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Baghdad, Iraq  
1 May 2011



**United States Forces-Iraq  
Quarterly Command Report**

**2d Quarter, FY11  
(1 January - 31 March 2011)**

**References**

- A. *Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq*, 17 November 2008.
- B. *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq*, 17 November 2008.
- C. US Embassy Baghdad/Multi-National Force Iraq, *Joint Campaign Plan*, 15 November 2009.
- D. US Forces Iraq, *Quarterly Command Report, 1 October - 31 December 2010*, 31 March 2011.
- E. Commanding General, US Forces Iraq, *Operational Guidance*, 4 October 2010.
- F. US Forces Iraq, Operations Order 11-01, 6 January 2011.
- G. US Forces Iraq, *Responsible Redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq*, April 2011.

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“The United States seeks a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq with a just, representative, and accountable government; a state that is neither a safe haven for, nor sponsor of, terrorism and an Iraq that is integrated into the global economy and is a long-term U.S. partner contributing to regional peace and security. Although stability has improved, it is not yet enduring. As United States Forces Iraq (USF-I) repostures, it will continue to advise, train, assist and equip the Iraqi Security Forces. USF-I will also continue to assist and build the capacity of the Government of Iraq, even as activities performed by USF-I are transferred to non-USF-I entities.”

*Responsible Redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, April 2011<sup>1</sup>*

## **Introduction**

(U) United States Forces-Iraq began its final year focused on strengthening the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) while planning for the termination or final transition of all the command’s missions to the US Embassy-Iraq (USEMB), US Central Command (CENTCOM), the Government of Iraq (GoI) and other entities by 31 December 2011.

(U) The most significant events of the quarter did not happen in Iraq but in the region as a whole, as simmering dissatisfaction boiled up into popular demonstrations that toppled autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and brought thousands onto the streets in virtually every other nation in the Middle East. Iraq’s citizens, like people the world around, were transfixed by images of the “Arab Spring.” As the quarter progressed protests threatened to unseat rulers in Yemen, Bahrain and Libya, and caused considerable disquiet in Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Iraq saw protests as well, though they differed from those in the rest of the region in that they were never particularly large and were not a call for democratic reforms at the national level, but rather focused on local issues such as joblessness, corruption and lack of essential services.

(U) Within Iraq, the single most significant event for USF-I was the unilateral movement in late February of Peshmerga forces into areas south and west of the Combined Security Area (CSA) surrounding Kirkuk. This action complicated relations between Arabs and Kurds and brought to a halt any progress in developing a follow-on to the US-brokered Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) that had been in place in disputed areas in northern Iraq since 2009 as part of pre-election security measures. As the quarter ended, Kurdish forces withdrew to their previous positions, but the future of the Security Mechanism following the reposturing of US forces later this year remains in doubt.

(U) The ISF continued to demonstrate proficiency in countering the activities of violent groups, if hesitancy when taking on Shi’a extremists. Meanwhile, select divisions of the Iraqi Army

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<sup>1</sup> USF-I: Responsible Redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, Report to Congress In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 (Section 1233, Public Law 111-383), April 2011. Also referred to as the 1233 Report, this report covers the period 1 Nov. 2010 – 31 Jan. 2011.

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engaged in al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS) combined arms training designed to provide them with a minimal essential capability to defend Iraq against external threats.

(U) This document presents a history of USF-I from 1 January through 31 March 2010. It will address major issues that arose during the quarter using the Lines of Operation (LOOs) laid down in the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP see Ref. C) as its organizational baseline. Major headings will consist of the JCP Political, Economic and Energy, Rule of Law, and Security LOOs. The Security LOO will be broken down further to examine progress made during the quarter along the three Lines of Effort (LOE) detailed in Operations Order 11-01, which was published during this quarter. Because of the nature of the USF-I mission, this report references political events within and outside of Iraq, as well as the USEMB's activities in support of the JCP.

### **Political Line of Operation**

“We are reminded that we only have 12 months to go to do everything we need to do before we get to zero. Make good use of the time available. Work with the Embassy to enable transition. Create capability and capacity. Time is very valuable.”

*General Lloyd J. Austin III, comments during Commander's Update Briefing, January 4, 2011*

(U) The Political Line of Operation, as defined in Annex A of the 2010 JCP, supports efforts to achieve accommodation between Iraq's main ethnic and sectarian groups, to develop capable, accountable institutions that serve the Iraqi people and respect human rights and the rule of law, and to peacefully resolve territorial disputes.

### **Assessment**

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## Assessment Overview: Political



Jul 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	LOO Conditions
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	1: Political accommodation between Iraq's main ethnic and sectarian groups advanced through commitment to the political process in lieu of violence.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	2: Improved capacity of national, provincial and local institutions, including the legislature, executive, judiciary, media, and civil society to promote effective governance.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	3: Provincial and national elections held at scheduled intervals.
Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange	4: KRG and GoI peacefully manage disputes over internal borders, security forces and hydrocarbon resources.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	5: Democratic culture promoted and furthered across the whole of government and through civil society institutions in order to protect human rights, press freedom and free speech, and ensure accountability for abuses.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	6: Iraq effectively pursues its interests constructively in the region and with the international community.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, 2010    On Track    Slightly Off Track    Moderately Off Track    Not On Track    Not Assessed or No Longer Relevant    Trending Up    Trending Down    UNCLASS//FOUO

### (USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The US Embassy's overall assessment of the Political Line of Operations at the end of this quarter was that it remained slightly off track, with the most concern in the area of Arab-Kurd relations. The embassy noted numerous examples of successes in the past quarter, including the participation of the major political blocs in the new government, a plan albeit still unimplemented for reforming the de-Ba'athification process, as well as power-sharing reforms that had been agreed upon but not fully implemented, the negotiation of a peaceful resolution to the unilateral Peshmerga deployment around Kirkuk, and ongoing dialogue and coordination with Kuwait on outstanding issues.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the limited Arab-Kurd cooperation in Ninewa and Kirkuk and lack of progress on resolving the issues surrounding the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs), significant remaining challenges identified by the embassy include the continued failure to reach agreement on the Defense and Interior ministers and the lack of progress on shaping the post-December 2011 relationship between Iraq and the US.<sup>2</sup>

### Background

(U) The government of Iraq finished the previous quarter having just reached agreement on 21 December on a new government following nine and a half months of negotiations and partisan

<sup>2</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter Executive Core Group (ECG) Brief, April 2011.

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bickering among the various political blocs. This achievement, however, meant that in many respects the hard work was just beginning. The new Council of Representatives (CoR) had significant work ahead of it, including the requirement to pass a budget for 2011 and develop legislation for a National Council for Higher Policies (NCHP), a new governmental body envisioned as a means for giving Iraqiyya leader Ayad Allawi a position of prominence (if not power) in the government.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The Council of Ministers (CoM), or cabinet, assembled by Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki and confirmed by the CoR on 21 December contained only 29 of 42 ministers. Among the portfolios without a permanent minister, the two most contentious ones were Minister of Interior (MoI) and Minister of Defense (MoD). Unfortunately, these were also the two ministries which USF-I had the most interaction with. In addition, the Minister of State for National Security remained unnamed. In the interim, PM Maliki named himself as the acting minister for each of these portfolios.<sup>4</sup>

(S) From the start of the quarter, members of various parties, but especially Iraqiyya leader Allawi, expressed frustration over what they deemed to be PM Maliki's lack of commitment to the promises he had made the previous fall in order to secure a second term as prime minister. Slow to non-existent progress in forming the NCHP, repeated refusals to reach an accord with Iraqiyya over the security ministries, and refusal to make any changes to the extra-constitutional structure of the Counter-Terror Service all contributed to increasingly acrimonious statements in the press as the quarter progressed, and talk that Iraqiyya might pull out of the government and form an opposition, potentially with the Sadrist Trend.<sup>5</sup>

(S) PM Maliki and Speaker of the CoR Usama al-Nujaifi initially got off to a rocky start, as Maliki was deeply resentful of the speech Nujaifi gave upon being elected Speaker on 11 November, and it took some time before the two found a way to work together. Nujaifi gained a reputation early on as an effective leader in the CoR and as the politician best positioned to maintain the system of checks and balances within the Iraqi body politic from being distorted by the expanding powers of the prime minister.

### **Stalemate over the NCHP**

(S) There was brief hope early in the quarter that PM Maliki, Ayad Allawi and the CoR would act quickly to create the NCHP, one of the key components of the government formation deal that had been brokered among the various parties last November. Maliki and Allawi met one-on-one in early January and on several occasions thereafter, and by mid-February the command reported that agreement had been reached on all outstanding issues between the two sides save

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<sup>3</sup> For more in-depth discussion of the political background, see interviews by USF-I Historian with Ambassador Lawrence Butler, Political Advisor to the CG, USF-I, 6 & 29 Apr. 2011.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to the ministries mentioned, the Minister for Planning, Electricity, Trade, and Women's Affairs as well as the various Vice President positions were all vacant positions at the start of the quarter. Eight of the thirteen vacancies would be filled by the second week in February.

<sup>5</sup> USF-I Commander's Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011 (Hereafter "Weekly Assessment").

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whether Allawi's title as head of the Council would be "president" or "secretary general." Nevertheless, despite this optimism there were still issues separating the sides, most prominently Allawi's insistence that he be elected NCHP chairman by the CoR and not the CoM, as had been agreed to the previous November. Repeated efforts by General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey could not get the parties to reach a consensus, and the situation stalemated with no NCHP formed by the close of the quarter and none on the horizon.<sup>6</sup>

~~(S/NF)~~ As the CG reported, "The level of distrust is high; Allawi believes Maliki has no intention of sharing power and Maliki believes Allawi has encouraged protestors in their calls for government reform." Allawi's frustration with the lack of progress led him to declare that he would withdraw from his agreement to head the NCHP, while PM Maliki countered that he still intended to form the NCHP with an Iraqiyya member as the leader.<sup>7</sup>

### Dispute over the MoI and MoD

~~(S)~~ The negotiations which preceded government formation last quarter had reached agreement that the Minister of Defense would be selected from among the members of the Iraqiyya bloc, while the minister of Interior would be selected from the National Alliance bloc. In practice, the process of CoR confirmation ensured that both individuals would have to be acceptable to a much wider political constituency than just their own party, and the command assessed that approval of these two ministers would most likely come as part of a package deal requiring a single vote on both of them. Because these two positions wielded considerable power, many Iraqi politicians preferred that the two ministers be independents and technocrats, without a strong partisan base or loyalties, in order to reduce the possibility that they would be tempted to use the power of their position to back a coup.<sup>8</sup>

~~(S)~~ Despite numerous engagements with the prime minister, the quarter proceeded without any security ministry candidates submitted to the CoR until the very end of March. Part of the reason for this doubtless had to do with the desire to ensure that there was sufficient consensus behind a minister before putting his name to a vote, as once an individual is voted down, that individual can not be presented to the CoR for reconsideration. Though he stated on almost a weekly basis that he would submit nominees to the CoR for its consideration, PM Maliki seemed content to wait until he could have the candidates of his choice, rather than be pressured by Iraqiyya to accept a nominee whose loyalty would be suspect. Maliki also faced considerable pressure over his choice for MoI, as it was one of 1.4b top goals to have Ahmed Chalabi occupy that position.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Weekly Assessment, 3-9, 10-16, 17-23 Jan.; 31 Jan.-6 Feb., 14-20 Feb. 2011; Butler interview, 29 Apr. 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Feb., 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011.

<sup>8</sup> J2 CG Roundtable (Hereafter "CGRT"): "Government Formation Update," 14 Nov. 2010; Weekly Assessment, 17-23 Jan. 2011.

<sup>9</sup> Weekly Assessment, 7-13, 14-20 Mar. 2011; Butler interview, 29 Apr. 2011.

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(S) The command assessed that the continued lack of MoD and MoI leadership was having an adverse impact on the ISF. “Incoherent guidance and direction is negatively impacting personnel systems within the ministries by preventing promotions, retirements, and appointments to key leadership posts. Furthermore, there has been a mixed response to counterterrorism (CT) targeting requests, with positive words but inconsistent follow through on Shia targets.”<sup>10</sup>

(C) PM Maliki finally sent nominations for MoD and MoI to the CoR on 27 March. Although Allawi himself had put forward the Defense candidate, Khaled Obeidi, he subsequently withdrew that nomination. The rest of the Iraqiyya bloc was prepared to accept Obeidi, but they went along with Allawi’s backtracking in the interest of bloc unity, with the Kurds taking the same position, thus sinking Obeidi’s candidacy. The PM also nominated three interior ministry candidates, but none of these were considered viable until the Defense Minister issue was settled. As the quarter ended, the Ambassador and CG engaged with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani, who agreed to try to move the process forward.<sup>11</sup>

### Sadr’s Return

(S/NF) Muqtada al-Sadr continued his campaign to gain political respectability, starting the quarter with his unexpected return to Iraq on 5 January. Sadr had been resident in Qom, Iran, where he had been in self-imposed exile for nearly four years and immersed in studies to become an ayatollah. Sadr’s return to Iraq lasted less than three weeks, during which he made a single televised speech from Najaf that left the command both hopeful and concerned. Sadr called for his followers to support the new Iraqi government, encouraged reconciliation between Sunni and Shi’a, and supported Iraqi Christians. While he again called for the removal of US forces from Iraq and advocated military, cultural and religious resistance against USF, he also insisted that his supporters lend their support to the ISF and seemed to accept the timeline for the removal of USF laid down in the 2008 Security Agreement between Iraq and the United States.<sup>12</sup>

(S) Sadr was assessed by the command to be disappointed with the results of government formation, having only obtained second-tier ministries and no vice presidential position for his political party. PM Maliki’s need for the support of the Sadrists was largely over once he had achieved his goal of securing the premiership, and so the Sadrists’ desires for further concessions from Maliki fell on deaf ears. Furthermore, the return of Sadr to Iraq after such a prolonged absence led to friction between Sadr and other leaders in the movement, many of whom were uncertain of his intentions and had become accustomed to running things themselves in Sadr’s absence.<sup>13</sup>

(U) Sadr returned to Iraq in late February and met with Iraqiyya leader Allawi on 3 March in Najaf. The political agendas of Iraqiyya and the Sadrist Trend share little in common, but their

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<sup>10</sup> Weekly Assessment, 24-30 Jan. 2011.

<sup>11</sup> USEMB-Baghdad cable, Subject: Scen setter for the Visit of Defense Secretary Gates to Iraq, 4 April 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Weekly Assessment, 3-9 Jan. 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Historian Notes, J2 CGRT: “Government Formation Update,” 16 Jan. 2011.

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meeting indicated that they were at least entertaining the idea of forming a coalition if it could achieve their common goal of unseating PM Maliki. Sadr has made increasingly strong statements warning the GoI not to entertain any ideas of inviting the US military to remain in Iraq past the December 2011 deadline for withdrawal of forces.<sup>14</sup>

### **Court Rulings**

(S) On 18 January the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a controversial ruling that independent commissions such as the Central Bank of Iraq, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the Iraqi Human Rights Commission, and the de-Ba'athification Commission should be placed under control of the CoM. The Kurds, Sadrists and Iraqiyya all protested this decision as an attempt by PM Maliki to grab power. Critics highlighted PM Maliki's attempt in December to get the Central Bank of Iraq to provide the government a \$5 billion loan to help balance the 2011 budget, a fiscal procedure which the US and the International Monetary Fund both protested as unsound, and which would be much more difficult for the Central Bank to resist once it is under the cabinet's control. Some in the command dismissed the objections of Maliki's opponents as largely political in nature and pointed out that such a system of executive oversight of independent commissions was typical in the region though the region also lacked much in the way of democratic governments that could serve as an adequate basis of comparison for Iraq. Speaker Nujaifi, responding to widespread concern in the CoR, formed a fact-finding committee to determine what the original intent of the Iraqi constitution was regarding these types of commissions, and wrote to the Supreme Court to request clarification of the ruling. While the head of IHEC questioned the ruling, calling it unconstitutional, PM Maliki defended the decision and called it final. This ruling became a rallying point for Maliki's opponents during the remainder of the quarter.<sup>15</sup>

### **Protests in the Region**

(U) The protests that spread throughout Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011 were a landmark event for the region, and stemmed from generally similar socio-economic conditions poverty, unemployment, and politically repressive regimes. They rapidly spread from country to country through means that largely evaded state control: satellite television, internet, and a variety of electronic communications devices coupled with more traditional methods such as handbills and speeches used to coordinate protests at a local level.

(U) Small-scale protests first began in Tunisia in late December. The triggering event for these was outrage over the self-immolation of an unlicensed street vendor whose cart was confiscated by a female municipal official. The vendor suffered great indignities when he was allegedly slapped, spat on and insulted by the official, and many sources erroneously reported he was a university graduate unable to find appropriate work, a situation that resonated with many Tunisian youth. The vendor set himself on fire in front of a municipal building after being

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<sup>14</sup> Weekly Assessment, 28 Feb.-6 Mar., 7-13 Mar. 2011.

<sup>15</sup> Weekly Assessment, 24-30 Jan., 31 Jan.-6 Feb. 2011; J2 CGRT, "Government Formation Update," 6 Feb. 2011. The head of IHEC's vocal opposition to the ruling caused PM Maliki, in the following quarter, to launch an investigation that cost the IHEC chairman his job.

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refused an audience to make a complaint, an event which sparked local protests. These gradually grew, with police cracking down on peaceful demonstrators, only to spur violent demonstrations in response. By the end of the first week in January, protests had spread to include members of the middle class upset with the autocratic rule and heavy-handed tactics of the police. Zine al-Abedin Ben Ali, Tunisia's president since 1987, first threatened the citizenry with reprisals and placed blame on foreign media instigators, then tried to appease the protestors with a reshuffling of his cabinet steps that autocrats across the region would mimic when they were faced with protests in turn but to no avail. Ben Ali fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia on 14 January.

(U) Events in Tunisia, carried on satellite television and independently reported on by thousands of participants through social media sites, captured the imagination of the "Arab street." The next Arab state to feel the impact was Egypt. Nationwide protests in late January led President Hosni Mubarak to ask his cabinet to resign. This concession only led to larger crowds in Tahir Square in Cairo, and a declaration by the Army that it would not fire on the demonstrators. Despite a series of graduated concessions and a government shutdown over the next two weeks, the crowds refused to disperse until Mubarak had stepped down and transferred power to the military on 11 February. By this point, demonstrations had sprung up in several other countries throughout the region as well.

(U) Iraq's leaders, like the Iraqi populace, watched the events with fascination. In early February, the CoR made a statement supporting democracy, human rights and stability in Egypt. PM Maliki like other leaders in the region who had become more sensitive to the desires of the populace was hoping to forestall protests in Iraq, and announced he would limit himself to two terms as premier and cut his and top parliamentary leaders' salaries in half. While Iraq experienced demonstrations in early and mid-February, they tended to be fairly small-scale affairs focused on the desire for jobs and frustration over corruption and lack of essential services. The CG noted that the ISF was handling itself well, and wanted to see it continue. "We want the Iraqi Security Forces to keep a level head and treat people with dignity and respect."<sup>16</sup>

~~(S/NF)~~ Inspired by events outside Iraq, a groundswell of support grew for nationwide demonstrations on 25 February under the banner "Day of Rage" (also referred to as the "Day of Organized Demonstrations"). As in other Arab countries, word of the planned protests spread via social media, with the organizers of the protests remaining somewhat mysterious figures not readily identifiable with any particular political movement. The identity of the organizers was unknown, and of keen interest for both the Iraqi and US leaders in the weeks prior to the demonstrations. This key piece of information, which might have given indications as to possible actions on the day of the demonstration, caused the CG to ask his J2 at one point "When you pull the string, who is behind this?"<sup>17</sup>

~~(S/NF)~~ The command in mid-February assessed that protests in Iraq were significantly different from those elsewhere in the Middle East. No national protest movement was coalescing, there was little coordination of protests, and Iraq was better positioned than other Arab states to

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<sup>16</sup> CG Read Book, 6 Feb. 2011; Weekly Assessment, 31 Jan. - 6 Feb. 2011; Historian Notes, USF-I Commander's Update Brief (Hereafter "CUB"), 12 Feb. 2011.

<sup>17</sup> Historian Notes, J2 CGRT, 13 Feb. 2011.

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address popular unrest. Iraq even attempted to woo back thousands of citizens living abroad in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, offering free plane tickets and about \$250 for them to return to the relative stability of Iraq. Only three of the protests in Iraq up until that point had any violence, and two of those were due to local political issues. Protests in northern Iraq reflected internal Kurdish disputes; in the south protests were driven by longstanding grievances like corruption and unemployment. General Austin noted that senior Iraqis he talked to believed that having a democracy in Iraq may have inspired the revolution in Tunisia and the democratic desires that were being expressed throughout the region.

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(S) PM Maliki appeared to grow increasingly nervous as the 25 February "Day of Rage" grew closer. Media outlets were informed that live broadcasts of the demonstrations were forbidden. In a televised address on 24 February, Maliki affirmed the right of the people to demonstrate but simultaneously appealed to Iraqis to boycott the demonstrations, saying they were orchestrated by Ba'athists and AQI. He also expressed concern that participants might be the targets of extremist attacks.<sup>19</sup>


(S) Muqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq from Iran just prior to the protests and urged his followers to refrain from marching, telling them that the government should be given six months to improve services before protests should be held. Conveniently, this would mean that Sadr's grace period would expire at the height of the summer heat in August, when anger over the lack of electricity would be at a peak but also at the start of the normally quiescent Ramadan fasting period. Six months was not nearly enough time for even a concerted and well-coordinated effort by the GoI to make real progress in resolving the problem of electricity supply in Iraq and there was no indication that Iraq's assault on this problem was either concerted or well-coordinated. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani also expressed his concerns about the demonstrations and called for people to stay home, afterwards issuing a statement calling for concrete reforms and the elimination of unacceptable privileges that senior officials enjoy. This combination of concerns over extremist attacks along with appeals by Maliki, Sadr and Sistani suppressed Shi'a turnout on 25 February. Despite lower-than-expected turnout, USF-I still recorded 43 protests across the country on that Friday, of which 14 experienced some degree of violence, with 14 deaths in all and approximately 100 wounded civilians and ISF members.<sup>20</sup>

(U) Outside of Baghdad, the largest protests were in Basrah, Karbala and Mosul. Some of the most violent protests were in Mosul and in Anbar province, particularly Fallujah and Ramadi. The

<sup>18</sup> Historian Notes, J2 CGRT: "Regional Unrest - Effect in Egypt and Yemen: We'll Pay You to Return," by Jac

<sup>19</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cables, Subject: "Maliki Chief Iraqi "Day of Rage" February 25 Subject of Intense I

<sup>20</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Feb. 2011; CG Read Bo



25 February Demonstrations in Iraq

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ISF received some criticism in the press for banning television coverage of the protests, harassing and in some cases temporarily detaining media. The governors of Basrah and Babil provinces, the mayor of Baghdad, and the mayor, council chair and several members of the Fallujah city council resigned in the wake of the demonstrations, which like those earlier in the month focused on local issues like corruption and lack of services.<sup>21</sup>

(S) Remarkably, there were no extremist attacks on demonstrators. As the CG noted, “part of that was due to what the ISF anticipated and the measures they put in place. We have to figure out what else was going on with the violent extremist groups that caused them not to attack.” Unknown is whether Sunni and Shi’a extremists did not wish to suppress turnout among protestors who were demonstrating against their common enemy, the GoI.<sup>22</sup>

(S) The US Embassy, for its part, was unimpressed by the turnout for the Day of Rage when viewed in the context of other Arab Spring demonstrations, referring to it at the USF-I CUB the following morning as a “Day of Moderate Disgruntlement.” In reporting on the topic, the USEMB opined that “We anticipate that PM Maliki will conclude that he has been strengthened by the relative small scale of the protests and the ISF’s success in ensuring security.”<sup>23</sup>

(U) PM Maliki followed the 25 February demonstrations with a call for greater accountability and improved government performance, announcing that his ministers would have 100 days to improve the delivery of services to Iraq’s people and combat corruption or face “changes.” The following Friday, 4 March, saw 35 demonstrations across Iraq with significantly fewer people than had demonstrated the week prior.<sup>24</sup> Protests in Iraq picked up again towards the middle of March, but this time the focus of many of the demonstrations was Shi’a outrage over the repression of the Shi’a majority in Bahrain. Forty-nine protests were held across Iraq the week of 14-20 March, with a further 19 the following week.<sup>25</sup>

(U) The continued protests in the region, much more so than the protests in Iraq, led the members of the Arab League in early March to postpone the summit, originally set for 29 March in Baghdad, to mid-May. This was both a blow to Iraq, which had been greatly looking forward to hosting the event as a means for demonstrating its reintegration into regional affairs after decades of sanctions and war, and a boon as preparations for the summit were not complete. In private, some Iraqi leaders welcomed the delay as it gave them more time to prepare the capital

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<sup>21</sup> CUB, 26, 27, 28 Feb., 5 Mar. 2011.

<sup>22</sup> Commander’s Initiatives Group Executive Summary of CG’s CUB remarks (Hereafter “CIG EXSUM”), 26 Feb. 2011.

<sup>23</sup> Historian Notes, CUB, 26 Feb. 2011; US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: “Iraq’s “Day of Rage” Comes to an End,” 25 Feb. 2011.

<sup>24</sup> CUB, 1 Mar. 2011; Weekly Assessment, 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011.

<sup>25</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Mar. 2011.

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for the event; in particular, the renovation of several hotels and other construction projects had fallen behind schedule.<sup>26</sup>

(U) Protests in the KRG marked another major thread of discontent in Iraq during the quarter. These protests were particularly pronounced and violent in Sulaymaniyah. Kurdish opposition parties, led by the Goran party and inspired by Tunisian and Egyptian examples, began holding demonstrations in February and calling for the dissolution of the KRG and the holding of new elections. This provoked considerable ire from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leadership, who pointed out that unlike the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia, they had won elections widely judged legitimate a little more than a year ago.

~~(S/NF)~~ After several days of peaceful protests in Sulaymaniyah, on 17 February five people were killed and twenty injured in a demonstration that turned violent. Several hundred protestors (USF-I reported approximately 200; the embassy, citing press and local contacts, stated several thousand) had gathered that afternoon in a city square protesting corruption, after which a group of them marched to the local branch headquarters of the KDP and began throwing rocks and reportedly attempted to enter the building. KDP security guards opened fire, killing several, and the crowd dispersed. Goran denied involvement in the protests, and USF-I reported that the Kurdish Islamic Union was involved in organizing the event. Regardless, KDP supporters burned down a Goran office in the aftermath of the protest. There was extensive coverage of the event in both the pan-Arab and Western media.<sup>27</sup>

~~(S)~~ The deaths on 17 February were followed by daily protests in Sulaymaniyah and frequent clashes with police. Of particular note were two demonstrations on 19 February. One large demonstration at a downtown bazaar led to fights with Iraqi Police (IP) that left four IP and 21 civilians injured, while nearby three IP were injured during drive by shootings. At the same time police contained a protest on campus by 2,000 university students angry about the shooting of protestors, preventing the students from joining the larger demonstration. Many of the protestors carried signs calling for peace, not violence, and demanding investigation and punishment of those responsible for the 17 February shootings. Kurdish political leaders met afterwards to discuss how to address these demands.<sup>28</sup>

~~(C)~~ Sulaymaniyah was not the only site of protests, as PRT Kirkuk noted ten protests in that province between 17 January and 18 February. Unlike the demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah, the

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<sup>26</sup> Weekly Assessment, 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011; US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: PM's Chief of Staff: Sense of Relief Regarding Arab League Summit Delay, 28 Mar. 2011. Subsequently, in April, the ALS was postponed indefinitely in large part due to the anger of GCC states over Iraq's protest of the crackdown on Bahrain's Shi'a population. The GCC states also wanted the summit to be held somewhere other than Iraq. On 5 May the ALS was postponed until March 2012, but Iraq retained the right to host the event. See CG Read Book, 6 May 2011.

<sup>27</sup> CG Read Book, 18 Feb. 2011; US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: RRT Erbil Spot Report: Protests in Suleimaniye Result in Localized Violence, 17 Feb. 2011.

<sup>28</sup> CG Read Book, 20-24 Feb. 2011.

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Kirkuk protests focused on a variety of services issues such as lack of electricity, demands for higher wages, and an Arab-Turkmen land dispute that ended up with several Arabs dead.<sup>29</sup>

## **Conclusion**

(U) The unusually large number of protests during the quarter stemmed from a variety of causes. While they were certainly inspired by the events of the “Arab Spring” throughout the Middle East, they largely did not share the same goals of seeking political liberalization and the overthrow of repressive regimes. By and large, the protests taking place in Iraq were smaller and more local, with the anger directed at city and provincial authorities over lack of jobs, lack of services, and corruption. These protests peaked with the 25 February Day of Rage, elicited some small concessions from the government, and tapered off somewhat afterwards, though the heat of summer will doubtless bring with it a return to the streets to protest the lack of electricity. In March Shi’a Iraqis rallied in support of their brethren in Bahrain, protests which did little to threaten the GoI, but which helped to heighten anger at the US. Anti-US protests, largely organized by the Sadrist (but spreading to include the Sunnis in Ninewa in the coming quarter) were a small subset of the total number of protests, but a cause for concern over force protection for USF. Another subset of protests were those organized by reformists in the KRG demanding an end to the repressive hegemony over Kurdistan exercised by the Barzanis and Talabanis through the KDP and PUK.

(U) Political progress this quarter, which began with the hope that outstanding issues such as the NCHP and appointment of security ministers might be quickly settled, all too quickly stagnated into a familiar pattern of partisan accusations. The quarter closed without either a Minister of Defense or a Minister of Interior, leaving USF-I handicapped in its ability to engage with the GoI at the highest levels and reach agreements on land use and privileges and immunities for those individuals who would remain in Iraq past 2011 to conduct the Security Assistance Activities that would be vital to building capacity in the Iraqi military and developing a long-term, enduring partnership between Iraq and the US.

## **Arab-Kurd Relations**

(U) Discussions over the census, which had been postponed twice in the previous quarter (the second time indefinitely), yielded no significant progress and no tentative date set. By mid-February, the organization responsible for conducting the census had informed embassy officials that the nationwide census would be delayed at least until October 2011 due to political debate over the conduct of the census and lack of a Minister of Planning.<sup>30</sup>

## **Violations of the CSA**

(U) One of the key events of the quarter was the unilateral and uncoordinated movement of heavily armed Peshmerga troops to an area south of the Combined Security Area (CSA) surrounding Kirkuk on the night of 25-26 February. This move of two Kurdish Regional Guard

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<sup>29</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: PRT Kirkuk: Forecast calls for demonstrations, 22 Feb. 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Feb. 2011.

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Brigades (RGB's) and Zervani units (all PUK-linked) was in violation of the established CSA 12 Guiding Principles document that required all sides to coordinate with the provincial Combined Coordination Center and, if necessary, get permission from the Senior Working Group (SWG) prior to moving troops in this area.<sup>31</sup> At roughly the same time, near Jalula in Diyala province, a Peshmerga company that had been invited by the IA to assist in providing security for a demonstration refused to return to its former position afterwards. The resulting increase in Arab-Kurd tensions would occupy much of General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey's time for the following month.

(S) The Kurds maintained that their maneuvers around Kirkuk had been spurred by the threat of impending extremist attacks coming from the vicinity of Hawijah to the southwest, where there had been violent anti-Kurd demonstrations by Sunni Arabs during the 25 February "Day of Rage." Late that same evening, Peshmerga heavy forces began moving from their positions north of Kirkuk to positions south and west of the city, ostensibly to screen Kirkuk from the Arab extremist threat. The Peshmerga troops, however, were arrayed along roads that already had checkpoints on them, located a few miles closer to Kirkuk in the CSA, so this justification seemed somewhat hollow. There were also indications that the maneuver was not entirely unilateral. While USF-I was not notified in advance, US Division-North observers noted that the Kurdish troops were escorted by Iraqi Police (IP) and the Kurds afterwards claimed they had made the move at the request of the governor of Kirkuk and with the acquiescence of PM Maliki. No shots were fired between the two sides.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The Senior Working Group is part of the Combined Security Mechanism created in 2009 to reduce tensions and ensure stability and security between Arabs and Kurds in the Combined Security Areas (CSAs) in Ninewa, Tamim (Kirkuk), and Diyala provinces. The SWG typically consists of the DCG (Operations) for USF-I and chiefs of the IGFC, Peshmerga, and Federal Police, and meets on a monthly basis. It is the decision making authority for actions occurring in the CSAs and their decisions are reviewed and approved by the High Level Committee (HLC). The HLC consists of the USF-I CG and KRG and GoI ministers of Interior and Defense or Peshmerga; it generally meets on a quarterly basis.

<sup>32</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Feb., 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011; CG Read Book, 28 Feb. 2011; USF-I CSM Update: "Emergency Session of the SWG," 28 Feb. 2011.


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## CSA Violation #2



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(USF-I CSM Update, "Emergency Session of the SWG," 28 Feb. 2011)

(S) LTG Frank Helmick, the DCG (Operations), General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey all became deeply involved in shuttle diplomacy between the two sides over the next few weeks trying to negotiate a withdrawal of Peshmerga forces. While Arab and Turkomen leaders in Kirkuk found the Kurdish moves provocative and there were several demonstrations around the new Kurdish positions, the situation remained tense but peaceful. The Kurds withdrew much of the heavy equipment back to their lines north of Kirkuk within a few days, but troops remained in the new positions south and west of the city despite American protestations. On 28 February, an emergency meeting of the SWG was held to discuss the incursion, followed by a second emergency SWG on 6 March to discuss a joint solution that would lead to the withdrawal of forces. A senior level meeting with General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey was held in Baghdad on 11 March to formally agree to a withdrawal schedule and follow on actions, and to coordinate implementation.<sup>33</sup>

(S) The agreement specified that US forces would temporarily relieve Kurdish forces and provide overwatch, following which the Peshmerga would return to their previous positions over the course of 15 days. Once withdrawal was complete a tri-partite assessment of the security situation around Kirkuk would determine if there were sufficient security forces in place to address any threats to the population. US forces deployed into the areas on 12 March, and the

<sup>33</sup> J35 Enduring Ops History, 1 Jan - 31 March 11. Note: Summaries of SWGs, SVTCs, and senior leader engagements are embedded in this document; Weekly Assessment, 7-13 Mar. 2011.

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Peshmerga began withdrawing heavy equipment the following day. USF-I considered various options for what to do should the Kurds refuse to withdraw their forces by the agreed-upon time, to include discussions with the Kurds regarding our inability to continue advising, training, assisting or equipping Peshmerga or Zervani units. Ultimately, the Kurds weighed their options and withdrew the remainder of the forces, restoring the *status quo ante* over the weekend of 26-27 March. The trilateral assessment then took place.<sup>34</sup>

(S) There was comparatively little coverage of these events in the media; the Kurdish press is well controlled by KRG leaders, and Shi'a Arabs in southern Iraq had little concern for the status of Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk. Even the formerly vocal anti-Kurd Nujaifi brothers displayed little public reaction to the violation of the CSM. The stated reason for the move that of blocking an Arab extremist threat from Hawijah was widely dismissed as a thin fabrication by the command. The CG assessed that the move was a calculated effort by the PUK to gain leverage over the KDP, and possibly also a move engineered to distract the Kurdish public from the demands for KRG reform being raised with increasing frequency by the opposition Goran party. The CG's POLAD, Ambassador Butler, opined that the Kurds may also have calculated that their incursion would demonstrate to both Washington and Baghdad the need to keep US troops in the CSA past 2011. Some in the command assessed that the Kurds, who had been stalled repeatedly by Maliki and others on promises to enact the provisions of Article 140 of the Constitution resolving the status of Kirkuk, were taking matters into their own hands to force the issue. By surrounding Kirkuk, the Kurds sought to gradually create pressure on the Arab population in the city to leave, as Kirkuk had been a Kurdish city for centuries and most of its Arab population had displaced Kurds during Saddam Hussein's 1980s campaign of "Arabization." PM Maliki's stance throughout the situation was particularly noteworthy, as he never made a public statement opposing the Kurdish unilateral occupation of areas south of the Kirkuk CSA. Rather, his silence appeared to be necessitated by the requirement to retain the Kurds as political allies at a time when the Sadrists and Iraqiyya were exploring the possibility of removing PM Maliki from office via a vote of no-confidence—a vote which would require Kurdish participation in order to be successful. Nevertheless, while Maliki remained passive, he appeared more than happy to have US military and civilian leadership pressure the Kurds to withdraw from around Kirkuk.<sup>35</sup>

(U) In the midst of the crisis, the governor of Kirkuk and the provincial council chair resigned, marking the first significant change in leadership in the province since 2005. Speculation about the rationale behind the move was that the governor's replacement might be a Turkoman in a bid by the Kurds to win the loyalty of this significant minority in the province.<sup>36</sup> On 29 March the provincial council elected a new governor, a Kurd who is also a US citizen and a member of the CoR, and a new council chair, a Turkoman. Most of the Arab members of the council boycotted

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<sup>34</sup> Interview, USF-I Historian with (b)(3), (b)(6) J35 Northern Affairs, 13 May 2011; CAG EXSUM, Senior Level Meeting, 11 March 2011; Weekly Assessment 7-13, 21-27 Mar. 2011; USF-I J3: "USG Response Options," 27 Mar. 2011 (Final). When completed in early April, the trilateral assessment found no need to deploy additional security forces in the vicinity of Kirkuk.

<sup>35</sup> Weekly Assessment, 7-13 Mar. 2011; (b)(3), (b)(6) Interview, 29 Apr. 2011; EXSUM, 7 March 2011 A-K SVTC.

<sup>36</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011.

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the vote and stated their intention to boycott future sessions in protest to the marginalization of Kirkuk's Arabs by the Kurds and Turkomen.

(U/~~FOUO~~) A USEMB assessment of attitudes in the area following the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces found that "Arab and Turkmen CoR members from the DIBs (Disputed Internal Boundaries) universally credited US efforts with convincing the Kurdish leadership to withdraw Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk and Diyala on March 27; however, they urged the United States to redouble its effort to promote a long-term settlement in Kirkuk to prevent unilateral military action in the future." They also cautioned that the Peshmerga deployment had stoked mistrust along ethnic lines in the DIBs, and stated that they felt betrayed by Iraqiyya for failing take a strong, public stand against the Kurdish deployment.<sup>37</sup>

### **Sons of Iraq (SoI)**

(U/~~FOUO~~) USF-I's vision for the Sons of Iraq is to have all members employed in either security or service ministries with salaries paid on time and SoI retirees, disabled, and martyrs' families treated equitably with their ISF counterparts. This will deny insurgent groups the opportunity to gain a strategic victory by recruiting former SoI, and contribute to the reconciliation of the Sunni populace with the GoI and the disbandment of the SoI program. Despite a formal freeze on SoI transitions since May 2010 due to security concerns, USF-I expressed some hope this quarter that the GoI was displaying a renewed desire to fulfill its obligation of transitioning the SoI. This guarded optimism was based in part on the appointment of a Minister of State for National Reconciliation to oversee the reintegration of all disaffected groups (including the SoI) and the development of an initiative within the GoI to work through SoI issues in order to develop a comprehensive way forward in the transition process.<sup>38</sup>

(S) Attacks targeting SoI remained at fairly low levels throughout the quarter. The most severe attack occurred on 25 February, the same day as the "Day of Rage" protests, and therefore did not garner the type of widespread publicity it would have otherwise gained. On that day in Fallujah seven SoI members were kidnapped from their homes and executed nearby by suspected AQI operatives dressed in IA uniforms; an eighth SoI member survived with injuries.<sup>39</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) As related in previous quarterly histories, the outlook for the SoI improved when the Iraq Ground Forces Command (IGFC) was given greater responsibility for SoI pay and stood up a Joint SoI Coordination Center (JCC) to address complaints and issues. This JCC will transition from the IGFC into the Director General for Intelligence Services, and while the consequences of this move remain undetermined, they will be monitored closely by USF-I and subsequently by USEMB staff following transition of the SoI monitoring function effective 1 May.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: "Arab and Turkmen frustration lingers after Peshmerga withdraw," 1 Apr. 2011.

<sup>38</sup> J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>39</sup> CUB, 26 Feb. 2011.

<sup>40</sup> J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The GoI continued to make strides in improving the SoI pay process in this quarter. Though January pay was only on time in Baghdad, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) office which distributes pay doubled-up pay for the remaining provinces, with the result that February's pay was completed early. March pay is expected to be no more than 1-2 weeks late, which is relatively good by past standards.<sup>41</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I continued to advocate that exceptions to the freeze in transitions be made as long as the security environment was not affected. Despite hirings by the Oil Police and by the local police in Ninewa province last quarter, none of the new hires were from the ranks of the SoI. There were several reasons for this. Many of the public protests throughout Iraq in the last few months have been spurred, in part, by the lack of jobs. The SOI all have jobs while many other men remain unemployed, and alleviating unemployment is a higher priority than transitioning men from one government job to another. In addition, the Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Interior, and leadership in Ninewa province all have misgivings about hiring SoI given the longstanding suspicions that SoI members are Al Qaeda or Ba'athist sympathizers. While USF-I has worked diligently to combat these perceptions, there is still work to be done.<sup>42</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Various initiatives were on-going for transitioning SoI into security positions, including the potential hiring of up to 750 SoI into the police in Samarra. The IA has indicated it is open to admission of qualified SOI during provincial recruiting drives, but will not provide preferential treatment. Earlier discussions involving a plan to leverage SOI as an intelligence capability may now move forward with the transfer of the SOI JCC to the Intelligence branch. GoI representatives continue to acknowledge the need for additional intelligence capability and this transfer could be the initial move to integrate SOI capabilities into the existing security structure. Ultimately, any movement on the restarting of transitions would require the approval and support of the Prime Minister.<sup>43</sup>

## Diplomatic Relations

### Kuwait

(U) Kuwait's Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Sabah visited Iraq in early January to offer his congratulations to PM Maliki and discuss bilateral issues, the first such visit in 20 years. Maliki reciprocated by leading a government delegation to Kuwait in mid-February to discuss outstanding issues related to the 1990 Gulf War and unresolved border issues. While the meeting resulted in an agreement to establish joint committees to resolve the outstanding issues between the two nations, Kuwait chose not to support removal of Chapter VII sanctions from Iraq or lessen its demands for full war reparations.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Email correspondence, USF-I Historian with (b)(3), (b)(6) Director, USF-I J9 Sol Division, 12 Apr. 2011; J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>43</sup> J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011; DCG (Operations) Update to the CG: "Sol Update," 12 Feb. 2011.

<sup>44</sup> Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011.

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(U) Nevertheless, improving the Iraq-Kuwait bilateral relationship and cooperation on Chapter VII remains one area of the Political LOO that the USEMB deems an ongoing challenge. Both the Ambassador and General Austin continue to urge PM Maliki to fully commit to honoring Iraq's previous recognition of the current land and maritime borders with Kuwait with a formal diplomatic statement acknowledging the agreed-upon border. This would entail a letter from the prime minister to the UN Security Council upholding previous Security Council resolutions on the border and related issues.<sup>45</sup>

(U) In what the CG termed "another significant step in normalizing relations between the countries," President Talabani traveled to Kuwait in late February to participate in the Kuwait's 50/20 Day, which marked the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the independence from Britain and the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its liberation from Saddam Hussein's army during the Gulf War. CoR Speaker Nujaifi also travelled to Kuwait on 19 March to help build a sense of partnership between the two nations.<sup>46</sup>

(U) Foreign Minister Zebari also announced that Iraq will pay the remaining \$21 billion in compensation it owes Kuwait as a result of the Gulf War, though it remains unknown when and how Iraq will make the payment.<sup>47</sup>

## **Turkey**

(U) Prime Minister Erdogan visited Iraq in late March to meet with PM Maliki and sign an economic investment pact. He spoke to the CoR and met with Grand Ayatollah Sistani during the visit. He also presided over the opening of a Turkish consulate in Irbil with KRG President Barzani, the first visit ever by a Turkish PM to Irbil. Turkish airways will offer service to the newly opened airport in Irbil beginning in April, amidst growing trade between the two countries. Iraq is arranging for the export of oil through Turkey and negotiating the purchase of electricity from Turkey to augment its inadequate generation capacity. The media noted that for the first time the prime minister's visit did not include any requests for extradition of PKK members to Turkey, which was taken as a sign that bilateral relations are no longer dominated by security issues. While the PKK remains a concern, Turkey is seeking to improve its trade relations with Iraq so that it can leverage support in dealing with the Kurdish rebels.<sup>48</sup>

(U) While 2/3rds of the foreign companies in northern Iraq are Turkish, the Turks are invested heavily not just in that part of the country, but elsewhere as well, most notably Basrah. The *New York Times* noted "Turkey's influence is greater in northern Iraq and broader, though not deeper, than Iran's in the rest of the country." This legacy of soft power has been largely welcome in

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<sup>45</sup> USF-I / US Embassy-Baghdad Senior Leader Forum, 19 Feb. 2011; US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari, 23 Nov. 2010.

<sup>46</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Feb., 14-20 Mar. 2011.

<sup>47</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011.

<sup>48</sup> Weekly Assessment, 28 Mar.-3 Apr. 2011; CG Read Book, 31 Mar. 2011; CUB, 2 Apr. 2011.

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Iraq, though some critics have leveled charges of Neo-Ottomanism. The Turks have been careful to maintain ties to all Iraqi political blocs, and have been credited with forging the Iraqiyya coalition.<sup>49</sup>

## Bahrain

(U) Iraq's Shi'a majority, both political elites and the Iraqi street, reacted with anger at the suppression of the Shi'a majority in Bahrain by the Sunni monarchy. Bahrain's rulers were aided by troops of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with Saudi Arabia playing a leading role. The violent dispersal of protesters from Pearl Square in Manama and imposition of martial law on 15 March was met with condemnations and protests by the entire spectrum of Iraq's Shi'a population, with protests growing in number in late March. Muqtada Sadr predictably organized protests, with 21 demonstrations taking place across the country on 18 March, while members of the CoR called for the closure of the Bahraini and Saudi embassies in Iraq and more concrete actions against Bahrain and the GCC. Bahraini flags began to appear in many protesters' fists, and also came to be found at the Point of Origin (POO) sites of several rockets launched at US bases in Iraq in late March.<sup>50</sup>

(S) Bahrain's Shi'a majority look to the hawza of Najaf and senior Iraqi ayatollahs for their spiritual guidance, not [redacted] 1.4b [redacted] urged the government of Bahrain to refrain from violence against unarmed civilians. American diplomats were placed in a precarious position of calling for an end to violence and a pursuit of dialogue by all sides in Bahrain, while being careful not to condemn an important regional ally—a position that was viewed by many Iraqis as a lack of US support for Shi'a protesters. As the USEMB put it: "GCC intervention in Bahrain hit a raw nerve in Iraq and accusations of an American "double standard" persist." The USEMB attempted to advise Shi'a leaders in the GoI of how criticism of Bahrain could impact Iraq's reintegration into the region. While the GoI's official position on Bahrain remained neutral, the continued criticism of Bahrain and its GCC allies was largely responsible for those countries insisting on an indefinite postponement (and threatened cancellation) of the Arab League Summit, which had been scheduled for mid-May.<sup>51</sup>

## Syria

(U) In January Iraq and Syria increased bilateral relations during a Syrian delegation's visit led by Syria's PM, who together with PM Maliki signed a number of economic pacts and memorandums of understanding as well as agreeing to create a common strategic council to sustain bilateral relations.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> New York Times, "Resurgent Turkey Flexes Muscles Around Iraq," by [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] 4 Jan. 2011.

<sup>50</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011; One effective example of such an attack was a Bahraini flag was found at the POO of a rocket that injured 11 on Victory Base Complex on 28 March; see CG Read Book, 29 Mar. 2011.

<sup>51</sup> USEMB-Baghdad cable, Subject: Scen setter for the Visit of Defense Secretary Gates to Iraq, 4 Apr. 2011; Weekly Assessment, 14-20, 21-27 Mar., 28 Mar.-3 Apr. 2011.

<sup>52</sup> CUB, 17 Jan. 2011.

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## Economic and Energy Line of Operation


(U//~~FOUO~~) Regarding the Economic and Energy Line of Operation, as detailed in Annex B of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), it is the United States' mission to help Iraq build a diverse, stable, prosperous, market-oriented economy that creates jobs and is fully integrated into the global economy. Our goals include: improved delivery of essential services; development of the oil sector; improved key sectors, such as finance, energy and agriculture; macroeconomic stability; and creation of a well-functioning and accountable government administration.

### Assessment

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### Assessment Overview: Economic and Energy



Jun 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	LOO Conditions
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	1: Essential service delivery and infrastructure meets the basic needs of all Iraqis.
Yellow	Red	Red	Red	2: Energy sector institutions efficiently develop and manage oil resources and provide electrical services for the good of the Iraqi people.
Orange	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	3: Iraq's economy is diversified, growing, and globally integrated.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	4: Iraq's economy has a firm foundation for macroeconomic stability, including the use of sound economic policy and decision making.
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	5: Iraq has the institutions and laws in place to foster a well-functioning government administration, including accountability.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, 2010    On Track    Slightly Off Track    Moderately Off Track    Not On Track    Not Assessed or No Longer Relevant    Trending Up    Trending Down    UNCLASS//~~FOUO~~ 13

### (USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The US Embassy's overall assessment of the Economic and Energy Line of Operation at the end of this quarter was that it remained slightly off track but was improving across the board, with the greatest concerns in the energy sector. The embassy highlighted a number of signs that the Iraqi economy was moving in the right direction during the quarter, including the passage of the 2011 budget by the CoR, increasing adoption of airspace control by the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority, oil production levels that hit 2.5 million barrels per day, and the Ministry of Electricity rolling out an Iraq Electricity Master Plan, awarding new power plant projects, and embarking on its first-ever initiative to privatize a significant portion of the electricity sector.

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(U/~~FOUO~~) The chief economic and energy concerns raised by the embassy were with the timely completion of the onshore portion of the southern oil export infrastructure, the failure of the GoI to adopt policies that will increase Iraq's electrical generation capacity and also temper public expectations and demand for power, and the failure as yet to implement bilateral trade and investment agreements between Iraq and the US.<sup>53</sup>

## General

(U/~~FOUO~~) The USEMB summarized Iraq's economic prospects as follows:

“Iraq's oil revenues, which account for 88% of government revenues in Iraq's 2011 budget, will play a vital role in Iraq's continued development. The GOI has formulated an ambitious plan to increase oil exports over the next several years. Achieving its goal will require both tens of billions of dollars in investment as well as capacity building within the GOI, expanding Iraq's human capacity, and moving away from outdated, ineffective models of a centrally planned economy. Overall, Iraq's economy grew 70% from 2003 to 2008, with improved security conditions serving as the greatest single contributor to growth. Unemployment remains high, at an estimated 18% with unofficial estimates as high as 30%, and underemployment is estimated at near 30%. Agriculture, the largest sector for employment, has benefited from USDA and USAID assistance, but has a long way to go.”<sup>54</sup>

(U) The lifting of most of the remaining UN sanctions in December and the rapid rise in oil prices, coupled with Iraq's relative stability in a region filled with unrest, contributed to a 25 percent rise in the Iraqi stock market during the first two months of 2011. Foreign investment also flooded into Iraq during the period, as other Arab stock markets plunged 15 percent.<sup>55</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) The CoR on 20 February approved an \$82.6 billion budget, with a deficit of \$13.4 billion and total revenues of \$69.2 billion. Oil revenues comprise 74 percent of the total budget, based on an assumption of 2.2 million barrels per day (bpd) at \$76.5 a barrel totaling \$61.43 billion. The final budget included \$6 billion for ration cards, twice the original proposal. Measures in the budget also addressed increasing the supply of electricity and achieving a more equitable distribution of oil wealth among the provinces, measures designed to address the demands of many protesters who had been demonstrating in ever-larger numbers throughout Iraq in previous weeks. Security programs total \$12.2 billion for the MoD and MoI, an increase of \$1.3 billion or 10% from the 2010 budget.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

<sup>54</sup> USEMB-Baghdad cable, Subject: Scen setter for the Visit of Defense Secretary Gates to Iraq, 4 Apr. 2011.

<sup>55</sup> Washington Times, “War Weary Iraq Sees Economic Rebound,” 10 Apr. 2011.

<sup>56</sup> J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011; Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Feb. 2011.

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## Oil

(U) Iraq's income improved from an increase in oil outputs and higher prices per barrel. Revenues from oil exports in the month of January rose to \$6.08 billion, the most in more than a year, due in part to a ten-percent increase in export volumes and higher global prices, which averaged over \$90 per barrel for the month. Having worked out their differences during the previous quarter's government negotiations, the KRG began to export crude oil again beginning in February, with the goal of adding 200,000 bpd to Iraq's overall exports before long.<sup>57</sup>

(U) In the previous quarter, the CoM had drafted a budget that assumed KRG oil production of about 150,000 bpd, but the CoR failed to pass that budget by the close of the quarter. This quarter, in response to KRG protests over the lack of coordination in developing the budget and proposed revenue allocation penalties for failure to meet production quotas, the GoI re-drafted and re-adopted the 2011 Iraq budget to assume production of only 100,000 bpd by the KRG. Other KRG grievances, such as reimbursement for its IOCs' costs and restoration of Heavy Fuel Oil delivery were also addressed in the new GoI budget. Fortunately for the GoI, the price of oil throughout the quarter remained well above the \$76.5 price per barrel that had been used in calculating its 2011 revenue forecast. As a result, the command assessed that the Iraqi budget deficit would not be nearly as severe as projected, and may end up being a surplus if oil prices remain high for the rest of 2011.<sup>58</sup>

(U) In an encouraging sign for future investors, companies which had concluded agreements with Iraq in earlier rounds of oil field bidding were already beginning to turn a profit. BP reported in January that it had raised output from the Rumaila field above the initial production target established in its November 2009 contract well ahead of the three-year deadline it had agreed to for reaching that target and that it now would be receiving \$2 for every barrel produced over the target rate. By the close of the quarter, two other IOCs would join BP in reaching their initial targets and begin recovering costs from the fields.<sup>59</sup>

(C) By late January, greater than expected increases in production by International Oil Companies (IOCs) exceeded Iraq's southern export capacity of roughly 1.7 million bpd. The IOCs have increased Iraq's total production by roughly 250,000 bpd, and although some increase was achieved through the drilling of new wells, most of the increase was achieved through optimizing existing wells. Ministry of Oil (MOO) officials were pleasantly surprised, having estimated that it would take almost three years to achieve this much of an increase.<sup>60</sup>

(C) However, while oil is being pumped out of the ground in southern Iraq at a higher rate than anticipated, the USEMB assesses that Iraq's infrastructure will be unable to handle the increased

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<sup>57</sup> CUB, 20 Jan., 28 Feb. 2011.

<sup>58</sup> Weekly Assessment, 17-23 Jan. 2011; J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>59</sup> CUB, 12 Jan. 2011; J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>60</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Iraq's Oil Production Exceeds Offshore Export Capacity in the South, 21 Mar. 2011.

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flow until January 2012 at the earliest. The IOCs and Iraq's state oil company have been pushing the existing export pipelines past safe operating limits, which increases the risk of leaks or even a major break rendering one or both of the 36 year-old lines unusable and possibly causing an international ecological disaster. They have also been forced to pause production on a rotating basis, resulting in a "lost opportunity cost" that will likely exceed \$7 billion for 2011. Three defunct export pipelines lead from Iraq's southern fields, but none of these represent a potential solution to the current bottleneck, both because neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia have shown any interest in reopening those lines and because refurbishing the heavily damaged Syria pipeline would take longer than completing the new undersea export pipeline already under construction in the south.<sup>61</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) Embassy and USF-I staff have been heavily engaged in advising and assisting the GOI to complete their multi-phased export projects, principally the Iraq Crude Oil Export Expansion (ICOEE) project, as quickly as possible. Phase I of ICOEE began dredging in February, and the contractor expects to complete the phase by January 2012. When completed, the \$1.2 billion project will add an additional 1.8 million bpd of export capacity. Subsequent ICOEE phases and other export projects will increase export capacity even more. The embassy's chief concern with this project is the timely completion of the onshore infrastructure. "The Ministry of Oil's State Company for Oil Projects (SCOP) is responsible for the \$4 billion onshore portion of the southern oil export expansion program (tank farms, pump stations, and pipelines). At issue is both adequate coordination with the ICOEE project and whether SCOP has the capability and funding to complete its expansion on time. Recent conversations with IOC representatives and MOO officials suggest that the MOO will ultimately need to turn to the IOCs in order to ensure that the project is completed successfully and on time."<sup>62</sup>

(U) In January it was reported that Iran and Iraq had signed agreements to jointly develop 5 of 23 oil fields along their mutual border, though there were still technical details to be worked out before work could proceed. The MOO also announced in late February the signing of 13 contracts to develop 15 oil and gas fields.<sup>63</sup>

(S) There were two IED attacks on oil infrastructure in northern Iraq during the quarter, one on 8 March to the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, and one on 26 February to the Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR). Damage from both attacks was quickly repaired. The pipeline bombing caused a five day shutdown that did not impact exports due to surge storage downstream of the break. The BOR attack on 26 February was much more worrisome, as it shut down 30 percent of Iraq's total fuel production and the initial assessment was that it might take a year to restore capacity. However, the GoI marshaled its resources in an unprecedented manner so that in a little over two weeks the BOR was producing 170,000 barrels of refined petroleum a day, only 20,000 shy of pre-attack levels. A month after the attack the BOR had returned to pre-attack levels of gasoline production, and was actually producing more diesel than it had last summer at its peak. To

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<sup>61</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Iraq's Oil Production Exceeds Offshore Export Capacity in the South, 21 Mar. 2011; DCG (Support) Update to the CG: "Oil Production and Export Capabilities," 12 Feb. 2011.

<sup>62</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

<sup>63</sup> CUB, 12 Jan., 26 Feb. 2011.

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prevent future attacks, the MOO stepped up efforts to hire additional security guards and security infrastructure improvements.<sup>64</sup>

## Water

(U) Precipitation in both the Tigris and Euphrates watersheds is 70 percent of normal through the end of 2010, and the amount of water contained in upstream snowpack is also below last year's and historical averages, leading to predictions of scarcity of water this coming year. While Iraq has a larger amount of water per capita than most countries in region, it is not efficient in its use, so the potential impact of this scarcity could be high.<sup>65</sup>

## Electricity

~~(S)~~ As the CG acknowledged, "The ability of the GoI to meet the electricity demand is a major concern given the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East and in the light of the impending increase in electricity use this summer." The CG and Ambassador emphasized to PM Maliki that this was not just an issue of completing the construction of new infrastructure, but includes repair of existing infrastructure, importing additional power, and moderating public expectations with regard to the electricity supply. Electrical capital investments in the 2011 budget passed in February totaled \$3.2 billion, about \$300,000 less than in 2010. Iraq's current demand of approximately 12,000 megawatts (MW) is twice the current generation capacity.<sup>66</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 17 January the governor of Kirkuk briefly took his province off the national electrical grid, keeping 440 MW generated in the province solely for Kirkuk's use. Though this situation was corrected upon the intervention of PM Maliki, the command believed this dispute might foreshadow the kind of provincial and civil unrest that may arise this summer when electrical demand climbs.<sup>67</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ In February, the Iraq Electricity Master Plan (IEMP) was unveiled before an international audience in Istanbul, Turkey. The plan is the culmination of a two year study completed by Parsons Brinckerhoff. The study, which was funded and supervised by the DoS, provides data, identifies areas of concern, and proposes courses of action with respect to Iraq's electricity sector, specifically: load forecasting; generation planning; transmission planning; and distribution planning. The IEMP considers the period 2010 to 2030 and covers Iraq (excluding the KRG). If the recommendations in the plan are implemented, the cost of the IEMP would be approximately \$26 billion from 2011-2015 and \$55 billion from 2016-2030. The 2011 budget approved in February does not show clear support for the IEMP, and even if it did, the plan is not a quick-fix, as IEMP-planned generation would not come online until 2013-2014.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar., 28 Mar.-3 Apr. 2011; J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>65</sup> Historian Notes, CUB, 20 Jan. 2011.

<sup>66</sup> Weekly Assessment, 7-13 Feb. 2011; J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>67</sup> J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Positive news in the electricity sector included word that the Ministry of Electricity (MoE) is embarking on its first-ever initiative to privatize a significant portion of the electricity sector, via its ongoing Independent Power Producer (IPP) tendering process.<sup>69</sup> In late January it was announced that the MoE had finally agreed to hire a qualified Owners Engineer to ensure proper installation of 77 turbines bought from GE and Siemens. If carried through, this is a very positive step, and one which had long been urged by USF-I; by spending several million dollars on an engineer, Iraq will ensure the proper installation and investment of several billion dollars in electrical purchases.<sup>70</sup>

(S) In mid-February the CoR confirmed Ra'ad Shalal, a highly regarded engineer, as the new Minister of Electricity; previously, energy minister Shahrastani had filled the position. The minister signed agreements with the Syrian government in March to provide access to electrical lines from Turkey to Iraq via Syrian territories. MoE also plans to purchase of 200 MW of interim power from Turkey for the upcoming summer, and also purchased generators from Jordan capable of producing 280 MW of power for Salah ad Din province. Iraq currently imports about 10 percent of its power from Iran, and intends to import more, though it is currently having difficulties paying for the power it is receiving. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that Iran refuses to name a non-sanctioned bank for Iraq to pay its arrears into.<sup>71</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) In the last week of March, the CoM approved a \$6 billion plan to add 5000 MW of electricity to the grid by April 2012. First units online won't be until September 2011. USF-I's J9 took a decidedly dim view of the plan. "The venture will not finish in time to help alleviate the looming summer demand crush, is not in accordance with the recently approved Iraq electricity master plan, and the \$6 billion price tag does not reduce the \$26 billion cost to finish long term projects 2-3 years away from completion."<sup>72</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Continued electricity supply shortfalls caused USF-I and the USEMB to take a second look at the initial assessment made last fall that the MoE would be able to bring 3300 MW of additional power online by the summer of 2011. The goal of the "3300 MW by summer" initiative was to encourage the MoE to focus their attention on three areas: "fix what's broken;" "maintain what you have;" and "finish what's almost done." However, data provided to USF-I by the MoE led to a downward adjustment of what was obtainable, finding that by June 1, 2011, new construction, refurbishments, and additional imports from neighboring countries could only supply an additional 1500 MW of power.<sup>73</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The USEMB's assessment of the problem:

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<sup>69</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

<sup>70</sup> CUB, 3 Feb 2011.

<sup>71</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011; J2 CGRT: "National Politics Update," 10 Apr. 2011; J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>72</sup> J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

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“The Iraqi power sector is a broken system and an unsustainable drain on the GOI budget. As long as the government continues to be the primary provider of electricity without adequate tariffs or cost-recovery, there will likely be shortages and/or poor quality of service. In the short term, the focus is on getting the GoI to increase supply through increased funding for operations and maintenance, assisting and encouraging the MOE to implement a public messaging campaign to inform the public of the situation and progress towards the solution, and the purchase, installation, and fueling of 5,000 MW of HFO-fueled generators. In the long term, the focus is on implementation of the Electricity Master Plan, completion of ongoing GE and Siemens Mega Deal projects, continued refurbishment of existing units, and comprehensive power sector reform that includes privatization of the generation, transmission, and/or distribution systems, assuming the GoI is a willing partner.”<sup>74</sup>

### Ports of Entry (PoE)

(U/~~FOUO~~) The Model POE design build for Zurbatiyah stalled when a further site survey revealed that the minefields in that area had not been cleared and the soil condition and relative location of the area with reference to plate tectonics and seismic activity of the region required adjustments to the plan execution. Although the Model POE build at Zurbatiyah has not been cancelled, the delays for clearing the minefields and adjustments to building requirements will likely postpone the project for an additional six months to a year.<sup>75</sup>

### Air Traffic

(U) The Baghdad/Balad Sector from 15,000 feet and above was handed over to Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority (ICAA) control in February 2011. The Ali Sector in southern Iraq from 15,000 feet and above is scheduled to be handed over in May, at which point the ICAA will control all airspace in Iraq above 15,000 feet. The remainder of Iraq's airspace below 15,000 feet will be incrementally transferred to ICAA control over the next several months with the final sector, Baghdad/Balad approach, being transferred in October.<sup>76</sup>

(U) Training of the ICAA began in February 2011 under contract with Queen Noor Aviation Academy in Amman, Jordan, and will continue through June, covering technical, administrative, and management issues. Approximately 250 ICAA employees will be trained. Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) standards were implemented in March, a move that has the potential to double Iraq's airspace capacity and increase their over-flight revenues.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

<sup>75</sup> ITAM Police 2nd Quarter History (Jan-Mar 2011)

<sup>76</sup> Email correspondence, USF-I Historian with (b)(3), (b)(6) AFCENT ACCE Airspace Planner, 27 Mar. 2011.

<sup>77</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

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## Rule of Law Line of Operation

(U) The Rule of Law Line of Operation, as defined in Annex C of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), seeks to address Iraq's continuing needs through a closely coordinated prioritized effort to allocate US Government (USG) resources to achieve:

- (1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Further integration and security for the Iraqi criminal justice system, including its law enforcement, judicial, incarceration, and related legal community support components, and, for the foreseeable future, Iraqi Army and Regional Security Forces (RSF) subject to the rule of law;
- (2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Enhanced judicial capacity and training, including continuing professional development for judges, judicial investigators, prosecutors, judicial security personnel, and court administrative staff; and
- (3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Improved law enforcement and judicial relationships and integration of the legal community to address corruption, and common transnational criminal threats; as well as,
- (4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Assistance at each level of government for enactment of civil justice reforms which may lead to increased foreign investment and improved economic conditions.

### Assessment

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### Assessment Overview: Rule of Law



Jul 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	LOO Conditions
■	■	■	■	1: Increasingly transparent, independent, efficient and secure judiciary.
■	■	■	■	2: Enhanced professionalism and effectiveness in law enforcement.
■	■	■	■	3: Continued improvements in detention and corrections practices and capacities.
■	■	■	■	4: Improved civil justice system that protects commercial and property rights.
■	■	■	■	5: Improved corruption detection and enforcement practices.
■	■	■	■	6: Increased awareness of rights and equal access to justice through enhanced professionalism in the legal community.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, 2010

■ On Track   
 ■ Slightly Off Track   
 ■ Moderately Off Track   
 ■ Not On Track   
 ■ Not Assessed or No Longer Relevant   
 ↑ Trending Up   
 ↓ Trending Down

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### **(USEMB JCP Assessment 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The USEMB assessed that Iraq's overall progress in achieving the goals for Rule of Law laid out in the 2010 JCP was "slightly off track" in March 2011. This was the same assessment as in December 2010, though there was improvement in its assessment of "awareness of rights and equal access to justice through enhanced professionalism in the legal community."

(U//~~FOUO~~) The embassy highlighted successes in Rule of Law development such as: provincial level training for judges and law enforcement personnel that improved relationships and the criminal justice system's capacity for prosecution; increased partnerships with US agencies; a successful Judicial Investigator pilot program; increased corrections training to include the Jail Operations course and development of Maximum Security Unit training; and the prosecution of high level officials for corruption.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Judicial security remains a persistent challenge, as does case processing, integration of Iraqi Police with investigative judges, and endemic corruption problems that extend to the highest level of the GoI and KRG.<sup>78</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Lead for Rule of Law was handed over to the USEMB over the course of 2010, though USF-I continues to support Embassy efforts as appropriate.

#### **Prisoner Abuse**

(U) Camp Honor, a detention facility in the International Zone of Baghdad run by the MoD, created significant bad publicity for PM Maliki in late January when a string of stories in the Western and Arab media, as well as a report by Human Rights Watch, detailed significant abuses in the facility and another "secret" detention facility at Camp Justice (both are declared detention facilities). Among the concerns were the administration of the prison by military and CT forces answering to the PM alone, as well as the belief that the new Minister of Human Rights, a close Maliki ally, will not actively investigate allegations. In early February, Iraqi lawyers led one of the biggest anti-government protests in Baghdad against judicial corruption and prisoner abuse. The GoI announced in mid-March the closure of Camp Honor after members of the CoR's Human Rights committee visited the facility and declared it unsuitable for inmates.<sup>79</sup>

#### **Forensic Training**

(U) As Iraq continues to move from confession to evidence based prosecutions under the Rule of Law, the IP need to have the ability to gather and process a wide variety of criminal evidence using the most modern techniques and processes available to the forensic community. The Criminal Evidence Directorate (CED) in Baghdad oversees the ten criminal laboratories in Iraq, and the capability it brings to bear in solving crimes has made these labs and the personnel who work in them a target of extremists, with suicide attacks on the Baghdad and Mosul labs and the assassination of two high ranking CED Directors in 2010. The CED also began conducting a six

<sup>78</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

<sup>79</sup> CG Read Book, 25 Jan., 3, 11 Feb. 2011; Los Angeles Times, "Iraq to close controversial jail," by (b)(6) and (b)(6) 15 Mar. 2011.


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month training course to certify all laboratory examiners last year. At the beginning of this quarter there were 121 of the required 199 trained examiners in Iraq, and the first class of 38 new examiners graduated from the new certification course in January. USF-I anticipates that Iraq's forensic labs will be fully staffed by the beginning of 2012. In addition to comparative and analytical equipment, ISFF funds provided training and equipping of laboratories in Iraq with state of the art digital forensics capabilities to exploit cell phones, computers, and other digital media. By July 2011, the forensic police advise and assist efforts will transfer to the USEMB under the INL division. At this time, all labs will have required trained examiners and its full complement of analytical and comparative equipment. The CG acknowledged the importance of this effort when he noted "This is essential and the foundation for rule of law, which we need to get as far as we can for success. We need to do more and do it faster. The enemy knows this capability is significant because the enemy continues to assassinate people and destroy labs."<sup>80</sup>

### Corruption

(U) Corruption remains an endemic problem in Iraq. The chart below, compiled with polling data by the USF-I J9, indicates that the perception of corruption has increased over the past year, but most dramatically in the final month of this quarter. From February to March 2011, there was a 4 percent increase in Iraqis who do not think the Iraqi government is trying to prosecute government officials and employees who are suspected of corruption.



(J9 March 2011 "LOO's Clues" Polling and Media Space Summary)

### Detainees in USF Custody

(S) As of 1 January, there were more than 200 detainees being held at the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility. Eighteen detainees were transferred to the GoI and one detainee was released

<sup>80</sup> CUB, 11 Jan. 2011.

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
during the quarter. Plans to transfer detainees and facilities to the GoI are on track, with the goal for turnover of the remaining detainees of no later than 15 July. A key aspect of this initiative is to develop GOI capacity to properly secure these detainees within a secure Maximum Security facility. Key Leader Engagements have generated GoI concurrence with some concepts proposed by USF-I and incorporation of these recommendations into Iraqi Correctional Services practices. ATA conducted with Iraqi trainers at the National Corrections Training Center helped ensure the training of qualified corrections officers. Other training included a 13-day trip for a dozen GoI officials to six correctional facilities in the United States that was conducted by the DCG (Detainee Operations), MG Nelson Cannon, in which the Iraqis got to see how American prisons are run and gained ideas for how they might improve the Iraqi prison system.<sup>81</sup>

### Security Line of Operation

(U) The Security Line of Operation, as defined in Annex C of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), presents a vision of an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self reliant; a nation able to provide for its own protection under the rule of law and is fully responsible for its internal security; a nation that possesses the ministerial capacity and capability for external defense; a nation that contributes to regional stability and is a US strategic partner.

### Assessment

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Jul 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	LOO Conditions
■	■	■	■	1: GoI continuing to improve population protection nationwide.
■	■	■	■	2: GoI continuing to improve critical infrastructure protection nationwide.
■	■	■	■	3: GoI possesses the capability and capacity to sustain pressure on networks in order to neutralize AQI, violent extremist organizations, and other violent irreconcilables.
■	■	■	■	4: Iraq providing for its own internal security in addition to developing a foundational capability and capacity to deter and defend against external threats; executed through competent and increasingly professional ISF and security ministries that are governed by the rule of law.

4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, 2010    On Track    Slightly Off Track    Moderately Off Track    Not On Track    Not Assessed or No Longer Relevant    Trending Up    Trending Down    26

<sup>81</sup> DCG (Detainee Operations) / Provost Marshal Officer 2d Quarter FY 11 History Report.

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**(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011)**

(S) Unlike the Political, Economic and Energy, and Rule of Law LOOs which all have a USEMB lead, USF-I is the lead agency for the Security LOO under the 2010 JCP. For the quarter ending in March 2010, the command assessed progress as “Slightly off track,” though as the chart above indicates the assessment of two of the four conditions improved in this past quarter.

(S) The command noted numerous successes during the course of the quarter, highlighting the security efforts that kept citizens safe across Iraq during the 25 February Day of Rage and subsequent days of demonstration, as well as security provided to Arba‘een pilgrims throughout the month of January; the MOI’s success disarming and removing unexploded ordinance; and the basic recruit training for the Oil Police at Camp Dublin. USF-I also noted the Iraqi Army’s success implementing al-Tadreeb al-Shamil maneuver training in four divisions was already beginning to generate a collective training capability and building competency in maneuver after just three months. Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) battalions have developed into the most tactically proficient counter-terrorism forces in the theater, and the Iraqi Army is on schedule with M1A1 fielding and New Equipment Training.<sup>82</sup>

(S) The primary challenge identified by USF-I to success in the Security LOO were the tensions between the GoI and KRG that contribute to a lack of dialogue on establishing a cooperative Arab-Kurd security arrangement. Other challenges include the lack of progress in getting the Iraqi Police to assume responsibility for policing the cities; lack of capability within the Counter Terrorism Service for exploiting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence; increased potential for attacks on USF due to the continued reluctance by the GoI to target Shi’a Extremist Groups (SEGs); and the continuing struggle by the IA to field, train, and sustain all the new equipment it was receiving.<sup>83</sup>

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
<sup>82</sup> USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 1st Quarter ECG Brief, April 2011.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

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## Security Trends



### (USF-I J5 Assessments Division: Yearly Comparison Security Incidents, April 2009-March 2011. Data from Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE))

(S) As the chart above illustrates, the general downward trend of security incidents continued during the quarter. For the year spanning April 2009 to March 2010, the monthly average of incidents was 833; for April 2010 to March 2011, the average dropped to 656 a month.

(S) General Austin repeatedly focused the command on force protection, as intelligence indicators warned that violent extremists would continue to target USF in the hopes that they could take credit for driving the US out of Iraq. The CG warned of the various threats that the force faced. The following quotes are from January, but representative of the constant reminders given throughout the quarter: “There are threat streams warning of kidnappings and assassinations; from a Force Protection perspective, leaders need to do the right thing to protect our people.” “I encourage all leaders to make sure we are using 1.4c teams for force protection. Force Protection must be foremost in our minds all the time.” “It is easy to get complacent; take a look at the pictures of the IRAM and remind yourself that this is what they are trying to do to us. Don’t forget what they tried to do.”<sup>84</sup>

<sup>84</sup> CIG EXSUM, 6, 10 Jan. 2011; Historian Notes, BoD Luncheon, 21 Jan. 2011.


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(S) Another consistent refrain throughout the quarter was the necessity to continue pushing the GoI to pursue SEGs. While the overall number of security incidents remained low, the number of attacks on USF began to pick up, especially in the latter half of March. Many in the command expressed frustration over the ISF's lack of effort to prevent the IDF and EFP attacks that were becoming an increasing hazard, particularly in southern Iraq. As the CG said on several occasions, "We must press the GoI hard on the Shi'a extremist threat."<sup>85</sup>

(U) The trend over the last several months of fewer attacks has led to a growing sense of a return to normalcy in Baghdad, where T-walls continued to be removed from around neighborhoods and streets reopened. Projects to beautify the city in preparation for the Arab League Summit were initiated, such as the plan announced in January to pave 8.5 million square meters of streets in Baghdad.<sup>86</sup>

### Security Incidents this Quarter



(USF-I J5 Assessments: Weekly Security Incidents, 2d Quarter, FY 11. Data from CIDNE)

(S) As the chart above illustrates, the number of security incidents this quarter across Iraq averaged 127 per week, about 16 percent below the previous quarter's average of 151 incidents per week. The week of 7-13 February had the lowest number of security incidents (99) since

<sup>85</sup> Historian Notes, BoD Luncheon, 21 Jan. 2011.

<sup>86</sup> CUB, 24 Jan. 2011.


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July 2003, but statistics can be deceiving, as casualties for that same week were above average due to a single coordinated VBIED attack in Kirkuk that targeted first responders, killing and wounding more than 85 people. In fact, the first three weeks of February experienced progressively fewer security incidents, while at the same time suffering progressively more casualties due to a few high profile attacks. February's final total of 418 security incidents was well below the 12-month average of 663 and the lowest monthly total since USF-I began tracking in June 2003, though the casualty total was only the lowest since November 2009.<sup>87</sup>

### Overall Casualty Trends

(S) While the total number of incidents was lower than in the previous quarter, casualty numbers were somewhat higher than the record low numbers of killed and injured set during the final three months of 2010. February was the month with the fewest casualties during the quarter, despite the large number of demonstrations and protests during that month.



(CUB, 2 April 2011)

### US Casualties

(S) Casualties due to hostile causes increased when compared to the record low of two deaths among US forces in the previous quarter of October – December 2010. Six Soldiers were killed

<sup>87</sup> Weekly Assessment, 7-13, 14-20 Feb., 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011.


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by hostile fire this quarter five in January and one in March, as detailed below. A further 38 were Wounded in Action. In addition to the six combat deaths, there were five non-combat deaths suffered during the quarter.<sup>88</sup> The chart below, compiled by CENTCOM, depicts US casualties in Iraq over the past three years, and places this quarter in the context of the recent past here in Iraq.



## OIF / OND US Hostile Casualties



25 MAR 11

Prepared by:

(b)(6)

21 MAR 11

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(CENTCOM CUB, 25 March 2011)

(S) The weekly total of 13 attacks on USF for the week of 10 January was the lowest total on record up till that time. Attacks on USF remained below average for the following week as well, but this statistic fails to tell the full story, as two attacks on 15 January resulted in three American fatalities. In southern Mosul at the Ghuzlani Training Center two Soldiers were killed and one seriously injured when an IA soldier conducting al-Tadreeb al-Shamil training opened fire on them. Later that same morning, in a separate incident in Madain in eastern Baghdad province, a Soldier was killed when his vehicle was struck by an RPG during a route clearance mission. When these deaths were combined with the deaths on 2 January of two Soldiers on a route clearance mission along Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa in Taji due to an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) and small arms fire attack, January 2011 saw the largest number of Americans Killed in Action since July 2009, when five service members were also KIA. Only

<sup>88</sup> Final J1 History Report 1QT CY11.

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one other Soldier would die due to hostile attack during the quarter, when on 21 March the gunner on an MRAP leading a convoy along MSR Tampa in Muthanna province was killed by an EFP.<sup>89</sup>


### Security Planning

(S) USF-I leaders mentored their Iraqi counterparts as the ISF planned for the Arba'een holiday in late January in Karbala. Planning for Arba'een was informed by lessons learned from the Ashura holiday the previous month, and like Ashura, covered the week-long period of pilgrimage and return surrounding the actual 24 January holiday. USF-I supported the ISF with numerous Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to help them monitor key holy sites as well as the progress of pilgrims. Based on previous experience, the ISF employed concentric rings of security around the shrines in Karbala, with the IA manning the outermost ring, Federal Police (FP) the middle, and IP the innermost ring. There was also increased security though not as in-depth as in Karbala at Shi'a holy sites in Najaf and Baghdad.<sup>90</sup>



### Karbala Security

- Karbala OPS center has C2 for observance
- IGFC is the lead national agency for planning and implementing the Arba'een Security operations
- Three concentric circles of security
  - Inner security IPs
  - Middle Security FPs
  - Outer Security IAs



As of 1/24/2011

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Pre-Decisional - Not For Release

Arba'een Security Update V1

The OPS office and Force Protection forces utilize a system of surveillance cameras to maintain real time information on traffic, crowd control and events. The PCOP/PJCC maintains 30 wireless and several additional hard wire cameras in and around the city of Karbala to assist with security.



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### (History Report J35 FUOPS FY 11 Q2)

(S) The command conducted some of its most intensive security planning efforts early in the quarter in preparation for the Arab League Summit (ALS), which was scheduled for 29 March.

<sup>89</sup> Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011; CUB, 3 Jan., 22 Mar. 2011. In June 2009 ten Soldiers were KIA.

<sup>90</sup> History Report J35 FUOPS FY 11 Q2; Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011.

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The Summit is an extremely high profile event that Iraqis hope will demonstrate to Iraq's neighbors its reintegration into regional affairs. The Baghdad Operations Center has been given overall responsibility for summit security, and will augment security efforts with IA and perhaps Peshmerga forces. While US forces can assist the ISF with critical capabilities behind the scenes, both Iraqi and American leaders understood the importance of having only Iraqi forces providing the security for the event. USF-I leaders, including the CG, conducted weekly high-level joint security meetings with their Iraqi counterparts in the months leading up to the ALS, and provided assistance to the ISF in assessing security at hotels, determining Personal Security Detachment requirements, communications needs, surging intelligence support for the summit, and other planning factors.<sup>91</sup> In early March the summit was postponed until May due to demonstrations and unrest throughout the Arab world. This development, while disappointing, had a silver lining in that some Iraqi officials privately acknowledged that the delay gave them more time to complete construction and repairs to hotels and other facilities in Baghdad.<sup>92</sup> The postponed ALS was rescheduled for 10-11 May, and then subsequently postponed again in April 2011, in part due to Iraq's protests over Bahrain and the Gulf Cooperation Council's repression of Bahrain's Shi'a majority.

~~(S)~~ Widespread protests across Iraq in February and March were largely focused on local issues, unemployment, corruption and lack of essential services. USF-I assisted the ISF by providing ISR support and riot-control training, and by-and-large the ISF responded with restraint. PM Maliki, to his credit, addressed the nation and the ISF in the days leading up to the 25 February "Day of Rage" (Day of Organized Demonstrations) to remind the ISF that the people of Iraq had the constitutional right to lawful demonstration and that the ISF needed to use restraint in its dealings with Iraq's citizens, while at the same time reminding the people of Iraq that their right to demonstrate did not include the right to destroy property or act violently towards police or their fellow citizens. The CG noted afterwards, "The ISF were extremely busy throughout the country working to maintain order and discipline. By all accounts, they did a very good job in terms of planning and executing." PM Maliki also praised the ISF and celebrated the fact that there were no suicide bombing attacks on demonstrators.<sup>93</sup>

(U) In mid and late March Iraq experienced a number of popular protests in solidarity with Bahrain's Shi'a majority and the violent repression they were suffering at the hands of that country's monarchy and troops of the GCC. Many of the protesters directed their anger at the US, which was seen by some as a supporter of the monarchy due to longstanding ties and the presence of a major US naval base in Bahrain.

~~(S)~~ Finally, planning was underway as the quarter ended to cope with the possible impacts of the annual demonstrations that marked the liberation of Baghdad by US forces in 2003. Various groups, led by the Sadrists, called for sit-in protests at US bases for Saturday, 9 April. Billed as the "Day of Salvation," the date marks the liberation of Baghdad from Saddam's rule in 2003,

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<sup>91</sup> Weekly Assessment, 20-26 Dec. 2010, 10-16 Jan. 2011; History Report J35 FUOPS FY 11 Q2.

<sup>92</sup> Historian Notes, J2 CGRT: "Arab League Summit Outlook," 6 Feb. 2011.

<sup>93</sup> CIG EXSUM, 26 Feb. 2011; CUB, 27 Feb. 2011.

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but the Sadrists in the past have used the occasion to organize demonstrations demanding the removal of all US forces from Iraq.<sup>94</sup>

### Significant Security Events

(S) The quarter opened with the reappearance of an unwelcome weapon, the Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munition (IRAM). Eighteen US service members and two US contractors suffered injuries due to attacks against the Victory Base Complex (VBC) on 3 January that consisted of nine 107 mm rockets and one 240 mm IRAM fired from a house located near the base. COS Kalsu was targeted on the same day with six 240 mm rockets and nine 333 mm rockets rigged as IRAMs with 600-700 lbs of explosives. Due to technical problems and a lack of proficiency some of these rockets fell short of their targets, nevertheless, four service members and four contractors suffered injuries. [REDACTED]

(S) Security incidents in January remained at a low level for the entire month, with Shi'a violence limited somewhat by pressure on their networks and by the Arba'een pilgrimage in the second half of the month. USF-I J2 reported that both [REDACTED] and Promise Day Brigade declared temporary moratoriums on attacks during the two week Arba'een holiday in order to ensure that they were not held responsible for killing any pilgrims.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Mar. 2011.

<sup>95</sup> CUB, 4 Jan. 2011; Weekly Assessment, 3-9 Jan. 2011.

<sup>96</sup> Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011; USF-I J2: "Incoming DCG-O Intelligence Brief," 27 Jan. 2011.

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CENTCOM JIOC Daily  
Intel Update



## Terrorism: Suicide Attack Spike Highlights AQI's Focus on GOI / Shia

- JAN, AQI conducted a string of suicide attacks deliberately targeting GOI / ISF and taking advantage of other targets of opportunity


- Spike in AQI attacks against GOI / ISF likely intended to counter GOI / ISF CT pressure

- Inadequate security measures; Shia pilgrimage and Iraqi Police recruitment lines afforded AQI targets of opportunity

- Foreign operatives likely carried out these attacks; steady flow of foreign operatives to AQI enabled the network to conduct suicide attacks:

- ~Five to ten suicide operatives per month account for 60-70% of suicide attacks

Assessed AQI Suicide Attacks in 2011		
Date	Incident	Target
17 JAN	SVBIED Attack in Ramadi	Governor
18 JAN	SVEST attack in Tikrit	Police
19 JAN	SVEST attack in Baqubah	Shia Civilians
19 JAN	SVBIED attack in Baqubah	ISF
20 JAN	SVBIED attack in Diyala	Prov HQs
20 JAN	Two SVBIED attack in Karbala	Shia Civilians



**ASSESSMENT:** AQI is unlikely to sustain this optempo long term, and will maintain a suicide attack capability with a low, but steady stream of foreign suicide operatives

22 JAN 11

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
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(CENTCOM CUB, 22 January 2011)

(S) Even as the number of security incidents in January remained low, the middle of the month was marred by six AQI suicide attacks over a span of four days that killed 8 ISF and 38 civilians and wounded 260. The worst of these attacks was a pair of Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs) targeting Arba'een pilgrims in Karbala that killed and wounded 147 people. However, only two of the six attacks during this period were focused on Arba'een pilgrims; AQI's main focus appeared to be GoI officials and the ISF. As the CG related to the staff, "The number of security incidents seem lower than in the last several weeks, but it doesn't matter because the number of casualties climbed due to several catastrophic attacks over a 4-day period this week. We expected this from Al Qaeda." The 17 January attack in Ramadi was at least the third attempt to assassinate the Anbar provincial governor; on 18 January an AQI terrorist detonated a suicide vest at an IP recruiting station in Tikrit, killing at least 12 and wounding more than 20; the 19 January attack in Baqubah was on the headquarters of the Force Protection Services that guard Iraqi Government buildings, killing at least 13 people; and the SVBIED attack in Diyala on 20 January targeted the provincial headquarters.<sup>97</sup>

(S) Even while these suicide attacks were going on, USF-I noted that Arba'een security was a hidden success story. The CG noted that the losses in Karbala to SVBIEDs would have been much worse had the detailed security measures put in place by the ISF around the shrines not restricted vehicle access to an outer cordon of checkpoints.

<sup>97</sup> CG Read Book, 19 Jan. 2011, CENTCOM CUB, 22 Jan. 2011; His



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The CG also noted that the number of pilgrims traveling to Karbala this year were more than double those of last year, reaching as high as nine million, while the number killed and wounded by extremist attacks declined overall. The commemoration of Arba'een had been very restricted under Saddam; now it has grown to a major religious event with an important economic impact. "The ISF has done a good planning and is hustling," the CG noted, "but with six million pilgrims on the road, it's hard to protect them all."<sup>98</sup>

(U) Just as a few high profile attacks accounted for the majority of casualties during Arba'een, a single SVBIED on 27 January produced approximately 40% of all the casualties suffered during that week when a Shi'a funeral procession in downtown Baghdad was hit, killing and wounding more than 100. Frustration over the failure of police to prevent the bombing, especially when the vehicle had to pass through several checkpoints in order to get near the funeral, led to riots and rock throwing at the ISF in the aftermath of the attack.<sup>99</sup>

(S) AQI high profile attacks continued to stand out as inordinate producers of casualties in February as well. A coordinated IED attack on 3 February near a mosque in Ramadi was timed to cause maximum casualties to first responders, killing or wounding 36. Eighty five of the 185 casualties suffered during the week of 7-13 February came from a 9 February attack in Kirkuk, where three VBIEDs exploded within a half kilometer of the KDP Headquarters, with two of the explosions timed to detonate after first responders had arrived on the scene.<sup>100</sup>

(S) In mid-February AQI targeted Shi'a pilgrims to the al-Askari mosque in Samarra who were commemorating the death of the 11<sup>th</sup> Imam, launching a VBIED attack outside the town on 10 February that killed six and a suicide bombing aboard a bus on 12 February that killed 40 pilgrims. While it is virtually impossible to protect the huge numbers of people on the roads during major religious observances, the command praised the ISF for mitigating the threat by establishing security checkpoints outside of Samarra much like those that surrounded Karbala during Arba'een observances the previous month, noting that security kept the attackers from penetrating closer to the shrine and potentially inflicting more casualties.<sup>101</sup>

(U) While most of the protests during the month remained peaceful, a few escalated to violence. A 16 February demonstration in al-Kut demanding the resignation of Wasit's governor turned violent when contract security guards fired their weapons in the air. In the looting and arson that followed a citizen was killed and nearly 30 injured. As discussed earlier in the Political LOO section, on 17 February in Sulaymaniyah protesters from one Kurdish political party were fired

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<sup>98</sup> Weekly Assessment, 17-23, 24-30 Jan. 2011; CUB, 22 Jan. 2011; Historian Notes, CUB, 22 Jan. 2011. Note USF-I pilgrimage estimates are conservative when compared to local Iraqi estimates. The Karbala Provincial Council put the number at 13 million, and a spokesman for one of the shrines even put the number as high as 16 million. See CG Read Book, 26 & 30 Jan. 2011.

<sup>99</sup> CG Read Book, 28 Jan. 2011; CUB, 31 Jan. 2011; New York Times: "After Bombing, Iraqis Direct Anger at Police," by (b)(6) 7 Jan. 2011.

<sup>100</sup> Weekly Assessment, 7-13 Feb. 2011; CUB, 4, 10 Feb. 2011.

<sup>101</sup> Weekly Assessment 7-13 Feb. 2011; CUB, 19 Feb. 2011.

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on by guards employed by another party, resulting in five killed and 20 wounded. Protests in Sulaymaniyah in the wake of these deaths were frequently violent.<sup>102</sup>

(S) In Samarra on 21 February, an AQI SVBIED targeted the Emergency Response Battalion (ERB) compound, killing 9 and wounding 21 ERB members. Three days later an AQI suicide bomber wearing a police uniform attempted to assassinate the deputy governor of Anbar province, killing 15 and wounding 17, including the deputy governor.<sup>103</sup>

(S) The Day of Rage protests of 25 February, also covered earlier under the Political LOO, were generally peaceful, though 14 of 43 demonstrations across the country did experience some degree of violence, with 14 deaths in all. Overall, the ISF behaved professionally and with restraint, sustaining more than 45 injuries from protesters with fairly few instances of backlash. The CG pointed out “In those incidents where violence was used and there was loss of life, there will be investigations into what happened and hopefully we will gain some lessons learned from those situations.”<sup>104</sup>

(S) Despite concerns that the protesters could be targeted by AQI or other extremist or insurgent groups, there were no mass casualty attacks targeting demonstrators during the quarter. Given that violent extremists had several hundred protests during the quarter that they conceivably could have targeted, it is reasonable to assume that these groups found anti-government demonstrations in keeping with their own goals of destabilizing the GoI and local governments. This isn’t to say that the protesters were by-and-large extremists or extremist sympathizers. While the GoI accused protest organizers in some cases of being associated with AQI or the Ba’ath party, and while the Sadrists organized many protests in their own right, the majority of demonstrations across Iraq were peaceful, democratic expressions untainted by affiliation with extremist organizations.

(S) Early on the morning of 26 February the Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR) was attacked and damaged by insurgents using an IED. BOR is Iraq’s largest oil refinery and a key facility which had been identified by USF-I as Critical National Infrastructure for Iraq. The immediate aftermath of the attack left many questions unanswered, including whether the attackers were JRTN or AQI or perhaps other extremist groups, and what the motive behind the attack was. The command was concerned that a prolonged reduction in production of refined petroleum would have a broad impact on Iraqi society. While USF-I initially believed that it would take several months to restore production capacity, unprecedented efforts by the GoI restored production capacity within a month. The Ministry of Oil also reported that a second attempt to

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<sup>102</sup> Weekly Assessment 14-20 Feb. 2011.

<sup>103</sup> CUB, 22, 25 Feb. 2011.

<sup>104</sup> CUB, 26 Feb. 2011; CIG EXSUM, 26 Feb. 2011.

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detonate an IED at the refinery was defeated by the Oil Police. The refinery's engineering union leader was subsequently arrested, as were two AQI operatives linked to the attack.<sup>105</sup>

~~(S/NF)~~ The attack on the BOR prompted the USEMB to convene an Embassy Critical Infrastructure Working Group meeting in March. Realizing that USF-I efforts to assist Iraq in securing its critical infrastructure will cease as USF-I repostures, the USEMB began searching for civilian-led programs to assist Iraq, and will explore the possibility of CENTCOM support for infrastructure protection advise and assist efforts in the years ahead.<sup>106</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 16 March a VBIED targeted civilians near a hospital in Kirkuk, killing 3 and wounding 37. USF-I assessed that the attack was by a Sunni insurgent group attempting to influence the Iraqi population during a particularly tense time in Arab-Kurd relations as Kurdish forces were still occupying the unilateral positions they had taken up south and west of the city in late February.<sup>107</sup>

~~(S)~~ There were two disturbing security trends that began to manifest themselves in the latter half of March and continued well into April, beyond the period covered by this report. These were assassination attempts targeting senior GoI and ISF officials, and attacks on USF by Shi'a Extremist Groups (SEGs).

~~(S)~~ The assassination trend became clearly evident on 20 March when 7 assassination attempts took place over a five-hour period in Baghdad. Asaib al-Haqq (AAH) was deemed responsible, and one attack severely injured the commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> IA Division.<sup>108</sup>

~~(S)~~ The number of attacks on USF reached its highest point since early December 2010 in the last weeks of March. The International Zone (IZ) was hit by four rockets on 25 March, causing minor damage and no casualties. Prompt response by a USF Quick Reaction Force and the ISF prevented potentially much more significant damage, as 16 rockets were found at the POO on improvised rails attached to timers. Cameras and military uniforms, as well as Promised Day Brigade identification badges were also found at the POO. This was the latest, and had the potential to be the most deadly, of a rising number of IDF attacks against the USEMB and across Iraq in March. General Austin engaged directly with PM Maliki in its aftermath to push for the ISF to be more aggressive in its pursuit of SEGs.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Feb., 28 Feb.-6 Mar., 7-13 Mar. 2011; CUB, 27 Feb., 6 Mar. 2011. See also Command History for USD-North / 4th Infantry Division and USF-I J9 Command History Report 2Q FY 2011 for more details on the attack on the BOR, damage inflicted, and repairs.

<sup>106</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Protecting Iraq's Critical Infrastructure How the USG Can Help, 3 May 2011.


<sup>107</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011.

<sup>108</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Mar. 2011.

<sup>109</sup> CG Read Book, 26 Mar. 2011.

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(Weekly Assessment, 28 Mar. – 3 Apr. 2011)

(S) On 28 March a single rocket struck Victory Base, hitting the wall of a restaurant in the Iraqi-Based Industrial Zone (IBIZ) commercial area and wounding 11. On 29 March, another 122 mm rocket attack was made on the IZ, as well as attacks on COS Garry Owen and COB Basrah. The CG highlighted the growing trend and directed USF-I to exercise even greater preparedness: “We’ve seen an increase in rocket activity in the south and Baghdad. We expect this to continue for some time to come. ... We need to pay close attention to force protection. I fully expect that commanders and leaders do what they need to do to protect their people. That you dominate the terrain adjacent to your FOBs and bases.”<sup>110</sup>

(S) The quarter closed out with a high profile attack executed by AQI that gained significant media attention. Shortly before 1 p.m. on 29 March a group of as many as 10 insurgents, disguised as IP, assaulted the Salah ad Din provincial council building in Tikrit with a VBIED, small arms fire and suicide vests, taking some hostages but then systematically slaughtering all those in the building during a drawn out battle with the ISF. The ISF assaulted the building twice, finally declaring it secured shortly after 1800. Five ISF were killed and two wounded, while 53 local nationals died, including three members of the provincial council and two journalists, and nearly 100 were wounded. Many of the bodies were burned beyond recognition in a fire started during the initial assault which badly damaged the building. USF responded to Iraqi requests for assistance with ISR, a Scout Weapons Team and Close Air Support on standby, as well as a QRF, but did not participate in the assault. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Salah ad Din reported afterwards that the mood in the province was “stunned,” with the general sense of security that had grown there over the previous months gone. The CG noted that the attack resembled the 31 October 2010 assault on the An-Najat church in Baghdad.<sup>111</sup>

### Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

(U) The J2’s assessment of AQI at the start of the quarter is summarized in the graphic below:

<sup>110</sup> CIG EXSUM, 29 Mar. 2011.

<sup>111</sup> CG Read Book, 30 March 2011; US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: PRT Salah ad Din: Follow Up Report on PC Building Attack - More than 50 Killed; Mounting Concern about Security in Province, 30 Mar. 2011; Weekly Assessment, 28 Mar.-3 Apr. 2011.

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
USF-I J2  
04 January 2011

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## Key Takeaways

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Despite the loss of senior leaders and the attrition of its operational and logistical support networks, Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) remains the most violent Sunni terrorist group in the region.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Primary targets continue to be the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Government of Iraq (GoI), and recent targeting focus on Shia and Christian civilians.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ AQI maintains the manpower, materiel, and technical expertise to conduct sporadic complex coordinated attacks throughout Iraq with the focus remaining on attacks in Baghdad.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ During the past 30 days AQI has maintained a constant level of signature attacks throughout Iraq while the number of targeted assassinations / murders have increased.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The month of December noted an increase in sectarian violence against both Shia and Christian civilians. This increase directly coincided with the religious holidays of Ashura for the Shia and Christmas/New Years for Christians.

### Key Leadership Losses, NOV-DEC



(U) Baqubah Ashura SVEST Post-Blast

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### (J2, AQI Deep Dive, 5 Jan. 2011)

~~(S//NF)~~ The J2 further assesses that two-thirds of AQI's senior leaders have been previously detained, noting that detainees benefit from their time in incarceration by recruiting and radicalizing new members and increasing their knowledge of detention operations, thus facilitating the efforts of AQI's Detainee Affairs Network, which helps regenerate the group by procuring the release or escape of detainees. In particular, AQI attempts to have detainees transferred from Baghdad to Mosul, where bribery, intimidation and targeting of Mosul officials have been very effective in gaining the freedom of AQI leaders.<sup>112</sup>

~~(S//NF)~~ Nevertheless, AQI has been severely degraded. The command pointed out that evidence of this can be found in attacks that did NOT happen. "Multiple targets of opportunity passed without signature AQI attacks last week" the CG noted in early January, pointing out the events such as Iraqi Army and Police Days, Orthodox Christmas, and a major speech by Muqtada Sadr would likely have prompted AQI attacks in the past. "These events highlight the ISF's ability to effectively surge during short duration, geographically-confined events."<sup>113</sup> The J2 also assessed that while Mosul remains the leadership and financial hub, December 2010 marked the first month in which AQI made less than \$500,000 from their extortion efforts. In another sign of

<sup>112</sup> J2 CGRT: "Al Qaida in Iraq Maintaining Network Capability in 2011," 16 Jan. 2011.

<sup>113</sup> Weekly Assessment, 3-9 Jan. 2011.

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their weakening position, they have observed AQI agents trying to negotiate lower payments instead of killing those who won't pay.<sup>114</sup>

(U) As Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin noted in their testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early February 2011, the window of time between AQI attacks has widened while the level of sophistication of their attacks has declined. AQI's goal of inciting sectarian conflict seems further and further out of reach as the group has become marginalized and is rejected by the vast majority of Iraqis.<sup>115</sup>

(S) Unlike in past years when its reach spanned most of the nation, more recent AQI operations have focused on high-profile, media garnering attacks against ISF, GoI and civilians in Baghdad. USF-I and CENTCOM assess that Baghdad is AQI's priority effort due to the abundance of government targets, mixed Sunni/Shi'a population, and international media presence.<sup>116</sup>

(S) One of the more spectacular security incidents of the quarter occurred on 13 January when a dozen prisoners charged with Article 4 terrorism, including leading members of the Islamic State of Iraq (an AQI affiliated organization) escaped from captivity in a prison located at the Basrah presidential palace, apparently walking out of the facility dressed in police uniforms. PM Maliki launched an investigation into the Basrah Operations Command, the Basrah police chief was subsequently fired on 18 January, and officers working at the site were arrested amid suspicions that the escape was an inside job. Subsequently, the commander of the Intelligence cell in the prison, a colonel, and one other were arrested for aiding in the escape.<sup>117</sup>

(S) Several high level AQI leaders were captured in late January, including the Military Emir of Ramadi, the Sharia Emirs of Abu Ghurayb and Anbar, the Wali of Salah ad Din and an AQI intelligence cell member. In February, the head of the major Syrian-based foreign fighter facilitation network was detained by Syrian authorities, a capture which it was hoped would have a significant long term impact on the flow of AQI suicide operatives into Iraq. This capture was followed later in the month by the detention of an AQI Emir responsible for facilitating weapon and fighter flow from Syria, in addition to the apprehension of the West Mosul Extortion Emir.<sup>118</sup>

(S) Iraqi Police in Hit shot and killed Abu Ibrahim (also referred to as Abu Suleiman), AQI's Minister of War and second-in-command, as he tried to detonate a suicide vest during a routine stop at a security checkpoint in late February. This death would have a significant impact on

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<sup>114</sup> Historian Notes, USF-I J2: "Incoming DCG-O Intelligence Brief," 27 Jan. 2011.

<sup>115</sup> Testimony of Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and General Lloyd Austin before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 1, 2011.

<sup>116</sup> CENTCOM CUB, 4 Feb. 2011.

<sup>117</sup> CG Read Book, 15, 20 Jan., 3 May 2011.

<sup>118</sup> Weekly Assessment, 24-30 Jan., 31 Jan.-6 Feb., 7-13 Feb. 2011.

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already degraded AQI operations, and lead to the capture the following week of a close associate and gate keeper to AQI leader Abu Dua.<sup>119</sup>

(S) In mid-March partnered counterterrorism forces detained the AQI military emir of West Mosul and the Sharia emir of Mosul. Four AQI operatives from the area of Kirkuk and five in Diyala province were captured at the same time. Later in the month the AQI Detainee and Martyr Affairs emir and multiple assassination cell members in Ninewa were apprehended.<sup>120</sup>

(U) The impact of the Arab Spring on the long-term influence of Al Qaeda has yet to be seen, but has been the subject of considerable media speculation. It has been widely written in numerous editorials and opinion pieces that the protests that spread across the Middle East marked a strategic defeat for Al Qaeda. Generally liberal and democratic in their leaning and armed with social media and non-violent ideas, protestors throughout the region have succeeded where AQ's violence has not. While it is too early to determine whether the changes brought about by these protests will last, some think that the uprisings throughout the region will pose problems for the terrorist organization as protestors call for democracy and dignity rather than the imposition of fundamentalist ideals.

1.4b

and Shi'a Extremist Groups (SEGs)

1.4b, 1.4d

(S) The focus of these groups is presently on attacking American military and civilian personnel, with the hopes of gaining credit for driving us from Iraq or at the very least dissuading the US and Iraqi governments from pursuing an agreement that will extend the presence of the US military past December 2011. Both IDF and direct fire attacks against USF began picking up in the mid- to late March timeframe. Virtually all these attacks on USF were from SEGs, and indeed, the CG noted that the increase in attacks on US military and diplomatic personnel was in part due to PDB increasing its operational tempo in order to keep pace with AAH. "This ongoing „competition“ between the two groups will likely lead to continued attacks against our forces and on the IZ." The statement proved prescient, as the trend of a sustained increase in attacks by SEGs would continue well into the next quarter as the chart below illustrates.<sup>121</sup>


<sup>119</sup> Weekly Assessment 21-27 Feb., 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011; CUB, 27 Feb. 2011.

<sup>120</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20, 21-27 Mar. 2011.

<sup>121</sup> Weekly Assessment 21-27 Mar. 2011.

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(J35 Enduring Ops - Countering 1.4b VTC, 10 May 2011)

(S) As in past quarters, USF-I and USEMB remain consistent in urging Iraqi leaders to take decisive action against 1.4b and the SEGs as we believe they likely will turn on the GoI after USF-I has departed. This remains one of the abiding and consistent themes of the command, but it is a message that the Iraqi leadership sometimes seems resistant to, as is demonstrated by the continued failure to pressure SEGs to the same degree as Sunni groups like AQI and JRTN.<sup>122</sup>

(S/NF) Nevertheless, there was some success capturing Shi'a insurgents during the quarter. The 1.4b commander responsible for planning, logistics and execution of IEDS in Baghdad was detained in January. Later that month, an AAH leader in Baghdad responsible for several Magnetically Attached IED (MAIED) assassinations was also captured. In early February CT forces detained a PDB leader in Basrah responsible for multiple IED and IDF attacks.<sup>123</sup>

1.4b, 1.4d

<sup>122</sup> Historian Notes, J2 CGRT: "Shi'a Extremist Groups Threat to USF and GoI," 13 Feb. 2011.

<sup>123</sup> Weekly Assessment, 3-9, 17-23 Jan., 31 Jan-6 Feb. 2011.

<sup>124</sup> Weekly Assessment, 7-13, 14-20 Feb., 28 Feb.-6 Mar. 2011.

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## Operation New Dawn


“Our time is limited, our work is demanding, and our troops are still very much engaged in the mission, and as we continue to strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces, we must also closely partner with the embassy as we transform our mission over the next several months.”

*General Lloyd J. Austin III, comments during the XVIII Airborne Corps / III Corps Transfer of Authority ceremony, February 8, 2011<sup>125</sup>*

## Operations Order 11-01

(U) OPOD 11-01 was approved by General Austin on 6 January for execution beginning on 6 February.<sup>126</sup>

(S) The operational framework of OPOD 11-01 uses three Lines of Effort (LoEs) to synchronize military operations in support of the goals laid out in the Joint Campaign Plan Security LOO. The LoEs are: 1) Strengthen the ISF; 2) Conduct Transitions, and; 3) Reposture the Force. In turn, there are 13 objectives associated with the three LoEs, and progress towards achieving each objective is tracked using a series of quantifiable criteria.



(USF-I OPOD 11-01, 6 JAN 2011)

<sup>125</sup> USF-I Public Affairs Office: “XVIII Airborne Corps relieves III Corps in ceremony,” 11 Feb. 2011.

<sup>126</sup> Detailed discussion of the 11-01 planning process can be found in the USF-I Quarterly Command Report for October – December 2010. See also Interview, USF-I Historian with (b)(6) Chief of Plans, USF-I J5, 31 March 2011.

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(S) All three LoEs will be active through 2011. To delineate priority of effort among the LoEs, 11-01 is being conducted in two phases. Phase I covers February 2011 through August 2011 and prioritizes Strengthen the ISF. Phase II takes place from 1 September thru 31 December 2011 and prioritizes Reposture the Force. The following four paragraphs summarizing the Concept of Operations in Phases I and II are drawn from the final 11-01 Orders Brief given on 5 January.<sup>127</sup>

(S) The decisive operation for Phase I is the advise, train, assist and equip (ATAE) mission. The priority of efforts in ATAE are: al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS); partnered CT; Iraqi intelligence and logistics development. The MoI ATAE activities will focus on the police in areas where IA units need to disengage to conduct maneuver training, areas around enduring USEMB locations and on or adjacent to MSRs that will be used for USF-I reposturing and redeployment operations. As conditions allow, we will develop provincial police capabilities to help the Iraqi police become the sole provider of internal security. Finally, we will set conditions for transitions to appropriate partners and accelerate transitions where conditions permit. The purpose of these priority efforts is to ensure the ISF possesses the critical capabilities necessary to maintain internal security and develop the foundations for external defense capability.

(S) For shaping operations in Phase I, USF-I continues to develop the foundations for external defense through ATAE with the MoD. USF-I supports the USEMB with military capabilities to enable interagency operations and supports the establishment and mission of enduring USEMB organizations. USF-I maintains presence or engagement in the Arab-Kurd Combined Security Mechanism to provide time for the GoI and KRG to address politically contentious issues. USF-I assists the GoI with Sunni reconciliation through key leader engagements and emphasis on completing the Sons of Iraq integration into GoI ministries. USF-I maintains contact at critical Iraqi C2 and ministerial locations to include operations commands, provincial joint coordination centers, IA division headquarters, and other key headquarters. This develops ISF C2 capability and maintains influence and situational awareness. Reposturing in preparation for the final phase continues with the drawdown of excess equipment and the closure of bases. Phase I concludes on 31 August 2011.

(S) The decisive operations during Phase II are 1) completing the transitions necessary to establish the mechanisms for an enduring strategic partnership with IRAQ and 2) the retrograde of equipment, redeployment of forces, and operational maneuver of all USF-I forces out of Iraq. Operational maneuver is the synchronization of redeploying units with echelon above division enablers, ISF, and base closures. Execution of redeployment as an operational maneuver ensures all tactical movements are appropriately supported by US and ISF ISR, aviation, medical, MEDEVAC, route clearance, and communication assets. The critical transitions are: 1) transfer of functions to the USEMB; 2) transition of the US presence in the CSM; 3) transfer of the police advise and train mission to INL; 4) transfer of security assistance and security cooperation functions to OSC-I; and 5) the transfer of enduring DoD responsibilities to CENTCOM.

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<sup>127</sup> Orders Brief, JPOB version Final v.4.1, 5 Jan. 2011


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(S) For shaping operations in Phase II, USF-I continues to support USM-I with military capability until USM-I reaches a mission capable status, then conducts a deliberate transfer of responsibility during USF-I's operational maneuver. USF-I maintains contact at critical IRAQ headquarters and C2 nodes to integrate ISF into the operational maneuver in order to maintain situational awareness, and influence ISF actions to protect the force. USF-I will also coordinate with and report to USM-I, CENTCOM, and supporting components. Phase II and Operation New Dawn end on 31 December 2011.

### Task Organization

(S) Task organization of USF-I for the start of OPORD 11-01 was as follows:



(USF-I J3 OPORD Brief, 5 Jan. 2011)

(U) A key planning factor emphasized by the CG several times during the development of 11-01 and driving his COA selection was the need for the plan to retain maximum flexibility. Throughout 2011, USF-I will also continue to transition the missions it currently executes to other entities such as the USEMB, OSC-I, CENTCOM and the Iraqis themselves. The consistent message for all audiences is that US government engagement with the GoI will continue after 2011, but with different actors and a different emphasis.

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## ROC Drills

(S) The USF-I staff was heavily engaged during the quarter in synchronizing and refining the plan for phases I and II of OPORD 11-01 through a series of directed ROC (Rehearsal of Concept) drills. Six major ROC drills were planned by the USF-I staff, with higher commands like ARCENT and subordinate elements such as the 103<sup>rd</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) conducting their own rehearsals to synchronize their actions with the operational maneuver and the execution of OPORD 11-01. The large number of drills was necessitated by the complexity of the plan, with its many moving parts. The 11-01 ROC drills were modeled on the drill used to rehearse the USF-I Responsible Drawdown of Forces (RDoF) to 50,000 in the summer of 2010. They were all built and presented in essentially the same way, using multiple decks of PowerPoint slides presented simultaneously on two or three screens, with each screen displaying different information pertinent to the unit briefing. Some of the ROC drills also utilized a large carpet depicting the map of Iraq on which markers representing units were manually adjusted during the briefing. Units would brief their proposed actions in an established sequence, with all units briefing their actions in a turn before advancing the clock forward to the next turn. Turns usually covered a single month in 2011, though some of the earlier ROC drill iterations conducted all of Phase II as a single turn. Briefers would highlight movements of personnel and equipment, identifying risks, potential friction points and places where senior leadership would be required to make decisions. Senior leaders might occasionally break in to ask for clarification or comment or to direct further work be done to coordinate an aspect of the plan, but in many respects the final presentation of product to the assembled senior leadership and staff was not the most important function of a ROC drill. Rather, it was the preparation itself that served the most useful purpose. As the J3, MG Arthur Bartell, stated to the rest of the senior staff during one meeting, “The power of the ROC Drill is in what happens in the run-up to it,” when staff members coordinate and subordinate commands figure out their pieces of the larger operation. It was a process that served USF-I well.<sup>128</sup>

(S) The USF-I staff used the Troop Redeployment Enabling New Dawn (TREND) database to plan the reposturing of forces for OPORD 11-01. USF-I Knowledge Management developed TREND and other databases following the June 2010 RDoF ROC Drill, following direction from then-USF-I commander General Ray Odierno to make the troop-tracking software used during that ROC drill “operational.” General Odierno was seeking greater fidelity in tracking down the data behind troop numbers and troop transportation requirements provided during the briefings that tracked the drawdown of forces. The software was originally used to manage Mission Required Strength (MRS) caps for units deployed to USF-I, and will be used beginning in April 2011 by USF-I J35 Future Operations to run the monthly Operations Synchronization Boards. The logistics and equipment portions of the Ops Synch Boards are drawn from separate databases, as are contractor numbers.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> History Report, J35 FUOPS FY11 Q2; Historian Notes, staff updates to the CG provided at the Board of Directors luncheon, 11 Feb. 2011.

<sup>129</sup> Phonecon, USF-I Historian with (b)(6) USF-I Knowledge Management Office, 5 May 2011.

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(S) The first major rehearsal was the Communications ROC drill, conducted by the USF-I J6 on 26-27 January at the Stability Academy building on Victory Base. The Communication ROC Drill was primarily a walkthrough of the signal drawdown and transition in support of OPOD 11-01.

(S) The Operations ROC Drill held on 28 January in the Al Faw ballroom and chaired by the Deputy Command General (DCG) for Operations, LTG Robert Cone (with the incoming DCG, LTG Frank Helmick, in attendance) constituted the first major rehearsal of the plan. It raised several important issues for further synchronization prior to reiterating the process for General Austin in mid-February.

(S) An initial Sustainment ROC Drill, chaired by the DCG (Support), MG Edward Cardon, was held on 2 February. These rehearsals synchronized the logistics plan in support of operations through the rest of 2011. Issues included transportation, aviation, medical basing, contractor drawdown, sustainment support to the DoS for its enduring presence, among others. Together with the findings from the Operations and Communications ROC drills, this rehearsal uncovered a number of friction points requiring coordination prior to the holding of a second, refined version of both the Operations and Sustainment ROC Drills.

(S) General Austin himself chaired the refined version of the Operations ROC Drill, termed the "Continuity of Mission" ROC Drill, on 16 February with the commanders and key staff of every major military organization in Iraq in attendance at the Al Faw ballroom. The purpose was to begin "a deliberate, detailed and collaborative synchronization effort of the myriad actions and activities necessary to reduce the USF-I footprint to zero IAW the Security Agreement and establish the US Mission-Iraq's enduring presence." One of the key insights from this six hour-long exercise was the CG's direction that the Chief of Staff evaluate the concept of conducting regular iterations of these synchronization sessions. This concept rapidly developed into the monthly "Operations Synchronization Board," a venue that the CG determined would serve as a "rolling one month detailed synch with an additional two month outlook" allowing commanders and key staff a chance to update the synchronization process as details become clearer with each passing month.<sup>130</sup>

(S) The CG was happy with the effort, but informed the staff that the planning would have to get far more detailed. "With the ROC Drill yesterday, there was some really good work done across the board, including by our Embassy partners. We covered 10 months of activity in one session. We laid out our overall plan; now we need to drill down month-by-month to get greater fidelity."<sup>131</sup>

(S) The logisticians held a refined Sustainment ROC Drill on 2-3 March, a month after the preliminary rehearsal, while the new DCG (Operations), LTG Frank Helmick, and the J2, MG Mark Perrin, chaired an Intelligence ROC drill on 9 March. As with the earlier exercises, the

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<sup>130</sup> ROC Drill EXSUM 16 FEB v4, 18 Feb. 2011; Historian Notes, 11-01 Continuity of Mission ROC drill, 16 Feb. 2011.

<sup>131</sup> CIG EXSUM, 17 Feb. 2011.

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desired outcome was a baseline understanding among participating units and combat support agencies regarding the interaction and interdependence of their corresponding plans.

(S) As with the Operations and Sustainment ROC Drills, both the J6 and the J2 have scheduled refined Communications and Intelligence ROC drills for early and mid-May, respectively.

(S) On 23 March, USF-I commanders and key staff participated in Army Central Command's (ARCENT) ROC drill on Kuwait to synchronize the execution of the reposturing of US forces out of Iraq through Kuwait and other gateways. The conference allowed planners to validate their current models, exercise mitigation strategies, and plan for employment of critical enablers to the USF-I mission.<sup>132</sup>

(S) Many other units held rehearsals of their own. For example, on 28-29 March, the 103<sup>rd</sup> and 310<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Commands conducted a ROC drill to rehearse logistics and sustainment issues during the reposturing of forces. The exercise immediately preceded the Transfer of Authority between the two units, with the 310<sup>th</sup> relieving the 103<sup>rd</sup> on 1 April.

(S) USF-I's J5 took the lead in organizing and conducting an Operational Maneuver Wargame of OPOD 11-01 on 15-19 March in the Al Faw ballroom. As a result of the numerous ROC Drills and war games, staff sections and units developed a lengthy list of proposed changes to OPOD 11-01. Rather than considering each of these changes in an uncoordinated fashion and publish a separate FRAGO for each, the CG directed that the USF-I staff form a Joint Plans Group to review, write, and publish these changes as a single revision of OPOD 11-01. Staffing of this "Change Document" was just beginning in late March, with anticipated publication in mid-May.

### **VBC Transition and C2 During Phase II**

(S) In late 2010 planning began regarding how to draw down the USF-I staff concurrent with the closure of the Al Faw Palace and the Victory Base Complex in October / November 2011. While it was understood from early in the planning process that the CG and his immediate staff would transition to FOB Union III in Baghdad in order to exercise command and control and conduct strategic engagements up until the end of 2011, questions remained regarding which functions, and how many personnel, would accompany the CG in that move, and what the disposition of the remainder of the staff would be. The staff's evaluation of options for command and control during the operational maneuver phase of 11-01 continued throughout the quarter in an effort led by the J5 staff and, upon the transition to XVIII Airborne Corps in early February, the Deputy Chief of Staff, BG Michael Garrett. As the quarter came to a close, several courses of action were being staffed for the CG's consideration that would determine the ultimate disposition of the USF-I staff during the Operational Maneuver (Phase II) portion of OPOD 11-01.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Mar. 2011.

<sup>133</sup> Historian Notes, USF-I J5: "Command and Control: IPR on COAs and Enablers," JPOG, 26 Mar. 2011.

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### **Other Events of Significance to USF-I**

(U) On 5 January, LTG Michael Barbero, the DCG (Advising & Training) and commander of NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) turned over his responsibilities to LTG Michael Ferriter.

(U) Vice President Joseph Biden visited the command in mid-January, meeting with PM Maliki, President Talabani, Speaker Nujaifi, KRG President Barzani, Iraqiyya leader Allawi, and several other prominent GoI figures. He also spent time thanking members of the command for their hard work and reflecting on the great progress Iraq has made in the past eight years.<sup>134</sup>

(U) On 1 February, in conjunction with a trip to Washington DC for the Iraq Senior Leaders Transition Conference, General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey jointly testified before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Two days later they testified before the Senate Armed Services committee. Highlights from that testimony are cited throughout this document.

(U) On 8 February, LTG Robert Cone, the DCG (Operations) and commanding general, III Corps, conducted a Transfer of Authority with LTG Frank Helmick and the incoming XVIII Airborne Corps. The corps staff constitutes about one third of the entire USF-I staff, the balance of who are individual augmentees.

~~(S)~~ On 9 February General Austin traveled to the United Arab Emirates for the purpose of establishing a good working relationship with UAE leaders and providing them with an update on the current security situation in Iraq, and to discuss UAE's present and future relations with Iraq. The CG met with staff LTG Hamad, the Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces, and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid, the Deputy Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. They discussed the situation in Iraq, their assessment for the future of Iraq, and regional issues centered on Iran and events in Egypt.<sup>135</sup>

~~(S)~~ In mid-March, USF-I was tasked on short notice to provide a portion of its forces to support Operation Odyssey Dawn, the US portion of the international military operation to enforce a no-fly zone and destroy forces that threatened civilians in Libya. The most significant element lost was a squadron of EA-18G Growler airborne electronic warfare jets based at Al Asad Air Base. These planes were primarily employed as protection against remote-controlled IEDs in Iraq, and USF-I was able to draw on carrier-borne assets and other EW capabilities in the force to mitigate the loss of the Growlers. In addition, the Air Component Coordination Element-Iraq (ACCE-I) facilitated the movement of a dozen UAE aircraft thru Iraqi airspace in late March in order to allow them to participate in the Libyan no-fly zone, an important symbolic step to show Arab participation in the operation against Colonel Gaddafi.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011.

<sup>135</sup> USF-I CIG, CG KLE Summaries with Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid & sLTG Hamad Al-Rumaythi, 9 Feb. 2011.

<sup>136</sup> USF-I J3, JPOB: "Operation Odyssey Dawn," 18 Mar. 2011.

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## Possibility of a Residual Force in 2012

(U) The possibility of a post-2011 US troop presence remained the most significant media focus for interviews of USF-I leaders during the quarter. The topic also was a particularly sensitive one with Iraqis, as many GoI officials privately confided their desire to see a continued US presence while at the same time acknowledging the extreme unpopularity of that position among a significant portion of the Iraqi populace.

(U) Secretary of Defense Gates, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 February, noted that there had been a number of informal conversations about extending the US presence in order to provide the Iraqis with defensive capabilities they did not possess as of yet. “Our concern,” stated Gates, “is principally in three areas: intelligence fusion, logistics and maintenance, and in air cover in providing the ability to protect their own air space.”<sup>137</sup>

(U) The conditions under which the US would maintain a residual force in Iraq were clear, as was the US understanding of how difficult it would be for Iraq to ask. “My hope is that once they sort out who their new defense minister is going to be ... we will be able to move forward with this dialogue with the Iraqis.” As Gates acknowledged, “our presence is not popular in Iraq. And so the politicians, I think, the leaders understand the need for this kind of help, but no one wants to be the first one out there supporting it, very much like the security agreement itself. So we will continue that dialogue, but at the end of the day, the initiative has to come from the Iraqis. They have to ask for it.”<sup>138</sup>

(U) Regardless of these statements and the speculation, USF-I planning efforts remained unchanged. The command continued to operate on the assumption that all US Title 10 forces must be withdrawn from Iraq by 31 December 2011 in accordance with Article 24 of the Security Agreement. However, per General Austin’s guidance when issuing OPORD 11-01, the command built maximum flexibility into its planning and conducted prudent branch planning work to allow for late changes and the possibility of a residual force remaining in Iraq should one be requested by the Iraqis and agreed to by U.S. authorities.

## Adjustments to the Battle Rhythm and CUB

(U/~~FOUO~~) The USF-I staff made a significant adjustment to its normal “battle rhythm,” or decision-making and briefing cycle, during the quarter in an effort to streamline the decision-making process; ensure issues were fully synchronized across all appropriate staff entities before presentation to the CG, and to eliminate staff “stovepipes” of delivering information. Major outcomes of this change were the elimination of DCG Updates and the Board of Directors (BoD) luncheons, and the institution of a structured series of meetings each week through which information to be presented for decision would flow.

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<sup>137</sup> Robert Gates, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and Future Years Defense Program, 17 Feb. 2011.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

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(U/~~FOUO~~) In the new battle rhythm, initial staff framing and analysis of problems would continue to be conducted as it had before in Joint Planning Teams (JPTs), Operational Planning Teams (OPTs) and Working Groups (WGs). Once sufficiently developed, a staff product would be formatted as either an informational or decision brief for presentation to the Joint Plans and Operations Group (JPOG), a forum chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff with the assistance of the Deputy J5 and Deputy J3 and attended principally by the O-6 level deputies of all the J-staff sections and special staff. Input and synchronization during the JPOG would refine the product and result in a recommendation for presentation to the DCGs at the Joint Plans and Operations Council (JPOC).

(U/~~FOUO~~) The JPOC is chaired by the DCG (Operations) with assistance from the DCG (Support) and DCG (Advising & Training) and includes the staff principals from all elements of the USF-I staff. It provides guidance, further synchronization, and a recommendation to the CG on those issues of sufficient import to warrant presentation to the commander.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The CG provides his guidance in a small group setting termed the Joint Plans and Operations Huddle (JPOH) with the Chief of Staff (CoS), J3 and J5. Other staff principals attend by invitation only. Following any adjustments based on the CG's guidance at the JPOH, an issue may then be briefed at the Joint Plans and Operations Board (JPOB) for final decision by the CG with all staff principals in attendance.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Each of the above meetings is scheduled weekly, with the intent that a routine staff matter can be presented to the JPOG (1-star review) on a Saturday morning, proceed to the JPOC (3-star review) on the following Monday morning, be reviewed by the CG at the JPOH on Wednesday morning and be presented for final decision before the entire staff at the JPOB on Friday morning. Of course, should there be a requirement to get a decision faster than this cycle will allow, staff sections can work directly through the CoS to obtain CG input and decision.<sup>139</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) The CG also directed a re-evaluation of the information presented in the Commander's Update Brief (CUB), with the goal of adjusting the focus of the information briefed along the Lines of Effort detailed in OPORD 11-01. While the CUB is produced daily, it is briefed live to the CG and staff four mornings a week. Beginning with the CUB briefed on 1 March, Monday CUBs would focus on Operational updates, while Tuesday focused on the "Strengthen the ISF" LOE, Thursday on the "Conduct Transitions" LOE, and Saturday on the "Reposture the Force" LOE. The objectives and sub-objectives within each LOE are briefed on a rotational basis according to the schedule below.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> USF-I Chief of Staff: "Battle Rhythm Synchronization Meeting," 27 Feb. 2011.

<sup>140</sup> USF-I Chief of Staff: "New 11-01 CUB format, v4," 27 Feb. 2011.

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Version 1: Effective 01 Mar 11

**USF-I 11-01 CUB**

As of: 22 Feb 11

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
<b>NO CUB</b>	Operations Update OPR: J3	Strengthen ISF OPR: J3	<b>NO CUB</b>	Conduct Transitions OPR: J5	<b>NO CUB</b>	Reposture the Force OPR: J4/J7
	Political Update USEMB-B	Political Update USEMB-B		Political Update USEMB-B		Political Update USEMB-B
	STRATCOM J9	STRATCOM J9		STRATCOM J9		STRATCOM J9
	Weather JOC	Weather JOC		Weather JOC		Weather JOC
	CCIR J3	CCIR J3		CCIR J3		CCIR J3
	Casualties J1	Casualties J1		Casualties J1		Casualties J1
	Theater Overview J3	OP Commands J3 (Weekly)		USM-I enabled to conduct missions J4		Forces postured and supported to conduct operations J3
	CVEO J3	ISF integrated and conducting internal security operations J3		Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) established J5		Facilities transitioned or returned: J7
	CMII J3	CT forces conducting independent OPs JFSOCC-I		Enduring USG activities transitioned from USF-I to appropriate partners: J5		Equipment retrograded or returned: J4
	USD-N Enemy/Friendly: J3	Border Security functional and deters malign influence: J3		Cooperative Arab- Kurd Security Mechanism established: J3		OP maneuver conducted and all US Forces and contractors redeployed: J3
	USD-C Anbar Enemy/Friendly: J3	ISF developing external defense capabilities: J3		CG Guidance		Strategic Calendar SIS
	USD-C Baghdad Enemy/Friendly: J3	USF-I/contractors conducting Ops and protected from threats: J3				Strategic Update Chaplain
	USD-S Enemy/Friendly: J3	CG Guidance				Hero Tribute Chaplain
	MISR Roll-Up J3					CG Guidance
	CG Guidance					

**Legend:**

- = No Change; Briefed Daily
- = No Change; Briefed Weekly
- = Change; Briefed on a Rotational Basis
- = Change; Briefed Weekly

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(New 11-01 CUB format, v4, 27 FEB 11)

**Strengthen Iraqi Security Forces Line of Effort**

“Hats off to the Iraqi Security Forces, who have a number of things they are dealing with all at once. They are modernizing the force, focusing on countering terrorist activity and criminal activity, and training, and they are doing it all extremely well based on the help they are getting from US forces.”

*General Lloyd Austin III, comments during the Commander’s Update Brief, February 15, 2011*

**Assessment**



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**(March 2011 OPORD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 12 April 2011)**

~~(S)~~ USF-I's assessment at the end of March 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPORD 11-01 for the "Strengthen the ISF" Line of Effort is illustrated above. The first three objectives are assessed as being "Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas," while the final two are assessed as "Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required."

~~(S)~~ During Phase I of OPORD 11-01 the decisive operation will be ATAE mission to strengthen the ISF. USF-I will be focused on Tadreeb al-Shamil training with the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> IA Divisions, Partnered Counterterrorism with the Counterterrorism Service (CTS) and the Emergency Response Battalions (ERB), and building Intelligence and Logistics capacity.<sup>141</sup>

(U) The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) quarterly report was released on 30 January and noted a number of positive trends, including better than expected economic development brought about by Iraq's aggressive efforts to attract foreign investment, and the passage of three UN resolutions in December that lifted sanctions imposed on Iraq during Saddam's time (discussed in the previous quarter's history). However, the aspects of the report that garnered the most media and congressional attention were its evaluation of shortcomings in the ISF, highlighting corruption, lack of sustainment capacity, and absence of realistic planning and budgeting by the GoI despite expenditure of some \$20 billion out of \$58 billion in reconstruction funds on the ISF.<sup>142</sup>

**Overview**

(U) In their joint testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 1 February 2011, General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey outlined the gaps in ISF capabilities that U.S. operations throughout 2011 would be addressing. These shortfalls in Iraqi capabilities include:

- Counter-terrorism operations and intelligence fusion
- Cross-ministerial and interagency intelligence fusion and information sharing
- Sustainment and logistics
- Combined arms (external defense)
- Air sovereignty/ air defense<sup>143</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The same capabilities have been the focus of USF-I ATAE efforts for months now. The proposed way ahead to begin closing these gaps is summarized on the slide below.

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<sup>141</sup> USF-I OPORD 11-01 briefing, 5 Jan. 2011.

<sup>142</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 30 Jan. 2011; Washington Post, "Iraqi Security Forces Facing Serious Problems, US Oversight Official says, by (b)(6) 30 Jan. 2011.

<sup>143</sup> Joint Statement of Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 1, 2011

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## Projected Ministry and Security Force Gaps and Way Ahead



### Projected Ministry and Security Force Gaps

- Cross Ministerial and inter-agency intelligence and information sharing
- Iraqi Army combined arms capability
- Integrated Air Defense
- Enforcing air sovereignty
- Sustainment and logistics



### Way Ahead

- Promote MOD intelligence fusion cell
- Field modernized equipment to build internal security and foundational defensive capabilities
- Conduct advanced specialty skill and force professionalism training
- Advise during maneuver training
- Promote Joint Readiness Committee to focus on readiness reporting and corrective actions
- Mature maintenance and supply ops, procedures, requirements development, and resourcing
- NATO:
  - Conduct in country training for Federal and Oil Police
  - Conduct out of country training for security force ministries, institutions, and forces
  - Develop in-country doctrine development and force professionalization
  - Build regional partnerships

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(DCG (A&T) and NTM-I CG Update, 17 Jan. 2011)

(U/~~FOUO~~) In discussing Iraq's external defense capability, General Austin commented several times during the quarter that despite our efforts, Iraq still has a long way to go and is actually quite weak in comparison to its neighbors when simply comparing military hardware numbers. The chart below was developed by the USF-I J2 from unclassified sources and helped make that argument.

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## Order of Battle Comparison



Country	Combat Aircraft	Rotary Aircraft All	Tanks	Armored Personnel Carrier	Artillery	Theater Ballistic Missiles	UAV / UAS	Ships
Iran	299	613	1,613	640	2,320	523	YES	73
Syria	289	204	4,850	1,500	2,480	84	UNK	30
Saudi Arabia	291	322	765	3,000	370	10	UNK	23
Jordan	102	116	1,245	2,069	453	64	UNK	0
UAE	148	163	388	253	412	25	YES	18
Kuwait	53	29	368	321	113	0	YES	20
Iraq	0	60	259	696	142	0	NO	12*

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\* Mostly Smaller Patrol Ships w/o large guns

(USF-I J2, Regional Order of Battle Comparison, 18 Mar. 2011)

### Al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS)

(S) Following significant planning efforts by USF-I and IA staff planners, Al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS), or collective training, of four Iraqi divisions commenced on 2 January.<sup>144</sup> Each division rotated a battalion through the training regimen per month, and the collective training effort built up to company level tasks. The exercises emphasized proper fire control, movement techniques, and communication between subordinate elements in both offensive and defensive operations, with each rotation culminating in a company live fire exercise. Training took place at Al Kasik (3rd IA Div), Kirkuk (5th IA Div), Tallil (10th IA Div) and Habbaniyah (7th IA Div) using cadre from the IA's institutional Training Centers to both lead the training and also train division-based trainers to ensure the future sustainability of collective training. From a long-term perspective, even more important than the troop-level tasks trained was the staff-level training on how to plan, resource and execute an annual collective training program. General Austin was reported after the first month's iteration of TaS that "by all accounts, the training was a resounding success."<sup>145</sup>


<sup>144</sup> For more on the genesis of TaS, see the previous USF-I quarterly command report and interview, USF-I Historian with BG Jeffrey Snow, Director, ITAM-Army, 9 Apr. 2011.

<sup>145</sup> Weekly Assessment, 24-30 Jan. 2011; ITAM-Army Command History, 2nd Qtr (26 Apr 11)

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(S) Progress on TaS training was briefed regularly during the CUB starting in January, as well as preparations for future training iterations.



(CUB, 22 Jan. 2011)

(S) The CG and other observers were impressed with the progress in TaS training from the very start. "Great training going on with Tadreeb al Shamil" noted General Austin, "I want to applaud all who were involved. That is the first part of the execution of OPOD 11-01." LTG Bob Cone, the outgoing DCG (Operations), commented on his visit to view TaS training that the 7<sup>th</sup> IA was undergoing in Anbar that the unit he saw "had been in the fight for a long time, and this was first time they'd been together in the field ... The Iraqi leadership are doing a great job in building teams." Cone later noted that the first month's iteration of TaS "has been a wildly successful program, exceeding everyone's expectations." The challenge would be to improve and "to keep the Iraqi level of energy at this level or higher in the future."<sup>146</sup>

(S) The command emphasized post-training After Action Reviews (AARs) as another way to instill a culture of training in the IA. Of note, the AAR from the first month's rotation was held on 1 February at Camp Iraqi Heroes in Baghdad. Not only the battalion conducting the training, but also the division and IGFC staff conducted AARs, with several of the top IA leaders in attendance as all involved sought to maximize learning and improve future training execution of TaS. To prepare for an expected expansion of TaS, non-participating IA divisions and Training

<sup>146</sup> CIG EXSUM, 15 Jan. 2011; Historian Notes, CUB, 31 Jan. & 1 Feb. 2011.

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Centers sent representatives and cadre to familiarize themselves with the ongoing training by the four priority divisions.<sup>147</sup>

### **Long Term ISF Planning**

~~(S)~~ USF-I efforts to encourage long term planning by the ISF were frustrating at times. A case in point were efforts by the J35 Future Operations directorate to develop a comprehensive security campaign that nests with the reposturing of forces that will be going on later in 2011. The J35's efforts to work with planners on the IGFC G5/7 staff focused on an update to the very successful Fardh Al Qanoon (FAQ - meaning "Rule of Law") campaigns conducted in prior years. USF-I would like for FAQ V to take place in the summer of 2011, but has found engaging the Iraqis to begin planning frustrating:

"There is an inherent challenge in getting the ISF to plan more than 6-8 weeks in advance of their efforts. The lack of an MoD, an unstable coalition government, and numerous protests regarding the lack of responsiveness, capabilities, and corruption within of the Iraqi Government have delayed and reframed our initial FAQ concept. The current operating environment discourages the IGFC leadership from making long-term plans. Additionally, the IGFC has a key role in the security planning for the Arab League Summit scheduled of 10-12 May. The focus on short-term efforts, the fragility of the GoI, and the USF-I's limited information sharing on our upcoming movement out of Iraq have delayed this effort."<sup>148</sup>

### **Foreign Military Sales (FMS)**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ As of the end of the quarter, USF-I's Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM) FMS program was tracking 180 Iraqi-funded, implemented cases valued at \$6.15 billion. There are currently 31 Iraqi-signed Letters of Request (LOR) for cases with an estimated value of \$1.17 billion. The significant reduction in LOR value was driven by the cancellation of the F-16 aircraft total package. There are 20 Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) currently awaiting Iraqi signatures, valued at \$353 million.<sup>149</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Significant effort this quarter went into planning the transition of ISAM into the OSC-I as it prepares to stand up this summer. ISAM has a significant enduring mission in OSC-I, as it is responsible for orchestration of Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training and End Use Monitoring. While the initial plan had ISAM moving into the new organization as a unit, the final plan has the branch-specific FMS teams joining with members from the Iraq Training and Advising Mission (ITAM) teams to form hybrid teams.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> USF-I J3: "Incoming DCG-O Operations Brief," 27 Jan. 2011.

<sup>148</sup> History Report, J35 FUOPS FY11 Q2.

<sup>149</sup> ISAM Command History Report, 1 Qtr 2011 (Jan-Mar).

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

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## **Iraqi Army**

~~(S)~~ The command continued to assess that while the Iraqi Army is capable of conducting the internal security / COIN mission, it will not achieve MEC for external defense before December 2011 due to equipment procurement timelines and new equipment training requirements. Major challenges include logistics and resource management systems that are still immature, an army that struggles to maintain the equipment and infrastructure it has, failure to use requirements-driven planning, and a high operations tempo that competes with scheduled training at training centers and schools.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The fielding of M1A1 tanks is going as scheduled with 87 tanks received in country and 41 transferred to the Iraqi Army as of the end of this quarter. The next 12 tanks are expected in April. The IA started M1A1 Cadre training with 40 students on 5 February. The first UMNET (Unit Maintenance New Equipment Training course) started the following day. Additionally, all eight M88A2 recovery vehicles were received with 4 transferred to the IA, and 23 of 24 M109A5 self-propelled howitzers have arrived, with 20 ready for transfer. Excess Defense Article (EDA) equipment deliveries began with the first 8 of 120 M198 towed howitzers arriving at Taji. Artillery New Equipment Training (NET) is scheduled to commence on 1 May and be completed by December 2011. M113 armored personnel carriers are undergoing refurbishment at Anniston National Army Depot with deliveries expected to begin in July. A split M113 Operator NET and Maintenance NET are planned to be conducted at Besmaya and Taji respectively. Development of a platoon and company-level leader training program prior to NET is also underway. This leader training will set the conditions for a post-NET collective training phase to concentrate on maneuver and combined arms concepts. The Indirect Fire (IDF) Radar program also made progress with the cases for leasing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-48 radars completing the congressional notification process in late January. The goal remains to have an IDF detection capability in the hands of trained Iraqi operators before USF-I removes all of its assets during the final drawdown in the fall of 2011.<sup>151</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ During the quarter 334 M1114 Up Armored HMMWVs (estimated value of \$73 million) were transferred to the MoD in January under the United States Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) program under Section 1234 authority.<sup>152</sup>

~~(S)~~ USF-I advisors continue to work with the IGFC on the formation of a Modified Table of Organization (MTOE) for an operational level headquarters which will be named the Joint Operations Command (JOC). However, there has not been a formal tasking (ministerial order) to produce the MTOE, and the MoD continues to study the JOC concept. The current concept reflects four regional JOCs in provinces in the North (Diyalah), West (Anbar), Central (Baghdad), and South (Basrah) and a requirement for a mobile command capability able to conduct current operations with an intended span of control of up to four IA divisions. Contingent upon the MoD providing an approved JOC concept, the US can provide potential equipment and training options to support development of the JOCs.<sup>153</sup>

<sup>151</sup> ISAM Command History Report, 1 Qtr 2011 (Jan-Mar); ITAM-Army Command History 2<sup>nd</sup> Qtr (26 Apr 11).

<sup>152</sup> ITAM-Army Command History 2nd Qtr (26 Apr 11).

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

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(U/~~FOUO~~) The IA institutional training base maintained its core of fourteen proponent and specialty schools to include: Administrative Affairs/Logistics, Armor, Bomb Disposal, Chemical, Engineer, Field Artillery, Infantry, Joint Training Center, Medical, Military Police, Maintenance, Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), Signal, and Transportation. This training base continued to provide doctrinal and branch-specific professional education for both officers and NCOs. These schools provide the foundation for future self-sustaining professional competency and a platform to support institutional modernization and doctrinal improvement.<sup>154</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) Numerous significant challenges have been identified as obstacles to the ISF's ability to build self-sustaining and independent training and operations capabilities. The IA life support system hampers institutionalized training, as the operations commanders do not want to release their soldiers to attend schools. Logistical processes, in particular the ammunition order process, are not effective without close shadow tracking by USF-I advisors. Transition from COIN to conventional operations requires Transition of Internal Security to Police (TRISP). Convincing the IA to transition to conventional operations will not occur until they commit to a police-led internal security. Effective use of the Iraqi NCO Corps remained a challenge for the IA. The NCO system has been built, but not embraced by the Army leadership and not endorsed by the Defense Council. The IA institutional schools appear to have empowered their NCOs more than the operational forces, as NCOs now teach many of the institutions' courses. However, encouraging the MoD to formally accept this concept requires a strong KLE effort.<sup>155</sup>

(U) The General Depot Command Class II Warehouse (140,000 sq ft of storage space) was completed and accepted by the GOI during the quarter. Extensive equipping of logistical units such as the Echelon Above Division (EAD) General Transportation Regiment and EAD Fuel Transportation Company came from USF-I, largely through the USETTI program. USF-I staff, including ITAM-Army, J4 and J6 sections struggled to help the MoD transition the Iraqi Asset Management Program (IAMP) from commercial satellite connectivity that the US had funded onto the secure Iraqi Defense Network (IDN). The transition has been plagued by hardware, connectivity and account access problems, and the Iraqis are struggling to maintain the connectivity among various logistics sites that is required in order to make this automated Class IX repair parts requisition system functional. On the positive side, ITAM-Army logistical advisors report that "the Iraqi Army has mastered basic mechanical repair skills such as engine diagnostic and replacement," and repairs are able to keep up with demand despite lengthy delays in receiving parts.<sup>156</sup>

(S) While TaS remained the premier training event of the quarter, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment in the mid-Euphrates area south of Baghdad worked with the 8<sup>th</sup> IA Division to support Operation Eagles Rising, a four month training event focused on maneuver tasks in

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

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support of external defense. As with TaS, the US support will focus on improving the 8<sup>th</sup> IA's ability to plan, resource and execute maneuver training.<sup>157</sup>

(S) Likewise, units across Iraq engaged in training with IA divisions that were not participating in TaS this year, such as the Eagles Talon and Crossed Sabers training conducted by USD-Center. The 20<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade trained their Iraqi counterparts in route clearance operations and strategic bridge building, while the 67<sup>th</sup> Battlefield Surveillance Brigade paired up with the ISR companies of four IA divisions to provide intelligence training. Each USD regularly updated the command on the diversity of training being performed in its sector, as the slide below illustrates.<sup>158</sup>

 <b>USD - C Training Update</b> 	
<p><b>Tadreeb al-Shamil</b></p> <p><b>Unit Training: (ISF)</b> 1-28 BN, 7 IA DIV</p> <p><b>Unit Assisting: (USF)</b> TF 1.4a CAV</p> <p><b>Training Focus/ Key Event of Week:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Platoon Live Fire Exercise</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Squad LFX training increased confidence/proficiency in IA SOD LDRs during Platoon LFXs</li> <li>7IA G7 taking on greater role in TaS planning/resourcing</li> <li>60mm mortar ammo deemed unserviceable by IGFC but no source/date for replacement rounds provided to 7IA</li> </ul>	<p><b>Other IA Training</b></p> <p><b>Unit Training: (ISF)</b> 6<sup>th</sup> IA Div</p> <p><b>Unit Assisting: (USF)</b> 2/B/ TF 1.4a AR</p> <p><b>Training Focus/Event:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Map Reading/GPS</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6 day training event comprised of IA Officers and NCOs</li> <li>Included a 16-point land nav course</li> <li>IA Soldiers taught course to US trainers as a check on learning</li> </ul>
<p><b>IP/FP Training</b></p> <p><b>Unit Training: (ISF)</b> Al Anbar IP</p> <p><b>Unit Assisting: (USF)</b> APD STT, 3-7IN STT, 3-15IN STT, 442 MP</p> <p><b>Training Focus/Event:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Crime Scenes Investigation Training</li> <li>Scorpion IP Training Course</li> <li>Sensitive Site Exploitation/Evidence preservation</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scorpion IP Training Course is two days of IP training with Iraqi Police in the Fallujah area. The leadership is receptive to the training and continue to send shurta to training</li> </ul>	<p><b>Other Training (DBE, Special Skills, ...)</b></p> <p><b>Unit Training: (ISF)</b> 5<sup>th</sup> IA</p> <p><b>Unit Assisting: (USF)</b> 2/B/ TF 1.4a AR</p> <p><b>Training Focus/Event:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Soldier Training Course</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trained 30-45 IA Soldiers</li> <li>Training consists of Basic Soldier Skills</li> <li>Physical Training is conduct before training occurs</li> </ul>

(CUB, 19 Feb. 2011)

(U) The J3 staff, DCG (Operations), USDs and JFSOCC-I spent a great deal of time this quarter engaged in ATA for Lion's Leap, Iraq's first joint multinational exercise, which was scheduled to take place in four training areas across Iraq in mid- to late-April. While the number of troops participating in Lion's Leap was fairly small, the exercise was critical to USF-I because it is likely to be the foundation of for future CENTCOM Joint Exercises and security cooperation beginning in 2012.

<sup>157</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011.

<sup>158</sup> Weekly Assessment, 21-27 Mar. 2011; Interview, USF-I Historian with (b)(6) Cdr, 67th BfsB, 28 Apr. 2011.


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## Exercise Concept (18-28 April)



25 March 2011

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(J35 Training: LION'S LEAP 11 – Iraq's Spring 2011 Exercise, JPOG, 26 Mar. 2011)

### Iraqi Air Force

(S) The command continued to assess that the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) will not achieve MEC primarily due to lack of an integrated air defense capability.

(S) As discussed in last quarter's history, GoI leadership was unable to fund the purchase of eighteen F-16 Block 52 multi-role fighters despite a clearly expressed desire for the planes and successful efforts by the US government to restructure the payment of the \$3 billion package over a three-year period. Budgetary pressures on the GoI prevented them from meeting a 15 January deadline for signing the first of three LOAs that would have enabled delivery of the fighters starting in 2013. The deadline was extended to 28 February, with many Key Leader Engagements taking place to encourage support this program. Despite these efforts, the LOA went unsigned. Iraq's deficit, coupled with civil unrest throughout the Middle East in early 2011, caused Iraqi politicians to reevaluate...." Subsequent LOAs drawn up for smaller packages of fighters also went unsigned. Iraq's deficit, coupled with civil unrest throughout the Middle East in early 2011, caused Iraqi politicians to reevaluate its spending priorities in favor of social welfare programs, particularly an increase in the food ration program. Consequently, the CoM

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chose not to devote any funding in this year's budget to F-16 purchases or, indeed, purchase of any fighter aircraft at all.<sup>159</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) Despite this setback, ten Iraqi student pilots are currently in the United States pursuing undergraduate pilot training. ISAM anticipates that the F-16 program will be revisited in late 2011, perhaps with more success due to the improving financial condition Iraq is enjoying as a result of higher than anticipated oil prices. Other programs supporting the eventual return of Iraqi air power (such as long range radars, air traffic control development, and pilot training) have continued to progress.<sup>160</sup>

(U) Iraq demonstrated solid commitment to its Iraqi Army Aviation Command (IqAAC) programs over this reporting period with sustainment cases being approved in February for both the Huey II and Mi-17/171E helicopters. The "Iraqi Armed" Bell 407 program continued to meet its development milestones with aircraft deliveries expected to begin in December 2011. Four additional Mi-171E helicopters were delivered in January with future deliveries expected in April and all aircraft anticipated to be in-country this July. Iraq decided to relocate its Bell Jet Ranger and OH-58 Kiowa helicopters from Kirkuk to Habbaniyah. This marked the end of US-provided Contractor Logistic Support for these aircraft as there is no US presence at Habbaniyah.<sup>161</sup>

(~~S/NF~~) In February the IqAF took over the recently completed Iraqi Air Operations Center, a state of the art command and control facility for air battle management and air defense and aerial ISR downlink site. On 23 March, the new Operations Center commanded the IqAF's third successful Hellfire missile launch via live video feed using a forward air controller on the ground at the Al-Aziziyah range and ISR aircraft orbiting the target area, a complex mission that followed considerable training by USF advisors.<sup>162</sup> Despite this progress, the Air Operations Center remains the sole portion of the "Watch, Warn and Respond" integrated Air Defense capability that will be functional at the beginning of 2012. Only 2 of the Long Range Radars (LRRs) needed to "watch" the nation's airspace will be installed by 2012 and it is unlikely that the training will be complete enough for them to be significantly contributing to airspace monitoring. The first Sector Operations Center is also on track to be complete by the end of 2012, but with similar limitations as the LRRs. Finally, without a ground-based air defense and fighter response capability that would permit it to "respond" to incursions once detected, Iraq's required capabilities will not be achieved.<sup>163</sup>

(~~S/NF~~) In January the IqAF flew a total of 348 ISR missions for the month, an incredible amount of sorties in comparison to February, when 170 were flown. Even this lower number

<sup>159</sup> Weekly Assessment, 3-9 Jan.; 7-13 Feb. 2011; CG Read Book, 11 Feb. 2011.

<sup>160</sup> ISAM Command History Report, 1 Qtr 2011 (Jan-Mar).

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Weekly Assessment, 28 Feb.-6 Mar., 21-27 Mar. 2011; ITAM-Air 2d Q FY 11 History.

<sup>163</sup> CUB, 18 Jan. 2011.

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was well above the monthly average of ISR sorties for 2010. The large number of sorties in January resulted from the use of IqAF and IqAAC assets to provide ISR and security overwatch in support of the Arba'een observances in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.<sup>164</sup>

~~(S/NF)~~ English Language Training (ELT) suffered a setback during the quarter when the site at Camp Taji suspended operations in late January 2011, along with other ITAM ELT sites throughout Iraq, due to physical security concerns for the instructors. Language instruction resumed in early April upon provision of a Protective Security Detail for the instructors, but in the interim the IqAF advanced its efforts to create an organic ELT capability by designating several officer cadets with exceptional English skills to become English Teachers for their first assignment upon commissioning.<sup>165</sup>

### **Iraqi Navy**

~~(S)~~ The command continues to assess that the Iraqi Navy (IqN) will achieve MEC by December 2011, though it will continue to receive new equipment and increase its capabilities beyond that date.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The IqN has made tremendous strides in training and operational capability. In December, it established a command and control presence on the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT). During this quarter, the principal focus was preparing for the transition of residual command and control (C2) and perimeter defense of ABOT and the remaining areas of territorial waters to Iraqi control. Upon approval from General Austin and the GoI, coalition naval forces will transition into operational overwatch, and ultimately strategic overwatch positions, leaving day-to-day security at both oil terminals and in all of Iraq's territorial waters to the IqN while still remaining available to provide support if requested. ITAM-Navy assessed at the end of the quarter that the IqN had advanced far enough in capability that it is ready to take over C2 of ABOT, allowing coalition forces transition to operational overwatch.<sup>166</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The second and third Swift Patrol Boats (PBs) were delivered to Umm Qasr on 8 January and their crews underwent sea training and operational evaluations during the quarter. The third class of PB trainees arrived in Morgan City, La., in January and commenced operator and maintenance training; graduation is expected in early April. This will be the last class to be conducted in the United States as the simulators and training material will be relocated to Umm Qasr later this year. Schedule delays continue to haunt both the PB and Offshore Support Vessel programs. An LOA for Scan Eagle UAVs was delivered in late March and is awaiting signature. Finally, the ship repair facility achieved initial operating capability in March with a training team in place to teach the Iraqi sailors and technicians how to utilize the repair equipment.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> ITAM-Air 2d Q FY 11 History.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> DCG (Operations) Update to CG: "CTF-IM Operational Overwatch," 12 Feb. 2011.

<sup>167</sup> ISAM Command History Report, 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr, 2011 (Jan-Mar); ITAM-Navy History Report 2d Quarter FY 11.

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(U/~~FOUO~~) Approximately 500 IqN personnel have graduated from the Umm Qasr Naval Madrasa to date. These graduations mark the successful culmination of Iraqi-developed and executed basic maritime training courses and some elements of specialist training. The Defender squadron has taken ownership of the Defender training course. Also in late March ITAM-Navy began a 13 week course in which it trained two PB crews and a Swift Squadron Afloat Training Team (SATT). The creation of the SATT is a key step forward to ensuring the IqN can sustain its own training program after US forces withdraw from Iraq.<sup>168</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) USF-I's focus has shifted from the direct delivery of training to mentoring and oversight. ITAM-Navy notes that greater consistency in manpower management and a more convincing approach to sustainability would serve to ensure that the IqN's recent success will not be short lived. While overall efforts in preventative maintenance have improved, supply and maintenance remain especially weak.<sup>169</sup>

### Logistics

(U/~~FOUO~~) Maintenance and logistics were widely assessed, across all levels of the MoD and MoI, to be among the most daunting challenges facing the ISF. It has become an increasing focus of USF-I's ATAE mission, as developing a functioning system for sustainment is increasingly seen as one of the most significant obstacles remaining on the way to achieving MEC. USF-I's objective for December 2011 is to create enough momentum for the ISF to attain full sustainment capacity and capability in 3-5 years without slipping back after USF-I departs and the OSC-I has the lead.

(S) MG Edward Cardon, the DCG (Support), in summarizing the logistics situation in the ISF stated in mid-February: "It's not as bad as we think, but not as good as some report." He noted that there are points of excellence among the Iraqi units, and that TaS training has helped set an example for how to conduct sustainment operations properly. General Austin, having testified before Congress earlier that month and faced questions about ISF logistics capability in the wake of the release of the SIGIR report in late January, informed the staff that helping the Iraqis fix their logistics and sustainment systems was a crucial aspect of the USF-I mission. "This is foremost in my mind our reputation as a military hangs on this," the CG noted, saying he believed we will have achieved success when Iraqi equipment operators understand what we are trying to do and have bought in to the process.<sup>170</sup>

(S/NF) As with other training efforts, our logistical units partner with their Iraqi counterparts to advise them on logistics operations. The 103<sup>rd</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command partnered with the Iraqi Logistics Operation Center to train them on the use of automated logistics communications systems to order, track and receive parts.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>168</sup> ITAM-Navy History Report 2d Quarter FY 11.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Historian Notes, DCG (Support) Update to the CG: "ISF Logistics Way Ahead," 12 Feb. 2011.

<sup>171</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011.

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## Iraqi International Academy (IIA)

(U/~~FOUO~~) Renovations of the Iraqi International Academy buildings are progressing with current project completion status at 56 percent completion. This past quarter, the IIA program underwent a series of developments. These include: identifying an Iraqi champion; developing a plan to maximize utilization of the site facilities; migrating the Iraqi National Defense University (NDU) command staff to the IIA campus along with certain other education centers; rebranding the IIA strategic studies concept as the Mesopotamia Center for Defense and Strategic Studies (Mesopotamia Center); and placing the Mesopotamia Center under the NDU for budgeting and administrative purposes. While the program is still designated as the Iraqi International Academy, once complete the site will be called the Iraq National Defense University and Mesopotamia Center for Defense and Strategic Studies.<sup>172</sup>

## Ministry of Interior

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**Today's Mol**

**Snapshot**

- Basic capability exists with increasing maturity to administer and manage the force
- Investing in systems for HR, logistics and financial management
- Multi-year Strategic Plan 2010-12
- Logistics system is immature and bureaucratic with little delegation

**Challenges**

- No Strategic Communication
- MoI struggles to maintain the equipment and infrastructure we have built or provided
- Exponential growth of budget and personnel over past seven years
- Contracting is hampered by bureaucratic processes and individual desires
- Limited budget authorities tied to CPA rules
- Increasing managerial complexity

**Capabilities**

- Engaged high-level leadership
- Invested in an a HR and payroll management info system
- Improving ministerial (corporate) business management processes and systems for financial management, strategic planning, human resources and comms/IT
- Adjudicate internal disciplinary complaints
- Internal security force court process – fair, predictable, and evidence-based
- Annual investment in sustainment
- Established a national logistics center and a maintenance center
- Strategic Program Planning linked to annual operating budget w/a fledgling execution process
- Active Inspector General processes and systems
- Acknowledge training is critical for building the future

**UNCLASSIFIED** 22

(CUB, 4 Jan. 2011)

(U) USF-I began the quarter focused on several key areas with the goal of bringing the MoI closer to MEC. One area of focus was to improve MoI budget execution rates; historically MoI has only executed about 90% of the money allocated to it, leaving \$700 million on the table at the end of each fiscal year, which, if committed prior to December 31, 2010 per Coalition Provisional Authority Law #95, could have been used that could be used to improve capability.

<sup>172</sup> ITAM-MoD Consolidated Quarterly History Report v2, Jan. – Mar. 2011.

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USF-I has made a sustained effort through its eMinistry initiative to move the MoI away from a paper-based administration of financial, human resource and logistics records, and made significant progress this quarter in training on the HR and pay modules. For the remaining nine months of 2011, logistics and maintenance training will be a focus for USF-I ATA efforts, especially at the MoI's Abu Ghraib warehouse.<sup>173</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) At close of the quarter, the ITAM-MoI directorate assessed that MoI made significant improvements in Ministerial-level processes, particularly the strategic planning effort for the years 2012 to 2016, human resources professional development, and developing the strategy to improve Ministry of Interior force structure. Significant progress was also made this quarter in implementing eMinistry, which is anticipated to begin a pilot implementation with two organizations at the end of May. ITAM also noted that "the MoI made notable progress in preparing their vehicle repair parts warehouse [at Abu Ghraib] for receipt of both FMS case material and ISFF funded repair parts to sustain their vehicle fleet" and has increased its maintenance capability through training.<sup>174</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 3 January, MoI ordered conversion of 1,172 contractors to police in Ninewa province. Coupled with hirings in the previous quarter, more than 3,000 of the needed 8,000 Ninewa police had been hired. The goal is to have all 8,000 hired by April. Later in January, MoI transferred 13,898 police from the MoE to MoI and converted 82,182 Facility Protection Services contractors to permanent hires. The primary drivers for MoI personnel challenges continue to be the MoI perception that they are appropriately sized to accomplish their mission; lack of a process to identify, validate, and approve manpower requirements; and current end strength of forces, which is based primarily on budget rather than manpower requirements. These challenges are evidenced in Government of Iraq 2008 hiring freeze and requests for forces (FP, DBE, OP) which exceed MoI authorizations.<sup>175</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The MoI received its first 8 of 80 Armored Security Vehicles in February, along with several deliveries of weapons, communications equipment and ammunition throughout the quarter. Efforts continue on developing a police helicopter capability for Iraq. The border surveillance case made little progress with many discussions continuing between the MoI, ISAM, the implementing agency, and the sole-source contractor. The border roads case continues to progress with construction beginning on the second segment of roads (along the Iranian border) and man-camps being built to commence construction of the third segment (along the Syrian border). The border roads program is a model of improving security while providing local jobs and improving Iraqi construction capabilities.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> CUB, 4 Jan. 2011.

<sup>174</sup> ITAM-MoI 2nd Quarter History (Jan – Mar 2011).

<sup>175</sup> Weekly Assessment, 3-9 Jan. 2011; ITAM-MoI 2nd Quarter History (Jan – Mar 2011).

<sup>176</sup> ISAM Command History Report, 1st Qtr, 2011 (Jan-Mar).

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## Iraqi Police

(S) The success of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) in training Iraqi Police continued, with both Turkey and France seeking to establish partnerships with Iraq under NTM-I. The Turkish military sent instructors to observe training and conduct site surveys of facilities for training Directorate of Border Enforcement police, while the French approved plans to provide instructors in forensics and investigation to the Baghdad Police College.<sup>177</sup> On 1-6 February 2011, a team from the Turkish General Staff and the Turkish MoI visited NTM-I to carry out the evaluation of the border security training requirement requested by Iraq. The team concluded that Turkey was in a position to offer the type of training requested and that it could be delivered effectively at the DBE Academy at COB Delta, Al Kut. On 31 March 2011, the Turkish Deputy National Military Representative to SHAPE stated that Turkey is ready to start the training of Iraqi Border Security Forces beginning 1 April 2011.

(S) Due to a severe shortage of personnel, the Oil Police relies on both contractors and several Iraqi Army battalions to support the task of securing Iraq's oil infrastructure. The GoI is increasing guards along the Hamam al Alil pipeline in northern Iraq, with more than 500 contracted Guards due to complete training in early April, and two hundred containerized housing units (CHUs) acquired from USD-North to be placed along the pipeline to house security forces.<sup>178</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) This quarter, USF-I ITAM Police teams completed the delivery of equipment needed to stand up an additional twelve Iraqi Counter Explosives Team, giving Iraq a total of 40 teams nationwide. They also provided training to veterinarians and vet technicians needed to minister to the rapidly growing Iraqi Explosive Detection Dog population, while at the same time advising the GoI that it would be best to slow delivery of new dogs until adequate facilities for care of the animals are constructed. Currently, the IP veterinarians are not able to provide adequate care for K9's assigned to the program, and MoI continues to rely on US Forces for equipment, training sets, and medical supplies to sustain the program. ITAM-Police warned that "Unless maintenance training and quality of life issues are addressed the GoI is at risk of having a program that is largely ineffective and the public will begin to lose faith in the effectiveness of the K9."<sup>179</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) Looking forward, USF-I is striving to complete the fielding of the 6<sup>th</sup> Federal Police Division, which is a combined formation of Iraqi and Kurdish personnel that is the flagship for integration of the MoI and Kurdish MoI.

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<sup>177</sup> Weekly Assessment, 24-30 Jan. 2011. NTM-I training at Camp Dublin consisted of a dozen courses graduating more than 1,200 students. ITAM-Police 2nd Quarter History (Jan-Mar 2011).

<sup>178</sup> ITAM-Police 2nd Quarter History (Jan-Mar 2011).

<sup>179</sup> ITAM-Police 2nd Quarter History (Jan-Mar 2011).

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## Intelligence

~~(S)~~ USF-I's DCG (Advising & Training) consolidated the former ITAM-Intelligence directorate into the ITAM-MoD directorate during the quarter.

~~(S)~~ Along with logistics, developing Iraqi intelligence capacity is one of two focus areas that USF will concentrate their ATAE efforts on in 2011. The command was encouraged when in January the National Intelligence Center (NIC) hosted its first Operations Forum for senior representatives from seven Iraqi intelligence organizations. The event proved such a success that the NIC director made the forums a regular bi-monthly event.<sup>180</sup>

~~(S)~~ USF-I ITAM and J2 staffs conducted engagements and training, developing and improving infrastructure, and improving Iraqi institutional performance to include curricula at the Intelligence School at Taji. Nevertheless, the Iraqi intelligence establishment is assessed to be far from self-reliant, and the ITAM-MoD support plan for Iraqi intelligence services "underscores the dire need for national-level and military activity Intel support beyond December 2011."<sup>181</sup> Further action is dependent on political decisions from the National level in order to drive the process to completion.

## Merging of Kurdish Security Forces and ISF

~~(U//FOUO)~~ USF-I continued to facilitate the integration of Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into the IA organizational structure as a reserve capability. ITAM-Army was unable to hold a joint meeting to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Prime Minister's signature and additional Tri-Lateral Agreement due to the delay in the appointment of security ministers by the GoI. They were, however, able to work unilaterally with the KRG's Minister of Peshmerga (MoP) and capture their issues in an MoU which addresses personnel, the development of two Kurdish divisions, budget, military staff schools and social care. It was provided to the MoD, however absent a new Minister of Defense the MoD Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations placed the action on hold. Additionally, the Peshmerga move into the Kirkuk area from 25 February through 28 March strained relations between all partners. Key leader engagements and partnership activities with USD-North have just been restarted.<sup>182</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ RGB training was fully integrated into the 2011 IA Master Training Calendar which began as scheduled. Specialty training expanded into proponent schools as well for Officers and NCOs including the company commander, medical, infantry and intelligence courses. This training occurred at IA schools and training centers located outside of Peshmerga controlled areas, thus demonstrating increased acceptance of ethnic diversity.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Weekly Assessment, 10-16 Jan. 2011.

<sup>181</sup> ITAM-MoD Consolidated Quarterly History Report v2 (Jan-Mar 2011).

<sup>182</sup> ITAM-Army Command History 2d Qtr (26 Apr 11).

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Despite tensions surrounding Kirkuk, the MoP received major shipments of equipment worth almost \$2.5 million from the MoD's General Deport Command at Taji this quarter.<sup>184</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Police training programs continued to be an ideal means to break down Arab-Kurd barriers. ITAM continued initiatives to merge KRG and GoI forces through the Dahuk training center, and supported NTM-I training of 174 FP, 658 IP and 157 Oil Police this quarter with a total of 9,816 personnel trained to date at Camp Dublin, including 205 Zerevani.<sup>185</sup>

### Conduct Transitions Line of Effort


“I would say that right now it is a critically urgent concern because if the State Department does not get the money that they have requested for the transition in Iraq, we are really going to be in the soup.” ...

“If we cannot have a transition to the State Department and the police training function, if they do not have a presence in various places throughout Iraq, much of the investment that we have made in trying to get the Iraqis to the place they are is at risk in my view.” ...

“The State Department cannot spend the money to get ready right now. This is getting towards the end of February. There are facilities to be built. There are people to be hired, and they cannot do any of that. And so we are going to run out of time in terms of being able to get this accomplished. So I hope that the passion in this reflects just how strongly we feel about this. This is really, really important.”

*Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the  
Senate Armed Service Committee, February 17, 2011<sup>186</sup>*

### Assessment



(March 2011 OPORD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 12 April 2011)

(S) USF-I's assessment at the end of March 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPORD 11-01 for the "Conduct Transitions" Line of Effort is illustrated above. The

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> ITAM-Police 2nd Quarter History (Jan-Mar 2011).

<sup>186</sup> Transcript of remarks by Secretary Gates, "Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and Future Years Defense Program," 17 Feb. 2011, accessed at <http://armed-services.senate.gov>

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first objective, enabling the US Mission-Iraq to conduct missions, is assessed as being “Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas.” Efforts to establish the OSC-I are assessed as “Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required.” The command assessed no problems with its progress towards transitioning activities to its partners in DoS and CENTCOM with proper authorities and agreements, but “Critical Problem Areas” in the area of establishing a cooperative security mechanism between Arabs and Kurds in the Disputed Internal Boundary areas of northern Iraq.

## General

(U) The task of transitioning the enduring activities currently performed by USF-I to the USEMB is extremely complex. The US Embassy in Iraq, which is already the largest US embassy in the world, plans to expand from 8,000 to 17,000 in 2011-12 in order to be able to build and maintain a multi-faceted and lasting partnership between the United States and Iraq.

(U) The US government remained without a budget for fiscal year 2011 throughout the entire quarter covered by this report. As a result, government operations were funded through a series of continuing resolutions. However, as Secretary Gates’ statement at the start of this section indicates, funding for necessary construction and other preparations the DoS needs to undertake in order to assume responsibility for all the new missions it will have in Iraq was not available, and valuable time needed to complete these preparations grew shorter.<sup>187</sup>

(U) Along with Secretary Gates and other administration officials, Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin made the case for funding the US Embassy at an appropriate level to maintain the relationship that has been built with Iraq. The ambassador began his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 1 February with a direct message. “We face a critical moment now in Iraq, where we will either step up to the plate, finish the job and build on the sacrifices made, or we will risk core U.S. national interests, be penny-wise and pound foolish and cede the field to al-Qaeda and other dangerous regional influences.”<sup>188</sup>

~~(S)~~ As the quarter ended, the USEMB had still not secured legally-binding agreements from the GoI for the use of land at the planned post-2011 locations. As the embassy noted, “Continued delay will impact construction, and the sites may not be up to OSPB [DoS’s Overseas Security Policy Board] security standards by the date on which State is to take over responsibility for these locations from USF-I.”<sup>189</sup> The proposed enduring locations (illustrated below) changed most significantly in March with the dropping of Balad as a potential enduring site due to the failure of the GoI to sign the LOA to purchase F-16s. USF-I’s J7 Enduring Base Transition Working Group focused on developing requirements to ensure effective hand-over from USF-I

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<sup>187</sup> The White House and Congress would settle on a budget for FY 11 in mid-April, more than six months after the start of the fiscal year.

<sup>188</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Iraq: The Challenging Transition to a Civilian Mission,” Federal News Service transcript of testimony by Ambassador James Jeffrey and General Lloyd Austin III, 1 Feb. 2011.

<sup>189</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Embassy Baghdad Transition Update - Challenges and Possible Solutions, 21 Mar. 2011.

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to the USEMB. Engineering Teams conducted assessments at five enduring sites: Tikrit, Taji, Umm Qasr, Union III, and Besmaya, and prepared for OSC-I Phase II construction at Besmaya, Taji, Tikrit, Union III, and Umm Qasr. A significant decision in February to maintain the current perimeter at Besmaya and Taji saved over \$12 million in construction cost for new perimeters, Entry Control Points, and other force protection measures.<sup>190</sup>




**TRANSITIONS TO DOS/INL (7)**

- U S Embassy-Baghdad & Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
  - > Sather L SA/Logistics/Air Site
  - > Baera Consulate General
  - > Mosul Embassy Branch office (COS Marez)
  - > Kirkuk Embassy Branch Office (COS Warrior)
  - > Prosperity Logistics Site
  - > Erbil L SA (COS Erbil)
  - > Shield INL Development Site

**TRANSITIONS TO OSC-I (5)**

- Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq
  - > Union III (OSC-I HQ)
  - > Hammer OSC-I Site (Iraqi Army)
  - > Umm Qasr OSC-I (Iraqi Navy)
  - > Taji OSC-I Site (Iraqi Army and Natl Log)
  - > Tikrit OSC-I Site (Iraqi Air Force)



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**(J7 Enduring Base Transition Division History 2Q FY11)**

(S) The post-2011 US presence in Iraq is a politically sensitive issue for the GoI leadership, as is any discussion of residual military forces after 2012. PM Maliki’s delicate political situation left him unwilling to challenge the Sadrists on many of their positions, including their opposition to both a US military presence and an extensive diplomatic presence in Iraq past 2012. Therefore, the planned doubling of the size of the US Embassy staff and the construction of a number of consulates, branch offices, OSC-I and INL sites were delicate issues of negotiation.

(S) The situation was not helped when these issues were presented to the GoI without adequate prior preparation, as happened in mid-February when Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari made a presentation to the COM on the US request to open branch offices in Mosul and Kirkuk. Zebari

<sup>190</sup> J7 Enduring Base Transition Division History 2Q FY11. Note that following this reporting period, on 15 April, the proposed EBO in Mosul (COS Marez) was dropped from the list. Also in April, Iraqi sensitivity to the use of the term “Embassy Branch Office” led to the adoption of the term “consulate” for the Kirkuk site.

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had not coordinated his presentation with PM Maliki in advance, who was taken by surprise and reportedly believed that the Americans had put him up to it. The COM rejected the proposed branch offices, though the embassy believed that another hearing on the issue could turn out more favorably once we have engaged as many ministers as possible on the nature of our post-2011 plans. Ambassador Jeffrey acknowledged during the 16 February OPOD 11-01 Continuity of Mission ROC Drill that PM Maliki and other Iraqis are just now getting “sticker shock” over the size of the US embassy presence post-2011, noting that it will take time and hassle to convince them of its necessity, and time is something we don’t have.<sup>191</sup>

(C) Foreign Minister Zebari related to Ambassador Jeffrey in early April that he sought clear instruction from the PM regarding his desires to have the US maintain a presence past 2011, and that Zebari, Deputy PM Shaways and KRG President Barzani had been clear with Maliki that Iraq “needs the United States to stay.” According to Zebari, Maliki responded, “of course we need them to stay.” The topic was of such sensitivity, however, that Zebari advised Jeffrey “that documents should avoid mentioning ,airports” or ,branches.” Zebari also suggested removing the reference to locations ,on former U.S. bases.” He suggested that this would only raise suspicion that the Embassy’s plan was military engagement hidden in the diplomatic mission.”<sup>192</sup>

## Planning

(S) General Austin, Executive Director of the DCG (Advising and Training), MG Bradley May, the DCG (Support), MG Edward Cardon, and the J5; Maj. Gen. Noel Jones, led a small staff group to Washington DC in late January for the Iraq Senior Leader Transition Conference, a major coordination effort with senior DoD, DoS and White House leadership held at the National War College. Attending were Ambassador Jeffrey and two of his senior deputies, Ambassador Peter Bodde (Iraq Transition) and Ambassador Jeanine Jackson (Management); CENTCOM Commander General James Mattis; Senior Director of the National Security Staff Puneet Talwar; Senior National Security Advisor to the Vice President Antony Blinken; Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick Kennedy; Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Tom Nides, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy; Director of the Joint Staff Vice Admiral William Gortney and a large number of other senior leaders from DoD, DoS and other federal agencies. The conference updated participants on the status of the transition for USF-I, the USEMB, and CENTCOM, focused on major milestones remaining and challenges to reaching those milestones, and teed up major issues requiring action and decision.<sup>193</sup>

(S) Issues and challenges discussed by the executive committee included OSC-I authorities and funding, cost sharing among different US agencies at co-located sites, achieving mission

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<sup>191</sup> US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Embassy Baghdad Transition Update - Challenges and Possible Solutions, 21 Mar. 2011; Historian Notes, 11-01 Continuity of Mission ROC drill, 16 Feb. 2011.

<sup>192</sup> USEMB Cable, “Foreign Minister on MEK, Payment in Kind, Embassy Land Use, and Regional Issues,” 14 Apr. 2011.

<sup>193</sup> CG Commander’s Initiatives Group, Iraq Senior Leaders Conference files; Interview, USF-I Historian with (b)(6) (b)(6) Dir, Strategy Division, USF-I J5, 14 Apr. 2011.

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capability for facilities, support, and security, the INL police development program launch timeline, and the DoS decision timeline for reposture changes. Other issues discussed included strategic messaging, how to engage the GoI, and the US visions for Iraq in 2012 and beyond.<sup>194</sup>

~~(S)~~ USF-I and USEMB planners worked jointly with CENTCOM planners this quarter to conduct the initial mission analysis for the Iraq Country Plan, CENTCOM's document for how DoD will support the Embassy in 2012. "The combined mission analysis allowed better understanding of resource requirements, US government programs and agencies working in Iraq, and areas where increased inter-governmental coordination is needed." Planning will continue with additional government agencies in Washington in April.<sup>195</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (Transition Team) (formerly known as the Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq) is the principal staff organization under the DCG (Advising & Training) engaged in concept planning and execution for the OSC-I. During this quarter, OSC-I (TT) reshaped into working groups focused on three critical planning areas related to the standup of OSC-I and the drawdown of the DCG (Advising & Training):

- Manning Working Group tasked to provide a detailed manpower plan and organizational structure for OSC-I, based on validated transferred functional responsibilities and enduring tasks;
- FOB Union III Basing Working Group, which would provide a basing and movement plan for OSC-I and DCG(A&T) staff based on validated transferred functional responsibilities and mission need;
- Ops/Plans/C2 Working Group, which would provide a drawdown plan of "residual tasks" and organizational structure of the remaining DCG (Advising & Training) staff, aligned with redeployment timelines and mission need.<sup>196</sup>

~~(S)~~ Beyond OSC-I, there were numerous other DoD entities that would require life support and work space on enduring sites under the USEMB Chief of Mission authority after 31 December 2011. USF-I staff continued to work with CENTCOM and the USEMB to determine the number of personnel, their task, purpose and resource requirements for various DoD entities such as Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, the US Army Corps of Engineers Middle East District, CENTCOM Contracting Command, Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Task Force 1.4a and Army and Air Force Exchange Services. The embassy worked separately with several other organizations such as the UN Mission-Iraq, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Army Sustainment Command, Defense Contract Audit Agency, and Defense Criminal Investigative Services to determine the number of personnel and space

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<sup>194</sup> Iraq Senior Leader Conference slides, 110121 CENTCOM edit v2. A summary of main points made in presentations and conference findings can be found in the presentation made at the Board of Director's (BoD) Luncheon, "Iraq Transition Senior Leader Conference Readout," 11 Feb. 2011.

<sup>195</sup> Weekly Assessment, 14-20 Mar. 2011.

<sup>196</sup> OSC-I (TT) CMD History Q2 FY11

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requirements they would have. All told, these requirements (excluding the UN and NATO numbers) totaled more than 650 personnel, of which 157 were allotted to OSC-I.<sup>197</sup>

~~(S)~~ The Operations Transition Working Group, jointly chaired by the Deputy J3 and the USEMB's Director of the Regional Security Office, worked together throughout the quarter to oversee the transition of 21 Operational Functions military type capabilities to the embassy. These include functions such as MRAP rollover and driver training, personnel recovery, force protection technology, recovery of a downed aircraft or damaged vehicle, convoy security, EOD, and Threat Intelligence. USF-I assesses the group is on schedule to transition the remaining functions, thus enabling the success of the DoS enduring presence.<sup>198</sup>

~~(S)~~ As in the previous quarter, the USF-I J4, DCG (Support) and Surgeon continued to work with the DoS and OSC-I to develop contracting vehicles to enable the USEMB post-2011. Coordination continued to ensure the necessary contract processes were established to meet acquisition timelines. Further coordination with DoS and OSC-I was conducted to refine the transfer of excess Contractor-Managed, Government-Owned (CMGO) property in support of the USEMB enduring presence. The quarter ended with courses of action defined to enable the embassy's logistical success post-2011.<sup>199</sup>

~~(S)~~ The USF-I Chief of Staff, MG William Garrett, and the Assistant Chief of Mission Ambassador Peter W. Bodde, approved and signed the USF-I / USEMB Knowledge Management Transition Plan on 3 January. The purpose of this plan is to guide activities to ensure the preservation and long-term accessibility of knowledge essential for the ongoing operation of the USEMB following the departure of US forces from Iraq by December 2011. This plan expects participation from all directorates and sections of USF-I and all departments and agencies under the USEMB. Plan progress is briefed regularly to the Executive Core Group and the CORE with the first briefs on 14 and 17 March respectively.<sup>200</sup>

~~(U//FOUO)~~ USF-I's J8 was able to report that the overall cost estimate for standing up the OSC-I had dropped from the \$715 million estimated in November 2010 to \$615 million. This was due to facility savings at Hammer, Taji, Tikrit and Umm Qasr based on requirements refinement and force protection efficiencies, and movement costs dropped by adding dwelling infrastructure at Shield and Sather, reducing security detachment and air commute costs.<sup>201</sup>

~~(S)~~ Lack of legal authorities to conduct many required transition tasks remained a major concern for the command as the quarter came to a close. DoD continues to lack legal authority to fund construction of facilities for OSC-I personnel in Iraq in FY 2012 or to provide funding to sustain

<sup>197</sup> DCG (Advising & Training): "NSDD 38 Operational Requirements Brief," JPOC, 2 May 2011.

<sup>198</sup> CENTCOM CUB, 30 Mar. 2011.

<sup>199</sup> J4 Quarterly Report, 1 JAN – 31 MAR 11.

<sup>200</sup> USF-I Knowledge Management Summary Jan- Mar 2011.

<sup>201</sup> USF-I J8: "OSC-I Costing Stakeholder Synchronization," JPOG, 2 Apr. 2011.

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personnel conducting security assistance activities.<sup>202</sup> It also lacks authority to transfer some types of equipment to the DoS. Although DoD has authority to provide for the force protection of DoD personnel within OSC-I, there is no authority to provide for the force protection of the contractor personnel who make up the vast majority of the SATs. The US government also lacks an agreement with the GoI that would permit US forces and contractors to participate in operations in Iraq, and that would provide status protections, access to and use of facilities, customs duties and tax exemptions, or other legal privileges and immunities beyond the end of 2011.<sup>203</sup>

### **Looking Ahead: OSC-I and INL**

(U/~~FOUO~~) The plan as of the close of the quarter was that the OSC-I organization will have 118 DoD military, 9 civilian personnel and 30 locally employed staff for a total of 157. Its mission is to conduct Security Cooperation activities and programs to support Iraq's continued development into a sovereign, stable, and long-term self-reliant strategic partner that contributes to peace and security in the region. As the quarter came to a close, OSC-I remained on path to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on 1 June, with plans for a presence in Baghdad, Erbil, Basrah, Besmaya, Taji, Umm Qasr, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. OSC-I will manage International Military Education Training and Foreign Military Sales cases, organize joint exercises, evaluate Iraqi military capabilities and requirements, monitor programs, and conduct liaison functions.<sup>204</sup>

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
<sup>202</sup> \$129M in construction costs at four OSC-I sites was approved after 2d Qtr, FY 2011

<sup>203</sup> OSC-I Status Update, GO/FO SVTC, 7 Dec. 2010; CENTCOM CIA Information Paper: Subj: Legal Authorities in Support of Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), 10 Feb. 2011.

<sup>204</sup> ITSLC OSC-I Information Paper, 20 Jan. 2011 Final; US Embassy-Baghdad cable, Subject: Scen setter for the Visit of Defense Secretary Gates to Iraq, 4 April 2011.

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#### Security Assistance is Key Tool for Enduring Strategic Partnership

31

(DCG (A&T) and NATO NTM-I Update to the CG, 17 Jan. 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) As the chart above depicts, the current projection is that 763 Security Assistance Team members, almost exclusively contractors, will be serving under OSC-I direction on 1 January 2012. That number will drop significantly through the year, with future FMS cases signed by Iraq determining the exact number.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Building on USF-I's successful police training programs, the State Department's INL police training program is also on target to achieve IOC on 1 July. INL will deploy approximately 190 civilian police and technical advisors out of three hubs—Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil. The Police Training Program will execute an advise, mentor and train mission focused on improving the MoI's managerial functions and provincial police leadership. INL also provides integrated assistance to the Iraqi criminal justice system. The embassy's Rule of Law program, which draws on Department of Justice assets, will continue to strengthen the Iraqi judiciary. In the provinces, USAID will concentrate future operations on building capacity for democratic rule at the national, provincial, and local levels of government, modernizing the Iraqi agriculture sector, supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises, and fostering private sector expansion. At a national level, it will improve the ability of Iraqis to provide basic social services, strengthen parliamentary institutions, and increase capacity in public administration.<sup>205</sup>

(S) USF-I's timeline for transferring the twenty enduring police and ministerial functions to INL is shown below, along with challenges remaining in order to effect this transition. As can be seen, most of the challenges in this transition revolve around continued uncertainty in resourcing,

<sup>205</sup> US EMB-Baghdad cable, Subject: Scen setter for the Visit of Defense Secretary Gates to Iraq, 4 April 2011.

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be it construction of adequate facilities, equipping of sufficient vehicles, or concerns over further cuts to the DoS budget in fiscal year 2012.

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### OBJ 8: Transition Activities from USF-I to Partners

JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT-DEC
<b>Police</b> • Training Centers and Academies • Counter Explosives • National Forensic Program	<b>Police</b> • Criminal Evidence • Investigations • Law Enforcement Intel Support	<b>Police</b> • Police Force Leadership • Advisory Mission • Critical Infrastructure Protection • Border Security	<b>USF-I/AT&amp;E</b> • Mil Logistics • Advising • K&G • Integration • Borders and Ports • Federal Police Force Generation • Senior Leader Advising
<b>Mil</b> • Public Relations • Finance • Human Resources • Rule of Law (IA, IG, Human Rights)		<b>Mil</b> • Communications • IT • Logistics • Maintenance • Sustainment • Planning	

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Enduring Functions to Transfer**

- 10 Ministerial functions
- 10 Police functions

**Transfer Criteria**

- Capability
- Delivery of equipment
- Re-posture efforts
- Right seat ride

**Three Key Challenges**

- DoS Perimeter Security may not meet 01 Oct 11 Mission Capable date
- Potential occupation delay
- Developing mitigation measures
- Project insufficient up-armored vehicles to meet RSO requirements on 01 Oct 11
- Determining alternative options
- Determining feasibility of USF-I providing this capability
- Impact of DoS FY12 budget reduction on INL PDP

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23

(CUB, 7 Apr. 2011)

### Reposture the Force Line of Effort

“Look to Iraq, where nearly 100,000 of our brave men and women have left with their heads held high; where American combat patrols have ended; violence has come down; and a new government has been formed. This year, our civilians will forge a lasting partnership with the Iraqi people, while we finish the job of bringing our troops out of Iraq. America’s commitment has been kept; the Iraq War is coming to an end.”

*President Barack Obama, State of the Union address, January 25, 2011*

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Assessment




(March 2011 OPORD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 12 April 2011)

(S) USF-I's assessment at the end of March 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPORD 11-01 for the "Reposture the Force" Line of Effort is illustrated above. All three objectives currently being assessed are viewed as "Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas." The fourth objective, conducting operational maneuver, will not be assessed until Phase II of the campaign begins on or about 1 September. However, prior to that time the plan calls for the gradual drawdown of equipment and bases though not significant numbers of personnel in order to reduce the logistical burden anticipated during the final four months of 2011.

Disposition of Forces

 **USF-I Advisory / Assistance Force Laydown**

Transfer of Authority (TOA) Projection		
Current Unit (BOG date)	Incoming (Arrival date)	TOA Date
III Corps 21 FEB 11	XVIII ABN 28 JAN 11	8 FEB 11
USD-N		
HQ 4 <sup>th</sup> ID 16 OCT 11	---	---
4/1 CD 18 SEP 11	4/1 AD 9 AUG 11	8 SEP 11
1/1 ID (-) 11 OCT 11	---	---
2/25 ID 1 JUL 11	2/1 CD 22 MAY 11	21 JUN 11
USD-C		
HQ 25 <sup>th</sup> ID 26 DEC 11	---	---
2/1 ID 15 DEC 11	---	---
4/3 ID 9 JUL 11	2/82 ABN 30 MAY 11	29 JUN 11
USD-S		
HQ 1 <sup>st</sup> ID 9 JAN 11	HQ 36 <sup>th</sup> ID 16 DEC 10	2 JAN 11
3 ACR 9 OCT 11	1/1 CD 30 AUG 11	29 SEP 11
3/4 ID 21 MAR 11	3/1 CD 9 FEB 11	11 MAR 11



28 DEC 10

Prepared by: (b)(3), (b)(6) CCJ3-O-AP, SVOIF b 6 27 DEC 10 ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU~~


(CENTCOM Commander's Update Brief, 28 December 2011)

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(U) Disposition of USF-I elements at the beginning of the quarter is shown above; disposition at the close of the quarter is shown below. The basic disposition of three US Divisions commanding six Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) and one Advise and Assist Task Force (AATF) did not change during the quarter. On 2 January the Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, transferred authority for the US Division-South Area of Operations to the Headquarters, 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Texas Army National Guard, MG Eddy Spurgin commanding. The 103<sup>d</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command, which directed logistical support across Iraq throughout the entire quarter, will be replaced by the 310<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command on 1 April.

(S) FRAGO 2432 was issued on 21 January reconstituting the Iraq Contingency Response Force (ICRF) and designating USD-South and USD-North to develop plans establishing a force indentified as the primary and alternate ICRF, respectively. The requirements for the ICRF are an Immediate Ready Force (IRF) consisting of a battalion tactical command post and one rifle company augmented with a battalion reconnaissance section available at no later than Notification + 12 hours. USD-South designated 2/2 Cavalry as the primary and USD-North designated 1-14 Infantry as the alternate ICRF.<sup>206</sup>



<sup>206</sup> History Report, J35 FUOPs, FY 11 Q2. The previous ICRF, TF 1.4a Cavalry, had been committed to USD-North on 16 December 2010.

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**(CENTCOM Commander's Update Brief, 30 March 2011)**

(S) Advise and Assist relationships for the six AABs and one AATF at the close of the quarter were as follows:

In the USD-North Area of Operations (AO):

- 4/1 CD AAB is partnered with 2nd IA Division and 3rd IA Division (at COS Marez, Mosul)
- 1/1 ID AATF is partnered with 12th IA Division (at COS Warrior, Kirkuk)
- 2/25 ID AAB is partnered with 4th IA Division and 5th IA Division (at COS Warhorse, Baqubah)

In the USD-Center AO:

- 2/1 ID AAB elements (Training Teams) are partnered with ISF at COSs Hammer and War Eagle (at COS Falcon, Baghdad).
- 4/3 ID AAB is partnered with Anbar Operations Center, 1<sup>st</sup> & 7th IA Div, and 2nd DBE Div (at COS Blue Diamond, Ramadi).

In the USD-South AO:

- 3 ACR AAB is partnered with 8th IA Division (at COB Echo, Ad Diwaniyah).
- 3-1 CAV AAB is partnered with 10th IA Division and 14th IA Division (at COB Adder, Nasiriyah).

**Personnel**

(U) USF-I personnel boots on ground strength on 1 January 2011 was 49,712. On 1 April 2011 it was 46,396.



**US Forces – Iraq  
 Personnel Strengths by Month**



		1-Dec	1-Jan	1-Feb	1-Mar
ARMY	AC	30,855	34,586	34,619	34507
	RC	2,769	2,681	2,670	2,804
	NG	6,646	5,070	5,057	5,150
AIR FORCE	AC	4,975	4,879	4,875	4,841
	RC	336	365	360	347
	NG	348	442	439	371
NAVY	AC	993	1,210	1,205	1,168
	RC	313	360	364	304
MC	AC	73	94	95	67
	RC	4	8	7	7
CG	AC	0	8	7	5
	RC	8	9	8	8
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>47,320</b>	<b>49,712</b>	<b>49,706</b>	<b>49,579</b>

(J1 History, 1Q CY 11)

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(S) Per the CG's guidance for OPORD 11-01, in order to retain maximum flexibility for as long as possible, personnel drawdown will not begin in earnest until August 2011. The chart below, with data as of 26 March, depicts how the J1 projects that drawdown will take place throughout the rest of 2011. The gap between the two lines on the graph is the difference between the number assigned and the actual number of boots on ground. This difference takes into account the SECDEF business rules for managing Iraq force levels as well as personnel not present for duty.. Those two lines draw together in the final quarter of 2011 with the reduction and eventual elimination of Rest and Recuperation leave program.



(CUB, 2 Apr. 2011)


### Logistics

(S) USF-I retrograded 5,213 pieces of rolling stock and 596,961 pieces of non-rolling stock during the quarter. There are currently approximately 1.31 million pieces of equipment in Iraq consisting of just less than 34,000 pieces of rolling stock and approximately 1.28 million pieces of non-rolling stock. This is down from 1.81 million pieces of equipment when Operation New Dawn began on 1 September 2010. However, for some categories of equipment, there was a slight increase in numbers within Iraq. This was attributed to recent RIP/TOAs and fielding of

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XSAPI plates for individual body armor. No significant change in on-hand equipment balances are expected until USF-I reaches its final set of units in 2011.<sup>207</sup>



#### (J4 Quarterly Report 1 Jan – 31 Mar 11)

(S) The organizational property trend line (ORG) increased during the quarter, but will begin to decrease, coinciding with the completion of various unit RIP/TOAs. The Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) and Contractor-Managed/ Government-Owned (CMGO) trend lines depict gradual decreases throughout the quarter as units identified and retrograded non-mission essential or excess equipment. The Central Issuing Facility/ Individual Protective Equipment (CIF/IPE) trend line shows a drastic decrease as CIF quantities reduced by approximately 165,000 items in early April following retrograde to Kuwait.<sup>208</sup>

(S) Stocks of other classes of supply were also gradually drawn down. For example, Class V (ammunition) stockpiles in Iraq were reduced by 664 short tons. Supplies of Class III (bulk petroleum, oil and lubricants) dropped from 14 million gallons to 11.8 million. Following a review of authorized stockage lists in February, Class IX (repair parts) stock levels within the six Supply Support Activities across Iraq were reduced by 64 percent.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>207</sup> J4 Quarterly Report, 1 Jan 11- 31 Mar 11.


<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

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## Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP)



### (J4 Quarterly Report 1 Jan. – 31 Mar. 11)

(S) During this period, USF-I completed 109 FEPP packets consisting of 1,248,412 items with a fair market value of over \$39.7 million dollars. Most of this came during the month of March, when USF-I transferred nearly 1 million items totaling \$14.8 million dollars fair market value. This was due in large part to the Camp Cropper Prison Facility Tiered Authority transfers which transferred over 628,000 consumable items to the GoI. From January 2009 through March 2011, USF-I has transferred nearly 2.5 million items with a fair market value over \$231.4 million dollars.<sup>210</sup>

<sup>210</sup> J4 Quarterly Report, 1 Jan.-31 Mar. 11; CUB, 2 Apr. 2011.

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## Transportation

(S) USF-I's J4 coordinated the movement of 6,076 Corps and Theater convoys, 246 pieces of land/sea cargo shipments from Iraq to Afghanistan, and 6,789 Iraqi Transportation Network (ITN) truckloads of US Forces' cargo. During this period, the J4 also coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy in response to a GoI request for assistance in the return of the Iraqi Jewish archives. Working with the DoS, USF-I helped arrange for military airlift to return an Iraqi national treasure from a non-DoD entity.<sup>211</sup>

## Base Transfers

(U) USF-I began the quarter with 80 bases and returned 9 to the GoI. However, it added two bases during the quarter due to the reopening of the Kirkush Military Training Base (formerly COS Caldwell) and the creation, for accounting purposes, of a separate base for Camp Cropper out of the already existing Victory Base Complex. As a result, on 31 March there were 73 bases remaining under USF-I control. The command anticipates closing 14 bases during the April-June 2011 quarter, though this number will almost certainly be adjusted due to more than 20 requests from the USD's to adjust planned base closure dates that were being staffed by USF-I in April 2011.<sup>212</sup>

(U) All nine of the bases or facilities transferred during the quarter were small entities, with no infrastructure improvements and less than \$2 million in FEPP transfers handed over. In contrast, the transfer of a single base in the previous quarter, Camp Bucca, entailed transfer of over \$12 million in infrastructure improvements and \$36 million in FEPP to the GoI.<sup>213</sup>

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
<sup>211</sup> J4 Quarterly Report, 1 Jan.-31 Mar. 11.

<sup>212</sup> USF-I J7 BF&E, Memorandum for US Central Command, Logistics Directorate, Engineer Division, Subject: FY 11 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter Iraq Base Closure Report, 31 Mar. 2011.

<sup>213</sup> Encl 1, FY 11 1st Quarter Iraq Base Closure Report, 31 Dec. 2010.

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(Encl 2, FY 11 2d Quarter Iraq Base Closure Report, 31 March 2011)

(U) The most difficult part of the base transition the drawdown of the eleven largest bases in Iraq is yet to come. LTG Frank Helmick, the incoming DCG (Operations) made this point as he was receiving orientation briefings from the USF-I staff in late January, commenting “I drive around Balad or Victory and I cringe when I think about what we’ve got to do.” Realizing the unprecedented challenge that closing the largest bases in Iraq will present in the coming year, the J7 organized a Large Base Transition Working Group and Large Base Transition Board during this quarter to work directly with key staff elements such as the DCG (Support), J4, CENTCOM Contracting Command, and the commands responsible for each of these bases. The group and the board provide regular progress updates, and identify and resolve issues and future actions concerning transition of the non-enduring Hub and Spoke bases. In USD-North, the focus is on COB’s Warhorse, Cobra, and Sykes. The 322d Air Expeditionary Wing has responsibility for Joint Base Balad. In USD-Center, the primary concern is Al Asad Air Base (Victory Base Complex is so large it is in a class by itself, with its own separate dedicated working group). In USD-South, the large base focus is on Echo, Garry Owen, Kalsu, Delta, and Adder. The J7 has also formed separate working groups and boards along with key USF-I staff elements and the USEMB to facilitate the transition of bases which will become enduring presence locations, shifting to DoS control later this year.<sup>214</sup>

<sup>214</sup> Historian Notes, USF-I J3 Incoming DCG-O Operations Brief, 27 Jan. 2011; USF-I J7 “LBTB Final,” 9 Mar. & 23 Mar. 2011.

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## LARGE BASE TRANSITIONS



LAFB	BASE	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	
<b>USD - NORTH</b>											
#317	★ Warhorse	SP		UNK (5th IA- MoYS)			30 SEP (7 OCT)				
#395	★ Cobra	SP		1st IA				8 OCT (30 SEP)			
#86	★ Sykes	SP		3rd IA				8 OCT (9 OCT)			
#306	JBB	HUB		IAF					30 NOV		
<b>USD - CENTER</b>											
#82	Al Asad	HUB		7th IA					15 NOV		
#188	VBC	HUB		UKN					1 DEC		
<b>USD - SOUTH</b>											
#343	Delta	SP		IAF				30 OCT			
#29	Garry Owen	SP		UKN				30 OCT			
#19	Echo	SP		UKN (5th BDE)						19 DEC	
#262	Kalsu	HUB		8th IA						16 DEC	
#31	Adder	HUB		IAF/MoD						23 DEC	

Gol Counterpart
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★ Pending Date Change from OSB.

Engineering Excellence!



With Honor and Success

4

**(J7 Large Base Transition Board, 23 Mar. 2011)**

(S) One of the concerns USF-I leadership expressed about the drawdown is that personnel will migrate towards the large bases as 2011 progresses and smaller bases close, making it more difficult to empty the large bases at the end of the year. “It seems to me that in my travels that a lot of people have told me they are headed to Adder” noted LTG Helmick, stating that he was not sure they will all fit, and that without planning COB Adder will become a big choke point. Others on the staff remarked that Adder was not the only base in this situation the other big “bathtubs” they noted were FOB Union III, Sather Air Base, and Camp Taji.<sup>215</sup>

(U) The J7 Environmental Section mitigated and closed 44 environmental sites during the quarter and completed 57 Environmental Site Closure Surveys, treating and neutralizing 2.4 million pounds of environmentally regulated waste and recycling 3.7 million pounds of used oil, coolant, off-spec fuel, crushed filters and batteries.<sup>216</sup>

<sup>215</sup> Historian Notes, USF-I J3: “Incoming DCG-O Operations Brief,” 27 Jan. 2011.

<sup>216</sup> USF-I J7 BF&E, Memorandum for US Central Command, Logistics Directorate, Engineer Division, Subject: FY 11 2nd Quarter Iraq Base Closure Report, 31 Mar. 2011.

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
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### Construction

(S) At the end of the quarter there were 350 construction projects still ongoing valued at \$965 million. These projects support the ISF, enduring mission requirements, reconstruction, civil capacity development, and O&M construction including projects executed by CENTCOM Contracting Command and the Theater Engineer Brigade. 190 of these 350 projects are CERP and I-CERP projects funded through the US Divisions, all of which are scheduled to be completed by July.<sup>217</sup>

(S) The US Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region District (GRD) construction program completed 66 projects during the quarter, with 112 remaining at the end of March. Sixty of these are Iraqi Security Force Funds (ISFF) projects and align with USF-I's Strengthen the ISF LOE. GRD anticipates that it will be down to 37 projects remaining at the end of the June. In August, GRD will transition to the Middle-East District Iraq Area Office and assume 17 EMS-related projects.<sup>218</sup>

### Contractor Drawdown



<sup>217</sup> CUB, 2 Apr. 2011.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

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**(CUB, 23 April 2011)**

(U/~~FOUO~~) The end of March 2011 contractor census showed 63,206 contractors supporting USF-I, a drop of 4,603 (9.3 percent) from the 67,809 contractors in Iraq at the end of December.<sup>219</sup>

(U/~~FOUO~~) On 1 March, CENTCOM Contracting Command (C3), the DCG (Support), J4 and other entities together stood up a Contractor Fusion Cell to monitor, track, assess and report on contracts, equipment and personnel with regard to base transitions and drawdown. At the end of the month, C3 and the other members of the Fusion Cell conducted a ROC drill to gain a clear, common picture of the contracts in theater held by various entities, determine how contracts will be brought to conclusion or transitioned to DoS control, especially on the larger bases and those transitioning to an enduring OSC-I presence.<sup>220</sup>

### **Conclusion**

“We now face an historic opportunity and a critical window to help Iraq emerge as a strategic partner and a force for stability and moderation in a troubled region. An enduring Iraqi-U.S. partnership will be critical in enabling Iraq to be that positive force. It is our national interest to fully support that partnership. We cannot afford to let the gains we have sacrificed so much for slip away before they are cemented.”

*Joint Statement of Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 1, 2011*

(U) This quarter will long be remembered as the time of the Arab Spring, a movement that overthrew long-established autocrats and offered the promise of democratic reform for millions across the Middle East. Whether those promises will come true or not is yet to be seen, but Iraqis like others across the region and much of the rest of the world watched with fascination as rulers who appeared impervious to change were swept away or lashed out in bloody reprisal. Iraq's own demonstrations, to include the 25 February “Day of Rage,” were small and peaceful by comparison, as the lack of democracy was not an underlying concern. But joblessness, corruption, and lack of services provided their own motivation to take to the streets, and most observers agree that protests over these issues will only grow worse as the summer temperatures rise. As key security ministries in the GoI remained unfilled and the Kurds tested how far they could push their forces in violation of the Combined Security Mechanism, USF-I focused on several tasks simultaneously. The Advise, Train, Assist and Equip mission continued to strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces in many ways, but perhaps most impressive were the results of the al-Tadreeb al-Shamil combined arms training conducted by the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army Divisions. All elements of the USF-I staff were deeply engaged in planning,

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<sup>219</sup> CUB, 23 April 2011

<sup>220</sup> OPOD 10-01 FRAGO 2676, Contractor Drawdown Operational Controls (C3 Contractor Fusion Cell).

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synchronizing and rehearsing Operations Order 11-01 and preparing for the final transition of all missions to the US Embassy and other entities. Reposturing of forces and equipment will pick up dramatically during Phase II of OPORD 11-01, and in December the last US Forces will depart Iraq ... unless, of course, the Iraqis ask us to stay.



USF-I Historian

Handwritten signature of William B. Garrett III.

WILLIAM B. GARRETT III  
Major General, USA  
Chief of Staff

Annexes:

Annex A: USF-I Command and Staff Roster, May 2010 thru Feb. 2011

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Annex A: USF-I Command and Staff Roster, May 2010 thru Feb. 2011

Headquarters USF-I Command Group


	1 May 2010 (III Corps)	1 Sept 2010 (OND)	15 Feb 11 (XVIII Corps)
Commanding General, USF-I	GEN Raymond Odierno (Sep 08)	GEN Lloyd Austin III (Sep 10)	GEN Lloyd Austin III
USF-I Command Sergeant Major	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
Deputy Commanding General-Operations (DCG-O)	LTG Robert Cone (Mar 10)	LTG Robert Cone	LTG Frank Helmick (Feb 11)
DCG-O Command Sergeant Major	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
Deputy Commanding General-Advising & Training (DCG-A&T)	LTG Michael Barbero (Jan 10)	LTG Michael Barbero	LTG Michael Ferriter (Jan 11)
Deputy Commanding General-Support (DCG-S)	LTG Ken Hunzeker (Jan 10)	MG Edward Cardon (Aug 10)	MG Edward Cardon
Deputy Commanding General-Detainee Ops/ Provost Marshal General (DCG-DS/PMO)	MG Nelson "Jerry" Cannon (Mar 10)	MG Jerry Cannon	MG Jerry Cannon
CG's POLAD	Ms. Emma Sky		
CG's Executive Officer	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
Commander's Initiatives Group	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
COS	MG Joseph Anderson (Aug 09)	MG William Garrett III (Jul 10)	MG William Garrett III

DCOS	BG Joseph DiSalvo (Mar 10)	BG Joseph DiSalvo	BG Michael Garrett (Feb 11)
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U.S. Embassy - Chief of Mission  
 Ambassador Christopher Hill (Apr 09) / Ambassador James F. Jeffrey (Aug 10)

**Primary Staff**

	<b>1 May 2010 (III Corps)</b>	<b>1 Sept 2010 (OND)</b>	<b>15 Feb 2011 (XVIII Corps)</b>
J-1	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-2	MG Ted Nicholas (Aug 09)	BG Mark Perrin (Oct 10)	MG Mark Perrin
J-2 JIOC	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-3	MG James "Mark" McDonald (Apr 10)	MG Mark McDonald	MG Arthur Bartell (Nov 10)
J-3 Deputy Director	RDML Frank Morneau (Jan 10)	N/A	RDML Kevin Kovacich
J-35 FUOPS	(b)(3), (b)(6)	RDML Kevin Kovacich (Aug 10)	(b)(3), (b)(6)
J-33 CUOPS	BG John Rossi (Mar 10)	BG John Rossi	(b)(6)
J-3 Info Ops			
J-3 CHOPS			
J-3 Enduring Ops			
J-3 Air			



J-3 Force Management	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-3 COIC	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-3 Training	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-4	BG Gustave Perna (Oct 09)	BG Gustave Perna	MG Thomas Richardson (Oct 10)
J-4 JLOC	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-4 JPIC	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-5	Maj Gen Mark Mathews (Jun 09)	Maj Gen Noel "Tom" Jones (Jun 10)	Maj Gen Tom Jones
J-5 Deputy Director	N/A	Brig Gen Jeffrey Harrigan (Jul 10)	Brig Gen Jeffrey Harrigan
J-5 Strategy	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-5 Plans	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-5 Assessments	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-6	RDML David Simpson (Jan 10)	RDML David Simpson	RDML(S) Hank Bond (Nov 10)
J-7	BG Kendall Cox (Oct 09)	BG Kendall Cox	BG Scott "Rock" Donahue (Jan 11)
J-8	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
J-9	MG Stephen Lanza	BG Jeffrey Buchanan	MG Jeffrey Buchanan
J-9 Deputy Director	Brig Gen Thomas Masiello (Jan 09)	Brig Gen John "Bob" Ranck (Jan 10)	Mr. Greg Garcia (Jan 11)

**Special Staff**

	<b>1 May 2010 (III Corps)</b>	<b>1 Sept 2010 (OND)</b>	<b>15 Feb 2011 (XVIII Corps)</b>
<b>FSEC</b>	Maj Gen Joseph Reynes	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)
<b>JCC-IA / C3</b>	BG Camille Nichols	BG Camille Nichols	BG Camille Nichols
<b>SJA</b>			
<b>CHAPLAIN</b>			
<b>IG</b>			
<b>National Guard Advisor</b>			
<b>Army Reserve Advisor</b>			
<b>Knowledge Management</b>			
<b>EO</b>			
<b>Surgeon</b>			
<b>RED TEAM/Competing Strategies</b>			
<b>SJS</b>			

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SAFETY	(b)(6)
Command Historian	(b)(3), (b)(6)

**DCG Advising & Training Staff**

	1 May 2010 (III Corps)	1 Sept 2010 (OND)	15 Feb 2011 (XVIII Corps)
PSG-I // OSC-I	(b)(6)		
ITAM MOD	(b)(6)		
ITAM Army	BG Lloyd Miles	BG Jeffrey Snow	BG Jeffrey Snow
ITAM Navy	(b)(6)	Brig. (UK) Tim Chicken	Brig. (UK) Tim Chicken
CNATT, Umm Qasr	RDML Jeffrey "Scott" Jones	RDML Scott Jones	RDML Kelvin Dixon
ITAM AF / Air	Brig Gen Scott Hanson	Brig Gen Scott Hanson	Brig Gen Anthony Rock
ITAM DIR	MG Richard Rowe	BG Bradley May	BG Bradley May
MOI	RDML Charles Ray	RDML Charles Ray	Mr. Edward Horton
Police	BG Michael Smith	BG Michael Smith	BG Michael Smith
Intel	(b)(6)		
ISF LOG	(b)(6)		
ISAM	Brig Gen (s) Scott Jansson	Brig Gen Scott Jansson	Brig Gen Scott Jansson

**USF-I Major Subordinate Commands**

	<b>1 May 2010</b>		<b>15 Feb 2011</b>	
<b>USD-N</b>	<i>3d Infantry Division</i>	MG Tony Cucolo	<i>4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division</i> (4 Nov 10)	MG David Perkins
<b>USD-C</b>	<i>1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division</i>	MG Terry Wolff	<i>25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division</i> (20 Dec 10)	MG Bernard Champoux
<b>USD-S</b>	<i>1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division</i>	MG Vince Brooks	<i>36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division</i> (2 Jan 11)	MG Eddy Spurgin
<b>Expeditionary Sustainment Command</b>	<i>13<sup>th</sup> ESC</i>	BG Paul Wentz	<i>103d ESC</i> (1 Jul 10)	BG Mark Corson

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