USF-I Commander's Weekly Assessment

Mr. Secretary, Chairman, Jim:

Government leaders met on Monday and discussed a potential U.S. Forces (USF) presence after 2011. Although there was minimal progress due to the absence of KRG President Barzani and Ayad Allawi, the meeting provided the political blocs an opportunity to address the topic collectively. Finalizing government formation in accordance with the Irbil Agreement was not addressed. The leaders intend to hold a second meeting next week to continue discussions.

We remain focused on pursuing Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) cells responsible for conducting IRAM attacks against USF. In addition, we are assessing reports that these groups are preparing to conduct additional attacks in the near future. We are working aggressively to counter this threat and implementing enhanced force protection measures on U.S. installations.

The operational tempo of the ISF has increased over the past week. Iraqi forces in the North have conducted a number of successful independent counterterrorism (CT) operations and discovered multiple weapons caches. In Baghdad, the ISF is preparing for the arrival of approximately three million Shia pilgrims on 28 June. In the South, the ISF is conducting operations in Maysan Province aimed at disrupting the flow of lethal aid into Iraq.

The number of security incidents decreased slightly; however, the number of casualties increased due to multiple AQI signature attacks. On 21 June, a suicide operative detonated a vehicle-borne IED in the southern city of Diwaniyah, killing 21 and wounding 24. Two days later, IEDs exploded in a Shia marketplace in Baghdad, resulting in over 100 casualties.

Political

President Jalal Talabani convened a meeting of GOI political blocs on 20 June. President Barzani and Ayad Allawi did not attend. Discussions were cordial and centered on the future security relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki and others reportedly acknowledged the need for continued training and logistical and intelligence support. Although there were no major breakthroughs or discussion on government formation, the meeting was a positive step toward reestablishing communication between the blocs. President Talabani indicated he will schedule a follow-on meeting, perhaps as soon as next week when Allawi returns from abroad.

Repairing the relationship between Maliki and Allawi is key to finalizing government formation. The Ambassador and I conducted numerous engagements with GOI officials to discuss the matter. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari informed us that he has spoken to Allawi and advised him to tone down his public rhetoric regarding Maliki. He further encouraged him to “ease the situation” upon his return to Iraq.
Prime Minister Maliki reportedly asked Adnan al-Asadi to relinquish his position in the Council of Representatives to become his advisor on ministry of interior matters. Asadi is a member of Maliki’s SOL coalition. In this position, Asadi will function much like former Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir, who was recently handpicked by Maliki to act as a personal advisor on defense issues. The move will likely raise the ire of Maliki’s opponents, who may consider it a stall tactic to further delay the appointment of permanent ministers.

**Security**

During the reporting period, there were 152 security incidents, a decrease from the previous week and below the 12-week average of 165. The number of casualties was 319 (68 killed, 251 wounded), an increase from last week and well above the 12-week average of 206. Attacks targeting USF decreased from 36 to 32. No U.S. service members were killed or wounded in action. A USAID employee was killed in downtown Baghdad during a complex attack consisting of an IED followed by small arms fire.

In addition to the actions described above, we are taking a number of steps to counter the threat of additional attacks by Shia extremist groups (SEG). These steps include increasing partnered and unilateral counter-IDF patrols, establishing additional checkpoints and observation towers, and implementing heightened force protection measures on U.S. installations. To counter the increasing IED threat, we are employing...
change detection technology on airborne platforms and have recently engaged the
director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to
discuss current and future counter-IED capabilities. These capabilities include the first-
ever fielding of JIEDDO’s in September. We appreciate the
Department’s approval of funding for this which will enhance our
ability to protect our forces as we conduct our withdrawal.

Despite pressure from security operations, degraded financing, and reduced foreign
fighter flow, we assess AQI maintains the capability to conduct attacks across the
country. In the North, AQI continues to target the GOI and ISF and has recently
increased attacks intended to aggravate Arab-Kurd tensions. AQI continues to place
emphasis on its operations in Baghdad and has focused its resources on restoring the
network’s capability. This was demonstrated on 23 June, when two IEDs exploded in a
crowded market in a predominately Shia neighborhood, killing 17 and injuring 84. In the
South, attacks are rare due to AQI’s limited presence; however, the recent suicide
vehicle-borne IED attack at the governor’s residence in Diwaniyah demonstrated AQI’s
operational reach.

We have seen a recent increase in the operational tempo of the ISF. Security forces in
the northern province of Ninawa have aggressively pursued extremist groups, resulting in
the detention of a number of extremists as well as the discovery of multiple weapons
 caches. The operational tempo in the Baghdad area has also picked up. In addition to
participating in partnered counter-IDF patrols, the ISF is preparing for the upcoming
pilgrimage to commemorate the death of the 7th Imam. An estimated three million Shia
pilgrims will converge on the Khadamiyah Shrine in Baghdad, making them a potential
target for Sunni extremists.

In the South, the ISF commenced operations in Maysan Province to disrupt SEG activity
and stem the flow of lethal aid into Iraq. Although the operation may have a deterrent
effect, initial indications are that the ISF has pursued only low-level targets and
discovered no major weapons caches. We assess operations were scaled back due to
political concerns. In addition, we suspect lax operational security may have resulted in
plans being leaked, allowing high value targets to depart the area.

U.S. and Iraqi CT forces conducted 28 operations resulting in the detention of 36
extremists, including high level AQI operatives in Mosul, Kirkuk, Baqubah, and Bayji
who were involved in extortion and financing activities. Other AQI detainees include a
military commander in West Mosul and multiple operatives responsible for attacks
against the GOI, ISF, and USF. The ISF conducted a number of independent ISF
operations, resulting in the detention of a New Ba’ath Party leader linked to Jaysh Rijal
Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN), two members of AQI accused of facilitating the recent
attack on the Diyala Provincial Council building, and an AAH operative involved in
attacks against USF. On 23 June, joint CT forces detained a senior Promised Day
Brigade leader responsible for IDF and IED attacks against USF and ISF.
ISF Development

On 25 June, Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) personnel completed Rapiscan fixed system operator training at the Zurbatiyah Port of Entry. The Zurbatiyah Rapiscan system is the first of four fixed systems to be fielded to Iraqi ports of entry (POE). By 31 August 2012, nine Rapiscan fixed systems will be fielded to POE and oil refineries, providing them with the capability to rapidly inspect cargo trucks for accelerants and lethal aid. Two will be fielded at POE along the southern border with Iran during the next two months, enhancing the capability of the DBE to detect and interdict lethal aid.

On 23 June 2011, 420 students graduated from the 11-week regional guard brigade (RGB) basic combat training class at Sulaymaniyyah Infantry Training Center. Instruction was provided by the Ministry of Peshmerga; subjects ranged from physical training and drill and ceremonies to weapons training, first aid, and basic combat skills. An additional 800 RGB students are currently in training and scheduled to graduate in late August.

Transition

Under the terms of the 2008 Security Agreement, and at the request of the GOI, USF-I has maintained custody of 206 detainees at the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility in Baghdad. USF-I and the GOI will conduct the final transfer of these 206 detainees to Ministry of Justice (MOJ) custody by 13 July 2011. To prepare for the transfer, USF-I detention operations (DO) personnel conducted a detainee transfer rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill on 23 June. We will conduct a ROC drill with MOJ personnel next week to ensure they are prepared. In addition, USF-I DO personnel will continue to work with MOJ personnel to ensure Iraqi correctional officers are properly trained by the transfer date.

I appreciate CENTCOM assistance in obtaining Kuwait’s support of USF-I withdrawal activities as well as the consideration of our request for additional ISR that will be required to protect our forces as we draw down.

Respectfully,