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**Assessment: Top 20 MOI Officials
29 April 2006
US Embassy JSPA / 4ID Intel LNO**

This paper is a joint US Embassy JSPA and 4ID Intel LNO assessment. The assessments are based on the authors' interactions, meetings, conversations and statements with the individuals in question over a period beginning from June 2004.¹ Some assessments are derived from multiple sources, including SPTT and CPATT advisors, plus intelligence reporting. A majority of the assessments come from direct interactions during weekly targeting, operational coordination, and other recurring meetings over the past 7 to 8 months.

Readers are encouraged to provide feedback to the POC below with corrections, comments, and questions. This is not fully evaluated intelligence, but intended to be a guide in interactions with these and other MOI officials. It may also be used as a primer on the Ministry of Interior, as the assessments contain numerous illustrative anecdotes on the inner workings of the Ministry.

The top 20 individuals are chosen by the authors on a basis of influence, formal position, and informal power within the Ministry. As of 29 April 2006, they are:

Top 20

1. **Minister "Bayan" Baker Solagh Jabr al Zubaidy** - Minister of Interior
2. **MG Ali Ghaleb** - Deputy Minister for Police
3. **MG Ahmed al Khaffagi** - Deputy Minister for Supporting Forces
4. **MG Hussein ali Kamal** - Deputy Minister for Intelligence
5. **Ms Hala Shahr Mustafa** - Deputy Minister for Finance
6. **Mr Adnan Hadi Noor Ali al-Asadi** - Deputy Minister for Administration
7. **MG Tariq Tawfiq Majeed Al-Baldawi** - Deputy Minister for Technical Affairs
8. **MG Adnan Thabit** - Police Special Forces Commander
9. **MG Aydin Khalid Qadir** - ADM for Police (Baghdad)/Election Security
10. **Staff MG Mohammed Ne'meh Naser Hassan** - Director, MOI Operations
11. **MG Ghazi Khader al Yass** - Special Advisor to the Minister (former NJOC CG)
12. **Mohammed Muhsen Zaydan Abid al Quraishi (Abu Waleed)** - Commandos Chief of Staff (former 2nd Commando Brigade Commander)
13. **Staff MG Mehdi Sabeeh** - POD Commander
14. **Staff BG Nabil Mohammed Jaffar** - BPOC Director
15. **MG Hussein Jasim Mohammed al Awadi** - Police Special Forces Chief of Staff
16. **MG Rasheed Flayeh Mohammed Al-Helfy** - Commandos Commander
17. **Staff BG Basim Khadim** - 1st Mech Brigade Commander
18. **BG Thamer Sadun Al-Janabi** - MCU Director
19. **Mr Akeel Saeed** - Inspector General
20. (b)(6)

¹ POC for this assessment:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Assessments

1. "Bayan" Baker Solagh Jabr al Zubaidy - Minister of the Interior

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	SCIRI
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	1946
	Place of Birth:	Maysan Province, Iraq
	Current Residence:	Adnan Palace Residence, International Zone, Baghdad

Bayan Jabr is a Shia Iraqi who was born in 1946 in Maysan Province. Jabr is married and has a daughter and 3 sons, all of whom at one time have carried Syrian passports. His daughter attended university in the US. Jabr and his wife reside in Kadhamiyah within metropolitan Baghdad. He is religiously devout, and does not consume alcohol or smoke. Jabr speaks English fluently, but prefers meetings to be held in Arabic. He holds a Civil Engineering degree from the University of Basrah, has managed Iraqi factories, and reportedly has commercial interests throughout the Middle East. He owned a textile manufacturing and sales business prior to his 1982 self-exile to Syria (which was due to several family members being arrested at that time). Several of Jabr's relatives were reportedly murdered by the Saddam Hussein regime during this self-exile to Syria.

Jabr is an engaging and informed interlocutor who is articulate, personable, and very politically astute. Some reporting suggests, however, that Jabr is pompous and is disliked for using personal connections to his advantage. It is difficult for him to focus for a long time on complex issues, and while he is ready to say the right thing in public on issues, he will not always follow through with actions. Jabr is also reported to be very formal and conscious of appearances.

Jabr has worked diligently to improve and enhance the effectiveness of Ministry of Interior security forces under his control since he began his tenure as Interior Minister in April 2005. He has chosen his actions as Minister very carefully, probably because he is aware that he is being closely scrutinized by many who believe he seeks to empower the Shia within his Ministry at the expense of qualified Sunnis, and because reports of alleged human rights abuse have been directed against forces under his control. Jabr stated publicly in July 2005 that his Ministry's three top priorities were providing security, fighting corruption, and protecting human rights. He had previously told US diplomats in June 2005 that hiring procedures at the Ministry would not be based on political patronage, but we do not know to what extent his ties to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) have led him to renege on his word since that assurance was given. Jabr later told US diplomats in October 2005 that steps were being taken to curb human rights abuses within the Ministry, but he qualified this statement by also stating that these changes would take time to take root.

The US intelligence community has not seen any reporting to suggest that Jabr's self-touted efforts have produced any real results, and is unsure as to whether or not Jabr is acting out of genuine concern for these stated matters. Jabr has told US diplomats that he is thankful for

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US assistance in Iraq and that he does not want US forces to withdraw until ISF are fully capable of handling security issues.

Since assuming his post, Jabr has worked to manage numerous allegations that MOI forces are committing human rights abuses. In November 2005, he was dealing with the issue of the discovery of confirmed abuse at MOI's Directorate of Special Investigations (DSI) at the Jadriyah Bunker an MOI facility in east Baghdad. In October 2005, he had previously instructed the head of this Directorate, [b 6] to begin reporting through the appropriate chain of command instead of directly to him after numerous allegations were aimed at the DSI. Nevertheless, he did also publicly vow to hold accountable those found to be responsible. This may have been an effort to increase transparency into DSI activities and to mitigate Coalition and GOI concerns that after cases of abuse were uncovered he was minimizing their severity in public announcements. Jabr told US diplomats in October 2005 that many reports of violence and assassinations allegedly carried out by MOI personnel were in reality carried out by terrorists disguised as MOI forces, and that MOI had bolstered the rule of law in Iraq by placing investigative magistrates with each special police battalion. Jabr also held a human rights conference in October 2005 to specifically address dealing with MOI detainees.

Jabr's efforts are complicated by perceptions, particularly among Sunnis, that he is promoting an extremist Shia agenda through his Ministry. Morale within MOI is reportedly decreasing due to Jabr's alleged actions to target MOI personnel (especially senior leaders) who have certain political, ethnic, or sectarian affiliations and remove them from their positions. US diplomats stated in July 2005 that although Jabr appeared to be committed to preventing abuses, no tangible or actionable results have been forthcoming from any investigation into alleged abuses, and no senior officials had been held accountable.

Bayan Jabr is a member of SCIRI's Consultative Committee, a group of key advisors to Abd al Aziz al Hakim. He has forged connections with officials in several other governments because of his status as a key SCIRI figure. [1.4c, 1.4b]

[1.4c, 1.4b] and some reports indicate that these ties may still exist. Jabr reportedly worked with these contacts in the 1980's to expedite passports for expatriate Iraqi colleagues and friends, and he may have even on one occasion helped to smuggle Iraqis out of Iraq into Syria and Western Europe. Jabr reportedly also had strong ties with Kuwaiti officials prior to 2002 stemming from his many visits to Kuwait with the former head of SCIRI, Mohammed al Hakim. Reporting from the 1990's describe Jabr as a close confidant of Hakim, who was assassinated in 2003 and was then succeeded by his younger brother, Abd al Aziz al Hakim. Jabr may have also headed the SCIRI Committee in Damascus, Syria from 1991 until 2003. During that period, he also served as the SCIRI Representative on the executive committees for several opposition groups, including the Independent Iraqi Alliance (IIA) and Iraqi National Congress (INC). Jabr has also served as Chief Editor of the SCIRI-affiliated weekly newspaper *Nidal al Rafidayn* throughout the 1990's.

One report claims that Jabr was a member of the Badr Organization, and another report (which cannot be confirmed or corroborated) noted that he helped to establish the Harakat Mujahedin, Badr's predecessor. Jabr emphatically denied his involvement with Badr in conversation with US diplomats in April 2005.

Jabr reportedly headed a Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA) committee of current and former Ministers to examine problems within the Iraqi Ministries in preparation for the appointment of new Iraqi Transitional Government leaders, even though he was not on the UIA's official list of members. He was appointed in October 2004 to serve as an advisor to Interim Iraqi Government Prime Minister Allawi on reconstruction affairs, and he was the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction during the period of the Iraqi Governing Council from July 2003 through May 2004.

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In 1982, Jabr was named media director for Harket Al Mujahdeen Al Iraqueen and the editor of *Al Aathwa'a* Magazine. He then became a member of the Harket Al Mujahdeen Al Iraqueen political office in 1984. There, Jabr produced a series of lectures in preventive security for the young people in Harket Al Mujahdeen Al Iraqueen. From 1990 to 2003, Jabr published the Beirut based *Nida'a Al Rafidain* newspaper for worldwide distribution. He also continued to participate in media campaigns against the former regime through both his newspaper and international television broadcasts. Familiar with the media, Jabr conducted over 4,200 interviews during the last 20 years. He has also maintained relationships with most the foreign embassies in the Arab and Islamic world to help raise the Iraqi voice against dictatorship.

2. **MG Ali Ghaleb Al-Bayati** - Deputy Minister for Police Affairs

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab Turkman
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	International Zone, Baghdad

A Shia, MG Ghaleb is a career Iraqi Police Officer. He is one of the few Generals in MOI today who actually rose to the General Officer rank in the Police service rather than the Iraqi Army. For this reason alone, he is a valuable source of institutional knowledge. Before 2003, MG Ghaleb was a member of a Ba'ath Party Cell. He was Director of Patrol Police Directorate (Al-Najda). He has three sons. The oldest, Fa'ez, was a 1LT who worked in the Criminal Evidences Directorate under Sadaam. Fa'ez was involved in a corruption bribery scandal, imprisoned for 3 years and discharged from the police. He is now back working in the Karadat Maryam (International Zone) Police Station as a Captain. While ethnically, Ali Ghaleb has some Turkman blood, he says he is an Arab when asked. Despite this, Ali Ghaleb still enjoys reading original Turkish poetry to guests in his home over dinner. Some sources say he is known for changing his sect and/or ethnicity based on the situation, but it is not clear whether this is a consistent habit of his.

After 2003, MG Ghaleb held the post of Assistant Deputy Minister for Police (Western Provinces), which meant he was responsible for police in Ninewah, Salah ad Din, and al Anbar. It was in this role that he first began expressing an extreme dislike to tribes and tribal leaders, often stating that the central government gives them too much respect. This is ironic, given that some of his brothers are themselves tribal leaders. One brother, a tribal leader in Ninewah, was kidnapped and killed in autumn of 2005. This incident only strengthened Ali Ghaleb's resolve to defeat terrorists in his country.

Around April 2005, incoming Minister Bayan Jabr appointed MG Ali Ghaleb as an interim replacement in the post of Deputy Minister for Police, effectively placing him in charge of all regular police in Iraq. The post was vacated by MG Hekmet Moussa, who was asked to resign after serving for previous Minister Falah al Naqib. MG Ghaleb took on the post with the understanding that Minister Jabr would continue the search for a young Sunni to take the

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permanent post, yet this replacement never was found. Thus, MG Ghaleb shifted from "interim" Deputy Minister to a more permanent role.

Some reporting indicates that, in December 2005, Minister Bayan Jabr asked MG Ghaleb to process his retirement papers. However, MG Ghaleb has expressed to one author personally that he believes it is his duty to remain in the MOI to provide strong technical advice to the Ministry, based on his many years in policing. So far, it seems MG Ghaleb has no immediate plans to retire. However, as of April 2006, the GOI deBaathification Committee has issued an order to fire MG Ghaleb based on his history with the Baath party. Minister Jabr has sworn to fight this order, and has pledged to protect MG Ghaleb's position within the Ministry. MG Ghaleb states that he was not a Baathist when the war broke out, and was never senior enough to warrant attention from the deBaathification committee.

MG Ghaleb sees great danger in "a Minister who is tied to militias," yet often publicly defends the fact that, "there is not a single militia member in the MOI." The distinction may be a psychological one for this career police officer: The moment a member of the IPS questions his own allegiance to the Iraqi Government, he is no longer an Iraqi Policeman in Ali Ghaleb's eyes. Thus, when pressed on this point, Ali Ghaleb does concede that there may be officers in the MOI who, "have more than one authority." MG Mohammed Ne'meh (below) was raised as an example of such individuals. It is clear that MG Ghaleb sees value in his remaining in the Ministry to carry through yet another transition, and to prevent the militarization of his police force.

MG Ghaleb has stated privately that the greatest problem in the MOI today is the amount of "former Army officers now wearing police uniforms." He is worried about the militarization of the police force, and that officers are losing an understanding of how to conduct basic police work as opposed to sustained counterinsurgency operations. He has also lamented the poor leadership that he sees in the IPS today. Around December 2004, when discussing police reconstitution plans for Mosul and Fallujah, MG Ghaleb told US civilian advisors that the most important problem facing the IPS was the lack of good leaders. He related a story of his days as a commander under Saddam, and a specific incident when he demonstrated the power of good leadership. "Typically," he said, "they would line the criminals up for execution. As a strong leader, I would get down there with the police, take the pistol, and shoot them myself, with my own hands. This was an example of strength and leadership to the men under my command." MG Ghaleb then followed up to the astonished advisors that, while we may believe in different tactics, we all share the same goals. In this spirit, MG Ghaleb has always been a willing ally with Coalition members. He is highly cooperative, and only seems to cut US persons out of the conversation when there are many Iraqis present at an internal Iraqi discussion. While his past transgressions are not entirely clear, it seems MG Ghaleb is focused on fighting terrorists and the insurgency, in cooperation with Coalition Forces. However, some reporting indicated that he may not always be as cooperative with Coalition officials as he appears on the surface. He sometimes agrees to certain decisions with his military advisors, then makes the changes that he and the Minister want, only to turn around and make excuses to the advisors as to why the advisors' wishes were untenable.

At times, Coalition advisors have stretched MG Ghaleb's patience with inclusion into discussions that should not have involved a Deputy Minister. At one time, CPATT personnel included MG Ghaleb at a weekly meeting to discuss police reconstitution issues in various "failed cities" such as Fallujah. These meetings took up roughly two hours of his time on Saturday mornings. The breaking point, according to some sources, came when MG Ghaleb spent one of these meetings discussing the details of what types of toilets would be used in new Fallujah police stations with a CPATT Colonel. Shortly after this event, MG Ghaleb stopped attending the weekly meeting.

In April 2006, a very reliable senior source in the MOI confided that MG Ghaleb has gradually turned into a "bad officer" during his tenure as Deputy Minister. Numerous MOI officers

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mention his pompous attitude since attaining this position, and some officers are concerned about a new affiliation with Badr and the use of IPS forces to violently further a Shia sectarian agenda.

3. **MG Ahmed al Khaffaji - Deputy Minister for Supporting Forces**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	SCIRI
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	House in Basrah, Sleeps at Ministry of Interior HQ

Major General Ahmed al Khafaji is a Deputy Minister of Interior (MOI) for Supporting Forces, a Shia, and a Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) representative to the MOI. As Deputy Minister for Supporting Forces, he is in charge of the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), Points of Entry (POE), Civil Defense, Communications, and Dignitary Protection. The regional DBE generals report to MG Mehse, Director of DBE (also called "Border Patrol") who in turn reports to MG Khafaji.

Khafaji does not have a particular position within Badr corps. But, prior to the fall of the former regime, he was a trainer for Badr corps units. Prior to working for Badr corps, Khafaji was a Staff Colonel in the Iraq Army, and chief of a brigade. After fleeing to Iran, Khafaji joined SCIRI on 28 February 1986. Khafaji moved to Gara Dag, Iraq with SCIRI/Badr, and fought along side the Kurds against the former regime. Badr corps has provided Khafaji intelligence information regarding terrorists, but since the arrival of Minister Bayan Jabr (SCIRI), Badr corps has been providing the information directly to the Minister. During all of 2005 MG Khafaji met daily with a senior officer from Badr Organization. Sometimes, IRMO-MOI advisors would arrive early for a meeting and (b)(6) MG Khafaji's execsec, would tell them that he was getting his morning brief from Badr.

Through the DBE, MG Khafaji also runs the Customs Police, THE # 1, cross-border mafia out there. He has diverted some of the "illegally" collected funds to the purchase of equipment for the DBE. He has spoken out against corruption and smuggling and publicly chastised MG Shehab the CO of the Customs Police. Also, it was very easy to get him to set in motion plans to interdict smugglers and the influx of T&FF on the western and south-western borders. While he often did not have the control over BG Sabbar (Anbar DBE CO), he was still able to implement his desired security plan. On the other hand, it was next to impossible to get him to see the 1.4b as a problem, from Diyala south to Basrah. He would address things like drug smuggling, something that he actively tried to engage, but the influx of personnel from 1.4b was not on the table for discussion. When it came to ca ital ro ect, he seemed to focus on spending money on building POE facilities on the 1.4b like the construction of rest houses in the POEs at Shalamcha and Zurbaytia. He had also complained about the quality of the Border Forts. He said that there was a plan under former Minister Falah al-Naqib to abandon the newly constructed forts and build their own set of forts that weren't "junk" focusing on the areas that the MOI saw as strategic and necessary. He reiterated this plan on at least 3 occasions during Minister Jabr's tenure.

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Khafaji has expressed concern for the "many problems currently facing MOI," to include terrorism and smuggling issues." According to a source, Khafaji had a meeting with 150 Mujahadin fighters on 20 December 2005, during which Khafaji allegedly praised the US/Coalition forces and argued the US forces have been helping the Iraqi people.

Prior to the US investigation, Khafaji heard rumors of abuse in the Jadriya bunker from Brigadier General Hatem, who used to be in charge of Khafaji's secret service division. Khafaji reported the alleged abuses to the Minister of Interior, and was subsequently assigned to investigate the issue on the same day news of the bunker became public. Khafaji drafted a plan to resolve the bunker issue which was allegedly forwarded to the Minister of Interior and US officials.

MG Khafaji was allegedly involved in the murder of his own half-sister in the summer of 2005. The information on this event was provided from a Sunni judge that investigated the case, but is allegedly well known (although not discussed openly). His mother and father are divorced. While his father was in prison, working against Saddam, his mother prostituted herself to make ends meet. When Khafaji's father found out, he got an immediate divorce. He has a long-lost sister that went with the mother and also is thought to have fell into prostitution. His father remarried and Khafaji now has 3 half brothers and 2 half sisters. The youngest half sister ran north (Mosul or Kirkuk) with her boyfriend, in summer 2005. Having their honor insulted Khafaji, his father, and 3 half brothers pursued the couple and caught them having either intercourse or about to. The man immediately ran off, escaping with one bullet wound. The half sister was then shot to death by the father. Khafaji and his brothers participated in the killing. A case for murder was brought and Khafaji and all participants went along with the case. They were not tried, as the killing was justified as an "honor killing".

Khafaji has at least two brothers and family in Basrah. His brothers are mentally incapacitated to an unknown extent due to Saddam's reign (NFI). Khafaji's office is on the 6th floor of the Ministry of Interior building and has two entry doors - one toward the south facing the Olympic Stadium, leading to a hallway and one to the west facing the International Zone, which probably connects to an adjoining office. Khafaji has four landline phones and three cell phones; an Iraqna, Atheer, and al Asia. There is a safe along the east wall. Khafaji has a new model black and silver HP laptop computer. Khafaji's office manager is (b)(6) is in charge of the protection squadron.

The following border divisions fall under Major General Ahmed Khafaji's control:

- The Iraqi Border Police Forces (MG Mehzen is in charge)
- Kurdistan Border Police (General Ahmed Bakr is in charge)
- Western Border Police Forces (MG Hadi is in charge)
- Eastern Border Police Forces (MG Rashid is in charge)
- Southern Border Police Forces (BG Abbas Mahsen is in charge)
- Middle Euphrates Border Police Forces (MG Hussein is in charge)

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4. **MG Hussein ali Kamal** - Deputy Minister for Intelligence

	Religion:	Sunni Muslim
	Political Party:	Kurdish Democratic Party
	Ethnicity:	Kurdish
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	International Zone, Baghdad

Hussein Ali Kamal is an ethnic Kurd. During the former regime, he defected to the North to join Massoud Al Barzani in the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and held many Internal Security and Intelligence posts in both Suleimaniyah and Irbil. He initially became the Director of Intelligence at MOI, and thereafter became the Deputy Minister for Intelligence.

He is prudent and maintains very low profile. He is rarely seen at MOI Adnan Palace. He has direct access to Prime Minister Ja'afari and to Minister Bayan Jabr. During the aftermath of the Jadriya Bunker episode, he made several statements to the press indirectly condemning the practices at the prison. Thereafter, he disappeared from the public media scene.

His assigned duties include:

1. Oversight of all intelligence organizations within MOI.
2. Provide broad directions for all intelligence organizations within MOI.
3. Serve as the director of the National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA), currently undergoing a name change from the previous name of "Criminal Intelligence Service."
4. Security vetting of MOI personnel.

MG Hussein Ali Kamal holds a Law Degree from Baghdad University. He has not attended any military school or college. He speaks some English, though only enough for pleasantries.

MG Hussein Ali Kamal has significant experience as an intelligence officer. In the post Desert Storm period, he worked with Kurdish intelligence organizations opposed to Saddam Hussein. He was chosen to lead the MOI intelligence organization during the transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the current government. He has remained in his position under four Ministers of Interior since then.

He has gained the confidence of senior coalition partners with whom he interacts at meetings at Adnan Palace. He serves on the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC), along with his counterparts from MOD intelligence and INIS.

He is a charismatic leader, friendly, and is engaging in meetings. His affable manner makes him a favorite Coalition partner and one with whom coalition officers enjoy working.

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He comes across as a true Iraqi patriot, serving at considerable risk to his life. His family lives in the north of Iraq, near Irbil, while he remains alone in Baghdad at a residence in the International Zone. His sacrifice to serve in Baghdad means extended separations from his family and young children.

MG Hussein Ali Kamal constantly speaks about developing an intelligence agency bound by the rule of law and respecting human rights. He speaks often about working to enhance the future of Iraq. He is highly skilled as an interrogator, with many counterparts and subordinates acknowledging his skill in interviewing suspects.

5. **Ms. Hala Shahr Mustafa - Deputy Minister for Finance**

	Religion:	Sunni Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	

Ms. Hala, 49, has worked for the Ministry of Interior in multiple capacities for over 25 years. She is Sunni Arab, but keeps this a closely held fact, as she does not believe there is any room for religion or politics in the running of the Ministry. Ms. Hala is well-respected in the Ministry as an able technocrat, although at times there has been minor tension between her and Deputy Minister Adnan al Asadi. Since their roles overlap significantly, there have been frequent rumors of a consolidation of their positions, leading to competition between the two. At one point in Spring 2005, Minister Jabr was about to consolidate the positions, putting Ms. Hala a step below Mr. Adnan. Ms. Hala told the Minister she would leave the Ministry entirely if this happened. Perhaps as a demonstration of her value, the Minister decided against the consolidation.

Ms. Hala has been a Deputy Minister since April 2003, and has remained a large influence inside the MOI. Prior to her appointment as Deputy Minister, she worked in the finance & administration sections. She receives constant attention due to the difficulties associated with payroll, hiring, firing, pensions, death benefits, and budgeting in a post-war Iraq. Her self-confidence and integrity have made her an essential part of MOI and will hopefully continue well into the future. Her father was a diplomat prior to the Saddam regime and was taken out of power when Saddam assumed his position. She speaks perfect English as a result of her father's travels and postings as an Ambassador for Iraq and is well-educated. Her formal education includes degrees in English from Cambridge University (overseas) and a degree in Civil Administration.

Her office, for the most part, is well-run and she is keen on taking the MOI into the future with increased technology in computers and communications. She uses her computer quite regularly for email and news. She is easy to talk to and will rarely refrain from giving you her honest and full opinion. Her office is situated on the 4th floor of the Ministry of Interior building in Baghdad.

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6. **Mr. Adnan Hadi Noor Ali al-Asadi - Deputy Minister for Administration**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	Dawa
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	~1953
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	

Mr. Adnan is a member of the Al-Dawa Party. Mr. Adnan, 53, has worked for the Ministry of Interior since April 2003. He has no previous experience at the Ministry of Interior, but has proven himself as a keen businessman and intelligent strategist when it comes to Human Resources, Administration, and Logistics. As the Deputy Minister responsible for hiring and firing as well as weapons cards and private security company registration, he has developed an enormous power-base and has much more influence than his official position suggests. Being the close confidant to the new Prime Minister and holding quite a large amount of political capital will take him far into Iraq's future.

He is a well-dressed and impeccably mannered person and has quite a bit of experience in business. His formal education is in Political Science and lived in Denmark with his family after leaving Iraq as a dissident to the Saddam regime. He speaks fluent Arabic and Danish. His English ability has improved tremendously since he began working with Americans and an interpreter is necessary on the rarest of occasions.

As a keen businessman, Mr. Adnan has the ability to strategize well into the future and is interested in technology applications for logistics and personnel databases. He is a key part of the MOI as he deals with recruitment, placement, and training of the new recruits. Mr. Adnan can be located on the 5th floor of the Ministry of Interior building in Baghdad.

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7. **MG Adnan Thabit - Police Special Forces Commander**

	Religion:	Sunni Muslim
	Political Party:	Iraq National List (Allawi)
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	

A seasoned and shrewd Sunni officer, MG Adnan was involved in a coup against Saddam Hussein and was sentenced to death. His life was spared due to his tribal status and power-base in Samara, which had to be respected by Saddam. He is the uncle of Falah Al-Naqib, the former (ITG) Minister of Interior.

Currently, MG Adnan's position at MOI is not as strong as it used to be. He is being marginalized and overshadowed by MG Mehdi (POD) due to Mehdi's political affiliation with SCIRI. However, it is not in the interest of the Minister to get rid of MG Adnan at this time, as he is Sunni, and a convenient figurehead for Bayan Jabr to reference when discussing his "non-sectarian" Ministry. He usually blames the MNF-I and MND-B for not supporting him. He is very bitter about what is going on at MOI and the infiltration of SCIRI's militia into MOI's different agencies. More importantly, he is not informed of all missions being conducted by POD, yet he is blamed for not coordinating with MND-B.

Although he has his strong political views, he rarely shares them with **anyone**, with the exception of MG Ghazi, ex-Director of NJOC (now Special Advisor to the Minister of Interior), MG Aydin Qadir, MG Hussein, Chief of Staff of MOI Special Forces, and MG Abdel Razaq, former Baghdad Chief of Police.

CF counterparts in both senior and mid-level positions have found MG Adnan to be extremely candid, trustworthy, and directly honest about matters pertaining to operations, and his viewpoints and assessments of ongoing missions elsewhere in Iraq have proven to be highly accurate. MG Adnan demonstrates a solid foundation of operational maneuver in this counter-insurgency environment, having proven himself in both battalion and brigade operations. He is also respected as the expert on Samarra, given that it is his hometown.

Although MG Adnan's background is not combat arms, he fully grasps the art and science of tactical mission execution and operational maneuver, demonstrating ability to exercise span of control conducting battalion and brigade operations. His leadership presence and exertion of control combines a mix of centralized personal contact with his direct division subordinates and small HQs staff linked to battalion and company level operations where he often talks by cell phone directly to the commander on the ground. He demonstrates lawful civilian authority and will execute the orders of the MOI and PM with exacting detail to the order given, even when the mission is not fully developed in terms of intent from the MOI.

MG Adnan is clearly a survivor who keeps close ties with his roots in Samara, while fully acknowledging the problems of Sunni recalcitrance and Tribal Sheik influences in and around Samara. His ability to interact with coalition partners at the highest levels combined with the trust built within the Iraqi government and the MOI creates a powerful political base. His inner circle is built around the Commandos leaders he recruited along with his son who

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serves as a close confidante and heads his PSD. MG Adnan is a patient strategist who is ensuring his utility in the new government by carefully balancing CF desires with the reality on the ground of a major insurgency that must be defeated.

MG Adnan should be viewed as a key leader in any future plans for the MOI. He is already attempting to look at the National Police as a "Corps" like structure which could create a three star billet within the MOI. This could make him the most senior ranking policeman in the MOI. MG Adnan was (and still is) where he needed to be during the crucial election and transition period to support the Iraqi government and assist in defeating AIF. MG Adnan should be more closely included in the operational planning of MOI force employment by both the MOI and the Coalition. MG Adnan has most likely kept his position because he is Sunni from a strong tribe and at the same time is being used to portray the impression that key positions within the predominantly Shia MOI are also given to and retained by Sunnis.

MG Adnan's previous assignments and breaks-in-service include the following:

- 1967 - Commissioned a 2LT in the Iraqi Army
 - Trained in Aviation Engineering, a supporting branch to the Iraqi Air Force
- 1979 - Graduated from Yugoslavia Staff College as a MAJ in Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism
- 1980 - Studied Military Logistics in France
 - Served as Wing Commander of an Engineering Unit supporting the Iraqi Air Force during the Iran-Iraq War
 - Terminated from his position and discharged from the military when he was a COL, due to his hatred and comments about the Saddam regime (did not get exact year)
 - Worked in Construction Contracting (as a civilian) in Baghdad until 1990
- 1990 - Elder (Sheikh) in Samara; worked his farm in Samara with his tribe until 1996
- 1996 - Arrested in for his opposition to the regime and sentenced to death; his sentence was later reduced to 20 years in prison; he was released in 2002.
- 2004 - Interior Minister Falah al Naqib (Adnan's nephew) re-instated his military status within MOI, promoted him to MG, and placed him in command of the newly-forming Special Police Commandos
- 2005 - Placed in command of Special Police Forces, which includes the Special Police Commandos Division, the Public Order Division, and the Police Mechanized Brigade

8. **MG Tariq Tawfiq Maieed Al-Baldawi** - Deputy Minister for Technical Affairs

No Picture	Religion:	Sunni Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	

The following information was provided to (b)(6) IQATF POLAD to 4ID LNO at MOI on 23 April 2006.

MG Tariq:

- Graduated from Police Academy in 1968 as 1st Lt. Police.
- From 1968 through 1970 Served as Company leader, Battalion commander and as Assistant to Police Patrol Brigade (similar to Iraqi Army system)
- Joined the Directorate of Traffic Police and worked as Operations Officer for 4 years. Thereafter, served as Secretary to the Director General and subsequently as his Office Manager until 1980.

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- From 1972 until 1976 studied Law and graduated as a lawyer from Law College in Baghdad.
- In 1976 was sent to Japan for advanced courses at Japan International Cooperation Agency. Thereafter, was sent to Germany, Italy and Austria to review and learn from the Traffic Police systems and methods in those countries.
- In 1980 and when Iraq-Iran war started, was appointed as Director of Traffic Police in Basrah Province.
- In 1981 was sent to UK to study police management at Wakefield Academy in Yorkshire.
- End of 1985 was transferred to become Deputy Director of Iraqi Traffic Police for managing main roads and express highways.
- In 1985 was registered as an Expert by the Arab Ministry of Interior Council.
- 1987 became the Assistant for Legal Affairs to the Director of Iraqi Traffic Police.
- On 27.12.1987 was transferred to Mosul to become the Director of Traffic of the Province.
- 1989, submitted thorough research and studies on External Roads and Express Highways to the Arab Ministry of Interior Council.
- Between 1989 and 1990 organized and lectured two courses on Police Administration at University of Mosul.
- In 1991 after the events Al-Shaabaniya Uprising (the Shiia Uprising) was transferred to Al-Nassiriyah Police Directorate to supervise the reconstruction in the Province after the devastation left behind because of the Shiia Uprising and the Iraq-Iran war.
- In 1991 MG Tariq was already a Brigadier General.
- In 1992 was transferred to Ministry of Interior to become the Inspector General of the Ministry.
- In 1993, was already entitled to become a MG. But, during the process of his documents, the authorities discovered that 357 members of MG Tariq's tribe in Balad were either killed or executed by the former regime, and were buried in mass graves along the Iraqi-Saudi borders. Consequently, the regime decided to retire him on 5.1.2003 whereas he was entitled for a promotion on 6.1.2003.
- After leaving his post and precisely on 23.1.2003, joined the Lawyers Cooperative and opened his law offices for legal consultations.
- Worked as a successful attorney in Iraq for last 10 years.
- In 2004, was sent to Washington, DC to participate in Government Administration course given at the Pentagon by the US Peace Institute.

In 2003, Mr. Noori Badran, the first Minister of Interior after the fall of the regime, contacted MG Tariq to become his Deputy, but Tariq declined the offer. Mr. Badran attempted 4 times to convince Tariq to come back, again he declined. Eventually, the 5th attempt succeeded and he joined the Ministry of Interior on 20 January 2004, and worked as a Deputy in charge of the Technical Affairs Dept.

On 4 April 2006 the Department was dissolved and MG Tariq's position was relinquished.

According to MG Tariq, MG Ali Ghaleb played a significant role in closing down the Department and relinquishing MG Tariq's position.

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9. MG Aydin Khalid Qadir - ADM for Police (Baghdad)/Election Security

	Religion:	Sunni Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Turkman
	Date of Birth:	~1947
	Place of Birth:	Kirkuk
	Current Residence:	International Zone, Iraq

A Sunni Turkman, MG Aydin is a highly educated lawyer who earned a Ph.D. from Pau University in Southern France in Bordeaux. He is a well balanced individual who has earned Bayan Jabr's confidence. He is married and has one son (b)(6) works at the NJOC in Adnan Palace) and two daughters. He is fluent in French and has steadily improved his English over the past two years to basic conversational level. He is the Assistant Deputy Minister of Policing for Baghdad, under his close friend and colleague MG Ali Ghaleb. MG Ghaleb used to serve in an equal post as ADM, yet was promoted to interim Deputy Minister with the departure of his predecessor MG Hekmet in April 2005. For this reason, MG Aydin and MG Ghaleb have a relationship more like equals (they live very close to one another and have frequent casual gatherings), which means the MG Aydin has more access to power than his rank would normally afford.

MG Aydin is perhaps best known for his exemplary work as the Director for the Election Security Commission. He began this work in September 2004, and led the planning and implementation of security for the January and December 2005 elections, as well as the October referendum. In this position, he earned the respect and admiration of his Coalition counterparts as well as his Iraqi colleagues from across the government. Throughout this time period, MG Aydin gradually adopted more and more power over the planning process. While in the beginning MNF-I may have had some control over the process, by December 2005 the Election Security Commission was certainly driven by Iraqis under MG Aydin's leadership. This period of time also allowed MG Aydin to develop his own leadership abilities, and further entrenched his reputation as a powerful and able technocrat in the Iraqi Government.

MG Aydin is largely seen as a neutral player, and is sought out for advice from the most senior Iraqi Generals to basic police recruits. Everywhere he goes, MG Aydin is treated as a popular leader. He is also very open to Coalition advisors, though he has stated behind closed doors that he favors civilian advisors to military. Despite this, he is happy to receive any offers of assistance.

After relieving MG Abdel Razaq, the Minister of Interior appointed MG Aydin to become the interim Baghdad Chief of Police. The reason behind his selection to the post is due to his superb performance planning and executing security for the January and December elections, and October Referendum. MG Aydin was not necessarily happy about this, but acknowledged that it is his duty and took on the role. MG Aydin previously has acted as interim Baghdad Patrol Police (*Najda*) Chief, so such as position is not necessarily new to him. Interestingly, the title put him in a unique position as both the Baghdad Chief of Police and the Assistant Deputy Minister for Baghdad, giving him both Provincial and National

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Authority. After roughly a month in this position, MG Aydin was replaced by the new choice for Baghdad Police Chief in mid-March 2006. Having fulfilled his duty, MG Aydin returned to his position as Assistant Deputy Minister for Baghdad. He was very happy to do so, as he now believes he will have more time to focus on strategic-level issues for Baghdad.

While in the position of Chief of Police, MG Aydin's assessment was grim. He described the police working under his as a "mafia" to one author, and stated he was worried for his life when he worked in the Police HQ. He stated that, given the choice of the job of Chief, or "10 other jobs," he would rather take on the 10 other jobs simultaneously. During his tenure as Chief, MG Aydin developed a severe illness that caused pain through his back, arms, and neck. He was unable to sleep for many nights in a row, and was forced to wear a neck brace for days after. He attributes this illness to the stress of the job and long hours required. Even from his bed in his house, MG Aydin still fielded phone calls at all hours of the day, giving direction to Baghdad Police. He says that he does not want to stay in the MOI for much longer, but is not likely to leave soon. His experience as Chief of Police shows that, despite the hardships, MG Aydin believes in the importance of his job so much that he will stay as long as it takes. Unfortunately, his attitude has become increasingly pessimistic over the months of Bayan Jabr's tenure. If he ever leaves the country, he will go to Turkey with his family, where he has other relatives.

MG Aydin has two office locations. One is at the MOI HQ building in east Baghdad, and the other is on the 2nd floor Adnan Palace in the International Zone. MG Aydin has two separate offices at Adnan Palace. He has one regular aide (b 6) an older assistant (b 6) (b 6), and a driver. MG Aydin has 15 to 25 bodyguards who have been protecting him for over 3 years. They successfully defended him during a SAF ambush on his convoy in al Hilla in 2004, during which 30-40 AIF engaged from both sides of the road. During this attack, MG Aydin's son described MG Aydin himself returning fire and killing at least two AIF. When one car with another police officer at the back of the convoy got separated from the main convoy, the bodyguards and MG Aydin's son decided to drive on out of the attack to get MG Aydin to safety. At this point, according to his son, MG Aydin said, "if you don't go back there and get that man, I am going to go there and get him alone."

Like many Iraqi leaders, MG Aydin has displayed a tendency to get down in the weeds of planning, reveling in minute tactical details at the expense of overarching strategy. However, over the past years MG Aydin has gotten much better at seeing the bigger picture, and, in fact, now scolds other Iraqis in meetings for getting sidetracked with such details.

Regarding his time as a law professor, MG Aydin's son (who was once also his law student) has described him as a very strict grader. He always expects perfection of his students, yet was one of the most popular professors at Yarmouk University because of his engaging personality and intellect. Such high standards have consistently frustrated Coalition translators, who often find their Arabic products returned from MG Aydin with a page full of red pen corrections.

He advises MGs Ghazi, Adnan and Abdel Razaq on how to address the critical changes at MOI and with their deteriorating positions. They pay close attention to his advice.

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10. **MG Mohammed Ne'meh** - Director, MOI Operations

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	SCIRI
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	

MG Mohammed is known for his direct affiliation with SCIRI and its Badr militia. He was promoted to become one of Badr's senior officers. It is unknown whether he still a Badr senior officer in addition to his current position. He has strong views against Sadr and his JAM and the Fadhilah Party in the South. However, he will avoid any discussions about Badr and SCIRI. He is one of the players behind MG Abdel Razaq's downfall. The Minister trusts him and he is a close friend of MG Mehdi, but they avoid each other at meetings. Abdel Aziz Hakim has full confidence in MG Ne'meh.

MG Mohammed has in the past conflicted with MG Aydin (below) over specific security planning. He has claimed to have led the election security planning process, which is not true. He stated so publicly at a meeting with numerous Coalition and Iraqi Generals, and was essentially told to stop lying by all present. In the words of one attendant, "if they all had eggs, they would have thrown them at him." In one recent incident, MG Aydin's security planning group developed an integrated security plan for Ashura, which was then taken back to MG Mohammed. MG Mohammed then took the plan to the Minister and presented it as his own. Subsequently, all special event security planning responsibility was transferred away from MG Aydin to MG Mohammed.

MG Mohammed has been well supported by his MNF-I advisors, who fall under MNF-I STRATOPS. The following facts suggest close scrutiny of this approach:

- "Staff" MG Mohammed was either a Major or a Captain before he came to MOI Ops, depending on who you ask.
- He never went to MOI Staff College.
- MG Mohammed is a Badr loyalist. It is unlikely he has renounced this in any other forum other than to Coalition officers. For this reason alone, he is well protected and cannot be fired.
- According to other senior MOI officials, "the Minister now hates MG Mohammed" because he realizes his incompetence despite having installed him in the first place (but can't fire him; see above).
- So do the rest of the senior MOI leaders.

Deputy Minister MG Ali Ghaleb and another senior MOI GO have privately laughed about the time they saw MG Mohammed try to take credit for a list of MOI Ops Directive accomplishments at a MNSTC-I Commander's Conference a few months ago. During his presentation, MG Mohammed was practically laughed off the stage. Every Iraqi MOI leader at the conference confronted him on the fact that he did not do any of the things he was claiming to have done, including Minister Jabr himself. A specific Ali Ghaleb quote was "If

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you are truly personally responsible for all those things you say, then we [Deputy Ministers] may as well put on our coats and go home." Another reported quote from yet another senior MOI GO was "We wrote the Tall Afar plan before you even came into your position, so how did you manage to accomplish that?"

11. **MG Ghazi Elias Khedhr - Special Advisor to the Minister (former NJOC CG)**

	Religion:	Christian
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	International Zone, Baghdad

MG Ghazi is an MOI officer, yet served for over 30 years in the Iraqi Army. He claims to have played an influential role in many battles of the Iran-Iraq War, and certainly has the scars to prove it. In July 2005, MG Ghazi's NJOC was raided by special Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MOSNSA) agents and most of its personnel were replaced. His position was marginalized by a young Col. from MOSNSA by the name of (b)(6) was a fanatic Shia and a very close friend of MG Mehdi. He was relieved from his NJOC duties when his past affiliation with the Saddam Fedayeen was discovered. He was transferred to the PM's office and then MG Mehdi brought him to POD.

Although he has been the NJOC CG since its inception, MG Ghazi spent the last 8 months of his tenure in a constant struggle for power with the Minister of State for National Security Affairs, Abd al Karim al Anzi. Al Anzi is a member of the Dawa party, and Ghazi is a Christian with no strong political affiliation. There is a debate about whether the NJOC falls directly under the control of the Ministry of State or the Prime Minister, but recent events point to the former being in control. Al Anzi requested that the MOI first move MG Ghazi out of the NJOC and into MOI Headquarters in downtown Baghdad, then later requested that he be arrested for insubordination. NJOC CF LNOs have supporting documents on file regarding this case. Eventually, MG Sadek was sent to the NJOC in late January 2006 to replace MG Ghazi. With no other options, MG Ghazi sought the protection of Minister of Interior Jabr, who refused to arrest him and gave him the position of Special Advisor. MG Ghazi has not been paid in months, and is not receiving salary in his current role. While he is a trusted friend of the Coalition, this does make him susceptible to outside influence.

MG Ghazi is bitter too due to the infiltration of Badr Organization into MOI and, according to him, by Iranian agents. He is also very disappointed because of lack of support from MND-B and MNF-I. He expected more support for his position in the NJOC, and requested a meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad to explain this.

The authors' assessment is that, while he is a politically unbiased friend of the Coalition, he is not the most educated and sophisticated officer at MOI's Adnan Palace. He is often quiet in meetings, and either does not contribute because he has nothing to add, or because he knows to watch his words in public. Behind closed doors, other senior MOI Generals have

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criticized him for his political missteps throughout the confrontation with al Anzi, including his defensive statements that "the Coalition assigned me this position." With this statement alone, MG Ghazi almost certainly sealed his own fate. MG Ghazi can speak recklessly about sensitive issues, especially when he is upset or feels threatened. He has done so in front of US Senators and Iraqi MOI personnel in a very public NJOC brief. When one Senator asked, "what is the main problem right now?" MG Ghazi answered, without hesitation, "Al Anzi." Al Anzi's men were certainly in the crowd, and likely relayed the message within minutes,

Authors' assessment is that he is trustworthy, but that he is also an opportunist. With only a few more years of service in front of him, MG Ghazi is certainly looking out for himself first and foremost. He is a demonstrated survivor.

In April 2006, MG Ghazi suffered a heart attack. As late April, he was awaiting cardiac bypass surgery in Amman, Jordan. MG Ghazi is an extremely heavy smoker and drinker, and significantly overweight.

12. **Mohammed Muhsen Zaydan Abid al Quraishi (Abu Waleed) - Commandos Chief of Staff (former 2nd Commando Brigade Commander)**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	SCIRI
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	2 July 1962
	Place of Birth:	Baghdad, Iraq
	Current Residence:	International Zone, Baghdad

MG Mohammed Muhsen Zaydan Abid al Quraishi was born on 2 July 1962 in Baghdad. He grew up in both the Kadhamiyah and Sadr (then Saddam) City districts, and currently resides within the Baghdad International Zone. He is Shia Arab.

MG Mohammed was commissioned in January 1983, and received both a Bachelor of Sciences and a Master of Sciences in military studies from the Iraqi Army Staff Academy. His assignment history within the Iraqi Army prior to the fall of the Saddam regime has included Platoon Leader, Company Commander, Regimental Deputy Commander, and Regimental Commander prior to his Staff Academy attendance, followed by continued duties as Regimental Commander, an Army Logistics Commissioner, and an Operations Staff Colonel after Academy completion. In the course of his second assignment as a Regimental Commander, Mohammed was reportedly arrested by former regime authorities for failing to follow an order to destroy a Kurdish city (NFI).

MG Mohammed became the first Commander of the 2nd Commando Brigade (also known as the "Wolf Brigade") in November 2004. He deployed his Brigade to Mosul in February 2005 in support of the campaign to re-establish a policing presence in that city. While in Mosul, he accepted twelve vehicles from MNSTC-I, yet only returned with two of those vehicles when he redeployed back to Baghdad. It is unknown if the remaining ten vehicles were sold or given away.

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While deployed to Mosul, elements of his Brigade deployed to Tall Afar for a couple of days. The reports may be exaggerations, but there was a significant outcry from the locals about the Commandos wrecking the place and even stealing from private houses. Commando SPTTs had to overcome significant obstacles in the perceptions of the locals when the 4th Commando Brigade later deployed to Tall Afar in September 2005.

Also while in Mosul, MG Mohammed crafted the idea of putting insurgent detainees on TV to show their confessions to the public. This was considered to be very media savvy, and he became the most famous member of MOI's Commando forces as a result of his TV broadcast. He also built up a considerable amount of jealousy among both his peers and superiors. The show, *Terrorism in the Grips of Justice*, has become internationally renowned, and contributed greatly to the reputation of the now infamous Wolf Brigade. It called into question the practices of ISF interrogators, as many suspects were clearly severely beaten before being put before the camera. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, Iraqis across the country proved a captive audience for the show.

MG Mohammed was later implicated by his own Brigade S2 in a convoluted plot to capture and then ransom detainees. Also implicated were the primary interrogator and the Site 4 Investigative Magistrate. The S2 was fired, but Mohammed survived the implications unscathed. Numerous other reports have surfaced regarding detainees being tortured under his custody. While insufficient actual evidence was provided, the volume and frequency of these reports alone seems sufficient indication that something improper was probably going on.

MG Mohammed seems to have very strong ties to both of the major Shia militias in Iraq (Badr Organization and Jaysh al Mahdi). At one point in June 2005, the Badr Organization web page published two things at the same time, a list of all the Sunni leaders in the MOI Commando Division (which amounted to a hit list) and an article reflecting on how great the 2nd Commando Brigade did in Mosul. Taken separately, these articles being published at the same time could have been coincidental, but when analyzed together it could be construed that Mohammed tried to get his peers killed. The Commander of 1st Commando Brigade, BG Sala'am, was shortly thereafter assassinated in July 2005.

MG Mohammed regularly violates his assigned chain of command. He was frequently tasked by the Interior Minister and the PM for operations which were launched without informing either MG Rasheed or MG Adnan, both his superior officers. These instances have added to their distrust of him as a subordinate.

As the Commando Division Chief of Staff under MG Rasheed, MG Mohammed has been personally involved in several reported transgressions. He received an assigned target from "somewhere" (NFI), ordered the 3rd Commando Brigade to provide forces for a raid within 6 IAD's assigned battle-space, and when 3rd Commando Brigade requested SPTT top-cover of this mission, Mohammed said that the Commando Division-level SPTT was covering the mission (which the SPTT knew absolutely nothing about).

MG Mohammed is shrewd, tactically sound, charming, and inspires tremendous loyalty from his subordinates. He has enjoyed hosting US diplomats and advisors at his home in the International Zone, and has frequent casual contact with some Iraqi-American linguists. He is also extremely ambitious and morally bankrupt, being very much a victim of his own ambitions. He does everything possible to curry favor with the Interior Minister and the PM, frequently at the cost of support and loyalty to his own direct superiors.

He is backed by certain high ranking officials of PM Al-Jaafari's government and SCIRI. He carries ID's which take him directly into PM's offices as well as Al-Hakim's offices, and is known for carrying out missions at the orders from the PM's party.

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13. **Staff MG Mehdi Sabih Hashim Al Gharawi - POD Commander**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	SCIRI
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	11 January 1961
	Place of Birth:	Baghdad, Iraq
	Current Residence:	Baghdad, Iraq

MG Mehdi Sabih Hashim Al Gharawi was born on 11 January 1961 in Baghdad. He currently resides in the Hayy Al Amil of Baghdad, but also retains residency in the Al Emarra district of An Nasiriyah.

MG Mehdi is a Shia Arab. His education includes a BA, an MA, and a PhD in Military Science from the Iraqi National Security College. He speaks Arabic and is able to speak and understand some English.

MG Mehdi is a very affable, very politically astute, very media-savvy, and very ambitious. As a Public Order Brigade Commander assigned as an interim policing capability after the Fallujah battles, he took on the tribal-based establishment in Fallujah and helped the Coalition re-establish a viable City Council and police force, and to this day he remains well-liked and well-respected by Fallujans.

MG Mehdi publicly praises Coalition and Iraqi Government objectives for a free and democratic Iraq and for an Iraqi Security Forces structure that is responsible to civil authority. He does not publicly support sectarian views or agendas, and has many Sunnis on his personal staff. He supports MNF-I requests, even when not all requests are supported by his higher HQ. He publicly supports enforcement of human rights in Iraq, and has investigated and filed reports regarding instances and accusations of abuse.

MG Mehdi shares intelligence and operational information freely with his Coalition counterparts. He emphasizes the planning process, but not to the detailed standards of the U.S. military decision-making process. He plans and directs the training of his Public Order force, but does not personally supervise execution of that training. He is decisive, and usually follows all verbal guidance with specific written orders or directives. He is quick to address any issues that come up regarding the well-being of his Public Order forces (pay, quality-of-life, personal welfare, force protection). He personally mentors his subordinate commanders and senior staff officers in the course of their duties.

MG Mehdi shares a good rapport with MG Rasheed, the Police Commando Division CG, and with several senior Iraqi Army counterparts, but does not get along well with his direct superior, MG Adnan, the Special Police Forces CG, to the degree of being openly critical of him on occasion. He tries to maintain good relations with other Iraqi Security Forces units throughout Baghdad.

MG Mehdi's weaknesses include lack of a well-trained Division battle-staff (impacts his situational awareness), inefficiencies in the area of information management (same impact),

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and a short temper when he is either tired or in Iraqi-only circles. Other weaknesses would be an unwillingness to relieve subordinate officers who he considers friends (although he has relieved non-friend subordinates on occasion), needing to be reminded to conduct external coordination prior to an operation (another aspect of having a weak battle-staff), and a quickness to pursue AIF before all required coordination has been completed.

MG Mehdi's military assignments include the following:

- 1982 - 1986 Mechanized Infantry Platoon Leader (Iran-Iraq War)
- 1986 - 1989 Mechanized Infantry Company Commander (Iran-Iraq War)
- 1989 - 1993 Mechanized Infantry Battalion Staff Officer (Gulf War I)
- 1993 - 1997 Mechanized Infantry Battalion Commander and
Mechanized Infantry Brigade Deputy Commander
- 1997 - 2000 Doctoral Studies at the Iraqi National Security College
- 2000 - 2003 Mechanized Infantry Brigade Commander (Gulf War II)
- 2003 - 2004 Break in Service (Post Gulf War II)
- 2004 - 2005 Commander of 1st Public Order Brigade
- Current Commander of Public Order Division (Appointed 19 July 2005)

MG Mehdi has captured the confidence of Minister Bayan Jaber, MG Mohammed Ne'meh of MOI Operations, and other important elements within Abdel Aziz Hakim's offices. He is a loyal Badr, and was selected to "clean-up" Salman Pak, Al-Mada'en, a city in which Sunnis and Shia coexisted for decades. [REDACTED] 1.4b
(with particular attention on Al Kut), it became necessary to clean-up Al-Mada'en from Sunnis due to the city's strategic location in Baghdad.

MG Mehdi has successfully over-shadowed MG Adnan, and has continued to conduct POD missions without coordination or even approval from MG Adnan. Consequently, he has effectively weakened MG Adnan's position.

In January 2006, after MG Mehdi conducted certain missions behind the backs of BPOC but with the endorsement of the Minister and his followers, MG Adnan requested to depart for a 2 week vacation. He was convinced by MG Rashid, MG Hussein (his Chief of Staff), and MG Aydin not to go. The Minister called him into his office three times, and eventually convinced him to stay. Ever since that day, MG Mehdi has for all intents and purposes avoided MG Adnan completely.

MG Mehdi has direct access to Minister Bayan Jaber at any time, and they talk over the phone every day. Through the narrow corridors of MOI, rumors periodically circulate that MG Mehdi has even gone so far as to directly interact with [REDACTED] 1.4b agents.

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14. **Staff BG Nabil Mohammed Jaffar - BPOC Director**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	1960
	Place of Birth:	Baghdad, Iraq
	Current Residence:	

BG Nabil was born in 1960 in Baghdad, and resides with his family in the Baya'a district of Baghdad. He was commissioned as an Iraqi Army armored forces officer on 14 July 1981, and was promoted to his current rank of Staff BG on 14 July 2006.

Presently he is the Director of BPOC, and is doing a very good job according to 4ID advisors. MG Adnan brought him to BPOC to become his eyes and ears. He is loyal to MG Adnan. He is very prudent, and is very skilled in interacting with both US liaison officers and more senior Iraqi Generals from both MOI and MOD. He is highly educated, and has been lecturing at Iraqi military institutions for the past 17 years. He is trustworthy, logical, and well-respected. However, as with many senior leaders in Iraq, BG Nabil will tend to look after his own personal interests first and foremost.

BG Nabil has stated on numerous occasions to US liaison officers that he wants the BPOC to operate without all the sectarian and political tension that has been evident and problematic within the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC), also located within Adnan Palace. He has on several occasions given his BPOC staff officers instructions (and in a very loud and directive manner) to cease ongoing discussion of these kinds of divisive issues. At the same time, looking after his own personal and professional interests, he is not himself above overt signs of respect to various MOI senior generals prior to and after key meetings and briefings, depending on which senior MOI general is currently viewed as a "rising star". He was also very interested in a proposal to move 2 more MOI BGs from the National Police Forces HQ into the BPOC, and very likely viewed this as an attempt to both "water down" his authority and inject both sectarian and political influences into the BPOC in similar fashion to recent changes in NJOC leadership.

Assignment History:

- Tank Platoon Commander
- Tank Company Commander
- Deputy Commander of a Battalion
- Armor Brigade Commander
- Tank Weapons Instructor
- Senior Instructor for New Officers Command courses
- Training Department Commander
- Department Training Commander for Armor Mobilization
- Wing Commander for Officers Command Courses
- Instructor for Unit and Formation Commanders
- Department Commander for Officers' Formations

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- Senior Staff Officer of Directorate?
- Deputy Commander of Third Public Order Brigade
- (Current Assignment) Director of the Baghdad Planning and Operations Center

Military Education Courses:

- Basic Grade Courses (Armor Classification)
- T72 Tank Commander Courses
- T72 Tank Weapons Instructor (taken under the supervision of a Soviet General)
- New Officers Command Courses
- Joint Staff College Courses
- Improving Personnel Technique Courses
- Mobilization for Unit Commander Courses
- Formations Commander Courses
- Modern Scientific Administrative Courses
- Studied for 2 years at the Police College.

15. MG Hussein Jasim Mohammed al Awadi - Police Special Forces Chief of Staff

	Religion:	Shia
	Political Party:	Unknown
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	1 May 1951
	Place of Birth:	Al Amarah, Maysan Province, Iraq
	Current Residence:	Baghdad, Iraq

MG Hussein Jasim Mohammed al Awadi was born on 1 May 1951, in the city of Al Amarah in the Maysan Province. He currently lives with his family in Baghdad. He initially entered the Iraqi Army in 1971, attended the Iraqi Military Academy, and graduated in 1973 with a BA in Military Studies and as a 2LT in the Iraqi Army as an Air Defense officer. He later received an MA in Military Studies from the Iraqi National Defense College in 1986. MG Hussein speaks Arabic and limited English (he understands English much better than he speaks it).

Military Assignment History:

- Military Staff College BA Student (1971 – 1973)
- Platoon Leader (1973 – 1975)
- Company Executive Officer (1975 – 1979)
- (1 year gap in known assignment history)
- Company Commander (1980 – 1982)
- Battalion Deputy Commander (1982 – 1983)
- Battalion Commander (1983 – 1985)
- Military Staff College MA Student (1985 – 1986)
- (3 year gap in known assignment history)
- Military Staff College Instructor (1989 – 1992)
- Military Staff College Senior Instructor (1992 – 1994)
- Commander of Officer Candidate School (1994 – 1996)

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- Commander (echelon unknown) in the Iraqi Army's Air Defense Command (1996 – 1998)
- (2 year gap in known assignment history)
- Commander (echelon unknown) in the Iraqi Army's IV Corps (2000 – OIF)

MG Hussein is clearly an accomplished military academician. He finished second in his class in Military Staff College, and was first in his class in three specialized staff courses (War Planning, Command Training Management, and Military Administrative Management). He has also had significant accomplishments in the areas of military research and the publication of articles. His most notable research accomplishments were in the fields of National Defense Manning and Manpower, Training for Warfare, and a project called "A Study of the Various Grades in the Iraqi Army (Reality and Ambition)". He has also been published on at least two occasions, once within Iraq (the article was entitled "Air Defense in the 1920 Revolution") and once in a Japanese military periodical with an article entitled "Kamikaze" that was published in Japanese.

MG Hussein received 3 military seniority achievement awards under the former regime, which amounts to his being 3 year-groups ahead of his original peers in terms of seniority. These were awarded to him in three separate 1-year-seniority promotions, as rewards for being second in his Military Staff College class while in pursuit of his BA in Military Studies, war heroism during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, and exceeding all previous Military Staff College examination standards while in pursuit of his MA in Military Studies.

MG Hussein joined the National Police Forces in the summer of 2004 as the Chief of Staff to MG Adnan Thabit at MOI Site 1 immediately outside of the Baghdad International Zone, a compound formerly occupied by Saddam Hussein's Special Republican Guard. He also serves as the National Police Forces Deputy CG as required. He manages the personnel, operations, and logistics for a 1,000 man (plus) headquarters, which includes the National Police Force's organic Company-sized Quick Reaction Force.

MG Hussein is well respected by almost all senior military and MOI leaders. He maintains absolute loyalty to his assigned MOI superiors, especially to MG Adnan Thabit. He clearly understands military doctrine, and readily applies that doctrine in pursuit of counterinsurgency operations. MG Hussein does not shy away from taking charge in MG Adnan's absence, and maintains a steady course on National Police Force azimuths that have been established by MG Adnan during these periods when he has had to step up to the plate. In the course of dealing with complex issues involving other senior MOI and MOD officials, he tries to stay focused on the point at hand rather than (like many of his peers) wandering off on tangents.

MG Hussein has a tendency to get involved in tactical level decisions on occasion, even though he serves at a strategic-level HQ. Also, despite his own clear skills as a staff officer, he has neither trained nor developed members of his own HQ staff.

MG Hussein should remain a key player in the National Police Forces in the near term future. He is fully capable of assuming command when required to do so, and works smoothly with Coalition officers at all levels. He is highly respected by his men.

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16. **MG Rasheed Flayeh Mohammed Al-Helfy - Commandos Commander**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	1 July 1957
	Place of Birth:	Baghdad, Iraq
	Current Residence:	

MG Rasheed was born on 1 July 1957 in Baghdad. His father was warrant officer in the Iraqi Army under the former regime.

MG Rasheed is both an ethnic Arab and a Shia Muslim, and currently resides in Baghdad. His education includes a BA from the National Security College, a BS from the Iraqi Media College of Culture, and an MA in Political History. He speaks Arabic and is able to speak and understand some English.

MG Rasheed was reportedly involved in an attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 1996. He was sentenced to death, but that sentence was later commuted to five years imprisonment. He was released from prison in 2001.

As a former Directorate of General Security (DGC) officer, MG Rasheed was very much an enemy of the Badr Corps (now Badr Organization) under the former regime. He currently shows no toleration for any extreme ethnic or sectarian influences within his command. He is very attuned to the basics of information operations, and is an effective public speaker. He is politically ambitious, especially in his relations with the current Prime Minister and Interior Minister.

MG Rasheed is an inspirational leader within the Special Police Forces. He is fiercely loyal to both superior and subordinate officers. He is especially loyal to his immediate superior, MG Adnan Thabit, based on their long imprisonment together under the former regime. The motto he implemented for the Police Commandos reflects this aspect of his personality ("Loyal to Country"). He works well with the coalition, particularly with his assigned Special Police Training Team.

While he is a tactically sound and decisive leader with very keen instincts, MG Rasheed lacks detailed organizational skills. He lacks training and experience in staff operations, and lacks experience as a Commander at the operational and strategic level. He makes notes to himself on Post-It notes which he stuffs in his pocket, resulting in many coordination "balls" being dropped. He tends to make immediate decisions that are emotionally-based in the heat of the moment. He also has difficulty in holding subordinate commanders (who are his friends) accountable for their actions or lack thereof, and has a hard time saying "No" to them.

MG Rasheed's military assignments include the following:

- 1980 Graduated from Iraqi National Military Academy

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- 1980 - 1984 Commander of DGS Special Task Training
- 1984 - 1989 Commander of Marshins Emergency Company
- 1991 Security Director of Al-Nasiriya Province
- 1993 Commander of DGS Emergency Battalion
- 1994 - 1995 Commander of DGS Protection Unit
- 1996 - 2003 (Imprisonment 1996 – 2001; Break in Service 2001 – 2003)
- 2004 - 2005 Commander of 1st Brigade of Police Commandos
- Current Commander of Police Commandos Division

17. **Staff MG Basim Khadim - 1st Mech Brigade Commander**

	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	United Iraqi Alliance
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	1961
	Place of Birth:	Baghdad, Iraq
	Current Residence:	Baghdad, Iraq

MG Bassim Mohammed Faraj was born in 1961 in Baghdad. He is a Shia Arab, and currently resides in Baghdad. His education includes both a BS and MS in Military Science from the Iraqi National Security College. He speaks Arabic and is able to speak and understand some English.

MG Bassim was an officer under the former regime. His duties in that capacity were primarily in the areas of maintenance and munitions (primarily mechanized forces) factory production management. Details of previous specific assignments are very sketchy at best.

MG Bassim (at the time a newly-promoted COL) was previously assigned as 2nd Public Order Battalion Commander under 2nd Public Order Brigade, which was initially assigned to police the Al Doura area. When ordered by MG Adnon Thabit to deploy his battalion to Fallujah to help reconstitute a police presence there, he refused to deploy his battalion in support of that order, and he was subsequently relieved of his command by MG Adnan. The Interior Minister reversed that decision, re-hired Bassim as a BG, and then assigned him to command the Police Mechanized Brigade in the summer of 2005. He has since been promoted to MG.

MG Bassim attempted unsuccessfully to hire 300 Badr Organization members as the baseline of a newly-forming Battalion within his Brigade. He has also been implicated in a number of detainee abuse cases (NFI on the specifics). Based on his ability to easily mix with sectarian groups and on possible direct ties with militia groups, he is potentially very dangerous, and is not to be trusted, even though these ties could in fact be less direct and more indirect in nature (based on shared sectarian beliefs and personal greed). He himself only trusts his own close knit circle of friends.

While tactically sound, MG Bassim adheres to overly-centralized decision-making processes. He is technically and tactically competent, and has excellent computer skills as well. He understands the basic tenets of information operations. He routinely bypasses the chain-of-

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command, especially in dealings with his direct superior, MG Adnan Thabit. He is extremely politically ambitious in his personal dealings with the current Interior Minister. He is very greedy, and appears to have no moral foundation in his decision-making on most occasions.

18. **BG Thamer Sadun Al-Janabi - MCU Director**

No Picture	Religion:	Sunni Muslim
	Political Party:	No Strong Affiliation
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	2 May 1961
	Place of Birth:	Baghdad, Iraq
	Current Residence:	Baghdad, Iraq

BG Thamer Sadun Al-Janabi was born 2 May 1961 in Baghdad. He currently maintains a residence at 26 street, house 5, and area 606. The general spends most nights at his HQ in Karada.

BG Thamer is a practicing Sunni who is married to a Shia. His father is a Sunni who married a Shia. He is a graduate of the Baghdad police academy. He speaks Arabic and can communicate without an interpreter in English. For a clear understanding it is recommended to have an interpreter present when meeting with the general. He has demonstrated on a number of occasions that he does not have a sectarian bias when it comes to his job.

BG Thamer is a loyal officer and though he has many objections to the current Minister of Interior (Bayan Jabr) he keeps the Minister informed on operations in his unit to include interactions with the coalition. BG Thamer can speak recklessly about sensitive issues, especially when he is upset or feels threatened. It is unexplained why BG Thamer has survived attempts from within the Ministry to discredit and fire him. It is rumored that he has strong family connections that have protected him. He is respected by his people and maintains a strict discipline, routinely docking pay for minor transgressions. There are, however, officers in his unit that do not like him and report against him to the Minister and other outside sources. BG Thamer does not venture around his own offices very often and is apparently ignorant of details of his own organization that would shock a western officer. He has very good access to the Minister and by his accounts feels comfortable enough to speak frankly to him on issues he feels strongly about.

BG Thamer has a very positive view of the coalition. He speaks generously about the support of the coalition to the media and instructs his staff to support coalition initiatives. The Gen has traveled to the U.S. as a guest of the Army (in 2005), and was extremely impressed with what he saw and grateful for the opportunity. He has grown open to coalition recommendations on issues concerning the training and operation of his organization. He responds well when issues are presented to him for his consideration and initiatives worked from the perspective of seeking his opinion and input. BG Thamer is prone to oversell his organization and its ability to support CF in investigations. He will however apply what resources he has to issues identified by the CF as important.

1.4b, 1.4c

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BG Thamer likes and respects his immediate superior MG Tariq (Deputy Minister for Technical Affairs). He does not get along with the current commander of the Patrol Police, BG Ali. He has a cooperative relationship with MG Hussein Kamal (Deputy Minister for Intelligence), but does not trust him and resents the attention that office is getting from the Coalition.

BG Thamer's weaknesses include an inflated ego and sensitivity to slights that can make him retaliate against critics in a strong fashion. BG Thamer is unable to develop his staff. While he recognizes and embraces long term solutions to his organizations problems, he does not develop long range plans without coaching. He is prone to knee jerk reactions to problems, though he is open to recommendations from the CF. His staff has many competent and conscientious officers but is not managed as a team and many sections do not receive much oversight. Some of the senior officers in the HQ are retired on active duty and have been placed there as favors by elements within the MOI. Some of the senior officers resent the CF for transgressions real and imagined. They are, however, civil. The HQ has elements of Badr, and Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) in the ranks. The unit is a mix of Sunni and Shia. BG Thamer has been at the center of a number of allegations of corruption. His current staff seems to believe that he will not tolerate corruption within his unit, though there have been recent allegations that he solicited a bribe for \$50,000 from a prisoner with the promise of release. This allegation seemed inconsistent with the impression he has made on a number of CF advisors who have worked with him closely. The allegations also came at a time that some of his enemies were conducting an aggressive and at times clumsy campaign to discredit him. When a French film crew visited his unit recently a member of the French film crew recognized the general from an incident prior to the war. In the incident BG Thamer charged the reporter a bribe while he was at the Baghdad International Airport. BG Thamer and the reporter recognized each other and discussed the issue frankly; the general in effect stated that that was how you survived then.

BG Thamer has served as an Iraqi police officer his entire career. At one point he was assigned to the Baghdad International Airport, he was the commander of the Baghdad Patrol Police until 2004 when he was relieved for reasons that are still unclear. At the time of the invasion in 2003 he was a LTC.

(b)(6)

19. Mr. Akeel Saeed - Inspector General

No Picture	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	United Iraqi Alliance
	Ethnicity:	Arab
	Date of Birth:	1964
	Place of Birth:	Karbala, Iraq
	Current Residence:	

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Mr. Akeel Saeed is Shia who claims to have left the Dawa party after ten years of affiliation and is now an "independent and modern Iraqi". He is a civilian but has had no formal IG training. On January 2, 2006, Saeed was appointed by the Minister of Interior (Jabr), the Commissioner of Public Integrity (Rhadi) and the Prime Minister (Jafari) to be the new Inspector General (IG) for the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

Mr. Saeed was born in 1964 in Karbala, where his father still lives. He grew up and was educated in Iraq and holds a degree in law from an Iraqi institution. After graduating school he spent 6 years in Iran working as a journalist and radio broadcaster. He stated that for political reasons he moved to Syria and Lebanon (he claims to have occupied residences in both places at once) for the next three years where he continued to work as a journalist. In 1995 he moved to Denmark where his wife and three children (boys, ages 7, 14, and 17) still reside. He came back to Iraq during the CPA when he was chosen by the Bremer administration to be one of the members of the "leader committee" of the National Assembly. He speaks Danish and Arabic and very little English.

(b)(6) both of whom have been members of the IG staff for over three years and have been very helpful to Embassy officials in the past, came to the Embassy to discuss the Mr. Saeed. Their impression was less than favorable. Although they believed that Saeed had both the personal charisma and professional energy for the job, his connections to the Dawa party were undeniable and have already caused problems in the IG office.

First and foremost he is viewed as a puppet of, not a check-and-balance on, the Minister of Interior. Given his strong Dawa connections, (b)(6) claim that the IG is simply an extension of the reach of Adnan Al-Asadi, the Deputy Minister of Administration, into the IG office. They claim that Asadi is extremely close to Jabr (they believe they actually share the same home in the IZ), and to Jafari.

The second problem is that immediately upon taking office he transferred 17 members of the present staff out of the IG office and into other directorates. This could be because Saeed believed that "even my own office had been corrupted". But (b)(6) claim that the real reason is that he wants only other Dawa members to be part of his staff and only those who have served previously as police, "he does not want any civilians."

After a first meeting, the basic opinion by US diplomats was that Mr. Saeed is very polished and charming, and politically savvy enough to tell them what he thought they wanted to hear. He spent a great deal of time stating that he would like to ensure cultural diversity in his IG office by including Shia'a, Sunni, Kurds, Turks and women. When queried as to whether he removed staff members upon coming into office he said simply no, however he did mention having moved (b)(6) into the communications department because that is where he ought to be. When asked if he knew that several members of the former staff, including (b)(6) had been given professional IG training by American IGs in November, he said no.

Saeed also talked at length about his plans to help fight corruption and human rights abuses in detainee facilities but they lacked substance and detail. He also asked for money, computers and other equipment.

There is little evidence that Akeel Saeed will be more than a puppet for the present, or future, Minister of Interior.

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(b)(6)

No Picture	Religion:	Shia Muslim
	Political Party:	
	Ethnicity:	
	Date of Birth:	
	Place of Birth:	
	Current Residence:	

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