JOINT STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT TEAM

SIGIR Leadership
14 May 2007
### JSAT Members

- **AMB Robert Ford**
  - DoS, U.S. Ambassador to Algeria
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - DoS, Political Counselor, USEMB Rome
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - Special Assistant to CG, MNF-I
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - JIK
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - MNF-I SPA Campaign Plans
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - USA/JSFA
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - ORAUQU
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - U.S. Army War College
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - Council on Foreign Relations
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - CPAWG
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - British Govt. Latin America
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - Defense Attache’s Office, USEMB Tel Aviv
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - DoS, Special Assistant to CG, MNF-I
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - International Institute for Strategic Studies
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - DoS, Deputy Political Counselor, USM-UN
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - DoS, PEO-COM Counselor, USEMB Algiers
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - DoS, Information Officer, USEMB Rabat
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - GPO
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - UK PERS
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - CENTCOM JO
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - CENTCOM Commander’s Advisory Group
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - Nat’l Presbyterian Fellow
- **(b)(3), (b)(6)**
  - 20th Engineer Det, 10th Armored Corps

---

**Declassified by:** MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff

**Declassified on:** 201505
Nature of the Conflict –

- **Communal struggle for power and survival** between rival political, ethnic and sectarian groups;
- **Insurgency** against the central government and the coalition continues and sets conditions for terrorism and sectarian conflict

| 1.4c, 1.4d |

- Underlying and contributing to instability is a **chronic lack of state capacity** to fulfill basic responsibilities to its people
Situation – Obstacles to Progress

- Continued sectarian behavior
  - A large number of GoI actions are inconsistent with and undermine coalition objectives
  - Coalition, to date, has not exerted sufficient leverage to dictate GoI behavior or impose will on parties to the conflict
  - We are running out of time
  - Many Iraqi communities and organizations are positioning themselves for future conflict rather than endeavoring to achieve stability through power sharing

- Coalition organization and inadequate GoI capacity

**We need more leverage and more time**
Recommended Joint Campaign Plan Goals

**Near-Term** (6 to 9 months): End large scale sectarian violence and defeat AQI/insurgency such that economic and political development can proceed; conditions set for substantive progress on political accommodation and for maintaining improved security while coalition forces are slowly reduced.

**Intermediate** (9 to 21 months): The establishment of a negotiated political agreement that leads to sustainable security.

**Long-Term** (multiple years): Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
LOO Goal – Political accommodation agreement leading to a sustainable security situation, marked by a significant reduction in aggregate political violence.

LOO Goal – End large scale violence; defeat irreconcilables; develop leverage to bring reconcilables to the table; reform ISF; reduce destabilizing external influences.

LOO Goal – Progress in key sectors of the Iraqi economy supports and reflects movement towards sustainable stabilization and political accommodation.

LOO Goal – Negative influences from neighbors reduced. Increased Iraqi outreach to regions, more acceptance of Iraqi government by region.

Campaign Goal
Near Term - End to large scale sectarian violence, improved population security, and substantial progress on political accommodation.
Intermediate Term - The establishment of a negotiated political agreement that leads to sustainable security.
Long Term - Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deprive Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
Key Objectives (1 of 4)

- Forge and maintain unity of effort within the Coalition and between the Coalition, the Government of Iraq, and Iraqi Security Forces.

- Shape the regional security and international political dimensions of the effort to achieve sustainable stability; undertake or recommend the appropriate coalition and Iraqi diplomatic and military actions to advance our efforts, grow international support, and reduce or interdict disruptive and destabilizing influences.

- Generate and apply persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means to move reconcilable groups toward compromise and into the political process, defeat irreconcilables, dramatically reduce ethno-sectarian violence and create the conditions that allow Iraqis to reach a national political accommodation that leads to enduring stability and development.
Key Objectives (2 of 4)

- Conduct effective multi-national (coalition-GoI) counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist operations to protect the population, isolate extremists, destroy terrorists organizations, address local grievances, rekindle hope among the people, and set conditions for political compromise.

- Work with Iraqi leadership to remove disruptive actors from the government and security forces, marginalize destabilizing influences and strengthen responsible individuals who can help move Iraq toward political accommodation.

- Reform, strengthen, and expand Iraqi security institutions such that they are able to sustain the security situation after Coalition forces are reduced and the population regards their forces as professional and legitimate.
Key Objectives (3 of 4)

- Assist the Iraqi government in providing basic services for the population while building and connecting governance capacity at the national, provincial, and district levels such that the GoI functions without coalition assistance and in a way that does not disadvantage particular communities.

- Assist the GoI in building Rule of Law capacity to curtail extrajudicial actions, ensure that there are consequences for criminal activity, adopt a degree of due process consistent with the security situation, and meet humanitarian standards.

- Assist the GoI in setting conditions for economic growth and development while using development aid to encourage institutional reform and reward non-sectarian practices.
Key Objectives (4 of 4)

- Develop a long term security agreement with the Gol and plan for coalition support such that Iraq remains secure from the transition external threats and is able to continue to develop politically and economically.

- Assist the Gol in developing and implementing a program to disarm, de-mobilize, and re-integrate militias and illegal armed groups back into mainstream society.

- Conduct effective strategic communication to clarify coalition intentions, counter enemy disinformation, expose enemy brutality and nefarious objectives of both the enemy and move Iraq’s communities toward compromise and reconciliation.
**Concept**

- Apply integrated civil-military leverage to drive key Iraqi internal political actors towards political accommodation
- Remove malign actors and reduce destructive sectarian bias in government
- Secure necessary authorities in context of discussions concerning long term security agreements.
- Streamline and network coalition organizations; build ministerial capacity, generate performance, and connect the “center” to provinces and districts
- Prioritize security efforts to Baghdad and the “Baghdad belts” then to mixed sectarian and mixed ethnicity areas
- Create a security environment in which a much larger, reformed, capable and professional ISF can retain control, with the populace cooperating with the ISF to sustain security.
- Focus economic development aid on achievable goals the attainment of which will make a maximum contribution to achieving sustainable stability.
Key Differences from previous JCP/JCAP

- Realistic goals within JCP timeframe
- Political accord as driver for other efforts
- Stress on population security as critical to success
- Call for more active CF role in setting limits on parties
- Recognition that Gol itself is part of sectarian problem
- Call for focusing economic assistance relative to objectives
- Focus on external dimension of Iraq's problems
Risks

- Lack of time; erosion of coalition will; enemies wait us out
- Loss of necessary authorities
- Insufficient forces to protect population and break cycle of sectarian violence; extremists prevent progress
- Iraqi fears/desire for revenge exceed desire to co-exist

- 1.4c, 1.4d

- GOI/ISF non cooperation, sovereign intransigence
- GOI/ISF learning curve too shallow; reforms inadequate
Questions?