Current Coalition efforts
MND-SE
Led MND-CS
Deployment on track
Gaining more Coalition support
Need Division in the North
Former Regime Loyalists (FRL):
- 4,000
- Ba’athists
- Republican Guards
- Saddam Fedayeen
- Shia Militia
- "Party of the Return"
- "Mohammed’s Army"
- "Muslim Brotherhood"
- Al Rifa Party
- Battalion for Striking Americans

Criminals:
- 2,000
- Smuggling, theft
- Motivated by profit or revenge

Objectives:
- Defeat the Coalition
- Reinstate the Ba’athists

Extremists:
- 1,000
- Terrorists
- Foreign fighters
- Jihadists
- Lebanese Hezbollah
- 100
- Ansar al Islam
- 300-600

Objectives:
- Kill Americans
- Destabilize Iraq
- Defeat the Coalition
- Wage holy war
- Create new base of operations (Reclaim the loss of Afghanistan)

Assessment:
Recent Coalition operations have had significant impact on operational capabilities of FRL. Al and other extremists continue to establish operational capability in Iraq. Tactics, targets and weapons continue to mature. Attacks on infrastructure and Coalition partners will continue.
Extremists planning and conducting attacks in Iraq

Terrorists / Jihadists

Mid-level Ba’athists threat reduced, but desperation increases as Coalition success broadens

- Use infrastructure sabotage to impede progress

Sunni Mujahedin support network moving fighters into Iraq

1.4b, 1.4c

Muqtada Al Sadr is a challenge to order and moderate Shi’a leadership

1.4b

Criminal activity remains a significant threat

Will provide labor for any organization with money
Will perpetrate any illegal act for the right price
AI / AQ / Jihadist and Islamic extremist activity will increase as anti-Coalition mid-level Ba’athist elements are neutralized

Expansion of security, Governing Council success, and economic growth dispel perceptions of Western / US ulterior motives
   Iraqis taking care of Iraq, rebuilding infrastructure, ensuring internal security

Improved border and internal controls are needed to prevent transnational terrorist infrastructure and cut off weapons / narcotics smuggling

Seek a prominent role for Shi’a in the new Iraqi government
   Prevent external threats to the regime
   Ensure regional influence
   Counter perception of encirclement by western influences
Current Coalition efforts

MND-SE

Led MND-CS

Deployment on track

Gaining more Coalition support

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Current Coalition efforts
MND-SE
Led MND-CS
Deployment on track
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Need Division in the North

- Soliciting Coalition partners for security forces
- Building Iraqi Border Guards (1,926/7,000)
- Engaging Regional Leaders and Tribes to support security
- Conducting increased security for Embassies and other soft targets
## 11 Iraqi Governing Council Security Points

- Security is the highest priority
- Encourage the coalition to improve the security situation
- Increase allocation of resources for security
- Form a joint, high-level security committee between the Coalition and the Governing Council
- Form special courts and judicial structures
- Form intel / information liaison
- Support Civil Defense Corps
- Focus efforts on Baghdad and Central Iraq
- Use information and propaganda, re-educate coalition forces on cultural norms, redeploy forces outside cities
  - Support for tribes’ monitoring borders and supply routes to/from cities
  - Use Kurdish military assets and demobilized army units in police and army

**Indicates Iraqi Governing Council is moving towards greater Coalition cooperation and highlights preconditions for progress in the region.**
Current Coalition efforts

MND-SE
1.4b Led MND-CS

Deployment on track
Gaining more Coalition support
Need Division in the North
Current Coalition efforts

MND-SE

Led MND-CS

Deployment on track

Gaining more Coalition support

Need Division in the North
Current Coalition efforts

MND-SE

1.4b Led MND-CS

Deployment on track

Gaining more Coalition support

Need Division in the North
Current Coalition efforts

MND-SE

Led MND-CS

Deployment on track

Gaining more Coalition support

Need Division in the North

- Increase persistent ISR for Counter Terrorism and border control.
- Security for foreign missions
  - CPA and CJTF7 meeting with all foreign missions to discuss security enhancements Friday 22 August
  - CJTF7 facilitate Force Protection assessments of each mission in Baghdad
  - CJTF7 continue to make periodic contact with missions
  - CJTF7 continue with ongoing actions
    - Hasty check points
    - Random vehicle searches
    - QRF
  - CPA looking at ways to provide missions situational awareness
Way Ahead

- Focus and Prioritize Intelligence Effort
- Target Jihadists / Terrorists
- Target Anti-Coalition Mid-level Ba’athists
- Target [1.4b, 1.4d] inside Iraq
- Refocus HVT Targeting
- Protect new governing bodies and infrastructure
- Build Iraqi Security Capacity
- Return stable areas to Iraqis
- Build robust border monitor and patrol organization
- Improve Strategic Communications
- Improve cooperation with OGA
- Build Coalition Troop Strength
- Free US combat power for mobile operations
- Improve military quality of life

- Target Anti-Coalition Mid-level Ba’athists
  - Map and defeat cellular structure
  - Keep ROE robust

- Target Jihadists / Terrorists
  - [1.4c, 1.4d]
  - Detect and interdict infiltration routes
  - Work with Iraqis and neighbors to control borders

- Build Coalition Troop Strength
  - Reverse US / Coalition force ratios
  - Increase Police / Paramilitary capability

- Free US combat power for mobile operations
  - Reduce urban footprint
  - Remove military presence from Baghdad Int’l Airport

- Build Iraqi Security Capacity
  - New Iraqi Army (Long Haul)
  - New Iraqi Civil Defense Force (Immediate Iraqi capacity)
  - Local security hires for infrastructure
  - Police / Border Guards / Customs Police
  - Get angry young Iraqis off the street

- Refocus HVT Targeting
  - Get Saddam
  - Expand HVT process to include key anti-coalition organizations

- Protect new governing bodies and infrastructure
- Improve Strategic Communications
- Enhance military unity of effort
  - SOF / Conventional
- Improve military quality of life
• Return stable areas to Iraqis ASAP
  • Umm Qsar port operations
  • BIAP: Civilianize
• Improve cooperation with OGA
• Develop coherent rotational plans
  • Train new forces in LIC
  • Consider mobile force in 14b, 14d
Current Coalition efforts
MND-SE
Led MND-CS
Deployment on track
Gaining more Coalition support
Need Division in the North
Current Coalition efforts

MND-SE
1.4b Led MND-CS

Deployment on track
Gaining more Coalition support

Need Division in the North
OIF Casualties by Region

KIA North 7
KIA West 2
KIA Central 52
KIA South 13

74 TOTAL KIA (1 MAY - 26 AUG)
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  - Map and defeat cellular structure
  - Keep ROE robust
• Target Jihadists / Terrorists
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• Build Coalition Troop Strength
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  • Consider mobile force in 1.4b, 1.4d