sources: loyalists of the former regime and radicalized Islamists. Criminal activity complicates the intelligence picture and is connected to other sources of violence. The enemy is limited to using guerilla tactics and terrorism due to a lack of economic power, military strength, and popular support. Attacks against U.S. personnel and, increasingly, on Iraqis aim to create an impression of Coalition impotence and vulnerability, discourage Iraqi cooperation, incite U.S. forces to conduct operations that offend Iraqi sensibilities, and erode U.S. and Coalition political will. In the near-term, former Ba’ath loyalists represent the most significant threat. While there is no concrete body of evidence to suggest regional or national-level command and control of their operations, it is likely that the enemy is executing plans that pre-date the fall of Baghdad. The formation of opposition parties such as the Party of Return suggests the growth of organized political as well as low-level military resistance. Despite our recent successes, the enemy’s inability to coordinate actions at the regional or national level, and the successful operation against Uday and Qusay, we should not underestimate the danger that anti-Coalition forces pose. The fractious nature of enemy resistance complicates our intelligence efforts and limits the decisiveness of our military operations. After suffering severe losses as the result of our recent operations, the enemy is likely to lie dormant for a brief period while reorganizes and reassesses the situation. Once he reengages, we are likely to see an increase in enemy propaganda, sabotage, and terrorist attacks.

4. (S) Sources of Enemy Strength: The enemy draws psychological strength from his hope to influence Iraqi and U.S. public opinion. He believes that he has greater “staying power” than Coalition forces and the Iraqis who have joined in rebuilding Iraq. His attacks are important not as much for the damage that they inflict, but for the effect that they have on U.S. support for the effort and Iraqi confidence in the Coalition and the incipient post-Saddam regime. Many Iraqis are experiencing residual fear of Saddam and the Ba’ath Party, although the killing of Uday and Qusay will mitigate that fear. A source of physical strength is the enemy’s ability to recruit from a large pool of unemployed and angry youth, especially in the Sunni Heartland. These potential recruits are disaffected mainly because they perceive a lack of progress in economic development and political reform. They are facing loss of livelihood, are frustrated by a lack of security and basic services, have the perception that they are the “losers” due to the termination of Saddam-era patronage and de-Ba’athification, have strong nationalistic feelings, feel humiliated by the rapid Coalition military victory over Iraqi armed forces, and are suspicious of Coalition motivations for liberating Iraq as well as Coalition designs for the future. Other sources of enemy strength include large stocks of weapons, munitions, and money; access across Iraq’s porous borders to “reinforcement” by Islamist jihadists and the additional funds, munitions and terrorist techniques that they bring with them (e.g. bomb making); and the ability to avoid detection or pursuit in urban environments.
5. (C) Recommendations: The Coalition must refine and aggressively execute a comprehensive strategy that integrates political, economic, diplomatic, informational, and military efforts to attack the sources of enemy strength. Security is not a precondition for work to proceed along the other critical paths that Ambassador Bremer has identified. All are interdependent.

A. (C) Organization and Resources: Extend the reach of the CPA to the local and regional levels. The CPA civil structure and military civil affairs operations have generated tremendous progress, but both seem to be at the limits of their capabilities. Execute the Governance Team (GT) concept and extend Governance Support Teams beyond the planned six month period. Provide the human, material, and financial resources that the GTs require to implement political and economic reforms. To ensure unity of effort, align these inter-agency teams with emerging Iraqi political and civil institutions as well as coalition military units.

B. (C) Strategic Information Operations: We need to be as skillful and aggressive in the information spectrum as we are in battle. Because the enemy relies on misinformation, we must implement dramatic improvements in public affairs and information operations. “Good-news stories” are not reaching the American public, the international community, or the Iraqi people. We should take the following actions immediately:

1. Deploy the best civilian and military PAO professionals to Iraq.
2. Encourage the media to send their best reporters to where we are making progress and defeating the enemy. Many reporters on assignment in Iraq lack experience base and imagination to move beyond beyond daily casualty reports.
3. Educate the media and give them better access.
4. Establish a credible Iraqi media capable of telling our story in a coherent, “culturally literate” manner that resonates with the population. Invest in communications infrastructure and partner with Iraqis.
5. Send a clear, consistent message that emphasizes the benefits and promise of stability, freedom, and a market economy in Iraq, the cost of failure, and our determination to succeed. Tell the public that it is impossible for the Ba’athists to return. To militate against sectarianism, tell Iraqis that everyone has a stake in the future of the country.
6. Continue the dialogue with religious leaders and stress the compatibility of the Constitutional reform process with religious interests. Urge their support for the new order.

C. (C) Economic Development and Restoration of Services: Because the enemy draws strength from disaffected members of society, it is also vitally
important that we restore services. Time is against us. Structure all projects to avoid creating dependency and involve as many Iraqis as possible in those initiatives.

1. Make the development of sufficient, reliable electrical power the first priority. Power is a precondition for water supply, gasoline pumps, and other essentials. Restoration of power would inspire confidence in the coalition and post-Saddam government, provide employment, and improve security by removing the most important sources of disaffection. Conversely, lack of power allows adversaries to claim Coalition impotence. Commit whatever resources are necessary now to make this happen. Iraqis expect Americans to solve these problems quickly. Iraqis expect a level of services from the CPA and new Iraqi leadership far above what they experienced under Saddam.

2. Continue visible local projects, such as schools. Decentralized assessments and initiatives made possible through commander discretionary funds are extremely effective and should be continued.

3. Expedite foreign investment to energize the economy and attenuate unemployment. Use U.S. and third-country embassies to highlight investment opportunities and the positive contributions such investments could make to the welfare of the Iraqi people.

D. (U) Political and Judicial Systems: Sustain momentum associated with the formation of the IGC with the Constitutional Convention. Connect local political initiatives and governments to regional and countrywide political organizations to discourage sectarianism. Establishing a code of law and a judiciary remains critical. Iraqis standing in judgment of Ba'athist criminals will be a powerful symbol.

E. (S) Security: Because the enemy will continue to adapt, we must stay on the offensive to disrupt his operations. We will not achieve lasting security until Iraqis risk their lives for the future of their country.

1. Establish effective Iraqi police. Our early experience suggests that selecting the right leaders is even more important than providing resources such as uniforms, weapons, communications, and vehicles.

2. Establish Civil Defense Forces and border guards quickly. The more soldiers we can replace as guards for fixed sites, the more Coalition soldiers will become available for patrolling and taking the fight to the enemy. We will conduct operations alongside Iraqi forces until they gain experience and we ensure their reliability.

3. Proceed with existing plans to establish the New Iraqi Army as the long-term solution to security at the national level.

4. Maintain the fight against mid-level Ba'athists. Strengthen our ability to fuse tactical intelligence. Increase interpreters. Conduct offensive operations to
kill or capture paymasters and cell leaders and strip them of their resources, especially money.

5. Isolate the Ba'athists and religious extremists from international support. Improve border surveillance and control through intelligence, cooperation with friends and allies, and military operations. Kill or capture the enemy once they enter Iraq, but before they intermingle with the population.

6. Create a mobile operational reserve to concentrate effort in selected areas.

7. Monitor latent threats to security such as and remain ready to eliminate them. Defeat elements that are clearly hostile, but avoid premature actions that might undermine our objectives in Iraq.

F. (S) Diplomatic: Encourage foreign embassies to open in Baghdad. Besides the diverse resources they bring, international partners buy us more time because they debunk the myth that U.S. motives in Iraq are neo-colonial exploitative.

1. Work with other nations, especially Pakistan and Turkey to provide division-level forces. Ask a third party to request Pakistani assistance. Coordinate long-term commitments.

2. Ask Sunni Muslim countries to urge Iraqi Sunnis to support the coalition and the new order and reject Ba'ath efforts to survive.

3. Ask select countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to assist us in interdicting foreign Islamist jihadists. Ensure that Syria and Iran understand that active or passive assistance to radical Islamists or secular terrorist groups will not be tolerated.

6. (C) Conclusion: The future depends not only on our actions, but also on enemy reactions and initiatives that will prove difficult to predict. I am confident, but we are at a critical point that demands resolution and a sense of urgency. If we approach this problem as a team, we will give the Iraqi people freedom and prosperity and alter the course of history in the Middle East. While the price of succeeding in this endeavor will be significant, the cost of failure is unthinkable.

John P. Abizaid
General, USA
Commander, U.S. Central Command