"Posturing for the Long War"
Potential Courses of Action for the Drawdown of US Forces
COAs Based Off MNF-I Commander Guidance

**COA 1 “Baseline”**
- 05-07 Off Ramped units
  - 1/10 MNT
  - 2/28 ID
- 06-03 Do Not Deploy Units

**COA 2 “Stretch”**
- 2/101 ID
- 4/4 ID
- 7 RCT
- 2/4 ID
- 3/4 ID
- 2/10 MNT
- 2/1 CD
- RCT
- 4/25 ID
- 3/1 CD

**COA 3 “Exploitation”**
- 2/28 ID
- 1/10 MNT
- 2/101 ID
- 1/101 ID
- 3/4 ID
- 4/4 ID
- 7 RCT
- 05-07 Off Ramped units
- 06-08 Do Not Deploy Units

**Potential PTDU Candidates**
- 2/10 MNT
- 2/1 CD
- 3/25 ID
- 4/25 ID
- 3/1 CD
- 2/1 ID

*Acceleration Effects Sourcing of MiTTs, RFFs, PRTs, Partnerships, and Double RIPs*

(b)(3), (b)(6)  MNC-I C3 Force Gen, 18 December 2005

SECRET//REL to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR/ORDON/20151214
Background and Timeline

Problem Statement: Identify the risk associated with accelerating off ramp of US Forces.

Background:
- JS Draft PLANORD (1 DEC 05) directs the development of COAs to reduce BCTs in Iraq
- SECDEF COAs: (1) reduce to 13 BCTs in Iraq NLT Mar 06; (2) reduce to 10 BCTs in Iraq NLT Jun 06 and (3) reduce to 8 BCTs in Iraq NLT Sep 06
- Develop other COAs for SECDEF consideration as well
- JS J3 suspense is 13 Dec 05; working with the CCJ3 to determine way forward
- MNC-I refined current planning to address PLANORD requirement

Timeline:
Facts, Assumptions, Constraints and Issues

Facts
1. Modified OIF 05-07 Force Rotation is 15 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT Call Forward.
2. JS approved OIF 06-08 Force Rotation is 13 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT for Call Forward and 1 x BCT PTDO.
3. Decision point to redeploy Call Forward Force (2/1 AD) to Europe is March 06.
4. US Forces currently provide 54 x out-of-hide (OOH) Transition Teams; each BCT can provide up to 5 x OOH Transition Teams.
5. Off Ramp BCTs will depart the ITO with their OOH Transition Teams.
6. 95% of the AIF attacks occur in 6 provinces (Ninawa, Al Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Al Tamim).

Assumptions
1. Insurgency will not grow post-December election period; sectarian violence will not destabilize Iraq.
2. AIF attacks will continue in the same battlespace (ERV, TRV, Baghdad to Baqubah, Tal Afar to Mosul, and Bayji to Kirkuk).
3. UK Forces will continue to C2 MND-SE.
4. ROK Forces will continue to C2 MND-NE.
5. US Forces will retain Theater Security Brigade requirements regardless of off ramp COAs.
6. CJCS will support request for additional external Transition Teams.
7. Enablers will not be curtailed at the same rate as US BCTs; enablers required to support and sustain ISF.
8. GOI will not be fully seated until late April 06; assume some loss of momentum in building ministerial capacity to sustain ISF.
9. Iraqi Army will remain on glide path for force generation/assumption of battlespace per the DEC TRA projections.
10. Full Transition Team program required until tactical units achieve Level I; select IA BDEs/BNs begin to achieve Level I NET JUN 06.

Constraints
1. Estimate 6 month lead time required IOT source/deploy external Transition Teams.
2. Realignment of BCTs will require some disruption of OOH Transition Teams.
3. BOG extensions require SECDEF approval; invite media attention.
4. Significant requirements for security of PRTs will create delays and/or major modification to each COA.

Issues
1. Additional external sourced Transition Teams are required after MNC-I off ramps forces to 12 BCTs or less; MNC-I will also require 252 augmentees (Medics and Fire Supporters).
2. Rapid off ramping of BCTs will require MNC-I to relook how they support PRTs, P3s and Transition Teams.
3. BCT BDE HQs plus enablers can adequately partner with an Iraqi Division; less than a BCT partnership per IA Division is problematic.

NOTE: "Do not deploy" BCTs identified in each COA can remission to support PTDO rotations.
Transition Readiness Assessment
Projected IA Division and Brigade
Assumption of Battlespace
(based on DEC TRA data)

Currently Owns Battlespace

IA Division HQs

IA Brigades

Dec 2005

*NOTE: 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in JAN 07
Off Ramp Model
# U.S. Off Ramp Opportunities

(1 DEC TRA Data)

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- Special Police Conditions Achieved for Transition of 1 x US BDE Equivalent
- Iraqi Army Conditions Achieved for Transition of 1 x US BDE Equivalent
Courses of Action
Potential Courses of Action

- COA 1 “Baseline” 10 + 1 BCTs by OCT 06
- COA 2 “Stretch” 8 + 1 BCTs by DEC 06
- COA 3 “Exploitation” 8 + 1 BCTs by SEP 06
COA 1 "Baseline"
10 + 1 BCT Set by OCT 06
Enemy Conditions Set COA 1 "Baseline"

CONDITIONS:
- Shia Dominated Government w/little Sunni Acceptance
- GOI / ISF Capabilities Slow to Improve
- IZR Continue to Attack CF and ISF
- Shia Concerns in the South

AO WEST
- Continued presence and firm bases required to deny T&FF ability to regain significant influence
- Patrols in the Western Desert required to reduce T&FF influence over local smuggling organizations
- Ramadi remains under the influence of IZR attempting to gain control over the government and population center - T&FF Influence will likely diminish
- Fallujah continues to progress slowly toward self-sufficiency

AO NORTH
- Mosul and Tal Afar remain a Moderate Threat to CF as ISF do not yet possess the capability or public support to reduce T&FF, IZR, and SDM influence
- Attacks continue along MSRs, as IZR-Sunni and SDM maintain influence over the population
- Infrastructure attacks continue in order to influence the political situation as well as provide income to IZR-Sunnis
- In Kirkuk, tension between IZR Sunnis and Kurds increases during TAL 58 negotiations

AO CENTRAL
- Baghdad remains an HVT for T&FF due to its importance and media attention.
- Surrogates and IZR-Shia continue to strengthen their position in Wassit, Karbala, and Najaf Provinces

AO SOUTH
- Political stability continues as Shia consolidate power; attacks against CF remain low
- In Amarah remains at acceptable levels due to Shia dominated government control
COA 1 Initial Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at platoon level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 90 day period in 6 key provinces.
- No change in FF flow across Syrian border.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; no increase in trends over 90 days.
- Tacit support to T&FF from Syria does not increase.
- 1.4b continues influence by transiting funds and MOIS into Iraq.

Security:
- 11 of 32 (33%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 6 of 18 (33%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOU signed).
- MOD and MOI capable of managing/funding current sustainment contracts.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government able to cooperate/coordinate with National Ministries.
- National government able to sustain current essential services.
- No significant increase in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show some limited progress.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 2 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy with coalition support).
COA 1 “Baseline” - 10 + 1 BCT Set by OCT 06
Final US BCT Set in October 2006

Sequence of Forces
- 1/1 AD realigns with RCT 7
- Curtailment of RCT 7 (10+1 BCT Set)
- MNF-W realigns with a 2 BCT set

Risk
- Threat: 7.6% of AIF attacks in this battlespace; 32.7% running aggregate for this COA (24 attacks per day).
- Seams & Gaps: Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor and North Ramadi Region
- TRA Level 2:
  - 2/1 IA – JUN 06 (+ 4 Months)
  - 3/1 IA – SEP 05 (+ 13 Months)
  - 4/1 IA – FEB 06 (+ 8 Months)
- Partnership: Creates a break after 8 months of partnership, requires realignment within MNF-W.
- Transition Teams: Requires 5 additional Transition Teams (Submit RFF MAR 06)

Curtail
- Apr 06: 1/10 MTN
- May 06: 2/28 ID
- Jul 06: 2/101 AA
- Aug 06: 4/1 ID
- Oct 06: RCT 7

THEATER SECURITY
- 1/34 BCT

Remains at Homestation

[Map with military units and regions labeled]
COA 1 Endstate Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 4-5 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
- AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of FF flow from Syria.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 4-5 month period.
- Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.
- 1.4b, 1.4d assessed as minimal.

Security:
- 24 of 32 (75%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 14 of 18 (75%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
- MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established, achieving TRA Level 3.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
- National government demonstrates 4-5 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
- Downward trend in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detainee operations transitioned to GOI.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
COA 1: "Baseline" Off Ramp Decision Timeline

- (20 JAN) Curtail 1/10 ID
- (19 FEB) Curtail 2/28 ID
- (21 APR) Curtail 2/101 ID
- (08 MAY) Do Not Deploy 2/10 ID
- (22 MAY) Curtail 4/4 ID
- (22 JUN) Do Not Deploy 2/1 CD
- (21 SEP) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT

FEB 06: Submit RFF for 5 US TTs + 252 Augmentess (Medics/Fire Spt)
MAY 06: Submit RFF for 10 US TTs

- SecDef DP Brief
- Rail Contract DP
- Ship Contract DP
- Air Contract DP
COA 2 "Stretch"
8 + 1 BCT set by DEC 06
**Enemy Conditions Set**

**COA 2 "Stretch"**

**CONDITIONS:**
- Shia Dominated Government w/some Sunni Acceptance
- GOI / ISF Capabilities Continue to Improve
- CF Withdrawal from Urban Areas Influences IZR Support Base/Attacks
- Isolated Shia Concerns

**AO NORTH**
- Threat in Mosul remains Moderate due to T&FF presence and influence
- Kirkuk – TAL 58 negotiations are postponed, tensions remain high, but violence is limited
- Attacks along MSR's remain proportional to CF presence
- Infrastructure security improves but attacks remain primary method of negotiation

**AO SOUTH**
- Political stability continues as Shia consolidate power, attacks against CF remain low

**AO WEST**
- Some T&FF presence and influence returns to Al Qaim
- In Haditha, Hit, and Fallujah local insurgent groups and city leadership remain under some IZR influence
- T&FF influence in Ramadi leadership remains and local Sunni IZR groups maintain influence over population
- Rutbah criminals reduce T&FF influence in order to regain financial control over smuggling network

**AO CENTRAL**
- Baghdad continues to be a focal point for T&FF and IZR attacks
- Significant continues in several areas
- In Kirk and Al Kut tensions remain high due to overt
- But Najaf remains stabilize

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**SECRET//REL to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR//ORCON//20151214**
COA 2 Initial Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 6 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
- AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of FF flow from Syria.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 6 month period.
- Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.
- assessed as minimal.

Security:
- 26 of 32 (80%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 15 of 18 (80%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
- MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established, achieving TRA Level 3.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
- National government demonstrates 6 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
- Downward trend in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detainee operations transitioned to GOI.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
COA 2 "Stretch" - 8 + 1 BCT Set by DEC 06
Final US BCT Set in December 06

Sequence of Forces
- Curtailment of 3/4 ID (8+1 BCT Set)
- MND-N realigns with a 3 BCT set
- 4/1 CD replaces 1/4 ID
- 2/2 ID replaces 4/101 AA

Risk
- Threat: 7.6% of AIF attacks in this battlespace; 46% running aggregate for this COA (34 attacks per day).
- Seams & Gaps: Diyala Provinces
- TRA Level 2:
  - 1/5 IA - FEB 06 (+ 10 Months)
  - 2/5 IA - APR 06 (+ 8 Months)
  - 3/5 IA - SEP 05 (+ 15 Months)
- Partnership: Creates a break after 12 months of partnership, requires realignment within MNF-W.
- Transition Teams: Requires 5 additional Transition Teams (Submit RFF Jul 06)
**COA 2 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MITT Requirements**

*(Based on DEC TRA data)*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Partnership Realignment</th>
<th>MITT Requirement</th>
<th>Currently Owns Battlespace</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projected 15 + 1 BCT Set</td>
<td>Projected 13 + 1 BCT Set</td>
<td>DEC05 JAN06 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC06</td>
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<td>Risk:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Threat: 46% of AlIF attacks in this battlespace (236 attacks per week).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Seams &amp; Gaps: Abu Ghrab area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region; Diyala Provinces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- TRA: 32 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)</td>
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<td>- Partnership: 7 Partnership Transitions.</td>
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<td>- Transition Teams: 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Discussion: Conditions based; allows for the acceleration of off ramping US BCTs in Fall 06; does not achieve a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV.</td>
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COA 2 Endstate Conditions

Threat:
• No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
• No change in attack trends over 6 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
• AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of FF flow from Syria.
• No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
• Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 6 month period.
• Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.

Security:
• 29-32 of 32 (90-100%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
• 16 of 18 (90%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
• MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
• MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established and projected to achieve TRA Level 2 by the end of 2006.

Governance/Economic:
• Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
• National government demonstrates 6 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
• Downward trend in unemployment.
• Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detention operations transitioned to GOI.
• MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
COA 2: "Stretch" Offramp Decision Timeline

- **FEB 06**: Submit RFF for 5 US TTs + 252 Augmentees (Medics/Fire Spt)
- **MAY 06**: Submit RFF for 20 US TTs

- SecDef DP Brief
- Rail Contract DP
- Ship Contract DP
- Air Contract DP

## Timeline Details

- **(20 JAN)**: Curtail 1/10 ID
- **(19 FEB)**: Curtail 2/28 ID
- **(21 APR)**: Curtail 2/101 ID
- **(08 MAY)**: Do Not Deploy 2/10 ID
- **(22 MAY)**: Curtail 4/4 ID
- **(07 JUL)**: Do Not Deploy 2/1 CD
- **(22 JUN)**: Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
- **(21 SEP)**: Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
- **(02 JUL)**: Do Not Deploy 4/25 ID
- **(27 JUN)**: Do Not Deploy 3/1 ID

**Notes:**
- NO URF BACKFILL SCHEDULED
- NO URF BACKFILL SCHEDULED;
- REQUIRES IN THEATER REORG
- 2/4 ID BOG OUT 29 NOV 05
- 3/4 ID BOG OUT 02 DEC 05
- LAD 04 JAN 07
- LAD 10 OCT 06
- LAD 15 OCT 06
- LAD 30 OCT 06
- LAD 21 AUG 06
- LAD 25 AUG 06
- LAD 25 JUL 06
- LAD 25 MAY 06
- LAD 26 APR 06

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Approved for Release

Declassified by MG Michael X. Garrett, Chief of Staff
Declassified on 201505
COA 3 "Exploitation"
8+1 BCT Set by SEP 06
Enemy Conditions Set
COA 3 "Exploitation"

CONDITIONS:
- Shia Dominated Government w/significant Sunni IZR Acceptance
- Significant GOI / ISF Improvement
- CF Withdrawal from Urban Areas Reduces IZR Support Base/Attacks
- Minimal Shia Concerns in the South

AO NORTH
- T&FF continue to operate in the Tal Afar and Mosul area, but influence over population is significantly reduced
- IZR begin to see financial gains from government programs and no longer resort to violence as the only solution
- Kirkuk – Progress on TAL 58 is acceptable to Kurds and Arabs
- Local sheiks gain control over tribes reducing attack levels while economic opportunities reduce IZR disillusionment
- Infrastructure security programs bring money to IZR and Tribes reducing attack levels

AO CENTRAL
- Threat in Baghdad reduced as IZR begin to see tangible effects of a stable government
- T&FF movement and support through TRV and ERV are significantly reduced
- Najaf, Karbala and other IZR accept governmental primacy reducing and legitimizing existing groups

AO WEST
- ISF maintains border security reducing T&FF infiltration
- Haditha no longer a permissive environment for T&FF
- IZR in Ramadi reduce T&FF influence and engagement with GOI begins
- Rutbah returns to economic vice insurgent smuggling
- Fallujah maintains momentum from elections, IZR begin to see advantages from new government, IP program establishes Rule of Law

AO SOUTH
- Political stability continues as Shia consolidate power; attacks against CF remain low
COA 3 Initial Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 4-5 month period in 6 key provinces.
- A measurable decrease in FF flow across the Syrian border for a 90 day period.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; no increase in trends over 4-5 month period.
- Tacit support to T&FF from Syria does not increase.
- [1.4b, 1.4d] by transiting funds and MOIS into Iraq.

Security:
- 24 of 32 (75%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 14 of 18 (75%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOU signed).
- MOD and MOI capable of managing/funding current sustainment contracts.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government able to cooperate/coordinate with National Ministries.
- National government able to sustain current essential services.
- No significant increase in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show some limited progress.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 2 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy with coalition support).
### COA 3 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements

(Based on DEC TRA data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnerships Realignments</th>
<th>Projected 15 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Projected 13 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Projected Consolidation of MND-C</th>
<th>Projected 10 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Projected 8 + 1 BCT Set</th>
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#### Risk:
- **Threat:** 46.8% of AIF attacks in this battlespace (238 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghurib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Sadr City and Salman Park; Kirkuk regional engagement; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.
- **TRA:** 32 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection to achieve level 2 is JAN 07)
- **Partnership:** 7 Partnership Transitions.
- **Transition Teams:** 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05

#### Discussion:
- Quickest COA for off ramp; creates challenges upfront to resource External Transition Teams; does not achieve a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV; creates significant "turbulence" in the battlespace; provides the least decision space for assessments

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**SECRET//REL to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR**
COA 3 Endstate Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with minimal risk anywhere).
- A measurable decrease in attack trends over a 6 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
- AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of FF flow from Syria.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 6 month period.
- Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.
- 1.4b, 1.4d assessed as minimal.

Security:
- 29-32 of 32 (90-100%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 16 of 18 (90%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
- MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established and projected to achieve TRA Level 2 by the end of 2006.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
- National government demonstrates 6 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
- Downward trend in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detention operations transitioned to GOI.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
COA 3: "Exploitation" Offramp Decision Timeline

DEC 05: Submit RFF for 10 US TTs
JAN 06: Submit RFF for 5 US TTs
MAR 06: Submit RFF for 10 US TTs

+ SecDef DP Brief
+ Rail Contract DP
+ Ship Contract DP
+ Air Contract DP

(22 Nov) Curtail 2/28 ID
(20 DEC) Curtail 1/10 ID
(20 JAN) Curtail 2/101 ID
(08 MAY) Curtail 1/101 ID
(19 FEB) Curtail 2/4 ID
(28 APR) Curtail 4/4 ID
(22 MAR) Curtail 2/4 ID
(28 APR) Curtail 3/101 ID
(17 JUL) Do Not Deploy 3 / 82 ID
(22 MAY) Do Not Deploy 3 / 101 ID
(22 JUN) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
(21 SEP) Do Not Deploy 2 / 1 CD
(21 APR) Do Not Deploy 4 / 25 ID
(22 JUL) Do Not Deploy 2 / 1 CD
(22 AUG) Do Not Deploy 3 / 101 ID
(25 SEP) Do Not Deploy 7 RCT
(21 OCT) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
(25 AUG) Do Not Deploy 3 / 25 ID
(21 JAN) Do Not Deploy 2 / 10 ID
(25 MAR) Do Not Deploy 3 / 25 ID
(25 APR) Do Not Deploy 3 / 25 ID
(21 AUG) No Backfill Scheduled
(21 OCT) Do Not Deploy 4 / 25 ID
(21 JAN) Do Not Deploy 2 / 10 ID
(21 SEP) Do Not Deploy 7 RCT
(21 JAN) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
(21 SEP) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
(21 JAN) Do Not Deploy 2 / 10 ID
(21 SEP) Do Not Deploy 7 RCT
(21 JAN) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
(21 SEP) Do Not Deploy 2 RCT
Enabler Analysis
# Enabler Analysis (as of 25 NOV 05)

Note 1: PAX delta based on 100% MTOE Authorized and projected Transformation / Modularity MTOEs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15 MNVR + 1 CF</th>
<th>9 MNVR + 1 PTDO</th>
<th>15 MNVR + 1 CF</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Rotation 05-07 to 06-08 PAX Delta</td>
<td>Rotation 06-08 to 07-09 PAX Delta</td>
<td>Rotation 05-07 to 07-09 PAX Delta</td>
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<td><strong>MANEUVER</strong></td>
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<td>Brigades:</td>
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<td>Ordnance (EO):</td>
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Transition Teams
**US External TT Requirements**

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<th>RFF 510</th>
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<td>MiTT</td>
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<td>252 pax required*</td>
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<td>PTT</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
<td>Just 252 pax</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TT Assumptions (25 teams available):**
- 20 TTs can be remissioned based on IA TRA data (JUN 06)
- 5 TTs remissioned from 3/9 IA FORGEN delay (NLT JUN 06)
- US will not backfill in the event of coalition TT curtailment

**Additional External TT requirements if assumptions not valid:**
- COA 1: 15 MiTTs (JUL06)
- COA 2: 25 MiTTs (JUL06)
- COA 3: 25 MiTTs (JUL06)

*Requirement for 252 pax to replace the medic and FA augmentees from MNC-I (84 BDE and BN MiTTs) for all COAs
- No Change to IAG JMD requirement: 71 pax
Air Power Requirements for 2006
Way Ahead

Actions:
- Continue coordination and provide input to MNF-I as required
- Continue refinement of COAs
- Brief MNF-I Commander on 20 DEC 05
- Brief CENTCOM Commander on 21 DEC 05
- Conduct MNC-I Force Structure Review 22 DEC 05
- Conduct IWS with MNF-I as required
- Brief to SECDEF o/a 5 JAN 06

Timeline:

- Brief to MNF-I Commander on refined COAs
- Brief to CENTCOM Cdr on COAs
- MNF-I Commander brief to SECDEF

1 DECEMBER JS Draft PLANORD directing COAs.

3 ID & 4 ID TOA
XVIII & V Corps TOA
II MEF & I MEF TOA
Questions
Conditions

1) 10/10 and

2) TSF

3) OHMMTS BEKKO

4) P7

5) 1/Div AEO 06

6) INSURG/VIOLENCE DOWN

7) JUNE OUT OF CITIES

MNU - N - 4
MNU - W - 2
MNU - B - 3
TSF - 1
"Posturing for the Long War"
Potential Courses of Action for the Drawdown of US Forces

(b)(3), (b)(6)
MNC-I C3 Force Generation
14 DEC 05
Background and Timeline

Problem Statement: Identify the risk associated with accelerating off ramp of US Forces.

Background:
- JS draft PLANORD (1 DEC 05) directs the development of COAs to reduce BCTs in Iraq.
- SECDEF COAs: (1) reduce to 15 BCTs in Iraq NLT Mar 06; (2) reduce to 10 BCTs in Iraq NLT Jun 06 and (3) reduce to 8 BCTs in Iraq NLT Sep 06.
- Develop other COAs for SECDEF consideration as well.
- JS J3 suspense is 13 Dec 05; working with the CCJ3 to determine way forward.
- MNC-I refined current planning to address PLANORD requirement.

Timeline:

11 DEC: Brief to MNC-I Commander on potential COAs.
14 DEC: Brief to MNF-I Commander on potential COAs.

1 DEC JS Draft PLANORD directing COAs.
3 ID & 4 ID TOA
XVIII & V Corps TOA
II MEF & I MEF TOA
# Facts, Assumptions, Constraints and Issues

## Facts

1. US mid-term elections Nov 06.
2. Modified OIF 05-07 Force Rotation is 15 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT Call Forward.
3. JS approved OIF 06-08 Force Rotation is 14 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT PTDO.
4. Call Forward Force (2/1 AD) will remain in Kuwait as Theater Reserve until MAR 06.
5. US Force currently provide 92 x out-of-hide (OOH) Transition Teams; each BCT can provide up to 5 x OOH Transition Teams.
6. Off Ramp BCTs will depart the ITO with their OOH Transition Teams.
7. 95% of the AIF attacks occur in 6 provinces (Ninawa, Al Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Al Tamim).

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## Assumptions

1. Insurgency will not grow post-December election period; sectarian violence will not destabilize Iraq.
2. AIF attacks will continue in the same battlespace (ERV, TRV, Baghdad to Baqubah, Tal Afar to Mosul, and Bayji to Kirkuk).
3. Will not provide a Division HQs after JUN 06; will required consolidation of MND-B and MND-CS = MND-Central.
4. UK Forces will continue to C2 MND-SE.
5. Forces will continue to C2 MND-NE.
6. US Forces will retain Theater Security Brigade requirements regardless of off ramp COAs.
7. CJCS will support request for additional external Transition Teams.
8. GOI will not be fully seated until late Spring 06; assume some loss of momentum in building ministerial capacity to sustain ISF.
9. Iraqi Army will remain on glide path for force generation/assumption of battlespace per the DEC TRA projections.
10. Full Transition Team program required until tactical units achieve Level I; select IA BDEs/BNs begin to achieve Level I NET JUN 06.

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## Constraints

1. Estimate 6 month lead time required IOT source/deploy external Transition Teams.
2. Realignment of BCTs will require some disruption of OOH Transition Teams.
3. BOG extensions require SECDEF approval; invite media attention.
4. Significant requirements for security of PRTs will create delays and/or major modification to each COA.

---

## Issues

1. Additional external sourced Transition Teams are required after MNC-I off ramps forces to 12 BCTs or less; MNC-I will also require 252 augmentees (Medics and Fire Supporters).
2. Rapid off ramping of BCTs will require MNC-I to relook how they support PRTs, P3s and Transition Teams.
3. BCT BDE HQs plus enablers can adequately partner with an Iraqi Division; less than a BCT partnership per IA Division is problematic.
Transition Readiness Assessment
Courses of Action
Potential Courses of Action

- COA 1 "Baseline" - 10 + 1 BCTs by DEC 06
- COA 2 "Accelerated" - 10 + 1 BCTs by SEP 06
- COA 3 "Exploitation" - 8 + 1 BCTs by SEP 06
COA 1 "Baseline"
10 + 1 BCT Set by DEC 06
**Enemy Conditions Set COA 1 “Baseline”**

**CONDITIONS:**
- Shia Dominated Government w/ little Sunni Acceptance
- GOI / ISF Capabilities Slow to Improve
- IZR Continue to Attack CF and ISF
- Shia /

**AO WEST**
- Continued presence and firm bases required to deny T&FF ability to regain significant influence
- Patrons in the Western Desert required to reduce T&FF influence over local smuggling organizations
- Ramadi remains under the influence of IZR attempting to gain control over the government and population center – T&FF influence will likely diminish
- Fallujah continues to progress slowly toward self-sufficiency

**AO NORTH**
- Mosul and Tal Afar remain a Moderate Threat to CF as ISF do not yet possess the capability or public support to reduce T&FF, IZR, and SDM Influence
- Attacks continue along MSRs, as IZR-Sunnis and SDM maintain influence over the population
- Infrastructure attacks continue in order to influence the political situation as well as provide income to IZR-Sunnis
- In Kirkuk, tension between IZR Sunnis and Kurds increases during TAL 58 negotiations

**AO CENTRAL**
- Baghdad remains an HVT for T&FF due to its Importance and media attention.
  - 1.4b surrogates and IZR-Shia continue to strengthen their position in Wasit, Karbala, and Najaf Provinces

**AO SOUTH**
- Political stability continues as Shia consolidate power; attacks against CF remain low
- In Amarah 1.4b, 1.4d remains at acceptable levels due to Shia dominated government control
COA 1 Initial Conditions

**Threat:**
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at platoon level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 90 day period in 6 key provinces.
- No change in FF flow across Syrian border.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; no increase in trends over 90 days.
- Tacit support to T&FF from Syria does not increase.
- 1.4b, 1.4d by transiting funds and MOIS into Iraq.

**Security:**
- 12 of 36 (33%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 6 of 18 (33%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOU signed).
- MOD and MOI capable of managing/funding current sustainment contracts.

**Governance/Economic:**
- Provincial government able to cooperate/coordinate with National Ministries.
- National government able to sustain current essential services.
- No significant increase in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show some limited progress.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 2 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy with coalition support).
COA 1 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements
(Based on DEC TRA data)

**Risk:**
- Threat: 33% of AIF attacks in this battlespace
- Seams & Gaps: Abu Ghraib area, realign Victory Base security
- Western Ninawa: Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.
- TRA: 32 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)
- Partnership: 5 Partnership Transitions; 3 breaks in HQ US BCT/IA DIV.
- Transition Teams: 25 x Add'l External Transition Teams required; 252 x augmentees required NET August 06
- Discussion: Slowest off-ramp COA; Achieves a 1 x CF BCT partnership par 1 x IA DIV; least amount of "turbulence" in the battlespace over time; provides adequate decision space for assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projected 15 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Consolidation of MND-C</th>
<th>Projected 13 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Projected 10 + 1 BCT Set</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/16 M TN</td>
<td>1/28 ID</td>
<td>2/101 ID</td>
<td>4/4 ID</td>
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Currently Owns Battlespace

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<th>APR</th>
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<th>JUN</th>
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<th>OCT</th>
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</table>
COA 1 Endstate Conditions

**Threat:**
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 6 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
- AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of FF flow from Syria.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 6 month period.
- Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.

1.4b, 1.4d assessed as minimal.

**Security:**
- 27 of 36 (75%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 12 of 18 (75%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
- MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established and achieve IOC.

**Governance/Economic:**
- Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
- National government demonstrates 6 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
- Downward trend in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detainee operations transitioned to GOI.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
COA 2 "Accelerated"

10 + 1 BCT Set by SEP 06
**Enemy Conditions Set COA 2 “Accelerated”**

**CONDITIONS:**
- Shia Dominated Government w/some Sunni Acceptance
- GOI / ISF Capabilities Continue to Improve
- CF Withdrawal from Urban Areas Influences IZR Support Base/Attacks
- Isolated Shia Concerns

**AO NORTH**
- Threat in Mosul remains Moderate due to T&FF presence and influence
- Kirkuk – TAL 58 negotiations are postponed, tensions remain high, but violence is limited
- Attacks along MSR remain proportional to CF presence
- Infrastructure security improves but attacks remain primary method of negotiation

**AO CENTRAL**
- Baghdad continues to be a focal point for T&FF and IZR attacks
- Significant continuing in several areas
- In Karbala and Al Kut tensions remain high due to over 1.4b, 1.4d
- But Najaf remains stabilize

**AO WEST**
- Some T&FF presence and influence returns to Al Qaim
- In Haditha, Hit, and Fallujah local insurgent groups and city leadership remain under some IZR influence
- T&FF influence in Ramadi leadership remains and local Sunni IZR groups maintain influence over population
- Rutbah criminals reduce T&FF influence in order to regain financial control over smuggling network

**AO SOUTH**
- Political stability continues as Shia consolidate power; attacks against CF remain low

SECRET//REL MCFI
COA 2 Initial Conditions

Threat:

- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at platoon level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 90 day period in 6 key provinces.
- No change in FF flow across Syrian border.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; no increase in trends over 90 days.
- Tacit support to T&FF from Syria does not increase.
- 1.4b, 1.4d by transiting funds and MOIS into Iraq.

Security:

- 18 of 36 (50%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlepace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 9 of 18 (50%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOU signed).
- MOD and MOI capable of managing/funding current sustainment contracts.

Governance/Economic:

- Provincial government able to cooperate/coordinate with National Ministries.
- National government able to sustain current essential services.
- No significant increase in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show some limited progress.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 2 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy with coalition support).
COA 2 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements
(Based on DEC TRA data)

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<tr>
<th>Partnership Realignment</th>
<th>KiTT Requirement</th>
<th>Projected 15 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Consolidation of MND-C</th>
<th>Projected 13 + 1 BCT Set</th>
<th>Projected 10 + 1 BCT Set</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Threat:</strong> 33% of AIF attacks in this battlespace</td>
<td><strong>Seams &amp; Gaps:</strong> Abu Ghraib area, realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Kirkuk regional engagement and Kirkuk-Bayji corridor; Yusufiya region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah – Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.</td>
<td><strong>TRI:</strong> 32 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection JAN 07)</td>
<td><strong>Partnership:</strong> 5 Partnership Transitions; 3 breaks in HQ US BCT/IA DIV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Transition Teams:</strong> 25 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05</td>
<td><strong>Discussion:</strong> Achieves a 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV; delays significant &quot;turbulence&quot; in the battlespace until summer '06; provides less decision space for assessments beginning summer '06</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Currently Owns Battlespace</th>
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Approved for Release by MG Michael X. Garrett, Chief of Staff, on 7/1/55.
COA 2 "Accelerated" - 10 + 1 BCT Set by SEP 06
Final Set in September 2006

Sequence of Forces
- Curtailment of RCT 7 (10+1 BCT Set)
- MNF-W realigns with a 2 BCT Set
- 3/25 ID replaces 1/101st AASLT

Risk
- Threat: 7.6% of AIF attacks in this battlespace; 33% running aggregate for this COA.
- Seams & Gaps: Fallujah - Baghdad Corridor and North Ramadi Region
- TRA Level 2:
  - 2/1 IA - JUN 06 (+ 3 Months)
  - 3/1 IA - SEP 05 (+ 11 Months)
  - 4/1 IA - FEB 06 (+ 7 Months)
- Partnership: Creates a break after 7 months of partnership, requires realignment within MNF-W.
- Transition Teams: Requires 5 additional Transition Teams to fill void

Curtail Apr 06 BOG Jun 06 Curtail Jul 06 Curtail Aug 06 Curtail Sep 06
1/10 MTN 2/28 ID 2/101 AA 4/4 ID RCT 7
DP Feb 06 DP Apr 06 DP May 06 DP Jun 06 DP Jul 06

THEATER SECURITY

1/34 BCT

MND-SE

MND-C

MND-N

MND-NE

3/2 SBCT

3/1 AD

3/2 ID

3/4 ID

1/101 ID

2/4 ID

4-101 ID

1/34 BCT

Heavy PDTO
Force
Remains at
Homestation
COA 2 Endstate Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 6 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
- AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of FF flow from Syria.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 6 month period.
- Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.

Security:
- 27 of 36 (75%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 12 of 18 (75%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
- MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established and achieve IOC.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
- National government demonstrates 6 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
- Downward trend in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detention operations transitioned to GOI.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
COA 2: "Accelerated" Offramp Decision Timeline

JAN 06: Submit RFF for 5 US TTs
FEB 06: Submit RFF for 15 US TTS

SecDef DP Brief
Rail Contract DP
Ship Contract DP
Air Contract DP
COA 3 "Exploitation"
8+1 BCT Set by SEP 06
**AO NORTH**
- T&FF continue to operate in the Tal Afar and Mosul area, but influence over population is significantly reduced.
- IZR begin to see financial gains from government programs and no longer resort to violence as the only solution.
- Kirkuk - Progress on TAL 58 is acceptable to Kurds and Arabs.
- Local sheiks gain control over tribes reducing attack levels while economic opportunities reduce IZR disillusionment.
- Infrastructure security programs bring money to IZR and Tribes reducing attack levels.

**AO CENTRAL**
- Threat in Baghdad reduced as IZR begin to see tangible effects of a stable government.
- T&FF movement and support through TRV and ERV are significantly reduced.
- Najaf, Karbala and other IZR accept governmental primacy reducing 1.4h, 1.4d and legitimizing existing groups.

**AO WEST**
- ISF maintains border security reducing T&FF infiltration.
- Haditha no longer a permissive environment for T&FF.
- IZR in Ramadi reduce T&FF influence and engagement with GOI begins.
- Rutbah returns to economic vice insurgent smuggling.
- Fallujah maintains momentum from elections, IZR begin to see advantages from new government, IP program establishes Rule of Law.

**AO SOUTH**
- Political stability continues as Shia consolidate power, attacks against CF remain low.
COA 3 Initial Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with moderate risk anywhere).
- No change in attack trends over 4-5 month period in 6 key provinces.
- A measurable decrease in FP flow across the Syrian border for a 90 day period.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; no increase in trends over 4-5 month period.
- Tacit support to T&FF from Syria does not increase.
- By transiting funds and MOIS into Iraq.

Security:
- 27 of 36 (75%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 14 of 18 (75%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOD signed).
- MOD and MOI capable of managing/funding current sustainment contracts.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government able to cooperate/coordinate with National Ministries.
- National government able to sustain current essential services.
- No significant increase in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show some limited progress.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 2 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy with coalition support).
COA 3 "Exploitation" – 8+1 BCT Set by OCT 06

Final Set in September 2006

Sequence of Forces
- 1/1 AD realigns with RCT 7
- Curtailment of RCT 7 (8+1 BCT Set)
- MNF-W realigns with a 2 BCT set

Risk
- Threat: 7.6% of AIF attacks in this battlespace; 4.6% running aggregate for this COA.
- TRA Level 2.
- 2/1 A - JUN 06 (+3 Months)
- 3/4 IA - SEP 05 (+12 Months)
- 4/1 A - FEB 06 (+7 Months)
- Partnership: Creates a break after 7 months of partnership, requires realignment within MNF-W.
- Transition Teams: Requires 5 additional Transition Teams to fill void

THEATER SECURITY

- Heavy PTDQ Force
- Remains at Homestall

134th BCT

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COA 3 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MiTT Requirements
(Based on DEC TRA data)

Risk:
- Threat: 46.8% of AIF attacks in this battlespace.
- Seams & Gaps: Abu Gharib area; realign Victory Base security; Western Ninawa; Sadr City and Salman Park; Kirkuk regional engagement; Yusufiyah region; Southern Baghdad; Fallujah - Baghdad Corridor; and North Ramadi Region.
- TRA: 32 IA Bde Level 2 or better (4 remain – Projection to achieve level 2 in JAN 07)
- Partnership: 7 Partnership Transitions; 3 breaks in Hq US BCT/IA DIV.
- Transition Teams: 35 x External Transition Teams; 252 x augmentees required in April 05
- Discussion: Quickest COA off ramp; creates challenges upfront to resource External Transition Teams; does not achieve 1 x CF BCT partnership per 1 x IA DIV; creates significant “turbulence” in the battlespace; provides the least decision space for assessments

Currently Owns Battlespace

DEC05 JAN08 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC06
COA 3 Endstate Conditions

Threat:
- No known sanctuary in AOR (can operate at squad level with minimal risk anywhere).
- A measurable decrease in attack trends over a 6 month period in 6 key provinces; no significant attacks on infrastructure.
- AQIZ defeated; minimal evidence of EF flow from Syria.
- No evidence of operational coordination among IZR or SDM.
- Sectarian violence localized; decreasing trends for a 6 month period.
- Syria provides improved coordination/support to GWOT.
- 1.4b, 1.4d assessed as minimal.

Security:
- 32-26 of 36 (90-100%) of Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2, assumed battlespace and capable of leading COIN Ops in their sectors.
- 16 of 18 (90%) Iraqi Police at Provincial Level are TRA Level 2 or above, capable of maintaining domestic order.
- MOD and MOI demonstrate significant capability to cooperate and integrate COIN operations; to include intelligence sharing.
- MOD and MOI National Logistics systems established and projected to achieve FOC by the end of 2006.

Governance/Economic:
- Provincial government empowered to coordinate resources and support national policy.
- National government demonstrates 6 months of improve capability in providing essential services.
- Downward trend in unemployment.
- Rule of law institutions show significant progress; all detention operations transitioned to GOI.
- MOD and MOI achieves TRA Level 1 (able to develop, coordinate, and implement national policy without coalition support); 50% of key ministries achieve TRA Level 2.
Way Ahead

Actions:
- Coordinate and provide input to MNF-I
- Conduct IWS with MNF-I
- Continue refinement of COAs
- Brief MNF-I Commander on 14 DEC 06

Timeline:
- 4 DEC Brief MNF-I COAs
- 22 DEC Brief COAs on individual COAs
- 1 DEC Draft PACOMOIB Drafting COAs
- 1 DEC Draft Drafting COA
- 1 DEC Draft Drafting COA
Questions
Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on DEC TRA data)

Currently Owns Battlespace

IA Division HQs

IA Brigades

* NOTE: 3/7, 2/9 and 3/9 in force generation, projected to assume battlespace in JAN 07

Dec 2005

Approved for Release

Declassified on: 201505

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
DEC 06 Projection of IA Owned Battlespace (based on DEC 05 TRA data)

Icons based on final IA Brigade locations

IA owned battle space