MNC-I directs Haditha investigation


On that day, Marines assigned to the Marine Expeditionary Force responded to an IED and small-arms fire attack on their convoy.

"There are allegations of potential misconduct, and they will be investigated," said Lt. Gen. Chiarelli.

Lt. Gen. Chiarelli initiated a preliminary investigation Feb. 14 when allegations of possible violations of the rules of engagement were brought to the attention of coalition officers.

On March 9, Lt. Gen. Chiarelli was presented with the initial findings of that preliminary investigation. Based on the recommendation of the investigating officer, he directed further review of the incident.

-30-

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS RELEASE, CONTACT THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE AT...
Operation Scales of Justice

“Scales” Patrols (+91)
- Coalition Only 25
- Combined 9
- Iraqi Army only 33
- National Police 24

“Scales” Traffic Control Points (+111)
- Coalition 68
- Iraqi Army 43

“Scales” Operations 202

“National Unity” Patrols and TCPs 136

Other Enduring Operations 21

TOTAL Operations 359
### Additional units IJC MND-BAGHDAD

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<th>PROJECTED ARRIVAL TIME</th>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>On site. Already TACON to 4ID</td>
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#### Composition:
- **Coalition** (1651)
- **Iraqi Army** (1315)
- **Iraqi Police** (441)

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3400 additional forces – 1650 Coalition and 1750 ISF
MURDERS/EXECUTIONS 22 Feb – 16 Mar

Marked increase in murders since 22 Feb Golden Mosque attack
- Average number of murders per week pre 22 Feb; 77
- Average number of murders per week post 22 Feb; 231
- Figures based on fusion of NJOC and SIGACTS reporting
- Methods of disposal have become less cautious
  - fewer attempts to conceal bodies (ie down drains)
  - discoveries of large numbers increasing
- Militia cells – JAM and also Badr – involved in majority of killings
- Available intel indicates Sunnis are the primary victims; bodies located in Shi’a dominated neighborhoods

Assessment: Badr and JAM responsible for majority of revenge killings after Mosque attack, recent VBIEDS in Sadr City. JAM likely used post-Mosque attack chaos to increase sectarian killings and expand influence. T&FF possibly involved, attempting to exploit sectarian tensions.
CURRENT SITUATION

• Rise in Extra-Judicial Killings following 22 Feb Attack
  – Since 22 Feb Mosque attack there has been a significant rise in numbers of bodies found and numbers of discoveries of large groups of bodies
    • Average number of murders per week pre 22 Feb; 87
    • Average number of murders per week post 22 Feb; 199

  – Groups conducting Extra-Judicial Killings (EJK) capitalizing on strong public sentiment following major attacks against sectarian icons
    • Local official stated JAM was increasingly targeting Sunnis following 22 Feb; specifically targeting Sunnis in Sadr City
      – Attacks believed to not be sanctioned or authorized by Sadr; believed to be conducted by independent, JAM-affiliated cells

  – Significant rise in number of high-profile discoveries of large groups of bodies
    • 14 March, 15 bodies found in truck in Mansour district; method of killing almost identical to 7 March incident when 18 bodies were found
    • Investigation of 7 March killings determined most victims were Sunni
      – Victims stopped at checkpoint during morning commute

  – Rise in EJK’s in Baghdad direct result of Golden Mosque attack. Independent JAM-affiliated cells conducting majority of attacks. High levels of EJK's reinvigorated by subsequent 12 March VBIED attacks in Sadr City.
From: b 3, (b)(6)  
Fri, March 17, 2006 3:22 AM  
To: b 3  
cc: b 3, (b)(6)  
Subject: Haditha Press Release & Options (S//NF)  
Importance: High  
Attachments: Haditha information paper March_16_2006.rtf; Haditha Release (V5).doc  

Classified: SECRET NOFORN

Sir,

Request you provide the attached documents to GEN Casey as soon as he is available. Use to brief & prepare GEN Casey for the SECDEF Phone Call on 171220zMAR06 (Friday).

Attached documents are:
- Information paper - Coordination of Investigations into Haditha Incident
- MNC-I Press Release

Please Acknowledge

V/R  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
Executive Officer for  
Deputy CDR CENTCOM  
(b)(6)

Haditha information paper Marc... (V5).doc (33K)

DERIVED FROM: USCENTCOM Classification Guide 0501  
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 Mar 2016
From: Commanding General, Multi National Force-West,
I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

To: 
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE REPORTING OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING AN IED ATTACK AND ENSUING
FIREFIGHT INVOLVING KILO CO, 3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
ON 19 NOVEMBER 2005

Ref: (a) JAG INSTRUCTION 5800.7D (JAGMAN)

1. This memorializes my verbal direction of 12 March 2006
appointing you, per chapter II of reference (a), to inquire into
the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter. You
are directed to inquire into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the reporting of information concerning the events
of 19 November 2005 involving the patrol of Kilo Co, 3rd
Battalion, 1st Marines, that was subject to an IED explosion and
an immediately ensuing firefight with insurgents amidst several
houses that date. Your inquiry must include and consider all
voice, spot, SIGACT, CCIR and other official reporting,
including press releases.

2. Consider and evaluate all reporting at all levels from unit
patrol through and including MNF-W for accuracy, consistency and
compliance with applicable regulation and policy. Determine if
any intentional or negligent miscommunication or misdirection
resulted in incorrect reporting of events.

3. This patrol was engaged with hostile forces numerous times
throughout 19 November; center your focus on the reporting of
morning events beginning with the first IED explosion and ending
immediately preceding the discovery of a second unexploded IED,
unless reporting with regard to additional events is germane to
your above inquiry and evaluation.

4. You are directed to proceed to any location necessary for
this investigation. Investigate all facts and circumstances
surrounding the incident. Report your findings of facts,
opinions, and recommendations in letter form within 10 working
days from the date of this letter. Any request for extension of
time will be directed to me and must be in writing.

5. Your attention is directed to the Privacy Act and Article
31, UCMJ. Use the Suspect's Rights Acknowledgment Form,
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE REPORTING OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE IED ATTACK AND ENSUING
FIREFIGHT INVOLVING KILO CO, 3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
ON 19 NOVEMBER 2005

Appendix A-1-m(1) of the reference, prior to taking a statement
from anyone you suspect of having committed an offense under the
UCMJ.

6. You are directed to coordinate with the I MEF (Fwd) DSJA,
(b)(3), (b)(6) for guidance in completing this investigation.

R. C. ZILMER

Copy to:
SJA, I MEF(FWD)
File
## Operational Summary

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<td>Central</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>H 14</td>
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### TSF/INTEL Highlights

- Interrogations continue to provide insight into AQIZ leadership, operational, and logistic infrastructure.
  - PCJ
    - Provided TTPs on Foreign Fighter Facilitation
  
  - Mid-level Military Commander for AQIZ
  - Identified key personnel on the FFF network

- Senior Religious personality for Karkh; responsible for mosques
- Provided information on key religious personalities of AQIZ
- Kidnapping Cell Member
- Provided info on his involvement in Italian kidnappings
- Provided info on 20th Revolutionary Brigade and other insurgent personalities

### Situation Update

**AMZ:** Four unconfirmed AMZ reports; none provided actionable intelligence.
- Promising leads center around senior AQIZ leadership in Baghdad
- Al-Iyeh movement provides potential targeting opportunities due to internal and external movement of key AQ, AAS, and AQIZ personalities
- Unclear if al-Masri and al-Walli movements are related to ‘Aliyeh mission

**WEST:** Focused on Ramadi-Fallujah corridor in support of OPN Steeler while monitoring facilitation networks in Western Iraq
- Detainee providing insight into AQIZ senior personalities in Al Anbar to include he assessed AQIZ Emir of Zaydan and AMZ associate

### Highlights

- 8 PC PID from 43 OBJs
- 19 SIGINT, 22 HUMINT, 2 FMV

10 Mar. OBJ ARNETT

10 Mar. OBJ LIGHTWATER VIII

12 Mar. OBJ CORDOVA II

13 Mar. OBJ CLOSSEN

15 Mar. OBJ ROSEWELL III

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505
AQIZ Network in AO Steelers

- Baghdad leadership extends beyond Baghdad; remains vital to operational success
- Several distinct, yet interconnected networks
- Foreign fighter facilitators in al-Anbar remain prominent; likely have limited operational control of some AQIZ cells
OUTLOOK: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- Weekly reported incidents increased to 89
  - 15 targeted Shi’a, 11 Sunni, 1 Kurd and 62 suspected
  - Total casualties: 178 KIA, 186 WIA
  - Triple digit attack numbers for second consecutive month
- Incidents directed at Shia:
  - Four VBIEDs detonate in Sadr City; 52 KIA, 96 WIA
  - Shi’a religious student murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - Two SAF attacks on Shi’a mosques, Baghdad; 1 KIA, 2 WIA
  - SAF attack near Sunni mosque, victims’ vehicle contained Mahdi Militia badges, Baghdad; 1 KIA, 2 WIA
  - Deputy MoT (and OMS member) murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - IED defused at Shi’a mosque, Kirkuk
  - Report of checkpoints detaining and murdering Shi’a, Abu Ghraib; no reported casualties
  - Shi’a family members murdered, Kirkuk; 3 KIA
- Incidents directed at Sunni:
  - Report of 22 Sunni kidnapped from a mosque, Baghdad
  - Leaflets tell girls school IVO Sunni mosque to evacuate, principal receives threat mosque to be mortared, Baghdad
  - IED detonated at Sunni tomb, Tikrit; no casualties
  - Former IA Colonel murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - SAF attack on Sunni funeral, Baghdad; 2 KIA, 2 WIA
  - Sunni imam murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - SAF attack on Sunni mosque, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - Sunni shaykh kidnapped, Baghdad
  - VBIED targets IP, kills Sunni imam, Samarra; 1 KIA, 11 WIA
- Other:
  - Five VBIEDs target civilians, Baghdad, Baqubah, Al Hillah; 7 KIA, 34 WIA
  - 44 incidents of human remains found murdered execution style in Baghdad; 80 KIA
  - Umar Brigade claims 11 Badr members killed

Assessment: Incidents remain high, with an increase in casualties. Majority killed are result of VBIEDs and executions. Likely T&FF targeting Shi’a with VBIEDs; Shi’a militia retaliation with executions and murders of suspected T&FF and Sunni. Expect civilian targeting to increase this week in anticipation of Arba’een, with considerable Shi’a militia reprisal in response to T&FF attacks on participants.
CURRENT SITUATION – Murder Spike in Baghdad

Marked increase in murders since 22 Feb Golden Mosque attack
- 156 bodies discovered in last 48 hours; 79 murders, and 77 executions
- Since 22 Feb Golden Mosque attack, 696 bodies discovered, average of 33 per day; significantly above pre 22 Feb norm of 11 per day
- Methods of disposal have become less cautious
  - Fewer attempts to conceal bodies
  - Finding increasing number of sites with multiple bodies

Assessment: Militias responsible for majority of killings, in revenge for Mosque attack and recent VBIEDS in Sadr City. T&FF possibly responsible for selected incidents to provoke sectarian violence. More blatant dispositions intended to convey strong deterrent message.
Approved for Release
FOCUS
16 Mar 06

Current Top 10 Key Tasks

- Secure HVC-1 (43rd Bde)
- Reinforce due process (SJA)
- Develop formal resourcing requirement for FY07 and revised timeline (Transition, J3)
- Complete first 3 expansion compounds (En)
- Execute detainee strategy:
  - Internal counter insurgency program (J2, 43rd)
  - Reintegration program (DCdr, IO)
  - Release Strategy – Link to Reintegration program and support Abu closure (J3, SJA)
- Move out of Abu Ghraib (Transition, J3)
- Institutionalize the inspection of Iraqi facilities (J3)
- Institutionalize oversight of SOF facilities (Master Chief)
- Review/document unwritten policies in addendum to MNF-I 11-1 (includes restraint, ROE, Discipl matrix, return to unit, ...) (J3, SJA)
- Execute a major positive communications event Jun 06 (PAO)
- Correct and Institutionalize all databases (J6, J3, SJA)

First 120-Day Post-Election Goals

- Reinforce CCCI as an enduring institution
- Educate key Govt officials, religious & civic leaders on Security Detention/CCCI process and release program
- Establish a high-level Govt mechanism/committee to review facility inspection results and propose legislation
- Establish key contacts in detention and rule of law functional areas
- Convince PMOI/MeK to realistically define their end state
NF-I CG Aide-de-Camp

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 8:35 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: [U] 15-6 Investigation – Haditha (U)
Categories: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classification Caveat: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classification Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Thanks Dave, does Chairman know about this? JPA

Boss, FYI... Dave

See summary immediately below from Gen Casey’s SJA. Alleged LOAC violation involving Marines killing 15 civilians in response to an IED attack on 19 Nov 2005. The first attachment detailing the meeting with the TIME reporter is also worth reading. I will keep you posted as this develops.

w/r

3/17/2006
From: b 3, b 6  
To: b 3, b 6  
Subject: FW: [C] 15-6 Investigation -- Haditha

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Heads up.
TIME magazine recently brought to our attention allegations of Marines shooting non-combatants in Haditha on 19 Nov and asked us to confirm the story. MNC-I conducted a AR 15-6 investigation into the events of that day and have determined that additional criminal investigation by NCIS is necessary. Facts as we now them is that following an IED explosion in which one Marine was killed and two injured, a four vehicle convoy from K Co, 3 Bn, 1 MAR received small arms fire from multiple directions. In responding to the attacks and clearing homes that appeared to be the source of the SAF, 15 civilians and 9 suspected AIF were killed. Of the 15 civilians, nine were women and children (oldest 76 and youngest 3 yrs old). The 2MARDIV press release of the events is attached above. An investigation was not conducted after the event. Notes of the meeting with TIME are also attached above. When MNC-I received the information, they sent a senior IN colonel and a FG legal advisor to Haditha to conduct an AR 15-6 investigation. Their thorough investigation raises the strong possibility that the Marines did not attempt to positively identify hostile actors before engaging them, a possible violation of the law of armed conflict. In fact I read the statement of the Sergeant in charge of the team and he candidly and openly admitted that his orders to his four man team was to “shoot first and ask questions later.” Accordingly, additional investigation is warranted.

We will keep you posted and I advised (b)6 to send up a LOAC Report.

r/

Staff Judge Advocate, MNF-I
DSN (b)6

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2006 21:23
To: Wright Rudy BG MNFI STRATEFF
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: TIME Allegations on Haditha Attack, 19 NOV 05

Sir,

Attached is the Memorandum For Record on my review of material provided by TIME Magazine’s Tim McGirk regarding allegations against unidentified Marines accused of killing 15 civilians after an IED killed one Marine in Haditha on 19 NOV 05.

These allegations are substantial. It appears sincere in wanting to ensure the information is fully investigated before they report anything. However, we should assume other media are being provided the same info and are likely to push it out regardless of what TIME does.

Recommend this information be provided to criminal investigators for evaluation. I have possession of the video, which must be reformatted before I can send it as a file.


vr,
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DERIVED FROM: USCENTCOM Classification Guide 0501
DECLASSIFY ON: 10 Mar 2016