Maintaining Momentum

Problem Statement: Determine the best method to maintain the momentum of Operation Together Forward – Phase II during transition

The overall classification of this briefing is SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI

Approved by: 4ID G2
Classified by: Multiple Sources
Reason: EO 12958 (as amended) 1.4(a), (e) and (d)
Declassify on: 20161025

26 October 2006
Concept of Operations

- Disrupt Anti-Iraqi Forces during MND-B Transfer of Authority in order to maintain momentum in reduction of attacks after Ramadan
- Reinforce combat power and increase tempo during transitions to keep the enemy off balance and mitigate risk for transitioning units
- Two courses of action
  - COA 1 - Units not involved with transition increase military operations
  - COA 2 - Aggressive combat operations during last part of TPE transfer and right seat ride
- Common to both courses of action
  - Stryker battalions and 1-26 IN provide continuity throughout – one per BCT in Baghdad City
  - Gain additional combat power from checkpoints adjustment 1 Nov 06
- No change to command relationships - Incoming units TACON until TOA
MND-B Transition - Maintaining Momentum

- Full Operation LJS Ride
- Maximum patrols in Crossover
- Must hot bed vehicles
- Last units out increase Opns
- Max gain five battalions (2-12 CAB, 3-87 CAB, 2-506 IN, 1-61 CAV, 8-10 CAV)

- Beginning of Left Side Ride
- Last Day of Full Employment

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Operational Impact

- Of the seven BCTs, four are in Baghdad City
- BCTs do not overlap in time and space
  - 2/101 BCT and 2/10 BCT have completed RIP/TOA in south
  - 2/1 ID is HQ and separate companies, currently in right seat ride and artillery battalion must RIP with 2-20 FA at Victory Base Camp
  - 2/4 BCT oversees three provinces in south and must position equipment for 4/1 CD in Baghdad
  - 1-14 CAB, 1-23 SBN, and 1-26 IN do not transition; Potential gain in Baghdad is only five maneuver battalions
  - 172$^{nd}$ must cease combat operations on 18 Nov 06 to conduct Stryker reset – 4/1 RDC not until 17 Nov 06
- Extension of 172$^{nd}$ SBCT never created a full TPE set for seventh BCT
- Alternate mitigation measures
  - Units not in transition surge – Increases tempo while minimizing risk during transitions; Changing set presents a different look to the enemy
  - Adjust inner checkpoints - generates up to 35 additional platoons of combat power
Transition Considerations

- Limited Conditions for transition
- Theater Provided Equipment.
  - 5 Day average for BCT to swap equipment
  - UAHs average 120 per Battalion
  - 1/1 CD, 2/1 CD and 4/1 CD deployed with ESAPI but without DAPS and ESB-I
  - 2/1 ID, 4/25 BCT, 2/2 BCT deployed without PPE
  - CREW Systems (1:2 ratio currently in Baghdad)
- Transportation
  - MB flights start before BCT/Bn TOAs to manage Theater and STRAT Lift
  - Strategic lift schedules tight in Nov-Dec 06
  - Theater Transportation assets can not handle an extended overlap
- Organizational Equipment Swap (4 ID - 1/1 CD, 2/1 CD, 4/1 CD)
  - 1 CD using 4 ID M1A2s, M2A3s, and other tracked vehicles
  - Extends back equipment handover - requires close management
- Building Situational Awareness
  - Engagements and reconnaissance required by incoming units
  - Leadership intensive with Councils, IA, NP, and IP
  - Joint Patrolling
Risk

- Unfamiliarity (terrain and task organization)
  - Rise in Escalation of Force Incidents as well as blue-on-blue/green
  - Trust issue between GOI/ISF and new unit
- More forces increases the potential for more targets
  - Increase in dismounted operations increase risk of sniper fire
- Increased Patrols with Same amount of KIT/CREW
  - Inability to increase CREW on hand significantly
  - No additional equipment (TPE, radios, crew served radios)
- Command and Control.
  - New unit operating jointly with veteran unit
  - Potential Unity of Command issues during cross over period --- joint operations
  - Different TACSOPs