INTERVIEW
OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL J. TERRY
COMMANDING GENERAL
13TH SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
JULY 19, 2007

This transcript was produced from tapes provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.
Today is Thursday, the 19th of July 2007. I am here at LSA Anaconda in Iraq. It is approximately 1300, and I am here with the Commanding General of the 13th Sustainment Command, Brigadier General Terry.

Sir, could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Sure. I am Brigadier General Michael J. Terry, Commanding General, 13th Sustainment Command, Expeditionary, Active Duty. We are based out of Fort Hood, Texas.

Thank you, sir. Just as a recap, can you tell me again when you assumed command, and then also when did you all first come to Iraq?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: I assumed command on the 21st of June 2005. We came into country, Kuwait, on the 23rd of August, was our boots on the ground time, and assumed mission on the 16th of September.
2006.

(b)(3), (b)(6): When are you due to transition command and return home, sir?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: We will TOA on the 8th of August 2007.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, one of the big changes when we look back in terms of change in strategy was when III Corps assumed command, also when General Petreus assumed command at MNFI, was the idea that we were going to change directions and, instead of a drawdown, move to a surge strategy.

I just wanted to ask you from your perspective as Sustainment Commander, what did that cause the Command to have to do? As you look back on that piece, can you talk me through some of the significance of that from your perspective?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Sure. Yes, we were coming in as we prepared for this operation with the idea that the operations would continue, however, that there would be a downsizing from 15 to possibly 10 by the spring -- 10 brigade combat teams by spring of
2007.

When III Corps came in under Lieutenant General Odierno, and of course, when General Petreus came, we saw a change in mission set. So what we needed to do is make sure that we got ahead of this. Knowing that we were going to have at least five brigade combat teams come in, we worked hard from a planning perspective to get onto the timing of those brigade combat teams, when they were going to be coming in, where they were going to be at, what type of brigade combat team would it be. Would it be a heavy mechanized? Would it be a Stryker or would it be more of a light type formation?

So -- and each of those really have a specific set of planning factors associated with it that we've seen through history here, depending on type unit, for consumption of different commodities such as fuel and food and water, what type of platforms they would be operating in.

Clearly, we are operating a lot of Humvees, Strykers and Bradleys and tanks, but we
wanted to make sure we understood where they were going to be, and it wasn't final.

So we had time to do our own planning process. We like to say we are trying to get ahead of everyone in identifying potential locations. The importance wasn't necessarily where the brigade was going to be, the headquarters, but it was based on battalions.

That was the key for us. Because of re-task organizing that goes on in this fight, we wanted to make sure where the battalions were going to be located, what type of battalion was it going to be, and then what were the capabilities of the main area that they were going to be located at, the support structure, who was providing what type of support to whom, what had to be done to increase the capabilities, such as fuel or maintenance or distribution, based on those plans.

Again, there were several brigades where it wasn't -- There were several instances where brigades weren't actually finalized where they were
going to be located until we were well within the operation earlier on. But I think we did a pretty good job in setting conditions and doing it far enough out where we had time to get the pieces in place, get the concepts of support in place and, of course, the infrastructure set to support the operation.

So we really began that in earnest as soon as it was being developed and identified the units that were on tap for coming in, and I think we did a pretty good job of getting ahead of it, and measuring those requirements based on what capabilities we had is one key ingredient.

This is a distribution fight for us, clearly, getting the right things to the right place at the right time, and what were our means to be able to execute that, and what were our shortfalls, and how were we going to make up for those shortfalls.

For example, the only increase in force structure we had was about 84 soldiers, green suit, that made up several moving patrol teams. The rest, we did not increase in size. So what we had to do was
identify capabilities that contractors could provide, in this case, KBR, where we saw an increased requirement of fuel tankers, flatbeds, tractors to pull the trailers, and along with that we've got to have the necessary protection, convoy security capabilities.

So what we did was identify how we would make those up. So we transitioned several units from what they were doing, like a transportation company that didn't have -- where the mission had been TOA'ed to KBR and developing them into convoy security companies.

So we would incrementally build fleets along with the requisite amount of convoy security to make this mission happen.

The other was also an expeditionary capability. We knew that there would be at least in several instances a requirement to stand up a capability in an austere environment, as is the case with Butler Range, now Cov Hammer (Phonetic) where that basically came up from the dust of the desert and
built. The engineers had to build -- (Inaudible) engineers had the build mission for that.

What we did was get in there early and establish a basic capability logistics, fuel capability, water production, distribution, laundry and bath. So we worked very hard early on, on our expeditionary capability in terms of water purification, laundry and bath capabilities, where we could flex quickly with transportation assets, and fuel capabilities, getting fuel storage on the ground and getting the distribution system working.

So that was key to us. That was the key in our hip pocket so we had the flex, and we have done that throughout the battlefield, throughout the whole operational environment. We've got pieces in place throughout Iraq that are doing those missions now.

So the key was getting to the left of it, getting planning process, then collaboration with our subordinate units as well as horizontally together with the other subordinate commands, the divisions and corps, and working to -- We drove this process to make
sure we had enough time where my folks can develop the plan, courses of action, and get to me, lay out the courses of action.

I would decide the way to go, and then establishing decision points when key events had to occur.

Another piece to it -- I think there are two critical areas why I think we have been successful. One, first of all, I've got a magnificent staff. I've got brilliant folks. We were able to influence that, building the team, prior to coming over and put the right skillsets and personalities in the right places.

Then great brigades: Great brigade commanders who can operate independently, tied to us, very strong in leadership and, of course, in their logistics ability or their technical abilities.

So that really paid off dividends, keeping everybody on the same sheet of music. The other piece with the brigade commanders, plus we've had great team players. There are no personalities involved.
Everybody understood the criticality of the mission.

So the beauty of Corps operations at this level is our ability to lift and shift capabilities. So along with identifying those requirements, the capabilities to fill our requirements, what we also did was -- and Baghdad being the main effort -- seeing what was required to enable that mission, we had moved elements, company size elements and lower, from one brigade to the other in order to weight the main effort and make sure we had the right capabilities in place.

So that's a tribute to my brigade commanders and how they really interacted with each other, and were willing. You know, commands will execute based on orders given, but there was really an outpouring of helping each other, getting along with a common focus so they understood what was the right thing to do, and what's worked very well.

Looking at the different pieces of that, in particular, because we had the tactical piece, meaning the Ops side trying to figure
out at the MNCI, certainly, where do I want to put these units to influence the action. On the other hand, there is the Force generation part: Where are we going to get these guys, and when can they come.

The last interesting piece, to me, is the one where they -- In addition to that was the strategy of, hey, no, we need to push back out from the main bases and get back out with these forward operating bases, with the joint security stations. That, to me, seems like a perfect storm, so to speak, and also may rest in the lap of a logistics piece. How do you -- I guess what I wanted to know is: Does the sequencing of those brigades flowing here -- to what degree was it a driving factor on the logistics side of saying, hey, here is how fast we can handle these guys coming in; or was it more of a force generation drive in terms of how fast they were able to --

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: It was more Force generation. I think what we -- Again, it goes back to everything I just said earlier, on working quickly, working together. Having a streamlined process
allowed us to support the requirement established by the Commanding General

You know, these are when the forces are coming in. We knew we needed to be set to be able to execute this by the time they came in. So getting to the left of it, we did not wait for orders. We did not wait for a finalized product.

I think, what really -- where we worked was understanding commanders' intent and getting on that, and working from commanders' intent to facilitate this. And you are absolutely right. It started in Baghdad with establishing COPs and JSSs, and that is a shift in the paradigm.

There are some great lessons learned, particularly in Algeria in the Fifties, the late Fifties, in how the French operated and the successes they had for actually going out, getting off the established fortress like establishments and getting into the community.

This follows right in with that, and we are seeing successes. But it added another dimension,
because we were not planning -- Our planning factors were fairly -- let me make sure I have the -- Our planning factors did not include the number of COPs and JSSs that were going to be built, and as it progressed, of course, they increased in numbers, starting at Baghdad and then, of course, in other areas, MND-North, MND-Center when 3-ID came in, and of course, Baghdad.

So these became missions that we really had to pull together and execute. The concept of support that we execute right now is that each one of the divisions has a brigade, a support brigade, a sustainment brigade that is associated with providing them direct support.

In the north, originally it was the 45th Sustainment Brigade that was associated with 25th Infantry Division, MND-North. In the west, it was the 593d Corps Support Group supporting the Marines, MNF-West. In Baghdad, it's the 15th Sustainment Brigade, and in MND-Center South and Southeast, 82nd Sustainment Brigade. We have a total of seven
brigades.

When Task Force Marne (Phonetic) came in, JID (Phonetic) established MND-Center. We gave that additional mission to the 82nd Sustainment Brigade, and the key was that these sustainment brigades are tied at the hip with the divisions.

I liken it to the relationship in Army of Excellence design where a force support battalion, although it belonged to division support command, was tied at the hip with the brigade combat team.

You kick this up a couple of notches, and we have a similar relationship, to the point where what I wanted to see was that they are completely tied into what the divisions were doing. They were the logisticians to go in and support the division. If there was a conflict or a decision whether a commander should attend a meeting with the division or a line meeting, focus is on the division, just as long as we had representation and folks to talk what was going on in the brigade.

It seems like a very structured set, but
it's not. We have in several instances where it made sense tactically and logistically to have more of an area support mission. We'll use MND-North as an example.

The 45th Sustainment Brigade, now the 3d Sustainment Brigade, is based out of Key West, and they have elements at Speicher, Marez, and some personnel support here at Anaconda, but a large operation that is being conducted by MND-North is right here in Baqubah just across the river from Anaconda, and the distances are great where it would be very difficult for the 45th, now the 3rd Sustainment Brigade to support 3-1 and 3-2 in Baqubah.

So what we established was that that brigade would receive its support directly from Anaconda with our 164th Support Group. It works.

What we also did when 3-ID was coming in, that COP Hammer has got one of its brigades, 3-3, and if you will look at the design from the east of Baghdad, they run around the south kind of like a crescent where a lot of the 3-ID units are located.
82nd Sustainment Brigade from Tallil had been supporting what was the southern-most elements of MND-Baghdad, 425, in Kalsu (Phonetic). When 3ID came in, that area became 3ID's operational environment, and so it was a good fit when 82nd took over support of 3-ID, because they were supporting the folks at Kalsu.

When you work your way up around the south and east, Hammer, though it made sense to support 33 at Hammer from Baghdad from the 15th Sustainment Brigade that is located on Taji and VVC.

So there again is an example where we have the 82nd Sustainment Brigade that's got a support relationship closely tied with the 3rd Infantry Division, but because of proximity it makes more sense from the distribution side for delivery of food, water, fuel, you name it, to run it from 15th Sustainment Brigade.

So that's been key, and having a corps level operation, being able to make those decisions and flex and watch -- not watch, but adjust where we
need to adjust, I think, has been key. And the ability of the brigades to adjust quickly has been key to that as well.

Sir, that is an interesting point. When you talk about those exceptions where it, obviously, made more sense geographically to adjust the support relationship, did those adjustments tend to be driven from top down or from bottom up, meaning did you get feedback from the field that say, hey, these are -- or you obviously saw it and said, hey --

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: No, this is where we saw it. Another key to this is, I believe, the relationship that we have with the divisions, particularly everybody seems to know everybody on this battlefield. They have served with them before, either in combat multiple times or in previous lines, if you will, in other assignments.

So there was already -- You know, we are a III Corps element. We are already tied in with III Corps back at Fort Hood, along with 1st Cavalry
Division. We originally came in as 4th Infantry Division. There's relationships that have already existed.

So bringing division planners into the planning process and working as a team, a collaborative team, to make this happen has been key. So we would identify what makes sense, work with everybody, see how we need to make it happen, and as long as we are doing it and establish that credibility, I believe, and the confidence that it's going to happen, it hasn't been a hard sell.

In this rotation, too, I think we have really come to the next level of transformation in the Army in terms of logistics, in terms of support-to-supported relationships and command and control.

So it's worked. As long as they know that they can talk to the right folks to get their support, I think it's going to have success.

Along the lines of that continued refinement of the logistics process, sir, the Command has been the first, if I understand
properly, to at least start to bridge the gap between a modularization concept in the Army and the restructuring of the sustainment command.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Yes. It's kind of -- kind of -- (b)(3), (b)(6): All of a sudden, there's one foot in and one foot out, but moving in the direction.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Yes. We were sourced for this operation as a legacy Corps Support Commander, COSCOM. That goes with the Corps Materiel Management Center and a Special Troops Battalion and a large staff under modular transformation; where our staff right now is a little over 700, we would be at 254 under the new.

We saw this early and worked hard to mitigate. So we've got right now is we were able to keep the Corps Materiel Management Center and the Special Troops Battalion, and I mentioned Special Troops Battalion, because that's an important piece.

They are performing the mission in Kuwait
as MNC-Kuwait, and their mission is to facilitate the RSO process for Corps separates and for our formation, and they also helped in the surge for several of the brigades when they were coming through. That unit helped facilitate the RSO and get them up here into Iraq.

So seeing that, really, the logistics hadn't changed or wasn't going to change for our rotation, we adjusted our base into what is called an EMTO (Phonetic). We were able to keep the MNC and the STB. They will activate in January of 2008, but we further refined things that happened within this formation.

What we've got is certain tasks that we migrated down to, for example, the management of ammunition supply points. The sustainment brigades are very large headquarters. Just to give you an idea, a corps support group, which is a legacy unit -- we have one in the west -- the staff is about 130 soldiers. A sustainment brigade is about 350 in the headquarters alone, and they have a lot of
capabilities to operate.

So several of the tasks include migration of the ammunition management. This is a big operation. The management -- we call it the RICD (Phonetic) management of -- That has to do with managing the supply support activities that deal with repair parts, durables, things like that -- down to the sustainment brigades, so that they have an area that they are responsible for, and it doesn't matter whether you are wearing a division patch or a corps patch. They are the manager.

So a lot of those tasks have moved down to the sustainment brigades. So -- and we have also pushed sending the folks that are coming behind us, the 316th Sustainment Command -- to help develop -- and we are key in developing their force structure and how they would operate; because they were going to come in a little bit even less than us, about 80 -- a little over 80 positions less than us.

So we've worked it out pretty well now. I also think certain lines of communication -- There is
a document, a tool that is used to manage readiness. It's called the 026, and it actually is a printout from the different enabler systems that show what pieces of equipment are now and what is on order, and the ability now -- who in the division under the modular transformation produces that document was different.

We had three divisions doing it three different ways, and the brigades were sending it directly to us, and we were -- In-Op data, it's called, and we would produce the 026, hang it on the website for them.

In 1st Cav, the G-4 was getting the information from the brigades that was coming to us, and then when 3ID was coming on board, we said we need to standardize this across the whole battlefield, and what we do now is that the sustainment brigade will receive the data, send it to us. We put it through the system. It takes overnight. We get it all put together, and what we end up having is a product the next morning that is provided to the sustainment
brigades that they handle that's got all the 026 information for the units within the division and their support.

So there have been a lot of things that have occurred, you know, from the grassroots kind of support area to enhance support, and take it to the next level; because these concepts weren't formalized. There was intent. There was this kind of the way it should work, but we've really put some meat on the bones of it.

Sir, changing gears a little bit, what are the things that -- Just sitting at an MNCI (Inaudible), and it is very interesting to me to listen to you on the number of combat logistics patrols are out on the road any given night, and also the initiative to move a lot of cargo to aircraft.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Right.

And take advantage of that.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Right.

Could you speak to that
process? How did that -- What was the initiative behind that, and how is it --

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Well, we will not ever fail the Corps in our primary issue, and that's in providing support, and of course, a large portion of it -- We could be running between 2500 and 3000 trucks on the road a night, sometimes up to about 100 CLPs, combat logistics patrols, and if you use the math, one to five in ratio of the convoy protection platforms, gun trucks, it's a lot of trucks and soldiers on the road; even though most of those trucks out there are white trucks, we call them, KBR, there is a good deal of green trucks besides the convoy protection platforms out there.

We look at it that we -- You know, the prime directive is we will not fail in providing the necessary support, but what can we do to reduce the threat to our soldiers on the roads?

They are out there doing a marvelous job every night. They are in harm's way. They are fighting the enemy. We look at it in terms of
offensive maneuver on the road versus going out waiting to get hit.

Some of these operations are very intricate, particular out west where we have infantry company sized formations that are running the convoy escort for the trucks from the Jordanian borders, al Assad and to Hue (Phonetic) and back, three-day missions. These are huge operations in the middle of the desert.

So it differs in different areas, but the bottom line is we've to execute our mission and try to protect our soldiers. So we equip them. We train them. We make sure that they are prepared to execute the mission.

What I can do to reduce it is try to get as many off the road as possible, while not failing in our mission or lessening our support capabilities.

So the best way to do that right now is to move as much as possible by air. You know, our belief is why can't it? You know, if it's something that can, why can't it move? So we started off --
TOA, it was like around 15-16,000 pallets being moved a month back in September, and then we really hit stride -- I believe March was our highest with 24,500, but we have averaged over 20,000 pallets a month moved by aircraft in and around the country. That will be Air Force, fixed wing, commercial tenders type aircraft, the IL-76s, Corps CH-47s, and Sherpas.

So we maximize as much as possible moving everything and anything we possibly can by air to reduce the number of soldiers on the road.

Is there a technology that has a particular help in doing that? I'm just envisioning the management piece of managing what's the available space, what's waiting to go, the movement of it to the --

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: We've got -- It's a very interesting unit. It's called the Movement Control Battalion, the first unit that -- and they were with us from home station, the 49th Movement Control Battalion, and now the 719th has just TOA'ed.

In garrison they are a small organization.
I think the whole battalion with its 300 soldiers in garrison -- when they are over here -- and underneath them are Movement Control Teams which are Captain and Major run command elements, where we put them out -- and they have responsibility of synchronizing and arranging for the movement of every commodity in this battle space, and we've got to perform area support missions. We have them tied to the hip with the divisions, and we've also got them at the air terminals, if you will, the A-5s, the APOEs, wherever moving things by air.

So -- but they are tied to this headquarters, the Distribution Management Center, and the Trans Integration Division to synchronize this.

There's been discussion about whether these Move Control Teams should, for example, be assigned to a Sustainment Brigade.

I believe that the relationship -- again, it's kind of like the sustained brigades at the divisions, a support relationship. The Movement Control Teams are tied up with the sustainment...
brigades, but they are tied in a formal manner to a central location to synchronize the movement of all these pieces.

So they go through their -- If it's a ground movement control team or if it's an air movement control team where they are focusing, they go to their chains, the coordination lines, to arrange for the movement. Yes, it is very complex.

So these little small battalions, the headquarters, that are not so great in size in terms of soldiers, numbers of soldiers, are huge over here. I think our -- It shot up over 1,000, but their criticality to the mission -- it's probably the most critical mission on this battlefield.

We were fortunate to have had a great one, (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic), commanded the 49th, and now the 719th are doing a bang-up job as well. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sir, the use of contractors -- I'm just kind of interested. You talked a little bit about KBR and some of the
vehicles, that sort of thing.

As we look at the overall logistics responsibility, and even in the open they were, you know, bandying about numbers of troops on the ground and contractors.

I just wanted your perspective on what role the contractors are playing for you in the mission that you have, and how is that relationship, and what has worked well, what has been more challenging there.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY:  We've got -- We are responsible for the mission, regardless, anything that has to do with supporting the Corps, except for base life support. We have a role in making sure stuff gets to those who execute the mission, like the BFAX (Phonetic) on the different plots, the trucks from the contractor. We make sure we get them to where they need to go.

We look at the contractor -- and in this case it is KBR. It could be anybody else. In this case, it is KBR. We look at them as part of our
formation and work very closely with them in terms of making sure -- As a matter of fact, we have an LNO on our staff here from KBR, but they are completely integrated into our operations.

The key to our success for this operation has been the ability to flex and gain more contractor support, since we don't have green suit support or, you know, green suit formation. So building that capability has been important.

There's different contracts that -- different sequences of the contract that bring a capability. For example, we've shifted some of our other technicians other than transportation over to contractor run, some of the maintenance -- the maintenance operations, running bag farms for fuel, things like that, where we have been able to shift our green suit forces and re-mission them to where we needed them.

Now some of this has taken a little bit longer than what we would like. It's not from the contractor not wanting to do it, but gaining certain
skillsets sometimes takes a little while, particularly in the more refined, more technical aspects of maintenance, communication, electronics.

Some of these capabilities we are still executing, but that; and during the surge right now June and July are going to be tough months, and we have to keep things going, while KBR increases the size of its fleet, to include drivers for those pieces of equipment.

That is being worked right now. We think, by August, mid-August, that most of that should be in place. You know, we are making it happen, but to give us some flexibility, and that's what the contractors give us.

Of course, we make sure everything we do with contractors are vetted through Contracting Officers and the lawyers, and go to higher for approval. We develop the requirements, and then push up what the requirements are for the rest of the process to take place.

I'll tell you right now, they have been
great to work with in terms of being flexible. And of course, we have worked the means by which to do this legally but quickly, and we know what the tools are to make it happen quickly.

In particular, because it is so critical to your mission, if I were to go walk into your Joint Operations Center or sit in on your battle update assessment, would there be a KBR rep in there?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Yes.

Okay. Changing gears, sir, again in a different direction, looking at the number of trucks that are out on the road any given night, I'm really, just as a historian, looking over the last couple of months anyway -- given that volume, I guess I'm sort of impressed that, really, the level of significant incidents of enemy small arms fire, of IEDs, to me during this last two to three month window at least, appears to be pretty small compared to what you have out on the roads. Is that a (Inaudible) direction? What have you seen over the course of your
tour?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Well, it's relative.

Each one of our -- and it's amazing how it works out, but each one of our Sustainment Brigades are supporting a division in that area of the region, MND-North, MNF-West. The conditions are different in each of these areas.

The conditions are very different. The contrasts are significant in some cases. For example, when we came on board, the west was a very hard place.

Of course, as you know, in Anbar Province (Inaudible), it's amazing.

MND-North, basically from Tallil and TIA-1 up to Lazul (Phonetic) where we have the most volume of our incidents. Where we have the most deadly, though, is in the MND-Center South area. MND-Center South area down around Anduamia (Phonetic), because that is where the predominance of what we've seen affecting us are the EFPs.

There's not a lot of forces down through that area from south of the MND-Center. Just south of
that area from Skania (Phonetic) south, besides forces that are on Tallil and Adder, we are doing the rough security.

We have radio relay points, COPs, throughout the south and MSR campus, and we take it upon us to do the clearing.

So to get back to the original point, though, of not so many events, one event is too much for me. We work very, very hard at training our soldiers, and continuously training them even while they are here, to change a TTP the enemy is using; and you can see that the longer a unit is here, the better they get at finding IEDs.

I use -- a great unit. You know, we are not just a bunch of logisticians running around the world, and our logisticians in most instances are executing a logistics mission. They are on the road with gun trucks, performing what is tantamount to motorized infantry operations every night. But we have a brigade combat team that comes under us. They perform the theater security mission.
It was the 1st of the 34th out of Minnesota, 1st, 34th Brigade Combat Team, and now it's 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division. But besides that, we have 16 additional convoy security companies that are made up of Armor companies, Cavalry Troops, Infantry companies, Engineer companies, Field Artillery batteries, all performing this mission besides our Brigade Combat Team.

So they are on the road every day, and have to go again (Inaudible) looking for those IEDs, looking for the trigger men, making sure they are enabled. We have the crew systems to defeat IEDs and, of course, the predominance of what we are seeing right now are the victim operated command wired.

So that's a matter of getting out there and seeing and looking. We will average between 15 and 20 events a night, of all the trucks that are on the road. Is that pretty good? I guess, but you know, we -- and we see everything from light heats to small arms attacks to complex attacks, to include small arms, RPG, indirect fire, along with IEDs.
Escalations of force, we work very hard at. You know, we have them. Thank God that 99 percent of the time, they come out okay, but -- and we make sure the soldiers are trained and what they know about EOF, how it does not constrain the rules of engagement. But again, the units that are here, they get better.

Delta 4 Cav is a great example. They are out of Fort Riley, a great, great troop, Cavalry troop. They are out at -- up at Camp Speicher. When they got here -- I guess now it might be nine, ten months ago -- they would get hit every day. They are now one of the most prolific counter-clearing IED units that we've got. They've gotten very good at it.

You also see -- So you see units at the beginning as they -- because they were trained to a certain extent at home station. They were trained when you come through Kuwait, but there is nothing that experience on the road can replace.

So they work their way through this, and after several months -- I'd say after two, three
months, they start getting pretty proficient at this.

The same is true with escalation of force U.S. You will see units, when they originally come online, they will have more, because they are not comfortable at the battlefield yet. They are not familiar with what goes on, even though we train them. But as they gain experience and confidence, you see less and less of that.

So I think going out to defeat the IEDs, fighting in, we have had some significant firefights. We just got a soldier who was awarded the -- Well, the award ceremony is going to happen in Minnesota, but it was approved for the Silver Star for one of our soldiers from 1-4a, but heroic actions every night on the road, fighting the enemy and executing -- in support of executing the mission goes on every night. It goes on every night.

So of course, another thing we are really concerned about is safety. We are very careful. Speed is not our friend on these roads.

Could we take a pause for
just a minute, sir?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Sure.

(Off the record.)

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, you were talking about safety.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Safety, speed: Speed is not our friend in this fight. When I was over here on OF-1, you know, speed was good. It is not good here.

Our maximum speed on combat logistic patrols is 45 miles an hour. What you will see, though, is that they will go much slower, and this is designed to, first of all, make sure that the combat logistics patrol, the CLP, can see.

It's the way we are finding those IEDs, and they go slower in areas that we know are "hot" areas. And how do they know which areas are hot areas? Well, we have a concerted effort on the intel fight for this operation.

We produce a product called the Trail Book. Marines are even using our Trail Book. What it
is, is it is from our G-2 shop, and it is a compilation of a collaborative effort to bring in all the reports, all the assessments of the MSRs and ASRs, what's going on, warnings, what's been seen in the past, the trends, the patterns, and then -- Of course, we get that from our -- again, laterally from the divisions. We get it from Corps, from the feed we get from our subordinate units.

So we pass that to our units. And of course, in their area they are working with the division they support, the battle space owners of that area, to develop their products.

So the ISR fight is important as well, anything we could possible get in terms of capabilities to overfly areas. There's change technology on the airborne platforms that we use in certain areas that will identify what is different on the route. So they will go five miles an hour to make sure we are looking and, of course, we are up-gunned.

We've got the protection necessary.

Based on intel, we will increase the
firepower in our combat logistics patrols. So it's a matter of getting to the left of the boom as much as possible, defeating the IED and capturing or killing the folks who are involved in that process, and providing everybody the means by which to do that.

What's amazing is these combat logistics patrols, the senior person on most of those is staff sergeant level, and they are the ones leading these.

The technology that they've got available to them in these operations is huge, and the products we are getting in preparation, starting a couple of days prior, in the intel build, into the rehearsal process, and then, of course, PCCs, pre-combat checks, pre-com inspections and getting ready to go out on the road all add up to being able to operate in a very dangerous environment.

So could there be more events? Yes, there could be more. The good news is -- The good news is that, you know, the vast majority are folks that are walking away from it or a successful engagement with the enemy.
Sir, one piece of that, because you mentioned the ASRPs. Of course, in the area of vehicle assets or something, they are in great demand, because every commander realizes the value of that. Have you been able to get --

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Yes. Not consistent, but when available, yes. We also get air weapons team support from escorts, depending on the availability in the area that our folks are operating in. And also, if we are going into some area that -- We've had a lot of bridges interdicted since we have been here. So that has caused us to go through a very quick battle drill, if you will, in assessing alternate routes, and some of them have taken us down to areas that are not normally traveled by our units.

So good relations with the unit that owns that operating environment and getting down and having escorts through a pool where these units will link up with our folks on the road, providing additional escort to get them through areas -- you know, it's amazing, the collaboration and the willingness to work
with each other in this environment, crossing boundaries.

We are always crossing everyone's boundaries, but being able to do that, doing that cross-boundary coordination, has really been successful.

Other things: You know, besides our guys on the road, there are several of these large Forward Operating Bases that we own, we are responsible for. Anaconda -- we are responsible for running of Anaconda. I remember in OIF-1 there were 17 (Inaudible) Iraqis in there when we came in.

There's over 28,000 people in here today, and only about 4,000 of them are from the 13th Sustainment Command. We've got the Air Wing, the Air Force here with three F-16 squadrons, 10 C-130s. They've got a helicopter squadron. We've got the Corps Aviation Brigade here. We've got Special Operations units that are here as well, an Engineer brigade, Corps Engineer Brigade.

AMC has a very large operation here --
Army Materiel Command. So we are responsible for the mayoral responsibilities, if you will, and the defense. So we've got a Field Artillery battalion that is part of the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, who is responsible for the wire, inside the wire, 200 meters out, and we work closely with -- We are MND-North's battle space. So we are tied in very closely with the unit that is responsible for that, and we conduct operations outside the wire with them.

Then we own the responsibilities for Q-West, Quyarrah West up north, and that's up in MND-North's area. Right now the 3rd Sustainment Brigade is there. So we run that place, and we defend Convoy Support Center Scania (Phonetic) south of Baghdad.

I have a Cavalry squadron there that's responsible for running that and the defense. Then, of course, Cedar and Adder down at Tallil. We are responsible for that as well.

Then I had mentioned earlier radio relay points throughout the south that we've built into COPs, reduced the number from 12. We are down to
five. We are going to eventually get down to three, but I've built these areas up to fortresses and increased manpower.

So it's not just folks on the road. It's maneuvering in someone else's battle space, if you are in an operating environment for defense of these spots. And of course, we have our other units all over in everyone else's major areas throughout the battlefield.

Sir, looking ahead to one of the things that I know General Odierno has mentioned in terms of keeping a close eye on, in particular on AOI and their potential to disrupt things in the coming weeks and months, are there any particular initiatives on the part of the sustainment effort that you are thinking about or that can make -- Given that you are doing a lot of things right now, is there anything more that's sort of pending out there that you plan?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Well, we are pretty aggressive. At first detection, I believe we have
been very aggressive. What we really worked at is increasing our capabilities on the road.

We have seen a PTP of the enemy wanting to cut off our trail gun truck, isolating them. So we have increased the number of gun trucks at the trail end of our combat logistics patrols.

I had mentioned the radio relay points. When I first came on at TOA, originally occurred, we had less than 10 folks on some of these radio relay points, and they are out there kind of along on the freight, and those really caused some sleepless nights for me.

So we put out a dictum that no fewer than 20, that we were going to reduce the number, even though -- There wasn't 100 percent coms on MSR Tampa. There was 25 percent dead space, and the plan at the time was we wanted to take from 12 to four enduring, and it would increase to 37 percent dead space. We said, no, we are going to get 100 percent coms, maintain 100 percent coms while we downsize to the enduring radio relay points.
So what we did was invest heavily in force protection in building up what we see as the enduring radio relay points. Again, no fewer than 20. When it's all said and done, there are between 40 and 50 soldiers on each one, really built up right now with mortars, radars, UAV capability now in the south that the 1st of 82nd brought in at Seattle.

We are working in the EF very hard. That's my major concern, through other programs that are being made available to us now. So increasing force protection even on our (Inaudible), the significant increase that we have invested is in force protection, force protection, force protection, and mission support.

Quality of life -- we have had a couple of area that we needed to fix. You know, we've done that for the quality of life of the soldiers, but our major focus has been on force protection for the mission.

So you can see here at Anaconda what we've done with enablers and everything dealing with force protection. So that's what we've done, and making
sure that information on trends and these TTPs, what is being developed is quickly disseminated through our force, and that's been important for us.

Sir, we covered a number of different points. I really wanted to kind of come back and ask you if there is any area that we haven't talked about at this point that you feel are significant or that need to be touched upon.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: I think it is important that this issue of kind of like plug and play formations be addressed.

The lesson I learned in OIF-1 where 12 companies in my brigade were Reserve component, prior to our deployment we had the opportunity to bring them all to Fort Hood and have everybody come on board, commanders' conference, First Sergeants, go through the planning with them. That paid off huge dividends on the battlefield.

What we did in preparation for this operation was, again, we deployed in August of '06, but starting in December '05 we started building the
team. I went around and visited the different brigades. That ranged from -- Something you need to know of our formation, we are up to about 21,000 soldiers. Forty-five percent is Active Duty. The rest are National Guard and Reserves.

Bringing -- Making an attempt, definitely at the brigade level, as much at the battalion level as we possibly could, getting out there and visiting, meeting, doing face to face interaction.

So I visited all the brigades save one, the 82nd Sustainment Brigade who had just come off of Katrina. We were the Joint Logistics Command for Katrina, and 82nd Sustainment Brigade was there with us. So we knew the 82nd Sustainment Brigade.

Remember, when I talk about these brigades, these brigades are just headquarters. Everything else is built underneath them. The battalion headquarters come from everywhere else, and even the companies underneath those battalion headquarters all come from someplace else. But I believe it needed to be started at the top, where we
went out and executed getting and seeing.

In several instances I was able to go to the training events at NTC (Phonetic) where 593rd was at NTC. First the 34th was at JRTC, and begin there, start the process of then making sure that they started going out and touching subordinate battalions and so forth as soon as they were able, because some of these units hadn't been alerted yet that they were going to deploy, if it was a National Guard or Reserve unit. So the timing had to be carefully planned to make sure we did it at the appropriate time.

Then we had events where we brought units together at Fort Hood, several planning conferences. We even ran an off-site in San Antonio where we brought the command teams for the brigade level -- that means Command Sergeant Major and Brigade commander and their spouses, and as many of the battalion command teams as we possibly could, brought them to San Antonio.

I believe it was four days, and folks get to know each other, go through some of the programs
that are out there to help units; and then the second week, came to Fort Hood. Spouses went home. Brought the staffs from the different subordinate brigades as many times as we could, and for a week long of the class fight side, and worked plans, mission back briefs, and then there were two instances for training.

There was one with the 25th ID, had a Division MRX, and then the Corps MRX where folks -- Folks were already starting to deploy at that time. So as many as possible. And the key to this was folks getting together, so the first time -- to prevent happening that the first time that they meet each other will be on the battlefield.

So we wouldn't develop perfect products during these sessions nor during the train-ups, but it was who do I talk to, and developing the relationships, developing the team, I think, has been very important for us, is developing the team that's over here.

I can't overstate that enough, and I think
it has worked out for us very well.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, thanks. I know we are coming to the end of our time, sir. The last question I would ask, if you are game for one more, is: How do you see, as you go out and have your battlefield rotation, especially given this mix of Reserve and Active soldiers -- from your perspective, how are they holding up? How are your reenlistments doing? What are you hearing from the troops about--

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: Reenlistments are great. I mean, we are doing very well. And I like to say -- and this is so true -- that when I go out and talk to the soldiers, and particularly if I get a bunch of them together, it doesn't matter if they are Active, National Guard or Reserve, I ask them how many of you enlisted after 9/11? Of course, just about all their hands go up. And how many of you have reenlisted since 9/11? All the hands that go up.

It's amazing. It's amazing. They do believe out there that they are making a difference. They knew when they were coming in that there would be
a good chance that they would have to deploy, but they keep coming. And we get these young people, besides the soldiers that are enlisting, but the officers who are coming from the Academy, from ROTC, OCS. They keep coming.

I think it's humbling. I am personally humbled to be part of the formation with these folks. You go out there, and they are focused. They are doing a great job.

The piece on interaction of Active, Reserve and National Guard -- Another thing that I learned from IOF-1 that worked for us then was embracing everyone as equal. If you see my command philosophy, we work this hard.

Right from the very beginning when we were forming our teams, right from the very beginning we needed to press that all the units in our formation are considered equal, and we had to go out and embrace them make sure they understood it; because some units may come in not feeling so up about themselves, about how they would be treated by an Active component
higher headquarters.

So it takes a concerted effort to bring them in, let them know that they are a valuable part of our organization. And I'll tell you, once that happens, it's amazing. So we've had no problems in terms of equity or perceived inequity when it comes to all the different components of this fight.

You know, we also have Air Force folks in our formation. You know, not that many, but in terms of -- and Navy. Another piece I've got to mention. I'll do that again. Please remind me, electronic warfare officers are involved in the com (Inaudible).

Anyway, to finish this piece up about all components, I think everybody is Active here. It just depends on where you from. There are challenges that are associated with pay. You know, systems are different.

Some of the challenges with building units, Reserve units, Reserve component units from multiple states, if you will, you know, that's a little bit of a challenge, making sure that they are
taken care of. We now have tools to be able to do that are much better.

One challenge we had was the 1st of the 34th BCT when they were told in January -- they were supposed to go home in the March-April time frame -- that they were going to be extended, and in the way that was done, it was announcement stage before we even knew about it.

We had to work that very hard to make sure families would continue to be taken care of, so they wouldn't come off of their orders earlier than the extension. So a lot of great work by our higher headquarters, from our Reserve Affairs Officer that we've got with us.

Each individual had to be reviewed, over 4,000 soldiers, to make sure (Inaudible), that IRA -- or I'm sorry, IRR soldiers were taken care of. So very complicated.

One quick (Inaudible) on this battlefield is what the Navy has done for us in terms of the electronic warfare officers and what they've brought.
These are all folks who are associated with that field, if you will, in the Navy: Submariners, folks who are on the A6 Bravos, and this is what they live, and senior NCOs and officers.

Right now, I believe we've got 36 of them that are battalion level and higher, very passionate, making sure we have the right equipment, the right training, the updates occur.

They are down there with our soldiers, checking on their equipment before they roll out on the combat logistics patrols. That's been very, very positive for us, because you could tell just by -- and I get an update every week on where we're at in defeating those systems that we are going after with these capabilities, are significant. So that's a heat increasing victim operated and command detonated. The other is significantly decreasing.

(b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, that's all I had from my list of questions. Is there anything else before we wrap up?

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: I think that's it.
Sir, thank you very much.

BRIG. GENERAL TERRY: I hope you got what you needed.

That was all great, sir.

Thank you very much. That concludes this interview.