4TH INFANTRY DIVISION MND-B

BCT CDRs AO ASSESSMENTS

6 1A 9 1A
9 Bns 6 Bns
3/6 (w-Erby) 1/6
1/6 2/6 (Taji)
5/6
2/6
4/6 (Mahmudiyah)

5 NOV 06

1 - 4 NP Bdes (13 Bn)
- Army Canal
- Karada, Rusafa

5 - 8 Bdes (10 Bn)
- Rusulid
MND-B BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM AREA ASSESSMENTS
29 OCT 06 - 4 NOV 06

2/1 AD—Area of Operations Assessment
4/101 BCT—Area of Operations Assessment
4/4 BCT—Area of Operations Assessment
2/10 MTN—Area of Operations Assessment
1/4 BCT—Area of Operations Assessment
2/4 BCT—Area of Operations Assessment
172SBCT – Area of Operations Assessment
2BCT/1AD-- Area of Operations Assessment (29 OCT - 04 NOV 06)

Focal: Ameriya

Sectarian Violence. There was an increase in AIF activity this week in Ameriya. This Sunni safe haven still serves as a staging area for Sunni terrorist groups and we continue to see an influx of Sunni families and Shia families being forced out. We assess the increase in events as a result of Sunni terrorist leaders' directives to further purge the Shia population from mixed and Sunni neighborhoods. Additionally, the detention of a Sunni Imam from Jihad by 1/1 NP (M) may have fueled tensions between the Sunni and Shia in Ameriya. Fewer attacks on CF are due to our reduced predictability combined with limited access points. Establishing combined checkpoints along RTE Michigan and Little Market Road are enhancing the credibility of the ISF. The presence of IA with NP will ease the population’s concerns and reduce the opportunities for criminal or EJK related activities. The people of Ameriya continue to see the Shia militia as their primary threat and view CF as a protector against that threat and what they view as a JAM infiltrated MOI force. We still believe this is the probable explanation in reduced attacks against CF and a slight increase in attacks against the NP. We anticipate continued EJK activities to further purge the Shia population and attacks against MOI forces with fewer attacks against CF. The conditions in Baghdad continue to provide the government with an opportunity to separate the Sunni population and insurgency—dependent upon the GOI’s ability to demonstrate their willingness to eliminate Shia militia from its security forces and government.

JAM Influence. There continues to be minimal indicators or reported JAM influence on 2/1/6 IA or the Mansour IP station. We have had no reports of 2/1/6 IA Soldiers involved or implicated in any sectarian activities. Corruption remains our primary concern with the IPs operating in Ameriya and Khadra.

Way Ahead. Our way ahead in Ameriya is conducting combined patrols focusing on disrupting sectarian killings to increase the perception of security among the locals and curb violent actions against the Shia. We will use ISR assets with maneuver forces to target IED cells and disrupt IED and sectarian activities. We will continue our counter body drop/sectarian killing Small Kill Teams and planned emplacement of tactical cameras in historical IED sites. In addition, we will maintain one vehicle access point secured by 2/1/6 IA.

Focal: Ghazaliya

Sectarian Violence. Incidents of sectarian violence have remained lower than average this week. Several factors have likely contributed to this, including the end of Ramadan and increased CF/ISF presence in northern Ghazaliya. LN reporting has also suggested infighting between JAM and the Fedailah Party. Recent operations in both Shula and Ghazaliya (detention of [redacted] and the Abu Bakr cell) have also likely disrupted death squad activity.

Extremist anti-CF Activity. Anti-CF activity has also remained low this week. Nearly all AIF activity this week targeted ISF. There were numerous small arms attacks against ISF checkpoints. The reasons for the lower level of attacks against CF are likely the end of Ramadan and our increased presence with ISF in Ghazaliya. We believe that the AIF are currently planning their next attack on checkpoint E47 on Sword [redacted] as this checkpoint has already been very effective at disrupting insurgent movement into Baghdad from the west. Expect a future attack on this checkpoint when their planning cycle is complete. Meanwhile, we will continue to fortify this checkpoint and assist 1/1/6 IA in securing it, and work to disrupt the insurgent cells in the area before such an attack occurs.

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JAM Influence. There is no significant change to JAM influence this week. We think there are limited JAM forays into southern Ghazaliya to target Sunnis. No specific reporting this week.

Way Ahead. In northern Ghazaliya, the way ahead for the short term is neutralizing the sniper cells around the Mujahareen and Naqib mosques, and looking for possible tactical camera locations around the mosques and ambush sites to overwatch them. In central Ghazaliya, we are working to target the three Tawhid Wa'Al Jihad cells and one Umar Brigade cell that are conducting attacks on the IA. In southern Ghazaliya, we will continue to focus on Constant Hawk data, gathering intelligence on the supposed AQIZ cell in muhalla 649, and counter cache operations. Also, we will continue gathering information on the Ghazaliya IP station shifting towards JAM. We will continue attempts to conduct increased joint patrolling with a specific group of IP to gather information from them (two of the four were wounded in last week's booby-trapped body attack). Longer term, we are working towards 100% combined patrols with ISF, and integrating the 9th IA Division BMP company into our AO.

Shula

Sectarian Violence. The level of sectarian violence has been low this week. One murder was reported on 1 NOV. The end of Ramadan and our increased presence in the AO are the likely causes of the lower level of violence. Another possibility is the LN reporting in Ghazaliya about infighting between JAM and the Fedlian Party. This is likely only a temporary reduction as JAM attempts to keep a low profile and reorganize, with plans to resume their cleansing operations in the near future. However, Operation Blackhawk Strike on 2 NOV was successful in detaining a suspected EJK cell (and several associates). We have strong evidence for five of the cell members, and less strong for himself and his brother. There was no backlash from the Shula population after this operation like there was after Sheik Mazin's detention. We expect this is because he is low-level. We believe that the results of this operation will temporarily disrupt EJK activities in Shula.

Extremist anti-CF Activity. The level of anti-CF activity this past week has been low. There was what we suspect was a baited ambush on 28 OCT, when a platoon moving to link up with a LN after a phone tip regarding the DUSTWUN soldier came under small arms fire from several rooftops. There was also a PSAP attack on a soldier on 31 OCT that struck the soldier's side SAPI plate. In both incidents, the attackers escaped.

JAM Influence. There is still a heavy JAM presence in Shula, especially in the Shula IP force. We are continuing our BATS data collection at the Shula IP station and distributing the data to the EJK Task Force and other partner agencies. We will continue collecting data over the next few weeks.

Way Ahead. We will work with the PTT to continue collecting BATS data at the Shula IP station. We will also continue our IP campaign to get toy guns off the streets to counter JAM flooding the streets with toy AK-47s to provoke an IP fratricide incident. We still plan to bring Sheik Mazin into a face-to-face meeting with Tomahawk 6 to ensure that he keeps his pledge to support the Iraqi government and cease all sectarian violence. No progress has been made on this in the past week; people in Shula are still telling us that he is "on vacation" away from Baghdad. Before the end of this month, we plan to develop and action the Jowadeen mosque JAM cell and conduct a sensing survey of all high schools in Shula.
4-101 BCT Area of Operation Assessment (29 OCT- 4 NOV 06)

Adhamiyah

Sectarian Violence. Sectarian violence has increased in the past week with the discovery of five LNs with gun shot wounds to the head on the 29th and the discovery of another body on the 30th. This increase of bodies indicates that Sunni insurgents are exploiting JAM vulnerabilities created by the recent CF raids into Thawra and JAM restructuring of its leadership. We expect sectarian violence will increase in Adhamiyah as Sunni EJK cells venture into Thawra and Khamisya to conduct kidnappings.

JAM Influence. We continue to assess that the recent raids into Thawra have kept JAM off balance. JAM's primary focus has been on the defense of Thawra and conducting retaliatory attacks against CF. JAM incursions into Adhamiyah will likely remain low in the coming week as JAM stands by for further guidance from MAS.

Way Ahead.

Adhamiyah continues to serve as a Sunni enclave in East Baghdad. As US and IA led security operations deter sectarian attacks in Adhamiyah, one of two outcomes will result. Either JAM will continue attempts to attack the Sunni populace, or JAM will bypass it in it's efforts to control Baghdad, allowing US forces to be tied down to security of the area. In either case, US/ISF must continue and improve Adhamiyah security.

For the protect state in Adhamiyah, the next step remains the transition from a US-planned, US-led, combined security operation into an operation with more planning involvement by the Iraqi Army. Last week, 2/13 IA BN (M) proposed a transition from fixed checkpoint operations around the cleared areas of Zones 18 and 19 to a greater emphasis on patrolling and Snap TCPs. Over the next week, 1/9 IA BDE (M) will be integrating this proposal with the continued security operations by 1/26 IA BN within Zones 18 and 19 for consideration by 9th IA DIV. The 1/9 IA BDE MITT are working with the IA BDE Commander and his staff to affect this planning and coordination.

Until this effort is complete, we will continue the combined patrols between TF 1-43 (US) and the IA under the MND-B approved security plan. Meanwhile, TF 1-43 will continue to target the "Group of the Doctor" a Sunni Group believed to be responsible for sniper attacks against US forces in Adhamiyah. Within the past week, TF 1-43 observed and confirmed that DVDs of the Sniper attacks in East Baghdad were being handed out to local nationals as they departed the Abu Hanife mosque. TF 1-43 will employ THT and tactical questioning on patrols to determine the distribution network for this Anti-US Forces propaganda and examine counter-IO courses of action.

TF 1-43 will also continue to integrate the "Build" phase for Adhamiyah with their kinetic actions. The next focus for "Build" operations are (a) working to open the Al Rafadain Bank #32 - the request is at DoS level; (b) the installation of nine 11 kV electrical feeders at the Royal Cemetery substation to add redundancy in the network; (c) the rehabilitation of the electrical networks in Muhallas 307 and 311 - Estimated Start Date (ESD) is 30 NOV 06; (d) the replacement of electrical networks in Muhallas 308, 310, 312, 314, 316, 318, and 320 - request submitted to USACE PCO for funding; and (e) the replacement of water networks for Muhallas 307, 311, and 318 - the request has been submitted for funding.
Sha'ab/Ur

Sectarian Violence. JAM EJK cells operating in Ur continue intimidation tactics against Sunni LNPs. The cells mark the Sunni homes with an X on the door, indicating that the families should move out or face the risk of violence. Some of the Sunni families have received an envelope with a 5mm round and note telling them that the next round will be aimed at them. JAM EJK cells have used similar intimidation techniques successfully in other areas of the Currahee AO to force Sunni's out of the area.

JAM Influence. On 31 Oct 06, MAS issued an order for all JAM to conduct a lock down of Thawra and Sha'ab/Ur. This lockdown was more of a general strike to protest the perceived blockade of Thawra by the Army Canal Checkpoints. During this timeframe all citizens remained in their homes, public transportation stopped and only JAM roamed the streets.

The reference to the Army Canal Checkpoint as a "blockade" by JAM is most likely an IO campaign in response to the recent raids. Reporting indicated that many JAM members blamed CF "blockade" for the lack of medical support after an IED attack on the 30 Oct 06 targeting a LN market place. However, IOATF reporting shows that most LNPs feel that the blockade has reduced the amount of sectarian violence in Sha'ab/UR areas.

Way Ahead. TF 1/42 under continues to patrol Sha'ab and Ur ICW 1/1/9 IA BN (M) under the "Protect" stage for this OTF II focus area. Meanwhile, TF 1/42 also integrates and nests the Regiment's "Build" phase operations. The civic action operations in this area are (a) the installation of two 250 kV generators to power 300 homes in poorer areas, (b) the delivery of two X-Ray machines at Sha'ab PHCs - currently at G9 for funding;
(c) the installation of one generator for a Sha'ab PHC – also at G9 for funding; and (d) the rehabilitation of six local schools – USACE is refining the scope of work.

New Baghdad

**Sectarian Violence.** Sectarian violence in New Baghdad has remained low in the past week. However, recent reports indicate that JAM infiltrated IPs are responsible for targeting Sunni LNs in the Baghdad Al-Jadida area. Baghdad Al-Jadida is one of the last Sunni neighborhoods in the New Baghdad area and has continued to be a target of JAM intimidation cells. We assess that this neighborhood and the Palestinian neighborhood located north of FOB Loyalty will continue to be areas of increased JAM violence until the Sunni LNs either move or are killed.

**JAM Influence.** In the past week JAM has aggressively reacted to the CF missions in Tharwa. We believe the LOR conducted an indirect fire attack targeting FOB Loyalty with seven rounds of 81mm mortars on 28 Oct 06 in retaliation for CF mission into Tharwa. JAM has also increased rocket attacks against FOB Rustamiyah and the IZ from historical POOs located in New Baghdad.

JAM increased targeting of CF on the Army Canal Checkpoints. Within the past week there have been three PSAF incidents resulting in one US KIA and the discovery of a sniper rifle. We believe that these attacks were carried out by the JAM/LOR cell that has been targeting CF from a mobile platform in the past two months.
**Way Ahead.** First in priority is the continued execution of TST capture/detain missions in support of operations to rescue or recovery the DUSTWUN. Second in priority is the continued HVI targeting of the League of the Righteous (LOR), with emphasis on the capture and detainment of the equivalent of the LOR operations officer and commander, respectively. Meanwhile, we plan to conduct a combined 3-67 AR and 9TH IA MEDCP in New Baghdad prior to 10 NOV 06. This will be combined with THT operations to develop sources and elicit intelligence on the LOR and its operations.

**Jisr Diyala/Mada'in**

**Sectarian Violence.** In the past week 1-61 CAV discovered a weapons caches in Wardiyah in connection to JAM EJK activity. JAM has used Jisr Diyala as an operating base for ethnic cleansing of the Wardiyah area. We believe this cache will hinder JAM EJK activity for at least a week until the weapons can be replaced.

JAM has also picked up activity near the Diyala Bridge. Various reports have indicated JAM has intended to ambush CF and Sunni LN crossing the bridge. JAM will most likely continue to target CF patrols on the MSR leading into Jisr Diyala in order to provide early warning to JAM/LOR leadership.

**JAM Influence.** Last week issued a Fatwa for JAM members in Jisr Diyala to attack CF who show aggression or intentions of detaining JAM members. Since the capture of Abu Sayf in early October, we have seen various reports that JAM was stockpiling weapons and setting up an early warning system in preparation for CF raids. This reporting corroborates JAM/LOR connections across the Currahee AO.

**Way Ahead.** The 506TH RCT will continue to focus on disrupting JAM attempts to seize and control the Lines of Communication in Jisr Diyala and Mada'in IOT prevent the spread of JAM influence. On 04 NOV 06, 1-61 CAV conducted a combined raid with 2/1 NP BDE to capture/detain two HVIs:

(a) Sheik Majid Aribi Abbas al Farraj (UL #0388), a suspected link between LOR and the Jisr Diyala area to include recent ADD, IED and IDF attacks. Likely assuming responsibilities of captured leaders.

(b) Sheik Muhammad Jabar Alawi al Khazali (UL #0401), a likely replacement for detained JAM leadership in Jisr Diyala, who is Sheik Muhammad's brother. Sheik Muhammad is part of a gang that conducts IED, IDF and EJK operations.

The following week will be used to exploit the successes of this set of HVI raids, showing and communicating to the local populace that:

(a) JAM no longer has control of Jisr Diyala
(b) The short-term future of Jisr Diyala security is with the US and ISF.
(c) The long-term future of Jisr Diyala security is with the IPs and National Police.
(d) The only way to achieve security is to support the CF/ISF and deny support to JAM by providing information to us.

**Overall.** For the long-term, broader tactical effects, we will continue to remain focused on identifying and reducing the following contributors to sectarian violence.
- Unemployment of Military Aged Males. Create employment opportunities through the application of CERP projects and the coordination with GOI elements to bolster State Owned Industries (SOE).
- Lack of Essential Services. Continue OTF II "Build" stage activities in Adamiyah, Sha'ab, and Ur, but increasingly tie improvements to local support, both through active[1,2,3] and overall denial of sanctuary to AIF.
- Dissention of AIF. Exploit the developing fractionalization – and factionalization – of JAM, as the subgroups begin to show different objectives and means of achieving them, and as the subgroups take different stances on EJK activities.
4-4 BCT – Area of Operation Assessment (29 OCT – 4 NOV 06)

Al Dora Assessment: Murders have decreased this past week with the Dora Market area being the primary location for the murders. The recent murders have all been against Shia. The murders continue to be a combination of sectarian based, crime, and intimidation with a hard to define line of separation. We continue to find some IEDs in the immediate vicinity of the bodies as well on the route for first responders to come to the scene. The public trust continues to be high for Coalition Forces. In M820, the population likes having Coalition Forces in the neighborhood. Several local nationals stated that the ongoing violence in the Dora Neighborhood has had a severe affect upon the schools; including the execution of 2 female teachers last month. These local nationals requested that Coalition Forces patrol around the schools during the start and end of the school day to convince them to send their kids to school again. In one engagement in M808, TPT was told that most Christians in the Dora area, and most of Baghdad, have relatives who live north of Mosul, in tribal/family villages. The search in M808 revealed that many of the abandoned homes in this neighborhood are owned by Christians that moved north to escape the violence and tensions in Baghdad, and that they would eventually return.

The majority of citizens in M822 continue to express a low opinion of the Iraqi National Police. The center of economic activity in Zone 25 remains to be the Dora Market / M822, an area which continues to struggle with AIF activity. Additionally, more shops and places of business have been opening up in M824 along Street 26. Nevertheless, citizens in the Dora Focus area have continued to voice their concerns and complaints over road access to their neighborhoods and the availability of reliable electrical power.

Trash continues to be a significant issue in the Dora Focus Area. It is a force protection issue for coalition forces as the AIF emplaces IEDs inside the trash piles and target coalition and NP patrols. Some recent engagements have supported that there is one insurgent cell that is threatening the trash contractors and is responsible for the IEDs occurring in the northern portion of the focus area. There are currently five trash contractors, but none have cleaned up the trash in three weeks. They continue to state that they will clean-up and then the sub-contractors do not show-up to work.

IP and NP are still not conducting the requisite number of unilateral patrols in support of Operation Together Forward II. This past week, the NP conducted a unilateral raid to detain a target in M826. The local nationals believed that this was a militia led unauthorized raid due to the lack of coalition forces. As a result, the local nationals in the area began to defend themselves and attacked the National Police. This incident has further impacted the trust the local nationals have for the National Police. Currently there is a complete lack of trust between the NP and LN. The LN believe that the NP are detaining people at checkpoints and are turning them over to the militia. They state that they do not trust going through a checkpoint unless coalition forces are on the checkpoint with the NP. They continue to state that they do not trust NP and IP and assert that they are undisciplined, corrupt, and that they only see the IP and NP detain Sunni. They say that the Sunnis that are taken are beaten and tortured during interrogation and show up beaten to death. We have been unable to confirm these reports. They still complain about the NP and IP shooting large volumes of ammunition indiscriminately around their checkpoints. People also want to know how explosives are being brought into the Muhallas when there are checkpoints that everything must come through.
Al Dora Way Ahead: We will continue to conduct small scale cordon and searches to disrupt the AIF in Dora utilizing individual combat patrols to conduct small, combined cordon and search operations (10-15 houses) randomly in the focus area. Another disruptive technique is the use of rolling TCPs (10 minutes in position). Companies will randomly conduct dismounted and mounted movement to contacts with several patrols simultaneously to find, fix, and finish the AIF. We will conduct a deliberate clearance in the vicinity of the Al Rumi Mosque in M824 as part of the RIP/TOA. We will continue to press the NP and IP to conduct the requisite number of patrols inside the focus area. It is imperative that NP and IP conduct patrols in the focus area if the operation is to be a success. The ECPs have become less effective in recent weeks. The NP will adequately operate the ECPs if we are located with them, but as soon as we depart the ECP they will quit searching vehicles. We observe the ECPs routinely throughout a patrol spending 20-30 minutes a time observing the CP as well as coaching, teaching, and mentoring them in correct ECP procedures. The discipline of the NP when not directly supervised by CF is severely lacking. The NP must be resourced to their authorized MTOE strength if they are to be successful in Dora. They do not have enough Shura to complete the tasks assigned to them.

The Dora Market revitalization plan has been approved by the required Ministries. This project will clean and rebuild all of the stalls throughout the market. The completion of the Dora Market revitalization plan will ideally provide an economic stimulus in the area. We believe this project will begin in December. The trash contractors remain incapable of developing a sustainable trash collection program. The contractors complain of intimidation and threats inside of the Muhallas and the workers live in the Muhallas and fear that when they go home at night they will be targeted. The contractors must hire local nationals from outside of the focus area, so when they go home at night, they do not feel threatened. We will conduct a meeting with all of the trash contractors to determine the way ahead and what it will take them to do their job and collect the trash in the Muhallas.

Abu T'Shir & Al Hadr (Zone 26) Assessment: Residents in Southern M828 have indicated that this is the new battle zone between JAM and the Sunni population. Sunni leaders have indicated that they intend to fight for this area. The Belad IP in Saha appear to be heavily JAM influenced or JAM controlled and reporting and SIGACTS indicate that they have participated in attacks, EJKs and reprisals against Sunnis in this area. JAM's freedom of maneuver was disrupted due to the effects of Operation Together Forward and due to the disruption caused by replacing 8-2 NP with 6-2 NP in July. SIGINT indicates that JAM has established connections to 6-2 NP through the 1-6-2 NP Battalion Commander. In addition, it is assessed that JAM receives some level of support from the Belad Al Shudai IP Station. JAM's influence over NP and IP provides it with an early warning and freedom of maneuver/action within Abu T'shir. Unable to conduct EJK operations in Dora, JAM has turned its attention to targeting Sunnis and AIF throughout Zone 26, while simultaneously protecting its support zone in M850 and M852. JAM is expelling the Sunni population and establishing control over muhallas 832, 834, 858, and 860. JAM is doing this through a deliberate campaign of intimidation and murder that has resulted in the abandonment of many homes and businesses and has left the remaining Sunnis living in a state of fear. Local national tips and general atmospheres implicate both the NP and IP with this activity. Sunni groups are also conducting kidnappings and murders against JAM and Shia civilians, albeit at a significantly lower rate. Sunni AIF in Zone 26 are in a defensive posture, more concerned with protecting the populace and retaliating for JAM transgressions. However, there are indicators that the Sunni organization Omar Brigade has increased activity in Zone 26. This could be due to increased JAM activity or more freedom of movement with the removal of National Police from the isolation area. It appears that an Omar BDE cell is active in northern M830 and 832. An increase in graffiti and reporting
indicates that JAM and Omar BDE are in direct conflict inside the Mechanix isolation area and the fault line is vic the 77 Grd line in M830 and 832.

Abu T'Shir (Zone 26) Way Ahead:
Our current targeting priority in Abu T'shir is disrupting EJK. To counter the EJK threat, 1-14 CAV has isolated the Mechanix area (M830, 832, and 834) and has established two NP ECPs that are manned by NP and overwatched by US forces to monitor traffic flow between Mechanix and Abu T'shir. The unwillingness of 1-6 2 to effectively man these checkpoints is a hindrance to effective checkpoint operations (likely due to JAM influence). These ECPs will disrupt (but not completely prevent) JAM from conducting EJK within the mixed population area of Mechanix. This week 1-14 CAV will begin conducting combined cordon and search operations with the NP and eventually resume NP patrolling in Mechanix. Outside the isolation area 1-14 CAV has focused the Belat IP in the Saha apartment area to continue to build the relationship between the IP and the locals. The effectiveness of the Belat IP is questionable and may be heavily JAM influenced. 1/6/2 NP remains ineffective in the area and is currently only capable of manning and executing ECPs along 60th Street (ECPs 80B and 60S). 1/6/2 NP also mans an unauthorized checkpoint at the intersection of Yemana and Market (T72). 1/6/2 NP refuses to abandon this checkpoint. 1-14 CAV believes this checkpoint is further evidence of JAM influence over 1/6/2 and the NP in general as this checkpoint serves as an early warning position and covers the entrance into M830 and M832. Replacing the 1/6/2 NP CDR will increase the effectiveness of JAM in Abu T'shir and will disrupt JAM operations. Non-lethal targeting will continue in Zone 26 primarily focused on the following: school repair contracts, completion of 2 health clinic contracts, sewage clean up, trash collection, and anti-graffiti campaign. The main effort for lethal and non-lethal actions will be the isolation zone in M830, M832, M834, and M860.

Risalah (Zone 39) Assessment:
Sectarian Violence. Since conducting clearance operations in Objective Risalah at the beginning of September, the number of attacks, especially against civilians, has reduced. Locals within the area have stated that the area is safer now that Coalition Forces have conducted clearance operations and established security around the focused area. Since establishing the barriers around the focus area, 121 families have moved into the focused areas (most citing increased security as a reason for their moving into the focused area) while 139 families have moved out (the majority citing the unpredictable electricity, water and sewage as the reason for their leaving). The establishment of the barriers around the neighborhood has successfully isolated the neighborhood from both Sunni and Shi'a groups attempting to use that area as their battleground. Sunnis in the focus area continue to state that JAM conducts kidnappings and murders in areas outside the focus area, especially the Markets on Routes Cedars and Arees. This psychological fear prevents many Sunni males from leaving the focus area, for fear of kidnappings and murders. There have been isolated cases of murder in the focus area, but Coalition Forces have rapidly reacted and caught most of the perpetrators of violence. The locals see these actions positively, and continue to assist in deterring violence in the focus area.

JAM Activity. Besides for the patrolling focus in the Risalah Objective area, Coalition Forces have begun putting significant pressure upon the JAM leadership in the Turath and Mal'alive areas (Muhallahs 843 and 837). Continued offensive operations by Coalition Forces against High Level JAM Leaders have forced them to leave the area for extended periods of time and have disrupted their activities. ç1/6cç continues to indicate the level of frustration among the JAM members in the area. JAM does receive some early warning from 7-2 National Police in the area, but that early warning has not prevented the capture of these JAM leaders and
members in the area. This pressure by Coalition Forces ensures that the JAM leadership is unable to plan and conduct EJK activities outside their neighborhoods.

Suni Insurgent Activity. Due to frustration with Lion's Gate barriers, many of the Sunnis in the Radwniyah area are becoming increasingly supportive of AIF activities in their areas. This passive, and in some areas active, support of AIF activities has led to focused IED attacks along routes leading in and out of OP San Juan. The attacks are designed to cause Coalition casualties and prevent Coalition Freedom of Movement in the area. Indicates that AQIZ may be moving into the Salaam Village in the Task Force's Southern boundary with 2/10 Mountain. This has led to a number of IEDs emplaced along Routes leading into this location, designed to disrupt Coalition movement into that area and prevent capture of AQIZ leadership.

Risalah (Zone 39) Way Ahead:
One of the biggest threats to Coalition Forces' efforts in Risalah is the message that the various AIF Groups (both Sunni and Shi'a) are sending to locals in the focus area. "American Forces are leaving this area." This message can undermine the Coalition efforts by causing the locals to turn away from Coalition security efforts and allow Miltia groups from both sects into the community. Coalition Forces are working to counter this message through PSYOPs and Civil Affairs activities to build increased trust among the local populations. Also, Coalition Forces are working with 7-2 National Police and the Hay al Aamil Police Station to bring in the Iraqi Security Forces to assist with the security operations in the focus areas. This combined patrolling will allow for trust building between the ISF and the local population and deter the death squads from conducting assassinations and drive by shootings. In the Turath/Ma'alive areas, Coalition Forces are conducting small-scale cordon and search operations within the JAM strongholds to disrupt JAM activities and prevent the establishment of significant caches in the area. This effort will ensure that Coalition Forces stay within the JAM decision making cycle and protect the local population in the area. Finally, CF and ISF need to conduct operations south of the Ghartan Canal to disrupt the Sunni Insurgent support zone in Ghartan, Duwaniun, and Radwniyah areas in order to prevent these forces from conducting operations in Baghdad.

With the upcoming adjustment to Lions Gate security belt, we foresee the ability to positively affect the relationship between the Sunni and Shi'a populations. It will be moved to a position that will allow Coalition Forces greater ability to overwatch and influence the INP CP operations. We anticipate seeing a spike of attacks in vicinity of moved CP 12 but a reduced threat over the long term. This can only be accomplished by close coordinated effort between NPTTs and Coalition Forces.

Jihadi/Furat Assessment:
Sectarian Violence. Over the last two weeks, the number of murders within the Jihadi/Furat areas have remained steady. This is most likely related to the increase Coalition presence in major EJK and sectarian violence historical locations, the emplacement of barriers around northern Jihadi to protect the Sunni populations from JAM access, and the successful employment of Small Kill Teams (SKTs) to deter sectarian activity. The emplacement of barriers around northern Jihadi will have a significant impact, both actual and psychologically, upon the Sunni populations, as the barriers will deny JAM and Shi'a Militias the freedom of movement to conduct some of their sectarian activity. The successful interdiction by Small Kill Teams in Muhallah 887 is demonstrating the JAM early warning network in the area has been significantly disrupted with the removal of 8-2 National Police from the Jihadi/Furat. The adjustment of barriers and a concrete tower in Muhallah 887 has significantly reduced the
number of EJKs occurring within this area. However, EJK activity has increased in surrounding areas, specifically Muhallahas 889 and 891.

JAM Activity: Over the last two weeks, there have been a number of targeted operations against JAM leaders in the Jihad and Furat areas. CJSTF and conventional Coalition Forces have conducted these operations. Due to the number of JAM leaders captured in Jihad/Furat, as well as across Baghdad, JAM has increased offensive operations against Coalition Forces. There have been four EFP attacks in Jihad since 21 September. All four attacks involved an EFP targeting the lead vehicle in the patrol, followed by small arms fire, and in one case RPG fire. The attacks are all occurring within 500m of the Zahra Mosque and Route Steelers. The use of EFPs is JAM's attempt to regain the initiative from Coalition Forces. Expect these attacks to continue as Coalition Forces place pressure on JAM strong points and deny JAM the freedom of movement to conduct EJK activity.

Jihad/Furat Way Ahead:
Aggressive Coalition operations in the Jihad/Furat neighborhoods, will continue to disrupt EJK activities and protect the local population. Murders have remained steady in the area, since two Coalition Company-sized elements have assumed responsibility of Jihad/Furat. However, we anticipate an increase of EJK activity as B/8-10CAV transitions out and is not replaced. The precise targeting of JAM leaders will allow Coalition Forces to disrupt the EJK activities within Jihad/Furat. The arrival of 1-5-2 National Police has allowed Coalition Forces to focus the National Police checkpoints away from areas that favor JAM and Shi'a objectives and towards supporting the protection of both sects of Iraqis within the Jihad/Furat area. Additionally, constructing a series of barriers with a single entry controlled point (ECP) around Muhalla 887 will prevent JAM/EJK death squads from operating in this area — and overall reduce the levels of sectarian violence by protecting this major Sunni population center. Coalition Forces will focus on influencing and overwatching the INP operating in this area in order to ensure they are properly executing their duties. Additionally, ensuring that the barrier emplacement plan will not disrupt civilians every day activities but provide additional security. Of note — this Muhalla houses numerous influential Sunni families — including many professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc) that have a large influence on major Sunni political parties. Projects focused on trash and standing sewage will improve quality of life and perception of Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Government in and around that area. Finally, the maintenance of Iraqi Police Patrols in these areas — particularly along the commercial market areas along Route Steelers and Route Pine will further deter sectarian violence and instill confidence in the population (both sects) that the Government of Iraq can provide for their security.

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2/10 MTN—Area of Operations Assessment (29 OCT—4 NOV 06)

Sectarian Violence: Sunni AQI affiliates continue to target Shia within MMD. Threat stream reporting detailing plans for VBIED attacks on the MMD IPS and market area were likely realized with successful detonations on 31 OCT and 04 NOV. While casualty figures remain low, a coordinated JAM response to these continued attacks will target Sunni LNAs within MMD proper. It consistently describes sectarian attacks conducted by JAM members in MMD, while a widespread perception of a "JAM controlled Mahmudiyah" pervades outlying Sunni villages. Additionally, reports from the Rasheed IP station describe an increasing division between Sunni and Shia police officers with tribal sheikhs using the police force as personal security details. Reports of Sunni on Anbari violence in Yusifiyah indicate continued tensions within the city proper, though reports of JAM expansion from downtown area have decreased. Both Sunni AIF and JAM are threatened by the recent success of IA operations as evidenced by increased intimidation and attacks on IA officers and their families. This intimidation campaign will continue as ISF within Commando AO gain increased legitimacy as a result of successful offensive operations.

JAM:
Atmospheric reporting indicates that a widespread perception of a “JAM Controlled” MMD pervades outlying Sunni Villages as far west as Arab Jasim. LNAs will not enter MMD in fear of becoming the victims of carjackings, kidnappings or executions. JAM continues to describe executions and JAM TTPs for the disposal of bodies following EJK activities, however, CF and ISF patrols have been unable to confirm these activities. JAM will continue to build combat power within MMD, using the Qa’Qa’ apartments as a base of operation.

Yusifiyah:
Sunni IDF teams continue to target PB Yusifiyah with IDF from POOs IVO the SAC while attempting to disrupt operations at IA BPs IVO D115A and D135A. The current JAM presence in Yusifiyah is assessed as low, with estimates of 20 members running operations out of an office near the Husseiniyah in the city.

Al Rasheed:
Atmospheric reporting describes an emerging division within the Rashid IPS. The IP are reportedly divided into two separate groups; one Shi’a the other Sunni. The Shi’a group is supported by Sheik Ammar and an influential tribal sheik from Rasheed while the Sunni IP are supported by the Iraqi Islamic Party. Recent confrontations between the IA and the IP within MMD will likely cause further division within the Al Rasheed IPS while tribal sheiks are reported to use the police as personal security details. The IP commander for the Al Rasheed IP station, has demonstrated resolve in dealing with the issues in the area and has agreed to attend the bi-weekly security meetings chaired by the 4/6 BDE CDR.

Way Ahead: 4/6 IA developed and executed four operations in the last 7 days in AO Commando. We will continue to facilitate the IA’s ability to proactively plan and conduct independent COIN operations. We will extend IA’s influence west in AO BAGHDAD EAGLE. 2/10 MTN will also focus on reducing AIF sanctuaries in the Euphrates River Valley
north and south of the YTPP; exploiting recent caches found in Zone 304; and disrupting AIF cells operating south of MSR TAMPA. A tribal council is now meeting every two weeks in Sadr al Yusufiyah. In addition, the 4/8 BDE CDR's bi-weekly security meetings that include both the MMD and AR police chiefs demonstrate the ISF senior leadership's resolve to control destabilizing influences in the region. These efforts in conjunction with the continued tactical over watch of AO BAGHDAD EAGLE will support the growth of legitimate governance and reduce the potential for sectarian violence.
1/4 BCT—Area of Operations Assessment (29 OCT – 4 NOV 06)

Taji Qada

**General Overview:** Taji Qada is comprised of the western and southern portions of AO Raider and consists of essentially four areas: Taji Market area (which includes the sparsely populated western portion near the boundary with Salah al Din Province), Saba al Boor Nahia, Bassam area, and North Kadamiyah. The population of Taji is a mixture of Shia and Sunni. In the south, it is mostly industrial and commercial with mostly Shia residents and pockets of Sunnis. In the west, it is mostly Sunni residents with the exception of Saba al Boor, which is a predominately Shia town with some Sunni residents. Saba al Boor, Bassam, and the northern portion of North Kadamiyah are situated along a sectarian divide. In particular, Saba al Boor has become the focal point for sectarian conflict as both JAM and Sunni Insurgents vie for dominance the town.

**Threat Assessment:**

The threat in the Taji Market area is predominantly criminal. Some Sunni Rejectionists from three different AIF networks reside and conduct attacks in the vicinity of Nasser Factory, Hor al Bash, and Taji Market (near Gunner Gate). These networks primarily target Coalition Forces and Iraqi Army Forces with IED and indirect fire attacks. In addition, they secure support zones in the west using large buried IEDs to prevent Coalition Force encroachment. These insurgents view the IA as pawns of the US Government and therefore legitimate targets. These groups use kidnapping to raise funds to support their insurgency. Some of these groups are involved in attacks on Saba al Boor.

There are three threats to security in Saba al Boor: indirect fire from Sunnis that surround the town; ambush and drive-by shooting on ASR Lincoln; and sectarian related violence within the city itself. The local population is the primary target. The Sunnis use indirect fire and snipers to terrorize the Shia population and force them out of town and as retribution for the actions of militia death squads. The Sunni dominated region surrounding Saba al Bor provides freedom of maneuver for mortar teams. Reporting of Shia militia death squad activity declined this reporting period. Security conditions within the town remain relatively stable with consistent low-level violence. However, resumption of CERP projects, progress on power distribution, and a successful food distribution program improved perception of security in the town. As a result the population increased from approximately 3,000 to 3,500.

In the Bassam area, the largest threat is from inter-tribal violence. Similar to Saba al Boor, EJK-type activity is used to intimidate rival tribes and drive them out of the area. In addition, the Sunnis living in the Bassam area are involved with indirect fire directed against Saba al Boor.

**MSC, JAM, and Tribal Influences:**
In the southern portion of Taji Qada and within Saba al Boor, JAM has the greatest influence. JAM death squads were responsible for driving out Sunni residents in Saba al Boor and for the illegal checkpoints near the Baghdad Gates, which in turn triggered the response from the Sunni communities in the area. The northern and western portions of Taji Qada are predominately Sunni and provide safe havens for AQI and the MSC to conduct operations. The MSC and its subordinate insurgent groups are self-styled protectors of the Sunni populace. Both JAM and Sunni groups perceive they act in self-defense. Each persuades local tribal leaders to side with one group or another. Reporting indicates that all Shia tribal leaders in the Taji Qada are affiliated with JAM. Although they have tried, the MSC has not successfully cowed all Sunni tribal leaders to support them. However, they have enough influence among the Sunni tribal leaders to conduct operations with impunity.

Tarmiyah Qada

**General Overview:** The Tarmiyah Qada is comprised of the majority of the northern portion of AO Raider and consists of essentially three areas: Al Abaychi, Tarmiyah, and Mushada. Abaychi is outside of the Raider AO but remains a Sunni insurgent safe haven and area of influence along the northern division boundary. Tarmiyah and Mushada are almost entirely Sunni towns. The population of Tarmiyah has grown with the arrival of Sunni families seeking refuge from the violence in Baghdad and Samarra. Mushada is a transient town and most of the inhabitants run shops along MSR Tampa. Essentially Mushada is a truck stop town similar to towns that grew-up along a US interstate highway. The areas around Tarmiyah and Mushada are loosely controlled by the MSC. Recently, the MSC claimed Tarmiyah as a separate Islamic state and started imposing the strict Wahabbist code of conduct on the populace.

**Threat Assessment:** The MSC and the Sunni insurgency in AO North, primarily around Tarmiyah and Mushada pose the greatest risk to Coalition Forces and Iraqi Army Forces in AO Raider. MSC elements operate at will throughout this portion of AO Raider and conduct attacks against Coalition Forces. Primary forms of attack are IEDs and complex attacks along MSR Tampa and RTE Coyotes. In particular, the MSC appears to be rebuilding their network and increasing efforts to destabilize the area. Their intensified IO campaign and violent actions are designed to influence the local population. However, the MSC is highly interested in spectacular attacks; recent threat reporting indicates that the MSC is building additional VBIEDs to attack Coalition Forces and has hired a specialist to use HME target Coalition Forces using the culvert system along RTE Coyotes. In addition, the insurgents in the area conduct murder, kidnappings, and car-jackings to fund their cause.

**MSC, TWJ and Tribal Influence:** The MSC and its affiliate, TWJ, are the major influences in this area. Atmospherics indicate a growing resentment of the MSC, partially due to the MSC Wahabbist interpretation of Islamic law and restrictions
imposed, under threat of death, on the inhabitants of Tarmiyah. In Halabsa, west of Mushada, the local populace actively resisted the MSC and conducted small arms fire attacks against the insurgents. However, AO North insurgents are entrenched and their influence extends from Tarmiyah to Saba al Boor. In addition, they influence the ranks of IPs and the 11th SIB through the use of infiltrators. The MSC has the support of some Sheiks in the area. The tribal leaders in the area have great influence over the population and are viewed by the local communities as the only leaders who are interested in their concerns and view the GOI as remote and Shia controlled.

Istakal Qada

**General Overview:** The Istakal Qada is comprised of the eastern portion of AO Raider and consists of four areas: Hussieniyah, Rashadiyah, Boob al Sham, and Falahat/Fahama. Hussieniyah and Boob al Sham are almost exclusively Shia with strong ties to JAM. These cities serve as a support zone for Shia militias. Rashadiyah is the rival Sunni town. Falahat/Fahama (area near the confluence of the Tigris Arm Canal and the Tigris River, aka Taji Beach) and Sheik Hamid are Sunni dominated areas, situated along the sectarian divide within Istakal Qada.

**Threat Assessment:** Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to stability within Istakal Qada. Recently, JAM burned the homes of several Sunni farmers in Intesar Village. Reporting indicates that AQI affiliated terrorists moved from the Falahat (Taji Beach) and Sheik Hamid Village to support the farmers' resistance. In addition, ASR Dover is the historical EFP zone within the Raider AO. EFP attacks against Coalition Forces have significantly declined in recent months. Neither JAM nor Sunni insurgents target ISF within Istakal Qada. The exception is the Taji Beach area where anti-government/anti-Coalition insurgent groups affiliated with AQI frequently attack Coalition Forces and Iraqi Army Forces near Checkpoint 15. The populace in this area holds similar views to the Sunnis in Taji Qada and view the Iraqi Army as puppets of the Coalition.

**JAM and Tribal Influence:** JAM has the greatest influence within Istakal Qada, especially in Hussieniyah and Boob al Sham. Most citizens, if not all, inside Hussieniyah must claim passive allegiance at a minimum to JAM. JAM supports local services to enhance its image, garner recruits, and shape their image as providers of security. JAM conducts illegal checkpoints with impunity throughout the zone and death squads have taken their toll on the local Sunni populace. Overt action by JAM to expand into Sunni areas and has attracted the attention of AQI affiliated Sunni insurgents. The criminal behavior of JAM within Istakal Qada drew the wrath of Muktada al Sadr. Recent reporting indicates he may have had the JAM leaders in Hussieniyah removed and possibly killed.

**Way Ahead.**
• Continue comprehensive operations in Saba al Boor to eliminate IDF and sectarian attacks

• IO Campaign to influence Saba al Boor IDPs to move back into town

• Conduct Intel-based operations around Tarmiyah and Mushada to disrupt the AIF

• Leverage increased presence in Tarmiyah to hold previous gains

• Increase vigilance against SVBIED attacks and increase targeting of MSC VBIED cell

• Deny the AIF access to culverts along RTE Coyotes and auxiliary routes

• Undermine support for the MSC through IO and other non-lethal means

• Continue ISF growth throughout zone

• Continue vet, and re-train the 11th SIB

• Continue to push and security concerns through Qada leadership and address issues at NBCC

• Maintain lower level of attacks in Corps TAI 1
2/4 BCT—Area of Operations Assessment (29 OCT – 4 NOV 06)

Karbala Province

**Sectarian Violence** Over the last month there were a number of unexplained murders reported by the PJCC. We assess this as a result of sectarian or intra Shia violence. It can not be ruled out that other possibilities exist such as tribal disputes, criminal activity, or de-ba’athification.

**JAM Influence** JAM continues to promote the perception of a benevolent, civic-oriented group providing security and essential services. JAM security and temporary checkpoints strengthen public belief in their intentions. There are multiple threat reports of JAM in Karbala.

The new Karbala Police Chief, Mohammed Muhsin Zaidan, is reportedly receiving death threats from JAM because of the changes he made to the Karbala IP organization, which was heavily influenced by JAM. Uncorroborated reporting indicates that JAM may conduct attacks to occupy the government building, similar to what happened in al Amarah last week. It is likely JAM will continue to flex its power within Karbala and through intimidation keep the IPs and non-JAM affiliated council members in line with JAM goals. We assess due to JAM IP influence, IP checkpoints will provide early warning and support to JAM and EFP cell leaders and members against CF operations.

In early October, a large percentage of all tribes in Karbala governorate supported the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). Most tribal leaders supported either the BADR Corps or JAM because of the financial resources that the groups provided or the political power the relationship afforded to the tribes on the local and governorate levels. No tribe rejected the influence or political power of the BADR Corps and JAM entirely, but some tribal leaders sought to form a coalition against the growing political dominance of the BADR Corps and JAM in Karbala. The purpose of this partnership was to create a collective strategy to compete in the governorate elections against the SCIRI and JAM organizations if needed.

**Way Ahead** 2BCT will focus its efforts in Karbala on developing the police. We will continue to support MG Mohammed Muhsin Zaidan. 2BCT engagements with MG Mohammed have led to an agreement that CF will assist with Karbala IP training. Specifically, Karbala will send their district and station training officers to the Babil Academy Training Officer course in an effort to build a train the trainer cadre for Karbala. The Karbala police will also take part in a Kalsu based “Crucible” training event that will serve as a PLDC-like junior leader certification. BG Mohammed will identify a core group of officers to make changes within the Karbala police force. He will focus on fortifying the Provincial Headquarters, conducting kinetic operations in Hindiyah possibly with the IA, and he will continue to rid the police force of incompetent officers and those loyal to outside forces. Beyond IPS development, 2BCT is engaging the 8th IA CG to change out the IA battalion in Karbala so that a unit willing to conduct operations against the militia can support the CF and G0I efforts to reduce militia influence. Additionally, we will continue targeting known EFP targets within Karbala and are developing intelligence on militia/EFP targets in Hindiyah which may lead to the first step of a clearing effort against the militia in Karbala province.

Babil Province

**Sectarian Violence** Sectarian violence within Babil occurs along the Shia-Sunni fault line, primarily focused in Iskandariyah and Zone 316. The true extent of sectarian violence is unknown. The activity within Zone 316 initially was assessed as tribal in nature that has spread to sectarian conflict. Reports of sectarian violence increased as local tribes requested assistance from JAM and Sunni AIF; we continue to see reports of this violence as returning
families were fired upon during their return to the Obeidi area. 3/R IA has conducted numerous cross-boundary operations primarily targeting Sunni AIF. These operations have, unfortunately, spilled over into retribution attacks and seizure of property by the Shia-dominated IA units. A group of Sunni tribal leaders and activists from north Babil view American intervention as their best hope to address unemployment in their area, stabilize Iraq's security situation, and promote expression of moderate political views. According to a subsequent communication from one member of the group, their own personal security worries have intensified following the assassination of the head of the Hillah SWAT team, as a result of which they now fear that Shia death squads may have them in their sights. On 28 Oct, in COA Lion, we had a VBIED detonate in the Hateen Apartments, which has a significant Shia population and resulted in 7 LN WIA and 15 LN KIA. The VBIED driver tried to get into a market place, but was denied access by ISF. It detonated outside the marketplace, probably causing fewer casualties. Due to this attack, we will more than likely see an increase in sectarian violence along the Sunni, Shia fault line that runs between Musayyib and Iskandariyah. This attack will continue to fuel the flames of sectarian violence, likely causing JAM to conduct assassinations and murders of Sunnis they believe supported this operation or were directly involved in the operation.

**JAM Influence**  JAM will conduct retribution attacks for last week's CF lead ISOF incursions into the Hillah Imam Ali Shrine and the OMS office in Hindiyah. This has manifested itself with IDF threats and attacks on the REO at Hillah as well as an ADD attack vicinity Hillah. The JAM influence Iraqi government continues to exert its political power to release detained individuals. Sheik Salah al Obeidi, who was detained by ODA on 01 Sep will be released in the next few days; this is at least the second high profile JAM member to be released in the last month.

The IPs in Babil continues to be intimidated by the militia, as they feel they are not properly equipped to take the militias on. This has been noted in District Police Commander Meetings as hosted by BG Qals. Additionally assessed that roughly half of the IPs in the province fall into the category of being unwilling to take on the militias and approximately 1/3 of the IPs have direct ties to the militias. JAM influence on the Iraqi Police in Babil Province tends to be strengthened in the southern portions of the province towards Diwaniyah. In Northern Babil there are clear links between IPs and JAM. Where the PTTs mainly operate, the PTT teams have linked the station commanders of the Eshkan, Haswah, and Jabala IP stations with JAM. The PTT believes that the station commanders have freely supplied JAM with weapons and ammunition in the past.

**Way Ahead**  The tribal disputes/sectarian violence that occurs in zone 316 requires CF and IA to mediate a cease fire and conduct presence patrols. 2BCT will continue to engage tribal leadership in zone 316 and has established a check point at the Copper Bridge to control movement in and out of the conflict area. 2BCT continues to conduct non-kinetic civil-military operations in Diyala to strengthen a fruitful bond with local citizens that has stopped the great majority of the sectarian violence in that area. In Haswah and Iskandaria, we continue to target JAM EFP and IDF cells. Additionally, 2BCT continues initiatives at the Iskandariyah Industrial Complex that have led to increased Shia and Sunni employment and decreasing sectarian violence.

**Najaf Province**

**Sectarian Violence**  No sectarian violence noted this week. However, limited reporting was received due to a minimized CF presence in Najaf province. The very small Sunni population makes it difficult for Sunni based insurgent groups to blend in with the local populace and conduct sectarian violence. The most likely sectarian violence would occur as a SVBIED or VBIED in the vicinity of the Imam Ali Shrine or Kufa Mosque. Assess minimal sectarian violence
due to majority Shia population, although intra-Shia violence may occur. Should any symptoms of sectarian violence be noted, it is likely deba'athification, conducted by either Badr or JAM. Najaf IP show little interest in preventing such activity, due to heavy Badr infiltration and a generally hostile attitude towards former Ba'ath party members across the province.

**JAM Influence** JAM continues to intimidate the IPs and IA in Najaf, while trying to prove that they are a legitimate security force. The general assessment is that the level of militia influence and infiltration in the ISF and government in Najaf is consistent with the political demographics of the Province. OMS/MAS are very popular throughout the area, consequently there is a large percentage of IPs and elected/appointed leaders who sympathize with MAS – this does not necessarily mean, however, that they are active members or supporters of JAM or are affiliated with anti-CF attacks. Similarly, SCIRI dominates politically in Najaf – therefore its affiliated militia, Badr corps, will continue to exert significant influence in local politics and security institutions. It should be noted that Badr is no less dangerous than JAM, they are merely in power and contend to maintain positive relations with CF because it is politically and economically beneficial to do so – when they either lose legitimacy with their constituent base or CF takes an action directed at one of their high ranking militia members they will be just as likely to engage in anti-CF attacks, and are potentially more dangerous than JAM. We continue to believe the IDF attacks within Najaf are related to an inter-Shia conflict between Badr/SCIRI and JAM/OMS. MG Oothman, the 8th IA CG believes that the PM’s visit on 18 OCT, where he allegedly spoke with Sadr, will help keep this potential fight from escalating.

**Way Ahead** Continue leader engagements, PJCC, PTT and MITT Operations with the Holy city of Najaf. Continue efforts to increase the impact of the limited PTT coverage by developing a PLDC-like class at FOB Echo and a similar OBO or ANCOC type class also at Echo.

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172SBCT AREA OF OPERATION ASSESSMENT (29 OCT 06 – 4 NOV 06)

RUSAFA

Sectarian Violence. DUSTWUN operations have impacted CF presence in Rusafa, where sectarian violence likely continues (based on SIGACT reports) despite the relatively low number of bodies being found. This is further supported by previous tactical questioning of IA soldiers suggesting EJK cells operating east of the Tigris River may be exerting a concerted effort to hide the bodies of murdered LNs. We continue to assess that AIF likely see a relation between the numbers of bodies found in a given area and how often CF patrol those neighborhoods and are hoping to conceal bodies found in order to reduce CF presence in areas where they wish to operate. EJK activity by JAM death squads will likely increase their reliance on MOI vehicles and uniforms to conduct kidnappings throughout western Rusafa in the predominantly Sunni neighborhoods. In response to Shia targeting, Sunni militias (neighborhood watches) are now established to scare off ISF. Sunni retaliatory attacks against Shia LNs in southeast Rusafa and on the base of the Karada peninsula may have been tempered by DUSTWUN operations. These attacks normally include VBIED and IED attacks directed at Shia LNs and ISF checkpoints.

JAM Influence. JAM influences every level of the ISF operating within Rusafa, especially through the NP. ISF consistently seem willing to search Sunni neighborhoods, while acting hesitant when asked to help search Shia homes. Reporting indicates JAM death squads routinely enter Rusafa from Sadr City to kidnap and intimidate Sunnis in order to convince them to relocate elsewhere. This is likely part of a larger plan to “cleanse” eastern Baghdad from Sadr City to the Tigris River in order to consolidate MAS power and influence.

KARKH

Sectarian Violence. Haifa Street remains an EJK focus area, where LNs indicate bodies from other areas where EJK incidents occur are being dumped. Northern Karkh is divided between the Sheik Ali and Rahmaniya neighborhoods. Most murders likely remain motivated by tit-for-tat killings between the two groups. This also affects EJK bodies found vicinity Haifa Street, a Sunni AIF support zone. While patrol frequency was tempered by DUSTWUN operations, CF patrols and ISF patrols presence will continue to draw attacks.
JAM Influence. JAM influence continues in northern Karkh, led by [redacted]. Indications of JAM influence over the ISF in Karkh persists and remains a dangerous area, particularly in the northern Karkh area for ISF operations. LNs in this area will target each other, FF, and ISF if the opportunity presents itself. Just during the last week, AIF engaged ISF patrolling along Haifa Street in sustained SAF during three separate instances. This indicates the level of discord felt by the residents of Haifa Street toward ISF and their willingness to engage them.

Way Ahead.
Over the last week, TF [redacted] CAV conducted five clearances of areas within both Karkh and Rusafa in order to disrupt AIF and EJK activities. [redacted] CAV is actively targeting both Sunni and Shia EJK cells through aggressive [redacted] efforts aimed at finding the targetable link in the EJK process. We assess the best means of targeting these cells is to locate their torture/interrogation locations and shut them down – to deny them sanctuary and to throw the death squads off balance. With more time, we expect refined targeting of the cells themselves and will search the AIF out within their homes.

COA BAYAA
Bayaa is a mixed Sun - Shia district in Southwest Baghdad with a dominant Sunni concentration just outside the eastern boundary along Route Ishri in Muhallah 804, and a Shia concentration in the northwest portion of the COA centered within Muhallah 881. Threat mosques within the neighborhood include the Sunni Fakhri Ibrahim Shanshal Mosque, Sunni Al Sammarae Mosque, Sunni Jihad Al Shakur Mosque and Sunni Ibrahim Shanshal Mosque. The Bayaa and Aamel neighborhoods remain ethnically contested with a Shia – Sunni fault line running through the center of the COA. Reporting indicates Sunni militias supported by foreign fighters and VBIED cells outside the Bayaa COA in the Yousefiya / Abu Ghraib districts conduct retaliatory attacks against Shia residents. The local Bayaa car market is assessed as a staging and financial support zone for both Sunni and Shia terrorist groups.

Sectarian Violence. Both Sunnis and Shia AIF continue to conduct EJK Killings in their opposite ethnic groups. Murders and executions had been decreasing in COA Bayaa by based on EJK TF reporting. However, recent reporting this week tempered reductions significantly. Hasty executions and drive by shooting murders are increasingly utilized in these events due to
CF presence. In addition to EJK incidents, VBIEDs along RTE Martin or along major intersections may target LNIs. Bayaa and Aamel neighborhoods are assessed as the most active Shia/Sunnin fault lines in Western Baghdad. Expect Sunnis to retaliate towards the end of the month, most likely in conjunction with the end of Ramadan. Sunnis will bring militia, FF's, and VBIED's from the Yousefiya/Abu Ghraib districts in order to conduct retaliatory attacks against JAM and NP. Expect Bayaa Car market will remain a staging area and financial support zone. Sunnis will have to counter JAM’s control of LOC into and out of Baghdad. Sunnis will continue to strengthen their areas in Abu Ghraib, Yousefiya, and Mahmudiyyah districts in order to keep their supply lines to Al Anbar province open. In addition to JAM dominant influence in the area, other Shia affiliated terrorist groups conduct operation vicinity COA Bayaa. Intelligence reports indicate the UMAR Brigade recently moved out of Bayaa and into Al Rafaq, but conduct IED operations within the COA. Long-term (90 day) EJK concentrations within the COA are primarily located within ethnically mixed sub districts in the center of COA Bayaa (Muhalllahs 805, 809, 813, 815, 811 and 877). Sectarian violence across the Bayaa Beladiyah continued to increase over the past 80 days with fourth highest number of incidents reported within Baghdad. However, EJK incidents decreased 28% within Bayaa COA since 172nd SBCT commenced operations. Indicates Shia led EJK cells directed by the office of JAM leader Shaykh Jasim planned to conduct kidnappings within COA Bayaa. However, JAM is assessed to have collapsed (EJK) attack zones, at least through Ramadan, in order to provide security within Shia dominated elements.

JAM Influence. JAM influence continues to grow in the Bayaa COA with NP and other ISF elements infiltrated by JAM. However, Reporting continues to indicate that National Police remain heavily infiltrated by JAM. Active JAM support zone exist around the Aamel OMS building. JAM has collapsed their attack zone in order to consolidate numbers in order to continue EJK against Sunnis while providing security for the primarily Shia dominated area. Muhalllahs 805 and 809 are assessed support zones for JAM EJK DA cells operating in COA Bayaa. Expect JAM to respond to increased CF presence and pressure with more destructive attack measures including increased use of EFP's.

COA MONSOUR

Monsour is mixed Sunni - Shia district in West Baghdad with a dominant Sunni concentration in the western portion of the COA and Shia Concentrations in the northeast and central portions of the COA. Threat mosques within the neighborhood include the Sunni Mujhareen Mosque.
Sunni Al Hamra Mosque and the Sunni Um Al Maark Mosque. The residents of the Mansour area have limited power. They receive about 2-5 hours a day but power continues to be an issue in the area and is adding to the scale of black market fuel. People are running personal generators to offset the loss of power and buying fuel on the black market because some fuel stations are either out of fuel or people are killed as they stand in line to buy the fuel. More than 50 percent of the Mansour water is not fit to drink, the richer neighborhoods where doctors and lawyers live have the water systems that work but it's the lower income neighborhoods that the water is not potable. Lower income neighborhoods have standing sewer in the streets. The whole of the Mansour district has a trash problem. There is very limited trash pick up because there are not enough trucks and workers to cover the whole city. Also when we try to use our engineer assets to clean up the trash the local populace will replace it because they use it to block the roads into their neighborhoods so they will not receive drive by shootings.

Sectarian Violence. Residents of the district are worried about security more than the status of essential services. Long-term (90 day) EJK concentrations within the Shia areas include Muhallahs 612, 616, 518 in the central southern portion of the neighborhood and 613, 615, 617, 619, 623 within Sunni areas in the northeastern portion of the neighborhood. EJK incidents continued to rise over the past 60 days within the Monsour Beladiyah with Eastern Monsour remaining the focus of reported incidents. Recently, EJK incidents have increased within COA Monsour. Distrust persists between residents and the IP/NP, likely due to the infiltration of JAM elements who conduct EJK activities. Residents also have limited faith in the IA.

JAM Influence. An established network of JAM affiliated terrorists exist in the Monsour district with an estimated 10-15 cells active in the area. Leadership of these cells is linked to ABU Muqtada through at least four company commanders in the area, with indications of links to ISF.

COA HURIYAH

Huriya s a mixed, but predominately Shia neighborhood with a mixed predominantly Sunni area in sub-districts located in the north, northwest portion of the COA encompassing portions of Muhallahs 422 and 430. The Shia have ethnically dominant control of most of the COA with elements of the Omar Brigade and JAM elements reportedly patrolling Route Rangers, which separates the northwest corner of Muhallah 432 where the Sunni terrorist groups have support zones including a Tawafuq group headquarters (Adnan Al-Dulaymi) at 1,4a and a secondary headquarters at 1,4a as well as support from the Nida.
Al Da'iah Mosque (Sunni) at 1.4a Multiple 1.4c Indicate JAM support is extensive in the northern corner of Muhallah 430. South or Route Rangers, Shia groups have support zones that include the 1.4a Home (JAM Leader) at 1.4a a possible Hasani Group office (Shia / Sadr Movement Allies) at a primary JAM HQ 1.4b at 1.4a secondary JAM HQ at SMB 1.4a and the Al Darka Mosque (which was taken from the Sunnis by JAM) at 1.4a

Sectarian Violence. Long term EJK TF reporting indicates Muhallah 430 is a historical body dumping area and EJK activity area. EJK activity continues within the COA, consisting primarily of body dumping and murders. IA/JP checkpoints that support AIF (JAM / Ji) along MSR's/ASRs provide early warning to members located within neighborhood. Both Sunnis and Shia AIF conduct EJK Killings in their opposite ethnic groups. In addition to EJK incidents, VBIEDs attacks along RTE Marlin and other major intersections targeting LNs have occurred in the past and are remain a threat. Influence from Shia who travel into COA Hurayah from Sadr City and Sunni groups from Adhamiyah or Ghaziliyah trying to spark tensions.

JAM Influence. JAM influence persists in COA Hurayah, with the area in the midst of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia for further dominant control. The conflict is organized and perpetrated by AIF organizations that further perpetuate sectarian violence. The conflict is exasperated by the lack of non-biased security forces currently dominated by JAM who have infiltrated ISF forces in the area and maintain a consistent presence and permissiveness through the security apparatus.

WAY AHEAD.
Focused SIGINT operations in support of the DUSTWUN have led to captures in the Karadah kidnapping cell as well as the ABU NUR VBIED network. The upcoming week the BOE will begin focused clearing operations in select neighborhoods and muhallas 28-31 OCT. LN tips to both CF and ISF in zone have been successful disrupting EJK activity, as well as patrols in zone. We will continue to patrol at night stopping all curfew violators and searching their vehicles. In Mansour, we will continue to target both AQI and JAM EJK. The unit will continue to engage local leaders and sheiks to stop the cycle of violence. 2-1 IN will capitalize on two success last week where they killed or captured two EJK cells. 2-1 IN is waiting on two PSYOP products to utilize in Mansour: "MOSQUES ARE NOT MILITIA SAFE HAVENS" – PRODUCT REQUEST TO DIVISION ON 17OCT06 (2-1N REQUESTED) and "PRIVATE SECURITY – PROMOTE 6TH IA" – PRODUCT REQUEST TO DIVISION ON 13OCT06 (2-1N REQUESTED). In COA Bayaa, 4-23 IN continues to work with the 1-5-2 NP and the 2nd NP DIV Security BN to secure the area. However, they heard at the end of this past week that the NP units will be replaced this coming week, causing the unit to reestablish partnerships as well as build the public trust in confidence in the new NP unit. 4-23 continues to work to get the
Sunnī and Shia leaders together with the ISF to discuss ways to reduce the violence. In COA Yorktown, 4-14 CAV continues to conduct minimal patrols in this area as they are focused on the DUSTWAN screen line on Karadah. Once they are relieved of the DUSTWAN requirement, they will begin focused clearing in Russafa and Karkh. They are still engaging the local leaders on Haifa street as well as patrolling to reduce the tribal violence. In COA Huriya, 1-17 IN will continue to capitalize on LN tips to both the ISF and the CF. They will execute the CONOP upon approval to detain on FOB JUSTICE.