through Basrah are destined for Baghdad, some are diverted south to Safwan and Umm Qasr for attacks on CF convoys.
Page 58 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4c
Fourth Iranian-American Detained

• (U) detained o/a 11 May

• (U) Iran issued statement, did not cite by name
  – Linked pursuit, detention to “cooperation” from
  –

• (U) Three other dual Iranian-American citizens currently prevented from leaving Iran; another American citizen missing
Intelligence Highlight

- 23 May SVVEST attack in Mandali
  - SVVEST detonated in coffee shop
    - 11 LN killed; 25 LN injured
    - Frequent by ISF, border security
    - Targeting, methodology suggest AQI

- 19 May 15 LN killed execution style
  - Assailants wore IA uniforms
  - Traveled to Kurdish village of Humit Kapie, approx. 14km NW of Mandali
  - Executed 15 LNs, injured 1 LN female

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
JAM Unable to Intimidate IA in West Rashid

- JAM concerned with inability to intimidate predominantly-Kurdish IA units in southwest Baghdad, likely 1/2 IA
  - 30 & 31 Mar, JAM engaged in series of clashes with IA in ‘Amel district
  - 29 April, JAM reported nine leaders detained in ‘Amel district after JAM threatened IA
  - Mid-May, IA engaged JAM in ‘Amel, Bayaa; JAM unable to reinforce
- OCINC senior Iraqi officer critical of predominantly-Kurdish IA units’ performance in Bayaa district
  - Alleged IA cooperating with terrorists
  - Considering proposal to replace units

**Assessment:** Despite JAM frustration with IA operations in West Rashid, OCINC contemplation of attempt to replace effective units suggests sectarian motivation
Responses to IAEA report on Iran

• (U) El Baradei suggested Iran 3-8 years from developing nuclear weapon, if it chooses to do so
  – Referenced prior US estimates
• (U) Report schedule for IAEA Board review in June, UN Security Council meeting likely to follow
• (U) Ahmadinejad sustained defiant tone, noting Iran is “close to the peak” on path to nuclear capability
• (U) EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana to meet with Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, 31 May

(C//REL) Assessment: Third round of sanctions expected, though unlikely to deter continued Iranian nuclear research
1920 Revolutionary Brigade Fissures

• Muthanna al-Dhari’s leadership of 1920 Rev Bde caused breakaway of senior personnel, formation of new group
  – 02 May, Muthanna al-Dhari reorganized 1920 Rev Bde following organizational split and creation of Hamas-Iraq
  – Abu Maryam, 1920 Rev Bde media cell official, dissatisfied with changes, announced he and his associates no longer support Muthanna
  – 22 May, Abu Maryam intended to use media coverage to announce the founding of a new group, al-Da’wa Wal-Ribat (DWR)
  – Abu Maryam commanded 21-person cell in Baghdad, with four or five additional groups supporting operations

Assessment: Abu Maryam’s departure likely in short term to degrade 1920 Rev Bde Baghdad operational capability. An increase in organizational divides can be expected, especially if DWR perceived to be successful. However, well-publicized success combating AQI will increase 1920 Rev Bde community support, bolstering al-Dhari’s leadership and encouraging expansion of anti-AQI efforts
AQI Experimentation in Bridge Attacks

- 24 May AQI Attack on Overpass Bridge in Mansour
  - Explosives placed between bridge surface and support beams
    - Attempt to cause permanent damage
    - Previous bridge attacks employed VBIEDs detonating on bridge surface
      - Not likely to cause irreparable damage to bridge structure
    - Proper employment of emerging TTP increases risk of AQI permanently damaging bridge structures

Assessment: AQI likely experimenting for future attacks against more strategic bridges in Baghdad. Expect subsequent attacks on bridges to employ emerging TTPs in attempt to cause catastrophic failure of bridge structure; targeting of strategic bridges across the Tigris likely
Propaganda Response to Abu Qadir’s Death

• JAM/OMS media interviews
  – Beirut-based Sadrist, Hasan al-Zarqani
    • characterized the event as an “assassination”
    • alleged British intentionally attempting to worsen situation as reaction to recent targeting of British forces
    • Referenced Sadr’s reappearance, indirectly linked to operation
  – Unnamed Basrah-based Sadrist spokesman
    • Described incident as occurring “while [Abu Qadir] was driving his car in a commercial street”
    • asserted hundreds of JAM members took to the streets

Assessment: Death of senior JAM leader Qadir likely to cause only isolated retaliatory attacks, as desire to respond conflicts with Sadr’s guidance at Friday prayers not give ‘occupation’ justification for remaining in Iraq
Sadr Reappeared at Kufa Mosque

- Muqtada al-Sadr reappeared in Kufa to deliver an anti-American sermon after four months in Iran
  - Called for CF withdrawal
    - Urged government not to allow extension for CF
  - Urged JAM not to attack ISF or one another
  - Stressed bridging all sectarian divides
  - Called on government to provide basic services and prevent Ba’athists from returning to gov’t
  - Reached out to Iraqi Sunni-Arabs with a message of national unity
- Attendance reportedly ~ 6000 (typically ~ 300)

Assessment: Sadr’s politically themed sermon is likely an indication of his political strategy over the next six to eight months. Sadr’s message was delivered with an Iraqi nationalist tone, calling on Iraqis across sectarian lines to stand united and work together.
Anbar Awakening meets Sadrists in Sadr City

- Primary attendees at 22 May meeting
  - Three Sadrist CoR members
  - Anbar Awakening President Sheikh Hamid al-Hayis
  - Sadr City representatives, including Shi’a tribal leader Mohammad Kathir

- Called for:
  - Identifying killers of Iraqis labeled “terrorists”
  - Improved national security services
  - Internationally monitored provincial elections

- Shi’a leader Sheikh Malik Sewadi al-Mohammedawi stated tribes are united against sectarianism

- Sheikh Hamid al-Hayis: “Meeting is a message to Iraq politicians to get rid of differences and seek reconciliation.”

Assessment: Unprecedented meeting improves the posture of Anbar Awakening, Sadrists for provincial elections, builds on Shi’a-Sunni reconciliation initiatives. Sadrists engagement with Sunnis likely early component of plan outlined by Sadr at Friday Prayers. AQI likely to target both groups, release propaganda portraying Anbar Awakening as traitors of Sunni population.
Interest in Nuclear Technology in Gulf States

- (U) Interest sparked by Iran’s suspected weapons program
  - Nearly a dozen Gulf states interested in nuclear energy plants
    - Plants would be regulated by IAEA
    - IAEA does not want the countries enriching their own uranium
    - More than 30 countries currently operate nuclear energy plants
  - Some fear it could turn into arms race in long term
  - Gulf states are eager to close perceived technology gap with Iran
  - Iran sought to rally Arab support for its nuclear program at World Economic Forum in Jordan
    - Arab state officials openly questioned Iran’s intentions
AQI Propaganda: Selling Lies

- Attempting to reconsolidate control of media by making assertions to discredit opposition
  - Massive Coalition/Shiite deception campaign
  - Coalition controlled media falsely showing Coalition as noble saviors
  - Coalition security activities are all false propaganda
  - Coalition created rumors of encircling Diyala and removing Mujahidin

- Sensitive to media backlash for killing Iraqis
  - Denounced television for falsely accusing AQI of killing other Mujahidin
  - Claimed AQI will not kill Muslims unless they join the ‘army of Maliki’
  - Called Iraqi Islamic Party infidels but claimed AQI will not attack them
  - Will not attack Iraqi Christians, protect those who pay tribute

Assessment: AQI focused on countering negative media and insurgent group accusations. Attempting to take high ground which would allow insurgent propaganda leadership, protection from media attacks. Expect continued effort to focus propaganda toward broader Sunni population.
AQI Targeting LOCs via Infrastructure

- Migration of bridge attack TTP to Anbar Province
  - 27 May STBIED attack on Atlantic City bridge SW of Habbaniyah
    - Attempt to disrupt CF CLPs between AO Raleigh, AO Topeka; redirect movement onto MSR Mobile
- Recent bridge attacks targeting LOCs in Iraq
  - 16 May SVBIED attacks on bridges near Mosul
    - Attempt to route ISF, CF movement onto ASR Sante Fe
  - 11 May STBIED attacks on Diyala river bridges in Baghdad
    - Likely attempt to disrupt Shi'a militias’ weapons smuggling
- Specific motivations for bridge attacks vary across MNDs based on tactical, operational considerations

Assessment: AQI elements across Iraq employing similar TTPs to target bridges. Expect future attacks on bridges by AQI forces to continue to use VBIEDs and SVBIEDs in attempt to shape ISF, CF ground movement
Sadr Frustrated with Maliki

- Muqtada al-Sadr is reportedly angry with Prime Minister Maliki over:
  - Maliki’s failure to expedite CF withdrawal
  - Maliki’s suspected private deal with Qays al-Khaz’ali

- Sadrists allegedly intend to follow Sadr’s 25 May sermon with program of unspecified practical measures

Assessment: Sadrists likely believe Prime Minister Maliki has compromised OMS/JAM objectives and are moving away from their strategic political alliance. The political initiatives of Sadr’s 25 May sermon will serve as a Sadrist political roadmap. Some of Sadr’s proposed initiatives threaten to undermine Maliki’s leadership.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

19 May – 25 May 2007

- 91 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 263 killed
    - 96 injured

- 85 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 202 killed
    - 56% of total casualties
    - 77% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 29 deaths

May 2007 Outlook

- 476 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,368 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 846 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Casualties increased due to an increase of execution deaths in neighboring provinces outside Baghdad. Babil, Salah ad Din, and Diyala had a combined 12 incidents with more than 4 killed; including 3 with more than 12 killed. Expect incidents of sectarian violence to remain below pre-Fardh al-Qanoon levels.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

Baghdad City Incidents 12 MAY 07 – 18 MAY 07

- 52 Sectarian Incidents
- 50 Execution Incidents
- 79 Total Casualties

Baghdad City Incidents 19 MAY 07 – 25 MAY 07

- 56 Sectarian Incidents
- 53 Execution Incidents
- 174 Total Casualties

**Assessment:** Casualties in Baghdad increased in large part due to 2 effective HP attacks in West Rashid targeting Shi’a civilians. No significant change in either execution incidents or deaths, majority of bodies found were in West Rashid. Decreased activity in Mansour likely due to Shia and Sunni groups focusing attacks on ISF, CF.
Assessment: Yesterday’s attack further demonstrates AQI’s willingness to target Iraqi civilians indiscriminately in attempts to discredit ISF, CF security operations. Inability of the TBIED to penetrate the ISF checkpoints leading to the Sadriyah market demonstrates the success of current security measures in Rusafa’s market districts.
JAM, Special Groups’ Tensions over Attack

- Wathiq AKA Abu Muhammad reportedly behind 14 May attack on US convoy in Aamel district of Baghdad
  - Reportedly the attack mastermind
  - EFP builder
  - Attack reportedly funded by
    - Some JAM members angry that Wathiq injured fellow Iraqis, took money for attack, drew CF attention to area
- Wathiq reportedly JAM Special Groups leader in southern Karkh
  - Districts: Aamel, Jihad, Bayaa, Shurta
Chlorine VBIED Threat in Baghdad

- AQI expressing intent to use Chlorine VBIEDs in Baghdad
  - Multiple reports indicate ongoing AQI planning
  - Attack in densely populated area would amplify impact

- Previous attacks demonstrate attempts to refine capability
  - Most occurred in Anbar, targeting ISF
  - Last attack 15 May northeast of Baqubah

- Previous impact mixed
  - Several produced high casualty figures, though most treated and released
  - High media coverage
  - Use against Sunni targets helped solidify Anbar tribal resistance

Assessment: AQI has intent to employ chlorine augmented VBIEDs in Baghdad; demonstrated capability in Anbar, Diyala. Impact of previous attacks mixed overall. Expect increased media coverage in event of additional chlorine VBIEDs, particularly if in Baghdad.
Iran Links Iraq, Nuclear Issue

- (U) Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said talks on Iraq can not be separated from nuclear issue
  - Larijani spoke while he was on his way to talks with EU Foreign Minister Javier Solana
  - Said US could benefit from Iran’s proposal on Iraq
  - Ruled out suspension of uranium enrichment
    - Insisted the suspension was not the solution

(C/REL) Assessment: Linkage of Iraq, nuclear program likely Iranian attempt to gain concessions on nuclear program through implicit offer to negotiate on security situation in Iraq.
Sectarian Violence in West Rashid

- **Omar al Faruq Mosque destroyed**
  - Sunni mosque destroyed in unknown explosion on 30 May
  - Assessed as retaliation for 29 May SVBIED attack
    - Destroyed Musa ibn Jaffar al Kadhem Mosque
  - Most likely conducted by JAM
  - 2km south of 29 May SVBIED site

- **MoI reports 7 bodies found**
  - Corpses were found 30 May in Aamel
    - Within 1km of 29 May SVBIED attack
    - All victims were reportedly shot in head

**Assessment:** Expect continued retaliatory attacks as cycle of sectarian violence in West Rashid increases during the next 48 hours following recent attacks damaging mosques in the area. AQI likely to attempt high profile attacks targeting Shi’a civilians
JAM Special Groups Activity

- Special Groups leader Abu Fatima received weapons shipment in late May
  - Fatima seeking guidance of how to hide or disperse weapons, likely shoulder-fired
  - 26 May, reportedly fired 3 rounds, likely IDF, planned to fire 3 rounds 28 May; targets unspecified
  - Leads group in southwest Baghdad
- Abu Fatima possibly ‘Ali Makia Alawi al-Fartusi AKA Hajji Abu Fatima
  - Fatima released by CF in Apr 06
  - Previously resided in Sadr City
  - Allegedly conducted multiple attacks against CF using IEDs and RPGs

Assessment: JAM Special Groups continue to traffic weapons into Baghdad, attempting to prevent compromise of caches. Expect continued IDF attacks against CF
Diwaniyah Ceasefire

- Ceasefire agreement/charter
  - Authored by Nassar al-Rubay’i (COR) and Khalil Hamza (Governor)
  - Four parliamentary members, Najaf OMS, Qadisiyah PC, Dawa and ISCI
    Parties were present
  - 11 points in written agreement; 4 extra points in media broadcast

- Conditions since the ceasefire
  - Regular media broadcasts show ceasefire as favorable to community
  - No attacks against CF since afternoon of 19 May
  - Reporting shows possible increase in JAM weapon shipments
  - OMS states JAM not responsible for assassinations of ISF who facilitate CF operations

**Assessment:** OMS is probably attempting to establish an environment that conveys favorable conditions as they look forward toward the PIC process. Expect JAM to use the one month cease-fire period to rest, rearm, and refit forces. IDF, SAF, and sniper attacks likely to resume in mid- to late-June.