5 May 2006 2006-0825-Task2 Objective Larchwood IV

A glance at the reality of Baghdad in light of the latest events (sectarian turmoil)

1. It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government. The only power the mujahidin have is what they have already demonstrated in hunting down drifit patrols and taking sniper shots at those patrol members who stay far from their patrols, or planting booby traps among the citizens and hiding among them in the hope that the explosions will injure an American or members of the government. In other words, these activities could be understood as hitting the feared and the hiding ones, which is an image that requires a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s wisdom.

2. The strength of the brothers in Baghdad is built mainly on booby trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin groups in Baghdad are generally groups of assassins without any organized military capabilities.

3. There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a joint operations.

4. The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction. This direction has large positive effects; however, being preoccupied with it alone delays more important operations such as taking control of some areas, preserving it and assuming power in Baghdad (for example, taking control of a university, a hospital, or a Sunni religious site). At the same time, the Americans and the Government were able to absorb our painful blows, sustain them, compensate their losses with new replacements, and follow strategic plans which allowed them in the past few years to take control of Baghdad as well as other areas one after the other. That is why every year is worse than the previous year as far as the Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad.

5. The role that the Islamic party and the Islamic Scholars Committee play in numbing the Sunni people through the media is a dangerous role. It has been proven from the course of the events that the American investment in the Party and the Committee were not in vain. In spite of the gravity of the events, they were able to calm down the Sunni people, justify the enemy deeds, and give the enemy the opportunity to do more work without any recourse and supervision. This situation stemmed from two matters:

* First, their media power is presented by their special radio and TV
stations as the sole Sunni information source, coupled with our weak media which is confined mainly to the Internet, without a flyer or newspaper to present these events.

* Second, in the course of their control of the majority of the speakers at mosques who convert right into wrong and wrong into right, and present Islam in a sinful manner and sins in a Muslim manner. At the same time we did not have any positive impact or benefits from our operations.

6. The mujahidin do not have any stored weapons and ammunition in their possession in Baghdad, particularly rockets, such as C5K Katyusha or bomber or mortars which we realized their importance and shortage in Baghdad. That was due to lack of check and balance, and proper follow-ups.

7. The National Guard status is frequently raised and whether they belong to the Sunnis or Shites. Too much talk is around whether we belong to them or not, or should we strike and kill their men or not?

It is believed that this matter serves the Americans very well. I believe that the Committee and the Party are pushing this issue because they want to have an influence, similar to the Mujahidin’s. When and if a Sunni units from the National Guard are formed, and begin to compete with the mujahidin and squeeze them, we will have a problem; we either let them go beyond the limits or fight them and risk inciting the Sunnis against us through the Party’s and the Committee’s channels. I believe that we should not allow this situation to exist at all, and we should bury it before it surfaces and reject any suggestion to that effect.

8. (Salah), the military commander of Baghdad (he used to be the commander of the Rassafah County and still is) is a courageous young man with a good determination, but he has little and simple experience in the military field and does not have a clear vision about the current stage and how to deal with it. Most of his work at al-Rassafah County is to take cars to the Jubur Arab Tribes, convert them into booby traps and take them back inside Baghdad for explosion. And the more booby trap cars he makes, the more success he has. This alone is not a work plan and we do not benefit from it in the medium range let alone the long range.

9. (Salah): The current commander of Northern al-Karkh (Abu-Huda) is very concerned because of his deteriorating security situation caused by being pursued by the Americans, since they have his picture and voice print. Therefore, his movement is very restricted and he is unable to do anything here. We should remove him from Baghdad to a location where he can work easier; otherwise he is closer to become totally ineffective. I know nothing about his past military experience or organizational skills.

10. (Salah): Northern al-Karkh groups are estimated at 40 mujahid, so is the Southern Karkh. They could double that number if necessary. Al-Rassafah groups in general is estimated at 30 mujahid as I was informed by the commander of al-Rassafah. These are very small numbers compared to the tens of thousands of the enemy troops. How can we increase these numbers?
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A proposed work plan for Baghdad for this period to be performed according to the following
circumstances:

In the name of God, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

1- Baghdad is divided into Sunni, Shi’ah and mixed areas. The mixed areas are classified
according to the majority [TC: Majority located in the area] and on the basis of this
arrangement the operation will be done.
2- The losses of the American forces in Baghdad are hardly worth mentioning in the total
measure of their losses in the West and other provinces, therefore, the priority in Baghdad is
the Shi’ah, the guards and the rest of the auxiliary forces there.
3- Reduce the attacks on Sunni areas – in proportion to the area – and areas where the people
are calm, in order to reduce the pressure on the Sunni so as to leave them as restful and
progressive, and to be dedicated to cleansing them, calmly, of spies and of Shi’ahs.
This will be done in the following ways:
A) Refrain from attacking moving patrols and concentrate on stationary patrols by using
snipers without provoking the matter.
B) Drive away the Shi’ahs and expel their businesses and workplaces from our areas.
The exploitation of this phase of displacement of the Shi’ahs from our areas, or from shared
areas, is necessary, as this will reduce the eyes that they [TC: They refer to Coalition Forces]
depend on to track us, but it is necessary to do this operation calmly and without fanfare so
that we may plant terror in the hearts of those found in the areas in order to push them into
either fleeing [TC: The area] or staying in their homes, likewise expel all merchants of gas,
bread or meat or any person that that may be suspected of being susceptible for spying against
us (and there is no doubt that that some of the villagers and construction workers arrive to
work among us as spies) that is to say that this should be the priority in cleansing our areas.
C) Move the battle to the Shi’ah depths and cut off the paths from them by any means
necessary to put pressure on them to leave their areas.
D) Our areas are considered strategic areas according to the Americans because the primary
roadways, as well as transportation and financial pathways, are near them, therefore, we will
leave or reduce our operations against them in our areas for the near future, and will perform
our work against them in the areas of Baghdad itself, as well as the surrounding areas.
The road to the airport is very strategic for them, as well as the new international Abu-
Ghuraih Highway. These roads are very important to the Americans, and the Americans are
more susceptible to be attacked than the government forces, as they may use these roads to
mobilize government forces against us with ease and extensive pressure (as the government
wants only the opportunity and the authority to put pressure on our Sunni areas) therefore it
is necessary to leave the Americans to feel safe at this time in our areas and attack them on
the exterior roads or in the Shi’ah areas. Then we will have control over our areas in a month.
God willing, and we will open the door once again with the Americans. The most beneficial
opportunity for us in Baghdad is the highways, because one can listen at night to learn if there
is a huge American military convoy moving across it. There is a possibility, therefore, that
we can plant [TC: an explosive] during the day and explode it at night to inflict excruciating
injuries upon them.
E) Arrange the groups according to their work abilities, situation and geographic area to track
them.

Important Comments and Notes for Working in Baghdad:
1 - The freedom of movement in Baghdad places it in the grasp of the Brothers.
And that is done by:
A – Striking the fixed detachments: Make this the highest priority always, through sniping and explosive devices, but if this proves to be ineffective, then we can use infiltration or booby traps [cars] and persistence, to make it impossible for them to maintain a fixed detachment in our areas. To control the streets, it is necessary to obliterate the fixed detachments, in order to open the roads for the Mujahidin to move in any direction they wish, to strike here and there. To control this, it is necessary to strike the old fixed detachments, and those which had been previously struck; then strike every detachment that dares to arise to set up control of the street. Do this until it becomes ingrained in their souls; that whoever stops in the street, will be killed, because they will not be able to compensate for their losses in this way.
B – Striking and Sabotaging the Centers, which the patrols dispatch from, or possibly use them. Make this one of the priorities, because they will not be able to compensate for their losses in this manner ever if there was continued dispatching. According to the plan, continue these operations on this faction. However, the centers from which no patrols operate are much less important. These persistent operations for this strike may continue two or three months – God knows – and then, the situation will be better, God willing, because during this time, we will enter our area easily. And the strike at that time, we will be in their depths.
2 – Dropping the belt: [TC: Possibly the beltway around Baghdad] chokes Baghdad and makes the work of Mujahidin very difficult, because the workshops and the storehouses are either in the belt or passing through it. Because of this, the concentration of the Americans on the belt is not random, but it is that most of the Mujahidin in Northern Al-Karkh came from the belt at the request and all of their storehouses are there.
3 – The operation at this stage is to incite the people against the Shi‘ahs, in view of the fact that the sectarian war has benefits for us:
A) Politically, bringing down the government or weakening it (and then destroying the Shi‘ahs’ four year rule) and militarily, the Sunni regions are governed by them, at least;
B) Position the struggle entirely between the Shi‘ahs and the Mujahidin directly. This is what the Committee and the Party doesn’t want, as it does not give them influence on this war and they lose their political, economic, and social position. Because they are parasites, unable to live without the insecure political activity.
4 – What is the strategy of the Commander of Al-Rasafa – for example- for the next six months, instead of the next year, two years or twenty years? Booby trapped cars only, and with today’s current situation (after the enemy is protected from them) it is no more than an annoyance for the enemy. Yes, it does have very tangible benefits if you wanted to strike a Shi‘ah area or market randomly, as a reaction and an example to them. It is best to say that there must be booby trapped cars also, consistent with our vision and strategy.
5 – It is known, by the rank and file of the Mujahidin in Baghdad, that their leadership do not operate according to a broad view, or a well-knit plan, and that the operations are based upon mere reactions, or on a media strategy by researching through daily news bulletins looking for feedback, and this has led to strategic losses for us.
The Commanders [except those that God has mercy on] demand from everyone continuous daily operation with the most force possible, with the intention of exhausting the enemy, but in reality, the Mujahidin are the ones who are exhausted.