Sunni Arab Resistance --- why do I call it that....because it is primarily Sunni and Arab.....and they ...the Iraqis ...call it a “resistance.”

At present Iraq provides a potentially supportive environment for insurgency. ....and successful insurgents understand that insurgency is political action with an armed component. Iraq is a traumatized nation with a destroyed economy, defeated in a war..and occupied...not believing they were actually beaten...surely the Sunnis did not feel the effects of the war as it stopped on their doorstep...and looking back on a recent history of brutality and mass murder. The people of Iraq are divided against each other with the Kurds and Shia flexing their political muscle for the first time, and the Sunni fearing for their future.
The Sunni are vitally important due to their concentration in the geostrategic heartland of Iraq. Sunni support is vital to the continued viability of the resistance....see where the fighting is occurring....in green....where Sunnis predominate. If the Sunni cut them off, then the Ba'athi resistance will wither. If the Sunni come to see the Ba'athist as "their" resistance....it will be hard to control the insurgency in the near term....This is not to say that the Ba'athi or Sunni can return to power....the other ethnic/confessional groups are growing to strong. But it could lead to increased inter-ethnic or inter-communal fighting....fracturing the country. If the objective is to reassert a secular Sunni dominance -- that is patently not a realistic aim. Are the Americans essentially acting as a buffer now between Sunni insurgents and the Shia and Kurdish communities.

**Solid Position:** Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Samarra, Balad, Abu Ghurayb

**Secure Operating Areas:** Haditha, Tikrit, Mahmudiya, Yusifiya, Qalidiya, Habbiniya, Al-Qa'im

**Presence/Less Secure:** Basrah, Mosul, Al-Hilla

**Presence/Insecure:** Najaf, Karbala, Al-Amarah, Al-Kut, Irbil
Solid Position: Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Samarra, Balad, Abu Ghurayb
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Presence/Less Secure: Basrah, Mosul, Al-Hilla
Presence/Insecure: Najaf, Karbala, Al-Amara, Al-Kut, Irbil
Essentially violent culture within a traumatized and insecure people….emergence of politics with a vengeance?

Most Iraqis do not support us….lets be clear….they are angry neutrals….they want services and safe environment.

Arab-Israeli conflict, humiliation felt militarily, culturally, and religiously and Iraqi xenophobia and anti-Western beliefs make the ground fertile for nurturing a resistance movement…. 

There is widespread anger…..fear and anxiety about marginalization in the political process, and deep anger at the security practices the Coalition has used to combat the insurgency. There is an impression that our security practices are consciously intended to humiliate the population and to violate the sanctity of the home and their women. CJTF-HR is updating guidance regarding some security procedures to reflect CPA concerns. 

What may seem innocuous in our eyes can be disrespectful and humiliating to the local population.

Sense that there are no mechanisms in place for their grievances, anger and confusion over detainees;

Just asked that we should try to open the door before kicking it in or simply knock. Al Anbar slights to honor.
Anger that the de-bathification policies implemented are not focused on criminal behaviour but instead on mere membership ....

Cognitive dissonance...all their lives they have been taught that Islam is the superious way of life yet they can see that the European culture is clearly thriving when the East in comparison is failing...once again this relates to the humiliation factor. It cannot be because of us, it must be the West Crusaders or Zionists...they must have done something to us.

Abu Eissa tribe members which had cooperated with Americans turned after the shooting of four police officers in Falluja;

Arrests of Sheik Jamal shaker prayer leader in Fallujah's Grand Mosque...graffiti and posters called for his release—Oct ....had been making anti-Coalition sermons.
We don't know how many are participating; last summer estimates were about 3,000...since then we held over 10,000 in Abu Ghrab; killed others; divisions have captured, held and released even more. We just do not know...the number...people float in and out of the campaign; and our we looking at active military resisters or the total active...in one way or another in resistance. It is like mowing the grass, when we take down operations and cells; the capability tends to return to an area over time.

• E.g., Esawi Tribe members pay for anti-Coalition attacks, reported to include the Chinook shoot down in 82nd AO; Janabi Tribe members acting as couriers, providing safe haven, etc.

Wahabis such as the 636 cell in Baghdad who work with FREs/foreign fighters/terrorists.
The Coalition faces not one, but multiple insurgencies in Iraq. In Iraq the Coalition forces face not one insurgency, but several operating simultaneously.

There are diverse entities with different goals... multiple enemies... call it a polyglot mix of bad actors.

The groups involved: Ba'athists: Iraqi nationalists: Arab nationalists: Islamic volunteers: international Jihadists: Iraqi Jihadists: and al-Qaeda terrorists, would fight each other if the Coalition forces were to withdraw. However, they can find common cause for the time being in attacking Coalition troops, elements of the new Iraqi government, other targets perceived as associated with the foreign presence. This complex threat picture presents an unprecedented challenge to intelligence personnel trying to identify hostile networks operating in Iraq. Many insurgents are operating locally with limited connection to each other, a fact that makes identifying them more difficult. This is mitigated slightly by the fact that the truly devastating attacks require larger organizations with complex logistics and intelligence capabilities to succeed.

There are large numbers of Iraqis, outside the Ba’ath network, who are fighting the Coalition units located near their homes for a variety of reasons. Some are Iraqi patriots, or Arab nationalists, or are taking revenge for injury to family or friends. Others are paid cash by Ba'athist or Jihadist groups, or feel that it is their duty as Muslims to confront foreign invaders. Although they may have minimal local knowledge and may have good skills as fighters, these fighters are less of a threat to Coalition operations.

THE VOLUNTEERS

Iraq is the destination for numerous Arab and Muslim men drawn to fight for ethnic brotherhood and faith. They have a wide variety skills and levels of experience and are of differing value to the various insurgent groups in Iraq. Because they are foreigners, their local knowledge is usually limited, so they must link up with a local group (of Iraqi insurgents: Iraqi nationals: International Jihadists) to effectively join the fight. These men are effectively force multiplying assets for other groups, providing technical expertise, or expendable fighters for ambush attacks or suicide truck bombs.

The Jihadists have established cells operating within Iraq, and are building operational capabilities. The al-Qaeda affiliates have the opportunity to link up with local operatives from the Iraqi Kurdish al-Qaeda affiliates of Ansar al-Islam. The longer the insurgency continues, the more these ruthless veterans will make their presence felt. There is also a probability that non-Islamic insurgents cooperating with them will increasingly become radicalized. This was the experience in Kashmir and Chechnya where insurgencies that were largely nationalist took on an Islamist character. Radicalization of the insurgency would make conflict termination far more difficult.

Most seriously, the Al-Qaeda operatives appear to want to trigger the religious and ethnic war that the Coalition (and the Iraqi public) wish to avoid. In a letter captured from an Al-Qaeda courier, an official believed to be AQ senior operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi advocated attacking Shia targets to trigger a Shia-Sunni war. He believed that if a civil war broke out Iraq’s Sunni would be forced to cooperate with the Jihadists to avoid extermination.

Some linkages to Zarqawi--former ISIS allegedly working with or coordinating with this group... the B36 gang... religiously motivated and linked to the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Society of Islamic Scientists... a Ba'athist organization... formed by Saddam 10 years ago to further control of the Ba'ath Party. During the war and afterwards... tasked with recruiting and training foreign fighters and more recently, has evolved into coordinating more activities of resistance from mosques... to include some Shia mosques... the SIS controlled most mosques...and
were the source of foreign fighters funneled to the Fedayeen Saddam and Mohammed's Army

636 Gang—religious but close ties to SIS and IIP... similar to links to Mohammed's Army... personal and family links

Iraqi Islamic Party formed in 1960... provides opaque Islamic cover to protect former Regime while espousing anti-Coalition and pro-Islamic doctrine.
An insurgency is a political action with an armed component. The insurgents lack the political support or the raw military power to impose their political project, so they attempt to use the population as a force multiplier. Successful insurgents carry out coordinated political mobilization with information operations and targeted military force. They work to build support within the civilian population (and/or decrease civilian support for the existing government). The civil population provides political support, refuge, intelligence, material aid and recruits for the insurgent forces. Slowly the insurgents occupy more and more of the political (and military) landscape as the opposing forces are increasingly trapped inside their own wire.

Expel Coalition from Iraq

Maintain constant casualty rate; mass casualty events – keep Coalition off-balance/reactive

Ensure failure of IGC

Undermine Iraqi security forces

Ensure organizational viability and effectiveness

Establish resistance groups/maintain key networks

Develop and execute tactics, techniques, and procedures

Contain Shia / Kurd influence

and propaganda

Divide and conquer through assassination, terror, bribes, and tribal/party/personal influence

The successful insurgency is political first, and military second. When writing on insurgency MaoTse-Tung stated: “The question of the political mobilization
of the army and the people is indeed of the greatest importance... victory is impossible without it. There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental."[1] The insurgent forces in Iraq are well aware of this truism. They are building networks of supporters, and exploiting themes of nationalism, ethnic solidarity, tribal loyalty, and religious duty in their information operations to increase their base of supporters. Those they cannot win over are attacked, removing them as an obstacle and providing an object lesson to others who oppose the insurgents' ends.

Some up tick in sunni political activity... a considerable part of it associated with or influenced by Ba'athists.

Once you get clear articulation of political agenda and political arm then we will have to worry...

Return to pre-Saddam origins... history of working underground...63 and 68....

Appeal religious themes intertwined Arab nationalism ---state socialism which has widespread appeal across the middle east... separate from thuggery of Saddamism

Ba'athism provides the structure but not the ideology behind the resistance... some trying to reconstitute the party to participate in the political process... and muster support on a anti-Saddam and anti-Coalition platform... aspirations to return the Party to pre-Saddam roots

An insurgency is a political action with an armed component. The insurgents lack the political support or the raw military power to impose their political project, so they attempt to use the population as a force multiplier. Successful insurgents carry out coordinated political mobilization with information operations and targeted military force. They work to build support within the civilian population (and/or decrease civilian support for the existing government.) The civil population provides political support, refuge, intelligence, material aid and recruits for the insurgent forces. Slowly the insurgents occupy more and more of the political (and military) landscape as the opposing forces are increasingly trapped inside their own wire.

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Establish legitimacy Enhance Sunni unity through patronage, intimidation, and elimination; deny support to Coalition/IGC

Leverage SuEstablish overt/covert political organizations

Ensure supremacy among rival groups

Develop provincial and national organizations

The land between the two rivers is called al-Jazeera, just like the TV station....

Independent Iraqi Alliance; Shayks Council in Al Anbar, United Iraq Party, Iraqi Senate;

Al Salah Party, New Democrat Party, Democratic Reform Party or Hizb al-Islah al-Democrat; disown former regime and condemn foreign occupation talk about daily cruelty of the occupation by violating human rights, destroying houses and farms, and arresting thousands of innocents...putting off rebuilding in Sunni areas and denying necessities that others are receiving...claim 80 percent unemployment

Democratic Re-Education Party Al Eslah; is a political wing for the FRE...links to 11th Sept Revolutionary Group...armed wing... Controlling some ops around the Triangle....members taking trips to Syria...along with tribal sheiks....looking at operating openly....covert elements

Mohammed Mehti....New Democracy Party too...three trips to Syria

Reject all arrangements with the IGC and UN
Weaker members of coalition vulnerable...doing a reasonable job...fear quotient and impact on ops is significant. UN consideration for ops – returning to IZ is encumbered security concerns and legitimacy...continuing perception UN is a tool of the US and West
Key Elements of Support

- Arab distrust of the United States
- Sunni Arab Support and Nationalism
  - Power, influence and authority reduced
  - Ba'ath Party based in Sunni dominated areas
  - Feel superior to other ethnic, religious groups in Iraq
- Freedom of Movement
  - Knowledge of urban areas, terrain, security forces; blend in to the environment
- Large recruiting pool – former Ba'athist, security services, disenfranchised, unemployed, foreign fighters
- Availability of weapons, ammunition, explosives and other military equipment
- Financial support and distribution of funds
- Organization viability

More weapons, resources, trained personnel than other insurgencies have had... greater target array... compare to Algeria
Won military campaign but lost the political war
Historical animosity stemming from Colonialism
Influenced by Israeli/Palestinian and Anti-West sentiment due to religious beliefs
Tact support, will not report activities; possibly support by providing safe haven, logistics, and intelligence
Fear de-Baathification as anti-Sunnis

Freedom of Movement
- Knowledge of urban areas, terrain, security forces
- Ability to move throughout the country where no checkpoints are present
- Tact support in Sunni areas, possibly protection and intelligence of friendly situation
- Move freely through areas lacking Coalition presence, blend in otherwise, rural safehavens

Thousands of ex-military available, especially in Sunni areas
- Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi corridor and Baghdad, Tikrit, Mosul corridors represent areas where most loyal
  to regime reside
- Republican Guard
- Special Republican Guard
- Special Security Organization
- Iraqi Intelligence Service
- Saddam Fedayeen
- Baath party militias
- Low-mld level regime leaders
- Disserted Regular Army

Unemployed and disenfranchised young males
Foreign fighters sharing hatred of US
- Full spectrum from individuals to groups seeking to attack the Coalition
- Terrorist groups seeking available Coalition targets
- Facilitators soliciting funding from rich anti-western Arabs
Recruiting Base for SAR (Mil)

- Special Republican Guard (SRG)
  - Approximately 11 battalion equivalents; 8-10,000 regime loyalists, mostly Sunni
  - Saddam Fedayeen
    - Paramilitary force used for internal security, estimated strength was 9,000-30,000 well-connected regime loyalists
    - Stationed primarily in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Habbaniya

- Special Security Forces (SSF)
  - Inner circle of regime security and operational control over SRG
  - 7,000 + extremely loyal regime members, including presidential bodyguards
  - Stationed primarily in Baghdad and Tikrit

- Baath Party Militia
  - Units organized along party structure; militias used against Shia for suppression
  - Stationed throughout Iraq with traditional homes in Sunni-dominated areas; most fanatic fighters during OIF

- Directorate of General Security (DGS)
  - Monitored population and conducted security and counter-intelligence operations
  - 8,000 well-connected, mostly Sunni loyalists
  - 10,000-15,000 (up to 60,000) extremely loyal Baathists
  - Stationed primarily in Baghdad, but stationed throughout Iraq

- Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)
  - Monitored dissidents, officials, the armed forces, and foreigners
  - Official strength 25,000; well-connected Sunni loyalists

60,000 – 95,000 well-trained, hardcore Baathist loyalists

Special Republican Guard (SRG)
- Approximately 11 battalion equivalents
- 8-10,000 regime loyalists, mostly Sunni
- Outer ring for regime protection, stationed at BIAP, Abo Gharab, Tikrit, Bayji, and Mosul

Saddam Fedayeen
- Ruthless paramilitary commando force used for internal security, led by Uday Hussein
- Estimated strength was 9,000-30,000 well-connected regime loyalists
- Stationed primarily in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Habbaniya

Special Security Forces (SSF)
- Inner circle of regime security and operational control over SRG; most junior SSF officer above senior SRG; led by Qusay Hussein
- 7,000 + extremely loyal regime members, including presidential bodyguards
  - 2,000 from Saddam's home tribal clan, Abu Nofal and Tikrit
- Privileged position and most loyal of the services
- Primarily in Baghdad and Tikrit, but had an over-watch element in every SRG, RG and many RA units

Baath Party Militia
- Units organized along party structure; fanatic militias used against Shia for suppression
- Stationed throughout Iraq with traditional homes in Sunni-dominated areas; most fanatic fighters during OIF

Directorate of General Security (DGS)
- Monitored population and conducted security and counter-intelligence operations on Iraqis, maintained para-military forces for quelling civil unrest, reservoirs; 8,000 well-connected, mostly Sunni loyalists and coordinated Baathists
- 10,000-15,000 (up to 60,000) extremely loyal Baathists
- Stationed primarily in Baghdad, but stationed throughout Iraq

Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS)
- Overseas, it collected foreign intelligence and monitors Iraqi expatriates; domestically, it monitored dissidents, officials, the armed forces, and foreigners
- Official strength 25,000, well-connected Sunni loyalists, principle role to monitor and suppress dissent at home
- M-14 Special Ops—terror, bombs, IEDs
- M-16 Security Directorate—sub directorate for bombmaking and remote controlled devices
- M-40 Opposition Activities Directorate
- Gadhafi Branch— bomb makers too
15 years of EOD tasks

An essentially unlimited supply of arms and munitions drawn from hidden caches or from the huge and poorly guarded stockpiles left by the former Iraqi Army

A war chest estimated in the billions of dollars cash: money can pay for freelance attacks as well as facilitating the Ba’athi’s own activities
### Funding/Logistics

- Flows from ex-Baathists and regime mid-high ranking officials
- Funding comes from the Sunni-dominated area, however the main areas where individuals are providing funds are:
  - Tikrit, Samarah, Mosul & Sunni areas of Baghdad
- External funding is focused on facilitating movement, training and sustainment of foreigners, Jihadists, and terrorists transiting to and from Iraq
  - External funding/support well organized & adaptive.
  - Networks same as those used in previous Jihads
- Internal funding:
  - Former regime stash
  - Fund raising at local mosques, businesses, donations
  - Crime and extortion
Attacks by Week
26 July 03 – 27 Feb 04

- Increase (8%) in number of attacks this week (240 to 260).
- Increase (5%) in number of attacks on Coalition forces (129 to 136).
- Attacks on Iraqi Security Forces & Civilians increasing

1 Jan – 29 FEB  52 kia; 252 WIA;  TOTAL 304  C1 CJTF-7
What We Know:
- Increase in number of attacks last month, particularly against ISF
- TTPs include standoff attacks, VBIED/IEDs, evolving sophistication
- Recruitment and meeting places include internet cafes, mosques, schools (Mosul University)
- Transit point/Hub for foreign fighters, weapons, dollars entering Iraq
- Ba'ath party leaders and HQ of 14th RG Division, 5th Corps and 16th Infantry Division were located in Mosul, and reporting has indicated that many of these individuals still reside there. Consequently, the city has a base of FREs who are willing and likely capable of carrying out anti-coalition activities.

What We Don't Know:
- Precise FRE C2 and infrastructure
- Nature of links of FRE groups to terrorist groups and individuals (Zarqawi)
- Roles of former Ba'athist/Military Bureau, Shaykhs, Imams
- Will Sunni Arab-Kurd relations deteriorate to violence?

Assessment:
- Attacks against ISF will increase; TTPs will continue to evolve
- Frustration due to high unemployment and lack of basic daily necessities will spur future FRE activities
- IED/VBIED attacks remain most dangerous threat to CF and ISF in region
- Disparate individuals/groups coalescing; coordination between cells will increase
- Anti-Coalition forces likely receiving help from corrupt

al-Qaeda/Zarqawi network cells are operational in Mosul
- Zarqawi has history of activity in northern Iraq, in collusion with Al
- Cells have conducted VBIED attacks, but not in northern Iraq
- Associated Islamic extremists building/modifying VBIEDs at safehouses
- Mosul provides readily available access to Iran, Syria, and Turkey
- Zarqawi mentioned targeting Kurds, presumably in northern Iraq—but not yet
- Al tactical cells still viable; strategic and operational structure crumbling
Group losing funding and influence, but still able to mount effective attacks.

Discernable cell signature in Mosul, evidenced by number of safehouses

AI comfortable in Mosul/northern Iraq; familiar with the territory

Will conduct attacks predominantly outside the city – AI likely views Mosul as safehaven/staging area for attacks throughout northern Iraq.

Continued attempts at collusion between AI/AS and FREs, as in Baghdad.
The insurgents have shown themselves to be resilient and adaptive enemies. From the first ill-conceived small arms attacks on American armored units, insurgent attacks evolved to complex ambushes using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The IEDs themselves have followed a rapid evolutionary path utilizing decoy devices, inexpensive radio and other remote control detonators, anti-tampering devices and sophisticated tactics employing multiple command detonated charges. As the Coalition hardened its facilities to stop truck bombs (the Coalition Headquarters “Green Zone” in central Baghdad was made a veritable fortress), the insurgents shifted to attacking “softer” Iraqi and NGO targets, and adopted rocket attack as a strategy to overcome the Coalition's hard perimeter. Given the time to digest their tactical lessons and train the Iraqi insurgents will become increasingly lethal. As the U.S. learned in Viet Nam and the Israelis learned in South Lebanon, insurgents don’t start out good, practice against conventional forces makes them that way.
25 Feb - Mosul's Deputy Police Chief Brigadier Hikmat killed on way to work
23 Feb - VBIED kills 13 and wounds 36 at Kirkuk police station
- Brother of Samarra ICDC Cdr assassinated; ICDC member at bus stop
- Baghdad Imam Sheik Dhamer killed in his mosque for supporting Coalition
21 Feb - Son of religious leader Sheik Dari killed for involvement with Coalition Baghdad; funeral procession attacked with grenade.
19 Feb - Hadithya Police Chief attacked; son killed; two RPGs fired at police checkpoint with no injuries
18 Feb - VBIED at Polish Army Base in Hilli kills 11 Iraqis /injures dozens
14 Feb - Falluja police station gun battle kills 27
11 Feb - VBIED at Baghdad army recruiting centre kills 47.
10 Feb - VBIED at police recruitment centre in Iskandariya kills 50
9 Feb - A bomb under the couch in the Suwayrah police station killed 4 Police officers
5 Feb - A bombing at the Baghdad Sheraton Hotel; no one injured.
4 Feb - Baghdad police investigate two additional car bombings. Also a citizen reported nine rockets on a time-fuse which were subsequently disarmed.
1 Feb - Twin suicide bombings kill 100 Iraqi Kurds in Kirkuk; injure 250; Two Baghdad area police vehicles were damaged by bombs under them.

UNCLASSIFIED

• More Iraqis killed in month of FEB than US to date in the WAR;

• Mayor of Haditha or police chief resigned, police station cpt getting death threats in Hadetha, two anti-tank mines planted outside station...graffiti on walls, threats to family.

• ICDC regularly targeted in Samarra, Dulu'iyah, Bakir Village and Tarmiyah

• As the impact of the capture of Saddam fades, FRE leadership must consolidate its support base, reassess its influence w/o Saddam, and tap into Sunni dissatisfaction with the slow rate of rebuilding efforts of the Coalition

(GBU) Ninewa governate sheikhs distrust provincial council involvement in Transitional National Assembly (TNA) delegate process.

(GBU) On 23 December, CPA representatives in Ninewa province hosted a meeting in Mosul of ~150 sheikhs, Governor General Basso, and members of the Ninewa provincial council to discuss the CPA GC 15 November Transition Plan for Iraqi sovereignty. The plan calls for proportional representation to a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) from Iraq's governates. Each governate will form an Organizing Committee (OC) made up fifteen members: five selected by the GC, five selected by the governate's provincial council, and one selected by each city council of the governate's five largest towns. Once seated, each governate's OC will confirm delegates to the TNA on a 11/19ths majority vote. Delegates would be nominated by regional associations, tribal, civil organizations, or political parties.

(GBU) Governor Basso had to explain the TNA process at the meeting because of a lack of knowledge about the process among the sheikhs. The sheikhs voiced opposition to the process and questioned the legitimacy of the Ninewa council. They also objected to GC appointment of OC members because they felt the GC was unaware of local issues and concerns in Ninewa. A number of sheikhs asked for re-election of Ninewa council members and claimed they "are all former Baathists, intelligence officers, and corrupt." Governor Basso became frustrated and defensive in response to the criticism and claimed they were doing their best during a difficult interim governing period.

(GBU) In response to the criticism, Basso proposed the provincial council confirm five OC members nominated by five broad societal categories: sheikhs, imams, professors, military officers, and "professionals." His proposal was
generally supported by attendees who proposed different categories. Proposals which called for categories based on ethnicity or religion, however, were vociferously opposed. The meeting adjourned without reaching a conclusion.

(COREL TO USA and MCFI) Assessment: Perceived Ba'athist contamination is feeding popular distrust of city and provincial councils and corroding confidence in the TNA selection process. In order for the TNA to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of Iraqis, a broader selection process is needed. (Note: CPA hopes to address Iraqi concerns by “refreshing” city and provincial councils, i.e., replacing council members who are corrupt or who have Ba'athist ties)

(e) 19 Dec: Iraqi Hashemite heir Sharif Ali conferred with CPA on causes of insurgency, options for Sunni outreach, transition of sovereignty

(U) Sharif Ali, 47, leads the Constitutional Monarchy Movement (CMM), whose goal is a national referendum on the form the Iraqi government should take: republic or constitutional monarchy headed by a restored Hashemite king, presumably Sharif Ali. Sharif Ali is recognized by some Iraqis as the heir-apparent to the Iraqi throne. He is a second-cousin of the late King Faisal II who was murdered along with most of his family in the 1958 revolution. Sharif Ali fled the country at the age of two and grew up in London where he became an investment banker. He returned to Iraq in June 2003. The CMM initially cooperated with other Iraqi opposition groups which formed the Supreme Leadership Council, the nucleus of what became the Governing Council. However, the CMM turned down a seat on the Supreme Leadership Council and has since chosen to operate independently of the GC.

(e) During his 19 December meeting with CPA representatives (reps), Sharif Ali was briefed on the creation of the Office of Provincial Outreach in the CPA and that its primary efforts would focus on Sunni outreach, tribal engagement, and developing better mechanisms for managing detainees. Sharif welcomed CPA’s willingness to take the lead on these initiatives, but pointed out that the opposition did not differentiate between the actions of CPA and the Coalition military. He also indicated that local disputes were often provoked by the conduct of Coalition forces.

(e) Sharif noted that the opposition to the Coalition had expanded beyond “spoilers and fundamentalists” to include those with “ideological and practical” grievances. As a result, tribes and notables who were initially supportive and cooperative had begun to turn against the Coalition. However, Sharif believed room for negotiation existed. A major difficulty was a perceived lack of Coalition representatives in Baghdad and the Central Region with whom to deal.

(e) Sharif warned that “political oligarchs” on the Governing Council (GC) might try to deadlock the process laid out in the 15 November agreement in order to perpetuate themselves in power and create circumstances whereby sovereignty would have to be transferred directly to the GC. He also pointed to Kirkuk as a simmering problem. The KDP and particularly the PUK were flexing their influence in the area, intimidating the Arabs. Finally, Ali Sharif presented a list of grievances he had received via intermediaries from former military and security elements in the Al-Anbar governorate who were willing to decrease their attacks if their demands were met. CPA reps noted that some of their grievances were already being addressed. At the meeting’s conclusion, Sharif indicated he would continue communicating with the Al-Anbar insurgents and closely coordinate with the Coalition.

(e) Assessment: Sharif’s independence from the GC and his Hashemite lineage make him an ideal conduit to marginalized Sunnis, particularly those motivated by wounded national pride, vice Ba'athist ideology or Islamic extremism. Sharif’s contacts with the Al-Anbar insurgency could be exploited to facilitate an end to attacks in that area.

Iraq: Food Pipeline Under Stress (C/NF)
Coalition:

Static locations; indirect fire easy but need access to suitable firing positions requiring control of local population

Mobile targets – Coalition rarely varies routes; predictable; lack of foot patrolling allows effective use of RCIEDs. Need control of local population

Increasing Coalition EOD effort anticipated. Will lead to changes in IED design to include anti-handling and use of secondary devices

Coercion of population not tacitly supportive very effective and easy to affect

Infrastructure Sabotage:

Denies basic services, notably to Shia; undermines Coalition credibility in rebuilding; spreads suspicion of Coalition intentions weakening ability to maintain security. Makes Coalition reactive.

Numerous linear and point targets with little or no security

Former Ba’athist workers can provide expert advice; revenge

Requires unsophisticated IEDs, or simply physical destruction
Evolution of SAR Tactics

- **May:** Direct attacks with small arms and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs); Stand and Fight
  - Remote Controlled Door Bell Device
  - Generator and Donkey Cart MRLs

- **July:** RPGs, mortars, and command detonated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
  - Crank-Style Electronic Command Detonation Device
  - 155mm Round Excised In Concrete

- **August:** Increasingly sophisticated IEDs with electronic detonators, mortars fired at soft targets

- **October:** Disguised multiple rocket Launchers (MRLs), camouflaged IEDs, and vehicle-mounted mortars for quick escape

Standoff is now the critical factor in all FRL operations
• Property search capture of former military officer, weapons cache, and sand table
• Demonstrates low-tech, detailed planning

Weapons cache at house

Former military officer captured

Replica convoy and operating base sand table / rehearsal site at house

(b)(5)
Page 29 redacted for the following reason:

Illegible Text
Baghdad improvised MRL (IMRL) attacks indicate increased planning and innovation.

The past three months have seen improvised MRL attacks in Baghdad. IMRL targets have been Baghdad buildings with Coalition presence.

- 27 Sep - Al Rashid Hotel
- 26 Oct - Al Rashid Hotel
- 21 Nov - Ministry of Oil, Palestine Hotel

**Platform:** Improvised Multiple Rocket Launcher, disposable, fire and forget, shoot and scoot

- 27 Sep - Small, 8 tubes, likely easily set up by one to three men, unloaded from a small truck, point, shoot, escape
- 26 Oct - IMRL configured from portable two wheeled generator, towed, point, shoot, escape
- 21 Nov - Improvised donkey cart, four wheeled, pulled by donkey, point, shoot, escape

**Munitions:**
- 27 Sep - 68mm rockets used for Al Rashid attack
- 26 Oct - 68mm and 85mm rockets
- 21 Nov - Tubes and rockets appear similar to previous Al Rashid attacks

**Success at hitting target:**
- 27 Sep - 2 of 4 rockets fired impact hotel
- 26 Oct - approx 20 of 29 rockets fired impact hotel
- 21 Nov - U/I number of rockets of U/I type impact hotel and Ministry of Oil building

**Point of origin:** ~200m – ~600m

**Time of Day:** Early morning: 0630 Sat 27 Sep, 0610 Sun 26 Oct, 0715 Fri 21 Nov, (average one month apart)

**Increased planning, deception, low tech innovation.** Each successive IMRL was disguised as common, everyday, low suspicion means of transport, a generator and donkey carts, as the means to move home made IMRLs to their launch positions. The 21 Nov incident required increased planning and coordination which resulted in a successful, multiple IMRL, coordinated attack with no enemy losses or casualties.
Rocket attacks nearly doubled in Jan (50) and Feb (47) each, compared to Dec (26)...allow standoff and chance for escape; with continued use of times to departure prior to launch of rockets and avoid counter battery fire. SIGACTS 123 total rocket attacks in last three months. Mortar attacks also above pre-Ramadan levels.

Attacks outside of Baghdad more random, less sophisticated, and less effective (unique situation around BIAP)

Primary target is BIAP base complex, secondary CPA

  Doesn't need to be accurate
  High publicity value
  Military and political; not terrorist associated

Attacks at night

  For concealed ingress and egress

Has preferred operational areas to fire from

  Open areas, near main access roads, away from populated areas, NW-SW of BIAP, out of range of 1AD and 82d C/F, near max standoff range

**Most Likely**

  Continues single launcher attacks for ranging
  Graduates again to multiple launcher attacks for mass
Continues to operate NW-SW of BIAP
Exports knowledge and equipment throughout theater
Most Dangerous
Uses skills and equipment for terror attacks on densely populated areas
12 attacks since 17 JAN 04
Seven of twelve were multiple rockets (4, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1-2, 8)
3 attacks on CPA (1 x acquired by radar)
9 attacks on BIAP (6 x acquired by radar)
Uses darkness to conceal attacks:
  8 Night attacks (1845-2244) Sunset around 1733(C)
  2 Morning attacks (0621-0627) Sunrise around 0700(C)
Must have technical knowledge of artillery/rocket fundamentals
At least three widely dispersed firing areas
Increasing in frequency (2 attacks in DEC 03, 7 attacks in JAN, 5 in FEB 04)
Fires from rural areas just off secondary roads & canals not far from known intersections — areas easily identifiable on a military map
8 FEB 04 - 4 x individuals & 13 x improvised dual tube rocket launchers captured; moved launchers in old IZ military trucks
Limited Op Areas
Large firing signature
Limited supply of ammo
Inability to provide precision fires pushes him toward mass
No ability to reload in Op Area
Susceptible to observation from local populace
Time on the firing point
He hits what he is aiming at (or at least in the vicinity)
Crews have military rocket / artillery training possibly advanced technical training
More than one crew
Has additional well hidden caches
Using the berms as an elevation device
Has at least some fine tuning ability
Firing executed in stages: 1st recon, 2nd aiming points established, 3rd rockets hidden, 4th launcher arrived and fires rockets (1 AD assessment)
Targeting “strategic targets” (BIAP & Green Zone)
**Ansar Al-Sunna Propaganda/Jihad Video**

- **Hummvee**
  - 101 ABN 2 BCT convoy near the town of Bartallah. No one was injured.

- **Semi-Truck**
  - Various filmed IED attacks.

- **Hummvee**
  - 101 ABN DIVARTY convoy traveling to Ibil on ASR Santa Fe. 1 US KIA, 2 seriously wounded.

- **Firing an improvised MRL**

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It is clear that Al was responsible for these attacks.

Ibil is a hotbed for Al activity.
What Does SAR Do Next?

- More of the same, keep Coalition off balance and reactive; demonstrate inability of GC to govern, leverage regional media
- Determine when major events can best influence, and support SAR agenda e.g. UN role or US presidential elections
- Attempt some higher profile carefully planned attacks eg, VBIEDs, SAM, more assassinations or kidnapping
- Continue to kill, threaten and coerce Iraqis cooperating with Coalition, especially police, ICDC, border guards
- Plan for coordinated attacks and implement when ready (Samara, Falluja, Abu Gharib; and possibly Camp Victory in the future)
- Facilitate attacks by other groups

Important because they listen to

Arab media

Media oriented attacks and mass casualty event
Sunni Arab Resistance

"How We Are Organized"
Assessments and Initiative Group – Red Cell

Ba'ath Party Organization Under Saddam

Regional Cmd

Governates X 18

Branch X 6

Section X 8

Division 6-10

Cells X 6-18

• Remnants of Party try to redirect
• Party more influential locally
• Oversees security and operations
• 1m members or affiliates
• Training of party militia; training of party
• Resistance of the resistance is most likely result of party institutionalization
• Party Operated Military Bureau
• 20,000 members in Baghdad
• Sector commands
• 80 sectors in Iraq

Origin: 1952; Stalinist cell model; in Power: 1963 (nine months) 1968 coup
Ideology: Arab nationalist, influenced by fascism, socialism, and communism, as well as Saddam's personality cult.
Organizational Structure: Cellular, clandestine and hierarchical: Total affiliated: 700,000 to 1,500,000, but only 70,000 actual members
Key leadership: 20 in the Iraq Regional Command; Another 350 in next tier (provincial)

Local levels
Branch and Section leaders are key elements of leadership...belief...Udow Faruq and Udow Shu’ba...who are probably coordinating activity.

Majority of the insurgents are Iraqi, and the most effective network present operating is composed of elements of the former Ba'ath government [3]. This is not surprising. The press has quoted Ba'ath officials as stating that Saddam Hussein had ordered Ba'ath party militia and regular forces to engage in guerrilla operations as part of his defense plan against the Coalition military. All elements remained for Ba'ath irreconcilables to build an effective insurgency. The Ba'ath party, a violent cell based organization based on the principle of conspiratorial action, is tailor made to carry on an underground insurgency. After several months reconstructing interparty contacts the Ba'ath leadership has been able to put together an effective network of insurgents sharing resources and coordinating actions. The Ba'ath were able to assemble resources that would take other insurgent movements decades.

A trained cadre of Special Forces operatives, intelligence officers, and weapons technicians to plan and carry out attacks
A zone of potential supporters who can facilitate attacks and protect Ba'athi insurgent activities (the so-called "Sunni Triangle")

Lost standing ties with many tribal leaders
Working relationships with smugglers and other criminal organizations in the region (from "sanctions busting" during UN embargo)
An ideology that justifies unlimited violence against countrymen and others
Fear: Thirty years in power gives the Ba'ath a aura of invincibility. Many Iraqis will cooperate with the Ba'ath (or refrain from opposing them) out of fear of retaliation. Iraqis are killed each day for standing up to the Ba'ath.
The Ba'ath have been operating in Iraq for over sixty years, as underground rebels as well as government officials, and they can look at the present period of fighting against the Coalition as just another period of Party struggle.

There are tens of thousands of former intelligence officers, interior security personnel, Special Republican Guard
troops, Ba'ath Militia leaders, Party officials and other government officials with blood on their hands who can soon
no place in the "New Iraq". Former power brokers, few are interested in living as exiles abroad or as outcasts within
Iraq. They can be counted on as willing fighters for a Ba'athi insurgency.
An intelligence network of operatives and sympathizers that extends into every village in Iraq and likely penetrates every joint Coalition-Iraqi activity.

Exceptional area knowledge and tradecraft... thousands of Ba'athis remain in local and regional networks and can be reorganized and reenergized once the pressure is off... FARC was looked at as being finished in the late 80s but began to rebuild at the local level and now controls large areas of Columbia.

Batist as a subversive organization has significant capability to cause political unrest and physical damage... but they also have their own interests to look to... personal safety, financial security etc.

**Guess based on mil bureau breakout:**

**Combination of former FFE, New Ba'ath Party, and tribal elements. Key leader thought to be Mohammed Younis.**

**Coalition operations have forced all the key leaders to go OTR. However, due to decentralized C2 and broad operational direction.**

South: Basrah and Nasiriyah are thought to be the focal points of the south; no assessed strength or leadership. The emerging coalition of Shia tribes/groupings in this area, FFE/New Ba'ath Party find it more difficult to operate due to lack of support at the Grass Roots level.
Plans were made for localized anti-Coalition operations in case of the regime’s fall from power (From post war DOCEX)

Anti-Coalition cells mostly contain personnel with former Iraqi military/intelligence experience, particularly from IIS/Fedayeen Saddam

Various recruiting methods are used to attract and maintain support (nationalist, incentive-based, religious rhetoric, etc.)

Overall, cells/organizations are able to survive and continue to operate absent key leaders, seized funds, and caches

C2 structure is decentralized, various types and sizes of cells
Operational Leaders:
HVT#1’s Trusted Leaders

SADIKH MUSEIN
HVT#1

IZZAT TARIQ ABU KHAIR
HVT#4

(b)(6)

- Identified operational leaders of the FRE Insurgency

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Remaining operational leaders are “underground”

(b)(6)

has been captured
The military Bureau was initially established to penetrate the armed forces and direct the Ba'ath Party's military affairs...ensuring loyalty became the Bureau's primary task. Leading role in organizing party cells within the military, ...screening and ensuring loyalty. Branches corresponded to the Party organization, and also aligned with RGF...not necessarily members of the military...but were influential...and could overrule general officers.

Party's militia - counter insurgency experience

Party Security Bureau part of IIS in 2000
Recruiting for the IIS and Militia vetted by party based on strong family and tribal loyalties to the regime and Ba'athism

**CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**
**HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION FROM RCC TO LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS**
**DE-CENTRALIZED C2 AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TEMPORARILY DISRUPTED**

**What We Know:** Since the capture of #1, coalition forces have significantly disrupted the operational level leadership of the military bureau. We have captured about half of the key leadership (10 of the top 55 and 8 Operational level leaders of the Military Bureau) and assess that the other leaders are on the run or underground and are basically ineffective.

**What we Assess:** We assess that the Military Bureau's operational level leadership is fractured and assess that the other leaders are on the run or underground rendering them ineffective. We also assess that the regional structure is disrupted. However, attacks continue with an increase emphasis on attacking the IPS and ICDC. We assess that tactical cells continue to conduct low level operations and are reaching out to tribal, familial, and religious connections for safe haven and funding. We assess that many groups are currently attacking
coalition forces to include Sunni Extremist groups. We see a developing theme of Sunni unity to increase recruiting.

**Key Reads:** What we are now need to know is whether tactical level leaders are attempting to fulfill the role of operational level leaders and continue the military bureau structure. Who the tactical level leaders are working under...if anyone. And whether tactical level cells are joining with other non-Ba'athist and Sunni extremist groups. We are also looking at the links between foreign fighters and Terrorists to try and determine what type of coordination is going on and how their objectives merge and at what level. We believe and have limited reporting that suggest that they may be cooperating by sharing resources. i.e. the FFE have the skills to make IED while the FF or Terrorist organizations have the personnel willing to blow themselves up.
Sunni Arab Resistance

“Objectives and Threats”
SAR Strategic Objectives

End State: The removal of the US/Coalition from Iraq; "end to occupation"; and ascendance of Sunni Arab power, influence and authority.

Strategic Imperatives:
- Isolate US from the Coalition Partners; undermine US National Will
- Separate the GC from people; undermine credibility and popular support for GC
- Isolate Coalition/CPA & GC from int'l and NGO support
- Create fear, instability and insecurity to rupture relations between Coalition efforts and Iraqi people – to lose popular support and tolerance
- Undermine, delay, stall Iraqification of Security Services and Constitutional Progress because this is the biggest threat to SAR (As GC/Provisional Gov’t credibility increases SAR position weakens)
- Destabilize CoG of Iraqi base of operations for Coalition in Shia/Southern IZ
- Ensure new IZ gov’t lacks legitimacy and is inherently weak “Weimar-like”

Strategic Enablers:
- Divided International Community
- Unsupportive/uncertain/uncommitted int’l organizations
- NGOs that require permissive environment
- Sympathetic Arab Media and European Press
- US Presidential Campaign & US Public Opinion
- Iraqi public that remains divided, fearful, distrustful and uncertain
- Traditional base of support among Sunni Arabs (mil, econ, popular supt) and the emergence of some popular support for Sunni Arab issues
SAR Operational Objectives

Operational Objectives:

- Deny Iraqi Gov’t Progress and credibility; “puppet gov’t”, sow dissenion
- Maintain view of Coalition as Occupiers, not Liberators
- Leverage Jihadists/Muj efforts who need new home and rallying point
- Impede Coalition Stabilization Efforts – economic, political, social, and security
- Leverage organized Crime and tribal connections; establish civil groups as fronts
- Maintain/Grow organizational base; Ba’athi base and use former military, ISS, SSO, Fedaiheen etc
- Effective IO Campaign leveraging Arab media outlets and influencing int’l media
- Deny Quality of Life Improvements, keep population frustrated and fearful
- Increase cost and time for rebuilding IZ; pass threshold of US will to continue
- Coordination/leadership of multifaceted threat with greater synergy
- Conduct limited ops in southern IZ, economy of force
- Keep US off balance and in reactive mode
SAR Operational Enablers

- Access to finances
- Semi-Permissive environment; knowledge of area, culture and people
- Access to weaponry, munitions and explosives
- Organized Crime Connections and capabilities
- Excellent intelligence, traditional levers of power, influence
- Fear and Intimidation
- Military, Political and Organizational skills abundant
- Base of support among Sunni Arabs/Tribal Connections
- Increasing support from some religious and terrorist groups
  (foreign fighters)
- Factionalized society; population indifference/support
- Infiltrate civilian, gov't and security organizations for short/long term benefit
- Broad guidance, limit C2 requirements, maintain OPSEC
Tactical Objectives:

- Steady state of low level attacks to achieve mounting casualties in Coalition
- Periodic major events to support operational objectives; create instability and fear
- Maintain cadre and organizational capability

ENABLERS:

- Mid-level leadership to organize, coordinate operational and logistics requirements
- Sufficient manpower to conduct variety of operations
- Sufficient financial support to bribe, buy specific skill sets or operational support
- Adaptive and creative; responding to Coalition TTPs
- Ability to select the time, place, method of attack with relative freedom of action
- Ability to blend into population, small, cellular and flat structure
- Expertise and skill sets available:
  - bomb-makers, possibly a limited number?
  - intelligence capabilities
  - operational level planners, trainers
  - logisticians and coordinators
  - C2
  - Security elements, safe houses/transportation, and networks for refuge
- Use religious and cultural sites for illegal and anti-coalition activities

leverages underclass
and unemployed male youth, criminals, traditional tribal smuggling networks, organized crime, Jihadists

darwinism
Near-term Threats SAR
(1 of 2)

- Stability
  - GC and/or Coalition success
  - Competent and uncorrupted Iraqi police and security forces

- Coalition Success engaging tribal leaders
  - Authority and responsibility
  - Security of tribal lands, and controlling Iraqi border areas

- Significant Sunni acceptance and participation in evolving political process
  - Emerging Sunni political figures willing to engage political process
  - Fractionalized Sunni population

- Neutralization of key facilitators

- Economic success
  - Employment
  - Economic multipliers – oil, ports, trade
Near-term Threats SAR  
(2 of 2)

- Functioning infrastructure  
  - Basic needs: Petroleum, Electricity, Water, Food

- International support, aid, and recognition

- Effective border security

- Unified, monolithic Shia population; Shia-led de-Baathification process

- Restriction of freedom of movement  
  - National ID card; controlled movement
  - Control checkpoints
  - Restricted communications
Long-term Threats to SAR

- Significant Sunni acceptance and participation in follow-on government
- Establishment of effective police/security forces and intelligence capability
- Economic success; reduces recruiting base & popular support
- International recognition of follow-on government
- Effective border security
- Significant tribal cooperation
- Unified, monolithic Shia population
- Shia-led de-Baathification process
- MOIS/IRGC activities in Iraq
- Unified, monolithic Kurd population
- Robust Islamic extremist presence
What we expect to see in the Insurgency

- Sustain military operations and capability while building political base – overt and covert with increasing emphasis on setting conditions for political objectives
- Concerted efforts for occasional high profile attacks
- More visibility on operational leadership re-emerging to link political and military efforts
- Some coalescing of mostly Sunni Arab, FRE and disparate individuals and groups fighting for political, family and tribal influence
- May surge operations after the transfer of power; and closer to US elections
- Continuation of:
  - Long term goal to drive out Coalition; for now discredit Coalition/IGC
  - Motivating common principles – protect Sunni interests, anti-West
  - Enabled by former regime expertise and operational leadership
  - Cellular structure; fundamentally still Ba’athist leveraging Islam
  - Communication and financing mechanics
  - Limited Foreign Fighter involvement but increasing

SAR is resilient, adaptable and determined; and views insurgency with long term perspective, not hinged to specific timetable. Absent Ba’athist reconciliation, SAR will sustain and expand operations.

The insurgency is highly decentralized and secretive...but it has enough popular support and resources to continue reproducing itself for some time to come...but to date it has lacked the ideological coherence or organization it needs to grow to a more formidable force.
Questions we have...

- What does SAR see for options, plans and lines of operation?
- What is the character of operational/strategic guidance and direction? Is there a C2 structure? Where? Who?
- What is the role of former regime leaders/sympathizers in emerging political/security structure?
- How is SAR maintaining organizational viability and effectiveness?
  - Building organization base
  - Expanding geographic influence
  - Developing intel, maintaining OPSEC and security
  - Infiltrating Govt, NGOs, work forces at US bases
- How are SAR ops and attack mechanisms evolving as they adjust to Coalition presence/responses and Iraqification?
- What is SAR worried about that can unringe campaign/survival?
- Where is SAR at in campaign? Does it have a timeline?
- What are SAR’s next operational steps?
- Is there a coherent popular message being delivered? If so, how? What is that message? How is it received?