



(b)(6)

Good Agreement

Potential Off-Ramp Decisions

21 October 2005

This briefing is classified

SECRET

REL USA AND MCFI

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: 20 Oct 2015

Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

Strategic Force Options - 051020

~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

004443

*Leaving units + dependent
people in front quickly
mines getting killed
dig for food? NSC advise?
12K off of current*

~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~



Bottom Line Up Front

Of the two brigades remaining to deploy to Iraq for OIF 05-07, we recommend that we off-ramp one brigade and deploy the other to Kuwait as an in-theater reserve as a hedge against the projected uncertainty of the post-election environment.

At some point, the reserve force could transition to a PTDO force with a pre-positioned set of equipment.

Ilizam Mushtarak – United Commitment



Situation

- Successful Referendum and continued ISF improvement provide strategic opportunity to demonstrate progress by off-ramping two US brigades in Jan 06.
- Next 60 days will continue to be turbulent as terrorists and insurgents attempt to derail the political process.
- Constitution amendment and implementation processes likely to be politically divisive; violence will still be used to influence political outcomes.
- The outcome of the December elections and the nature of the next government remain uncertain. We should prepare for another protracted transition.
- Conditions feeding the insurgency won't be resolved by Jun 06. Expect impact of political process on insurgency to be gradual.
- While increasingly isolated, AQIZ will still be a factor post-election.



What I know

- Development of ISF across the MND-North Center and MND-Baghdad sectors makes it possible to reduce Coalition requirements by 2 brigades.
- One division, 9 brigades, and 50 ^{(b)(6)} Iraq Army battalions should be capable of assuming battle space by Jan 06; projected to grow to 4 divisions ^{(b)(6)} 23 brigades, and ^{(b)(6)} 17 battalions by May 06.
- When coupled with US Army transformation changes, a 2 brigade reduction in US forces achieves an overall reduction of ^{(b)(6)} ~12K troops.
- To achieve desired impact, any announcement should be carefully coordinated with the ITG, Coalition members, and within our Government.
- Expect terrorists and insurgents to claim "victory" and to attempt to exploit the announcement and discredit ISF.
- Police and Security ministry capability continue to lag military capability; both require a focused effort in 2006.
- 80% of insurgent and terrorist attacks are against Coalition forces.
- 90% of Iraqis do not believe it is acceptable to attack the ISF.



RISK NOT DONE
of

What I think

- A gradual, conditions-based reduction of Coalition forces, tied to improved ISF capability, and done from a position of strength, could:
 - ③+ Begin to remove central motivation attracting foreign fighters and drawing Iraqis into the insurgency
 - ②+ Demonstrate we mean what we say – we'll depart as they stand up
 - ①+ Build on success of ISF in Referendum security
 - ③+ Reduce visibility and exposure of Coalition forces
 - ⑥+ Send strong signal to Coalition and Iraqi leaders that the Campaign Plan is on track and we are making progress
 - ④+ Create sense of urgency in Iraqi Government and security forces
- The tolerance for Coalition presence is diminishing.
- Additional forces on the ground could be absorbed tactically, but the tactical gains would be modest compared to the strategic benefits of reductions.
- In-theater brigade reserve will be required through Jun 06 to mitigate the risks caused by the political and security transitions.



What I don't know


- Outcome of the December election and the composition and effectiveness of government that results.
- Impact of the Referendum and election outcomes on the insurgency.
- Impact of AQIZ efforts to foment sectarian violence.
- The cumulative impact of increased transition of battle space to the Iraqi Army and Coalition force transitions in the first 6 months of 2006.
- Impact of increased

1.4b, 1.4d

~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~




Post Election Risk Window





US Force Structure - October 2005



Ilkizam Musharak - United Commitment



1.4a

Courses of Action


		1.4a	
COA	Course of Action	RISK	
1	■ Deploy 2/1 AD into Iraq ■ Do not deploy 1/1 ID	LOW	
2	■ Deploy 2/1 AD into Kuwait as Theater Reserve ■ Do not deploy 1/1 ID	MODERATE - HIGH	✓
3	■ Do not deploy 2/1 AD; remain in Germany on PTDO ■ Do not deploy 1/1 ID	HIGH	

Recommendation: COA 2



For. 17 SECTORS
IN COUNTRY

US Force Structure - January 2006



Ilizim Mushtarak - United Commitment



Risks

- Going too fast could unhinge ISF progress – Low.
 - Mitigation: Numbers of IA brigades / battalions coming online; Coalition transition teams and enablers; 146,000 Coalition troops
- Reduction in tactical and operational effectiveness and flexibility – ^{AdmC-A472}Low.
 - Mitigation: In-theater reserve and increased effectiveness of ISF
- Misperceived as US “running away” and creation of expectation for continuous reduction – Moderate.
 - Mitigation: Effective communications plan, improved ISF readiness
- Insurgency increases in size and effectiveness and threatens political and economic progress – Moderate.
 - Mitigation: In-theater reserve and increased effectiveness of ISF
- Ministries can't sustain security forces – Moderate.
 - Mitigation: Improved advisory support to MoI and MoD
- Employment of Reserve could be seen as regressing – Moderate.
 - Mitigation: Effective communications plan



Issues

- Timing of announcement
- Coordination of announcement / rollout
 - ITG - *want to engage*
 - Coalition
 - US Government
- Refine reserve proposal
- Infrastructure security battalions and coalition combat power in Anbar province.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~



BACK UP

SLIDES

Ittizam Mushtarak – United Commitment


Strategic Force Options - 051020

~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~ 13




Potential Announcement Timelines

1. 2/1 AD continues to flow; prepares for Theater Reserve mission; holds in Kuwait
2. 1/1 ID stop / delay flow
3. Timing of announcement:
 - Both prior to election?
 - One before, one after election?
 - Both after election?





Months to Assume Battle Space



Division & Brigades who are projected to assume battle space by 1 Jan 06:
6th DIV; BDEs- 2/1, 3/1, 1/4, 3/5, 1/6, 2/6, 2/8, 3/8, 1/9

Ilitizam Mushtarak – United Commitment



Transition Readiness Assessment (Army)

An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions

- Overall Readiness Assessment
 - Sustainment/Logistics
 - Personnel
 - Equipment
 - Command and Control
 - Leadership
 - Training

Iraqi Army Status as of 1 September 2005 (# Reported in June 05)				
Army Unit Rating	Fully Capable Level 1	Capable with CF Support Level 2	Partially Capable Level 3	Unit Forming Level 4 Unit Not Formed / Not Reporting
Division HQ (10)	0 (0)	1 (0)	4 (4)	3 (4) 2 (2)
Brigade HQ (36)	0 (0)	9 (4)	19 (22)	2 (3) 6 (6)
Battalion (111)	1 (1)	33 (26)	52 (54)	4 (8) 21 (21)
Total	1 (1)	43 (30)	75 (80)	9 (15) 29 (29)



Transition Readiness Assessment (Police)


Ultimately an Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Training
- Leadership
- Station Effectiveness
- Force Protection
- Facilities / Infrastructure
- Equipment
- Threat


Iraqi Police Status as of 1 September 2005				
Police Unit	Effective Level 1	Effective With Limitations Level 2	Considerable Limitations Level 3	Ineffective Level 4
Provincial HQ (18)	2	10	5	1
Special Police Brigades (8)		1	7	
Total	2	11	12	1




Transition of Security Lead



US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF



COALITION BASES TRANSFERRED TO THE IRAQI ARMY 15



- ACTIVE BASE
- TRANSFERRED TO IA



BASES

41

BRAC4IRAQ Report

as of: 24 OCT 2005

FOBs Closed Since TOA: 28
FOBs Remaining: 82 (+4 CSCs, 5 DetFac)

Closures Pending (<100 Days)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>MND</u>	<u>IRAQI</u>	<u>MITT</u>	<u>Disposition</u>	<u>Transfer</u>
OSB	SE	MOF	No	Shaiba	TBD
Alamo	NC	Regional Governor	No	Warhorse	30 OCT
Vanguard	COSCOM (NC)	TBD	No	Anaconda	31 OCT 30 NOV
Danger	NC	MOF	No	Speicher	22 NOV
Honor	B	5/8	Yes	Prosperity	14 JAN
Charlie	CS	MOF	No	Delta	31 JAN

All Closures Nominations (Conditions Based)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>MND</u>	<u>IRAQI</u>	<u>MITT</u>	<u>Transfer</u>
Abu Naji	SE	4/10	No	31 JAN

Working Issues

- Danger Closure
- FY06 Closure Nominations



Roll up of months to assume Battle Space

	OCT Or Already Assumed	NOV	DEC	JAN 06	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	BEYOND SEP
DIV HQ 10	6th DIV		8th DIV		5th DIV	4th DIV		10th DIV		1st DIV	2nd DIV	3rd DIV	7th DIV, 9th DIV
BDE HQ 36	7	2	5	2	4	1	6	1				2	6
BNs 112	28	16	7	9	7	5	4	1	1	1	1	9	22
Total	36	18	13	11	12	7	10	3	1	2	2	12	30

PLANNED
15 BCT SET

15 BCT SET
(OCT TRA)

PLANNED
13 BCT SET

Breakdown of Units Level I/ II by Division

	1st DIV	2nd DIV	3rd DIV	4th DIV	5th DIV	6th DIV	7th DIV	8th DIV	9th DIV	10th DIV
Level 1/ GREEN	BN 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	BDE 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Level 2/ YELLOW	BN 4	1	0	2	8	9	0	7	2	2
	BDE 2	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	2

10/2