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(b)(3), (b)(6)

American Embassy, International Zone, Baghdad  
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By (b)(3), (b)(6)  
MNFI Historian

Interviewers Comments: *This was a good interview. (b)(3), (b)(6) was smart, articulate, and his experience is very valuable. This recording should be a priority for transcribing. He spoke quickly enough that I could not quite keep up with my note taking. Trepa has a broad-ranging perspective on the operation because he deals with numerous issues, generally in the mode of having to hurry-up-and-react.*

(b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged the interview belongs to US Central Command.

(U) (b)(3), (b)(6) mission at MNFI is 1) reporting the battlefield, 2) implementing plans and orders, and 3) crisis planning, reacting quickly to evolving situations.

(U) (b)(3), (b)(6) is a reservist. In civilian life, he is a (b)(3), (b)(6).  
(b)(3), (b)(6) In 2003, he was mobilized to work with CFLCC at the Coalition Liaison Center. He faced the problem of how to integrate various coalition partners, many from the old Eastern bloc, with limited to no recent operational experience, combat or stability-wise. (b)(3), (b)(6) spent a lot of time prepping these coalition forces, preparing their RSOI. They had a C9 focus, which developed into Humanitarian Assistance.

(U) MNFI CHOPs is in a unique position. It is not just military. There are four pillars to its operations:

- 1) MNFI, the military pillar, including TF 1.4a
- 2) Government of Iraq, which involves LNOs and a lot of relationship building.
- 3) Embassy, the relationship between DOD and DOS.
- 4) Others, which include the United Nations and NATO.

These four groups do not work for each other, and they all have to work together.

(U) The enemy in the AO includes the JAM Special Groups, government corruption, and friction between the pillars mentioned above. As the situation becomes more secure, we can do more on the other lines of operation: political, economic, diplomatic.

(U) The terrain: The number one focus geopolitically is 1.4b, 1.4d and cross border issues.

~~(S//NF)~~ There is an agreement between the United States and 1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

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*All that follows is Unclassified*

We have the challenge of integrating Iraqi police and military boundary owners.

PIC stands for Provincial Iraqi Control. There are coalition forces in the provinces under PIC. It is a challenge to figure out maneuver, fighting, and reporting within those provinces.

In the Karbala Holy Pilgrimage, Badr and Sadr were involved. There are two sides to every story. The PM and some cabinet ministers went down to Karbala to establish ground truth.

He is not very concerned about Basra. The British withdrawal has greatly reduced violence down there, and it is not just based on less reporting.

We need to capitalize on success in Fallujah, and we need to keep protecting Baghdad, the center of gravity. One of the most important effects of the surge has been to let us demonstrate commitments to locals, and through that to reduce violence and build relationships. This helps us identify and hit the insurgent hideouts.

In 2003, State and Defense were not as close as they are now. Petraeus and Crocker work very well together. We have taken on the nation-building mission completely, and the shift is noticeable in the morning BUA. In July, our focus was on security and heavy military. Now, the focus has shifted noticeably to economic and political lines of operation.

Borders: The Syrian and Iranian borders are long and porous. A lot of lethal stuff crosses those borders. The relationship with Kuwait is complicated. There are wrecks in the water between Basra and Umm Qasr. It should be a simple thing to get these wrecks up in order to open the port. BUT, these are disputed territorial waters, and Kuwait is not making clearing them easy.

CHOPS spends a lot of time fighting tactical issues with strategic importance. They dabble in a lot of different things.

On the reversal of the surge, the Force Management Shop is working with Corps on the scheme of maneuver. As US force levels are coming down, the Iraqi Security Forces are stepping up.

The Liaison & Partnership Division provides a small liaison office to each Iraqi ministry. They build relationships. The ministers relationships are with the LNOs. The LNO teams have done very well.

Maj Gen **Barbero** is demanding and mission oriented.

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Strategic Effects Communications deals with the media. We hear about events in the media, and we track down ground truth. We confirm, and we have to do so quickly because the enemy will counter us very quickly. We have to prep the media (b)(3), (b)(6) has been very impressed that the media knows and recognizes our credibility and our striving for accuracy.

DoS plays a big role in keeping us all synchronized. We share information and work closely together.

The Prime Minister's Office. There is a National Operations Center (see (b)(3), (b)(6) interview). We have an LNO to the Chief of the NOC. He is our most direct link and ensures two-way communications on operations and challenges. Iraqi is so big that no one has the single complete picture. Never sure where the information is.

The greatest cost of this operation is born of the dual-military families, with both parents deployed. People believe in the mission. You can see the pride in what they're doing. Our goal is facilitating Iraqi stability.

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