

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Baghdad, Iraq  
01 October 2011



**United States Forces-Iraq  
Quarterly Command Report**

**4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, FY11  
(1 July - 30 September 2011)**

**References**

- A. *Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq*, 17 November 2008.
- B. *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq*, 17 November 2008.
- C. US Embassy – Baghdad/Multi-National Force – Iraq, *Joint Campaign Plan*, 15 November 2009.
- D. Commanding General, US Forces – Iraq, *Operational Guidance*, 4 October 2010.
- E. US Forces – Iraq, Operations Order 11-01, 6 January 2011.
- F. US Forces—Iraq, Fragmentary Order 487, 21 May 2011 (OPORD 11-01 Change 1)
- G. US Forces – Iraq, *Responsible Redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq*, April 2011.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

## **Overview of USF-I**

(U) The United States Forces-Iraq is a four star sub-unified command that reports directly to the Commander, US Central Command. It was formed on 01 January 2010 out of the consolidation of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Task Force 134—Detainee Operations, the Joint Area Support Group-Central and the Iraq Assistance Group. USF-I serves as both the Strategic and Operational command element for all US forces currently serving in Operation NEW DAWN. The USF-I flag flies the streamers of six Joint Meritorious Unit Awards and six campaigns.

(U) The first commander of USF-I was U.S. Army General Raymond T. Odierno. General Odierno had commanded Multi-National Forces-Iraq from 16 September 2008 through the consolidation period and was replaced as USF-I Commander on 01 September 2010 by General Lloyd J. Austin III. General Austin remains the USF-I Commander throughout the time period covered in this report.

## **USF-I Mission Statement**

*"USF-I, in cooperation with US Embassy-Baghdad, the Government of Iraq, and international partners, conducts stability operations through 31 DEC 11 to support Iraq's continued development into a sovereign, stable, and long-term self-reliant strategic partner that contributes to peace and security in the region."*

## **Introduction**

(U) United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) began the fourth quarter of the Fiscal Year 2011 still focused on strengthening the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) while planning for the termination or final transition of all the command's missions to the US Embassy-Iraq (USEMB), US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Government of Iraq (GoI) and other entities by 31 December 2011.


(U) During this quarter that USF-I began Phase II of OPORD 11-01 which is the operational maneuver portion of the plan. It was this shift into Phase II that signaled the beginning of the end for USF-I and Operation New Dawn. The first of the three US Division-Iraq headquarters cased their colors, transitioned their areas of operation and headed home.

(U) The ISF continued to show increased proficiency in countering the activities of violent groups, even when taking on Shi'a extremists. As that was taking place, certain divisions of the Iraqi Army were learning combined arms tactics and training designed to provide them with the skill set necessary to defend Iraq from external threats.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) The quarter was an important one as it set the stage for the implementation of the upcoming Phase II Operations. Throughout the quarter, the key phrase from the Commanding General was that USF-I needed to maintain flexibility. During this quarter there was an increased emphasis on reposturing the force as Operation NEW DAWN approached its final months.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This document presents a history of USF-I from 1 July through 30 September 2011. It will address major issues that arose during the quarter using the Lines of Operation (LOOs) laid down in the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP – see Reference C) as its organizational baseline. Major headings will consist of the JCP Political, Economic and Energy, Rule of Law and Security LOOs as shown in the slide below. The Security LOO will be broken down further to examine progress made during the quarter along the three Lines of Effort (LOE) detailed in Operations Order 11-01 Change 1, which was published during this quarter. Because of the nature of the USF-I mission, this report references political events within and outside of Iraq as well as the US Embassy's activities in support of the JCP.



(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, 24 October 2011)


SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

**Political Line of Operation**

(U) The Political Line of Operation, as defined in Annex A of the 2010 JCP, supports efforts to achieve accommodation between Iraq’s main ethnic and sectarian groups, to develop capable, accountable institutions that serve the Iraqi people, respect human rights and the rule of law, and to peacefully resolve territorial disputes.

**Assessment**



(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, 24 October 2011)

(U//FOUO) The US Embassy’s overall assessment of the Political Line of Operations at the end of this quarter was that it remained slightly off track. The overall assessment remains unchanged from the four assessments. There was a slight worsening of Track 4, which is the process by which the KRG and GoI manage disputes over the internal border, as the rating moved from

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Amber to Yellow. This change was the result of a return to the steady state by which the KRG and the GoI handle disputes.

(U) During August, USF-I formed a JPT to assess courses of action for manning the Combined Coordination Centers through November. Throughout August and September the Senior Working Group has maintained an aggressive meeting schedule, focusing on establishing an effective Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) for Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala in a post-OND environment. The SWG plans to present a series of proposals to the High Level ministerial Committee on 17 October that will establish a lasting CSM with minimal involvement from US Forces. Part of these proposals will address command and control for the CSM.

(U) While the acting Minister of Defense Saadun al-Dulaimi is very involved in the CSM, the lack of a Minister of Interior continues to provide challenges for CSM discussions. In addition staff Lieutenant General al Alwadi has been assigned to a new position within the Iraqi Army and his future status as a SWG member is uncertain. The time remaining to develop, to implement, and to build confidence in a transition process and structure is decreasing. These items increase the risk of escalation as Operation New Dawn draws to a close.

### **Background**

(U) During this quarter the Council of Representatives (COR) came back from a recess. The Iraqi politicians continued to play out their respective agendas in the media. Last quarter the COR unanimously approved the appointment of a new Minister of Planning, Ali Usuf Abd al-Nabi from the Sadrist trend. However they were unable to move forward in regards to the filling of positions with the security ministries. The various political parties asked Iraqiya to name a Minister of Defense. During the two week window of opportunity, they did not name a candidate. There was an agreement to name interim defense and interior ministers but only one was appointed. Prime Minister al-Maliki named the current cultural minister, Saadun al-Dulaimi as the interim Minister of Defense.

### **Stalemate over the National Council for Higher Strategic Policies (NCHSP)**

(U) The stalemated situation at the end of last quarter with no council being formed continued on throughout this quarter. The Kurds proposed a compromise in early July that would have Ayad Allawi heading the NCHSP. Allawi had insisted that he be named to head this council but that was opposed by prime Minister al-Maliki. The compromise called for the council to vote on Allawi and then have the Iraqi Parliament ratify the decision. Iraqiya accepted the compromise but al-Maliki sector declined to give a response.

(U) By mid August a draft law on the establishment of the council had its first reading in parliament. The National Council is not in the Iraqi Constitution so a law is needed to support its creation. The debate continued to rage throughout the quarter as to how much power the council would actually have.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) The State of Law (SOL) Party has raised several objections to the NCHSP. The SOL representative to parliament's legal committee, Mahmud al-Hassani, had complained that the draft law contains at least 8 articles that run counter to Iraq's Constitution. He specifically cited Article 7 which he claims infringes on the independence of the judiciary.

(U) The stalemate continued through the end of the quarter with no progress being made. The SOL has threatened to take the issue to the Supreme Court if the draft law is passed. Based on the past history, there is little hope of success in the near future in getting the law passed. Frustration on all sides continues to grow and it would not be surprising if leadership changes occur in an attempt to move the process forward.

### **Dispute over the MOI and MOD**

(U) With respect to the dispute over the naming of the Minister of Defense, the Iraqiyya Party had previously agreed to reject any candidate that was imposed upon them by the Prime Minister. This was a direct shot at Maliki's choice, former head of the MoD Saadun al-Dulaimi. They indicated they would unite behind one candidate, Salim Dilli. Dilli had been offered up by Iraqiyya throughout the negotiating process, but Maliki has repeatedly said he would not accept him. Dilli himself told a US Embassy (USEMB) official that he was now Iraqiyya's "sole and final" candidate and said he believed he had enough votes to win if his name was put before the COR.

(U) On August 16<sup>th</sup> of this quarter, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki named the former Defense Minister and current cultural minister, Saadun al-Dulaimi as the interim Minister of Defense.

(U) By the end of the quarter al-Dulaimi was still the interim Minister of Defense. There was no progress on the naming of a new Minister of the Interior. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains the interim Minister of the Interior. This action has led to some politicians in the political sectors to start comparing the Prime Minister with deposed dictator Saddam Hussein.

(U) With all sides unwilling to compromise on the original candidates, it does not appear that this stalemate will be resolved anytime soon.

### **Muqtada al-Sadr**

(U) In March of 2011, Muqtada al-Sadr had given the GoI a six month deadline to improve services throughout the country. Responding to his constituents' demands for government reform, al-Sadr called on his followers to demonstrate against the government, saying it has not done enough to improve public services.

(U) On the 5<sup>th</sup> of September al-Sadr told the GoI that changes had to be made. He called for the creation of 50,000 new jobs in Iraq. He also demanded that Iraqis be given a share of the oil revenues as well as step up the pace of reforms. He ended his demands by saying if change was not forthcoming, then protests were.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) Thousands of Iraqis demonstrated in response to al-Sadr's request. The protests were expected to take place on the 9<sup>th</sup> but they were actually held on the 16<sup>th</sup> of September. The protests were a renewed demand for improved power supplies and basic services. There were more than 10,000 protestors in Sadr City and another 5,000 in Hilla.

(U) As with the February protests, the protests in September were focused on jobs, better food rations and better government services rather than an overthrow of the GoI. That is due to the fact that the Sadrist Trend controls five GoI ministries at the present time.

(U) Although the Maliki Government has taken a series of steps to address the Sadr concerns, such as boosting the national ration programs and pledging free power, by the end of the quarter there were no substantive signs of progress.

### **Mujahadeen al-Khalq (MEK)**

~~(S//NF)~~ The situation involving the Mujahadeen al-Khalq (MEK) remained a concern this quarter. The escort missions that USF-I had conducted since 2009 ended this quarter. A mainstream media article in August outlined how former high-ranking former officials of the US Government have been lobbying to have the MEK delisted from the US Government's list of foreign Terrorist Organizations. The increased lobbying efforts run counter to the policy of neutrality that USF-I have strived to maintain.

(U) In response to the attack on Camp Ashraf by the ISF in April of this year, the Central Investigation Court Number 4 of the Spanish National Court has taken on this case. The court issued a writ on July 11, 2011 summoning senior Iraqi officials, including the Prime Minister, to appear on October 3<sup>rd</sup> to answer to the charge of war crimes. Currently Prime Minister al-Maliki enjoys immunity from judicial prosecution but once he leaves office, he loses that protection and will be automatically summoned by the court. The court invited Ad Melkert, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Iraq to stand as a witness in the court along with Struan Stevenson who is European Union's President of the Delegation for Relations with Iraq.

(U) The Iraqis summoned by the court include sLTG Ali Geiden, Commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, [redacted (b)(6)] who was the battalion commander during the attack and [redacted (b)(6)] has been identified as the individual who personally targeted and killed a number of the Ashraf residents on April 8<sup>th</sup>.

(U) Finally, on September 27<sup>th</sup> the European Union's High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton appointed Ambassador Jean DeRuyt as an advisor on the fate of the more than 3,200 residents of Camp Ashraf. Previously he had been Belgium's Permanent representative to the EU.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

## Protests in the Region

(U) The protests that rocked the Middle East during the first quarter of 2011 had dramatically decreased by the end of the third quarter. However, there were still protests in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. It was in Libya where things took a dramatic turn.

(U) Protests in Libya began in Benghazi on February 15, 2011. On that day between 500 and 600 protestors demonstrated outside police headquarters after the arrest of Fathi Terbil. In the police crackdown of the demonstration, 38 people were injured. Writer Idris Al-Mesmari was arrested hours after he gave an interview condemning the police tactics used to put down the demonstration.

(U) Over the next few months there were increased demonstrations not only in Benghazi but also Tripoli, Bayda and Adjabiya. A May siege in Misrata was reported to have used rockets, bombs and sniper fire against the protestors, according to Amnesty International. A more thorough examination in June by Amnesty International disproved many of the original allegations.

(U) At the beginning of this quarter there was heavy fighting in the Nafusa Mountains and around Misrata. Rebel forces clashed with pro-Qaddafi forces that were trying to recapture al-Qawalish. The Qaddafi forces recaptured it on the 13<sup>th</sup> but were pushed out again on the 14<sup>th</sup>. On July 18<sup>th</sup> rebel forces claimed to have captured the town of Brega following the retreat of Government troops to Ra' Lanuf. Two days later the Government troops were actually still holding on in Brega. On July 25<sup>th</sup> rebel forces executed a hostage rescue mission that freed 105 people. These civilians had been held since April of 2011.

(U) On July 28<sup>th</sup> Abdul Fatah Younis, Commander in Chief of the rebel army, was placed under arrest by the NTC (National Transitional Council). The charges were that his family had contacts with the Gaddafi regime. He had been Gaddafi's Minister of Interior but defected in February of 2011. On July 29<sup>th</sup> it was announced by NTC oil minister Ali Tarhouni that Younis had been killed by anti-Gaddafi militiamen. The deaths were suspicious as his body and the bodies of two other officers were found shot and dumped on the outskirts of Benghazi.

(U) The rebel attacks picked up momentum in August. Rebel forces took Zliten and were able to defeat the Libyan counterattacks. By August 8<sup>th</sup> the rebels controlled Bir al-Ghanam. On the 9<sup>th</sup> NATO planes bombed a ship in Tripoli harbor after it began offloading weapons. On the 13<sup>th</sup> pro-Gaddafi forces fired SCUD missiles into rebel positions. Over the next 4 days rebel forces captured the towns controlling the supply routes to Tripoli as well as the towns of Sorman, Sabratha and Gharyan. This effectively left Tripoli besieged. By the 27<sup>th</sup> of August, rebel forces had captured Tripoli and were occupying the homes of two of the Gaddafi children.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) On August 29<sup>th</sup> it was announced by the Algerian Government that [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] had fled to Algeria with several of her children and their spouses. The whereabouts of Moummar Gaddafi remain unknown at the end of the quarter.

(U) On August 25<sup>th</sup> the UN Sanctions Committee released over \$500 million of frozen Libyan assets. This was done after a direct request from the United States. However, South Africa would agree to the release only if the money was used for humanitarian aid. Once that agreement was made, the money was released. On August 31<sup>st</sup> \$280 million that had been blocked from entry into Libya was turned over to the NTC.

(U) Fighting continued in September. Reports of possible ethnic cleansing in towns like Taworgha were reported. There were also reports of rape in the refugee camps as well as outbreaks of highly contagious diseases. On September 22<sup>nd</sup> the town of Sirte was captured and it was reported that large caches of chemical weapons were discovered. There was no reports available confirming or denying the chemical weapons by the end of the quarter.

(U) In Syria protests continued despite the repeal of the 1963 emergency law. On July 24<sup>th</sup> a draft law was created to allow more political parties under the condition that they not be based on religious, ethnic or tribal beliefs and that they do not discriminate against gender or race. Protestors immediately dismissed the law as superficial.

(U) Also in that month pro-Government protestors attacked the French and US Embassies located in Damascus. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attacks and went on the say that Bashir al-Assad has lost his legitimacy. Attacks on protestors continued throughout the month of July.

(U) On July 31<sup>st</sup> a siege of Hama escalated during the Ramadan Massacre. More than 136 people were killed across Syria when government troops attacked protestors with tanks, artillery and snipers. These attacks continued into August with the majority of deaths coming around Hama. The Syrian Navy got involved on August 14<sup>th</sup> when they fired heavy machine guns into the waterfront districts in Latakia.

(U) The siege of Latakia which started in April was beginning to turn toward the government's side by the end of August. Using tanks and APCs Syrian forced rolled into the city on August 13<sup>th</sup>. The next day the army began an artillery barrage against parts of Latakia. Syrian naval gunboats joined in with heavy machine gun fire. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reported that more than 5,000 Palestinians had bene forced to flee for a refugee camp on the outskirts of Latakia. On the 16<sup>th</sup> nine people were confirmed killed. The killing and arrests continued through until the 19<sup>th</sup> of August.

(U) On the first day of Eid al-Fitr, thousands of people demonstrated in towns across Syria. Nine people were killed that day as security forces fired into crowds of demonstrators. By the end of the quarter, the death toll in Syria from the start of demonstrations in April through the

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

end of the quarter were estimated to be between 2,500 (Syrian Government estimate) to over 3,300 (United Nations).

(U) In Egypt the quarter started off much like the previous two quarters had—with demonstrations. On July 1<sup>st</sup> there were the *Friday of Retribution* demonstrations. Tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrated in Suez, Alexandria and Cairo's Tahrir Square to voice frustration over the slow pace of change by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

(U) Exactly one week later there were the *Friday of Determination* protests in the same cities which called for immediate reforms as well as swifter prosecution of ousted government officials.

(U) The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced that all Egyptians who get a new identification card before September 27<sup>th</sup> would be eligible to vote on the November elections. These are the first stage of the parliamentary elections and are scheduled to take place on November 28<sup>th</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

(U) The violence that started throughout the region during the first three months of 2011 had slowly died out by the end of this quarter. There were still those that called for action in the street but many were waiting for the promised reforms to take place. Although there were some protests during the first quarter in Iraq, there was nothing of significance during this quarter.

(U) In Iraq there was some political progress as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki named his current Cultural Minister to be the interim Defense Minister. Saadun al-Dulaimi, a Sunni Muslim member of the Iraqi Unity Alliance, was appointed on August 16<sup>th</sup>. Dulaimi had been the Defense Minister in 2005-2006 under Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

(U) As part of an attempt to end the nine month deadlock after the elections, the politicians had agreed to appoint interim defense and interior ministers at the beginning of August. After two weeks the secular Iraqiya Party did not name a candidate. As a result, Maliki appointed Dulaimi. While this action meant Maliki gave up some of his political power, he still remains Interior Minister.

### **Arab-Kurd Relations**

(U) There has been no significant change since the last quarterly report. Arab-Kurd relations will remain a potential flash point until the underlying political issues in the region are resolved. Reaching the desired end state establishment of a cooperative Arab-Kurd security mechanism within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala provinces will be elusive unless the Kurdish Regional Government and the Government of Iraq are capable of cooperatively conducting all security functions and arbitration of disagreements within the disputed areas.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) By the end of the quarter there had been no significant progress on negotiating and passing a revenue-sharing law. There had also been no significant movement in approving legislation to implement the national census.

(U) In addition the KRG has complained that the GoI has not acted forcefully enough to halt the Turkish air strikes that have been occurring in the region. The GoI has countered that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan--PKK) needs to agree to a cease fire and stop killing Turkish citizens. The KRG has also complained that the GoI has not acted forcefully enough in response to Iranian shelling that has occurred in the area. The GoI has responded that the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistan-- PJAK) needs to stop attacking Iranian bases.

(U) Finally, due to the shift in focus to the Phase II Operational Maneuver portion of OPORD 11-01 as well as the transition of many responsibilities to OSC-I and USM-I, the Arab-Kurd video teleconference was terminated at the end of the quarter.

### **Violations of the CSA**

(U) There have been no significant changes since the last quarterly report. The Kurdish Peshmerga battalions that moved through the Kirkuk Combined Security Area (CSA) and took up positions to the south and southwest of the city in an area under the control of the IA in response to perceived threats to the population on the Feb 25<sup>th</sup> Day of Organized Demonstrations remained in their assigned sectors throughout the quarter. The Senior Working Group (SWG), which is part of the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM), met during the quarter to discuss the relative issues of the factions involved.

(U) However there are issues that remain to be dealt with. While the acting Minister of Defense, Saadun al-Dulaimi, is very involved in the CSM, the lack of a Minister of Interior continues to provide challenges for CSM discussions. In addition staff Lieutenant General al Alwadi has been assigned to a new position within the Iraqi Army and his future status as a SWG member is uncertain. The amounts of time remaining to develop, implement, and build confidence in a transition process and structure is decreasing. These items increase the risk of escalation as Operation New Dawn draws to a close.

(U) The SWG is prepared to provide recommendations to the HLC on the CSM structure at the national and provincial level. A final meeting on 15 October should complete the proposals. The USF-I J35 Enduring Operations continues to maintain an open dialogue with USEMB in anticipation of transferring US government lead on Arab-Kurd relations before mid-December. At this time, there is a good possibility that a follow-on security agreement may be reached between the government of Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdish region.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

## Sons of Iraq (SOI)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I remains committed to ensuring sons of Iraq (SOI) are appropriately treated by the government of Iraq (GOI) in return for the service and sacrifice they gave to enhancing security and reducing hostilities within Iraq, during the insurgency through today. While transitions remained halted, planning continued. An intelligence capability is near completion and transition plans completion should follow. Transitions themselves could then happen in areas where security allows. Currently commanders assess that only Baghdad can sustain the loss of any SOI. The SOI joint coordination center moved from under the Iraqi ground forces command (IGFC) to the directorate general for intelligence and security (DGIS), a move that has driven improved support to and performance by the joint coordination center (JCC). The GOI has settled into a pattern of paying the SOI two months at a time, every other month. The SOI seem satisfied with this pattern and pay complaints have dropped significantly.

(C//~~FVEY~~) Despite the stall in transitions, the GoI continued its talking point of pushing to complete SoI transitions by the end of 2011. The Minister of State for National Reconciliation (MoSNR), Dr Amer Khuzai, whose ministry has oversight of the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR), has reiterated that objective. However, his actions were not always as strong. He expressed the desire to take a slow, quiet approach to SoI transition, likely because the benefits the SoI are due to receive could not be matched by the GoI as Khuzai attempts to reach out to other groups. However, prominent SoI Leader Abu Risha (Anbar) expressed frustration with this approach.

## Diplomatic Relations

### Kuwait

(U) Last quarter it was discussed that Iraq was claiming that Kuwait's new port would hinder Iraq's access to its waterways. It would also have a huge economic impact. Instead of the Grand Faw being a lynchpin in the economic development of southern Iraq, the Mubarak al-Kabir could cost the Grand Faw some 60% of its business once it opens. The Mubarak al-Kabir is being constructed on Bubiyan Island at the very mouth of the Shaat al-Arab waterway. The issue with the Kuwaiti port, as far as Iraq is concerned, is that it would render unprofitable the Grand Faw port that Iraq has already signed a \$4 billion contract for.

(U) However, during the first week of September Iraq's Finance Minister, Rafie al-Esawi told *The Financial Times* that a committee that was investigating the Mubarak al-Kabir determined that the new port was unlikely to have an economic impact on Iraq. The Kuwait Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammad Sabah Al-Salem, had stated in August that the new port was not a competitor to the port of al-Faw.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) Iraqi Airways and Kuwaiti Airways remain at an impasse over debts incurred during the Saddam regime. Kuwaiti Airways is still claiming compensation for the 1990 invasion. This claim is separate from the funds owed to Kuwait as compensation for the invasion. Iraq is currently paying 5% of its oil revenues to Kuwait to satisfy that requirement. In addition Kuwait is pushing Iraq to formally recognize the border between the two countries as demarcated by the United Nations in 1993.

(U) Despite the assurances from al-Esawi and Al-Salem, it remains to be seen what the actual economic impact will be. Much of Iraq's concern can be tied to the port of al-Faw. In 2005 the GoI announced plans to expand the port. As of the end of this quarter, no construction has been started. However, the GoI has confirmed that construction will begin sometime after the beginning of 2012.

(U) In addition to these issues, Suzan al-Saad of the Shi'ite al-Fadeela Bloc announced that the recent seizure of 12 Iraqi fishermen from the al-Faw port by a Kuwaiti Naval vessel while in Iraqi regional waters reflected the Kuwaiti aggressive spirit against Iraq. Kuwait responded by claiming that they arrest 10 fishermen for illegally fishing in Kuwaiti territorial waters without paying the appropriate fees.

## **Turkey**

(U) Turkey continued to explore better relations in regards to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). During this quarter Turkey hosted a delegation headed by Kurdistan Islamic Union party leader Salahaddin Bahaddin. Recent skirmishes between the Turkish military and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) were among the topics of conversation.

(U) The PKK remains a limiting factor in the relationship between the KRG and Turkey. During this quarter more than 30 Turkish soldiers were killed in Turkey's southern provinces as a result of PKK attacks. On August 17 the Turkish air force initiated a bombing campaign against PKK sites in the Kandil Mountains of Iraq. It was reported that 100 PKK members were killed and more than 80 others wounded in the attacks.

(U) Although Turkey still has major security concerns about Iraq, this has not stopped a noticeable warming in the relations between the KRG and Turkey. Economic activity is increasing as Turkey is finding Iraq a rich market for her export goods. Turkey will continue to use soft power to advance her goals in Iraq while never taking the use of force off the table when it comes to dealing with the PKK.

## **Bahrain**

(U) During this quarter the crackdown on demonstrators in Bahrain by the government of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa continued. There is also a growing concern over Iranian interference in Bahrain, especially as they appear to be grounded in real territorial claims by the Islamic

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Republic. Iran has a long standing territorial claim to Bahrain that goes back to the time of the Safavids in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The religious leaders of the Iranian revolution renewed those claims on the grounds that the majority of Bahrain's citizens are Shi'a.

(U) At the end of last quarter Bahrain established the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) to examine the incidents from February and March. The Commission was expected to release their findings by the end of October. On August 9<sup>th</sup> the commission announced the release of 137 detainees including opposition party al-Wefaq member Matar Matar and Jawaad Fayrouz.

(U) The Bahrain Center for Human Rights has openly criticized the BICI. In an interview on August 8<sup>th</sup>, Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, an international UN war crimes expert, praises the cooperation the BICI had received from the Bahraini Government and states that there was never a policy of excessive use of force by the government. The head of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Nabeel Rajab, sent an open letter criticizing those comments and calling into question the legitimacy of the commission and its findings. On August 15<sup>th</sup> a group of protestors stormed the offices of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) as a result of Bassiouni's comments.

(U) Throughout the quarter demonstrations continued and deaths followed. A disabled woman named Zainab Al Juma died after being tear-gassed in her home. Seyyed Jawad Hashem died after being tear-gassed and then another man died after being teargassed at Hashem's funeral.

(U) A parliamentary by-election was held on September 24<sup>th</sup> to replace the 18 members of the largest political party, al-Wefaq, who had resigned in protest over the government's reactions to the protestors in February. Bahraini security forces closed the Pearl Roundabout, the site of the original demonstrations, the day of the election. They also attacked protestors in the village of Sanabis after thousands had gathered there to march to the Pearl Roundabout.

(U) Bahrain ended the quarter still dealing with the aftermath of the incidents from February and March. It was anticipated that the BICI findings, originally due to be released by the end of October, would be delayed until November.

## Syria

(U) As leaders in the Arab world condemn Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for his violent crackdown on protestors, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came out in support of Assad this quarter. Maliki went so far as to urge the protestors not to sabotage the Syria state. Yet in a September 20<sup>th</sup> statement, GoI spokesman Ali al-Moussawi was quoted by the *New York Times* as saying that Iraq has urged Assad to step down. Moussawi's statement read as —We are against the one-party rule and the dictatorship that hasn't allowed for free expression.”

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) Yet the very next day al-Moussawi was quoted as saying that Iraq was not calling for the resignation of Assad and claimed he was misquoted. On September 30<sup>th</sup> al-Maliki spoke on Iraqi television and indicated a belief that Syria will be able to overcome the current crisis through a series of reforms. It is interesting to note that al-Maliki's comments were very similar to those of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who had indicated the Syrian Government needed to implement the necessary reforms themselves, without outside interference.

(U) Iraq and Syria have a common border and have a long history as trading partners. Iraq is Syria's largest trading partner and a new economic pact signed at the end of the quarter will only solidify that status. Any attempt at economic sanctions will hold little appeal since it would cause black market enterprises to only increase between the two countries.

### **Economic and Energy Line of Operation**

(U/~~FOUO~~) Regarding the Economic and Energy Line of Operation, as detailed in Annex B of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), it is the United States' mission to help Iraq build a diverse, stable, prosperous, market-oriented economy that creates jobs and is fully integrated into the global economy. Our goals include: improved delivery of essential services; development of the oil sector; improved key sectors, such as finance, energy and agriculture; macroeconomic stability; and creation of a well-functioning and accountable government administration.


### **Assessment**

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

UNCLASS//~~FOUO~~



## Assessment Overview: Economic and Energy



Jun 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	Jun 2011	Sep 2011	LOO Conditions
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	1: Essential service delivery and infrastructure meets the basic needs of all Iraqis.
Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	2: Energy sector institutions efficiently develop and manage oil resources and provide electrical services for the good of the Iraqi people.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	3: Iraq's economy is diversified, growing, and globally integrated.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	4: Iraq's economy has a firm foundation for macroeconomic stability, including the use of sound economic policy and decision making.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	5: Iraq has the institutions and laws in place to foster a well-functioning government administration, including accountability.

3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, 2011  
 Legend: On Track (Green), Slightly Off Track (Yellow), Moderately Off Track (Orange), Not On Track (Red), Not Assessed or No Longer Relevant (Blue), Trending Up (Up Arrow), Trending Down (Down Arrow)  
 UNCLASS//~~FOUO~~

(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, 24 October 2011)

(U/~~FOUO~~) The US Embassy's overall assessment of the Economic and Energy Line of Operation at the end of this quarter was that it remained slightly off track. There was no change in the assessment between the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter and this quarter.

(U) The embassy highlighted a number of signs that the Iraqi economy was moving in the right direction during the quarter, The GOI made its first payments-in-kind to International Oil Companies (IOCs) under the Technical Service Contracts (TSCs) signed with IOCs to increase oil production. ExxonMobil elected to receive a cash payment versus payment-in-kind. The Iraqi Cabinet also approved \$927 million to begin civil works for key power projects, including GE Mega-Deal. Projects include installing and putting into operation gas turbines purchased under multi-million dollar deals with GE and Siemens.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Despite the improvements, it remains clear that there are no "quick fixes" for the electricity shortage problem. The Iraqi power sector is still a broken system and an unsustainable drain on the GOI budget. As long as the government continues to be the primary provider of electricity without adequate tariffs or cost-recovery, shortages and/or poor quality of

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

service will be the norm rather than the exception. In the short term, the focus is on getting the GoI to increase supply through increased funding for operations and maintenance, assisting and encouraging the MOE to implement a public messaging campaign to inform the public of the situation and progress towards the solution, and the purchase, installation, and fueling of 4,000 MW of HFO-fueled generators. In the long term, the focus is on implementation of the Electricity Master Plan, completion of ongoing GE and Siemens Mega Deal projects, continued refurbishment of existing units, and comprehensive power sector reform that includes privatization of the generation, transmission, and/or distribution systems, assuming the GoI is a willing partner.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A top priority for the US Government continues to be remaining engaged with the GoI on fiscal issues given that the GoI is gradually becoming more fiscally independent as oil prices rise. This will be particularly important after the fourth IMF review, expected to take place on or after October 30<sup>th</sup> of 2011. If, at that time, the GoI has earned \$3 billion more than it had budgeted for the first three quarters of 2011, or has projects that will be less than 90% of its 2011 capital budget, the program will be treated as precautionary and no additional funding will be released.

## Oil

(U) International Oil Companies (IOCs) continued ramping up production operations to meet their 10% initial production target (IPT), which enables the IOCs to begin cost recovery. The GOI made its first payments-in-kind to IOCs under the Technical Service Contracts (TSCs) signed with IOCs to increase oil production. ExxonMobil elected to receive a cash payment versus payment-in-kind. Several other IOCs are scheduled to meet IPT in the 2011 calendar year.

(U) Iraqi crude oil exports were spotty this quarter. For the last quarter of FY 11, Basrah crude amounted to 53.2 million barrels of crude a month which was an increase over the previous quarter. However, production from Kirkuk dropped drastically to 10.1 million barrels of crude for September after averaging 14.25 the previous two months. For the quarter a barrel of Iraqi crude average \$106 a barrel, down from the previous quarter.

(U) On August 8<sup>th</sup> the Iraqi Oil Ministry qualified 41 international companies to compete for 12 exploration bids in the next bidding round. That bidding round is expected to be held in January. Oil ministry estimates that the new blocs would add approximately 10 billion barrels of oil to its current reserves of 143 billion barrels as well as an additional 29 trillion feet of natural gas to its current reserve of 112.6 trillion cubic feet. The 41 companies include some of the world's largest oil producers such as Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, BP, the Russian company Lukoil as well as smaller companies like the UAE's Mubadala Oil & Gas and Kuwait Energy of Kuwait.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

## Water

(U) In the recent assessment of Iraq's economic performance, one of the issues noted was that the Ministry of Water failed again to address the subject of much needed repairs to the Mosul Dam.

(U) On August 21<sup>st</sup> Iran announced that they are willing to prevent all the Iranian rivers' flow from reaching Iraq. In the past Iran has cut the flow of the al-Wand River into Iraq.

(U) In an interview with al-Sumaria news on August 24<sup>th</sup>, Iraq Ministry of Water Resources spokesman Ali Taleb confirmed that the Ministry had not been informed officially that Iran was cutting the water of rivers and tributaries flowing into Iraq. He also confirmed that calls are ongoing in order to determine the country's share of common rivers.

(U) Stopping the flow of water from the Iranian rivers into Iraq would create a serious problem for Iraq. Currently there are 24 rivers and 42 tributaries as well as numerous valleys that flow into Iraq. Approximately 12% of the water flowing into the Tigris River comes from the Iranian side. In addition the Karoon River is used to replenish the areas around the Shat al-Arab to the tune of 14 million cubic meters of water. Cutting this flow off would adversely impact the provinces of Maysan, Diyala and Wasat.

(U) On August 26<sup>th</sup> the head of the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, Mohammed al-Saadi announced that the ministry's directories will increase water releases into the Tigris River. This is being done to prevent the increasing salinity of the river from reaching the Shat al-Arab.

## Electricity

(U) The Ministry of Electricity continues to contract for additional power supply generation contracts.

(U) At the end of last quarter, it was reported that 3250 MW of future generation projects had been awarded and 5,700 MW of future generation were under construction out of the total 22,990 MW of planned future generation. It was also noted that on June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2011 the GOI cabinet approved \$927 million financing for future electricity generation projects. This funding was 50% of the total cost of the GE Megadeal and Siemens projects plus one additional new generation project with the French Company, Alstom. The additional funding would allow the MoE to shorten the timeline between contractor bid award and start of construction because the letters of credit for these projects were already 50% funded. Additionally, the funding would cover the four cancelled IPP projects that were to be tendered as EPC. Finally, it would partially fund a new MoE 720 MW power project with Alstom. To complete the projects, another \$927 million would need to come from the GOI 2012 budget.

(U) However, during this quarter a few of those deals came into question. A developing scandal resulting in the dismissal of the Minister of Electricity hit the ministry.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) At the beginning of July Electricity Minister Raad Shalal signed two deals with a value approaching \$2 billion in total. These deals were for the building of power plants and infrastructure. The two companies involved were Maschinebau Halberstadt (MBH) and the Canadian company Canadian Alliance for Power Generation Equipment, Inc (CAPGENT). The issue is whether these two companies actually exist. Several GoI politicians have claimed the companies are not real and that the deals are frauds.

(U) MBH was awarded a contract worth \$623 million to build five power plants in the Ninewa Province over the next year. The CARGENT contract was for \$1.2 billion and it was to build ten power plants in the al-Anbar and Salah a-Din Provinces over the next 12 months.

(U) Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani stated that CAPGENT was a paper company only and that MBH was bankrupt and facing legal issues. MBH was actually declared insolvent by a German court in early 2011. However the insolvency administrators confirmed that the firm would continue to operate.

(U) Electricity Minister Raad Shalal resigned in mid August at the request of Prime Minister al-Maliki. He had been fired on August 7<sup>th</sup> but under Iraqi law the decision had to be approved by parliament.

### **Ports of Entry (PoE)**

(U) During this quarter Iraq's ports of entry at airports and sea ports, like Umm Qasr, have improved security throughout the country.

(U) However, the Ports of Entry Directorate (POED) still lacks the unity command and national standardization required to effectively manage and coordinate activities at the POEs. Ministerial Council Decision 281 would grant the POED the unity of command necessary to coordinate the activities of the multiple ministries operating at the PoEs. In addition, Ministerial Council Decision 125 would create the POED as its own separate commission. These two decisions are on the docket in the Council of Representatives, but the scheduled voting continues to slip. If passed into law, these two resolutions will provide the much needed authority for the POED to fulfill its responsibilities. Additionally, the NSA continues to attempt to create a High-Level Committee that will provide necessary focus and coordination on border security at the highest levels within the GoI.

(U) Progress toward compliance with ICAO Annex 17 is moving forward, and will continue to do so. Security has improved at BIAP with the use of ICAA-funded private security contractors (PSCs). There are now PSCs at airports in Mosul and Najaf, and a firm has been selected for Basrah Airport (MOI there currently provides security). The two airports in the KRG are secure (the KRG MOI provides security). Despite badging and perimeter-fencing issues at BIAP, security will not be the obstacle to attaining ICAO compliance after 2011; rather, it will be the lack of comprehensive rules/regulations within the ICAA.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) The GOI still needs to establish a designated port-security authority, but it has contracted with Aegis Defence Services to help develop port-security plans. The USG and GOI recently conducted vulnerability assessments for the North and South Ports of Umm Qasr, Al Maqal, and Abu Fulus. Khor Az Zubayr and the oil terminals will most likely be scheduled for assessments in early OCT. Once weaknesses are corrected and the ports are assessed a second time, the GOI can then –self-certify” that its ports are in compliance with ISPS code. The International Maritime Organization has expressed a willingness to come to Iraq and help with the process, if necessary.

## **Air Traffic**

(U) Beginning in 2007 when the Baghdad Area Control Center was opened, OTA and USF-I have been working to transfer airspace to the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority (ICAA). On August 25, 2011, airspace control of the Kirkuk sector 15,000 ft and below was transferred to the Baghdad Area Control Center. This leaves only one piece of airspace remains; that is the sector over Baghdad. It has an expected transfer in early October.

(U) Unfortunately the ICAA does not have adequate aviation infrastructure, such as, back up VSAT, radios, radar, nor redundant paths in the event of a failure. To counter this deficiency the US Embassy has proposed a CNS (Communications, Navigation, Surveillance) evaluation to be conducted by the FAA, as well as the creation of a program management plan for appropriate operations and maintenance.

(U) Several issues continue to hinder air traffic in Iraqi such as the exorbitant Iraqi airways royalties and fees which inhibit aviation commerce in the country. In addition US registered aircraft are unable to fly into and land in Iraq due to the FAA's SFAR 77. This SFAR (Special Federal Aviation Regulation) has been in effect since October 9<sup>th</sup> of 1996 and prohibits flight operations within the territory and air space of Iraq by any US commercial carrier.

## **Rule of Law Line of Operation**

(U) The Rule of Law Line of Operation, as defined in Annex C of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), seeks to address Iraq's continuing needs through a closely coordinated prioritized effort to allocate US Government (USG) resources to achieve:

- (1) Further integration and security for the Iraqi criminal justice system, including its law enforcement, judicial, incarceration and related legal community support components, and, for the foreseeable future, Iraqi Army and Regional Security Forces (RSF) subject to the rule of law;

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

- (2) Enhanced judicial capacity and training, including continuing professional development for judges, judicial investigators, prosecutors, judicial security personnel and court administrative staff; and
- (3) Improved law enforcement and judicial relationships and integration of the legal community to address corruption and common transnational criminal threats; as well as,
- (4) Assistance at each level of government for enactment of civil justice reforms which may lead to increased foreign investment and improved economic conditions.

Assessment

UNCLASS//FOUO



Assessment Overview: Rule of Law



Jul 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	Jun 2011	Sep 2010	LOO Conditions
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	1: Increasingly transparent, independent, efficient and secure judiciary.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	2: Enhanced professionalism and effectiveness in law enforcement.
Orange	Orange	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	3: Continued improvements in detention and corrections practices and capacities.
Yellow	Yellow	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange	4: Improved civil justice system that protects commercial and property rights.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	5: Improved corruption detection and enforcement practices.
Yellow	Yellow	Orange	Green	Green	Green	6: Increased awareness of rights and equal access to justice through enhanced professionalism in the legal community.

3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, 2011 
 
 15 UNCLASS//FOUO

(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, 24 October 2011)  
 (\*\*the slide contains an error—the last notation should read Sep 2011 not 2010)

(U) The USEMB assessed that Iraq’s overall progress in achieving the goals for Rule of Law laid out in the 2010 JCP was —slightly off track” for the quarter that ended September 30<sup>th</sup>. This quarter’s assessment was unchanged from the previous two quarterly assessments.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) The Embassy pointed out several successes for this past quarter. One was the development of a judicial security handbook and video. A thorough reference desk book has been developed to promote and standardize the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) judiciary security practices. The desk book is currently under HJC final revision. Additionally, an abbreviated and streamlined version of the desk book (this hand book will be distributed to all PSD and judges) has been created along with a 45 minute training video, which discusses protection scenarios and vital steps that can be taken to increase personal safety and security. The hand book and video are currently in the final stages of production.

(U) During four day period of July 9-13, 2011, the remaining detainees in USF-I custody were transferred to the MoJ-ICS Karkh Prison. Additionally, Compound 7 and the medical clinic of the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility (TIF) were transferred to the MoJ-ICS Karkh Prison on July 14, 2011. The MoJ-ICS continues to demonstrate they have the ability to conduct detainee/inmate transfers in a safe and secure manner. As an example, the Baghdad Central Prison (formerly Abu Ghraib) was re-activated on April 6, 2011, with the majority of these prisoners being transferred from the Rusafa Prison Complex. Today, the population is 1,769 and all transfers were accomplished without incident.

(U) Finally during the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY11, the Commission of Integrity (COI) doubled the number of active cases from 352 to 706. This represented a nearly a 40% increase in the number of arrest warrants obtained (53 to 84). They also increased the number of arrests made from 88 to 134, and more than doubled the number of cases referred to investigative judges from 352 to 746.

(U) Although there were a number of successes this quarter, challenges still remain. The leadership of the GoI still must decide whether a single-ministry can effectively and securely operate, manage, and sustain the GoI detention operations that comply with international corrections standards. They must also take into account the capacities of the various ministries involved including the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Ministry of Interior (MoI) as well as the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) to resource and manage detention operations.

(U) In addition, the lack of uniform crime scene protocols continues to negatively impact forensic based investigations as well as hinder the transparency of the court system as perceived by the Iraqi public. To combat this, the MOI leadership must develop a standard crime scene protocol which would bring conformity and consistency to the ROL operations. Additionally, training needs to be provided to Provicincial Director of Police (PDOPs) on evidence collection and forensic capabilities. Moreover, MOI leadership needs to procure equipment that will facilitate the proper collection of forensic evidence.

(U) Although the initial US Marshals Service (USMS) "train the trainers" course was very successful, the training has splintered because there is still a lack of communication between the MoJ, the MoI and HJC. This splintering has created a negative impact on cross-ministry training

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

and judicial security. In order to combat that as well as maintain ongoing support for HJC judicial security training, heretofore conducted at the National Corrections Training Center (a MoJ run facility), the relationships between HJC, MoJ, and MoI must continue to be fostered. This should be a topic of discussion during the next quarter's Joint Coordination Committee for Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation.

### **Prisoner Abuse**

(U) It was announced by the British Army this quarter that they would be launching a second inquiry later this year to examine disputed allegations of the systemic abuse of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers. The first inquiry was into the death of a hotel worker in Basrah named Baha Mousa. Mr. Mousa died after 36 hours in British custody. An autopsy revealed he had suffered at least 93 wounds including fractured ribs and a broken nose.

(U) The report on the Mousa inquiry was released on September 8<sup>th</sup> of this quarter. Former judge Sir William Gage began his inquiry in 2009 and released the report this quarter. Gage's findings indicated that senior officials should have done more to prevent Mr. Mousa's death in 2003. The report noted that the British forces in Basra were using methods that had been banned by parliament in 1972 to include hooding of prisoners, sleep deprivation and stressful positional standing.

(U) There are new allegations that British troops tortured and murdered up to 20 men while they were being held in British custody in 2004. The British Court of Appeals is currently considering whether to order a third inquiry into the military's entire detention and interrogation system after hearing arguments on behalf of some 150 men who allege they were tortured by the British between 2003 and 2005.

(U) The majority of the allegations center on the Joint Forces Intelligence Team (JFIT) located near Basra. Three members of that team have already been referred to the Director of Service Prosecutions for consideration of charges under the 2001 International Criminal Court Act.

### **Forensic Training**

(U) The Criminal Evidence Directorate (CED) Advisory Team (AT) conducted training, distributed and installed DNA and Chemical forensics equipment, and developed an Iraqi National Forensic Strategy to provide INL a way ahead for their program. MG Munim, the CED Director, continues to recover from an October 2010 attack, but is not expected to return to his position. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) Director, (b)(6) continues to make improvements in the system, even though at the end of the quarter the system was not functional due to a break in the FMS contract supporting the program. The highlights of the quarter are the complete installation of the Chemistry discipline's Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometers (GC/MSD) in the Loyalty and Basra labs and the installation of the DNA systems

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

for Al Hilla and Loyalty labs. Loyalty lab now has the complete array of forensic tools at their disposal to conduct CED and Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) operations.

(U) There are three primary full-service laboratories located in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil. The Baghdad Lab (Loyalty Lab) is collocated with the National Criminal Evidence Directorate (CED) Headquarters. These three labs will have both comparative and analytical capabilities. Comparative forensics includes traditional disciplines such as: latent fingerprints, firearms and tool-marks, document comparison, and basic serology. The analytical disciplines include advanced chemistry and DNA.

(U) As of the 4th Quarter of FY 11, Erbil remains the only lab that is processing DNA cases, even though all full service labs have the required equipment installed and functional, except DNA in Basra. There are two satellite labs located in Mosul and Al Hillah which previously had only a comparative capability and now have received the ability to use the chemical analytical discipline.

(U) Al Hillah also received the ability to process DNA cases in the last week of September, 2011. The final distribution of equipment to the five regional expansion labs, located in Najaf, Al Kut, Ramadi, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, are complete, minus Ramadi. Continued force protection concerns have kept the CED AT from fully installing Najaf and Ramadi and due to the end of mission, the training team members were unable to install the equipment at the new lab in Al Kut and at Al Hilla labs.

(U) The CED regional headquarters in Baghdad which relocated to the old Forward Operations Base (FOB) Loyalty saw no significant improvements during this 4<sup>th</sup> quarter. Key infrastructure issues such as the connection of a backup power source and the quality of the electrical wiring remained incomplete. Poor staff coordination and lack of support from IPS Headquarters resulted in no repairs being made. The Firearms section and archived documents section continue to reside at the old Karrada lab, with no date set for their movement to Loyalty.

### **Corruption**

(U) On August 29, 2011 the Commission on Integrity released their 2010 Annual Report. There were some interesting statistics from the report. The COI investigated 17,067 new cases in 2010. Of that figure 8,617 were classified as initial cases which are ones that are investigated by COI investigators and detectives but did not get submitted to a judge. There were 8,450 cases classified as criminal cases which mean they were submitted to an investigating judge. There were a total of 4,225 persons wanted under arrest warrants including 57 with rank of director general and higher. There was one with the rank of minister. There were 4,082 persons wanted under a summons order with 190 of those having a rank above director general. There were 7 ministers under a summons order.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) Corruption remains a serious problem in Iraq but there was a measure enacted this quarter which is designed to help combat it.

(U) On September 24<sup>th</sup> the Council of Representatives passed the Commission of Integrity law. This law, which was submitted by the integrity and ethics committees, clarified the duties and responsibilities of the COI. In addition the law provided for the mechanism by which the COI commissioner is chosen. Now the COR will form a committee of nine members from the various integrity and legal committees. They will select three candidates for the position of commissioner.

(U) This law also established three new directorates. They are the extradition office, the studies and research office and the Iraqi anti-corruption academy. The law also established a second deputy position for the COI commissioner who will be in charge of education and PR office as well as relations with NGO offices.

(U) There were some notable success in the fight against corruption during this quarter. The Director General of the State Company trading for food stuffs was sentenced to 5 years in prison by the al-Muthanna criminal court under Article 340 (corruption) of the Iraqi Penal Code. The same court sentenced the Deputy Director General of the same company to 7 years in jail under Article 318 (embezzlement).

(U) On September 15<sup>th</sup> the al-Rysafa criminal court sentenced the commander of the MOI's quick reaction force to two years in prison and slapped a 1,100,00 ID fine on him for bribery. He was arrested in March of 2011 after accepting a 50,000 ID bribe from a contractor.

(U) Finally the results of the survey to measure the extent of bribery in the public sector conducted in September of 2011 were released. It reported that in September the bribery rate dropped, reaching a level of 2.31% whereas the August rate was 2.64%. The survey noted that the Ministry of Justice had the highest rate of bribery 4.25% followed by the Ministry of Electricity at 3.97%. Among the provinces, the al-Najaf Province had a bribery rate of 10.36% with Babel Province in second at 4.49%. Both Thi qar and al-Najaf Provinces appeared in the highest three provinces taking bribes for all three months of this quarter. September marked the eighth consecutive month that the al-Najaf Province appeared in the rankings. The Thi qar Province has appeared in four of the last five months.

### **Detainees in USF Custody**

~~(S/NF)~~ At the beginning of June 2011 General Austin approved Al Asad as the alternate location for the TIF. He also directed that Detainee Operations end no later than November 24<sup>th</sup>, 2011. The TIF was moved to Al-Asad due to the closure of Camp Cropper and its transition to the GoI in July of this quarter. The facility at Al-Asad was a new holding facility on the south airfield that could hold up to 100 detainees.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) Also in the beginning of this quarter, USF-I Detainee Operations section completed the transfer of the remaining 203 detainees to the GoI, and anticipates the transfer or release of any remaining detainees in accordance with the U. S. - Iraq Security Agreement by the middle of November. USF-I also established an alternate Theater Internment Facility (TIF) located at Al-Asad Air Base to hold enduring security threat detainees as directed and new captures that are identified as a direct threat to U. S. Forces in Iraq. The facility at Al-Asad will be used only for new intakes of prisoners.


(U) During this quarter there were 52 intakes of prisoners. The criterion for intakes remained unchanged from previous quarters. USF-I will detain those who commit a hostile act such as an attack or other use of force against the United States, USF, or other designated persons or property. Individuals will also be detained if they demonstrate a hostile intent such as the threat of the imminent use of force against the United States, USF, or other designated persons or property. Finally, individuals will be detained when necessary for purpose of imperative security. These individuals will be held as long as they remain a threat but will not be held past 31 December 2011.

### **Security Line of Operation**

(U) The Security Line of Operation, as defined in Annex C of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), presents a vision of an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self reliant; a nation able to provide for its own protection under the rule of law and is fully responsible for its internal security; a nation that possesses the ministerial capacity and capability for external defense; a nation that contributes to regional stability and is a US strategic partner.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Assessment



(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, 24 October 2011)


(U) Unlike the Political, Economic and Energy and Rule of Law LOOs which all have a USEMB lead, USF-I is the lead agency for the Security LOO under the 2010 JCP. For the quarter ending in September of 2011, the command assessed progress as “Slightly off track,” – as the chart above indicates. There was no change in the assessment from the previous quarter.

**Security Trends and Incidents**

(U) The total number of incidents was considerably lower than in the previous quarter. This past quarter the numbers were more in line with the trending data over the past several quarters. They were nowhere near the levels they hit in 2010 and certainly nowhere near the 2007 numbers. August was the month with the fewest casualties during the quarter.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Overall Casualty Trends




(CHOPS USFI CTA 09\_2011 for CG Read Book)

~~(S//FVEY)~~ This quarter saw a downturn in US casualties. July was the deadliest month with a total of 4 killed. There were no US fatalities in August. That is the first time that had ever been recorded. The total number of incidents for this quarter was below the previous quarter. Across the board there were significant reductions in casualties in all categories.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



**USF-I Hostile Casualty Trend Analysis (Since June 2003)**



(CHOPS USFI CTA 09\_2011 for CG Read Book)

**US Casualties**

(U) In regards to US casualties, September was the lowest total out of the past twelve months with only 1 killed in action and the second lowest month of all time. There were no US fatalities of any type in the month of August. During this quarter there were 5 USF-I personnel who were killed in action supporting Operation NEW DAWN. This represents a 75% drop from the previous quarter when 21 Soldiers were killed in action. There were 50 wounded in action which was down from 105 wounded in action last quarter. Finally, 3 individuals died during the quarter as the result of non-combat injuries which was down from the figure of 7 during the last quarter.

**Security Planning**

(U) Security planning remains slightly off track but is progressing. For instance the GOI still needs to establish a designated port-security authority, but it has contracted with Aegis Defence Services to help develop port-security plans. The USG and GOI recently conducted vulnerability assessments for the North and South Ports of Umm Qasr, Al Maqal, and Abu Fulus.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The MoI 2012-2016 Strategic Plan was drafted following the completion of a second series of strategic focus groups at the General Director level. The MoI is scheduled to brief the Strategic Plan to Prime Minister al-Maliki early in the last quarter of CY 2011. This plan addresses many of the key challenges within the MoI as well as supports the long-term development and sustainment of Iraq's security requirements.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The GoI has been without a full time Minister of Interior since the November 2010 elections. It was only in August that an interim Minister of Defense was appointed. The appointment came only after Allawi's party did not put forth a candidate. After a series of high profile attacks by AQI that killed scores and wounded hundreds of Iraqis on August 15<sup>th</sup>, an interim minister was named. The interim minister continues to also perform his duties as the Cultural Minister.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ One issue that continues to plague security planning is the hiring freeze that has been in place since 2009. This freeze has prevented the ISF, both MoI and MoD, from expanding its forces. Many commanders—including the Federal Police, Oil Police, Iraqi Police and other internal security organizations—have called for the law to be repealed. Currently the security organizations can only hire people to replace those who have been lost due to firings, separations, and those killed or wounded. This impacts security planning—future planning can only be done for what is on hand as opposed to projected end strength or needed end strength.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ Without a Minister of Interior and only an interim Minister of Defense, it remains doubtful that the Iraqi security system will be able to agree on a long-term strategic vision or a coherent defense and security procurement policy. This lack of key ministers will also affect the transition of internal security to the police.

### **Significant Security Events**

(U) The latest reports from the Department of State Bureau for Diplomatic Security continue to state that indigenous terrorist groups and Shi'ite militias are responsible for the majority of attacks occurring in Iraq today. The reports note that these groups continue to attack as the US forces from Iraq continue to withdrawal in accordance with the mandated Security Agreement date of December 31<sup>st</sup> of this year..

(U) On July 5<sup>th</sup> 35 people were killed and 28 wounded when a VBIED and an IED exploded simultaneously outside a council building in Taji.

(U) Three US Soldiers were killed by an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) on July 7<sup>th</sup> right outside Camp Victory.

(U) On August 15<sup>th</sup> there were a total of 42 coordinated attacks across Iraq. The casualties 86 civilians killed and more than 315 wounded. Three suicide bombers also died in the attacks.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) Twenty eight Iraqi civilians were killed by a suicide bomber at the Umm al-Qara Mosque on August 28<sup>th</sup>.

(U) A bus carrying Shi'ite pilgrims was stopped at a fake checkpoint and twenty two civilians were killed in a suspected AQI attack on September 12<sup>th</sup>.

(U) On September 25<sup>th</sup> a VBIED and IED attack killed 25 in Karbala and wounded dozens more.

(U) A VBIED exploded at a funeral near Hillah for a tribal sheikh and kills 17 while wounding 70.

### **Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)**

~~(S/NF)~~ Al-Qaeda remains the most violent of the Sunni extremist groups. Although their logistical networks have been degraded over the past few months, they still remain a viable threat against the GoI, the ISF and the people of Iraq. AQI has retained the manpower, material and technical expertise to conduct sporadic attacks throughout Baghdad though their focus continues to center around Baghdad due to the abundance of government targets, the mixed Sunni/Shi'a population as well as an international media presence.

On August 28<sup>th</sup> of this quarter, AQI carried out the attack on the Umm al-Qara Mosque in Baghdad. The attack killed 28 people including an Iraqi parliamentarian. More than 30 were injured in the attack. The mosque is the largest worship place in Baghdad for Sunni Muslims.

(U) Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri (Abu Dua) remains the head of AQI.

~~(S)~~ The overall assessment on AQI is mixed. The impact of the Arab Spring on the long-term influence of Al Qaeda (AQ) isn't known but has been the subject of considerable media speculation. It would be a hard sell for AQI to sell itself as an organization supportive of the protestors while these protestors call for democracy and dignity rather than the imposition of fundamentalist ideals.

### **Khata'ib Hizbalah (KH) and Shi'a Extremist Groups (SEGs)**

1.4b, 1.4d

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

1.4b, 1.4d

(U) During this quarter there were no effective attacks against USF-I personnel using the IRAM.

~~(S//NF)~~ The slide below details some of the top leaders of the KH organization as well as their specific roles in the hierarchy.

## Kata'ib Hizballah Threat Update

1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d, (b)(6)

**(CMII SVTC 05 July 11 Presentation Deck)**

~~(S//NF)~~ During this quarter USF-I continued to seek measures that would counteract the KH. Through analysis by the J2, the USF-I friendly center of gravity was identified last quarter as the GoI. There was no change in that perception this quarter. Unfortunately the GoI is too large an

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930


organization to influence in its entirety so it had to be reduced for better understanding. After a narrowing of the scope the focus was refined to the senior leadership of the GOI. At the center is the Prime Minister; and then there are 23 individuals that have the most influence on the PM. These individuals through either position or relationship with the PM provide the best opportunity to change the behavior of the GOI. The key issue in dealing with the KH and the SEGs is that the Iraqis perceive malign [ 1.4b, 1.4d ] but the GoI leaders seek to improve relations with Iran. Only time will tell what the end result will be.

## Operation New Dawn

### Operations Order 11-01

(U) OPORD 11-01 was approved by General Austin on 6 January and began execution on February 6<sup>th</sup>. Change 1 to OPORD 11-01 went into effect on May 21<sup>st</sup>.

(U) The operational framework of OPORD 11-01 laid out three Lines of Effort (LoEs) to synchronize military operations in support of the goals laid out in the Joint Campaign Plan Security LOO. The LoEs are: 1) Strengthen the ISF; 2) Conduct Transitions, and; 3) Reposture the Force. The below slide illustrates those LoEs. All three LoEs were active during the last quarter of FY 2011.



(June 2011 OPORD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 19 July 2011)

~~(C/FVEY)~~ Although there are two phases to OPORD 11-01, for the majority of this quarter USF-I was still in phase I. The decisive operation for Phase I is the advise, train, assist and equip (ATAE) mission. The priority of efforts in ATAE are: al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS); partnered CT; Iraqi intelligence and logistics development. The MoI ATAE activities will focus on the

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

police in areas where IA units need to disengage to conduct maneuver training, areas around enduring USEMB locations and on or adjacent to MSRs that will be used for USF-I reposturing and redeployment operations. As conditions allow, we will develop provincial police capabilities to help the Iraqi police become the sole provider of internal security. Finally, we will set conditions for transitions to appropriate partners and accelerate transitions where conditions permit. The purpose of these priority efforts is to ensure the ISF possesses the critical capabilities necessary to maintain internal security and develop the foundations for external defense capability.

~~(S)~~ For the shaping operations in Phase I, USF-I continued to develop the foundations for external defense through ATAE with the MoD. USF-I supported the USEMB with military capabilities which enabled interagency operations and supported the establishment and mission of enduring USEMB organizations. During this quarter USF-I maintained presence and engagement in the Arab-Kurd Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) in order to provide time for the GoI and KRG to address politically contentious issues. USF-I assisted the GoI with Sunni reconciliation through key leader engagements (KLEs) and placed emphasis on completing the Sons of Iraq (SOI) integration into the various GoI ministries. USF-I also maintained contact at critical Iraqi C2 and ministerial locations to include operations commands, provincial joint coordination centers, IA division headquarters and other key headquarters. This assisted in the development of ISF C2 capability and helped maintain influence and situational awareness. Reposturing in preparation for the final phase continued with the drawdown of excess equipment and the closure of bases. Phase I concluded on 31 August 2011.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ It was noted that the internal political situation had changed from the time OPOD 11-01 had been approved and when Change 1 went into effect. The continued violent extremist organization attacks on Iraqi citizens, GoI officials, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and US forces, demonstrated that effective political reconciliation of Iraq's numerous factions has not been achieved. Recent demonstrations by Iraq's citizens, while nowhere near the scope of the Arab Spring protests, did highlight the requirement to improve the GoI's provision of just, accountable, and effective government.

~~(S)~~ While advise, train, assist and equip were the hallmarks of Phase I, the decisive operations during the opening month of Phase II were the completion of the transitions necessary to establish the mechanisms for an enduring strategic partnership with IRAQ and the retrograde of equipment, redeployment of forces, and operational maneuver of all USF-I forces out of Iraq. Operational maneuver was defined as the synchronization of redeploying units with echelon above division enablers, ISF and base closures. Execution of redeployment as an operational maneuver ensures all tactical movements are appropriately supported by US and ISF ISR, aviation, medical, MEDEVAC, route clearance, and communication assets. The critical transitions were seen as: 1) the transfer of functions to the USEMB; 2) the transition of the US presence in the CSM; 3) the transfer of the police advise and train mission to INL; 4) the transfer

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

of security assistance and security cooperation functions to OSC-I; and 5) the transfer of enduring DoD responsibilities to USCENTCOM.

~~(S)~~ For the shaping operations in Phase II, USF-I will continue to support OSC-I with military capability until OSC-I reaches a mission capable status, then conducts a deliberate transfer of responsibility during USF-I's operational maneuver. This should be at the beginning of the next quarter. USF-I will maintain contact at critical ISF headquarters and C2 nodes to integrate the ISF into the operational maneuver in order to maintain situational awareness and influence ISF actions to protect the force. USF-I will also coordinate with and report to USEMB and USCENTCOM as well as and supporting components. Phase II and Operation New Dawn will conclude at the end of the last quarter of CY 2011.

### **Task Organization**

(U) This is the task organization for USF-I during this quarter. There were no significant changes to the task organization this quarter.



(USF-I Phone Chart 29 Sep 2011)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

## Possibility of a Residual Force in 2012

(U) When the Status of Forces Agreement was negotiated in 2008 and set 31 December 2011 as the deadline, USG and GoI officials had said the deadline was set for political reasons so that a symbolic end could be put on the US presence in Iraq. However, there had always been an unwritten understanding that a continued US military presence was needed, even desired by the GoI. The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, Babakir Zebari had noted that the ISF would need US assistance until 2020.

(U) During this quarter discussions continued between the GoI and the US over the presence of a residual force in Iraq beginning in 2012. However there was more of a sense of urgency as the 31 December 2011 deadline drew ever closer.

(U) The issue of keeping US troops in Iraq remains controversial in both the US Government and the GoI. Without a request from the GoI to alter the 2008 Security Agreement, there will be approximately 200 troops remaining as advisors in Iraq after December 31<sup>st</sup>. Although President Obama had promised to end the US involvement in Iraq, as President he has pledged to abide by the agreement.

(U) During the 2008 negotiations on the agreement Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to the lead on this issue and pushed to get everyone to agree. It appears that he is unable or unwilling to do the same and this point due to the political cost. The US started off this quarter by indicating they were prepared to leave up to 10,000 troops in Iraq after the deadline.

(U) In his first visit to Iraq as the new Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on July 11<sup>th</sup>. The discussion included the need to decide if the US would stay or leave as well as the need for a Minister of Defense. That same day Panetta told an audience at Camp Victory that he wanted the Iraqis to move faster in regards to a decision.

(U) President Talibani had set a mid July deadline for the GoI to give a unified yes or no answer. That deadline expired with no decision. On July 27<sup>th</sup> Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told reporters that he believed there was a need for trainers and experts to remain beyond 2012. Talibani held a July 30<sup>th</sup> meeting to discuss the issue.

(U) On July 31<sup>st</sup> the GoI announced they could begin talks about keeping a limited US training force in Iraq. This was seen as a positive move by the Obama Administration on the part of the GoI. Although a number of Iraqi political factions have publically resisted the idea of US troops in Iraq after 2011 it appears that nearly all political blocs in the parliament support the idea except for the Sadrist Trend.

(U) After the August 15<sup>th</sup> attacks across 17 cities in Iraq that killed more than 65 people, a White House spokesman told reporters that the US Government's overall position in regards to

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

the drawdown was unchanged. Spokesman Jay Carney stated that the Obama Administration would consider any Iraq request made regarding a troop extension past 2011.

(U) In early September word spread that an offer of 3,000 US troops had been made. This figure immediately drew criticism from politicians on both sides of the spectrum in Washington, DC. Several Senators including John McCain, Joe Lieberman and Lindsey Graham all commented that the 3,000 figure was much lower than what military leaders had wanted.

(U) It has been noted that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has not publically endorsed an extension for the US troops. In addition, some of his opposition party leaders, like cleric Muqtada al-Sadr have come out against any US troop presence in Iraq past the deadline of the Security Agreement. That is a sensitive issue because al-Sadr helped the current government come to power. The Sadrist Trend were given 5 Ministry head positions as a result. Sadr has stated on numerous occasions that the US forces must leave.

(U) Both Iraqi and US military commanders have agreed that some US forces should stay beyond 2011. Few Iraqi politicians have been willing to state publically that help is required. The ISF is capable of the internal defense of Iraq but it is still questionable if the ISF is capable of fighting a conventional war against her neighbors.

(U) A potential friction point in the final agreement is the issue of legal immunity from the Iraqi court system for any US forces remaining in Iraq. US Troops in Germany, Korea, Japan and other countries enjoy legal immunity from the host nation judicial system. It is believed that any agreement for a US presence beyond 31 December 2011 will contain a clause granting that immunity.

(U) If the US and the GoI cannot reach an agreement on the number of troops to remain or even if there will be a US presence next year, then the only troops left will be approximately 200 housed at the US Embassy in Baghdad.

### **Adjustments to the Battle Rhythm and CUB**

~~(S//FVEY)~~ In preparation for Phase II of OPORD 11-01, Reposture, it was determined that changes needed to be made to the USF-I Battle Rhythm and to the Commander's Update Brief (CUB).

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The USF-I Battle Rhythm has been critical to the execution of OPORD 11-01 and it has ensured USF-I maintained flexibility as the operational environment changed. With the drawdown of the USF-I staff in conjunction with the main effort shifting to operational maneuver, it was necessary to examine the USF-I Battle Rhythm and make the appropriate changes. The changes went into effort on the 16<sup>th</sup> of August.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(S//FVEY) As a result of the review of the Battle Rhythm, there were a number of changes that were implemented. In order to gain a better focus on operational maneuver as well as the transition of many functions and responsibilities to the various partners, both the Arab-Kurd and

1.4b, 1.4d VTCs were terminated.

(S//FVEY) It was also determined that the Joint Plans and Operations meetings (JPOB, JPOC, JPOH, JPOG) would continue through the end of the USF-I mission. The Joint Assessment Board would be continued through November and the Operations Synchronization Board would be continued through October. Both of these meetings will be conducted at al-Asad Air Base with the Commanding General flying out for each of them. The ISF Readiness Quarterly Update was conducted in September but would be done monthly in the following quarter at the DCG/OSC-I level.

(S//FVEY) The slide below from USF-I OPOD 11-01 Frago 783 USF-I Battle Rhythm Update Phase II Reposture illustrates the new schedule.

SUN		MON		TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
Daily	Weekly	Alternating Weeks	Monthly					
			Intel Update (0830-0900)		Small Group Huddle (0830-0900)		Small Group Huddle (0900-0930)	Intel Update (0830-0900)
			CUB (0900-0930)	CUB (0900-0930)		CUB (0900-0930)		CUB (0900-0930)
			Small Group Huddle (0930-1000)	Small Group Huddle (0930-1000)		USEM/USF-I Small Group Huddle (0930-1030)		Small Group Huddle (0930-1000)
			JPOC (1000-1200)	Sustain Small Group (1000-1030)	JPOH (0930-1100) (Face to Face)*	CORE Meeting (1030-1130)	JPOB (1000-1200) (Face to Face)*	JPOG (1000-1200)
				JAB (1030-1200)	Intel Small Group (1100-1200)			ID Update (1030-1100)
				OSB (0900-1200)				STRATCOM/ Update (1030-1100)
							JFSOCC-I Update (1500-1600)	
			Battle Rhythm Sync Meeting (1500-1600)	CGC (1300-1700)				CGC (1300-1645)
			ECG (1430-1530)					
			KLE Leader Sync Meeting (1700-1800)					

\* Face-to-Face, Participating via distributed means must be approved by the USF-I CoS

As of 11/12/2011

SECRET REL TO USA, ACGU

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

~~(S//FVEY)~~ After implementing the changes to the USF-I Battle Rhythm, the focus was then directed to the Commander's Update Brief (CUB). After review, it was determined that the concept for the Monday CUB would shift from a US Division (USD) focused summary of friendly and enemy actions to a weekly summary of operational maneuver for each USD. In addition information provided for the preceding Saturday DCG-O CPOF would provide the basis for the Monday Operational Maneuver CUB.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ Tuesday's Strengthen the ISF CUB would continue to reflect the important ongoing work in support of our Iraqi partners. As such, USF-I did not significantly modify the Strengthen CUB with the exception of moving the Cooperative Arab - Kurd Security Mechanism Objective from Thursday to Tuesday. Further, the CSM objective was moved from one focused on the establishment of the Arab-Kurd CSM to one monitoring the CSM update and transition.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Thursday CUB saw the most significant changes over time as USF-I anticipated the establishment of OSC-I and the transition of designated activities from USF-I to its various partners. The changes would cut across all Conduct Transition LOE objectives. USF-I introduced an OSC-I update centered on the development and expansion of force protection, enduring site construction, medical preparedness, and other actions necessary to ensure a complete and thorough USF-I handoff. At the beginning of the next quarter, upon achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC), OSC-I will introduce topics related to its security assistance and security cooperation efforts.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Saturday Reposture CUB was altered to anticipate the exponential increase in retrograde velocity. The rotational J4 / J7 and J3 LOE brief were now covered weekly in order to keep pace with the rate of change over time and to adapt to greater data transmission rates. The revamped Reposture CUB provided an operational and strategic overview that included, but wasn't limited to, communication, basing, retrograde of equipment as well as the flow of personnel.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The slide below from USF-I OPORD 11-01 Frago 888 outlines the changes in the new CUB focus.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY//FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ~~

# USF-I 11-01 Phase II (Reposture) CUB 1 Sep 2011



SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
<b>NO CUB</b>	Operations Update OPR: J3	Strengthen ISF OPR: J3	<b>NO CUB</b>	Conduct Transitions OPR: J5	<b>NO CUB</b>	Reposture the Force OPR: J4/J7
	Political Update USEMB-B	Political Update USEMB-B		Political Update USEMB-B		Political Update USEMB-B
	STRATCOM J9	STRATCOM J9		STRATCOM J9		STRATCOM J9
	Weather JOC	Weather JOC		Weather JOC		Weather JOC
	CCIR J3	CCIR J3		CCIR J3		CCIR J3
	Casualties J1	Casualties J1		Casualties J1		Casualties J1
	Theater Operations J3	OP Commands USDs (Weekly)		USM I enabled to conduct missions (J4)		Forces posted and supported to conduct operations J3
	CEO J3	ISF integrated and conducting internal security operations J3	Focus on OSC-I USM-I Transition	Office of Security Cooperation-hq (OSC-h established (J5 DCG A&T))	Briefed weekly	Facilities transitioned or returned (J7)
	CMR J1	CT Forces conducting independent OPs -JFSOCC-I		Ending USG activities transitioned from USF-I to appropriate partners (J5)		Equipment retrograded or transitioned (J4)
Moved from Saturday	USD-N, USD-C/S OP Maneuver conducted and all US forces and contractors redeployed J3	Border Security functional and deters malign influence J3		New		Strategic Calamity SJS
	ASB Roll Call	ISF developing external defense capabilities; J3		OSC-IDOS Sites Update; Construction, Force Pro, Medical, Log CG Guidance		Strategic Arabian Chapdale
	CG Guidance	USF-I contractors conducting Ops and protected from threats; J3/J35FP				Herz Trilite Lumpkins
		Cooperative Arab- Rural Security Mechanism update transition (J3/J35NA)				CG Guidance
		CG Guidance				

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY//FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ~~

8

## Phase II of OPORD 11-01

(U) On September 1, 2011 Phase II of OPORD 11-01 commenced. Phase II is described as the operational maneuver portion of OPORD 11-01. As a result, Reposturing the Force now became the main effort

(S/REL) There are a total of two decisive operations and six critical transitions during Phase II. The first is completing the transitions necessary to establish the mechanisms for an enduring strategic partnership with IRAQ. The second is the retrograde of equipment, redeployment of forces, and operational maneuver of self-redeploying USF-I forces to Kuwait.

(S/REL) Operational maneuver is the synchronization of retrograde and redeploying units with echelon above division enablers, ISF, and base transitions. Execution of redeployment as an operational maneuver ensures all tactical movements are appropriately supported by US and ISF ISR, aviation, medical coverage, MEDEVAC, route clearance, and communication assets. The critical transitions are:

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

- 1) Transfer of functions to USM-I as it becomes mission capable at enduring locations;
- 2) The transition of the US presence in the CSM;
- 3) The transfer of the police advise and train mission to INL;
- 4) The transfer of SA and SC functions to the OSC-I;
- 5) The transfer of enduring DoD responsibilities to USCENTCOM;
- 6) The transition of USD-C to United States Division – Iraq (USD-I)

~~(S//REL)~~ Conditions for USF-I's operational maneuver in August were met and set when the USF-I Headquarters split between Al-Asad Air Base (AAAB) which was the main, Camp Beuhring in Kuwait was designated the Rear, and FOB Union III was designated for the Command Group. The withdrawal from Camp Victory was entering its final stages at this point. USD-C (25ID) also established a division TAC located at COB Adder to provide tactical level C2 of USF-I forces and to assume USD-S's AO upon the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's departure on the 7<sup>th</sup> of September. USF-I's operational maneuver began in mid August of 2011 when 4/1CD began to reposition its battalions in order to transfer TPE (Theater Property equipment) over to units of the 4/1AD which were at AAAB, COS Taji, and COB Adder.

~~(S//REL)~~ During the operational maneuver, the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) conduct partial self redeployment by tactical road march from their area of operations. Remaining units redeploy per USF-I guidance. USDs will support operational maneuver by providing area security along key areas of MSR Tampa and adjacent ASRs ICW with ISF partners. Partnered forces will secure key terrain and interior lines of communication used by transiting forces. USD's will deny SEGs/SIGs from areas of historical activity in order to disrupt IDF/IED efforts. The below slide illustrates the process of the operational maneuver.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930




**(11-01 Maneuver Force Posturev4)**

~~(S//REL)~~ Early on in the execution process the operational reserve was FOC at COS Adder on 1 September 2011. The operational reserve provided General Austin much needed operational flexibility by providing a dedicated force to respond to contingencies and deny extremist groups the ability to disrupt the reposturing of USF-I forces.

~~(S//REL)~~ With the operational reserve set, operational maneuver began with the first partial self redeploying AAB from USD-N. The partial self redeployment was defined as a portion of the redeploying unit conducting a tactical road march of a selected portion of its wheeled vehicle fleet from their AO all the way to Kuwait. As these units from USD-N maneuvered south, USD-C assumed tactical control of them and facilitated their movements through the AO. During this partial self redeployment, USD-C (25ID) assumed responsibility for the USD-S AO and the 36ID HQ redeployed without a backfill. The slide below illustrates the disposition of units during operational maneuver at the end of the quarter.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



#### (11-01 Maneuver Force Posturev4)

~~(S)~~ The most influential change USF-I dealt with during this quarter was associated with the publication of Change 2 to USF-I OPOD 11-01 in late August. Although this order would be suspended in early October, it did create a period of ambiguity for the USDs, specifically USD-Center. One of the secondary effects of Change 2's suspense was the projected dates for closing the last remaining American military bases in Iraq. Toward the beginning of FY 2011, Camps Kalsu, Echo, Adder, and Basra were scheduled to close in mid to late December. This was changed to have all bases closed by the time of the projected 15 December departure of USF-I from Iraq. With the suspension of Change 2, closing dates were moved back closer to the first dates projected by USF-I. A driving force behind the schedule was the time needed to close Al Asad Airbase. Convoys leaving Al Asad for Kuwait needed bases along their route to remain open to support them as part of the tactical maneuver phase. Transfer dates for bases that could support the convoys, such as COB Kalsu and COB Adder, were being planned around this need.

~~(S/REL)~~ In order to optimize the operational maneuver, USF-I did two things that proved to be of great assistance. The first was that USF-I conducted a Table Top Exercise (TTX) in accordance with an event matrix and TTX schedule) on 14 July 2011 in the Al Faw Palace

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

Ballroom at Victory Base Complex (VBC). The purpose of the TTX was to validate synchronization of operations and movements across the Iraq Joint Operations Area (IJOA) and Kuwait during phase II of OPORD 11-01. That TTX proved very successful.

~~(S/REL)~~ Then USF-I initiated a JPT devoted to operational maneuver. In mid August of 2011 a rehearsal of the operational maneuver plan was held at al-Asad Air Base. The lessons learned were incorporated into the refinement of the plan.

### **VBC Transition During Phase II**

~~(S)~~ In late 2010 planning began regarding how to draw down the USF-I staff concurrent with the closure of the Al Faw Palace and the Victory Base Complex in the last quarter of CY 2011. While it was understood from early in the planning process that the Commanding General and his immediate staff would transition to FOB Union III in downtown Baghdad in order to exercise command and control and conduct strategic engagements up until the end of 2011.

~~(S)~~ The USF-I HQ planning process continued into 2011 and through the end of this quarter on the re-posturing of the HQ to four different locations. This was in support of the Responsible Drawdown of Forces (RDoF) process which was instituted to facilitate the USF-I HQ's ability to conduct operations in the IJOA. The first location was at Al Asad Air Base, where the USF-I Operational Maneuver (OM) command and control node was placed. The second location was Camp Buehring, Kuwait where the USF-I Sustainment Rear CP was placed. The third location was the USF-I Tactical C2 node at COB Adder, in which USD-C had the C2 and life support role of all USF-I personnel until replaced by USD-C. The fourth and final location was FOB Union III where the Strategic Engagement C2 node was placed.

(U) Many of the key staff directorates such as the Operational Maneuver C2 node started their transition to al-Asad Air Base at the beginning of the quarter. With the beginning of Phase II of OPORD 11-01, the movement of the USF-I staff to the other locations, including FOB Union III, began in earnest. The Commanding General departed Camp Victory on September 26<sup>th</sup> and established his new headquarters at FOB Union III. Upon his departure, the work to transition Camp Victory and the al Faw Palace to the GoI began.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

## Strengthen Iraqi Security Forces Line of Effort

### Assessment




(September 2011 OPOD 11-01 Monthly Assessment Report, 15 October 2011)

(U) USF-I's assessment at the end of June 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPOD 11-01 for the "Strengthen the ISF" Line of Effort is illustrated above. There was improvement in one area and a worsening in another area but the overall assessment is unchanged. The first two objectives are assessed as being "Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas," which is no different than the previous assessment. However the third area, Border security function and deter malign influence, worsened to "Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required" due to Iranian extremist groups coming across the border. The fourth area improved to being "Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas." The Fifth area, US Forces & contractors conducting operations & protected from threats remained assessed as "Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required" due to the high number of US casualties during the quarter.

### Overview

(U//FOUO) During this quarter assessment of the progress made by the ISF continued. It was noted that the ISF has an unparalleled history of progress over the past eight years of heavy fighting. They are assessed as the fastest growing force with the highest OPTEMPO in the world. With the assistance of USF-I, the professionalism of the ISF continues to grow. They are capable of internal security with some remaining issues which include the following:



(U//FOUO) The slide below illustrates the makeup of the ISF as well as lists the major initiatives and challenges that face USF-I heading into the last quarter.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## Overview of Iraqi Security Ministries and Forces



Component	Authorized Personnel	Assigned Personnel
<b>Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces</b> <small>As of 29 Jun 11</small>		
Iraqi Police Service (IPS)	286,567	264,330
Federal Police (FP)	41,979	40,580
Border Enforcement	41,055	39,508
Oil Police	23,418	28,245
Point of Entry Enforcement	2,123	2,107
<b>* Total MoI</b>	<b>395,142</b>	<b>374,770</b>
<b>Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces</b> <small>As of 29 Jun 11</small>		
Army	239,353	192,554
Army Training and Support Forces	78,123	64,244
Air Force / Army Air	11,852	7,341
Navy / Marines	6,517	3,648
Department of Defense Civilians	15,337	15,355
<b>Total MoD</b>	<b>335,845</b>	<b>283,142</b>
<b>Counter Terrorism Service</b>		
Special Operations		5,922
<b>Total Iraqi Security Forces</b>	<b>730,987</b>	<b>663,834</b>
<small>* Does not include Facility Protection Service (FPS) - 98K personnel in MoI</small>		

**Major Initiatives**

- KRG security force integration
- Transition of Responsibility of Internal Security to the Police
- Iraqi Army modernization
- Oil and border police training programs
- Doctrine development
- English Language Training
- Out of Country training opportunities
- FMS cases including the F-16

**Challenges**

- "We are on the clock"
- Immature strategic planning, budgeting, and acquisition processes
- Near-term readiness and long-term sustainment capability
- Extended political transition period
- Security Ministry Transitions

9

### (DCG A & T and NTM-I Overview Brief for July 2011)

#### Long Term ISF Planning

(S) The assessment on the long term planning of the ISF for this quarter is mixed. It is unchanged from the assessment submitted last quarter. It remains challenging for the ISF to plan more than 6-8 weeks in advance of their operational efforts. The appointment of an interim Minister of Defense is a start but he is only an interim and there is a hesitation to fully buy into his program due to questions over how long will al-Dulaimi be the interim Minister of Defense and whether or not he will be named as the permanent Minister of Defense. In addition to that issue, there remains a somewhat unstable political coalition/government and numerous questions regarding the lack of responsiveness, capabilities, and corruption within the Iraqi Government. These issues have combined to delay and reframe the initial USF-I FAQ concept. The current operating environment discourages the IGFC leadership from making long-term plans.

(S) With the appointment of a Minister of Defense it is hoped that the IGFC unwillingness to discuss or initiate Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) V planning will subside. It is hoped that LIONS LEAP II will be the first of a series of offensive operations in southern Iraq to combat lethal aid networks, IED and IDF cells. The intent is to nest LIONS LEAP II within Fardh al-Qanoon V

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

and to shape/influence this effort in a manner that integrates with USF-I operational maneuver out of Iraq. It was hoped that this plan would start with the initiation of Phase II of OPORD 11-01 but it had not happened by the end of the quarter.

### Foreign Military Sales

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of the end of 4<sup>th</sup> Qtr FY 2011, ISAM Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is tracking 189 Iraqi-funded implemented cases valued at \$7.73 billion. USF-I is currently supporting the processing of 34 Iraqi-signed Letters of Request (LOR) for cases with an estimated value of \$935.4 million. At the end of the quarter, 25 Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) valued at \$655.95 million are awaiting Iraqi signatures.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Significant effort was expended throughout the quarter on implementing the transition from ISAM to Full Operating Capability (FOC) of the new Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I), targeted for 1 October 2011. Hybrid ISAM/ITAM teams formed in the previous quarter worked to merge their separate operations, while ISAM representatives continued to participate in mission analysis, plan development, joint manning document development, and the OSC-I foot print design. ISAM also continued to provide travel coordination services and in-transit visibility throughout the quarter. ISAM Logistics worked to prepare a team of contractors to assume responsibility for in-transit visibility activities at OSC-I FOC. The travel coordination services will not be replaced in OSC-I with the stand-down of ISAM.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Iraq continued to show commitment to its air sovereignty plans by signing and funding an LOA for the procurement of 18 F-16s on 15 September. The initial cadre of 10 F-16 pilots is training in the U.S. One student completed the T-38 phase of SUPT in July, and continued into the introduction to fighter fundamentals (IFF) course. He is expected to complete this course in November 2011; the second IFF graduate is expected June 2012. In September, the DLI commander recommended disenrollment of four pilots from the program, three due to lack of progress with the English language, and one due to medical concerns. The Government of Iraq has identified four replacements to fill these slots.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Iraqi Army modernization cases continued to progress this quarter. The last of 140 M1A1 tanks was received in country. Of that total, 85 were transferred to the Iraqi Army. Fifteen of 24 M109A5 self-propelled howitzers were ready for transfer to the Iraqi Army and the remaining 9 were awaiting track repairs at the Taji depot. Of the 54 M198 towed howitzers delivered to Taji, 48 were ready for issue. The first 128 of 1026 M113 armored personnel carriers were delivered to Taji.


(U//~~FOUO~~) The fourth and fifth patrol boats (PB 304 and PB 306) were delivered to the Iraqi Navy in August. As of the end of September, Patrol Boat 305 was en route to Bahrain for reactivation and subsequent delivery to the Iraqi Navy by the beginning of the last quarter of the

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Calendar Year. In addition, the second half of the equipment for the Umm Qasr Ship Repair Facility arrived in August and installation is in progress. The Ship Repair Facility represents a significant addition to the long term sustainment of the Iraqi Navy fleet. It will provide intermediate and depot level maintenance for the entire fleet. The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) project continued to progress, albeit slower than had been planned. Funding was also received for the Scan Eagle case, which was signed in the previous quarter. Development continued for a US-funded training course to support this case, which will provide the Iraqi Navy an organic capability to conduct surveillance of Iraqi Territorial Waters.

(U//FOUO) The slide below shows the breakdown of all FMS cases through the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY 2011.



### Iraqi Army (IA)

(S//FVEY) The Iraqi Army (IA) continued to widen the scope of institutional and Division-focused collective training in preparation for the expected departure of USF-I forces by 31

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

December 2011. Collective training was supported by the IA institutional training base of schools and training centers and continued the transition of a COIN focused curriculum to Programs of Instruction (POI) concentrated on building external defense capabilities, training and employment of modernization weapons systems, and Division-level combined arms concepts. *Al-Tadreeb al-Shameel* (TaS) II Maneuver Collective training will be conducted at the Besmaya Combat Training Center beginning in the fall of 2011. This training follows on the successful completion of TAS I last quarter. The training base continued to focus on Training Centers and institutional schools while also supporting integration of Kurdistan Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into professional development schools and Warrior Training Program cycles.

(U) The modernization of the Iraqi Army continued to progress this quarter. The last of 140 M1A1 tanks was received in country and 85 were transferred to the Iraqi Army. Fifteen of 24 M109A5 self-propelled howitzers were ready for transfer to the Iraqi Army while 9 were awaiting track repairs at the Taji depot. Of the 54 M198 towed howitzers delivered to Taji, 48 were ready for issue. The first 128 of 1026 M113 armored personnel carriers were also delivered to Taji.

(U) The Iraqi Army continues do to a commendable job of filling training seats; however, soldiers continue to be from multiple units instead of a single division. While soldiers are receiving the required training, this practice does not support the development of cohesive fighting units. This is significantly impacting the Iraqi Army's ability to field a trained battery /company within a division. Training will continue for the personnel that attend the training centers, and we will continue to KLE with the Iraqi Army leadership in an effort to make them realize the advantages of training at the unit level.


(U) Based on recent performance, a poll of the Iraqi citizenry conducted during this quarter reflects a growing confidence in the Iraq Army. More than 75% of Iraqis think that the IA is a capable service and 65% believed the IA is working against terrorists and criminals.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Meanwhile, COIN-focused IA Divisions continued to attend institutional schools and Warrior Training Program collective training while balancing assigned operational requirements to maintain Iraq's internal security.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IA institutional training base maintained its core of fourteen proponent and specialty schools located at eight regionally located training centers and one Combat Training Center. Institutional schools included: Administrative Affairs/Logistics, Armor, Bomb Disposal, Chemical, Engineer, Field Artillery, Infantry, Joint Training Center, Medical, Military Police, Maintenance (EME), Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), Signal, and Transportation. This training base provided doctrinal and branch-specific professional education for both officers and NCOs. These schools provide the foundation for building self-sustaining professional competency through institutional modernization and doctrinal improvements. The chart below lays out how the institutional training sector impacts the IA.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



### ITAM-Army Command History\_4th Qtr thru 30 Sep 11)

(U//~~FOUO~~) ITAM-A continued to facilitate the integration of Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into the IA organizational structure. All efforts were designed to improve Arab-Kurd integration in the Kurdistan-governed areas and integrate the RGBs into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as a Reserve capability.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In regards to Logistics Operations the United States Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) program made significant progress continuing to build the Iraqi Security Forces as detailed in the Force Modernization/USETTI section. USETTI has transferred equipment via three authorities. The 1234 Authority allowed US Forces to transfer equipment to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) at the General Depot Command (GDC). Of significant note, all 335 M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV's authorized to be transferred to the Ministry of Defense have been completed. Finally all 133 of the Section 1234 sourced 7-Ton prime mover trucks have been transferred to the Ministry of Defense. The below slide from the USF-I Commander's Update Brief illustrates the transfer of equipment.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



25

(CUB, 15 October 2011)

### Iraqi Air Force (IqAF)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The command continued to assess that the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) will not achieve MEC primarily due to lack of an integrated air defense capability.

(S) Although the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) capabilities continue to improve, IqAF will likely field only one of its two programmed Long Range Radars and will not possess fighter aircraft; therefore, the IqAF will have an extremely limited capability to exercise the critical elements of the air sovereignty mission and defend their airspace by the end of 2011.

(U) Iraq continued to show commitment to its air sovereignty plans by signing and funding an LOA for the procurement of 18 F-16s on 15 September. The initial cadre of 10 F-16 pilots is training in the U.S. One student completed the T-38 phase of SUPT in July, and continued into the introduction to fighter fundamentals (IFF) course. He is expected to complete this course in November 2011; the second IFF graduate is expected June 2012. In September, the DLI commander recommended disenrollment of four pilots from the program, three due to lack of

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

progress with the English language, and one due to medical concerns. The Government of Iraq has identified four replacements to fill these slots.

(U) In addition the Mi-171 flight simulator at Taji was declared full operational capability on 30 Jul. With the drawdown and closure of the 721st, the Iraqi instructor pilots have begun training their own. A Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contractor has trained the Iraqis in both maintenance and operation of the simulator.

(U) During this quarter USF-I reduced Contractor Logistic Support for the Mi-17/171 maintenance to seven personnel in an advisory role only based on a request of the Iraqi Aviation Command.

(U/FOUO) ITAM-Air's formal training courses for the IqAF continued at various locations throughout Iraq. These courses ranged from 13 different technical Air Force Specialty Codes and also included English and Professional Military Development courses. Students enrolled in English training maintained an average very close to the 150 IqAF members per week for this entire reporting period.

### **Iraqi Navy (IqN)**

(U) During this quarter control of the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) transitioned to Iraqi Navy control. The focus shifted to transitioning the defense of the remaining 20% of Iraqi Territorial Waters (TTW) to Iraqi control. As the force employer, ITAM-Navy's advising strategy to the IqN and IqM required newly delivered Swift Patrol Boats, along with existing Al Faw class and Predator class Patrol Boats, to increase their operational tempo as they assumed greater ABOT sector patrol missions. The IqN also routinely practiced anti-incursion "Smoking Barrel" exercises with Commander Task Force [1.4a] CTF [1.4a] assets. IqN Command and Control (C2) demonstrated proficiency in planning and executing operations. IqM providing point defense of ABOT routinely conducted live fire exercises. The Scan Eagle intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) main operational hub began a process of relocation from Basrah to Umm Qasr. We still seek written concurrence to execute the transition to OPLAT Defense Phase 2.

(U) Training saw a continuation of the shift to an oversight role. The IqN implemented a "Train the Trainer" concept that included the ability to evaluate the performance of their training efforts. Their focus was on Swift Patrol Boat crew certifications. The US Marines in Umm Qasr continued their daily training interaction with their IqM counterparts, to include mechanized and foot patrols in the areas surrounding the base, and night operations utilizing night vision devices.

(U) USF-I continued in an advisory role and developed plans to address weaknesses in IqN sustainment. Primary efforts were on establishing an IqN and IqM unique warehouse in Umm

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

Qasr. To support this, USF-I conducted planning to implement an electronic Iraqi Army (IA) 101 supply requisition process.

(U) At the senior levels, weak command and control between IqN/IqM headquarters in Baghdad and the operational elements in Umm Qasr continued to adversely impact execution of a “step change” in the IqN as an institution. ITAM-Navy/Marines continued execution of monthly visits by the Head of the Iraqi Navy (HON), sRADM Ali, to Umm Qasr. USF-I also encouraged weekly rotations of the Deputy Head of the Iraq Navy (DHON), the Chief of Staff, and the Operations Officer to Umm Qasr to strengthen the communication flow between Baghdad and Umm Qasr. USF-I and ITAM Navy trainers commenced the conduct of Iraqi Navy Staff Talks every three weeks at either Baghdad or Umm Qasr in order to increase communications flow among senior Iraqi Navy leadership. The results of these efforts have been encouraging, though there is still work to be done to ensure communications flow up and down the IqN and IqM chain of command, and among peers at each level.

(U) Currently the IqN has 2,787 assigned sailors out of 5,067, which equates to 55% of their authorized strength. The IqM have 1,047 assigned marines of 1,450, which equates to 72% authorized. A lack of consistent personnel inflow and outflow presents the largest manning concern for the IqN and IqM. Presently, they are well manned to perform their current mission. We are working towards the IqN performing its own recruiting which will allow them to manage their personnel balance. This will become more important as the IqN receives planned Swift Patrol Boat and Offshore Support Vessel deliveries over the next 12 months.

(U) The IqN demonstrated its willingness and ability to exercise C2 of ABOT and KAAOT, and has successfully managed operations since 1 July. The 1<sup>st</sup> IqM Battalion provided point defense on both the Khor al-Almaya oil terminal (KAAOT) and ABOT, while the 2<sup>nd</sup> IqM Battalion conducted mechanized and foot patrols in the vicinity of the IqN and IqM bases, manning checkpoints, and provided harbor patrols. C2 of both the IqN and IqM at the tactical level is fair to satisfactory and their missions are being effectively executed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The slide below from DCG A & T provides a clear overview of the Ministry of Defense initiatives as well as the individual service achievements during the quarter.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

## Defense Force Capabilities



### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

- Integration of KRG forces into the Iraqi Army
- Doctrine Development
- 2012 Budget Development
- English Language Training Program
- Ministerial Training and Development Center
- Center for Military Values, Principals, and Leadership Development



### IRAQI ARMY

- 13 LT INF DIVS & 1 MECH DIV
  - 123/140 M1A1's, 24/24 M109s and 40 M198s arrived in Iraq to build conventional defensive capabilities
- New Equip Trng in progress for M1, M109, and M198
- Built 9 Training Centers and 11 Location Commands
- Established Combat Training Center at Besmaya
- Leveraged "Train the Trainer" concept; transitioned from Coalition-led to Iraqi-led training
- Tadreeb al Shamil (3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> & 10<sup>th</sup> IA Divisions) is building offensive/defensive skills at company level; transitioning to Iraqi lead (9<sup>th</sup> Div in Modernization)



### IRAQI AIR

- Flew over 120 missions supporting national elections, over 80 for Iraqi Day of Demonstrations
- 152 Aircraft: training, airlift, recon, and ground attack
- Mission Ready Pilots: 135 Fixed Wing; 226 Rotary Wing
- Command and control of over 350 sorties per week
- 101 FW/45 RW Pilots in pipeline (24 outside Iraq)
- Operational capabilities C2, RSTA, ISR, Airlift, Battlefield mobility, CAS/MEDEVAC
- 4 or 4 successful AC-208 Hellfire exercises executed.



### IRAQI NAVY

- 12 Swift-Class Patrol Boats being built in Louisiana (3 on-hand)
- Specialized Training in Louisiana:
  - 135 Sailors completed training since July
- 2 Marine Battalions: conducting Vessel Boarding, Oil Platform Security and port security missions
- 50 patrols / week (300% increase over last year)
- Assumed approximately 50% security responsibility of oil platforms and 100% port security for Umm Qasr



10 July 2011

### (DCG A & T and NTM-I Overview Brief for July 2011)

#### Logistics

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI), have been underfunded for several years and have not executed budgets sufficient enough to support weapon system maintenance at all levels. They must be capable of accurately identifying requirements, resourcing those requirements, executing their plan, measuring readiness, and reacting appropriately. This capability is directly linked to the ability of the Government of Iraq (GoI), including MoD and MoI, to conduct logistic operations. Specifically, to accurately capture requirements, allocate budget resources, execute budget resources, and conduct maintenance and supply operations. To develop an enduring logistics capability within the ISF, a comprehensive strategy was initiated by ISF Strategic Logistics (ISF-LOG). Central to this strategy are coordinated Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), targeted use of Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) resources, and complementary initiatives designed to enable multiple levels of logistics systems. Coordination across the USF-I Staff and US Divisions (USD) to ensure the proper messaging and information flow is essential to the success of the ISF to conduct logistics

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

operations. Multiple actions are required across ministerial levels, directorates, and organizations to obtain required readiness.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ Again this quarter maintenance and logistics were widely assessed. Across all levels of the MoD and MoI, it continues to be among the most daunting challenges facing the ISF. It has become an increasing focus of USF-I's ATAE mission, even as the USF-I A & T section transitions to OSC-I. The development of a functioning system for sustainment is increasingly seen as one of the most significant obstacles remaining on the way to achieving MEC. USF-I's objective for December 2011 is to create enough momentum for the ISF to attain full sustainment capacity and capability in 3-5 years without slipping back after OSC-I has the lead.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ For the fourth quarter of FY 2011, ITAM Support Operations continued to make significant progress toward completing the processing of ISFF VI requirements. ISFF VII requirements (both in ITAM-Army and overall) have slowed substantially, primarily due to the complications related to the cost-share requirement in the 2011 NDAA. Focus areas included War fighter FOCUS (WFF) and Collective Training as well as Asset Visibility & Tracking. Asset Visibility is necessary to account for the large amount of commodities expected to arrive in Iraq over the next two years—through 2013. A robust team of Subject-Matter-Experts comprised of WFF contractors, to support logistics and modernization initiatives, arrived at the end of last quarter to assist. Finally, Support Operations continues to take the lead on issues related to a smooth transition from USF-I to OSC-I.

~~(S)~~ The MoI continued to make progress toward increasing the capacity and efficiency of the Abu Ghraib Warehouse (AGW) complex. Operations at the facility have been limited by the inability to receive continuous city power and the lack of fuel for generators at the complex. The MoI continues to make progress in receiving, storing, and issuing vehicle parts. Based on the USF-I assessment, that progress is at the point of sustainability. USF-I A & T also worked closely with the MoI to distribute ISFF funded vehicles to the Federal Police.

### **Iraqi International Academy (IIA)**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This past quarter, the IIA program continued to proceed with the course of action and plan of action and milestones developed in January 2011. The plan involved migrating existing capabilities at the Iraq's National Defense University (NDU), National Defense College (NDC) and Iraq War College (IWC) to the program site upon completion of construction and renovation in October 2011 and the establishment of a new strategic studies center called the Mesopotamia Center for Defense and Strategic Studies. Efforts this past quarter involved working in concert with the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) (advisors to Iraq's NDU, NDC and IWC – all future IIA program site tenants), to ensure full utilization of site capacity while working to ensure existing and planned staff and student body numbers are consistent with planned office and class space at the site.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) The Iraqi International Academy (IIA) buildings continue to progress and the current status is more than 80% complete. At the end of last quarter it stood at 72% complete. These buildings were the ones that the SIGIR had recommended be halted due to the fact that the GoI had not agreed to fund it or run it back in January of 2011. More than \$13.4 million has been spent on this project already. By the beginning of this quarter those issues had been resolved. National Defense University President sMG Jassim was granted authority by DCOS-T to be the site landlord in terms of providing support and administrative functions to include services such as DFAC, billeting, security, and other related functions.

(U) During this quarter the program was slowly transitioned from DCG A & T into the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) under the Professional Military Education Planner (PME). The PME Planner is currently developing an academic plan for the Mesopotamia Center for 2012 and 2013. The PME Planner will be responsible for out of country PME education (for example such as sending Iraqis to U.S. War Colleges) and is formulating the strategy with the overall goal of developing a PME continuum encompassing both in-country and out-of-country PME education.

### **Ministry of Interior**

(U/~~FOUO~~) This quarter continued to show steady improvements, building on momentum developed last quarter. There were gains in ministerial-level processes, particularly in the areas of the Directorate of Planning and Tracking's 2012 to 2016 Strategic Planning effort, human resources professional development, and developing a strategy to improve the manning of Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces.

(U) The absence of a Minister of Interior continues to have a detrimental effect on the performance, progress and morale of the IPS Affairs and proactive police tactics, techniques and procedures because most require Ministerial level approvals and must be implemented/ordered at the highest level. Unfortunately, because of a change in policy in the USF-I and Iraqi MoI regarding US training of senior Iraqi personnel, a Senior Leadership Workshop at the National Intelligence Academy in Florida was cancelled; a media training program in Lebanon and Erbil, sponsored by the UNDP, lost IPS participation; and other out of country training opportunities have been frustrated.

(S/~~FVEY~~) As of 30 September 2011, 374,770 personnel were assigned to MoI. That number represents 264,330 that were provincial police forces (Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Civil Defense Directorate); and 110,440 federal forces (Federal Police (FP), Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), Points of Entry Directorate (PoED), Oil Police and Electricity Police). There were an additional 60,948 in the Ministry Headquarters and its functional force directorates as well as 98,000 in the Facility Protection Service.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U/~~FOUO~~) The Ministry of Interior re-established its Recruiting Directorate and assigned a Brigadier General as the General Director. Additionally, the directorate continues with an online job application system. It remains an overwhelming success. There are currently 20,372 positions that are available and those are just the actual police positions, not the administrative and staff support positions. Last quarter access to the on-line application had to be suspended due to the excessive number of applications. The MoI has been able to work through that and the system continues to work with no issues noted at the end of this quarter.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The 2011 MoI Salaries and Retirement bill progressed through the parliamentary process, with successful first and second readings as well as markups from the Council of Ministers. This legislation will resolve a long-standing discrepancy regarding the total compensation between Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense personnel. By the end of this quarter, the proposal had passed a final reading and vote by the Parliament to become law.

### **Iraqi Police (IP)**

(U) The transition from DoD to DoS/INL began in high gear in July 2011 with the arrival in June of 3 INL Police Development Program (PDP) Senior Police Advisors (SPA) and alignment of the new staff to the critical functional areas of the Training & Qualification Institute (TQI), the HQ, Training Affairs, and the Police College. Three other Senior Police Advisors are scheduled to arrive in the next quarter for the High Institute, BPC Infrastructure and Logistics, and the Police Qualification Center/Commissioner's Institute. The SPA who arrived in June will cover these areas until next quarter.

(U) This provided an opportunity for a robust hand off and mentoring process in this quarter from DoD to DoS. This process was completed on 1 August 2011 officially and DoD remained through the end of the quarter to provide background and further assistance as needed. The TQI has openly embraced the INL team and has displayed cooperation and understanding all along the way with the recent changes from a DoD led to a DoS led operation. The significant change that as yet remains to be implemented is the shift from DoD to DoS security and movement protocols. These changes have been briefed to the TQI as they have been revealed to the DoD and the INL SPA and all indicators are that the TQI will continue to remain flexible and cooperative as they have in the recent past when these new protocols are implemented on 1 October 2011.

(U) TQI's greatest challenge, as with the previous quarters, continues to be the management of critical life support contracts. These contracts have been stalled at MoI by MG Jawad (Technical Advisor to Prime Minister al-Maliki). If the food service and facility maintenance contracts are not resolved soon – the campus will not be able to receive the 7,000 plus students returning in October for fall semester. The rain water distribution system and paving of the High Institute is another contract that is now three years in waiting with no resolution. The US funded phase II construction project is also several years behind schedule. The project was earlier scheduled to

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

be completed in August 2011 in time for planned expansion during fall semester. The rain water distribution and sewer system had to be redesigned and the completion date has slipped to November 2011. This project (2,000 beds and 2,800 seats) is desperately needed to replace dilapidated facilities and meet the growing the number of students.

(U) In the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY 2011, ITAM Police Professional Training trained nearly 14,500 Iraqi Police, Federal Police, Border Enforcement, Ports of Entry Enforcement, Emergency Response Battalion, Facilities Protection Services, Forest Police, Iraqi Civil Defense, Internal Affairs, Customs, Electric Police, Oil Police, National Intelligence Agency, Zerevani (Kurdish Region Federal/Provincial Police) and other special category forces personnel with a total of nearly 784,000 students trained to date.

(U) ITAM Police completed the distribution of \$4.5 million dollars of Police Training Aids destined for 36 Iraqi Police Forces Training Centers throughout Iraq including the Kurdish Region.

(U) Lastly, in accordance with the drawdown of USF-I forces, the Civilian Police Advisors also were drawn down, ending the quarter with only 5 USF-I Civilian Police Advisors who remained to complete residual tasks in October. To support Department of State's Police Development Program (PDP), the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau hired 25 Civilian Police Advisors in late September to assist the Police Development Program until Senior Police Advisors can be hired.

(U) Iraqi Police (IP) activities during this quarter have demonstrated that the IP investigations and operations have implemented many of the pro-active and intelligence led policing recommended by the IPSAT. According to IPS Affairs Operations Directorate, a 30% decrease in targeted crimes in certain Baghdad neighborhoods has been achieved as a result of strategically planned operations, targeted criminal patrols and/or surveillance; Family protection issues; Forensics and investigative techniques; Human Rights; and Women's Right and Gender Equality. Statistics provided by the IPS, which while there are issues as to accuracy, are probably reflective of trends, do indicate reductions in reported crime over the past year or more, although not to that degree. Crime Scene Protocol placing the Iraqi Police in charge of investigations and any other responding organizations with preserving life and setting up a perimeter has yet to be signed by the Minister of Interior (Prime Minister currently acting MOI).

### **Joint Headquarters**

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Joint Headquarters remained largely inactive during most of this quarter due to the lack of a Minister of Defense. With an interim Minister of Defense named, there was not much time to assess the impact of his nomination. The only way to implement actions remained to forward recommendations to the Prime Minister, just like last quarter. Although USF-I had more experience in dealing with this method, as did the GoI, it remained a very cumbersome administrative process. Many actions were waiting to be seen by the new Minister. It is hoped

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

that with his previous experience as the Minister of Defense, al-Dulaimi will be able to quickly reduce the backlog of submissions. Prior to the appointment of al-Dulaimi there was no indication of any significant delegation by the Prime Minister to the Joint Headquarters for execution of Ministerial tasks. With the lack of a Minister appearing to more centralize the operations of the Ministry of Defense rather than de-centralize actions to a lower level, it is hope that the appointment of an interim Minister of Defense, this trend will reverse.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Joint Headquarters continued to struggle this quarter with a complex command and control issue concerning the management of Air Defense. The new Air Defense Directorate was established under the DCOS (Operations); then the Prime Minister directing that the air operations and management of the airspace be removed from the Air Force and transferred to the Air Defense Directorate. This order was to include the long range radars constructed by the US for airspace management. It remains to be seen what the long term effects of this move will be.

### **Merging of Kurdish Security Forces and ISF**

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this quarter USF-I continued to facilitate the integration of Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into the IA organizational structure as a reserve capability. USF-I and the KRG did combine to provide Life Support Sustainment Requirement funds for RGB soldiers at IA Training Centers. This was required since the IA had not determined a method to allocate LSSR funds to RGB units by the beginning of this quarter. This remains a future Tri-Lateral agreement talking point for future negotiations. The convoy and coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that was developed last quarter between MoD and MoP Operations Centers has proved to be a successful venture.

(U//~~FOUO~~) RGB training remained fully integrated into the 2011 IA Master Training Calendar this quarter. Specialty training continued to expand into proponent schools for Officers and NCOs including the Company Commander, Medical, Infantry and Intelligence Courses. This training occurred at Iraqi Army Schools and Training Centers, located outside of Peshmerga controlled areas, demonstrating increased acceptance of ethnic diversity.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The RGB Second Set Letter of Request (LOR) draft was submitted at the beginning of the quarter. ITAM-Army scrubbed the equipment list for accuracy and cost effectiveness with the support of ISAM personnel. This LOR included equipment training, deprocessing and field services representation as well as spare parts services that were not included in the first RGB LOR. The estimated total cost is approximately \$143M. ITAM-A provided details regarding the type of training and services required for the new equipment and collective training. The approval was finally granted in mid-August. This equipment for the RGB is being used to facilitate the integration of these forces into the Iraqi Security Forces.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

## Conduct Transitions Line of Effort

### Assessment



(September 2011 OPOD 11-01 Monthly Assessment Report, 15 October 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I's assessment at the end of September 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPOD 11-01 for the "Conduct Transitions" Line of Effort is illustrated above. The first objective, enabling the US Mission-Iraq to conduct missions, is assessed as being on track. This as an improvement over the assessment provided at the end of the last quarter. Two other assessments remain the same from the previous quarter. Efforts to establish the OSC-I are still being assessed as "Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required." The command assessed no problems with its progress towards transitioning activities to its partners in DoS and USCENTCOM with proper authorities and agreements. The area of establishing a cooperative security mechanism between Arabs and Kurds in the Disputed Internal Boundary areas of northern Iraq is being assessed as "Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required" which is a noteworthy improvement.

### Planning

(S//~~FVEY~~) Annex F of the Joint Campaign Plan provides the framework enabling the methodical transition of activities to our enduring partners. It also established a disposition process for adjudicating activities. As a result, 431 activities were identified in April 2010 as enduring activities necessary for transition to our partners before the end of mission.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930




~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~


# Transition Snapshot

Total Transition Activities: 431

Transitioned Activities: 340



■ Transformed (241) ■ Transferred (82) ■ Completed (8) ■ Terminated (9)



06 Oct 2011

b 3 b 6 J5 Strategy, SVOP b 6 (b)(3), (b)(6)

4

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

## (Monthly Strategic Transition Update, 06 October 2011)

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The slide above provides a snapshot of transition activity status. In the upper left hand chart, you can see we have completed the transition of 340 activities (or 79% of the total of 431). The upper right hand chart shows the disposition (transform, transfer, complete, or terminate) of these 340 activities.


~~(S//FVEY)~~ Looking at the bottom chart, the green bars indicate actual transitions that have occurred while the blue bars indicate scheduled transitions. During this quarter USF-I transitioned 107 activities to their strategic partners. During the first quarter of FY 2012 USF-I has the final 97 activities planned to transition to their partners. As you can see 6 tasks have already transitioned this month and the bulk of the remaining 91 activities will transition in October.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Monthly Transition Breakdown



06 Oct 2011

(b)(3), (b)(6) J5 Strategy, SVOLF b 6 b 3, b 6

5

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

## (Monthly Strategic Transition Update, 06 October 2011)

(S//FVEY) Of the 107 activities that were transitioned during this quarter, September had the most with 70 activities successfully transitioned as planned. These transitioned tasks included 46 tasks, 23 programs or projects, and 1 relationship. The bulk of these activities were related to OSC-I and INL reaching FOC.

(S//FVEY) In October, there are 75 activities planned to transition. The 6 J9-OPR tasks are strategic communications task which have already transferred or transformed to the GoI. The bulk of the tasks remaining belong to J2. These are predominately intelligence related tasks going to CENTCOM and the Defense Attaché Office. Based on the latest validation, an assessment by USF-I foresees no reason these tasks will not shift responsibility as planned.

(S//FVEY) The remainder of the activities to transition in the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of FY 2012 are the 16 information operations tasks which USF-I will continue through end of mission and then transfer to CENTCOM; and 6 relationships or KLEs conducted by the CG and DCGs.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

## General

(U/~~FOUO~~) The task of transitioning the enduring activities currently performed by USF-I to the USEMB is extremely complex. The US Embassy in Iraq, which is already the largest US embassy in the world, continued with its planned expansion from 8,000 to 17,000 in 2011-12 in order to be able to build and maintain a multi-faceted and lasting partnership between the United States and Iraq.


(U/~~FOUO~~) A possible post-2011 US presence in Iraq remained a politically sensitive issue for the GoI leadership this quarter, as did any discussion of residual military forces after 31 December 2011. Prime Minister al-Maliki's political situation left him unwilling to challenge the Sadrist Trend on many positions, to include their opposition to both a US military presence and an extensive diplomatic presence in Iraq past 2012. As a result, the planned doubling of the size of the US Embassy staff and the construction of a number of consulates, branch offices, OSC-I and INL sites were delicate issues of talks.

(S/~~FVEY~~) During this quarter work continued in order to correct the shortcomings identified by the series of Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills that were held last quarter on the bases that will have an enduring Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) presence. The slide below depicts the enduring sites and what their status was at the end of the quarter in regards to various life support and mission capability. The majority of the bases were on track to be FPOC by the end of the year. However additional communications assets will be required at the Tikrit base in order for it to be FOC.

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



(USF-I JPOG 01 October 2011 OSC-I Transition)

### White Equipment Transfer to Department of State

(S//~~FVEY~~) To properly outfit the enduring bases for OSC-I and the DOS, USF-I has been transferring white equipment to these entities. The slide below shows white equipment transferred to the Department of State. So far, USF-I has transferred over 50,000 items valued at over \$115 million dollars. This surpasses the original requirement of 38,697 items set in January. Department of State requirements increased in July to 40,000, in August to 50,000, and in September to over 55,000 items by the end of CY 2011. The transfers include base life support items such as Containerized Housing Units (CHU), Ablution units, Generators, laundry units, ROWPUs, T-walls, Jersey Barriers, and storage tanks to name a few. All transfers were synchronized with base-closure and transition actions at no-cost to the Department of State.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



## USF-I White Equipment Transfers to DoS



Value of Transferred Excess Items		
Site	Items	Value
ERBIL	6,888	\$25,642,534
KIRKUK	6,042	\$13,218,303
MOSUL	4,224	\$6,146,220
SATHER	12,178	\$16,981,881
SHIELD	5,919	\$14,332,068
PROSPERITY	7,267	\$14,172,772
NEC	271	\$3,903,332
BASRAH	7,469	\$20,851,041
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50,258</b>	<b>\$115,248,151</b>

- “Priority One” Base Life Support equipment requirements have changed from the original 38,697 set on January 2011 by DoS
- DoS substantially increased the requirements in July to 40,397, in August to 50,000, and in September to 55,000
- USF-I J4 will continue to meet requirements

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY//FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ

(USF-I CUB 06 October 2011)

### Green Transfers to the Department of State

Green equipment requirements have also increased over time. The initial requirement of 2,993 pieces of equipment has increased to 3,738. The majority of the remaining 3,110 line items pending transfer will do so between October and November as USF-I hubs and spokes transition and units execute reposture actions. In September, the OSD Equipping Board approved the transfer of additional items such as Biometric Systems and Mortuary Affairs power generation components. The Board has a pending request of several medical and fuel support components; we expect approval of those items this month. Standard equipment loaned to USM-I such as the 60 Caiman MRAPs will be maintained by the Army Materiel Command’s enduring “FIRST” maintenance contract

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

---

(b)(6)

---

**(USF-I CUB 06 October 2011)**

The slide above summarizes the status of “green” or standard equipment being transferred to the Department of State. In total over 3,700 pieces of equipment will be transferred or loaned of which 17% of the transactions are complete. USF-I continues to work with CENTCOM and the OSD Joint Equipping Board to ensure that required standard equipment is sourced.

In September, USF-I transferred Medical Equipment, Information Technology and Communications equipment. USF-I will continue to transfer Medical equipment in the next quarter as medical units transition over to the CHS medical contractor. In total, medical equipment covers over 70% of the standard equipment expected to be transferred in support of the Department of State. In addition to the green equipment on the chart, USF-I has transferred 256 short tons of ammunition to the Department of State, which will be stored at Sather Airbase.


**Looking Ahead: OSC-I and INL**

(U) USF-I ITAM conducted transition with the INL representatives throughout the quarter. They provided INL with all the relative information pertinent for their understanding the mission and how the IPS operates. A series of Key Leader Engagements (KLE) were held with all the

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

IPS leadership and ensured INL knew who had what areas of responsibility. USF-I assessed that INL is well on their way to accepting the mission and will develop a Memorandum of Understanding with DM Ayden to outline their areas of interest and influence and how INL and IPS will work together in their newly developed relationship. The slide below from the DCG A& T orientation brief shows how the transition occurs between A & T and the OSC-I.



(DCG A & T and NTM-I Overview Brief for July 2011)

## Reposture the Force Line of Effort

### Assessment

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



(September 2011 OPORD 11-01 Monthly Assessment Report, 15 October 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I's assessment at the end of March 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPORD 11-01 for the "Reposture the Force" Line of Effort is illustrated above. All three objectives currently being assessed are viewed as "Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas." The fourth objective, conducting operational maneuver, will not be assessed until Phase II of the campaign begins on or about 1 September. However, prior to that time the plan calls for the gradual drawdown of equipment and bases – though not significant numbers of personnel – in order to reduce the logistical burden anticipated during the final four months of 2011.


(S//~~REL~~) This LoE integrates USF-I efforts to posture the force for operations, conduct retrograde of equipment, transition facilities, and redeploy US forces. The objectives of the Reposture the Force LoE are:

- a. (S//~~REL~~) US forces are postured and supported to conduct operations (Objective 10).
- b. (S//~~REL~~) Facilities are transitioned or returned (Objective 11).
- c. (S//~~REL~~) Equipment is retrograded or transitioned (Objective 12).
- d. (S//~~REL~~) Operational maneuver conducted and all US forces and contractors are redeployed (Objective 13).

#### Disposition of Forces

(S//~~FVEY~~) At the end of the last quarter the disposition of USF-I was what was illustrated in the slide shown below.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



**(USF-I Disposition and TOA 30 JUN 11)**

(U) The basic construct of USF-I was based on three US Divisions commanding six Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) and one Advise and Assist Task Force (AATF).

--In the Northern provinces, was USD-North, commanded by the 4ID under MG David Perkins was composed of 2 AABs (4/1CAV and 2/25<sup>th</sup> ID) and 1 AATF (1<sup>st</sup> BDE/1<sup>st</sup> ID).

--USD-Center was headquartered by the 25<sup>th</sup> ID, covered Anbar province and Baghdad provinces, with 2 AABs (4/3ID and 2/1ID). MG Bernard Champeaux was the Commanding General.


--Finally, the 36<sup>th</sup> ID of the Texas Army National Guard, commanded by MG Eddy Spurgin, was in the Southern provinces with 2AABs (3ACR and 3/1CD).

(U/~~FOUO~~) The 310<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), commanded by Brigadier General Don Cornett, was located at Joint Base Balad and was the element directing logistical support across Iraq.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(U) As a result of the beginning of Phase II of OPORD 11-01(Operational Maneuver), the construct of USF-I changed along with the disposition of its forces.



**(USF-I Disposition and TOA 23 OCT 11 303)**

(S//~~FVEY~~) On September 7<sup>th</sup> the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division cased its colors and redeployed. With the completion of their mission and the transfer of authority to the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, the overall appearance of USF-I changed dramatically. USD-South became part of USD-Center. The slide shown above illustrates the new disposition of USD-Center.

As a result of the transition, USF-I now was based on two US Divisions commanding five Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs). The Advise and Assist Task Force also was disestablished.

--In the Northern provinces, was USD-North, commanded by the 4ID under MG David Perkins was composed of 2 AABs (4/1AD and 2/1 CD).

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

--USD-Center was headquartered by the 25<sup>th</sup> ID, covered Anbar province and Baghdad provinces, with 1 AAB (2/82<sup>nd</sup> AA) as well as in the Southern provinces with 2AABs (1/1 CD and 3/1CD). MG Bernard Champeaux was the Commanding General.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The 310<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), commanded by Brigadier General Don Cornett, was located at Joint Base Balad and was the element directing logistical support across Iraq.

### Personnel

(S//~~FVEY~~) During this quarter The J1 focus shifted from strengthening the ISF to reposturing the force. Numerous planning efforts surrounded every possible contingent to include the GOI asking U.S. forces to remain in Iraq. The J1 played a significant role in reposturing the force planning efforts by collecting the personnel redeployment data via Troop Redeployment Enabling New Dawn (TREND) database.

(S//~~FVEY~~) The slide below illustrates the total number of US forces left in Iraq at the end of the quarter. At the beginning of the quarter, the personnel strength stood at 45,509. There was a drop of 14,568 during this last quarter of FY 2011.

### JPERSTAT final statistics, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter FY 2011

14a  
14a

### (J1 Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the uniformed strength pictured above, there were a total of 1,159 Federal Civilians working in Iraq at the beginning of the quarter. There were 780 working at the end of the quarter which is a 32% decrease in the number of Federal Civilians. This figure includes non-appropriated funds (NAF) civilians.


(U//~~FOUO~~) During this quarter there were 5 USF-I personnel who were killed in action supporting Operation NEW DAWN. This was a significant drop from the 21 who were KIA last quarter. There were no fatalities of any type in the month of August. There were 50 wounded in

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

action which was down from 105 wounded in action last quarter. Finally, 3 individuals died during the quarter as the result of non-combat injuries which was down from the figure of 7 during the last quarter.

## Logistics



(CUB, 08 October 2011)

(S//FVEY) As of 30 September 11, USF-I has repostured approximately 1.59 million pieces of equipment since September 2010. There are currently 817,000 items left to reposture by 31 December 2011. This includes over 25,000 pieces of rolling stock and 792,000 pieces of non rolling stock.


During the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY 11 USF-I

(S//FVEY) As of 30 September a total of 195,000 pieces of TPE equipment were on hand in the IJOA of which 12,000 were Rolling Stock and 183 thousand were Non-Rolling Stock. The trend up until last month showed Rolling Stock and Non-Rolling Stock turn-ins and transfers

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

maintaining glide path. However, at the end of the quarter USF-I was approximately 2,400 items above the projected trend line for TPE Rolling Stock. Specifically, USF-I retained the following:

- 900 pieces for 4/1 AD
- 500 additional pieces for 2/1 CD to compensate for 2/25 Stryker departure
- sourced an additional 300 pieces, including 193 MAXPRO MRAPS for Force Protection and CETs and
- 700 pieces retained with units reposturing in Iraq, most of these being non-standard equipment such as NTVs




(CUB, 08 October 2011)

(S/FVEY) In regards to organizational equipment, the slide below provides details on organizational equipment in the IJOA. At the end of the quarter USF-I remained 153,000 items over glide path. This organizational equipment is the primary reason the command remained above glide path for overall equipment reposturing. At the end of the quarter, USF-I had

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

381,000 pieces of organizational equipment in the IJOA against an OPLAN 11.01 projected glide path of approximately 230,000 items.

(S//FVEY) The bottom right portion of the slide shown below indicates the trend will remain above glide path due to the correlation that exists between non-rolling stock organizational equipment and Boots on the Ground. Approximately 69%, or 251,000 pieces of the approximately 379,000 pieces of on hand are non-rolling stock that accompany troops including individual weapons, scopes, night vision, and OCIE replacement items.



28

(CUB, 08 October 2011)

### Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP)

(S//FVEY) During the fourth quarter of FY 2011, USF-I completed 171 FEPP packets consisting of more than 857,900 items with a fair market value of over \$66.4 million dollars. From the period of January 2009 through September 30, 2011 USF-I has transferred more than 3.41 million items with a fair market value over \$313.7 million dollars. The majority of the transferred items have gone to the MoD, the ISF and the MoI.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

---

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**(CUB, 15 October 2011)**

(U) The slide above breaks down the FEPP disposition by base camp over the coming quarter as well as shows the totals for the quarter as well as the total since September of 2009.


### **Transportation**

~~(S//FOUO)~~ USF-I's J4 coordinated the movement of more than 6,000 Theater convoys and 6,600 Iraqi Transportation Network (ITN) truckloads of US Forces' cargo during this quarter.

### **Base Transfers**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ USF-I began the quarter with 62 bases and facilitated 26 full and 11 partial base transitions to the GoI. As a result, on 30 September there were 36 bases remaining under USF-I control. The command had anticipated closing 14 bases during this quarter. There were several large bases closed this quarter including FOB Sykes, FOB Prosperity, Camp Stryker and Q-West.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)

~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ The basing matrix shown below displays the current bases, current transition date, and expected recipient. Bases highlighted in yellow are enduring locations occupied by DoS after 2011. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) bases are not shown on this product.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

## 11-01 USF-I BASE TRANSITIONS

Hub
  Spoke
  US Base
  Partnered Base
  DoS or OSC-I Location

USD	Base Name	Est. Transition Date	Anticipated End State
Center	BESMAYA/HAMMER	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, 9 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	TAJI	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, NTM-I, 9 <sup>th</sup> IA
ITAM-P	SHIELD	1-Oct-11	DOS, NTM-I, 6 <sup>th</sup> IA
RAOC	UNION III	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, NTM-I, 6 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	UMM QASR	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, Iq Navy

USD	Base Name	Est. Transition Date	Anticipated End State
North	WARHORSE	7-Oct-11	MoD, MoYS
North	ERRIL	8-Oct-11	DoS, KRG
North	MAREZ	13-Oct-11	7/2 IA, 26/7 IA, 3 <sup>rd</sup> FP Div
North	SAYJI O R	14-Oct-11	Iraqi Oil Protection Police Force, MoI
Center	FALLUJAH	15-Oct-11	1 <sup>st</sup> IA
Center	GARRY OWEN	17-Oct-11	TBD
North	TIKRIT/SPEICHER	20-Oct-11	IqAF Academy, MoD, OSC-I
North	KAUFMAN	21-Oct-11	Al Askiri FP BDE
Center	DELTA	30-Oct-11	8 <sup>th</sup> IA BDE HQ
Center	ANBAR PGC	1-Nov-11	Iraqi Police Provincial Headquarters
Center	BLUE DIAMOND	1-Nov-11	Anbar Ops Center
Center	BAOC	7-Nov-11	BaOC Staff
North	JBB	13-Nov-11	IqAF, MoD
Center	AL MUTHANA	12-Nov-11	54 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	AL RASHEED	12-Nov-11	Rusafa Area Cmd and 11 <sup>th</sup> IA
North	JBB	13-Nov-11	IqAF, MoD
Center	RAMADI	16-Nov-11	DBE, 1/1 <sup>st</sup> IA
North	KIRKUK/WARRIOR	1-Dec-11	DoS, 10 <sup>th</sup> IA, Kirkuk IP, 5 <sup>th</sup> Iraqi AF
Center	VBC	1-Dec-11	DoS, NTM-I, ISOF, 6 <sup>th</sup> IA, TIFRC
Center	KALSU	16-Dec-11	8 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	ECHO	19-Dec-11	5 <sup>th</sup> DBE
Center	ADDER	23-Dec-11	IqAF, MoD
Center	AL ASAD	24-Dec-11	7 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	BASHAH	26-Dec-11	DoS, Provincial Gov, IA

\*Does not include JFSOCC-I sites (5)  
 \* Projected base transition partners

As of: 01 October 2011

Engineering Excellence!

~~SECRET~~

With Honor and Success 1


**(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I J7 Environmental Response and Cleanup Teams (ERCT) closed 78 major environmental sites and another 369 were closed by USDs. The ERCT also cleaned up an additional 19 environmental sites in support of the program. The pie chart below shows environmental site closure by type during 4th quarter. During this period, the Environmental Element completed 138 Environmental Site Closure Surveys, USF-I HWTC treated/neutralized 1.76M lbs of environmentally regulated waste, while diverting 431K lbs of material for recycling or reuse. DLA/DRMS supported the mission by recycling 2.89M lbs of used oil, coolant, off-spec fuel, crushed filters and batteries through GoI MIM licensed factories. Conditions were set for the HWTC located at Camp Speicher to allow continued operation into 2012, ensuring the responsible management of regulated waste generated through the EOM.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The slide below displays the USF-I environmental site cleanup efforts across the IJOA. The bottom left legend defines map symbols used, including Hazardous Waste Treatment Centers (HWTC), Environmental Response and Cleanup Teams (ERCTs), and Environmental Managers. There are two HWTCs located at Speicher and Al Asad; six ERCTs based out of

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

VBC, Al Asad, Speicher, Warrior, JBB and Adder; and 12 Environmental Managers, four located in each USD.




(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) US Forces-Iraq cleaned up/closed 447 major environmental sites this quarter. The graph on the next page shows major environmental site closures by month during 4th quarter and projections through 31 December 2011.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



**(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Finally USF-I J7 Environmental Response and Cleanup Teams (ERCT) closed 78 major environmental sites and another 369 were closed by USDs. The ERCT also cleaned up an additional 19 environmental sites in support of the program. The pie chart below shows environmental site closure by type during 4th quarter. During this period, the Environmental Element completed 138 Environmental Site Closure Surveys, USF-I HWTC treated/neutralized 1.76M lbs of environmentally regulated waste, while diverting 431K lbs of material for recycling or reuse. DLA/DRMS supported the mission by recycling 2.89M lbs of used oil, coolant, off-spec fuel, crushed filters and batteries through GoI MIM licensed factories. Conditions were set for the HWTC located at Camp Speicher to allow continued operation into 2012, ensuring the responsible management of regulated waste generated through the end of the USF-I mission.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)

### Construction


(U//~~FOUO~~) This quarter, the Engineer Program Management Division transitioned and became the TCFC Division. The TCFC team has focused on the establishment of the TCFC and the responsible closeout of the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) Construction Program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) TCFC became FOC on 12 August 2011 and proceeded to take on new roles and responsibilities. TCFC tracked, prioritized, and reported the status of all construction projects in the IJOA. TCFC tracked construction projects by funding type (O&M, ISFF, FMS, DoS, ESF, INL, CERP, I-CERP, IRRF) and execution agent (USACE, LOGCAP, AFCAP, Theater Engineer Brigade, CENTCOM Contracting Command, & JFSOCC-I).

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 13 August 2011, TCFC reported a total IJOA construction portfolio (projects in execution and planned projects) of 318 projects valued at \$878 million. There were 173 projects in execution valued at \$671 million while 145 projects valued at \$207 million were in planning. As of 30 September 2011, the IJOA construction portfolio consisted of 261 projects

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

valued at \$606M; 176 projects valued at \$427M were in execution while 85 projects valued at \$178M were in planning. The slide below illustrates these figures.




(J7 TCFC Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Starting at the beginning of the quarter OSC-I Phase I projects were slightly off track. Of the 33 approved projects, 18 were approved, 15 obligated, and only 9 started construction, with the overall progress at 6.0%. OSC-I Phase II projects were on track with the interim review of the design-technical packages complete. The DoS Phase III construction valued at \$363M was at 8.2%.

(U) As the first month of the quarter ended, OSC-I Phase I construction made progress, with 30 approved, 24 obligated, 10 started constructions, and an overall completion of 21%. The DoS Phase III construction ended at 8.6%. The slide below illustrates the construction status at the beginning of the quarter.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930



**(J7 EST Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)**

(U) July was a busy month with the final planning for transferring responsibility of Prosperity Annex from USF-I to DoS. This was the first of the proposed 11 Enduring Sites to be transitioned. This transfer became the model that would be used when transitioning the remaining Enduring Sites to USM-I. After numerous consultations with the USF-I J7 Basing, Facilities and Environmental section, SJA, and DoS, the document used was a simple one-page transfer of responsibility letter signed by both parties.


(U//~~FOUO~~) By the end of the quarter, the pace picked up significantly as interest across the board focused heavily at the ability of OSC-I and DoS to become FOC (Fully Operations Capable) by 1 October 2011. The frequency of the Board and Working Groups was increased to every other week. This change in frequency was needed to ensure critical items were being completed to ensure sites became mission capable. Toward the end of the quarter it became evident that DoS construction projects managed by the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations was behind by 2-3 months. The common obstacles were access and availability of materials and equipment. However, the DoS came through with funds to support the movement of a prime power plant from VBC-E to Sather Logistics Hub. This effort will save DoS \$64M over 5 years

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

due to reduced O&M costs. The Embassy Support and Enduring Site Transition Board refined how functional areas assess their progress with respect to making the enduring sites Mission Capable (MC). The board defined MC as —operating independently of USF-I with contracts for base operations and force protection in place and operational by the approved transition date”.

(U//FOUO) At the end of the quarter USF-I, with the help of (b)(6) from the USACE Trans-Atlantic division in Philadelphia, was able to award a contract to move a power plant from JBB to FOB Union III. The project was rescoped to keep it under the \$8.5M budget. The hard efforts in the last two days of the Fiscal Year 2011 resulted in the award of 6MW of power with 1 feeder system going to FOB Union III, with the remaining being shipped to Besmaya for future use. 27 September 2011, USACE awarded OSC-I Phase III construction to Perini Management Inc. for a total program cost of \$81.8M. This was under budget by \$25.7 million.

(U//FOUO) Overall, of the \$129.1M authorized by congress to spend on transition construction related activities, USF-I returned \$35.3 million. The key challenge this month was resolving the delays in construction at Sather and Basrah. By the end of the quarter, Phase I OSC-I construction continued to progress and ended the month with all 33 projects started construction and overall completion at 52%. DoS Phase III construction increased slightly to 16.8%. The slide below illustrates those figures.




SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

(J7 EST Quarterly Report 01 July – 30 September 2011)

Contractor Drawdown



Data as of 31 Sep 11; Published 28 Oct 11

(CUB, 29 October 2011)

(S//FVEY) Figures at the beginning of the quarter showed 61,373 contractors supporting USF-I. The end of Sep census shows 50,362 contractors supporting forces and Operation New Dawn. This represents a NET decrease of 5,930 contractors, or a 10.5% reduction in the contractor population since the end of August and a drop of 11,011 since the beginning of the quarter.

(S//FVEY) The Base Support category is the largest at 62.8% of the contractor population, and is primarily comprised of contractors associated with the LOGCAP contract. The next largest category is Security, which is 16.4% of the population. During this reporting period, LOGCAP led all units with a reduction of 4,149 contractors.

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

SECRET//NOFORN//20210930


~~(S//FVEY)~~ We categorize the Contractor population by nine mission categories. Eight of the categories are mandated by Congress; the ninth category –“Other,” includes contractors not associated with the other categories is the third largest at 9.8%.

### Conclusion

(U) This quarter illustrated that change in Iraq is ongoing as the Camp Victory headquarters split off into the TAC at Al Asad Air Base and the Command Group at FOB Union III. A number of bases were transitioned to the GoI to include FOB Sykes in the Ninewa Province. This quarter played in sharp contrast to the previous quarter. Two months after having the highest number of casualties in two years, we had a month with no fatalities at all—the first time that had happened in the more than 8 years of US ground involvement in Iraq. Through it all, USF-I celebrated our departing co-workers, worked hard to support our Iraqi partners and continued to move forward. There was progress. Bases were closed at an ever increasing pace, more US troops went home than arrived, equipment was transferred and Iraqi troops were trained and equipped. The Iraqi Government continued to function and participate in the daily lives of its citizens.

(U) The number of Base Closures picked up during the quarter progressed as 11-01 transitioned into Phase II and operational maneuver began. We shuttered an entire US Division headquarters while reducing our overall presence in Iraq.

(U) This quarter initiated the second phase of OPOD 11-01 and set the stage for our Reposture out of Iraq in accordance with the security agreement. As this quarter drew to an end, the USF-I Headquarters continued efforts that would provide General Austin the operational flexibility to counter any threat presented while continuing to comply with the tenets of the Security Agreement that called for the removal of all US troops by 31 December 2011.



SECRET//NOFORN//20210930

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~



WILLIAM B. GARRETT III  
Major General, USA  
Chief of Staff

Annexes:

Annex A: USF-I Command and Staff Roster, July through September 2011

Annex B: USF-I Chronology, 01 July through 30 September 2011

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20210930~~

UNCLASSIFIED

## Annex A: USF-I Command and Staff Roster, as of 30 September 2011

### Headquarters USF-I Command Group

Commanding General, USF-I	GEN Lloyd Austin III
USF-I Command Sergeant Major	(b)(3), (b)(6)
Deputy Commanding General-Operations (DCG-O)	LTG Frank Helmick
DCG-O Command Sergeant Major	(b)(3), (b)(6)
DCG-Advising & Training (DCG-A&T)	LTG Michael Ferriter
DCG-Support (DCG-S)	MG Thomas Spoehr
DCG-Detainee Ops (DCG-DO/PMO)	MG Adolph McQueen
CG's POLAD	Vacant*
CG's Executive Officer	(b)(3), (b)(6)
Commander's Initiatives Group	
Chief of Staff	MG William Garrett III
Deputy Chief of Staff	BG Michael Garrett
Assistant Chief of Staff	(b)(3), (b)(6)
U.S. Embassy – Chief of Mission	Ambassador James F. Jeffrey

\*Ambassador Butler departed prior to the end of the quarter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**Primary Staff**

J-1	(b)(3), (b)(6)
J-2	MG Mark Perrin
J-3	MG Arthur Bartell
J-4	MG Thomas Richardson
J-5	BG Jeff Snow
J-6	RDML Hank Bond
J-7	BG Scott — <del>McK</del> Donahue
J-8	(b)(3), (b)(6)
J-9	MG Jeffrey Buchanan

**Special Staff**

FSEC	(b)(6)
JCC-IA / C3	BG Camille Nichols
SJA	(b)(3), (b)(6)
CHAPLAIN	
IG	
National Guard Advisor	
Army Reserve Advisor	
Knowledge Management	
EO/Sexual Harassment	
Surgeon	
SJS	
SAFETY	
Command Historian	(b)(3), (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**DCG Advising & Training Staff**

**PSG-I //OSC-I**

**ITAM MOD**

**ITAM Army**

**ITAM Navy**

**CNATT, Umm Qasr**

**ITAM AF / Air**

**ITAM DIR**

**MOI**

**Police**

**Intel**

**ISF LOG**

**ISAM**

(b)(6)

**BG Robin Mealer**

**Brig. (UK) Tim Chicken**

**RDML Kelvin Dixon**

**Brig Gen Anthony Rock**

**BG Bradley May**

(b)(6)

**BG Michael Smith**

(b)(6)

**BG Robert McMurry**

**USF-I Major Subordinate Commands**

**USD-N**

**USD-C**

**USD-S**

**Expeditionary Support Command**

**MG David Perkins**

**MG Bernard Champoux**

**MG Eddy Spurgin**

**BG Mark Corson**

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

## **Annex B: USF-I Chronology 01 July – 30 September 2011**

**01 July**—June is announced as the deadliest month for US troops in more than 2 years.

**02 July**—A proposal by US Ambassador James Jeffries to move the People's Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK) was rejected by its Paris based leadership.

Responsibility for route clearance in Kirkuk Province is transferred to the IA 12<sup>th</sup> FE Regiment from USF-I's 1<sup>st</sup> AATF.

**04 July**—USF-I hosts the 20<sup>th</sup> and last naturalization ceremony for 45 US troops in Iraq who have earned their citizenship.

The Al Basah Oil Terminal is officially turned over to the Iraqi Navy by CTF-IM

**05 July**—The Iraqi Interior Ministry reports that June was the deadliest month this year for civilian casualties with more than 340 killed.

A bomb blast in Taji kills 37 Iraqis.

**07 July**—Two US Soldiers are killed outside Camp Victory in Baghdad by an IED.

**08 July**— COL Shocker is returned to the GOI.

**09 July**— Iraq's Government fails to reach agreement on the formation of a cabinet as well as whether to ask for some US troops to remain past the 31 December deadline.

**10 July**— A US Soldier is killed by indirect fire in Al Amarah during an attack on his unit.

**11 July**—SECDEF Panetta meets with Iraqi President Talibani and Prime Minister Maliki to discuss a variety of issues including the future US presence in Iraq.

Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi resigns from office. He is one of three Vice Presidents and has held office for more than 4 years.

**14 July**—USD-N reports that the transition of FOB Sykes in Ninewah province to the GOI is complete. FOB Sykes is the first of the large bases to be returned to the Iraqis.

Compound 7 and the medical clinic of the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility (TIF) are transferred to the MoJ-ICS Karkh Prison.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**15 July**— British Construction Company Harlow International holds a ribbon-cutting ceremony for the reopening of the Al-Rasheed Hotel after a \$65 million renovation.

Control of JSS Iraqi Media Network is transferred to the GoI.

A US Soldier is killed by an EFP in Basrah.

**17 July**—Fighting erupted between Iranian Kurdish insurgents affiliated with the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and Iranian military forces near Iran's border with Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region.

A US Soldier dies in Baghdad as the result of a non-combat incident.

**18 July**— Final transition activities of CCP N5 in Ninewa are completed. This marks the 8<sup>th</sup> of the original 11 CCPs in Ninewa to transition.

**20 July**—A report by Dunia Frontier Consultants indicates that foreign investment in Iraq is on track to double this year with \$45.6 billion in foreign investment for the first half of this year already.

**21 July**—SECDEF Panetta announces that President Obama has nominated LTG Robert Caslen for assignment as Chief, Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq. In the same announcement, LTG Michael Ferriter, the current DCG A & T at USF-I, is nominated to be the Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management Command.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously passes an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act stipulating that the US Government take all necessary steps to ensure the security and protection of the MEK residents of Camp Ashraf.

**22 July**—The GoI announces that it will delay taking custody of top Hezbollah commander Ali Mussa Daquq. Daquq has been held since his capture in 2007 in Karbala.

CCP N4 in Ninewa Province is transferred to ISF/KSF Control.

**23 July**—COL Falcon transitions to the control of the GoI.

**24 July**—Wasit Province Governor Mahdy al-Zubaidy announces that Iraq has started production of 60,000 barrels of oil a day at the al-Ahdab field in that province.

CCP N6 in Ninewa is transferred to ISF/KSF Control.

**25 July**—USF/ISF base COL K1 transitions to GoI control.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**26 July**—Diyala CCPs D2, D3 and D4 transition to ISF/KSF control. Kirkuk CCP K6 transitions to ISF/KSF control. COL Endeavor transitions to GoI control.

Iraqi Security Forces take charge of security at the oil export terminals in Basra.

**27 July**— CCP K5 in Kirkuk is transferred to ISF/KSF Control.

**28 July**—USF-I J35 Enduring Operations (ENDOPS) ceases participation in the Turkey Trilateral Subcommittee Working Group due to the US Embassy assuming the lead and the reposturing of the ENDOPS section to Al-Asad Air Base

**30 July**—Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announces that Iraq plans to buy 36 F-16 fighter jets from the United States.

Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, issues his quarterly reports stating that Iraq is more dangerous now than one year ago. He cites the continuing wave of assassinations of Iraqi officials and the growing number of rocket strikes in Baghdad's Green Zone as his evidence.

**31 July**—The last of the Kirkuk CCPs is transferred to the control of the ISF/KSF. The Baghdad PRT closes.

**01 August**—COL Prosperity is transferred to the Department of State. The facility at al-Kasik is transferred to the GoI.

Admiral Mike Mullen makes his last official visit to Iraq as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Today is the first day of Ramadan.

The US military's participation in the 22 combined checkpoints across the disputed territories in northern Iraq formally ends.

**02 August**—The GoI agrees to start negotiations on whether to authorize US troops to stay in Iraq past the 31 December deadline.

A study released by the RAND Corporation opines that the long-standing differences between the Arabs and the Kurds will lead to violence in northern Iraq if the US leaves by 31 December.

**03 August**—The facility at al-Kindi is transferred to the ISF.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**05 August**—A prison break in Hilla results in the escape of 5 prisoners as well as the deaths of 3 prisoners and 1 guard. Four of the five are later recaptured.

**06 August**—USF-I PMO operations moves to al-Asad Air Base.

**07 August**—USF-I CPoF repository relocates to al-Asad Air Base.

**08 August**—Posting on his website, Muqtada al-Sadr reiterates his threat to have his followers attack any US personnel in Iraq that are here past the 31 December deadline for the proposed withdrawal.

**10 August**—USF-I completes the transition of the Joint Operations Center from Victory Base to Al Asad Air Base.

Army Sergeant Joseph Bozicevich is sentenced to life without parole for the 2008 killing of two fellow soldiers in Iraq.

**13 August**—The USF-I Operational Main Command Post at Al Asad Air base becomes fully operationally capable.

Transfer of authority between 1/1CD AAB and 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR is completed.

**14 August**—Abbas Hussein Reshad, a PUK leader is killed, along with his driver, in Jalula.

**15 August**—Bomb blast rip through a dozen Iraqi cities, killing more than 50 and wounding more than 130. This is the worst attack of 2011.

Camp Cropper is transferred over to Government of Iraq control.

**17 August**—The Turkish Air Force initiates a bombing campaign against PKK targets in Iraq's Kandil Mountains.

**18 August**—Turkish airplanes attack 60 targets in the Qandil and Zap regions of northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish separatist rebels suspected of conducting an ambush on a military convoy in southern Turkey on August 17<sup>th</sup>.

**19 August**—Combined patrolling resumes in the Diyala Combined Security Area (CSA).

**21 August**—USF-I transfer the Summerall facility back to the GoI.

**22 August**—USF-I transfers COL KTMB back to GoI control.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**25 August**—DOS Office of Provincial Affairs reports the closure of the Anbar PRT.

The Kirkuk Air Traffic Control Sector 15,000 ft and below transitions to GoI control.

**27 August**—The High Level Ministerial Committee (HLC) meet for the first time in 12 months.

**28 August**—A suicide bomber in the Umm al-Qura mosque kills 28 and wounds more than 30.

**29 August**—COL Loyalty is transferred to the control of the GoI.

**01 September**—USF-I begins Phase II Operations.

JTF Troy is deactivated as a result of Phase II Operations.

The Ninewa PRT closes.

UNAMI assumes responsibility for Camp Ashraf and continues interface with the GOI.

**02 September**—Operational control of USD-S transitions to USD-C.

A Kuwaiti Naval vessel seizes an Iraqi fishing vessel and its crew near the port of al-Faw.

**04 September**—The Diyala PRT closes. All of the IJOA PRTs are now officially closed.

In USD-N, 4/1 CD transitions authority to 4/1 AD.

**06 September**—The Mujahedeen al-Khalq (/MEK) elect Zohreh Akhyani as its new Secretary General for a two year term.

**07 September**—36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division cases its colors and transfers its Area of Operation to the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and USD-Center. USD-South is disestablished.

**08 September**—COB Cobra is transitioned over to GoI control.

**10 September**—Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr calls on his followers to cease attacks against US military forces saying he did not want to give the US a reason to stay beyond December 31<sup>st</sup>.

**12 September**—A NATO Alliance official announces that NATO will continue a small training mission in Iraq until the end of 2013.

Gunmen forced their way onto a busload of Shiite pilgrims and kill 22 of them, all male.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**14 September**—A car bomb in Madhathiya kills 12 and wounds 43.

**16 September**—The GoI Iraq signs and funds an LOA for the procurement of 18 F-16s.

**18 September**—A US Soldier dies in Tikrit as the result of a non-combat incident.

**22 September**—A US Soldier in Baghdad dies in a non-combat incident.

**25 September**—A VBIED and IED attack kills 25 in Karbala and wounded dozens more.

**29 September**—A US Soldier is killed in Kirkuk by indirect fire.

**30 September**—A car bomb explodes at a funeral near Hillah for a tribal sheikh and kills 17 while wounding 70.

Approved for Release

UNCLASSIFIED