



Force Structure Assessment Update:

March 2006

This briefing is classified

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Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: 8 Mar 2016

SPA Plans – 10 Mar 06

Ittizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

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Situation

- Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us for decisive action in 2006.
- Appointment of a representative Iraqi government that shares power and resources among ethnic and religious groups is the key to success – uncertain when this might happen.
- The attack on the al-Askari shrine in Samarra inflamed sectarian tensions and violence during critical period – we're in a window of vulnerability through government formation.
- Terrorists will continue to foment sectarian violence.
- ISF performed generally well in crisis and their development continues on track.
- Political wrangling over constitutional amendment, federalism and provincial elections will dominate early tenure of new government.
- Presence of militias is detrimental to Iraq's development in the security domain and must be addressed by the new government.
- Impacts of election, engagement, security transition and coalition reductions will not be seen immediately. Expect reductions in insurgent violence to be gradual.



Impact of First Decision

- Still too early to fully assess the impact of the Dec 05 decision, but overall indications are:
 - Demonstrated strategic commitment to conditions-based drawdown.
 - Created basis for engagement efforts with Sunni community in general.
 - Enhanced credibility of Sunni outreach in Western Euphrates River Valley; gap continues to widen between terrorists and Iraqi people.
 - Attack levels have remained generally consistent in the areas transitioned to the Iraqi Security Forces.
 - The Iraqi Security Forces have stood firm – they have not faltered or failed in over a year.
 - Public confidence in ISF remains high; >70%.

▪ **Overall Assessment:** Haven't seen measurable impact of first decision, ISF have held ground.




Post Referendum Violence Trends


Total Casualties




CF Casualties



Total and Effective Attacks



Suicide attacks



Overall casualties are trending downward since May. Increase in casualties for February are due to sectarian violence incited by attack on the Golden Mosque. Total attacks and coalition casualties are trending downward since October. Suicide attacks continuing to decrease.

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SPA Plans – 10 Mar 06



Currently Own Battlespace

Unit	Count	Color	Symbol	Count	Color	Symbol	Count	Color	Symbol
1	1	Red	X	1	Red	X	1	Red	X
2	2	Red	X	3	Red	X	1	Red	X
3	3	Red	X	1	Red	X	1	Red	X
4	4	Red	X	5	Red	X	6	Red	X
5	5	Red	X	6	Red	X	7	Red	X
6	6	Red	X	7	Red	X	8	Red	X
7	7	Red	X	8	Red	X	9	Red	X
8	8	Red	X	9	Red	X	10	Red	X
9	9	Red	X	10	Red	X	11	Red	X
10	10	Red	X	11	Red	X	12	Red	X
11	11	Red	X	12	Red	X	13	Red	X
12	12	Red	X	13	Red	X	14	Red	X
13	13	Red	X	14	Red	X	15	Red	X
14	14	Red	X	15	Red	X	16	Red	X
15	15	Red	X	16	Red	X	17	Red	X
16	16	Red	X	17	Red	X	18	Red	X
17	17	Red	X	18	Red	X	19	Red	X
18	18	Red	X	19	Red	X	20	Red	X
19	19	Red	X	20	Red	X	21	Red	X
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22	22	Red	X	23	Red	X	24	Red	X
23	23	Red	X	24	Red	X	25	Red	X
24	24	Red	X	25	Red	X	26	Red	X
25	25	Red	X	26	Red	X	27	Red	X
26	26	Red	X	27	Red	X	28	Red	X
27	27	Red	X	28	Red	X	29	Red	X
28	28	Red	X	29	Red	X	30	Red	X
29	29	Red	X	30	Red	X	31	Red	X
30	30	Red	X	31	Red	X	32	Red	X
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42	42	Red	X	43	Red	X	44	Red	X
43	43	Red	X	44	Red	X	45	Red	X
44	44	Red	X	45	Red	X	46	Red	X
45	45	Red	X	46	Red	X	47	Red	X
46	46	Red	X	47	Red	X	48	Red	X
47	47	Red	X	48	Red	X	49	Red	X
48	48	Red	X	49	Red	X	50	Red	X
49	49	Red	X	50	Red	X	51	Red	X
50	50	Red	X	51	Red	X	52	Red	X
51	51	Red	X	52	Red	X	53	Red	X
52	52	Red	X	53	Red	X	54	Red	X
53	53	Red	X	54	Red	X	55	Red	X
54	54	Red	X	55	Red	X	56	Red	X
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57	57	Red	X	58	Red	X	59	Red	X
58	58	Red	X	59	Red	X	60	Red	X
59	59	Red	X	60	Red	X	61	Red	X
60	60	Red	X	61	Red	X	62	Red	X
61	61	Red	X	62	Red	X	63	Red	X
62	62	Red	X	63	Red	X	64	Red	X
63									

(2/13/49)

	9 BNS	6 BNS	7 BNS	4 BNS	4 BNS	5 BNS	1 BN
14 BNS							
1 BN							

Total (DIV/BDE/BN)

(8/32/93) (8/33/98) (8/32/99) (8/33/100)

[illegible]

2006

Mar 06 TRA

IA Endstate (DIV/BDE/BN) – 10 Divisions, 36 Brigades, 112 Battalions

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

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Current & Projected National Police TRA

MARCH 06

JUNE 06





Current IPS TRA level by Provincial HQ and District Roll-up

ANBAR		BAGHDAD		NINEWAH		ERBIL		WASIT		DIYALA		QADISSIYA					
DISTRICT		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS					
Fallujah	Hlt	Abu Ghraib	Al Tarmiya	Hamam Alil	Abi Tamaam	Choman	Al Aziziyah	Abu Sayda	Afak								
Ramadi	Raw ah	Al Adhamiya	Al Thawra	Makmoor	Al Habda	Dashtihawler	Al Kut	Balad Ruz	Al Qada'a								
Al Huria	Haditha	Al Kadhimiya	Al Zuhour	Qayarrah	AL Hadr	Hawler East	Al Aqhdiah	Bani Saad	Balda								
Rutbah	Baghdadi	Al Karadah	Bab Al Sheikh	Rabiyah	Al Hamdania	Erbil West	Al Hayy	Baqubah	Hamzah								
Habbaniyah	Kubaisa	Al Mansour	Madain	Sinjar	Al Karama	Khabat	As Suw ayrha	Diyala	Shamiyah								
Nukhayb	Anah	Al Rasheed	Mahmoudya	Tal Afar	Al Namrood	Mergasor	Badrah	Karatopa	Qadisiyah								
Husaybah		Al Saliyah	New Baghdad	Tal Keaf	Al Nasir	Shaqlaw a	An Numaniyah	Khalis	Mansuriyah								
				Zumar	Al Rabeain	Soran City	Mugdadiyah	Mandeli	Mugdadiyah								
NAJAF		TAMEEM		MAYSAN		THI QAR		BASRAH		DAHUK		BABIL		SALAHADIN		MUTHANA	
DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS		DISTRICTS	
Najaf	Balda	Dibis	Al Amarah	Al Rafai	Abu Al Kharib	Zakho	Al Aqhdia	Ad Daw r	Al Khidhir								
Balda	Hindiyah	Huw ayjah	Al Gharbi	Al Sharta	Al Barouki	Semel	Al Balda	Al Faris	Al Salmon								
Kufa	Karbala	Kirkuk	Al Kahla	Nasiriyah	Al Qurna	Shekhan	Al Hillah	Al Sharqat	Al Rumaytha								
Manathara	Outskirts	Aydallah	Qal At Salih		Al Ashar	Ahmedi	Al Hashmiya	Balad	Bayji								
		Meghdad	Al Majir Al Kibir	Al Chibayish	Az Zubayr	Akre	Al Mahaw il	Al Mahaw il	Samarra								
SULAYMINIYAH		Laylan	Al Maymurah			Dahuk	Mussayib	Tikrit	Tuz								
DISTRICTS		Dukan	Kalar	Penjw in	Ranya	Sharazoor	Chew arta										
Chamchamal	Derbankikhan	Halabja	Kaya	Pshdar	Sarchnar	Sulayminiya											

Level I Level II Level III Level IV No Data



Conditions

- Formation of a representative Iraqi government by Spring 2006.
- Political process and Sunni engagement diminishes violence to level that the ISF can contain (with Coalition support) in affected areas.
- Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.
- Iraqi Army / Police development continues near projected levels; ISF assuming battlespace are consistently able to hold it.
- Iraqis assume greater security responsibility for Baghdad; improved security in the other 9 key cities
- Sustained success in Mosul, Tal Afar, Western Euphrates River Valley, and border regions.
- Security ministries continue to improve and can sustain forces with Coalition support.
- No expansion of US battlespace due to Coalition reductions.




March 2006 Decision Point Framework

■ Jan Update:

- Curtail 1/10th Mtn Div (MND-B) by ~ 3 months (Depart Apr 06)
- Curtail 2/28th ID (MNF-W) by ~ 1 month (Depart May 06) No Backfill

■ Mar Update:

- Curtail 1/10th Mtn Div (MND-B) by ~ 1 month (Depart Jul 06)
- 2/28th ID (MNF-W) BOGs out (Depart Jun 06) No Backfill
- 2/1st AD (Theater Reserve) remains in Kuwait





Conclusion

- Haven't seen measurable impact of the first force structure adjustment ...although still too early to objectively assess.
- Progress of Iraqi Security Forces remains on track.
- Delay in government formation coupled with recent sectarian violence increases the period of uncertainty and risk – key condition for continuing force restructuring not yet met.
- It is too early to make a decision on the next step in force restructuring until we can see the nature of the Iraqi Government that is formed.
 - MNF-I remains on glide path to go from 15 to 14 US combat brigades in Iraq by Jun 06.
- Recommend maintaining 2/1 AD as the Theater Reserve during this period of uncertainty. → Jun 06
 - May want to deploy 1 Battalion to Baghdad during this window.

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Backup

Approved for Release


SPA Plans – 10 Mar 06

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
Provincial Police HQs TRA Status



Provincial HQs	TRA
Dahuk	
Ninawa	
Erbil	
Sulaymaniyah	
Tameem	
Salah ad Din	
Anbar	
Diyala	
Baghdad	
Karbala	
Babil	
Wasit	
Najaf	
Qadissiya	
Maysan	
Thi-Qar	
Basrah	
Muthana	




Provincial Police HQs & Key City TRA



Provincial HQs	TRA
Dahuk	
Ninawa	
Erbil	
Sulaymaniyah	
Tameem	
Salah ad Din	
Anbar	
Diyala	
Baghdad	
Karbala	
Babil	
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Basrah	
Muthana	



Provincial Police HQs TRA Status




Provincial HQs	TRA
Dahuk	
Ninawa	
Erbil	
Sulaymaniyah	
Tameem	
Salah ad Din	
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Basrah	
Muthana	




2006 Weekly Violence


Total Casualties




CF Casualties



Total and Effective Attacks



Suicide attacks



Casualties increased over the month of February. Weekly attack levels remain constant over the last four weeks. Suicide attacks show little change over the last two months.

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


Specific Indicators

- **Build on the success of the Iraqi Security Forces:**
 - An additional 9 Iraqi Army brigades and 26 more battalions have achieved TRA 2 since Oct 05; ISF fighting side-by-side, or in the lead in decisive operations.
 - ISF continues to stand and fight.
 - Response by ISF after al-Askari shrine bombing demonstrated increasing capability and confidence; provides good base for reinforcing success.
- **Remove motivation for foreign fighters and Iraqis entering the insurgency.**
 - Assessments indicate a widening gap between the terrorists and the people; indicators that Sunni tolerance of AQI thinning; political engagement of Sunnis beginning to show positive results.
- **Create sense of urgency in the Iraqi Government and its security forces.**
 - Iraqi security forces continue to mature; government institutions lag.
- **Send a strong signal to the world that we are making progress.**
 - Positive media coverage; 68% of Iraqis believe the ISF winning the battle against terrorism
- **Signal that we mean what we say, "As you stand up, we stand down."**
 - Indicators that impact of US force reductions not yet felt by most Iraqis



Strategic Timeline



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Positive Effects of Off Ramp Decision

- Demonstrated MNF-I strategic commitment to conditions-based drawdown, despite efforts of AQI to discredit this process
 - Enhanced credibility of Sunni outreach in WERV and MNF intentions in Iraq, created basis for engagement efforts with Sunni community in Salah ad-Din, Babil provinces
 - Demonstrated MNF-I's status as reliable partner, has started Sunni political leaders relook of US role as Iraqi partner in limiting ^{4b, 1, 4d}
 - Helped undermine Sadr's anti-MNF 'occupation' message
- Eastern Diyala – with Sunni Arab, Shi'a Arab and Kurd communities – a microcosm of Iraq as a whole
 - Success of off ramp provided an Iraq-wide model
 - Communication of successful off ramp by Sunni, Shi'a and Kurd communities in Diyala to their counterparts elsewhere in Iraq building positive perceptions



First Restructure Decision

- On 2 Nov 05, we recommended that we not deploy two incoming brigades to Iraq.
- One brigade did not deploy
- One brigade deployed to Kuwait to serve as the CENTCOM Theater Reserve
- Total US brigade combat teams in Iraq decreased from 17 to 15 in Jan 06
- While it is still too early to fully assess the impact of this decision, overall results have been positive.



Conditions not yet met

- **Formation of a representative Iraqi Government by Spring 2006.**
 - Timeline has slipped right – government formation may extend into early Summer.
 - Political wrangling impacting potential to form National Unity Government.
 - Not yet clear yet if the al-Askari Shrine bombing will strengthen the Iraq Government or reveal fractures – appears to be a lack of Government confidence now.
- **Threat of sectarian / militia-led violence remains low.**
 - High level of militia activity following the al-Askari shrine bombing.
 - Spike in sectarian tensions contained – for now; can quickly spike again.

Increased Risk for Additional Force Structure Adjustments



Unknowns


- The formation timeline, composition, and effectiveness of incoming Iraqi government.
- Impact of Al Qa'ida in Iraq's efforts to foment sectarian violence; timing and scope of Al Qa'ida's ability to generate another spike.
- Impact of recent spike in sectarian violence and militia activity in relation to long-term trends in Iraq.
- Schedule for Constitutional review / referendum; date for Provincial Elections.
- Ultimate impact of the political process on the insurgency.
- The cumulative impact of increased transition of battle space to the Iraqi Army and Coalition force transitions in the first 6 months of 2006.

- Impact of increased

14b, 1.4c




Battlespace Projections






Transition Decisions



US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF




COAs Based Off MNF-I Commander Guidance



* Acceleration Affects Sourcing of MiTTs, RFFs, PRTs, Partnerships, and Double RIPs



Overall Attacks in Diyala




Assessment: Overall attack levels in Diyala have decreased by 25% from 139 in OCT 05 to 141 in JAN 06. The attack levels in Eastern Diyala (AO Volunteer) have also decreased in correlation with overall attacks in the province by 36%. Attack trends continue to follow past insurgent TTPs; an increase in attacks followed by an operational lull. The majority of attacks in Diyala target MNE, followed by ISF and civilians. Sectarian violence remains problematic for the province, due to the ethnic and sectarian diversity of the province. IEDs and DF still remain the primary means of attack throughout the province.



Eastern Diyala Attack Enumeration


- Overall attacks have decreased, but attack effectiveness has increased
- Attack trends followed overall trend in Diyala; spike in attacks prior to the DEC 15 Election with a lull the following week
- IEDs remain the primary attack means, followed by DF (Small Arms)
- Mortar and rocket attacks are the primary method for attacking bases
- Attacks will continue to attempt to:
 - destabilize the ISF to allow insurgent freedom of movement along border
 - disrupt oil flow from Nahft Khanna (oil line and trucking) to discredit the IG






Post Referendum Violence Trends


Total Casualties




Suicide attacks



Total and Effective Attacks



VBIEDs



Overall casualties are trending downward since May. Increase in casualties for February are due to sectarian strife incited by attack on the Golden Mosque. Total attacks and VBIED attacks are trending downward since October. Suicide attacks continuing to decrease

Ilitizam Musharak - United Commitment