MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Jul 07
Threat Update

- AQI preparing to destroy Route Tampa Bridge over Grand Canal VIC Taji
  - Likely VBIED attack
  - Timing unknown

- 11 May TBIED as part of complex attack resulted in minor damage to bridge

- Ongoing threat stream of AQI intent to target bridges in Baghdad; increase in last 72 hours

- CIIOC issued situational awareness report 30 1345D JUN 07

Assessment: Bridges remain priority target for AQI. Expect similar TTP involving TBIED. Grand Canal Bridge destruction likely intended to limit ISF, CF freedom of maneuver.
Dhari Still Seeks to Become Sunni Leader

- Dhari capitalizing on IO opportunity offered by Golden Mosque bombing
  - Claims attack perpetrated by MOI, US, and intelligence; intended to "partition Iraq"
  - Effort to establish nationalist image
- Attempts to portray himself as sole Sunni solution for security, stability
  - Multiple statements to press stress non-participation in "occupation-sponsored" Gol
  - Willing to negotiate with CF on troop withdrawal, not reconciliation
- Dhari’s Association of Muslim Scholars actively discredits Gol projects, reconciliation
  - Condemned Salah ad Din Salvation Council
  - Offers no alternatives to Gol, only criticism
Multiple STBIED Attacks in Single Day

- Multiple STBIED attacks in Anbar 1 July
  - STBIED detonated 50m from IP ECP in Fallujah
  - STBIED, targeted Mobile-7 bridge VIC Ramadi
  - Additional truck on Route Mobile near Ramadi
    - Continued west after explosion
    - Suspected also TBIED, driver detained

- Other recent multiple VBIED days in Anbar
  - 19 June, 2x STBIED; target: CF, ISF
  - 13 June, 2x STBIED; target: ISF
  - 27 May, 2x STBIED; target: bridge, ISF
  - 25 May, VBIED, TBIED; target: ISF
  - 7 May, SVBIED, STBIED, VBIED; target: market, ISF, CF

Assessment: AQI attempting to prove continued viability in Anbar despite recent cache discoveries. Expect continued efforts to target infrastructure, ISF in order to intimidate local population, discredit Op PHANTOM THUNDER
Sadrists Inching Closer to Negotiations

- Representatives of Muqtada al-Sadr have been discussing possibility of opening negotiations with Gol, CF
  - Baghdad-based Sadrists reportedly discussing ending suspension of CoR participation
    - Contributing is a belief they are isolated from Sadr and his aides in Najaf
    - View boycott as not in best interests
    - Decision possibly to be announced by 3 July
  - Senior Sadrists discussed “officially” distancing movement from undesirable elements within their own ranks in exchange for CF withdrawal timetable

Assessment: Baghdad OMS perceive greater leverage on Gol if engaged politically. Sadrists view participation in CoR as opportunity to stymie Gol ability to pass legislation. Timetable for CF withdrawal will remain linchpin issue in all potential negotiations.
23 June – 29 June 2007

- 81 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 136 killed
    - 68 injured

- 73 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 117 killed
  - 57% of total casualties
  - 86% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 17 deaths

June 2007 Totals

- 391 ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,050 civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 618 execution deaths

Assessment: Number of sectarian incidents remained steady, despite decline in total sectarian casualties and execution deaths nationwide. Reported incidents in Diyala decreased for second week, likely a result of ongoing CF, ISF operations; no significant changes in other provinces.
Assessment: Activity in eastern Mansour likely IED expansion from Kadhimiyah into Sunni areas. Concentration of incidents in West Roshid indication of continuing faultline tensions. Sectarian HP attacks relatively ineffective. Expect incidents to remain steady, below pre-Farid al-Qassem levels.
“Iran and Venezuela – The Axis of Unity”

- (U) Venezuelan delegation visit to Iran
  - Goal of strengthening relationship and “axis of unity” against the US
  - Stressed “resistance against bullying powers”
  - Characterized US operations in Iraq as “barbaric”
- (U) Signed agreements focused on economic, political, social, cultural ties
  - Joint oil venture, international import export company offers Iran inlet to Latin American market, Venezuela easier access to India, Pakistan
  - Construction of various enterprises to “put an end to the monopoly of the superpowers”
STBIED NW of Yusafiyah

- STBIED 2 July: 4 LN killed, unknown number wounded
  - Issawi tribal leader Sheikh Nafath Farhan Kamal assessed as target
    - Likely in response to cooperation with CF
    - Two of Sheikh Kamal’s brothers reported killed in attack
  - Longstanding feud between Uwaysi Tribe, which reportedly supports AQI, and Issawi Tribe
  - Kurdish and Issawi tribesman were meeting at Sheik’s residence at time of attack, reportedly to discuss ways of getting IA/IP presence in nearby Kurdish village

Assessment: AQI and its supporters will likely continue to attack those cooperating with CF, regardless of sect, in attempt to intimidate tribes. Expect such attacks to have opposite effect, emboldening tribal opposition and encouraging increased tribal integration into ISF
AQI Continues Efforts to Undermine IAI/JARF

- AQI continuing aggressive propaganda campaign designed to undermine Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), allies in the Jihad and Reformation Front (JARF)
- AQI campaign based on the following themes:
  - Many JARF members leaving organization, rejoining AQI
  - IAI spreading misinformation, alleging AQI cooperation with MOIS
- Previously, Omar al-Baghdadi claimed IAI leaked sensitive information to press, linked to the Saudi government

Anti-AQI Fighter in Amman
GCC Ministers Meet in Saudi Arabia

(U) Meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council defense and foreign ministers and national security chiefs in Riyadh, 3 July

(U) Topics of discussion:
- Deteriorating regional security arising from situation in Iraq
  - Help Iraq maintain unity, territorial integrity
- Political-military-security strategy to be discussed at next summit
- Counter-terrorism cooperation
- Developments in Palestinian territories, Iraq, Lebanon, Darfur, Iran’s nuclear program
- Progress in qualifying Yemen to merge into GCC economies

(CF//REL) Assessment: Expect any efforts to address Iraqi security situation to focus on factors external to Iraq, rather than domestic issues.

(U) Countries of the GCC:
- Saudi Arabia
- Oman
- Kuwait
- Qatar
- UAE
- Bahrain
High Profile Attacks Continue VIC Baghdad Sha'ab Market

- HP attacks varying technique; sustained targeting of civilians
  - 3 July attack: SVBIED
    - 10x CIV killed; 20x CIV wounded
  - 29 March attack: SVEST
    - 60x CIV killed; 26x CIV wounded
  - 18 March attack: VBIED
    - 6x CIV killed; 7x CIV wounded
  - Targeting, methodology suggest AQI

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
Implications Of Fuel Rationing In Iran

- (S//REL) Protest an expression of public dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad
  - No indication blame associated with regime
- (U) Khamenei expressed conditional support for rationing scheme
- (S//REL) Decision driven by economic factors, possibility of nuclear-related sanctions on petrol imports

1.4b, 1.4d

(U) Lines at fuel pumps in Iran

1.4c
Emerging Attack PP Migrating From MND-N

- 4 Jul 07, East Rashid: CF patrol attacked with RKG-3 High Explosive Anti-Tank Grenade, 1x CF KIA
- Previous RKG-3 Use:
  - MND-B, 21 Jun 07, 1x CF KIA
  - MND-N, 8x since 20 Jan 07, 1x CF KIA, 13x CF WIA, 1x CIV injured
- RKG-3 background:
  - Widely produced and exported during Cold War
  - Used extensively in 1973 Arab-Israeli War
  - Armor penetrating to 125mm; variants can penetrate up to 165mm
- RKG-3 significance:
  - Simple, concealable, requires minimal operator training, emplacement time
  - Serves as an alternative to IEDs, EFPS

Assessment: Expect continued attempts to adapt TTPs and employ alternative weapons. Use of RKG-3 likely intended to avoid CF targeting of IED emplacers with Air Weapons Teams, respond to route clearance measures.
Sadr’s vision: Nationalist, Shi’a-dominated Islamic Iraq

- Sadr working toward goal through multiple avenues
  - Refining political activity
    - Continues to publicly undermine PM Maliki
    - Demanding CF withdrawal timetable
    - Sadrists awaiting instructions on return to CoR
  - Legitimizing JAM
    - Recent consideration of “officially” distancing JAM from undesirable elements
    - Emphasis on internally policing JAM
  - Distancing movement from Iran to portray nationalism, independence
Zawahiri’s Call for Unity

• (U) Main theme of video, global unity of jihadist movement
  – Support ISI, resist CF attempts to splinter insurgency
  – Fight “Jewish-Crusader interests” wherever they can be attacked
  – Hurry to Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine to train
  – Strategy of overthrowing regimes, using force and provoking uprisings, fostering popular support for al Qa’ida
  – Eighth Zawahiri video this year

• (U) Reaction from Arab world muted
  – Primary focus of attention on Palestinian issues

(U) Assessment: Video acts as “state of the ummah” address rather than instruction to carry out specific attacks. Al Qa’ida will continue to release media rhetoric to attempt to bolster jihadists’ morale, unity as leadership is aware of CF successes in creating rifts within the insurgency.
New Media Campaign Aims to Defend Islamic State

- Spokesman of Global Islamic Media Front calls on Muslims to support the ISI
  - Directs readers to dedicated website
  - Full campaign plan and instructions provided via video
  - Video available in various languages
- Calls for jihadists in Iraq to stand united
  - Necessary to counter media attacks on the ISI
  - Muslims in general and scholars in particular should also support and defend ISI
- Detailed instructions for jihadist website facilitators
  - Site owners urged to display campaign logo and establish special forums
  - Calls for support from computer professionals
  - Fields include graphic design, translation, web design and hacking

Assessment: ISI attempts to unify propaganda efforts against CF and anti-AQI groups indicate CF success in fracturing insurgency. If requests for expanded web capabilities are successful, CF efforts to counter insurgent propaganda may become more difficult.
Iranian Delay Tactics Mitigate Economic Pressure

- (U) Tehran characterizing “talks” with IAEA next week as concession
  - Ambassador Soltanieh asserted no “time-out” or “freeze-for-freeze” will be discussed with IAEA reps, but “probably” during next meeting between Solana and Larijani
  - IRNA labeled “talks...major step...to prove [Tehran’s] goodwill”
- (U) Soltanieh claimed US had sidetracked EU by unilaterally transferring issue from IAEA to UNSC
- (U) Officials in Tehran asserted regime would take “another, longer stride,” if faced with additional sanctions
- (U) Following gas rationing, industries and Mines Minister announced all vehicles produced from 23 July onward would be dual-fuel (LPG, gas)

(C/RET) Assessment: Expect Tehran to continue efforts to divide international community in effort to prevent increased sanctions, which are already having significant economic impact.
Page 20 redacted for the following reason:
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
1920 Revolution Brigades Re-Energizing Media Ops

• 1920 Rev Bde attack claims have dropped significantly since Jan 2007
  – No issuing of Mass-Harvests since Jan 2007
  – Decrease likely due to splintering of organization
    • Sareyat al-Da’wa al-Ribat (SDR) split December 2006,
      Hamas-Iraq split March 2007
    • Media Wing leader Abu Maryam left May 2007
  – Individual brigades alienated by decreased reporting
    • Local leaders look to other organizations to broadcast attack claims

• New 1920 Rev Bde media leader attempting to energize the media wing, calls for increased training and systems security
  – (b)(6) wants to develop an integrated training program

1.4c, (b)(6)
Press TV: Anti-American Mouthpiece

- (U) News program runs 30 minutes, every 2 hours
  - Remaining 90 minutes, current affairs pieces and documentaries
  - No commercials, “Do U Know” fills breaks between programs
- (U) News stories focus on casting US administration in bad light
  - Only brief summary of main international stories
  - No breaking news interruptions, but ticker runs constantly on bottom of screen
  - Little in-depth reporting or analysis, making little use of foreign correspondents
- (U) Current affairs pieces heavily biased against US, Israel to lesser degree

(U) Example question reads: “DO U KNOW How much the cost per capita of American war in Iraq?”

(C//REL) Assessment: Iran will continue propaganda attempts to discredit US, particularly Bush administration, ultimate goal of driving CF out of Middle East.
### Update: Iraq’s Potable Water Issue

- **Water-borne diseases likely this summer; children, elderly most at risk**
  - March 2007, UNICEF suspended tanker service; in Baghdad alone, 135k depend on tanker trucks

- **Degraded/underdeveloped infrastructure**
  - Reservoirs lower than this time last year, not enough invested in water sector
  - Water, sewage networks in disrepair; cross-contamination pollutes water
  - Shortage of fuel/electricity limits water distribution
  - Lack of security hinders infrastructure repair; attacks on ASR/MSRs curtail fuel/water delivery

- **Implications of water shortage**
  - Negative impact on hospital operations
  - Increased fuel consumption for water pumps
  - Raw sewage spills render streets impassable
  - Future provincial elections may be affected by GoI’s inability to provide potable water

#### Assessment:
Effectively addressing essential issue of water will have immediate positive impact on local populace; however, issue cuts across numerous ministerial levels, complicating coordination. Efforts to improve infrastructure to deliver potable water will relieve tensions, build trust between Iraqi people, GoI.
Increasing Frequency of AQI Activity

- July 7, VBIED in Umariyah
  - 170x CIV killed; 250 CIV injured
  - 50+ shops, homes, vehicles destroyed
- Target, methodology suggest AQI
- Previous HP attacks assessed as AQI
  - 21 June VBIED in Sulayman Beg
  - 8 June VBIED in Daquq
  - 31 March VBIED in Tuz
  - 29 January SVVEST in Tuz
- Turkey reportedly evacuated 21 Turkmen casualties to Ankara by air ambulance
Statements

PM Maliki issued statement demanding Sadrists take stand against weapons usage on 7 July
  – Accused JAM of being infiltrated by terrorists
  – Referenced attacks against ISF in Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Samawa

Senior Sadrists issued separate statements warning Maliki to reduce public rhetoric on 8 July
  – Ahmad al-Shaybani:
    • Maliki’s grip on power slipping
  – Salah al-Ubaidi:
    • Maliki implies “permission” to attack JAM
    • Maliki’s government ending
    • Believes US support for Maliki fading
  – Baha al-Araj:
    • Sadr Trend ideologically driven, would never sanction crime
    • Maliki should not give in to dictates of US, international powers
30 June – 06 July 2007

- 90 Nationwide ethno-sectarian incidents
  - Total casualties:
    - 184 killed
    - 139 injured
- 74 Nationwide execution incidents
  - 113 killed
  - 35% of total casualties
  - 61% of total deaths
  - Daily average of 16 deaths

July 2007 Projections

- 392 projected ethno-sectarian incidents
- 1,257 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 536 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Greater increase in casualties relative to moderate increase in events due to effective HP attacks intended to ignite ethno-sectarian violence. Expect increase in localized executions next week as extremists will likely seek retribution.
**Assessment:** Sectarian incidents remained steady, while casualties increased due to effective high profile attacks in Adhamiyah and East Rashid. Violence in Rusafa likely increased as a result of retaliation for high profile attack the previous week. Violence in Mansour continues as Shi'a from Kadhamiyah expand reach south.
AQL and AQSL Seek Kurdish Support

- (U) In 8 July audio statement, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) emir, Umar al-Baghdadi appealed to Kurds in bid to gain their support
  - Decries KDP, PUK as promoting corruption and vice, stealing from the public
  - Emphasizes unemployment, poverty on the rise in Kurdish areas
  - Also condemned Iran, disparaged Shi’a
- (U) In 4 July video, al Qa’ida Senior Leader (AQSL) Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Kurds to support ISI, join jihad
  - Zawahiri sympathized with their suffering, asked Kurds to keep open mind regarding ISI
Expanded Investigation of Iranian-Americans

• (U) Iranian judiciary spokesman alleged receipt of “fresh evidence” about Esfandiari and Tajbakhsh’s charges 10 July
  – “Series of new investigations have started”
  – Detained early May for “crimes against national security”
  – Ministry of Intelligence accuses Esfandiari of plotting “soft revolution”
• (U) Two other Iranian-Americans face similar charges
  – One under arrest, other free on bail

(Confidential/REL) Assessment: Expect continued lengthening of investigation, likely as attempt to exert implicit pressure for release of Irbil 5.
FPS/JAM Coordination within
Ministry of Health

- Op BLACK CRESCENT replacement of MoH FPS curb on JAM activity
  - IA assumed security at Medical City, 29 June
  - Reportedly immediate positive impact on corruption, sectarian violence
  - Medical City usage reportedly increased ~500%

- JAM violence coordinated with Facilities Protection Services (FPS) within MoH
  - JAM using MoH FPS assistance for operations
  - JAM uses emergency vehicles to transport weapons, bodies
Threat Update

- JAM elements reportedly ordered to increase attacks against IZ, as of 11 July
  - First attack planned for either 11 or 12 July
  - Attacks intended to follow daily for 4-5 days
  - JAM member in IDF cell reportedly had operation delayed 11 July, awaiting arrival of leadership to resume attack

- 11 July: 3x 107mm rockets
- 10 July: 35x 81mm mortar rounds
  - largest IDF attack recorded on IZ
- 19 June: 14x 107mm rockets
- 11 June: 10x 81mm mortar rounds
Mass Shipment of "Explosive Belts"

Interdicted
• 11 July seizure at Walid POE of Mercedes bus carrying:
  – 260x belts (no explosives)
  – 120x rifle case
  – 200x .5kg-case of munitions' rds
  – 40x 1kg-bag of propellant
  – 100x reloading press for ammo
  – 320x 750-gram bag of caps

• Driver detained, reportedly Iraqi national
• Mol issued statement publicizing “explosive belt” seizure
Page 33 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
(U) UNHCR doubles funding appeal for Iraq humanitarian needs

- Initial appeal of $60M, Jan 07; revised request of $123M, July 12
- US will contribute additional $19M bringing total contribution for 2007 to $37M
- UNHCR says humanitarian needs expanding, with massive displacement internally and externally
- Influx of refugees straining host governments
- Will be used for food, shelter, health care, education, emergency services to Iraqis who cross into neighboring countries
- UNHCR estimates that 1 in 7 Iraqis displaced with 2,000 newly displaced Iraqis per day

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(C/REL) Assessment: UNHCR seeks to increase support to both uprooted, those hosting them. Expect refugee issue to continue to fatigue international relief efforts, require ever-increasing donations, straining economies of host nations.
Sunni Resistance Statements on Draft Hydrocarbon Law

• (U) Sunni insurgent groups denounce Oil Law
  – 9 July, Jihad and Reformation Front
  – 5 July, Joint Hamas-Iraq and Islamic Iraqi
    Resistance Movement
  – 1 June, The New Iraqi Ba’ath Party
• (U) 4 July, Assoc of Muslim Scholars fatwa
  declaring legislation defies Sharia
• (U) 27 June, media elements of 1920 Revolution Brigades, through AMS,
  threaten attacks on CoR members who vote in favor of oil law
• (S//REL) Intent of denouncements possibly intimidation to preclude
  Tawafuq return to CoR for vote on Hydrocarbon legislation

(S//REL) Assessment: Recent, collective Sunni insurgent propaganda has likely moved
beyond general anti-CF, violent rhetoric to focus on specific political issues concerning
Sunni populace. Political concerns not heard in legitimate forum, may result in
increased prevalence of coordinated statements by insurgent groups.
Shi’a Sheikh Claims Influence Over Sunni Groups

- Sheikh Abdul Karim Ata Ibrahim claims to represent Sunni groups ready to combat AQI
  - Claims to be authorized to represent groups in discussion with Gol, CF
  - Initially claimed to have support of 7 groups
  - Now claims to have support of 5 groups, but has only identified 4 by name
  - Unclear on connections to Shi’a groups
  - Claims groups are prepared to publicly state their position against AQI
  - Requesting ISF, CF assistance
- Reporting indicates some groups mentioned are currently combating AQI
  - Efforts remain localized
Sadrists Considering End to Five-Week Boycott

- Press release, 14 July: claimed CoR has met Sadr Trend demands
  - Statement followed meeting with Kurdish leaders in Sulaymaniyyah
- Early July, Iraqi political leaders urged return to discuss hydrocarbon legislation
- As of 1 July, CoR Sadrists reportedly proposed boycott be cancelled
  - Felt isolated from senior Sadrists in Najaf
  - Viewed boycott as not in OMS' interest
- Sadr ordered boycott of CoR, 17 June
  - Stated no return until PM Maliki promised to rebuild Samarra Mosque, strengthen security at all holy sites

Assessment: Press statement face-saving measure intended to allow possibility of eventual return despite minimal progress toward Sadrist demands. Sadrist CoR members likely to continue pressuring senior OMS leadership in Najaf to allow return to Parliament. Sadrists' return only likely if able to take credit for success of key legislation.
07 July – 13 July 2007

• 106 Nationwide ethno-sectarian attacks
  – Total casualties:
    • 327 killed
    • 299 injured

• 96 Nationwide execution attacks
  – 137 killed
  – 22% of total casualties
  – 42% of total deaths
  – Daily average of 20 deaths

July 2007 Projections

• 414 projected ethno-sectarian attacks
• 1,596 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
• 551 projected execution deaths

Assessment: Last week was the third consecutive week of increased attacks, casualties. The sharp rise in casualties was caused by the highly effective HP attack in Umariyah, Salah ad Din. Baghdad Province attacks increased 27% and accounted for 68% percent of all sectarian violence across Iraq. Expect sectarian violence incidents to remain comparable to last month though with increase in casualties.
Assessment: Although attacks rose this reporting period, attacks remained 50% below weekly average in January 2007 of 135 attacks. Sectarian HP attacks during the reporting period were largely ineffective causing only nine deaths from three attacks. Violence remained concentrated in West Rashid as fighting in fault line areas continued. Attacks in southern Rusafa increased as all three HP attacks were in this area. Expect ethno-sectarian violence to remain below pre-FAQ levels for the near term.
Iranian-American TV: State-Run

- (U) Trailer from upcoming IRINN TV show, “Under the Name Democracy”
  - Esfandiari, Tajbakhsh shown separately
  - Quotations from each provided without context:
    - “I was an element in the velvet revolution in Georgia,”
      “finding speakers has been my role” - Esfandiari
    - “Role of the Soros foundation…was to focus on the Islamic world” – Tajbakhsh
  - Footage of detainees mixed with stock images of civil unrest and revolution
  - Editing of statements similar to “confessions” of detained Britons
- (U) TV show follows recent claim of new evidence from judiciary, specifically against Esfandiari, Tajbakhsh
- (U) Display of captives condemned widely in West
Multiple VBIED attacks in Kirkuk, 16 July
- STBIED attack targeted Kurdish bus stop
  - Device installed in dump truck, 2000lbs UBE
  - 80x CIV killed, 160x CIV injured
- 1320D VBIED attack 1km East of 1st attack
  - Unknown device; 1x CIV minor injuries
- 1400D VBIED F/C by ERU
  - Device installed in taxi
  - Detonated during interrogation by IEDD
  - No casualties
- 1418D VBIED attack targeted ERU
  - Unknown device; 1x ERU KIA, 4x ERU WIA
- Most recent multiple-VBIED attack in Kirkuk, 19 March
  - 4x VBIED targeted ERU, IA, Human Rights Bldg, using multiple taxis

Assessment: Attack likely conducted by ISI targeting Kurdish interests in order to further destabilize the region by heightening Arab-Kurdish tensions. Expect continued attempts to incite ethnic violence along fault lines in MND-N.
Rusafa VBIED Network Outlook

- CF, ISF degrading network capabilities
  - Op PHANTOM THUNDER disrupting flow of supplies from outside Baghdad
  - Kill, capture of 30+ members
  - Caches discovered
  - Operation Safe Market, Safe Neighborhood
  - Increased security presence
- Recent high-casualty attacks:
  - July 3, Sha’ab Market, 30 casualties, large barriers
  - July 2, VBIED near market, 35 casualties, no significant barriers
  - June 19, STBIED near mosque, 175 casualties, easier access than markets

Assessment: Despite personnel, logistics losses, Rusafa VBIED network continues efforts to reestablish capabilities and adapt to, avoid CF operations. Due to heavy losses, south Baghdad network likely facilitating reconstitution of Rusafa network. Expect continued attempts to target areas of high concentrations of civilians in order to maximize casualties, media coverage.
Sadrists Returned to Parliament

- (U) Parliament welcomed "return of Sadrists...to resume their work"
  - (U) Show of hands following statement of conditions for return
  - (U) Implied CoR consented to rebuild Samarra Mosque, other sites, improve security
  - (U) No quorum 17 July; current session closes 31 July
- (U) Sadrists quickly left to make press statement announcing return, declaring intent to oppose Hydrocarbon Legislation
  - (U) "We have suspended our boycott...after all our demands were met and the parliament voted on them"
  - (U) "It is dividing Iraqis...we don't want the wealth of our country to divide the people but to unite them"
Saudi Blame Game

• (U) Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif’s 14 July comments to Human Rights Commission published 16 July
  – Alleged Saudi teens in Iraq are brainwashed without understanding the reasons
  – Asserted masterminds and those who finance them are non-Saudis
  – Unnamed source blamed media for publishing inaccurate information, exaggerating news of Saudis in Iraq, Lebanon

• (U) HRC reported 59 Saudis currently detained in Syria, possibly Saudis killed in Lebanese clashes with Fatah al-Islam, 18 July
  – 29 face criminal charges; 30 implicated in efforts to infiltrate into Iraq, Lebanon
  – Unspecified number of suspected Saudis dead in Nahr al-Barid
  – HRC currently in 1.4b to investigate any possible detention of Saudis

• (U) LA Times published figures of Foreign Fighters by nationality 15 July: 45% Saudi, 15% Syrian/Lebanese, 10% North African
Threat Update

- AQI planning attack on Sayd Muhammad Holy Shrine in Balad, 19 or 20 July
  - Attack would employ 5x VBIEDS
    - Reportedly located at an orchard close to Muharrij’s house
- Shrine contains tomb of Sayid Mohammad
  - Not Imam, but son of 10th Imam, Ali al Hadi, brother to 11th Imam, Hasan al Askari
- Less significant to Shi’a than Hasan al Askari Mosque (Golden Mosque)
- CIOC issued situational awareness report, 18 1651D JUL 07

Assessment: While shrine does not contain remains of Imam, is considered less significant to Shi’a than Golden Mosque, successful attack would likely be catalyst for increased sectarian violence across Salah ad Din, possibly all of Iraq.
Ahmadinejad’s One-Day Visit to Syria

- (U) Three major meetings
  - Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
  - Hezbollah Sec Gen Hasan Nasrallah
  - Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal

- (U) Ahmadinejad and Assad conducted joint press conference, issued statement
  - Release condemned Israeli policies, called for unity in Lebanon, Iraq
  - News conference focused on bilateral relations, “enemies of the region”

- (U) Visit symbolic of relationship’s importance
  - Ahmadinejad’s second visit as president, timed to follow Assad’s reelection
  - Assad has twice visited Tehran, was first head of state following Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005
ISI Posts Counter-FAQ “Accomplishments”

- ISI announced al-Karamah (Dignity) Plan early Feb, to counter FAQ
  - Escalate ops against “Crusaders”
  - Take advantage of “continuous demoralization suffered by the enemy”
  - Intensify activities of “brothers” and invite them to join ISI
- Graphs released to illustrate “accomplishments” achieved in first 4 months
  - Graph 1: Casualties inflicted by “jihadi operations”
  - Graph 2: Vehicles destroyed, listed by type
1.4c

Graphs continued:
- Graph 3: Type of operation
- Graph 4: Summarizes results from other 3 graphs

Text of release focused attention on Baghdad
- 7,309 ops executed
- 3,041 of these “qualitative jihadi ops in Baghdad”
- 41.6% in Baghdad
- Concentrated to “harvest the Crusaders and apostates”
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1.4b, 1.4d, 1.4c
New Ba’ath Party Remains Active

- NBP involved in minor operational activity, mostly in north
- NBP remains focused on financing and recruitment
  - MYA and al-Duri focus respective factions on financing, recruitment efforts
  - Former Regime Elements targeted for recruitment to reinforce, improve their position
- Potential loss of al-Duri may affect NBP leadership
  - Single open source reporting al-Duri in deep coma

Assessment: Although comparatively minor tactical threat, NBP remains player in insurgency. Additionally, they are constantly organizing, recruiting in attempt to improve organization. NBP continues to view itself as potential long term alternative to Iraqi government, Coalition Forces.
Impact of Hydrocarbon Law on Reconciliation

• Sunni opposition to law
  – Believe Shi'a, Kurds will not share oil revenue under current proposal
  – Want more centralized control of oil to ensure equitable allocation of resources due to absence of proven oil reserves in Sunni-dominated Anbar
  – Suspect U.S. exploiting position for economic gain

• Effects on Sunni reconciliation
  – Inability of all factions to compromise likely to further fracture CoR
  – AMS issued fatwa condemning draft as against Sharia
  – Shi'a likely to portray Sunnis as obstructionist, though failure of legislation serves perceived interests of Shi'a, especially Sadrist, despite nationalist rhetoric

Assessment: Despite intent of promoting Iraqi unity, draft Hydrocarbon Law likely to continue having opposite effect. Legislation in current form roadblock to reconciliation; all groups view oil as zero-sum game. Cor deadlock resulting from uncompromising political factions will cause Iraqi Sunnis to further doubt viability of GoI, democratic processes.
Turkish Election Results

- (U) Justice and Development Party (AKP) expected to have sufficient representation to form government without coalition
  - AKP will lose some seats, maintain simple majority
  - Republican People’s Party (CHP) will lose seats
  - Nationalist Action Party (MHP) will reenter, based on election campaign exploiting fears of Kurdish separatism
  - Independents expected to control 27 seats, 24 of which are Kurdish legislators
- (U) PKK leader, Murat Karayilan predicted “date of Turkish offensive has drawn near,” denied allegations of staging attacks from Iraq

Turkish Parliament Facts
- 550 total seats
- 367 Parliamentary votes needed for Presidential confirmation

Shift from prior Parliament
- AKP lose 13, 35-44 seats
- CHP lose 42, 159 to 112 seats
- MHP enter 70 seats
- Independents: 27 seats

(CJ/REI) Assessment: AKP failure to gain super majority will require compromise to elect president. Election outcome unlikely to increase prospect of CBO.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict
(National)

14 July – 20 July 2007

- 118 Nationwide sectarian attacks
  - Total sectarian casualties:
    - 290 killed
    - 245 injured

- 103 Nationwide sectarian execution attacks
  - 190 killed
  - 36% of total sectarian casualties
  - 66% of total sectarian deaths
  - Daily average of 27 sectarian deaths

July 2007 Projections

- 465 projected sectarian attacks
- 2,116 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 654 projected sectarian execution deaths

- Sectarian casualties are projected to be close to March levels due to increased incidents and effective HP attacks causing 60% of total sectarian casualties nationwide

Assessment: Last week sectarian casualties decreased 15% but remained elevated from previous months. Sectarian attacks in Diyala increased as likely AQI elements targeted Shi'a civilians across the province. Expect sectarian tensions to remain high in Diyala as AQI asserts presence in Muqdadiyah, and JAM elements react to AQI and Sunni extremist attacks in the province.

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Approved for Release 201505
**Ethno-Sectarian Conflict (Districts)**

**Baghdad District Attacks 07 JUL 07 – 13 JUL 07**
- 67 Sectarian Attacks
- 25 Total Killed
- 62 Execution Attacks

**Baghdad District Attacks 14 JUL 07 – 20 JUL 07**
- 67 Sectarian Attacks
- 96 Total Killed
- 90 Execution Attacks
- 79 Total killed

Assessment: Sectarian attacks remained steady across the 10 Security Districts with majority of activity in Mansour, Adhamiyah, West Rashid. JAM, AQI continue to vie for control over West Rashid. Sectarian HP attacks have focused in southern Rusafa, notably on Karada Peninsula in the past two weeks. While relatively ineffective, HP attacks in Rusafa demonstrate increased effort to foment sectarian violence.
Isawi Aids in Policing JAM

- Sadr reportedly appointed Shaykh Kazim al-Isawi as Supervisor-Administrator for JAM
  - Appointed to solve problems with rogue JAM commanders in the South
  - Allegedly has authority to give orders and solve problems at any level
  - Previously served as Chief Council of Sadr City
  - Reportedly held Sadrist accountable, handled legal disputes
  - Reporting suggests Isawi replaced Abbas al-Kufi

Assessment: Isawi likely involved in attempts to curb rogue, criminal JAM members. Isawi’s efforts in Baghdad likely to produce only modest success without comprehensive new measures to restore discipline; success outside Baghdad unlikely due to lack of influence with JAM commanders in the south.
Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Diyala River Valley (DRV) Critical to AQI

- DRV is AQI’s center of gravity for maintaining active presence in Diyala
- Hembis is AQI’s current DRV headquarters, AQI is reportedly able to operate in the city unhindered by CF presence
- AQI conducting operations to clear DRV of Shia residents who were once 30% of population

Assessment: Recent setbacks, anti-AQI tribal initiatives emphasize the importance of DRV as AQI safe haven. Loss of DRV as staging ground could cause AQI to lose its ability to operate in Diyala province. Expect violent resistance by AQI to prevent further loss of territory.
Some Foreign Fighters Leave Iraq for Lebanon

- (U) LA Times reports 45% of FF in Iraq are Saudi nationals
- (U) Allegedly 300 younger generation Saudis drawn to Lebanon from Saudi Arabia because of Al-Qa’ida’s internet recruitment; figure disputed by Saudi officials
- (U) FF recruiters allegedly advise recruits to go through Lebanon, get training, then traverse Syria to Iraq
- (U) Saudis detained in Lebanon reportedly feel tricked; believed they were recruited to wage war on Israel, America, but instead ended up fighting the Lebanese Army
- (U) Saudi Interior Minister called on Saudi clerics to do more to stop Saudis from fighting in Iraq
High Profile Attack in Hillah

- SVBIED targeted market, 24 July
  - 24x CIV killed, 69x CIV injured
- Second SVBIED, fourth suicide attack in Hillah in last 19 months
  - Previous SVBIED 25 June 07
    - Targeted IP, CIV; 8x killed, 25x injured
- Methodology, targeting suggests AQI; indicates export of AQI suicide TTP into Shi’a dominated areas

Assessment: Attack likely conducted by AQI from outside area. AQI likely attempting to discredit GoI’s ability to provide security, demonstrate AQI ability to penetrate deep into Shi’a strongholds, instill fear of targeting of prominent Shi’a institutions.
Dhi Qar Primed for More Hostilities

- JAM reportedly receiving reinforcements
  - 300 trained members from Samawah, Diwaniyah, Baghdad
- JAM reorganized forces
  - Condensed JAM into two Companies
- Continued attacks, assassination attempts against TSU
- TSU continue to arrest criminal JAM members
- Tribes now aiding TSU

Assessment: JAM likely to attempt attack similar to mid-May, mid-June in near future. JAM will attempt to create environment in which it can operate unhindered, seek revenge for numerous arrests by IP.
Turkish Elections Provide Diplomatic Opportunity

(U) Timeline:
- Official election results by 29 July
- Parliament convenes within 5 days of official result
- Confirmation of new government within 45 days
  - Requires 275-seat basic majority, 367-seat quorum
- Schedule for presidential election remains to be determined precisely

(S/R) Turkey’s Way Forward
- PM Maliki invited to visit Ankara
  - Invitation accepted, visit next week
- Future tri-lateral discussions sought with Iraq, US
- Turkey will seek concrete actions on KGTK issue

(SF/REL) Assessment: Window for diplomatic solution will remain open for short time. Meeting with PM Maliki, trilateral talks will increase opportunity for diplomatic solutions, lessening likelihood of CBO.
• (U) Open sources offer conflicting justification for cancellation of 23-25 July conference
  – “Official [Syrian] source” stated it was “Iraqi decision...that concerns Iraqis alone”
  – Unnamed conference participants asserted cancellation was at Syria’s request, as “the time is
    not appropriate”
  – “Iraqi political sources” alleged announcement was preceded by meeting between AMS leader
    Harith
    al-Dhari and NBP leader Muhammad Yunis al-
    Ahmad in attempt to heal rift between MYA, Izzat
    Ibrahim al-Duri
  – Al-Duri representative noted “more discussions... needed among...participating groups, since
    divergences in opinion still exist”
Soccer Celebrations Marred By VBIED Attacks

- Two VBIEDs struck crowds in Baghdad as they celebrated Iraq’s first trip to Asia Cup Finals
  - 1918 VBIED 9xLN killed, 30xLN injured
  - 1945 VBIED 41xLN killed, 60xLN injured, 1xIP KIA, 2xIP WIA

Assessment: Attack likely target of opportunity, intended to undermine any symbol of national unity. Expect similar efforts following finals regardless of outcome.
Expectations and Outcomes of Trilateral Talks on Security in Iraq: Iranian Perspective

- (U) Goal of 2nd US-Iranian-Iraq meeting (24 Apr) focused on security situation in Iraq
  - (U) Agreed to establish Trilateral Security Subcommittee to discuss:
    - (U) Support to violent militias
    - (U) Fighting AQ
    - (U) Improving border security

- (S//REL) Views:
  - (U) Enabled them to evaluate, dismiss charges of attacks by supported militia groups
  - (U) Inquired about release of Irbil five
  - (U) Warned against arming Sunni to fight AQI
  - (S//REL) Meeting was symbolic gesture

1.4c
Arab League Envoys Make Historic Visit to Israel

(U) Egyptian and 1.4b Foreign Ministers met on 25 July with Israeli President to present Arab Peace Plan on behalf of the Arab League

- First Trip ever by Arab League to Israel
- Plan similar to that of 2002 Peace Initiative:
  - Withdrawal to the pre-1967 boundaries
  - Provide solution for Palestinian refugee problem
  - Israel to receive full recognition by Arab states

(U) Envoys “extend hand of peace,” hope to renew peace talks between Israel and Palestinians

- Israeli Prime Minister invites additional participation by other Arab states during next meeting
- Arab League concerned that Shimon Peres says peace with Arabs not possible in just one or two meetings

(C//REL) Assessment: Meeting between Arab states and Israel without facilitation from the West indicates commitment to progress toward stability, peace in region.
Timing of ISI Denial Timeline

- 18 July - CF publicly announced capture, confessions of (b)(6)
- 23 July - ISI publicly denied arrest of one of their top intermediaries

Diyala Denials Timeline

- 19 June - CF stated 30 AQI operatives killed
  - 20 June - ISI issued two denials, claimed 60 CF, 100 IP killed
  - 23 June - ISI issued interpretation of Diyala situation, clarified four truths to ISI followers
- 26 June - CF stated approximately 60 AQI operatives killed
  - 27 June - ISI issued denial, demanded proof of allegations

Assessment: ISI denials, “clarifications” usually announced within 24 hours of CF statements. Quick replies illustrate close monitoring of U.S. media, importance placed on immediate countering of negative AQI press. Five-day lag to counter (b)(6) statements indicates effort to devise response acceptable to ISI followers, possible disruption due to CF operations.
Possible Threat to Iraqi Civilians During Asia Cup Final

- Attacks likely during or after Asian Cup Final on 29 July
  - First ever Asia Cup final for Iraq
  - Soccer is Iraq’s national sport
- Expected large crowds provide AQI opportunity to conduct mass casualty attack
- Possible threats include SAF, VBIED and cover of celebratory fire to target and kill civilians
- Attacks on 25 July after Semi-Finals Match:
  - Two VBIED attacks targeting fans, 50x Civ killed
  - Celebratory gunfire, 1x Civ killed, 17 wounded

Assessment: Considering event’s significance, regardless of game’s outcome, effective attack would likely receive wide-spread domestic, international media attention. Any attack likely to incite further popular resentment against GOI, CF.
Sadists Intend to Isolate ISCI, Da’wa

- Sadists reportedly desire to renew UIA without ISCI, Da’wa
  - Response to grouping of ISCI, Da’wa, Kurds
  - Proposed “Sadist” UIA will reportedly retain same principles
    - Focus on Arab identity, rejecting sectarianism
    - No indications of orders from Sadr for political maneuvering
- Sadists returned to parliament 14 July
  - “Gol has met our demands”
  - Statement followed meeting with Kurdish leaders in Sulaymaniya
  - No indications of approval from Sadr

Assessment: Sadists possibly have begun taking political action without guidance from Sadr. Desire to transform UIA likely attempt to politically separate ISCI, Da’wa from Kurds, strengthen Sadist ties with Kurds, other parties, and Marja’iyyah, specifically Sistani.
1920 Revolution Brigade Fight Against AQI Intensifying

• 1920 Rev Bde incidents of conflict against AQI have spread, intensified
  – Fighting between groups now reported in Anbar, Diyala, Salah Ad Din provinces
• Unclear if 1920 Rev Bde attacks on ISF, CF have correspondingly decreased
  – Reporting suggests elements of 1920 Rev Bde now focusing efforts on AQI
Wahabi Muftis Issue Fatwa Against Shi’a Shrines

- July 20: Wahabi clerics reportedly issued fatwa calling for destruction of Shi’a shrines in Iraq, Syria
  - Previous fatwas issued in Feb and Apr 07
  - Named shrines include Imam Hussein Shrine in Karbala and Hazrat Zaynab in Syria
- Iranian religious, political officials expressed outrage
  - Ayatollah Shirazi, Ayatollah Hamedani: Saudi government responsible for stopping extremist muftis from spreading propaganda
  - Government spokesman, Gholam-Hossein Elham: World’s arrogant powers trying to incite sectarianism

(C//REL) Assessment: Fatwa represents most recent barrage of Wahabi sectarianism against Shi’as. Expect continued rhetoric from extremist clerics against shrines which are viewed as evidence of polytheism. Iran’s outrage signifies its perception of itself as defender of region’s Shi’a.
The crossing site at Safwan, IVO Navistar, is the only commercial crossing site between Kuwait and Iraq. Separating commercial and military activity at this critical junction is important militarily, economically and politically. ASR Aspen allows military equipment and most sustainment supplies to move from the port to Iraq without traversing any urban stretches of highway. Safwan is highly unstable and has a history of high criminal activity and low security presence. A crossing site that by-passes Safwan would avoid this threat.

The main threat groups along southern portion of MSR Tampa are Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Organization. Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP) are the primary weapon employed by JAM in MND-SE.

ASR ASPEN is a unlit, 25-26 foot wide, two-lane, soft-shoulder road. As mentioned earlier, ASR Aspen allows for 12 hour directional traffic from K-crossing to MSR Tampa. HET’s, which comprise 25% of all
MNC-I traffic, require a minimum of 28 feet for two-way traffic.

(S/MCFI) There is currently work underway to have RRP Radio Coverage throughout the entire route, but that project is currently ongoing.

(S/MCFI) EFPs are typically passive infra-red (PIR) or command wire (CW) initiated. Since July 2006, approximately 93% of all EFP’s with identified initiation types along MSR Tampa from K-crossing to the intersection with Aspen were PIR initiated. PIR initiators detect a heat differential due to motion. When it detects the heat a switch closes and the detonator on the EFP is initiated. The main threat area for these types of devices is the intersection of Tampa and Aspen.

(S/MCFI) The border area with Navistar continues to be a problem area with criminal activity. Hijackings remain prevalent in Safwan, a border village near Navistar.

(S/MCFI) ASR Aspen is 108 kilometers long and passes through mostly empty desert, and bypasses 150 kilometers of Iraqi/Kuwaiti interstate road with much higher civilian traffic volume. It provides substantially better force protection by it's shear isolation away from any major populated areas.

Completion of the MSR Aspen Road Project will shorten the time required to transport military goods from Kuwait City north towards Baghdad. Should mitigate attacks against CF support convoys. With the TOA of Basrah province in Aug 07, insurgent and criminal elements, will exploit new security gaps in MND-SE, include probable CF interdiction along MSR Aspen.
Results of Refugee Working Group

- (U) 1.4b claimed internal cost of Iraq refugees is $1B annually
- (U) $25M pledged by GoI
- (U) US pledged $153M for humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis
- (U) Egypt pledged medical aid
- (U) All conference participants agreed best solution to restore stability to Iraq, enable refugees to return home
- (U) Poor conditions for refugees provides fertile recruiting ground for extremist organizations

(Confidential/REL-LSA/DEL/REL-LSA/DEL) Assessment: Refugee issue will continue to fatigue host nations’ economies, strain GoI relations with neighbors. Extremist recruitment of refugees possible if conditions remain unsatisfactory over long-term.
Ethno-Sectarian Conflict
(National)

21 July – 27 July 2007

- 97 Nationwide sectarian attacks
  - Total sectarian casualties:
    - 252 killed
    - 255 injured

- 84 Nationwide sectarian execution attacks
  - 116 killed
  - 23% of total sectarian casualties
  - 46% of total sectarian deaths
  - Daily average of 17 sectarian deaths

July 2007 Projections

- 463 projected sectarian attacks
- 2,250 projected civilian casualties due to sectarian violence
- 621 projected sectarian execution deaths

Assessment: Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa continue to be three provinces with most ethno-sectarian violence activity. Expect violence to remain focused in these fault line provinces as insurgents, militias fight for dominance over disputed areas.
Assessment: JAM continues to displace Sunnis from West Rashid, Adhamiya, while pushing Shi'a presence into Mansur. Ethno-sectarian violence in East Rashid continues to be low over the past 3 weeks, while HP attacks continue on Karada peninsula. Expect ethno-sectarian attacks to remain below pre-Faq levels as AQI JAM focus on ISF, CF.