MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Task Force Joint Campaign Action Plan

1. References:
   a. FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency
   b. National Strategy in Iraq (Nov 05)
   c. USM-I/MNF-I Joint Mission Statement – Building Success: Completing the Transition.

2. Task Organization: See chart (enclosure).

3. Purpose. The purpose of this Plan is to provide joint tactical and operational level direction and to synchronize the efforts of the units, organizations and staffs of Task Force. It is also to identify our battlespace and where we as an organization mesh into the overall Campaign Plan for MNF-I (Multi National Force – Iraq), USM-I (United States Mission – Iraq) and the Gof (Government of Iraq).

4. Our Higher Command’s Joint Campaign Plan Mission and Endstate. Joint Campaign Plan (JCP 06) sets Coalition and U.S. policy for Operation Iraqi Freedom. This document outlines the strategy for the Campaign in Iraq. Our efforts must be synchronized with MNF-I efforts. All information and details that authorize and regulate the presence of MNF-I and highlights the significance of national unity to the future of Iraq must be understood and integrated in everything TF undertakes. Some elements of the campaign are progressing more slowly however, the mission and the campaign endstate remain achievable. UNSCR 1723, approved in Nov 2006, extends the mandate for operations in Iraq through the end of 2007.

   a. Mission: TF conducts detention and interrogation operations, supports the development of the Rule of Law in Iraq, protects the PMOI, and protects assigned Forward Operating Bases to support the MNF-I campaign plan and U.S. objectives in Iraq.

   b. Campaign Endstate: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists. Inherent in this endstate is a judicial process that is perceived as fair and just by the Iraqi people, International Organizations and the Moslem world as a whole. We must also have a professional Iraqi Correctional system that is trained, vetted and is incorporated into the overall security structure and considered part of the security forces of Iraq.
The Central Challenge: The central challenge of TF 1-4a is how best to develop an Iraqi court, correction, and detention program, that they can manage and that incorporates the Rule of Law. Additionally, we must plan to develop a detainee re-integration program that protects our forces, supports the MNF-I Campaign Plan but provides us with an IO platform to help identify detainees through Intelligence Screening and Interrogation Operations to support the Intelligence collection efforts, focused on the needs of the population, takes advantage of insurgent defections, provides parole and rehabilitation, counters the indoctrination efforts currently ongoing in our TIFs by the Takfiris and other extremists and helps professionalize the ICO system. The other aspect or challenge is to ensure the Rule of Law is adhered to and that all the people of Iraq whether Sunni, Shia or Kurd perceive it as fair and equitable.

campaign progress: TF 1-4a has a great reputation and much work has been accomplished by the personnel who served in this unit before us. There have been setbacks and challenges that have at times delayed our progress but forward progress has been made. We still have a long road ahead of us with still more challenges and objectives to be realized. Combined planning between the Gol, USM-I, TF 1-4a and the International Community will begin in earnest as the current operational plan for MNF-I gains momentum. We must think of anything we do in operational terms and how our battlespace fits, integrates and synchronizes into the overall campaign plan of MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, the Embassy and the Gol.

3. Situation.

a. Key Points:

1. Sectarian violence continues to erode security conditions.
2. Foundation for stability and transition is weakened.
3. Violence fueled by Shia extremists continues to intimidate Iraqis.
4. AQI and Sunni extremists continue to conduct high profile attacks.
5. ISF still rely on coalition forces for their support.
6. Efforts to bring the country together continues to progress slowly.

b. Key Judgments:

1. We must continue to support Iraqi efforts in the Rule of Law.
2. We must continue to develop the Iraqi criminal court system and ensure their judges and investigators adhere to established standards.
3. We must continue to assist the Iraqis in developing their corrections institutions and to professionalize their corrections personnel and system.
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(4) We must develop a way to marginalize the extremists and provide hope for the detainee population, granted that there are a number of detainees we would never want released.

(5) We must continue to conduct interrogation operations to identify the detainee’s affiliation and possible link to insurgent elements. This will allow us to have a better understanding of a detainee’s potential for reintegration.

(6) We must resolve the issue with the MeK and develop a way ahead realizing that this will largely be a policy issue and one that we will have to interface with DoS and other agencies.

(7) We must continue to provide security to the detainee population in Coalition administered TIFs and to ensure the detainees are properly treated and cared for in accordance with ICRC standards.

(8) We must exploit where possible information and intelligence that can help our forces in the fight.

(9) We must develop a parole and rehabilitation program that turns the marginal Iraqis into an asset for the Coalition.

(10) We must own our battlespace, control it and be proactive in our approach.

(11) We must develop a program to identify threats that target military and civilian groups and counter those threats with interrogations and counterintelligence operations.

4. Execution. The four numbered areas in the Execution portion of the document that will be discussed are as follows: 1) Indoctrination program; 2) Close and deep fights; 3) How we influence the AO; 4) Governmental Agencies. I think these four goals, partners and methods presuppose, or demand, an input. Indoctrination should on some level, include an assessment of individuals who are centers of gravity or who have placement and access within a community in our AO/Al. Some small subset of qualified detainees who have been indoctrinated, or enlightened, should be recruited as converted collectors. This should be a natural by-product and a goal of the indoctrination, one of the directed priorities of the close fight. We produce these converted collectors through interrogations, or garner them during the TIFRIC process. In doing so during the close, we have created and developed sources that will be primary tools in the deep fight.

The interagency piece of this is a layover, or hand-off, between the military, and diplomatic/informational elements of power—not quite law enforcement, but just shy of military; call it State Security or National Security.

a. Commander’s Intent. We must think of everything we do as an operation and in therefore in operational terms. We cannot change MNC-I’s operational objectives, enhance MNSTC-I’s ISF training programs but what we can do is influence the fight in our battlespace. Our battlespace are the U.S. detention facilities at Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper and, Camp Ashraf. We can assist with establishing the Rule of Law and create conditions where the Iraqi
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criminal court system is looked upon as being fair and impartial. We can assist the Iraqis in
getting more judges and investigators and ensure they are properly trained and administer the law
fairly and impartially. We can help the Iraqis train more correction officers to relieve the
problem of overcrowding and more importantly leave the Iraqis with a professional corrections
force. We can also help turn or marginalize the Islamists by providing an alternative to the
current system or the way of doing business. We can conduct Interrogation Operations to
support operational missions for MNC-I. We must never forget that this is an IO fight which we
must conduct with a vengeance. We have the moral high ground and we must show the Iraqis,
the international community, our own population and the Muslim world that we are fair and
provide a means and a way for Iraqis to improve their life and not throw their hat in with Islamic
extremists. We will develop a TIFRIC (Theater Internment Facility Re-Integration Camp)
concept which will hold detainees until they have completed a training and reorientation
program where they are considered no longer a security risk to Coalition and Iraqi Security
Forces.

My overall intent:

(1) To develop a team where no one is indispensable. Battle rhythm.

(2) To let the commanders and staff do their jobs without fear of someone continually
watching their every move.

(3) To provide guidance and direction and to let the action officer carry the ball.

(4) To provide an environment where we are not continually working ourselves to death,
don’t forget this is a marathon and not a sprint.

(5) Empower our senior NCOs.

(6) Develop an aggressive IO campaign.

(7) Use resources smartly. Many things have been built and are available already, let’s
not reinvent the wheel. Synchronize our efforts with MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, GRD, JCC-I,
the Embassy and the Government of Iraq.

(8) Be a team player with all MNF-I units and Governmental Agencies at the Embassy,
these are all great Americans who have come here to make a difference, let’s act as one team
and one fight and not a we – they relationship. Always think or include how IO will support the
mission within the context of the commander’s overall vision of the operation.

(9) Develop the close and deep fights and set priorities and the direction for this
organization.

(10) Change the mindset, think battlespace and how we can influence our area of
operations and our area of influence with adjacent and higher organizations. We own our
battlespace, we influence it, direct who enters into it and control it.
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(11) Develop a system that the Iraqis can manage and control when we turn it over to them. If they can not administer it or it is foreign to them we are causing second and third order effects that will come back to haunt us. The goal is to make it fit into their system with the Rule of Law as the basis.

(12) We can not take our focus from the close fight which are the detention operations at Camps Bucca, Cropper and Ashraf. That is the current fight.

(13) Develop a program for the deep fight, the TIFRIC concept, Professional Iraqi Correction system, Iraqi courts that follow the Rule of Law and are not perceived as being sectarian and the way ahead with respect to the Mek.

b. Big 5 Themes: In the overall plan I will present 5 themes that will outline our way ahead. These themes will attempt to synchronize our efforts as we move the Detention Operations to a new level.

(1) Courts. We have made a fundamental error in the way we have released detainees to date. First and foremost the Iraqi courts can only decide if the detainee has committed a crime under Iraqi law. The decision to hold or release the detainee rests with Commander TF. We hold people because they are considered security risks and no Iraqi court can make that call. The Iraqi courts can decide if the detainee is innocent or guilty under Iraqi law of committing a crime. If they decide he has and they are willing to take him and try him under criminal proceedings that are good. The determination of release can only be made if he does not pose a security risk to Coalition Forces. We therefore will continue to hold detainees who have committed no crime under Iraqi law due to the Operational Commanders determining that this person is a security risk. And they need to be interrogated to determine the underpinnings of the threat. If the threat is institutionalized, then we can collect on it by-products of the interrogation of threats would offer an angle for targeting them and for infiltrating them. This brings me to the second theme.

(2) Centralized vs. De-Centralized. We are in a counter insurgency fight but we have gone about conducting detention operations as if are fighting a conventional war. Arabs for centuries understand the nature of warfare at the local level. One tribe takes prisoners and negotiates their release based on what the other tribe will give in return. In this case security or the promise of no more attacks. We have taken this ability away from our local Major Subordinate Commanders. Multi national Division Baghdad, Multi National Force West, Multi National Division North and Multi national Division Center all have captured people they considered a security risk and handed them over to TF to care for, in other words taken them off the battlefield. There have been no negotiations at the local level. These commanders need to be able to negotiate the release of the people they capture with the local tribal (sheikhs), religious and political leaders. This currently is not being done, under our new concept these local commanders will have a say as to who gets release and when they get released. In other words they now have the power to negotiate for security and this fits in well with the Arab culture of prisoner exchange for something in return. This brings up the next point. We can’t assume that all tribal sheiks are honest men who have no axes to grind with the CF or who don’t have ulterior motive contrary to our own. Some will be evil and disingenuous, desiring to hurt
CF; and these or their followers will be interspersed with the common community we desire to help. Also, there will be other organizations or elements of society that have goals opposite of our own, also residing in this same common community. Commanders should have eyes-on these criminal/enemy elements, and again a good way to do so is to interrogate detainees of this kind for info about the groups. Similarly, those who are becoming enlightened, and hence, see the error of their ways may be susceptible to recruitment as sources. In this situation the placement and access would be within or near one of the group from which they originally sprang. The goal would be to have enough such sources recruited to slowly attrit the troublemakers. As stated earlier, these sources could be transitioned into a state security or other domestic security force through our own intelligence agencies or diplomatic agencies. But the key is to spot, assess, recruit, and project these sources incidental to interrogation indoctrination operations.

(3) Free Rider and Incentives. If water was free everyone would not control what they use or how it is used, that is a free ride program which currently exists under the way detention operations is conducted. Currently these MSC Commanders see TF 1.4a as an endless pool to accept all and any detainees they collect up. There is no incentive for them to have a stake in the action or with detention operations. Our new concept will call for these local commanders to make the call on when to release the detainee. They are now an active part of Detention Operations. They will have a vote and if our plan is fully funded they will be involved in bringing the detainee back to their area of operation as a member of a civil society with a skill.

(4) Care and Custody and Due Process. It is my intent to hold these detainees until they are no longer a security risk to our forces or to the Government of Iraq. Part of this process is to treat them with dignity and respect and to ensure that they develop a skill where they can become productive members of a civil society. Currently we drop them at Bucca and Cropper and leave them alone if they leave our guards alone. In other words they have a lot of free time to plan, indoctrinate the ill informed and practice their skills of open rebellion. However, if we put them through an education process, make them learn a skill and give them a program to follow for their release they begin to see that there I hope to obtaining release. Under the TIFRIC concept each detainee will be enrolled in a program and as they progress they will receive incentives. They will each learn a skill and trade where they can use these and become a member of a civil society. They will also undergo a program to show them the right words of the Koran and not be influenced by the extremists who basically now run the camps.

(5) Tents vs. Cells. Everyone who has been in TF 1.4a for longer than one week has seen what happens everyday or night; detainees with a lot of free time on their hands continue to destroy the tents we provide. We have spent a lot of funds replacing what the detainees destroy almost on a daily basis. Our program will call for the detainees to go into cells which can not be easily destroyed and will provide a level of safety to both the detainees and our guard force. Additionally, the ICOs understand how to control detainees under these conditions; they do not fully comprehend the use of tents for detainees. We will construct cells at Bucca and our TIFRIC locations to maximize control over the detainee population and to protect our guard force. These cells will meet ICRC standards; the added advantage is our ICO guard force is now capable of taking the lead.
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C. Key Tasks. Task Force 1.4a in conjunction with the GoI and Coalition will establish a common framework for actions based on the following tasks:

1) Close in Fight - Detention Operations. The key to Task Force 1.4a’s overall mission is the continued operations at Camp Bucca and Camp Cropper. This is our primary mission and will be for the near term. This is our close in fight. We must continue to hold, interrogate, provide medical care, provide required due process, and develop an IO campaign that keeps this from spilling over or causing us to divert resources from the deep fight. This close fight is also one which provides a venue for aggressive source operations, to plant agents within the community upon release; some, initially managed by military or DoD handlers as force protection assets, with an option for conversion to confidential informants or sources within LE or state security. This conversion would be a key overlap between the military interrogation operations and the Strategic Debriefing Center. We own this battlespace and need to ensure we continue to do what is right. Key implied tasks are:

(a) Establishing liaison with various entities, each of these liaisons will form a portion of the overall IO support.

(b) Using diplomatic and interagency support to assist in transferring status of detainees, the Mek (in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country teams), and agencies participating in the interrogations, assess, recruit, release, collective plan ICW the military, DoD and LE (CF and Iraqi).

(c) Establish C2 forward at Camp Bucca.

(d) Using CA, PSYOP, and our BBAs to support political and diplomatic initiatives.

(e) Transmitting the commander’s intent and scheme of operational maneuver, including close battle, deep battle, and rear security operations to ensure simultaneous understanding and execution operations in our battlespace.

(f) Supporting operational initiatives with IO such as health care for detainees, following the Rule of Law using DoS and other resources available.

(g) Determining support to the Camp Commanders.

(h) Developing branches and sequels to the close fight operations to stay ahead of the detainee TTPs.

(i) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more subordinate elements executing support functions. Also include instructions for informational linkups for TF resources involved in the deep battle.

(j) Continue providing required due process and complying with Iraqi law, while increasing the visibility and transparency in these areas both internally to the TIFs and externally within Iraq and within the international community.
(k) Interrogation to gain a better understanding of a detainee’s knowledge of information that can provide actionable intelligence.

(l) Recruiting to be run by military, agency, and Law Enforcement personnel to infiltrate threat organizations in the AO/AL.


(a) Rule of Law Line of Operation: Strengthened Rule of Law that provides for meaningful reconciliation.

(b) Professional Iraqi Correctional System: An Iraqi Correctional System that provides recruiting, vetting, and professional education system for the correctional officers. Professionalize the Force.

(c) Theater Internment Facility Re-integration Camp (TIFRC): Set forth the scheme of maneuver to move the detainees to Iraqi Regional Control. Inherent in this system is the ability train, educate, and recruit the detainees for reintegration into a civil society.

(d) MeK: In conjunction with our JIATF and the Department of State develop a way ahead with respect to the status of the MeK.

(3) Synchronization: The third component to our close in and deep fight is the ability of Task Force to synchronize assets and the ongoing activities from a host of agencies located in Iraq. The U.S. and our Coalition Allies have already provided much to the infrastructure of Iraq. We need to see what we need, what is already out there and synchronize all efforts. In our battlespace it will be our ability to synchronize these efforts that will provide us the leverage to influence the fight.

d. Tasks for the Lines of Operation.

(1) Rule of Law Line of Operation:

(a) Desired Effects: The Iraqi law and order forces, courts and corrections, are trained, equipped, protected and capable of carrying out their responsibilities. The application of the Rule of Law is fair and transparent. The people and government of Iraq have respect for and confident in the rule of law.

(b) Concept. Task Force will assist the GoI strengthen the Rule of Law in Iraq. This will be achieved by helping the GoI enhance the capability and accountability of the correctional officers, develop the criminal justice system, protect the judiciary, and improve the capacity for detention facilities and prisons. Ensure that detainee-related MNF-I actions are transparent and consistent with accepted norms of international and Iraqi law. Seek legal justification and GoI support for initiatives that go beyond
or appear to go beyond existing Iraqi law. Exercise caution in applying illusory due process or violating either Iraqi law or Iraqi considerations of fundamental fairness because of the detrimental impact this will likely have on the larger fight for hearts and minds.

(c) Tasks. Task Force Joint Campaign Action Plan 1.4a will encourage the GoI to form an Iraqi-led Rule of Law committee composed of appropriate senior level Ministry representatives and GoI officials to identify and implement solutions to conditions that prevent or threaten to prevent adherence to the Rule of Law. Task Force Joint Campaign Action Plan 1.4a has the lead. The following initiatives will be GoI and Coalition priorities as we both work towards setting the conditions for adherence to the Rule of Law in Iraq.

- Criminal Justice Initiatives. Develop procedures and capability to prosecute Coalition criminal detainees in the Iraqi court system.
- Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Enhance the capability of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq to prosecute Coalition cases consistent with international standards.
- Parole System. Develop an enforceable parole system that allows the Coalition to release detainees under conditions that minimize the likelihood they will continue to be a threat to the Coalition.
- Counterinsurgency. Advance Coalition counterinsurgency operations by synchronizing Task Force Rule of Law operations.
- Build Additional Detention Facilities. As a minimum 6,000 additional detention spaces must be built and the corrections force trained and logistical support organized and resources.
- Strengthen and Develop Local Criminal Justice Capacity. At a minimum, every province must have a functioning and fair criminal justice court capable of handling the adjudication of all criminal cases arising in that province. This will necessarily require local protection for judges and court personnel, physical facilities requirements, etc. Having local justice capacity will significantly enhance the fight at the local level where it is needed most by: 1) providing Rule of Law visibility to the local populace, 2) demonstrating the impact Rule of Law can have in their immediate affairs, 3) encouraging participation in the process by those with the greatest interest in advancing the Rule of Law in that area, 4) empowering Iraqi citizens to use government as a means to counter violence, 5) facilitating the adjudication of criminal cases in a criminal justice system that is witness, crime scene, and evidence intensive, and 6) ensure local ownership over the criminal justice process, thereby increasing overall accountability.
(2) Iraqi Corrections Officer Line of Operation

(a) Desired Effects. TF 1.4a will continue to train and where necessary assist with the development of a profession Iraqi Correction Officer model. This model must be base on the example of what CPATT has accomplished to professionalize the Iraqi Police. They must look, act and above all be a professional organization.

(b) Concept. Currently we have many moving pieces in the ICO system. We have a piece, ICITAP, and DoJ. We must bring these pieces together to assist with the professionalization of the ICOs. They must have standard training, uniforms, rank structure, pay and the ability to progress and advance in the ICO system. But above all they must be viewed by the Iraqi population, detainees and the other Iraqi Security Forces as a professional force.

(c) Tasks. The first objective will be to increase the number of ICOs in training. TF 1.4a must take the lead to ensure a transition type organization covers down on the current pieces involved in ICO training, equipping and management.

- Train an additional 8000-9000 ICO Officers. We must convince the G01 specifically the Minister of Justice that he is in need of this additional number. Without Iraqi buy in we will have a shortfall in the number of detainees we can realistically take in and hold.

- Use existing resources for training. A number of training centers are currently being used for ICO training. JIPTC, Iraqi ICO training academy and our own resources at Camp Buehr and Cropper. We must see where we can maximize this training and have it standardized where ICOs receive basic, advanced and NCO /Officer training.

- Professionalize the Force. ICOs need to understand that they are a part of the Iraqi Security Forces. They must have a means to advance, receive advanced schooling and act and look like a professional force. They must have a rank structure and with that structure additional pay for those ICOs in leadership positions.

- An Iraqi System. Whatever we do we must have a system that the Iraqis can support and resource. The ICO system we develop and hand off to them needs to be one they have the financial means to maintain.

(3) Theater Internment Facility Re-integration Camp (TIFRIC) line of Operation.

(a) Desired Effects. To develop a system that benefits all. The G01, MoJ, Provincial Governments, the Detainees and their families and the Coalition. Reintegration is one of the cornerstones to MNF-I and the Embassy’s campaign plan. This must provide a way for us to segregate the current detainee population from those that are in category
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5 and 6. Those detainees that are assessed as having rehabilitative potential will be provided a means to reintegrate into an Iraqi civil society.

(b) Assumptions.
○ Resources to include funding are available this FY to commence construction.
○ The GoI supports reconciliation of MNF-I held detainees.
○ The GoI and Provincial Governors will endorse and support the creation of a TIFRIC.

(c) Concept. To transfer the detainees to Provincial control. We must select those detainees that we perceive as a low security risk and move them out of the current TIP system. This will show that the Coalition wants to help those detainees transition (reintegrate) back into civil society. We provide the oversight through a parole system administered by the Iraqis at the Provincial level. This system integrates financial incentives as a means for the detained to comply.

(d) Tasks. There are many steps involved with this Loo. We must fully synchronize ongoing efforts with GRD, JCC-I, IRMO, the PRTs, USAID and CPATT. We also must integrate the GoI and the various Ministries into this process.
○ Identify an Area to Build a TIFRIC. The site selected must be secure and provide all the detention facilities, VoTech training site, education center, and an area where the Provincial Government is stable.
○ Identify the Detainees. Relieve the pressure of Camp Bucsa by selecting detainees to go through this process. The detainees receive an incentive and the Provincial Government along with the tribal chiefs will be the guarantor for each detainee.
○ Provide the monetary incentive for the detainee to remain in the program. The funds must come from the GoI as they realize that this program will reintegrate a person back into a civil society.
○ Develop and IO campaign to minimize Moslem extremist influence. The detainees must see this as a benefit and can be turned to assist the GoI and or the Coalition in its intelligence efforts.
○ Provide a way to transfer detainees back to Iraqi Control. The objective is to get the coalition out of detention operations. There will be detainees that we can not release not due to security threats should we. But we must begin to have the Iraqis control, administer and reintegrate their detainee population.
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(3) Mek Line of Operation

(a) Desired Effects. The Mek are no longer under the protective custody of the Coalition. An international agreement must be reached to ensure that the Mek are treated correctly and IAW international standards.

(b) Concept. TF and the JIATF are responsible for the security and welfare of the Mek. They will continue to be protected by Coalition Forces as long as the current mandate dictates. We must not assume that they will be incorporated into the Iraqi civil society model or repatriated back to This is an issue which continues to receive international attention.

(c) Tasks. The main task is to engage with the DoS and identify a way ahead. This will include the JIATF having close relationship with Political section at the Embassy. This will be a political solution and we will have to react and carry out the policy directed to us by DoS/DoD.

(e) Coordinating Instructions. Think battlespace and how to synchronize ongoing efforts by different agencies with MNF-I and the Embassy. At all times ensure the Iraqis understand the way ahead and hat they buy into our efforts.

(1) Times, events, or situations that may signal the transition of various LOOs between phases. Ensure LOOs are coordinated with staff activities.

(2) Constraints: Money, people and time.

(3) Restrictions. In addition to constraints imposed by agreement, certain commands and the limitations of the use of funds for certain projects we must not violate our laws or rules for the use of ISFF and IRF.

(4) Resource management guidance that may limit what we can and can not do have to be clearly understood by all.

(5) We will use an IO/PAO campaign in everything we do in our battlespace. PAO guidance will be provided by the command group. We must ensure it is dove tailed into the MNF-I plan with STRAT EFFECTS. (6) Operational planning guidance involving IO.

5. Transition. Our objective is to transition the Detainee Operations to the Iraqis. We must have them at every meeting we attend, discussing the way ahead with respect to Rule of law, ICO or reintegration is a non-starter.

a. TF will continue to work toward a potential transition of detention facilities' at Camp Bucca and Cropper. Currently in the MNF-I Plan this will happen in 2008.
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b. TF 1.4a will have to form Transition Teams to enable Iraqi Corrections Officers to take a greater role towards running the facilities. This is within our battlespace and will require resources.

c. Plan for the Coalition to continue to hold a detainee population into 2008, should the UNSCR not be extended and the Iraqis not able to assume the mission.

d. DoS will continue to seek acceptable resolution for the MeK at Ashraf, including the defectors held at the Transient Internment Protection Facility. TF 1.4a will continue to guard them in a protected person status until a political, legal and diplomatic solution is found.

6. Battlespace and Synchronization. We have a close fight and a deep fight. We must not forget our specified task to maintain the current operations at Bucca, Cropper and Ashraf. This is the context of everything we do and provides us the freedom of action to continue to plan for the deep fight. In our deep fight we have four Lines of Operation: Rule of Law, Iraqi Re-Integration Center, Iraqi Correctional Officers and the MeK. All these incorporate our battlespace and outline our way ahead. We must be able to synchronize many ongoing activities with the various agencies, commands and organizations in MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, GRD, JCC-I, USAID, IRMO, the Embassy, GoI, MoJ, MoF, MoL and the MoHR. The key is to pull these activities together and make it happen!

7. Think Operational!

D.M. STONE
MAJOR GENERAL, USMC
COMMANDING GENERAL TF 1.4a

Enclosure
Task Organization

DISTRIBUTION

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USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
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