Potential Off-Ramp Decisions

21 October 2005

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Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: 20 Oct 2015

Iltizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

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Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Strategic Force Options - 051020
Bottom Line Up Front

Of the two brigades remaining to deploy to Iraq for OIF 05-07, we recommend that we off-ramp one brigade and deploy the other to Kuwait as an in-theater reserve as a hedge against the projected uncertainty of the post-election environment.

At some point, the reserve force could transition to a PTDO force with a pre-positioned set of equipment.
Situation

- Successful Referendum and continued ISF improvement provide strategic opportunity to demonstrate progress by off-ramping two US brigades in Jan 06.

- Next 60 days will continue to be turbulent as terrorists and insurgents attempt to derail the political process.

- Constitution amendment and implementation processes likely to be politically divisive; violence will still be used to influence political outcomes.

- The outcome of the December elections and the nature of the next government remain uncertain. We should prepare for another protracted transition.

- Conditions feeding the insurgency won’t be resolved by Jun 06. Expect impact of political process on insurgency to be gradual.

- While increasingly isolated, AQIZ will still be a factor post-election.

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What I know

- Development of ISF across the MND-North Center and MND-Baghdad sectors makes it possible to reduce Coalition requirements by 2 brigades.
- One division, 9 brigades, and 50 Iraq Army battalions should be capable of assuming battle space by Jan 06; projected to grow to 4 divisions, 20 brigades, and 75 battalions by May 06.
- When coupled with US Army transformation changes, a 2 brigade reduction in US forces achieves an overall reduction of ~12K troops.
- To achieve desired impact, any announcement should be carefully coordinated with the ITG, Coalition members, and within our Government.
- Expect terrorists and insurgents to claim “victory” and to attempt to exploit the announcement and discredit ISF.
- Police and Security ministry capability continue to lag military capability; both require a focused effort in 2006.
- 80% of insurgent and terrorist attacks are against Coalition forces.
- 90% of Iraqis do not believe it is acceptable to attack the ISF.
What I think

- A gradual, conditions-based reduction of Coalition forces, tied to improved ISF capability, and done from a position of strength, could:
  - Begin to remove central motivation attracting foreign fighters and drawing Iraqis into the insurgency
  - Demonstrate we mean what we say – we’ll depart as they stand up
  - Build on success of ISF in Referendum security
  - Reduce visibility and exposure of Coalition forces
  - Send strong signal to Coalition and Iraqi leaders that the Campaign Plan is on track and we are making progress
  - Create sense of urgency in Iraqi Government and security forces

- The tolerance for Coalition presence is diminishing.
- Additional forces on the ground could be absorbed tactically, but the tactical gains would be modest compared to the strategic benefits of reductions.
- In-theater brigade reserve will be required through Jun 06 to mitigate the risks caused by the political and security transitions.
What I don’t know

- Outcome of the December election and the composition and effectiveness of government that results.

- Impact of the Referendum and election outcomes on the insurgency.

- Impact of AQIZ efforts to foment sectarian violence.

- The cumulative impact of increased transition of battle space to the Iraqi Army and Coalition force transitions in the first 6 months of 2006.

- Impact of increased

  1.4b, 1.4d
Post Election Risk Window

Jan 06 | Feb 06 | Mar 06 | Apr 06 | May 06 | Jun 06

Establish Iraqi Government

- First Session Council of Reps (31 Dec)
- Announce PM (15 Jan)
- Ashura (9 Feb)
- PM submits Cabinet for approval (14 Feb)
- If no Cabinet, President appoints new PM (1 Mar)

Announcement of Constitutional Amendments (T)

ISF Brigades Assuming Battle Space

US HQ Rotations (2 Div, 1 Corps)

10 US Brigade Rotations

9 Coalition Force Rotations

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Oct 05 US Force Structure
- MNF-W: 4 Brigades
- MND-NW: 2 Brigades
- MND-NC: 4 Brigades
- MND-B: 5 Brigades
- Theater Security: 2 Brigades
- 185 Transition Teams
- 17 Brigades in Iraq (~138,000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course of Action</th>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
<th>COA 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deploy 2/1 AD into Iraq</td>
<td>Do not deploy 1/1 ID</td>
<td>Deploy 2/1 AD into Kuwait as Theater Reserve</td>
<td>Do not deploy 2/1 AD; remain in Germany on PTDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not deploy 1/1 ID</td>
<td>Do not deploy 1/1 ID</td>
<td>Do not deploy 1/1 ID</td>
<td>Do not deploy 1/1 ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendation: COA 2
Jan 06 US Force Structure

- MNF-W: 3 Brigades
- MNF-N: 5 Brigades
- MND-B: 6 Brigades
- Theater Security: 1 Brigade
- 196 Transition Teams

15 Brigades in Iraq (~126,000)
1 Brigade in Kuwait
Risk

- Going too fast could unhinge ISF progress – Low.
  - Mitigation: Numbers of IA brigades / battalions coming online; Coalition transition teams and enablers; 146,000 Coalition troops

- Reduction in tactical and operational effectiveness and flexibility – Low.
  - Mitigation: In-theater reserve and increased effectiveness of ISF

- Misperceived as US "running away" and creation of expectation for continuous reduction – Moderate.
  - Mitigation: Effective communications plan, improved ISF readiness

- Insurgency increases in size and effectiveness and threatens political and economic progress – Moderate.
  - Mitigation: In-theater reserve and increased effectiveness of ISF

- Ministries can’t sustain security forces – Moderate.
  - Mitigation: Improved advisory support to MoI and MoD

- Employment of Reserve could be seen as regressing – Moderate.
  - Mitigation: Effective communications plan
Issues

- Timing of announcement
- Coordination of announcement / rollout
  - ITG – want to engage
  - Coalition
  - US Government
- Refine reserve proposal
- Infrastructure security battalions and coalition combat power in Anbar province.
BACK UP

SLIDES
Potential Announcement Timelines

1. 2/1 AD continues to flow; prepares for Theater Reserve mission; holds in Kuwait
2. 1/1 ID stop / delay flow
3. Timing of announcement:
   - Both prior to election?
   - One before, one after election?
   - Both after election?

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**Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 Oct: Rail load / transit begins
3 Nov: Load ship
7-10 Dec: Troop movement window
Hold in Kuwait

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# Transition Readiness Assessment (Army)

An Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi forces to perform counterinsurgency missions

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Personnel
- Command and Control
- Training
- Sustainment/Logistics
- Equipment
- Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Unit</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Fully Capable Level 1</th>
<th>Capable with CF Support Level 2</th>
<th>Partially Capable Level 3</th>
<th>Unit Forming Level 4</th>
<th>Unit Not Formed / Not Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division HQ (10)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade HQ (36)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>9 (4)</td>
<td>19 (22)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion (111)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>33 (26)</td>
<td>52 (54)</td>
<td>4 (8)</td>
<td>21 (21)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>43 (30)</td>
<td>75 (80)</td>
<td>9 (15)</td>
<td>29 (29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transition Readiness Assessment (Police)

Ultimately an Iraqi-led, Coalition monitored, readiness assessment of the ability of Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment

- Overall Readiness Assessment
- Station Effectiveness
- Personnel
- Force Protection
- Training
- Facilities / Infrastructure
- Leadership
- Equipment
- Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraqi Police Status as of 1 September 2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Unit Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial HQ (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Brigades (8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
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</table>
# BRAC4IRAQ Report

as of: 24 OCT 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOBs Closed Since TOA:</th>
<th>28</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOBs Remaining:</td>
<td>82 (+4 CSCs, 5 DetFac)</td>
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</table>

## Closures Pending (<100 Days)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>MND</th>
<th>IRAQI</th>
<th>MiTT</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSB</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Shaiba</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alamo</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Regional Governor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Warhorse</td>
<td>30 OCT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>COSCOM</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Anaconda</td>
<td>30 NOV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Speicher</td>
<td>22 NOV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honor</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>5/8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>14 JAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlie</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>31 JAN</td>
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</table>

## All Closures Nominations (Conditions Based)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>MND</th>
<th>IRAQI</th>
<th>MiTT</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Naji</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>4/10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>31 JAN</td>
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## Working Issues

- Danger Closure
- FY06 Closure Nominations
### Roll up of months to assume Battle Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>DIV HQ</th>
<th>BDE HQ</th>
<th>BNs</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>JUN</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>6</td>
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### Breakdown of Units Level I/II by Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Level I</th>
<th>Level II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</table>

- GREEN: 12
- YELLOW: 2
- OFF (OCT TRA): 2
- 13 BCT Set: PLANNED
- 15 BCT Set: PLANNED

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