VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
to
Iraq
11 February 2005

DELEGATION
(Total on C-17: 32)

Secretary & Staff: (4)
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
VADM Jim Stavridis, USN
(b)(3), (b)(6)
USAF
(b)(6)

OSD Policy: (1)
(b)(6)

Public Affairs: (4)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Support: (11)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

TBD X 2
(b)(6)

Returning from IRAQ to Andrews, AFB
(b)(3), (b)(6)

MNF-I
PSU

SECRET//REL-USA AND MCFI
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Traveling Press: (12)
John Banusiewicz
Alan Pessin
Durrell Kreisher
Jim Mannion
William Dunham
Eric Schmitt
John Lumpkin
Alan Rice
Bret Baier
Tony Capra
Josh White
Jim Long

American Forces Press Service
VOA
Copley News Service
Agence-France-Presse
Reuters
New York Times
AP
NBC TV
FOX News
NBC TV
Washington Post
NBC TV
SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI
Version 10. As of: 101200FEB05

ITINERARY FOR:
HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD + (32)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
11 FEBRUARY 2005

OFFICIAL PARTY (32): Attached Document Details Remainder of Official Party
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense Joint Visitors Bureau Escort b 3 b(6)
VADM Jim Stavridis Senior Military Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense b 6
(b)(3), (b)(6) Military Assistant Acting Asst/SECDEF Public Affairs b 6

ITINERARY:

All Times Are Baghdad Local (C = Z + 3)
Friday, 11 February 2005

0615 Arrive Mosul Airport via C-17 from Nice, France
POC: b(3), b(6)
Greeted BY: BG Carter Ham MND NW CRD
BG Ham, Aide de Camp, PSO, SGSx2, Interpreter, Photographer, PAO, SD, and
Embassy officials en route to MAF via UH-60. Met by (b)(3), (b)(6) and
Official Party for final preparation

0615 – 0620 En route by foot from Mosul Airfield to CSH
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0620 – 0630 Presentation of Purple Heart (T)
Awardees: TBD
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0630 – 0635 En route by foot from CSH to Mosul Airfield Theater
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0635 – 0700 Awards Presentations Ceremony at Mosul Airfield Theater
POC: BG Carter Ham DNVT: b 6
Awardees:
US Soldiers

SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI
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Irqi Soldiers:

Albanian Soldiers x 2 (TBD)

0700 – 0705 En route by foot from Mosul Airfield Theater to LZ
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0705 – 0710 En route movement via rotary wing from MOSUL AIRFIELD to FOB Freedom LZ
POC: C-3 AIR DSN: (b)(6)

0710 – 0715 Trans load from rotary wing to ground convoy
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Greeted by: b 3, b 6 Commander, 1/25 SBCT
(b)(6) Coordinator, US Embassy Office-Mosul

0715 – 0720 Movement by ground convoy from FOB Freedom LZ to Joint Coordination Center
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0720 – 0755 Joint Coordination Center visit: Meet with Governor, Iraqi Intervention Force Cdr, and Iraqi Bde Cdr
POC: BG Carter Ham DNVT: b 6
Greeted by: Governor Kashmoula and BG Moataz, Commander, JCC
Principal, Stavridis, Di Rita, Lati, Lattimer

0720 – 0725 Movement to Operations Center
0725 – 0735 Orientation of Operations Center given by Governor Kashmoula and BG Moataz
0735 – 0740 Movement to JCC auditorium
0740 – 0755 Discussion with Iraqi government and military leaders

Attendees:
Governor Duraid Kashmoula, Governor, Nineveh Province
MG Ahmed Muhammed Khalaf al Jabburi, Chief of Police, Nineveh
MG Dahar, Division Commander, IIF
BG Shycker, Brigade Commander, IIF
BG Tariq, Brigade Commandner, 6th IIF

0755 – 0805 Movement by ground convoy from Joint Coordination Center to FOB Freedom LZ
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
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0805 – 0810  Trans load from ground convoy to rotary wing
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0810 – 0820  En route via rotary wing movement from FOB Freedom LZ to Mosul Airport
POC: C-3 AIR DSN: (b)(6)

0820 – 0835  Trans load from rotary wing to C 17 preparations for departure
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0835 – 0925  En route via C 17 from Mosul Airport to BIAP TALCE
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0925 – 0935  Arrive BIAP TALCE via C 17 from Mosul. Trans load from C-17 to ground convoy.
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Greeted by: MAJ GEN Joe Fil and BG James Schmitters

0935 – 0945  Movement by ground convoy from BIAP TALCE to CAMP DUBLIN
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0940 – 0945  Arrive CAMP DUBLIN LZ movement by foot to Counter-Terrorism Force
Demonstration and Emergency Response Unit Demonstration area
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

0945 – 1010  Emergency Response Unit (ERU) demonstration at CAMP DUBLIN
Briefer: (b)(3), (b)(6)
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
IRAQNA MOBILE: b 6
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: b 6 DPN MOBILE: b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)

1010 – 1020  Movement by ground convoy from CAMP DUBLIN to AREA IV Counter-Terrorist
Force Demonstration
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

1020 – 1045  Counter-Terrorism Strike Force Demonstration at AREA IV
Briefer: (b)(3), (b)(6) (JSOTF CDR)
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
IRAQNA MOBILE: b 3, b 6
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)

1045 – 1055  Movement by ground convoy from AREA IV to BIAP TALCE
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

1055 – 1100  Trans load from ground convoy to rotary wing movement
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI

(b)(3), (b)(6)
1100 – 1115 En route via rotary wing movement from BIAP TALCE to TADJI Parade Field
POC: C-3 AIR DSN: (b)(6)

1115 – 1120 Arrive TADJI Parade Field movement by foot from LZ to demonstration areas
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

1120 – 1140 Combined Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) visit/brief
Principal: Stavridis, Di Rita, Luti, Lattimer
Briefer: BG James Schwiters
POC: b 3, b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: b 6
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: (b)(6) DPN MOBILE:
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)

1140 – 1155 MECH BDE Overview
IRAQI CDR: General Bashar
BRIEFER: b 3, b 6
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)

1155 – 1210 Transportation Regiment Overview
Iraqi Cdr:
Briefer: (b)(3), (b)(6)
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6) DSN: b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: b 6
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)

1210 – 1225 Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF)
Iraqi Cdr: MG Dhaher Ali Ahmed
Briefer: b 3, b 6
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)
IRAQNA MOBILE: (b)(6)
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: (b)(6) b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: b 6

1225 – 1230 Movement by foot from demonstration areas to TADJI Parade Field
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6) OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1230 – 1235 Trans load from ground transportation to rotary wing
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6) OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1235 – 1255 En route via rotary wing movement from TADJI Parade Field to LZ WASHINGTON
POC: C-3 AIR DSN: b 6

SECRET/REL USA AND MCFI
(b)(3), (b)(6)
1255 – 1300  Arrive LZ WASHINGTON trans-load from rotary wing to ground convoy
   Greeted by: General George Casey
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(5)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1300 – 1310  Movement by ground convoy from LZ WASHINGTON to AMERICAN EMBASSY
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1310 – 1315  Arrive AMERICAN EMBASSY move to SENIOR NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE
   CONFERENCE ROOM for working lunch
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1315 – 1415  Working Lunch with GEN CASEY, GEN ABIZAAD, and MG FEL in the SENIOR
   NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE Conference Room.
   Principal: VADM Stavridis, DR Luti, and Mr. Larry Di Rita
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

1415 – 1430  Media Availability
   Principal, Di Rita
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  DSN: (b)(6)

1430 – 1440  Movement by ground convoy from AMERICAN EMBASSY to IRAQI PM OFFICE
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1440 – 1525  Meeting with PM AYAD ALLAWI, DPM SALIH, and MOD SHA’ALAN at the
   PM OFFICE Principals, General Casey, Ambassador Jeffrey, VADM Stavridis,
   and Dr. Luti.
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  Cell: (b)(6)

1525 – 1535  Movement by ground convoy from PM OFFICE to LZ WASHINGTON
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1535 – 1540  Trans load from ground convoy to rotary wing
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1540 – 1550  En route via rotary wing movement from LZ WASHINGTON to BIAP TALCE
  POC: C-3 AIR DSN: (b)(6)

1550 – 1600  Movement from BIAP TALCE LZ to BIAP DV LOUNGE
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  OPS DSN: (b)(6)

1600 – 1630  Meeting with LTG JOHN VINES COMMANDER, XVIII ABN CORPS at BIAP
   DV LOUNGE Notes: Majority of delegation loads C17
   Principal, Stavridis, Di Rita, Luti, Lattimer
  POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)  DSN: (b)(6)
1630 – 1700  Police Commando Overview and QRF Demonstration at BIAP TALCE
Briefers: [b](3), [b](6)
P CO: (b)(3), (b)(6) DPN MOBILE b 6
IRAQNA MOBILE: [b](6)
MNSTC-I OPS CENTER: DSN: b 6 DPN MOBILE: [b](6)
IRAQNA MOBILE: [b](6)

1700 – 1710  Farewells and movement to C17 for departure
POC: (b)(3), (b)(6) DSN: b 6

1710  Depart BIAP for ANDREWS AFB

End of MNF-I Mission
24 hours after completion of MNF-I Mission itinerary becomes declassified.
1. Prison H/O plan - 30 days; train 600
2. Media suppression - STRATCOM
3. MAT rollout plan - details brief
4. Troop levels back down /1-DRAW
5. PSO
6. DOC
   - Details brief
   - UNA sectors
   - Coalition "drawdown" start
   - More medical forces
   - CD0 units - #4
   - Naming teams
   - Stagnation of insurgents
7. Militias plan - 30 days
8. DOS FM
9. Marine exp
10. Off ramps
The Army G2 has engaged Titan to push contract fulfillment. Current issues center around availability of cleared personnel and impacts of insurgent intimidation campaign.
Government Communications Directorate
Releases

GCD Press Releases Published
- Vehicle registration extended in Nineveh (Feb 9)
- Iraqi Security Forces capture terrorists in Nineveh (Feb 9)
- Iraqi Army frees brother of Mosul police chief (Feb 9)
- Iraqi Border Forces thwart terrorist attack (Feb 9)

GCD Releases Pending Publication
- Future 32nd Iraq Bomb Disposal Company trains with CF (Feb 9)
- As Sadiyah Iraqi Police conduct training and inventory (Feb 9)
- Insurgent minority continues to desecrate holy sites (Feb 9)
- Iraqi Security Forces continue the offensive (Feb 9)
- Iraqi Security Forces foil insurgent assassination attempt (Feb 10)
- Iraqi pilots get first-time C-130 training (Feb 10)
- Terrorists detained by ISF in Mosul (Feb 10)
- Potential recruits arrive in an-Numaniyah (Feb 10)
- Iraqi Police graduate 193 from regional basic police training (Feb 10)
- Capture of HVT Ibrahimi (Feb 10)
- VBIEDs trends down (Feb 10)
US Strength Trend in Iraq

Strength figures are for MNF-I units only and do not include CENTCOM Misc Forces (approx +9K) (Note MEF est varies between 26-31 K)
Casey, George (O-10) Embassy Annex

From: Melz Thomas F LTG MNC-I CG
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2005 3:24 PM
To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG
Cc: Defreitas III John BG MNF-IRAQ DCS INTEL; Lessel, Erwin F Brig Gen MNF-I STRATCOM Director; Molan Andrew J. (AUS 0-8); Palmer Peter J BG MNF-I DIR STRATOPES; Petraeus, David H. (O-8); Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-8) Deputy Chief of Staff, SPA; Stratman, Henry W. (O-8); Weber Joseph F MajGen MNF-I COS; Vines John R LTG MNC-I CMO Group CG; Batiste, John R. MG 1ID CG; Chiarelli, Peter W. MG; Fontaine Yves J. BG 1CC CG; Formica Richard F BG MNC-I III Corps Artillery/EFFECTS Commander; Ham, Carter BG (TFO) CDR; Natolski MajGen Richard F; CJSOTFAP Commander; Sattler LtGen John F

Subject: Thoughts on the Insurgency

Sir,

A few thoughts on the insurgency. We have almost two years of OIF data. After the '03 Ramadan and capture of HVT #1, the attacks were low and steady. Jan-Mar '03 attacks were in the 30 per day. Early in April, they rose to the 60-70 level and have stayed there since with spikes in August (MM Uprising), November (Fallujah) and January (election). With some confidence, I can say we average 70 attacks or less per day, but to make the math easy, let's use 70 AIF attacks per day.

If you assume each attack is supported by ten insurgents, then 700 are active daily. Let's also assume they work one day on and one day off, giving us a total of 1,400 active insurgents who cause the attacks daily. The MNF-I C-2 has recently estimated the insurgency to have between 13,040 and 15,340 participants. For ease of math again, let's use 14,000 as the size of the insurgency. If this estimate is any where near true and held against the math of the first paragraph, which is based on hard data and reasonable assumptions, then only 10% of the insurgents are active.

We can also show over the past year that when the insurgent surges, his lethality goes down. Thus, when he tries to get more than his hardcore group into the fight, it does not pay off for him. Albeit subjective, I believe this number of attacks relationship with the lethality informs us that the core of the insurgency is small. I think it is well resourced because when they want to surge they can, but training, materials and TTP limit what the surge can do - witness the election. Thus, finding the leadership, the head of the snake, is much more important than cutting
off the tail of the snake, which we have done rather well over the past year.

My above argument is another way to get at how important our IO effort is. With what I believe is a very small number of hardcore insurgents, the enemy gets enormous credit for his activities because they are so flexible and innovative with their IO effort. They whip us each day in cyber space and over the broadcast media. Because everyone wants to print bad news, the AIF does very well in the print media too knowing that the international media will react very quickly to news releases especially if they contain negative information. We must counter the mis-reports, but in this culture it is too late to make much of an impact. We've got to get faster, more agile, more flexible, and be willing to take some risk knowing mistakes will be made. But we simply can't give a major part of the battlespace to the enemy especially now that we are into the Information Age. In theory, we have worked the past twenty years in the Army not to fight the first battle of the last war. I'm more fearful each day that history will show how we continued to fight the first battle of the last war, because we didn't recognize how to fight the IO war.

The AIF's IO successes are worth battalions of fighters to him. We don't need more fighters. We need to invest in winning the IO war and doing just as you have the campaign headed, growing the Iraqi capacity to deal with the insurgency. Concurrently with growing the ISF's kinetic capability, we need to help them learn how to win the IO campaign. I'm not so sure we will be good teachers, but if we put the right priority our great Nation and Coalition should be able to win an IO campaign.

This is my story, and I plan to stick with it unless you have other guidance.

VR,
Metz
CG Discussion Topics for SECDEF Lunch, 11 Feb 05

Intell

- Within Iraq, attacks were down from yesterday (65 to 44) but remain consistent with pre-election levels. There are no changes to our major city ‘permissive environment’ assessments.

- Insurgent groups continue planning to conduct attacks in support of their intimidation campaign, with a focus on leaders and personnel of the security services.
  - Reports indicate that two unidentified groups are planning to assassinate senior security officials or kidnap their family members
  - Insurgents are reportedly seeking information on the location of a senior former Iraqi intelligence official working with the Iraqi Security Forces in Baghdad. They are reportedly monitoring his known last residence in Fallujah with hopes of kidnapping his family members
  - A group associated with Zarqawi is reportedly planning to ambush a police QRF.

- Various Insurgent groups are present and active along the Tigris River valley corridor in Salah ad Din province (including the population centers of Bayji, Tikrit, Samarra, and Balad).
  - FRE in the area include leaders and members of the former Republican Guard and Intelligence Service who operate in small cells ranging in size from around 10 to 20 people.
  - The capture on 8 Feb 05 of a FRE organizer and financier (Abdullah Mahir Abdul Rasheed, brother-in-law of deceased Qusay Hussein) in Tikrit is expected to have a significant impact on regional FRE operations.
  - As the Sunni heartland, this is the largest concentration of Sunni Arab Rejectionists (SAR).
  - The 20 to 30 FRE and SAR cells estimated to be active in the area probably total about 500 to 600 insurgents, with several hundred more supporters potentially in the pipeline.
  - While these cells conduct their activities primarily outside the larger cities, Tikrit, with its strong ties to the former regime, is assessed to be the region’s primary coordination base.
  - Bayji has been the focus of infrastructure attacks due to the presence of a major oil refinery. This facility will continue to be targeted by the insurgents intent on disrupting our reconstruction efforts.
  - Extremist groups are assessed to be a mix of locals and foreign fighters, including members of the Zarqawi network.
SECRET

- Current Strategic Assessment:
  - Elections endorsed as free and fair by the U.N. and Arab world, enhancing perceptions of legitimacy among Sunnis and set conditions for ITG engagement with moderate Sunnis willing to become part of the process.
  - Despite disruption by MNF forces, attacks by Sunni insurgents will remain at current levels, be directed against the same targets and use previously-observed tactics.
  - The security situation will improve only if Sunnis perceive the ITG as legitimate, representative of Sunni interests and willing to accommodate Sunni participation.
  - Elections will have no impact on terrorist (AMZ, AS) strategic goals. Their campaign of violence and intimidation will continue.
  - FRE remain primary threat to long-term security and stability.

STRATCOM

- Strategic Communications plan supporting the election was highly successful.
  - Extensive interagency coordination.
  - Effective integration and use of public diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations tools and capabilities.
- Could not have achieved this level of success without this pioneering organizational structure and the integrated, supportive efforts of all organizations (OSD, JCS, CENTCOM, State, US Embassy, MNC-I, etc.)
- Capacity of Iraqi government to conduct strategic communications proved effective during the pre-election period and continues to improve.

STRATOPNS

General Theme – Maintain momentum of election through the transition

A. MATS / PATS / Partnering – (lead with SPA).

B. Command and Control of ISF / LNOs – FUOPS / NJOC / COORD & SYNCH

1. NJOC and other CP manning/equipping/comms, etc.
2. ISF leaves – authorized? Immediate impact in Mosul
3. Intention to write to MOD and MOI requesting agreement to deployment plan for IAF and Special Police formations and units.
SECRET

a. Purpose is to confirm supporting deployments between Feb and Jul.
b. Priority is to maintain required level of military and special police support in Mosul, Samarra, Fallujah/Ramadi but deployment plan will signpost unit moves needed to bring ISF into line with longer term basing and partnering plans.
c. In the meantime, would ask that units remain in support of MNF-W, MND-CN and MNB-NW and coordinate leave rotation plans with their supported coalition HQ.

C. Iraqi Government Officials Security through transition –

1. Tier I Protection. We think that we can transition security to Iraqi PSD for all the current Top 5 except Allawi whom we will continue to protect until Dec 05. We will brief the current Top 5 Chiefs of Staff that if they are not elected, we will turn over responsibility for security to their Iraqi details.
   
   1) Protection for Iraqi National Assembly Members. Protection of the Legislative Members is an Iraqi responsibility. The MoI will provide weapons and some equipment for their familial PSD. The National Assembly members will likely seek funding to pay their bodyguards and drivers from the ITG.


a. We do not yet know the site for the First Meeting. The two options include:

1) The Convention Center.
   • Advantages. Site of the National Conference and subsequent National Counsel Meetings, this site has proven to be a safe and secure location that is within the US controlled IZ. We can provide MNF1 badge to the Iraqi principals on the first day.
   • Disadvantage: Iraqis would prefer to have their own site for which they can control access.

2) The Old Parliament Building.
   • Advantages. This is the traditional site of the Iraqi Parliament. It is 1500 meters North of Rasheed Hotel outside the IZ. It has been refurbished and the building itself is impressive and appropriate for a legislative building. There is sufficient parking for the 275 members.
   • Disadvantages. It is located next to the bus station in the proximity of Shak Maroof and Haifa Street (within direct fire range of RPGs). Security perimeter needs extensive engineering work to improve stand off. Current stand off is only 100 feet on West side of the building. Security force is untrained and ill equipped.

SECRET
4. We are assisting the Iraqi Government in weighing these options in close coordination with US Mission Deputy Chief of Mission and Regional Security Officer. Our current best estimate is that the first several Assembly meetings must take place in the Convention centre.

D. Ashura security –

1. MOI has the lead-- MG Eyden
2. Holy Sites are located in: Najaf, Kabarla, Kufa, Baghdad (Kadhimiya Shrine), and Samarra.
3. MOI plan is to mirror the polling center security plan: inner ring (MOI), outer ring (MOD), QRF (MNF)
4. Intention to ban weapons, vehicles and impose curfews in those areas to prevent insurgents from setting up IEDs in the evenings.
5. Checkpoints along highways leading to Holy Sites to conduct random searches.
6. Increased scrutiny along [table entries: 1.4b, 1.4d]
7. Potential MNF-I support:
   - QRF to assist, if needed.
   - Prepared to assist in mass casualty evacuation
   - Increased MNF-I support along Iraq [table entries: 1.4b, 1.4d]
   - Air and ground patrols to counter potential indirect fire from fields and farms in range of the holy sites (MOD will patrol Najaf cemetery)
   - Air patrols on the Baghdad to Kabarla Highway
   - CCTV equipment for crowd surveillance in Najaf and Kabarla
   - CRITICAL NOTE: Awaiting letter from MOI requesting MNF-I support. Reported at JPG that the letter is drafted, but has not been signed or delivered.

8. Infrastructure Security – CMO

1. Highlight on Bayji-Baghdad (W) 400kv security
   a. Currently 51 towers are down/damaged along a 120 km stretch of line between Baghdad and Bayji
   b. Power line provides redundant transmission capability to Baghdad from the north
   c. MOE currently making repairs – ECD: 25 Feb 05
   d. AIF threatening repair crews – security is an issue
   e. CF has offered to assist with security but moe has declined
   f. Power lines do not run in the same area where the corps is providing oil pipeline security
2. Bayji to Baghdad pipeline interdictions

a. ALF and looting have rendered these pipelines inoperable at least 34 times in the past 3.5 months
b. 21 of these interdictions fall within the high threat areas identified by FRAGO 519
c. 22” product pipeline has been repaired as of 10 Feb.
d. 12/16” crude oil pipeline has two breaks currently under repair
e. 16” natural gas pipeline has two breaks currently under repair

3. Iraqi establishment and the C2 of commodity “Protection Services” - Strategic Infrastructure Security Leadership Assistance:

1) Situation: The momentum of the will displayed by the Iraqi populace for their historic election must be kept alive by keeping basic Iraqi utility services functioning.

2) Major concern: Loss of public support and trust in political process to prevent significant attacks that would disrupt or shut down essential services to the people of Iraq. Recent threat warnings and attacks to infrastructure is a clear sign of the desire of the insurgent to kill the momentum that is building within the Iraqi populace and their display of enthusiasm to be self-reliant.

3) Recommendation: It is critical that Coalition Forces through TF 14a provide proper assistance to strategic infrastructure forces to maintain essential services to the population of Iraq. Request approval of TF 14a mission to assist Iraq’s strategic infrastructure security as follows:

1) Provide immediate authorization of personnel requirements (120 positions); in support of Oil, Electricity, and Rail infrastructures at the Division, Brigade, and Battalion levels.
2) Approve requisition of 16 mission essential Armored/Heavy Weapon vehicles to support operations throughout the area of operation.
3) Allocate $100 million for site improvements and mission capability requirements for infrastructure security projects that are a must to secure and harden protection sites.

SPA

Coalition Force Reduction Strategy and Post-1546 Military Framework for Iraq:

- With election success, the Iraqis have taken the first step in achieving UNSCR 1546.
SECRET

- Generation of some 80+ battalions over the last 7-8 months (PM Allawi had 1 Battalion at his disposal at Transfer of Sovereignty) is an accomplishment.
- Iraqi units are still “green;” troops, units and leaders need further training, experience, “seasoning” and leadership development.
- Lessons of the past tell us that we cannot “rush them to failure” (Vietnam).
- This insurgency will likely last well beyond 2005; we must develop capacity in ISF units and institutions to assume responsibility for the COIN campaign, eventually independent of Coalition support.
- Coalition partnership with and embedding assistance teams in Iraqi units and working on a “train-fight-train” cycle should provide the training, experience, “seasoning” and leader development necessary for independent capability.
- This is what drives the MNF-I 2005 strategy: transition the counterinsurgency campaign to the Iraqi government and security forces.
- Given improvements, Iraqi capacity for independent counterinsurgency operations should allow Coalition presence to be reduced to levels acceptable to both the Iraqi people and our own populations, while remaining relevant to the situation in Iraq.
- This will require continued Coalition partnering with the Iraqi's including formation of a combined headquarters that will allow us to leave a functional and operational C2 capacity as we are able to reduce further in 2006.
- This approach will transform the coalition presence and secure our strategic investment. Partnership is the best ways to development of independent ISF.
- Coalition force reductions will almost certainly mark an improving security situation that may attract more multinational participation in late 2005 and throughout 2006.
- ISF effectiveness and the security of Iraq should be the measure of merit. Force posture adjustments must be conditions based and subject to periodic assessment.
- Conditions include ISF capacity for effective, independent counterinsurgency operations and maintenance of domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment, Iraqi security ministry capacity, ISF organization, training, equipment and leadership capabilities, support of the population, and intensity of the insurgency.
- We can assume coalition support will be required to sustain progress in civil-military operations and economic development.
- We can assume ISF will continue to require augmentation and assistance in 2006, including in-extremist air support/ISR/Maritime/High-end SOF. A post UNSCR-1546 force should integrate command and control between US-led, coalition forces and Iraqi forces with the objective of handing off command and control to the Iraqis.
- Coalition force disposition in Iraq should be based on Iraqi security requirements.
- The force is part of combined Coalition-Iraqi forces, including US training efforts, but will likely be distinct from NATO training efforts.
PME

Iraq and National Unity Challenges

- Major challenge for IG will be establishing and maintaining national unity.
  - Kurdish population mainly against unity and wants independence
  - Significant section of Sunni population likely to feel excluded
  - Shia restrained political and military aspirations as they gain from process
- These identity fault-lines reinforced by elections process
  - Most parties concentrated on their client identity groups for votes
  - Once election results declared, leaders may choose to increase gains through aggressive political maneuvering and the use of force.
- Insurgency will continue to target these divisions to foment civil unrest in order to make country ungovernable.
- The IG, therefore, needs an effective strategy to establish national unity which should address the following issues in order of priority:

Kurds:
- Explain to the Iraqi people the process by which the issues of autonomy, the Green Line, IDPs and the TAL Art 58 will be resolved
  - Demonstrate visible progress on Article 58 by the newly established committee under Hamid Mousa
- Encourage Kurdish political leaders to educate their public on value of Iraqi unity

Sunni:
- Announce and immediately begin Sunni inclusion measures/options
  - A parallel de-Baathification policy should be enacted to rehabilitate those ex-Baathists not responsible for serious crimes
- Sunnis especially targeted by global jihadist ideology
  - Consider IO campaign to articulate theological case for religious tolerance and representative government

Shia:
- Engage Arab countries to win recognition and support at earliest opportunity to allay Sunni fears
- Find ways to demonstrate 1.4b, 1.4d not determining Iraqi policy

MAJOR POINTS OF EMPHASIS:

National Unity linked to Constitutional process:
- Green line, IDPs and TAL Art 58 will feature as issue of debate
- Autonomy, Federalism and ‘Independence’ argued
SECRET

- Sunni representation essential to acceptability and credibility of Constitution
- How to mitigate concerns over 14b, 14d in Constitution

SUBJECT: “Maintaining the Momentum in Key Post-Battle Cities”

GOAL: To enhance legitimacy and build public confidence in the Iraqi government by addressing near-term governance and security issues; implementing pledged projects in key cities to provide essential services and economic recovery; and setting the conditions for a successful constitutional development process.

CURRENT SITUATION:

Fallujah
- The acting mayor is unsuitable and the city council is not viable.
- The majority of the security is being handled by the Marines -- ISF has personnel in the city working with the MEF.
- Implementation of government’s most contentious issue: compensation plan for damaged homes /businesses.
- The IIG pledged $100M for reconstruction but project starts have progressed slowly.
- MNF-I has provided $6.8M to energize the local economy and allocated an additional $100M for reconstruction efforts -- USAID pledged $15M.
- The ITG needs to appoint a mayor and city council in Fallujah to relieve the MEF of the responsibility for city administration.
- Show progress with the compensation plan.

Mosul
- Mayor supports the central government but anti-coalition sentiment remains high. Insurgent forces continue to destabilize the security environment.
- Chief of police was recently appointed; however, the IPS has problems with infrastructure, equipment, funding and training.
- The Provincial Governor of Ninewa requested $15.4M for reconstruction and economic development promised by the IIG -- no progress.
- Following through on this commitment is a crucial underpinning to regional trust in the central government.

Samarra
- The city council is a mixture of AIF sympathizers and supporters of the IIG. The ITG should immediately purge AIF sympathizers from the city council.
- The local police are in disarray although a new chief of police was appointed.
- Approximately 70% of men aged 18-35 are unemployed.
SECRET

• The IIG has pledged to spend $25.0M on reconstruction – slow start, must re-energize

An Najaf
• A fuel crisis exists particularly with regard to kerosene for cooking and heating oil.
• The IIG pledged to match $100M committed by MNF-I for economic development and reconstruction projects in the city but no projects are in progress. Project delivery has been slow.
• The ITG needs to immediately act to improve fuel availability and distribution.

Baghdad
• Baghdad has a functioning mayor and city council -- central government is committed and working hard.
• IRRF funded projects succeeding in Tharwa (Sadr) City.
• The IIG pledged significant funds for reconstruction and economic development but project implementation is slow.
• Continue the rapid reconstruction program and honor commitments in Sadr City while assessing needs in other parts of the city.

MAJOR POINTS OF EMPHASIS:

1. Emphasize a proactive approach to security through aggressive patrolling and ISF presence to maintain pressure on insurgent forces, protect Iraqi citizens and infrastructure, and demonstrate the resolve and capability of the ITG.

2. Rapidly reconstitute IPS strength and capabilities to provide security, deny ALF freedom of movement, and minimize the presence of MNF-I forces.

3. Take action to honor the commitments of the IIG with regard to compensation, reconstruction and economic development.

4. Establish a rapid, centralized contracting capability within the ministry of housing/construction to replace the existing decentralized system.

5. Establish dialogue with key leaders in key post-battle cities and work with the city governments to begin holding town council meetings as a means to inform and engage local citizens in preparation for the constitutional referendum.

6. Promote inclusion theme and democratic principles in information campaigns.
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- Vision: A "federal, democratic, pluralistic, and unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights." (UNSCR 1546)
- Goals: Suppress the insurgency through military operations and political development
- Bottom Line: "Iraq's destiny belongs to Iraqis"

TERRORISM – INSURGENCY – SECURITY:

- The insurgents want to:
  - Derail Iraq’s constitutional process
  - Prevent the country’s evolution from a security state to the rule of law

- Our response:
  - Progressively increase Iraq’s role in the counter-insurgency
  - Conditions-based force reduction strategy
  - Negotiate longer term security relationship
  - Accomplished through Military Assistance and Police Assistance Teams

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

- UNSCR 1546 and Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) must be honored:
  - Negotiate a constitution – UN prepared to assist
  - Support the Transitional National Assembly -- inclusiveness

- Islam will be reflected in the rule of law  ⇒ Faith, Freedom and Tolerance can coexist in an Islamic context

GOVERNANCE – ECONOMY – DIPLOMACY – COMMUNICATION:
With international support, Iraq can and should become a regional source of growth, stability and democratic innovation.

Iraqis will expect advances in effective governance in both the short and long term.

Support interconnectivity between the federal, provincial and local levels.

Economic reform with special attention to the Iraqi banking system.

Reinforce counterinsurgency operations by pressing neighbor countries to engage a with new, stable, non-threatening and democratic Iraq.

Enabled by a broad scheme of public dialogue, strategic communications and exchange.
SECRET

Information For SECDEF Use

INTELLIGENCE

- Insurgents are now reassessing the impact of the elections on their goals and strategy. Sunni groups, some who are now supporting the electoral process, will keep their political options open, contributing to an eroding of the insurgent's support base. With successful elections we support an inclusive policy to help shape the way ahead.

- Various insurgent groups are present and active and attack levels are expected to stay near current levels. The insurgency is now in a window of vulnerability, but the opportunity is fleeting. We must collectively continue to fight the insurgents at every level, continuing the momentum we have established to date.

- Continue to work with and develop a strategic intelligence system, linked across the nation. This system will help gain and maintain a secure environment and help the ISF keep the insurgents and terrorists on the run and protect the people of Iraq. We must continue to train our intelligence analysis at all levels to understand how to fight the enemy, see him on this complex battlefield, and defeat him.

- Continue to engage neighbors to gain strategic partnership in the war on terror — protect the borders, foster economic growth, and gain and maintain stability for a prosperous Iraq and region.

Strategic Operations

- IIG to ITG Security Transition
  - Ability of Iraq to protect its own political leadership.

- Infrastructure Security
  - Improve Iraq Interagency process.
  - Develop and improve Iraqi Infrastructure Security Forces.
  - High payoff, in terms of demonstrating legitimacy to Iraqis. Relatively smaller investment in terms of training and equipping than other security forces.

- Border Security
  - Improving operations at legal checkpoints.
  - Developing and enhancing communications with technology and training.
  - Improving border fort infrastructure with reconstruction
• Partnership
  o Vehicle to pass responsibility for the Security Line of Operation to Iraqis.
  o Effective 01 March 2005.

Strategic Communications

• Iraqi communication efforts are effective and will continue to improve as the communications infrastructure matures
• Press conferences held by Iraqi officials such as you the Prime Minister, and other senior ministers, are going well and proving effective among U.S. and international audiences polls clearly indicate such
• We will continue to assist the Iraqis and will turn over the Coalition Information Press Center (CPIC) operations before the next elections
• Iraq’s elections were viewed in the U.S. as successful, and have generated a feeling of brotherhood and respect for Iraqis among Americans

Strategy, Plans and Assessments

• PM’s leadership decisive to securing Iraq’s freedom and a bright future
  o Rolled back the insurgency—stood down their challenge in Najaf, Fallujah, Samarra, and Mosul, denied them any success on election day
  o Developed an increasingly capable ISF—IIG initiative essential (police commandos, mechanized brigades, etc.)—ISF stood tall on election day
  o Achieved stability in 14 of 18 provinces (NOTE overall violence below 1970’s N. Ireland; violence in 14 provinces lower than violent crime other nations’ cities)
  o Laid the groundwork for political transformation of the nation of Iraq
  o The PM and ministers are to be congratulated; they have much to be proud of
• 2005’s focus – Transition the counterinsurgency campaign to ISF and successfully complete the UNSCR 1546 process. Key elements:
Partner with and embed teams into Iraqi units to enable ISF to keep the insurgents and terrorists on the run and to protect the people of Iraq

- Build on momentum in Mosul, Fallujah, Baghdad, North Babil, and Samarra
- Deny insurgents and terrorists any opportunity to reestablish sanctuary in Iraq
- Secure the political process and establishment of elected governments at the provincial and national levels – governance is our main effort
- Leverage political progress to create inclusiveness and unity in the new Iraq
- Strategic Communications discredit insurgents, enhance ISF confidence, increase public support for the ISF, and reinforce faith in the political process
- Establish conditions for drafting of constitution, referendum and election

- Coalition Transition
  - Will stay only as long as needed—defined by Iraq’s leaders
  - PM’s 6 conditions-based steps are prudent and align with our approach—how much is too much, too soon? Thoughts on presence in 2006?
  - We will move forward together; intend to brief all ISF commanders soon
  - Our focus is independent ISF capacity to complement a maturing Iraqi state

- Other issues
  - Begin now to think about our collective long-term interests
  - Economic development requires time and is essential to securing Iraq’s future, including economic reforms and support from donor countries and institutions
  - Iraq’s external security and territorial integrity is best secured through diplomacy and building relationships with neighboring states
  - Enhance Iraqi ministries and improve national thru local government links

- Allawi issues: reinforce national unity, bolster security and judicial institutions, create a modern constitution, include Sunnis, public education on the constitutional process, inclusion of UNAMI, US engagement to ensure a unified and secular Iraq

\[ \text{PME} \]

**Iraq and National Unity Challenges**

- Major challenge for ITG will be establishing and maintaining national unity.
  - Kurdish population mainly against unity and wants independence
  - Significant section of Sunni population likely to feel excluded
  - Shia restrained political and military aspirations as they gain from process
- These identity fault-lines reinforced by elections process
SECRET

- Most parties concentrated on their client identity groups for votes
- Once election results declared, leaders may choose to increase gains through aggressive political maneuvering and the use of force.
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- Economic reform with special attention to the Iraqi banking system
- Reinforce counterinsurgency operations by pressing neighbor countries to engage a with new, stable, non-threatening and democratic Iraq
- Enabled by a broad scheme of public dialogue, strategic communications and exchange
US Strength Trend in Iraq

Strength figures are for MNF-I units only and do not include CENTCOM Misc Forces (approx +9K) (Note MEF est varies between 26-31 K)
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**Graph and Notes:**

- **AS OF: 2/11**
- **OIF 3/04-06**
- **VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS**
- **SUPPORT TO CAMPAIGN AND PUBLIC CHALLENGE PERIOD**
- **POST ELECTIONS SUPPORT**
- **SUPPORT ELECTIONS**
Security Transition:

Opportunities for Reductions and Off Ramps
Assumptions

- Iraqi Transitional Government will remain committed to MNF-I presence and the UNSCR 1546 process

- Insurgency will continue at roughly the present level throughout 2005 in Sunni areas; security situation across the country will not be uniform

- Properly resourced, trained, and supported, Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations

- Iraqi Security Force development will progress as programmed; performance will improve with the Assistance Team concept

- Integrated civil-military action will be required longer than coalition combat formations

- Coalition partners will support new concepts and force posture adjustments, but within their current areas of responsibility

- External support to insurgents will continue, but at reduced levels as Iraqi border forces become more capable

Sharaka wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding
## 2005 Security Transition Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build Iraqi capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progressively transition counterinsurgency responsibility to capable ISF — Conditions-based</td>
<td>Police</td>
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<td>Adjust Coalition force posture and reduce presence</td>
<td>Borders</td>
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<td>Continue ISF development</td>
<td>Army Brigade and Division Headquarters</td>
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<td>Improve Iraqi Government capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations</td>
<td>MOD/MOI Institutional Capacity</td>
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<td>Transform nature of coalition</td>
<td>Integrated Iraqi counterinsurgency planning and execution</td>
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<td>Force Protection</td>
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<td>Continuous Force Transition</td>
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ISF Development and Potential Security Handoff
MND-North Center

Salah ad Din  Partners 30 Bde

Diyala  Partners 32 Bde

At Tamim  Partners 31 & 33 Bde

ISF

CF LOCAL OVERWATCH  ISF STRENGTH/CAPACITY FOR IRAQI CONTROL

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Projected Security Transition

Assessment of progress towards Iraqi Regional Control

Assessment of progress towards Iraqi National Control / Coalition Transformation

Pre-Referendum / Election Assessment

20 US Brigades

Referendum / Election Period

234K

272K

Iraqi Forces

17 US Brigades

13-17 US Brigades (-)

10-17 US Brigades (-)

6-10 US Brigades (-)

6-7 US Brigades (-)

Coalition Forces
Projected Security Transition

Assessment of progress towards Iraqi Regional Control

Assessment of progress towards Iraqi National Control / Coalition Transformation

Pre-Referendum / Election Assessment

- 20 US Brigades
- 17 US Brigades
- NL Withdraws
- PL Draws Down Ukraine Withdraws Total 4 Brigades
- Referendum / Election Period
- 10 US Brigades
- Est 2 Brigades
- 6-10 US Brigades (-)
- 6-7 US Brigades (-)

234K

272K

Iraqi Forces

Coalition Forces

JAN 05 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN 05 JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 05 JAN 06 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN 06 JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 06

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## Potential Off Ramp Opportunities

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Sharaka wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding
Assistance Teams

Implementation Brief

This briefing is classified
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REL NODI
Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: X1
Phase II: Transition to Self-Reliance

- **Liberation**
  - CJTF / MNF-I
  - CPA
  - June 2003

- **Occupation**
  - MNF-I
  - 28 June 2004

- **Partnership**
  - IIIG / ITG
  - Developing ISF
  - Advice from US (and other) Missions
  - Elections Jan 2005
  - After January 2006

- **Self-Reliance**
  - Military Alliances
  - Constitutionally elected representative Government, capable ISF
  - Diplomatic Relations
Situation

- Insurgency will continue at roughly present level throughout 2005 in Sunni areas; security situation across the country will not be uniform

- Iraqi Armed Forces and Special Police will have 80+ battalions by February and will be largely trained and equipped by mid-2005. Police and Border Police training will extend into 2006

- Iraqi Security Forces are gaining expertise, but most are unable to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations

- The longer Coalition forces carry the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the more dependent the Iraqis will be on the Coalition

- Counterinsurgency operations historically take years to achieve success

- Post – election turbulence in Iraqi government will impact pace at which ministry counterinsurgency capacity can increase

- Demonstration that coalition presence is not permanent will enhance ITG legitimacy

- Need to build on momentum of 30 January elections
Mission and End State

Mission

In partnership with the ITG, MNF-I progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF by developing Iraqi security forces and ITG security ministries while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process and the sustainment of political and economic development.

End State

Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists.
Strategy: Transition to Self-Reliance

"We will increasingly focus our efforts on helping prepare more capable Iraqi security forces... As those forces become more self-reliant ... America and its coalition partners will increasingly be in a supporting role"

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2005

- Progressively shift our main effort from fighting the counterinsurgency to building Iraqi capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations at the local, regional and national levels

- Accomplish this by:
  - Partnering Iraqi and Coalition forces and embedding Coalition assistance teams with Iraqi military and police units to improve their confidence and operational effectiveness
  - Improve security ministry capabilities to direct counterinsurgency operations

- As conditions warrant, transition areas of Iraq to capable Iraqi security forces and assign Coalition forces to a supporting role with a less visible presence and adapt the nature of the Coalition presence
What Are Assistance Teams?

- Eight to ten person teams
- Under Coalition command
- Specifically tailored to help Iraqi military forces, special police, border units and government ministries develop capability to assume the counter insurgency fight
- Embedded - they live and work with Iraqi forces
- Operate on Train - Fight - Train cycle
- Initially built "out of hide" from in place units, then augmented to full capacity
- Supported by Special Forces in an area support role
- Total personnel commitment of about 2500 at full implementation in DEC 05/JAN 06
- Each team equipped with:
  - Armored HMMWV
  - Blue Force Tracker
  - Individual/Crew served weapons
  - Medic

Sharaka wa Tarahum - Partnership and Understanding

2005 SECDEF ASST. 2/10/2005

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

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Redacted for Release
How Do They Operate?

- Teams will assist units in the following areas:
  - Individual and unit tactics
  - Counterinsurgency Warfare
  - Urban Combat
  - Communications
  - Military Decision Making
  - Sustainment/Logistics
  - Command & Control
  - Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance
  - Leadership
  - Teamwork

- Command and Control
  - Assistance Teams are under Coalition command and in direct support of their Iraqi unit
  - Assistance Teams are attached to the Coalition division charged with the partnership mission

- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
  - Assistance Teams operate under the same ROE as their Coalition Partner units
  - All forces operate under the Law of Armed Conflict; violations must be stopped and reported through both chains

- Logistics: support to MAT teams comes from Coalition units

- Force Protection: Coalition unit provides force protection support and quick reaction forces

Transferring counterinsurgency responsibility to the Iraqis is our main effort
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Iraqi Security Forces</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Designates Divisions and Brigades to partner with Coalition units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Receives and accepts Coalition Force MATs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Commitments</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Iraqi Commanders receive advice from US commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commitment of Iraqi Commanders to fully support development efforts and operate in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide Force Protection, logistical and administrative support to Iraqi units, and provide secure operating environment for teams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>MNF-I</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Establishes Military Assistance Teams (MATs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Advises Iraqi commanders on operations and training and works for Coalition commanders</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Counterinsurgency Operations</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Provide access to Coalition effects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a Joint commitment to create an ISF capable of sustained, independent counterinsurgency operations.

Sharaka wa Tafa'amu - Partnership and Understanding

SEDEF ASST - 2102005
# Assistance Team Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Assistance Team (MAT)</th>
<th>Special Police Assistance Team (SPAT)</th>
<th>Border Assistance Team (BAT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedded team that provides advisory support and direct access to coalition effects</td>
<td>Embedded team that provides advisory support and direct access to coalition effects</td>
<td>Embedded team that provides advisory support and direct access to coalition effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhances ability of Iraqi Army units — from battalion to division — to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations</td>
<td>Enhances the ability of Iraqi Special Police units — from battalion to division — to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations</td>
<td>Enhances ability of Iraqi Border Forces from battalion to regional headquarters to secure borders in a counterinsurgency environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAT Composition** — 10 per team
- Division team: COL/LTC plus 9
- Brigade team: LTC/MAJ plus 9
- Battalion team: MAJ plus 9

**SPAT Composition**
- 8 per team (plus paramilitary police expert)

**Personnel (Officers and NCOs):**
- 1760 from units in theater
- 500 additional

**Personnel (Officers and NCOs):**
- 264 additional

**Personnel (Officers and NCOs):**
- 260 additional

**Sustained personnel requirement under full structure — 2500 personnel**
Partnership
Risk

- Key risk areas:
  - Coalition soldiers are in more places and more dispersed
  - Coalition forces operating in smaller numbers and at longer distances from their parent units
  - Assistance Teams will be living and operating with Iraqi forces

- Mitigation Measures
  - Coalition teams are equipped with self defense, communications and Blue Force tracking equipment
  - Parent units will perform a risk assessment and add additional assets on a case by case basis
  - Parent units form quick reaction forces that operate on an area basis
  - We have experience with missions of this type from AST team operations
## 05/06 Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAN 05</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN 05</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC 05</th>
<th>JAN 06</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN 06</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC 06</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment**

- Form Partnerships between Iraqi and coalition units by 1 March
- Form Assistance Teams from deployed units by 1 April
- Form remaining Assistance Teams by 1 June
- Transition to standing Assistance Group by 1 JAN 06
- Full Implementation

---

**Build C4I Intelligence and Security Ministry Capacity**

**Sharaka wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding**
Way Ahead

- Get ITG buy – in for way ahead

- Begin transition to Assistance Team Concept; process request for forces for augmentation teams

- Strengthen ministry advisory teams

- Get Iraqi decision and support for Iraqi counterinsurgency lead

- Develop Public Affairs and Congressional notification strategy

- Develop plans for Coalition transformation
Concept of Operation

- 1 February – begin phased transition shifting MNF-I focus to growing the ISF capability to perform independent counterinsurgency and security operations.

- Military Assistance Teams (MATs), Special Police Assistance Teams (SPATs), and Border Assistance Teams (BATs) will be embedded with each Iraqi battalion, brigade, and division headquarters.
  - The majority of the MATs will be taken out of hide and be fully operational by 1 April (1760 personnel).
  - Remaining MATs (500 augmentation personnel), and all SPATs (264 augmentation personnel) and BATs (260 augmentation personnel), will be new forces and become operational between April and June (Total augmentation: ~1400, including headquarters personnel).

- Police Assistance Teams (PATs)
  - Proof of principle (1 Feb – 31 May) in four cities (Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra, Fallujah).

- Intelligence Assistance Teams (IATs) in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense.

- An assessment in June will allow MNF-I to capture lessons and make mid-course adjustments.

- All teams will be under command of coalition commanders. MNC-I will exercise operational control of all teams except SPATs, which will remain under MNSTC-I.

- Goal is to build in ISF a capability to conduct independent brigade operations, with MNC-I providing indirect fires and area support Quick Reaction Forces.

- In April, MNF-I establishes a purpose-built Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional). Its Assistance Teams will replace interim Assistance Teams taken out of hide from the Corps.
## Bottom Line—Personnel Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total initial requirement</th>
<th>Filled from MNF</th>
<th>Requested augmentation</th>
<th>December / January requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance Teams</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Assistance Teams</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Assistance Teams</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Assistance Teams</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Training Augmentation Teams*</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Advisory Group Headquarters</td>
<td>1 HQ (Provisional)</td>
<td>(partial)</td>
<td>1 HQ (Provisional)</td>
<td>1 HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>242 teams (+HQ)</td>
<td>1255 teams</td>
<td>137 teams (+ HQ)</td>
<td>222 teams (+ HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~ 3100 total</td>
<td>~ 1700 total</td>
<td>~1400 total</td>
<td>~2450 total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Linguist Requirements

- CAT I Local nationals (no security clearance required)
- Short Linguists now: 1500
- MAT Linguist requirement: 1200
- Total MNF-I shortage: 2700
Approaching the Iraqi Transitional Government

- While there will probably be continuity in the new government, especially beneath the ministerial level, we can expect a number of ministers and other principals to be new to government. We should plan now to brief senior officials of the Transitional Government with two purposes:
  - to ensure a common understanding of the current situation, plans, and programs, and
  - to get Transitional Government support or concurrence for our requirements.

- We should also be prepared for the new government to raise issues on which they may seek our agreement. Timing: although the Transitional Administrative Law provides up to six weeks for a cabinet to be selected and empowered, the process could move much faster.

  - We should be prepared for initial discussions with incoming officials by February 15th or as soon thereafter as they are identified or take office.

Key dates in 2005:

Feb 15- Mar 15: Formation of Iraqi Transitional Government

June 8: Security Council review of multinational force (MNF) mandate under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546

October 15: Ratification of Permanent Constitution

December 15: Election of New Government

December 31: Installation of New Government.

December 31: Expiration of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (based on completion of the political process)

Topics we might brief for informational purposes:

- MNF-I Iraq Campaign Plan and transition to Iraqi local and regional control
- The status and roles of the military in a democratic society
- Iraqi Security Forces (including military and police) train-and-equip program
• Coordination with MNF-I, including planning and conducting combined operations

Topics we might raise to seek Iraq concurrence or support:

• Developing the ministries and coordinating with them

• Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (this would enable U.S. forces to provide direct logistics support to Iraqi military forces in the field)

• Defense Attaché exchange

• Common strategy for the required Security Council review of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (June 8, 2005). (Note: we and the Iraqis should be prepared to counter French or other demands for a Coalition withdrawal at the end of 2005.)

Topics the Iraqis may raise with us:

• Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA-like protections are currently afforded to the MNF pursuant to CPA Order No. 17 (revised), which like all CPA orders will remain in effect until “rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.” (TAL, Art. 27(C)). Therefore, the ITG could through legislation decide to rescind or amend CPA Order No. 17. Although it is too early to know whether the ITG would want to enact such legislation, should it do so we would need to engage in negotiations of a SOFA.

• Longer-term Basing Arrangements. (We may want to consider combining SOFA and facilities access provisions for the long term into a single text for negotiation.)

• Other specific issues, e.g., MNF-I’s authority to detain persons, U.S. current use of property such as the International Zone and portions of BIAP.
Iraqi Special Capable Forces

Forces Capable of Direct Action Against Insurgents and Terrorists

- Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade (Based in Baghdad)
  - Currently has two battalions (1.4a) and a recce company
  - Iraqi Counterterrorist Force
    - (13 week course)
    - Similar to Delta Force; fought in Najaf, Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and elsewhere
  - Army Commando Battalion (Based in Baghdad)
    - 512 of end state 829
    - Similar to US Army Ranger Battalion; have fought countrywide
    - Full brigade will include two battalions, recon company, support company, and full Brigade HQs.

- Special Police Commandos (Based in Baghdad)
  - Eight battalions totaling over (1.4a) men; one more battalion training
  - Most aggressive insurgent fighters in country; great leaders and fighting spirit
  - Develop own tactical intelligence
  - Fought in Samarra, Baghdad, Fallujah, Mosul and elsewhere
  - Working with Ministry of Interior regarding possible expansion and basing of these forces

- Police Emergency Response Unit (Based in Baghdad)
  - 205 of end state 270; capable of expanding to larger force
  - Similar to FBI Hostage Rescue; fought in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul
Other Iraqi Forces with Key Counter Insurgency Capabilities

• Public Order Battalions (To be based in Baghdad, Hillah, and Basrah)
  - Bridge the gap between regular policing and direct action
  - Originally envisioned as riot control, training and equipment have been modified
  - Six battalions formed and three in training (complete in mid-March)
  - 3,500 assigned
  - Have provided much needed security pending reestablishment of police in several cities (Fallujah and Samarra); have also operated in Baqubah and Baghdad

• Mechanized Police Brigade (Based in Baghdad)
  - Para-military police force with two battalions of wheeled armored vehicles (BTR-94s)
  - Helped provide security for elections in Baghdad
  - Current strength 777; could expand to include a third battalion

• Iraqi Intervention Force (To be based in Habbiniyah and Baghdad)
  - 12 Battalions of the Army
  - Not a special capable force, but does have a direct counter-insurgency mission
  - Made up of volunteers willing to fight against insurgents in Iraqi cities
  - Receive five weeks of training on urban operations
  - Have operated in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, Sadr City, Thawra, and Mosul

• Provincial Forces
  - Provincial SWAT Teams
    • Five currently operating primarily in MND-CS; Exploring possibility of expanding these with Min. of Interior
  - Provincial Emergency Battalions
    • Five currently operating
### Special Capable and Other Counterinsurgency Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Basing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Special Operations Brigade (MOD)</td>
<td>• Assigned Strength: 701&lt;br&gt;• Currently expanding to full&lt;br&gt;brigade strength and capabilities (authorized 1,967)</td>
<td>Based in Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bns (-)&lt;br&gt;• Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force&lt;br&gt;• Commando Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Commando Battalions (MOI)</td>
<td>• Assigned Strength: 6508&lt;br&gt;• Exploring options for expansion with Min. of Interior</td>
<td>Based in Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Bns; one more in training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit (MOI)</td>
<td>• Assigned strength: 205</td>
<td>Based in Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Battalions (MOI)</td>
<td>• Assigned strength: 3,500&lt;br&gt;Based in Baghdad; current plans will base one bn in Hillah and two in Basrah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Bns trained and operational&lt;br&gt;3 Bns training (complete in mid Mar)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Police Brigade (MOI)</td>
<td>• Assigned strength: 777&lt;br&gt;Should expand to three brigades</td>
<td>Based in Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 battalions of wheeled armored&lt;br&gt;vehicles; paramilitary police force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Intervention Force (MOD)</td>
<td>• Assigned strength: 6,584&lt;br&gt;Will be based in Habbiniyah (Anbar Province) and Baghdad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 battalions of the Army&lt;br&gt;Has a direct, counterinsurgency mission</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial SWAT and Emergency Battalions (MOI)</td>
<td>• Exploring options for expansion with Min. of Interior</td>
<td>Based primarily in MND-CS and MND-SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 each of these currently operational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TIER 1 PSD TRANSITION

Caretaker Period

IIG President
IIG Vice President
IIG Deputy PM

PSD Team
Close-in: 22 + 5
MP Static: 26
MP Motorcade: 32

Train IZ PSD by 15 AUG
Steady State 5+1 teams until 15 AUG 05 or contract for security

SECRET // REL TO USA and MCFI///