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DECL: 02/28/2026

Meeting at [ b 6 ] house, February 28, 2006

[ b 6 ]  
(b)(6)

[ b 6 ] opened by saying that most of the insurgency leaders around Iraq now knew about the meetings with the Ambassador. He claimed they appreciated his comments about forming a unity government and ensuring credible security ministers are installed in that government. Changing the current Interior and Defense ministers would "solve 70 percent of the problem," he claimed. He urged the government be established quickly, since the country was in a dangerous situation.

The Ambassador said that for the discussions with the Secret Organization of the Iraqi National Resistance to have any utility, an agreed formula for a way forward had to be agreed. So far, the discussions had produced little.

[ b 6 ] all agreed.

The Ambassador proposed:

(a) the insurgency would issue a statement publicly saying that to prevent civil strife (fitna) stirred by the enemies of Iraq, the resistance would suspend its military operations. Its goal was national unity and it sought to reinforce Iraq's national unity at this difficult time.

(b) the Americans and the insurgency would then move ahead on a security track by addressing problems on a region-by-region basis. He recalled the idea of an operations center. Ford underlined that the talks had to include details and required probably several days of consecutive meetings to get the insurgency to provide the detailed information required, given the insurgent leaders difficulties with communications. [ b 6 ] agreed.

(c) the Americans and the insurgency would also discuss the formation of the national unity government, economic development and issues related to national reconciliation such as de-Baathification and the future of insurgent elements.

[ b 6 ] said "this could happen." He commented that he would need help from the Americans, such as release of prisoners. The Ambassador told him more would be released very soon, and he said that [ (b)(6) ] was free to propose names for future releases.

[ b 6 ] said that while the insurgents perceive fewer American raids, there appear to be some occurring in zones of sectarian violence that give the impression that the Americans are siding with the other side (ie. Shia). He cited the Shia occupation of the Sunni mosque in Salman Pak as a locale where the Americans were not acting fairly. The Ambassador referred to reports that a torture center was discovered in the mosque. The Sunnis in the meeting scoffed at this; [ (b)(6) ] said the insurgency does not operate in Salman Pak town. The Ambassador said this was a technical issue that could be addressed at a technical level.

Allawi interjected to suggest

- (a) the insurgency issuing a statement suspending military operations to reinforce national unity;
- (b) standing up an operations center (he told me he has a house next to his residence available to use);
- (c) starting up technical, security-related talks about multiple regions at once;
- (d) continuing political discussions.

[ (b)(6) ] said this plan was acceptable. He asked for an American statement to show "the street" that they had received something in return.

The Ambassador said we could issue a public statement in response, depending on what the insurgency's announcement contained. He also suggested that the two sides could have a technical level meeting between the time of the insurgency's announcement and the time at which the declared suspension of attacks would take effect. This would enable better coordination between the two sides.

Jaburi suggested a written record of agreement about political issues discussed, such as the agreement of both sides that the Iraqi Army must be rebuilt. [b)(6)] said this agreement is already secure, and he did not appear interested in getting a written record.

Allawi said he would review the insurgency's draft announcement before they would issue it. [b 6] said it would take a few days to prepare a statement.

All agreed that the next steps would be:

1. [b 6] and colleagues draw up a draft announcement;
2. They share it with Allawi and the U.S.;
3. They publish it;
4. The Americans respond to it;
5. [b 6] and colleagues tell us which regions they are prepared to discuss;
6. A new technical, security-related meeting.

Approved for Release