

Casey George GEN MNF-I CG

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 8:50 AM
To: 'Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD'
Subject: FW: ~~[S]~~ infrastructure security ~~(S//REL)~~
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Jim, sent this to john abizaid and pete pace a few weeks ago. It reflects where I am on the infrastructure security issue. If secdef has not seen, would ask that you get it in front of him before the svtc today. Tx. gwc

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG [mailto: [REDACTED] b 6]
Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 4:59 AM
To: Abizaid, John P. GEN (USA); [REDACTED] b 3 b 6)
Subject: ~~[S]~~ infrastructure security

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Chairman and John, Lots of stuff flying around on Iraqi infrastructure. Let me try to cut through all that and give you my thoughts:

- 1) Think fundamental policy issue is whether the generation of resources from the export of oil is so critical to Iraq's future that USG should take ownership over the problem. The electrical issue is a side show here in Iraq—most folks have generators or are used to not getting much electricity. They don't like it, but it's not a threat to stability until we get to the summer heat.

—I see an increased security effort as a subset of the broader issue.
- 2) I strongly believe that we must force the Iraqi government to deal with this issue. At an MCNS on this last week, Chalabi acknowledged that the problem was within the Iraqi government. PM has signed a memo giving DPM Chalabi directive control of other ministries, but he is in Vienna and has yet to convene a meeting since the MCNS to deal with the "crisis". This is their's to solve—with our full support. It will take a comprehensive effort. There are no silver bullets. And there are no quick fixes—particularly as we go through the government formation and transition process over the next few months.
- 3) On the security side, our strategy has been to organize and support Iraqi efforts to secure the infrastructure. I have consciously stopped short of giving the corps the mission to secure Iraqi infrastructure. Their mission is to:

—Assist ISF in organizing and executing the infrastructure security program.

—Assist in the training and preparation of SIBs and in the training of Iraqi infrastructure command and control nodes.

—Support ISF efforts with partnership support, quick reaction forces, aerial surveillance and, as necessary, key site security (we currently have a company at the al Fattah crossing until they can get the pipes pulled under the Tigris).

–Conduct counterinsurgency operations with ISF to neutralize the insurgency that is attacking the pipeline.

- 4) Strategy has resulted in a decrease in infrastructure attack trends since August—average for last 3 months has been about 3.6 attacks/week; but well-targeted attacks, the lack of quick repair by Iraqi crews and lack of an organized governmental response has led to the current situation.

- 5) Questions then are “What should we do as a government?” and “What role should the military play?”

–The government should get a firm commitment from the Iraqi government to devote the time, resources and effort to build and implement short, medium and long-term solutions. Our folks and the Embassy have been working with them for months on this. My sense is that the Iraqis know what to do, they just need the will and organization to execute.

–On the military role, we will rightfully be asked what more we can do to protect the infrastructure. My broad answer is that 1) we can do more with more resources, but further diversion of resources from the counterinsurgency and Iraqi military and police training missions will delay programmed transitions; 2) we should not agree to commit more resources without the full commitment of the Iraqi government discussed above to resolving the problem; and 3) any additional resources committed should be in a supporting role to ISF so that we do not take ownership of the problem.

–You should know that I am examining options to accelerate the development of the SIBs using forces (@ 2 battalions) from the Call Forward Force for a 90-day period. By bringing them forward and partnering them with the remaining SIBs we think we can get most of the SIBs up to speed by June vice September under the current plan. Their role would be training and support, not infrastructure security. I have not/finished work on this nor have I recommended it to John, but it is an option that could help head off an energy crisis just as the new government comes into power.

–Other options are to bring in US troops to secure the infrastructure—which I don’t recommend; or to muddle through with the Iraqis and what we have—which, at this point, I don’t necessarily think is all bad if we can live with about the same level of oil revenues for the next six months or so.

6) Bottomline: It’s their problem. We can’t want it more than they do. They have yet to generate an organized government effort, and acknowledge that this is the crux of the matter. That said, the problem will not be resolved without our help, and lack of action will result in the new government inheriting the problem. I recommend a concerted push to get full commitment from the government to address the issue with our support. I am prepared to use the CFF to support an Iraqi initiative, and will make my recommendation to John in the next few days.

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