INFORMATION PAPER

1 October 2001

Subject: OSD Request: Planning Guidance for Combat Operations against Iraq

1. (U) Purpose. Provide DJ5 with comments on SECDEF Memorandum

2. (U) Key Points.

- (S) SECDEF requests JS develop a strategic concept for combat operations against Iraq to be briefed to him NLT 7 October 2001. The objectives to be addressed:
  - (S) Deter Saddam from using WMD or providing WMD to terrorist groups and eliminate all known Iraqi WMD development and production capacity, stockpiles, storage capability, and weapons delivery systems.
  - (S) Severely cripple Iraq's armed forces with a focus on destroying key units that protect the regime
  - (S) Seize Iraq's southern oil fields intact
  - (S) Establish a safe enclave in southern Iraq for opposition groups, defecting units, and refugees
  - (S) Set the military conditions for a rapid operation northward to remove the Hussein Regime from power

- (S) These objectives are intended to accelerate the collapse or demise of the regime by:
  - (S) Encouraging internal opposition groups to take offensive action against the regime
  - (S) Severing the regime from its key source of revenue—oil fields
  - (S) Demoralizing Iraq's armed forces and inducing them to capitulate with minimal resistance
  - (S) Preventing Iraq's proliferation or use of WMD

- (S) The goal is to achieve these objectives in 30 days or less with a total force employed not to exceed 250,000
• (S) Develop branches to the plan for special operations or conventional forces to isolate the Iraqi leadership from their command and control elements and options for seizing or eliminating Saddam himself should the opportunity arise.

• (S) SECDEF requests advice on how best to assist Iraq in recovery after hostilities are concluded. This should include creating credible and enduring national institutions, creation of a national police force and reorganization of the Iraqi armed forces.

3. (U) J-5 Strategic concept.

• (S) Combat operations against Iraq, as part of the broader campaign on terrorism, should focus on Saddam's link to WMD as a major means of terrorism and a potential link to his regime leadership and any part of the terrorist network. If the strategic concept is to gain any international credibility, a link between Saddam’s possession of WMD, his documented efforts to further acquire, develop or deliver WMD, and the high risk of Saddam exporting WMD capability to a member of the Al-Qaida must be established.

• (U) Military Operations:
  
  – (S) Execute an air campaign to suppress Iraq’s air defenses and destroy strategic targets. Use ground forces to seize protect and hold Iraqi oil fields. End state: deny Saddam the oil revenue and create a southern enclave as a safe haven for defecting Iraqi military units.
  
  – (S) Execute an aggressive, phased air and ground campaign with Special Operations Forces, integrated with Air Forces, acting simultaneously against the regime's leadership, command and control, WMD capability and military infrastructure. End state: create conditions sufficient to isolate and extract/eliminate Saddam and his core leadership while also eliminating Iraq’s existing WMD capability and their ability to acquire or deliver WMD.
  
  – (S) Execute the regime overthrow phase of OPLAN 1003. Using air, land and sea forces to achieve a forced entry into southern Iraq. Proceed to Baghdad and remove the regime's core leadership while securing control of Iraq's southern oil wells. End state: defeat Iraqi Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army forces to seize regime power base, major revenue source and over throw Saddam's regime.
• (U) Benefits:
  - (S) Links Saddam to terrorist network and ties operation to current anti-terror campaign
  - (S) Rapid response launch is executable
  - (S) Targets and eliminates regimes highest priority center of gravity (WMD) and directly attacks regime leadership
  - (S) Branch and follow-on plans are available dependent on requirements
  - (S) Required and capable forces are in place
  - (S) Allows strike against Saddam's major means of terrorism
  - (S) At a minimum, destabilizes Saddam's leadership of Iraq. Success will eliminate him and his core leadership from power

• (U) Risk:
  - (S) Projects the image of opportunist adventurism
  - (S) Without clear link to terrorism, could drive away tenuous Arab partners
  - (S) Collateral damage impact on civilian infrastructure and industry
  - (S) Collateral damage exploited in Arab media
  - (S) Insufficient intelligence to be able to execute the Saddam portion of the mission

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